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Introduction
One of the most important developments of the twentieth century has been the movement
of humanity into space with machines and people. The underpinnings of that movement--
why it took the shape it did; which individuals and organizations were involved; what factors
drove a particular choice of scientific objectives and technologies to be used; and the politi-
cal, economic, managerial, and international contexts in which the events of the space age
unfolded--are all important ingredients of this epoch transition from an Earthbound to a
spacefaring people. This desire to understand the development of spaceflight in the United
States sparked this documentary history.
The extension of human activity into outer space has been accompanied by a high degree
of self-awareness of its historical significance. Few large-scale activities have been as exten-
sively chronicled so closely to the time they actually occurred. Many of those who were
directly involved were quite conscious that they were making history, and they kept full
records of their activities. Because most of the activity in outer space was carried out under
government sponsorship, it was accompanied by the documentary record required of pub-
lic institutions, and there has been a spate of official and privately written histories of most
major aspects of space achievement to date. When top leaders considered what course of
action to pursue in space, their deliberations and decisions often were carefully put on the
record. There is, accordingly, no lack of material for those who aspire to understand the
origins and early evolution of U.S. space policies and programs.
This reality forms the rationale for this compilation. Precisely because there is so much
historical material available on space matters, the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration (NASA) decided in 1988 that it would be extremely useful to have easily available
to scholars and the interested public a selective collection of many of the seminal
documents related to the evolution of the U.S. civilian space program up to that time.
While recognizing that much space activity has taken place under the sponsorship of the
Department of Defense and other national security organizations, the U.S. private sector,
and in other countries around the world, NASA felt that there would be lasting value in a
collection of documentary material primarily focused on the evolution of the U.S.
government's civilian space program, most of which has been carried out since 1958 under
the agency's auspices. As a result, the NASA History Office contracted with the Space Policy
Institute of George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs to pre-
pare such a collection, with a 1988 cutoff date for documents to be included. This volume
and two additional ones detailing programmatic developments and relations with other
organizations that _ill follow are the result.
The documents collected in this research project were assembled from a diverse number of
both public and private sources. A major repository of primary source materials relative to
the history of the civil space program is the NASA Historical Reference Collection of the
NASA History Office located at the agency's Washington headquarters. Project assistants
combed this collection for the "cream" of the wealth of material housed there. Indeed, one
purpose of this work from the start was to capture some of the highlights of the holdings at
headquarters. Historical materials housed at the other NASA installations, and at institu-
tions of higher learning such as Rice University, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and Vir-
ginia Polytechnic University, were also mined for their most significant materials. Other
collections from which documents have been drawn include the Eisenhower, Kennedy,
Johnson, and Carter Presidential Libraries; the papers of T. Keith Glennan, Thomas O.
Paine, James C. Fletcher, George M. Low, and John A. Simpson; and the archives of the
National Academy of Sciences, the Rand Corporation, AT&T, the Communications Satel-
lite Corporation, INTELSAT, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the California Institute of
Technology, and the National Archives and Records Administration.
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Copies of more than 2,000 documents in their original form collected during this project
(not just the documents selected for inclusion), as well as a data base that provides a guide
to their contents, have been deposited in the NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Another complete set of project materials is located at the Space Policy Institute at George
Washington University. These materials in their original forms are available for use by
researchers seeking additional information about the evolution of the U.S. civil space
program.
The documents selected for inclusion in this volume are presented in four major sections,
each covering a particular aspect of the evolution of U.S, space policies and programs.
Those sections address: the antecedents to the U.S. space program; the origins of U.S.
space policy in the Eisenhower era; the evolution of U.S. space policies and plans; and the
organization of the civilian space effort. A second volume of this work will contain docu-
ments arranged in four sections addressing specific relations with other organizations: the
NASA/industry/university nexus; civil-military space cooperation; international space
cooperation; and NASA, commercialization in space, and communications satellites. A third
volume will describe programmatic developments: human spaceflight; space science; Earth
observation programs; and space transportation.
Each major section in this volume and the two to follow is introduced by an overview essay,
prepared either by a member of the project team or by an individual particularly
well-qualified to write on the topic. In the main, these essays are intended to introduce and
complement the documents in the section and to place them in a chronological and
substantive context. In certain instances the essays go beyond this basic goal to reinterpret
specific aspects of the history of the civil space program and to offer historiographical
commentary or inquiry about the space program. Each essay contains references to the
documents in the section it introduces, and many also contain references to documents in
other sections of the collection. These introductory essays were the responsibility of their
individual authors, and the views and conclusions contained therein do not necessarily
represent the opinions of either George Washington University or NASA.
The documents appended to each chapter were chosen by the essay writer in concert with
the editorial team from the more than 2,000 assembled by the research staff for the overall
project. The contents of this volume emphasize primary documents or long-out-of-print
essays or articles and material from the private recollections of important actors in shaping
space affairs. The contents of this volume thus do not comprise in themselves a comprehen-
sive historical account; they must be supplemented by other sources, those both already
available and to become available in the future. Indeed, a few of the documents included in
this collection are not complete; some portions of them are still subject to security classifi-
cation. As this collection was being prepared, the U.S. government was involved in declassi-
fying and releasing to the public a number of formerly highly classified documents from
the period before 1963. As this declassification process continues, increasingly more infor-
mation on the early history of NASA and the civil space program will come to light.
The documents included in each section are for the most part arranged chronologically,
and each document is assigned its own number in terms of the section in which it is placed.
As a result, the first document in the third section of the collection is designated "Docu-
ment III-l." Each document is accompanied by a headnote setting out its context and
providing a background narrative. These headnotes also provide specific information about
people and events discussed, as well as bibliographical information about the documents
themselves. We have avoided the inclusion of explanatory notes in the documents them-
selves and have confined such material to the headnotes. The editorial method we adopted
for dealing with these documents seeks to preserve spelling, grammar, paragraphing, and
use of language as in the original. We have sometimes changed punctuation where it
enhances readability. We have used ellipses to note sections of a document not included in
this publication, and we have avoided including words and phrases that ha_' been deleted
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intheoriginaldocumentunlesstheycontributetoanunderstandingofwhatwasgoingon
in themindofthewriterinmakingtherecord.Marginalnotationsontheoriginaldocu-
mentsareinsertedintothetextof thedocumentsinbrackets,eachclearlymarkedasa
marginalcomment.Whendeletionsto theoriginaldocumenthavebeenmadein the
processofdeclassification,wehavenotedthiswithaparentheticalstatementi brackets.
Exceptinsofarasillustrationsandfiguresarenecessarytounderstandingthetext,those
itemshavebeenomittedfromthisprintedversion.Copiesofalldocumentsin theirorigi-
nalform,however,areavailableforresearchbyanyinterestedpersonattheNASAHistory
Officeor theSpacePolicyInstituteofGeorgeWashingtonU iversity.
Werecognizethattherearecertainto bequitesignificantdocumentsleftoutof this
compilation.Notwoindividualswouldtotallyagreeonalldocumentstobeincludedfrom
themorethan2,000thatwecollected,andsurelywehavenotbeentotallysuccessfulin
locatingallrelevantrecords.Asaresult,hisdocumentaryhistorycanraiseanimmediate
questionfromitsusers:whyweresomedocumentsincludedwhileothersofseeminglyequal
importancewereomitted?Therecanneverbeafullysatisfactoryanswertothisquestion.
Ourowncriteriaforchoosingparticulardocumentsandomittingothersrestedonthreeinterrelatedfactors:
o:oIsthedocumentthebestavailable,mostexpressive,mostrepresentativereflectionofa
particulareventordevelopmentimportanttotheevolutionofthespaceprogram?
Isthedocumentoteasilyaccessibleexceptinoneorafewlocations,orisit included(forexample,inpublishedcompilationsofpresidentialstatements)inreferencesources
thatarewidelyavailableandthusnotacandidateforinclusionin thiscollection?
o:oIsthedocumentprotectedbycopyright,securityclassification,rsomeotherformof
proprietaryrightandthusunavailableforpublication?
Ultimately,asprojectdirectorIwasresponsibleforthedecisionsaboutwhichdocumentsto
includeandfor theaccuracyof theheadnotesaccompanyingthem.It hasbeenan
occasionallyfrustratingbutconsistentlyexcitingexperiencetobeinvolvedwiththisunder-
taking;I andmyassociateshopethatthosewhoconsulti in thefuturefindourefforts
worthwhile.
JohnM.LogsdonDirector
SpacePolicyInstituteElliottSchoolofInternationalAffairs
GeorgeWashingtonU iversity
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Chapter One
Prelude to the Space Age
by Roger D. Launius
Curiosity about the universe and other worlds has been one of the few constants in
the history of humankind. Prior to the twentieth century, however, there was little oppor-
tunity to explore the universe except in fiction and through astronomical observations.
These early explorations led to the compilation of a body of knowledge that inspired and
in some respects informed the efforts of a body of scientists and engineers who began to
think about applying rocket technology to the challenge of spaceflight in the early part of
the twentieth century. These individuals were essentially the first spaceflight pioneers, trans-
lating centuries of dreams into a reality that matched in some measure the expectations of
the public that watched and the governments that supported their efforts. During the
period between 1926--when Robert H. Goddard launched his first rocket--and 1957-
when the first orbital spacecraft was launched--a dedicated group of spaceflight enthusi-
asts, scientists, and engineers worked hard to inaugurate the space age.
Early Explorations of the Observable Universe
From ancient times civilizations around the globe have erected great observatories
to chart the paths of the Sun, Moon, planets, and stars. Much of this observation became
a central part of religion, science, and philosophy, and as a result has informed modern
thinking on these subjects. The prehistoric people who built Stonehenge in England ap-
parently used their observations of celestial bodies to chart planting seasons and measme
other events, assigning this study a religious significance as well. Astronomers in Babylon
about 700 B.C. charted the paths of planets and compiled observations of fixed stars. Later,
around 400 B.C., the Babylonians devised the zodiac, the first such mechanism to divide
the year into lunar periods and to assign significance to a person's date of birth in foretell-
ing the future. In what became the Americas, the ancient Incan and Aztec cultures built
astronomical observatories. North American Indians also observed the supernova of 1054
which created the Crab Nebula--not seen in Europe)
By 150 A.D. the great mathematician, geographer, and astronomer Ptolemy of Alex-
andria had systematized a large amount of ancient information, and in some cases misin-
formation, about the universe. Ptolemy based his understanding on classical conceptions
of the universe inherited from the Greeks. His great synthesis, Megiste Syntaxis, sometimes
called the Almagest, argued that the Earth was at the center of the universe, and that the
Sun, stars, and planets were embedded as jewels in a setting of spheres circling around it.
[I-1 ] The Roman Cicero summarized the Ptolemaic belief this way:
The Universe consists of nine circles, or rather of nine moving globes. The outersphere is that of
the heavens, which embraces all the others and under which the stars are fixed. Underneath this, seven
globes rotate in the opposite direction from that of the heavens. The first circle carries the star known to
1. E.C. Krup, Echoes of the Ancient Skies: The Astronomy of Lost C_vilizations (New York: Harper and Row,
1983), pp. 27-29; Edward R. Harrison, Cosmology: The Science of the Universe (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1981), pp. 10-23, 73; Eugene M. Emme, A History of SpaceFlight (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
1965), pp. 12-16; Ray A. Williamson, Living the Sky: The Cosmosof the American Indian (Norman: Universit?_ of
Oklahoma Press, 1984); Anthony F. Aveni, Skywatchers of Ancient Mexico (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980).
2 PRELUDETOTHE SPACE AGE
men as Saturn; the second carries Jupiter, benevolent and propitious to humanity; then comes Mars,
gleaming red and hateful; below this, occupying the middle region, shines the Sun, the chief prince
and regulator of the other celestial bodies, and the soul of the world which is illuminated and filled by
the light of its immense globe. After it, like two companions, come Venus and Mercury. Finally, the
lowest orb is occupied by the Moon, which borrows its light from the Sun. Below this last celestial circle
there is nothing by what is mortal and perishable except for the minds granted by the gods to the human
race, Above the Moon, all things are eternal. Our Earth, placed at the center of the world, and remote
from the heavens on all sides, stays motionless and all heavy bodies are impelled towards it by their
own weight. The motion of the spheres creates a harmony formed out of their unequal but well-propor-
tioned intervals, combining various bass and treble notes into a melodious concert. _
Ptolemy's position accepted the geometric and static harmony of the universe and
placed humanity squarely at its center, a view not inconsistent with Christian religious
ideals about humanity's special relationship with God.
While this world view was modified to some degree during the following centuries, it
was not until the sixteenth century that it began to change appreciably. The Polish as-
tronomer-mathematician Nicolaus Copernicus saw that the irregular flight of some plan-
ets could not be explained using the Ptolemaic construct of the universe, so he placed the
Earth in orbit around the Sun. [I-2] He was, however, circumspect in his public statements
about this finding. Others followed his observation to its logical conclusion, most impor-
tantly Galileo Galilei, who used the newly invented telescope to show that the Earth and
the planets revolved around the Sun in a dynamic and ever-changing universe. He also
learned that the Moon revolved around the Earth and that other planets had satellites as
well? "On the seventh day of January in the present year, 1610," Galileo wrote in Sidereus
Nuncius (Sidereal Messenger),
when I was viewing the constellations of the heavens through a telescope, the planet Jupiter
presented itself to my view, and as I had prepared for myself a very excellent instrument, I noticed a
circumstance which I had never been able to notice before, namely that three little stars, small but very
bright, were very near the planet.
He concluded "unhesitatingly, that there are three stars in the heavens moving about
Jupiter, as Venus and Mercury around the Sun. '_ Additionally, Galileo's observations of
sunspots also led to a view of a dynamic, ever-changing universe.
In 1616 Galileo was brought before the Inquisition in Rome and his ideas were de-
clared heretical because they challenged more than 1,000 years of Christian tradition about
humans being at the center of the universe. He received no punishment by agreeing not
to teach these ideas, but in 1632 Galileo was brought to trial again for violating his previ-
ous compact and was forced into retirement at his home in Florence. He was also com-
pelled to recant his belief that the Earth revolves around the Sun. His legendary response
was reported only later, "Epur si muove" ('Net it does move")?
Disregarding the narrow position of the church, others took up the cause after Galileo.
An Englishman, Isaac Newton, was one of the most important. He formulated the three
laws of motion that have been central to the development of space traveling vehicles, and
placed both astronomy and physics on a firm scientific foundation. He established physi-
cal laws governing all matter that could be both mathematically proven and scientifically
2. Quoted in Wernher yon Braun and Frederick I. Ordway III, History of Rocketry and Space Travel (New
York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1975 ed.), p. 9.
3. On this astronomical revolution see Clive Morphet, Galileo and Copernican Astronomy: A Scientific World
View Defined (London: Butterworths, 1977); Thomas S. Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in
theDevelopment of Western Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); David C. Knight, Copernicus:
Titan of Modern Astronomy (New York: Franklin Watts, 1965).
4. StiUman Drake, ed. and trans., Discoveries and Opinions o/Galileo (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co.,
1957), pp. 31-$4.
5. Lloyd Mot.z and Jefferson Hane Weaver, The Story of Physics (New York: Avon Books, 1989), pp. 37-38.
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observed. Newton's observations on motion suggested that the universe was in constant
flux and that motion in a predictable pattern was the natural condition. Universal gravita-
tion, Newton argued, accounted for the physical actions of celestial bodies. In particular,
he demonstrated that the attraction of the Sun to a planet was directly proportional to the
product of the two masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance separat-
ing them. Newton's ideas, so critical to the development of spaceflight, became the estab-
lished method of explaining the universe during his lifetime and remained so until the
twentieth century. During this period the history of astronomy and physics was mainly a
story of working out a Newtonian "system of the world. ''6
The Dream of Spaceflight
Not until the twentieth century did technology develop to the extent that actual
travel into the observable universe could take place, although many people had posited
that it was theoretically possible and longed for the time when humanity could venture
beyond Earth. When Galileo first broadcast his findings about the solar system in 1610, he
sparked a flood of speculation about lunar flight. Johann Kepler, himself a pathbreaking
astronomer, posthumously published a novel, Somnium (Dream) (1634), that recounted a
dream of a supernatural voyage to the Moon in which the visitors encountered serpentine
creatures. He also included much scientific information in the book, speculating on the
difficulties of overcoming the Earth's gravitational field, the nature of the elliptical paths
of planets, the problems of maintaining life in the vacuum of space, and the geographical
features of the Moon. 7
Other writings sparked by the invention of the telescope and the success of Somnium
also described fictional trips into space. Cyrano de Bergerac, for example, wrote Voyage
dans la Lune (The Voyage to the Moon) (1649), describing several attempts by the hero to
travel to the Moon. First, he tied a string of bottles filled with dew around himself, so that
when the heat of the Sun evaporated the dew he would be drawn upward, but the hero
only made it as far as Canada on that attempt. Next, he tried to launch a vehicle from the
top of a mountain by means of a spring-loaded catapult, "but because I had not taken my
measures aright, I fell with a slosh on the Valley below." Returning to his vehicle, C}aano's
hero found some soldiers mischievously tying firecrackers to it. As they lit the fuse, he
jumped into the craft and tier upon tier of explosives ignited like rockets and launched
him to the Moon. Thus Cyrano's hero became the first flyer in fiction to reach the Moon
by means of rocket thrust, a premonition of Newton's third law of gravity about every
action having an equal and opposite reaction. Once on the Moon, the character in this
novel had several adventures, and later in the book he also journeyed to the Sun. 8
Other writers picked up the science fiction format and used it to discuss the possibili-
ties of space travel in the years that followed. For example, Edward Everett Hate, a New
England writer and social critic, published in 1869 a short story in the Atlantic Monthly
entitled "I'he Brick Moon." [I-3] The first known proposal for an orbital satellite around
the Earth, Hale described how a satellite in polar orbit could be used as a navigational aid
to ocean-going vessels. "For you see that if, by good luck," he explained,
there were a ring like Saturn's which stretched around the world, above Greenwich and the
meridian of Greenwich .... anyone who wanted to measure his longitude or distance from Greenwich
would look out of his window and see how high this ring was above his horizon... So if we only had a
6. Ibid., pp. 43-88; Harrison, Cosmology,pp. 103-203.
7. Edward Rosen, trans., Kep/er's Somnium: The Dream or Posthumous Work on Lunar Astronomy (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), pp. 17-122; Steven J. Dick. Plurality of Worlds: The Origins of the Extraterres-
trial Lzfe Debatefrom Democritus to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 77-84.
8. Von Braun and Ordway, History of Rocketry and Space Travel p. 12; Emme, History of SpaceFhght, pp. 37-38.
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ring like that.., vertical to the plane of the equatog, as the brass ring of an art_cial globe goes, only far
higher in proportion.., we could calculate the longitude. _
When the heroes of the story substitute a brick moon for this ring--brick because it
could withstand fire--it is to be hurled into orbit 5,000 miles above the Earth. An accident
sends the brick moon off prematurely, however, while 37 construction workers and other
people were aboard it. In contrast to what is now known about the vacuum of space, these
people lived on the outer part of the brick moon, raised food, and enjoyed an almost
utopian existence.
Perhaps the most important development in the literary consideration of space travel
came following the publication of work by Italian astronomer Giovanni Schiaparelli in
1877 concerning the possibility of canals on Mars. He, and especially others, concluded
that the features that he saw on Mars and called canals were the work of intelligent life.
This was a startling observation because it meant that science had now validated the specu-
lations of some fiction writers, lending credibility to their claims. Moreover, other scien-
fists sought to explore these ideas, and in the United States Percival Lowell built what
became the Lowell Observatory near Flagstaff, Arizona, to study the planets. In 1906 he
published Mars and Its Canals, which argued that Mars had once been a watery planet and
that the topographical features known as canals had been built by intelligent beings, [I-4]
Over the course of the next forty years, a steady stream of other works was based upon
Lowell's theories about the red planet. '°
While many of these writings were not scientifically valid, that became less true as
time passed and more modern science fiction writers such as Jules Verne and H.G. Wells
appeared. Both were well aware of the scientific underpinnings of spaceflight, and their
speculations reflected reasonably well what was known at the time about its problems and
the nature of other worlds. Both Wells and Verne incorporated into their novels a much
more sophisticated understanding of the realities of space than had been seen before.
Their space vehicles became enclosed capsules powered by electricity, and they possessed
some aerodynamic soundness. Most of Wells' and Verne's concepts stood up under some,
although not all, scientific scrutiny. For example, in 1865 Verne published De la Terre (l la
Lune (From theEarth to the Moon). The scientific principles informing this book were very
accurate for the period. It described the problems of building a vehicle and launch mecha-
nism to visit the Moon. At the end of the book, Verne's characters were shot into space by
a 900-foot-long cannon. Verne picked up the story in a second novel, Autour de la Lune
(Around the Moon), describing a lunar orbital flight, but he did not allow his characters
actually to land. Wells published War of the Worlds in 1897 and The First Men in the Moon
immediately thereafter. Both used sound scientific principles to describe space travel and
encounters with aliens, n
War of the Worlds, furthermore, played upon a theme in space exploration that had
been present for many centuries and would continue to appear throughout the twentieth
century, humanity's fascination and terror about contact with alien species. Excitement
9. Edward E. Hale, _l'he Brick Moon," The Atlantic Monthly, October 1869, pp. 451-460; November 1869,
pp. 603-611; December 1869, pp. 679-688.
10. Edward C. Ezell and Linda Neumann Ezell, On Mars: Exploration of the Red Planet, 1958-1978 (Wash-
ington, DC: NASA SP-4212, 1984), pp. 3-5; William Graves Hoyt, LoweUand Mars (Tucson: University of Arizona
Press, 1976) ; Frederick I. Ordway III, "The Legacy of Schiaparelli and Lowell,"Journal of the British Interplanetary
S0c/ety,January 1986, pp. 18-22.
11. General studies of science fiction can be found in Brian Ash, ed., The Visual Encyclopedia of Science
Fiction (New York: Harmony Books, 1977); James Gunn. Alternate WorMs: The Illustrated History of ScienceFzctwn
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1975); Ed Naha, The ScienceFictionary (New York: Wideview Books, 1980);
Franz Rottensteiner, The ScienceFiction Book: An Illustrated History (New York: Seabury Press, 1975);Jean-Claude
Suares, Richard Siegel, and David Owen, Fantastic Planets (Danbury, CT: Addison House, 1979);Jules Verne, De
la Terrecila Lune (Paris:J. Hetzel. 1866) ; H.G. Wells, TheFirst Men in the Moon (London: George Newness. 1901 );
H.G. Wells, The Shape of Things to Come (London: Hutchinson, 1933); H.G. Wells, The Ultimate Revolution (New
York: Macmillan, 1933); H.G. Wells, The War of the Worlds(London: William Heinemann, 1898).
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abouttheprospectthathumanityisnotalonein theuniverse,thatcontactispossible,and
thatbothculturesmightbemadericherthroughinteractionhasbeenapersistenttheme
foradvocatesoftheexplorationofspace.Somesciencefictionpositivelyexpressedthis
imageof contactwithaliens--asexamples,threenovelsbyC.S.Lewis,Out of the Sile_t
Planet (1938), Perelandra (1943), and That Hideous Strength (1945). At the same time, there
has long been a fear that an alien ci_41ization might attack Earth and either enslave or
destroy humanity. In War of the Worlds the Earth was attacked by invaders from Mars, and
eventually only defeated by terrestrial bacteria harmless to humans but deadly to an alien
without generations of built-up immunity. These stories, both positive and negative ex-
amples of contact, provided some of the inspiration for many scientists and engineers who
developed modern rocketry) =
The Technology of Rockets
Until the twentieth century, study about the universe and speculation about tile na-
ture of spaceflight were not closely related to the technical developments that led to rocket
propulsion. A merging of these ideas had to take place before the space age could truly
begin. The rocket is a reaction device, based on Newton's Third Law of Motion. Without
explicitly understanding that law, humanity had known of the rocket's practicality for
centuries. Although it is unclear who first invented rockets, many investigators link the
development of the first crude rockets with the discovery of gunpowder. The Chinese,
moreover, had been using gunpowder for more than 2,000 years. The first firecrackers
appeared during the first two centuries after the beginning of the common era, and the
Chinese were using rockets in warfare at least by the time of Genghis Khan (ca. 1155-
1227)." Not long thereafter the use of rockets in warfare began to spread to the West, and
they were in use by the time of the German Albert Magnus, who gave a recipe for making
gunpowder and wrapping it "in a skin of paper for flying or for making thunder" in De
MirabilibusMundi (On the Wonders of the World). By the time of Konrad Kyser von Eichstadt,
who wrote Bellfortis in 1405, the use of rockets in military operations was reasonably well
known in Europe. '_
The application of gunpowder rockets was refined through the first part of the nine-
teenth century. Essentially, the military role of rocketry was as a type of artillery. Sir Will-
iam Congreve carried rocket technology just about as far as it was to go for another
century, developing incendiary barrage missiles for the British military that could be fired
from either land or sea. They were used with effect against the United States in the War of
1812; it was probably Congreve's weapons that Francis Scott Key wrote about in the "Star
Spangled Banner"while imprisoned on a British warship during the bombardment of Fort
McHenry at Baltimore. The military use of the rocket was soon outmoded in the nine-
teenth century by developments in artillery which became more accurate and more de-
structive, but new uses for rockets were found in other industries such as whaling and for
seagoing shipping where rocket-powered harpoons and rescue lines began to be employed. _
12. On the issue of contact of two cultures in space see, M.Jane Young, "'Pity the Indians of Outer Space':
Native American Views of the Space Program," WesternFolklore 46 (October 1987) : 269-79; Patricia Nelson Lim-
erick, "The Final Frontier?," Wilson Quarterly 14 (Summer 1990): 82-83; Ray A. Williamson, "Outer Space as
Frontier: Lessons for Today," Western Folklore46 (October 1987): 255-67.
13. Frank H. Winter, "The Genesis of the Rocket in China and its Spread to the East and West," pp. 3-23:
Fang-Toh Sun, "Rockets and Rocket Propulsion Devices in Ancient Cbina," pp. 25-40, both in A. Ingemar Skoog,
ed., History of Rocketry and Astronautics: Proceedings of the Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth History Symposia _[ the
InternationalAcademy of Astronautics (San Diego: Univelt, Inc., 1990).
14. Von Braun and Ordway, H:story of Rocketry and .SpaceTravel. p. 28.
15. Frank H. Winter, The First Golden Age of Rocketry: Congreoe and Hal* Ro,:kets of the Nineteenth Centu_7
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1990).
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Progenitors of the Space Age
While the technology of rocketry was moving forward on other fronts, some indi-
viduals began to see its use for space travel. There were three great pioneering figures in
this category. Collectively, they were the progenitors of the modern space age. The earliest
was the Russian theoretician Konstandn Eduardovich Tsiolkovskiy. An obscure schoolteacher
in a remote part of Tsarist Russia in 1898, he submitted for publication to the Russian
journal, Nauchnoye Obozreniye (Science Review), a work based upon years of calculations that
laid out many of the principles of modern spaceflight. His article was not published until
1903, but it opened the door to future writings on the subject. In it Tsiolkovskiy described
in depth the use of rockets for launching orbital space ships. [I-5] Tsiolkovskiy continued
to theorize on the subject of spaceflight until his death, describing in great detail both
methods of flight and the technical requirements of space stations. Significantly, he never
had the resources--nor perhaps the inclination--to experiment with rockets himself. His
theoretical work, however, influenced later rocketeers both in his native land and abroad,
and served as the foundation of the Soviet space program. TM
A second rocketry pioneer was Hermann Oberth, by birth a Transylvanian but by
nationality a German. Oberth began studying the nature of spaceflight about the time of
World War I and published his classic study, Die Rakete zu den Planetenraumen (Rockets in
Planetary Space) in 1923. [I-6] It was a thorough discussion of almost every phase of rocket
travel. He posited that a rocket could travel in the void of space and that it could move
faster than the velocity of its own exhaust gases. He noted that with the proper velocity a
rocket could launch a payload into orbit around the Earth, and to accomplish this goal he
reviewed several propellant mixtures to increase speed. He also designed a rocket that he
believed had the capability to reach the upper atmosphere by using a combination of
alcohol and hydrogen as fuel. Oberth followed this up with a long series of publications on
rocketry and the prospects of space travel. He became the father of German rocketryY 7
Among his proteges was Wernher von Braun, the senior member of the rocket team that
built NASA's Saturn launch vehicle for the trip to the Moon in the 1960sY 8
Finally, the American Robert H. Goddard pioneered the use of rockets for space-
flighty 9 Motivated by reading science fiction as a boy, Goddard became excited by the
possibility of exploring space. In 1901 he wrote a short paper, "I'he Navigation of Space,"
that argued that movement could take place by firing several cannons, "arranged like a
'nest' of beakers." He tried unsuccessfully to publish this article in Popular Science News? 9At
his high school oration in 1904 he summarized his future life's work: "It is difficult to say
what is impossible, for the dream of yesterday is the hope of today and the reality of tomor-
row. "_l In 1907 he wrote another paper on the possibility of using radioactive materials to
propel a rocket through interplanetary space. He sent this article to several magazines,
and all rejected it. n Still not dissuaded, as a young physics graduate student he worked on
16. Konstantin E. Tsiolkovskiy, Aerodynamzcs (Washington, DC: NASA TT F-236, 1965); Konstantin E.
Tsiolkovskiy, Reactive Flying Machines (Washington, DC: NASA Tr F-237, 1965); Konstantin E. Tsiolkovskiy, Works
on Rocket Technology (Washington, DC: NASA TT F-243, 1965); Arkady Kosmodemyansky, Konstantin Tsiolkovskzy
(Moscow: Nauka, 1985).
17. Hermann Oberth, Ways to Spaceflight (Washington, D.C.: NASA, Tr F-622, 1972); Hermann Oberth,
Rockets into Planetary Space (Washington, DC: NASA TT F-9227, 1972); H.B. Waiters, Hermann Oberth: Father of
Space Travel (New York: Macmillan, 1962).
18. Interestingly, in 1969 Oberth attended the launch in the United States of Apollo 11 at the request of
yon Braun, who was then directing a major component of the lunar project.
19. The standard biography of Goddard is Milton Lehman, This High Man (New York: Farrar, Straus,
1963), although it is outdated and deserving of replacement.
20. Robert H. Goddard, "Material for an Autobiography," in Esther C. Goddard, ed., and G. Edward
Pendray, assoc, ed., The Papers of Robert H. Goddard (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1970), l:10.
21. Robert H. Goddard, "Of Taking Things for Granted," in ibid., 1:63-66.
22. Robert H. Goddard, "On the Possibility of Navigating Interplanetary Space," in ibid., pp. 81-87; Scien-
tificAmerieanto R.H. Goddard, October 9, 1907, in ibid., p. 87; William W. Payne to R.H. Goddard,January 15,
1908, in ib/d., p. 88.
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rocketpropulsionandactuallyreceivedtwopatentsin1914.Onewasthefirstforarocket
usingsolidandliquidfuelandtheotherforamuhi-stagerocket2'
AfterastintwiththemilitaryinWorldWarI,whereheworkedonsolidrockettech-
nologyforuseincombat,GoddardbecameaprofessorfphysicsatClarkCollegeinWorces-
ter,Massachusetts.Thereheturnedhisattentiontoliquidrocketpropulsion,theorizing
thatliquidoxygenandliquidhydrogenwerethebestfuels,butlearningthatoxygenand
gasolinewerelessvolatileandthereforemorepractical.Tosupporthisinvestigations,
GoddardappliedtotheSmithsonianInstitutionforassistancein1916andreceiveda$5,000
grantfromitsHodgkinsFund24HisresearchwasultimatelypublishedbytheSmithsonian
astheclassicstudy,A Method of Reaching Extreme Altitudes, in t919. [I-7] In it Goddard
argued from a firm theoretical base that rockets could be used to explore the upper attno-
sphere. Moreover, he suggested that with a velocity of 6.95 miles/second, without air resis-
tance, an object could escape Earth's gravity and head into infinity, or to other celestial
bodies. _' This became known as the Earth's "escape velocity."
It also became the great joke for those who believed spaceflight either impossible or
impractical. Some ridiculed Goddard's ideas in the popular press, much to the consterna-
tion of the already shy Goddard. Soon after the appearance of his publication, he com-
mented that he had been "interviewed a number of times, and on each occasion have
been as uncommunicative as possible. ''26 The New York Times was especially harsh in its
criticisms, referring to him as a dreamer whose ideas had no scientific validity. It also con>
pared his theories to those advanced by novelist Jules Verne, indicating that such musing is
"pardonable enough in him as a romancer, but its like is not so easily explained when
made by a savant who isn't writing a novel of adventure." [I-8] The Times questioned both
Goddard's credentials as a scientist and the Smithsonian's rationale for funding his re-
search and publishing his results. 27
The negative press Goddard received prompted him to be even more secretive and
reclusive. It did not, however, stop his work, and he eventually registered 214 patents on
various components of rockets. He concentrated on the design of a liquid-fueled rocket,
the first such development, and the attendant fuel pumps, motors, and control compo-
nents. On March 16, 1926 near Auburn, Massachusetts, Goddard launched his first rocket,
a liquid oxygen and gasoline vehicle that rose 184 feet in 2.5 seconds2" This event her-
aided the modern age of rocketry. He continued to experiment with rockets and fuels for
the next several years. A spectacular launch took place on July 17, 1929, when he flew the
first instrumented payload--an aneroid barometer, a thermometer, and a camera--to
record the readings. The launch failed; after rising about 90 feet the rocket turned and
struck the ground 171 feet away. It caused such a fire that neighbors complained to the
state fire marshal and Goddard was enjoined from making further tests in Massachusetts. _
This experience, as well as his personal shyness, led him to seek a more remote set-
ting to conduct his experiments. His ability to shroud his research in mystery was greatly
enhanced by Charles A. Lindbergh, fresh from his trans-Atlantic solo flight, who helped
Goddard obtain a series of grants from the Guggenheim Fund fostering aeronautical ac-
tivities. This enabled him to obtain a large tract of desolate land near Roswell, New Mexico,
23. Robert H. Goddard, "Material for an Autobiography." in ibid., 1:19-20; RH. Goddard to Josephus
Daniels, July 25, 1914, in ibid., 1:126-27.
24. C.D. Walcott to R.H. Goddard,january 5, 1917, in ibid., 1:190; Frederick C. Durant III, "Robert H.
Goddard and the Smithsonian Institution," in Frederick C. Durant III and George S. James, eds., First Step_
7bward Space: Proceeding_of the First and Second HistoTy Svmposm of the International Academy of Astronautics (Wash-
ington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1974), pp. 57-69.
25. Robert H. Goddard, A Method of Reaching Extreme Altitudes (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Miscella-
neous Collections, Volume 71, Number 2, 1919), p. 54.
26. Robert H. Goddard, "Statement by R.H. Goddard for Newspapers,".]anuary 18, 1920, in ibid.,
1:409-10.
27. _Topics of the Times," New York T_mes,January 18, 1920, p. 12.
28. Robert H. Goddard, "R.H. Goddard's Diary," March 16-17, 1926, in Goddard and Pendray, Paper, o/
Goddard, 2:580-81; Lehman, This High Man, pp. 140-44.
29. Lehman, This High Man, pp. 156-62.
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and to set up an independent laboratory to conduct rocket experiments far away from
anyone else. Between 1930 and 1941 Goddard carried out ever more ambitious tests of
rocket components in the relative isolation of New Mexico, much of which he summarized
in a 1936 study, Liquid-Propellant Rocket Development. [I-9] The culmination of this eftort was
a successful launch of a rocket to an altitude of nearly 9,000 feet in 1937. '0 In late 1941
Goddard entered naval service and spent the duration of World War II developing a Jet-
Assisted Takeoff (JATO) rocket to shorten the distance required for heavy aircraft launches.
Some of this work led to the development of the throttleable Curtis-Wright XLR25-CW-1
rocket engine that later powered the Bell X-2 and helped overcome the transonic barrier
in 1947. Goddard did not live to see this; he died in Baltimore, Maryland, on August 10,
19457'
Goddard accomplished much, but because of his secrecy most people did not know
about his achievements during his lifetime. These included the following pioneering ac-
tivities:
1. Theorizing on the possibilities of jet-powered aircraft, rocket-borne mail and ex-
press, passenger travel in space, nuclear-powered rockets; and journeys to the Moon and
other planets (1904-1945).
2. First mathematical exploration of the practicality of using rockets to reach high
altitudes and achieve escape velocity (1912).
3. First patent on the idea of multi-stage rockets (1914).
4. First experimental proof that a rocket could provide thrust in a vacuum ( 1915).
5. The basic idea of anti-tank missiles, developed and demonstrated during work ior
the Army in World War I. This was the prototype for the "Bazooka" infantry weapon ( 1918).
6. First publication in the United States of the basic mathematical theory underly-
ing rocket propulsion and spaceflight (1919).
7. First development of a rocket motor burning liquid propellants (1920-1926).
8. Ftrst development of serf-cooling rocket motors, variable-thrust rocket motors, practical
rocket landing devices, pumps suitable for liquid fuels, and associated components (1920-1945).
9. First design, construction, and launch of a successful liquid fueled rocket (1926).
10. First development of gyro-stabilization equipment for rockets (1932).
11. First use of deflector vanes in the blast of the rocket motor as a method of
stabilizing and guiding rockets (1932)?2
The U.S. government's recognition of Goddard's work came in 1960 when the Depart-
ment of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) awarded
his estate $1 million for the use of his patents."
Parallel Developments
Concomitant with Goddard's research into liquid fuel rockets, and perhaps more
immediately significant because the results were more widely disseminated, were activities
in several other quarters. Among the most important of these ventures were those under-
taken by the various rocket societies. The largest and most significant was the German
organization, the "Verein fur Raumschiffahrt" (Society for Spaceship Travel, or VfR). Al-
though spaceflight aficionados and technicians had organized at other times and in other
30. Ibid., 161-312; yon Braun and Ordway, History of Rocketry and Space Trave_ pp. 46-53. Many of these
experiments were summarized in Robert H. Goddard, Liquid.Propellant Rocket Development (Washington, DC:
Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections, Volume 95, Number 3, 1936).
31. Frank H. Winter, Rockets into Space (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 33-34.
32. G. Edward Pendray, "Pioneer Rocket Development in the United States," in Eugene M. Emme, ed.
T_e History of Rocket Technology(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964), pp. 19-23.
33. See the extensive documentation on this settlement in the "Goddard Patent Infringement" Folders,
Biographical Collection, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Washington, D.C.
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places, the VfR under the able leadership of Berlin aviator Max Valier emerged soon after
its founding on July 5, 1927, as the leading space travel group. It was specifically organized
to raise money to test Oberth's rocketry ideas. It was successful in building a base of sup-
port in Germany, publishing a magazine and scholarly studies, and of constructing and
launching small rockets. One of its strengths from the beginning, however, was the VfR's
ability to publicize both its activities and the dream of spaceflight, s4
The VfR made good on some of those dreams on February 21, 1931, when it launched
the LOX-methane liquid-fuel rocket HW-1 near Dessau to an altitude of approximately
2,000 feet. The organization's public relations arm went into high gear after this mission,
and emphasized the launch's importance as the first successful European liquid-fuel rocket
flight, s_ Wernher yon Braun, then a neophyte learning the principles of rocketry from
Oberth and Valier, was both enthralled with this flight and impressed with the publicity it
engendered. Later, he became the quintessential and movingly eloquent advocate for the
dream of spaceflight and a leading architect of its technical development. He began devel-
oping both skills while working with the VfR. "
There were other national rocketry societies that sprang up during this same period,
each contributing to the base of technical knowledge and the popular conception of space-
flight. The American Interplanetary Society (AIS) was one of the more powerful of these
institutions. Organized in 1930, within two years the AIS had begun a program of rocket
experimentation. On November 12, 1932, the AIS tested its first static test of a LOX-gaso-
line rocket. It actually launched a rocket on May 14, 1932, attaining an altitude of only 250
feet. But its second and last launch on September 9, 1934, rose over 1,300 feet. Because of
the great cost and risk to people involved, after this launch the group concentrated through-
out the rest of the 1930s on static firings of engines and published results of its research,
the cumulation of which proved significant for later experimentation in rocketry. Almost
concomitant with its withdrawal from rocket experimentation, and out of a desire to im-
prove the image of the organization, the A.IS changed its name to the American Rocket
Society. ':
That name change may also have been prompted in part by the organization of the
British Interplanetary Society (BIS) on October 13, 1933, at Liverpool, England. More
oriented toward theoretical studies than rocket experimentation, in the 1930s the BIS
became a haven for writers and other intellectuals interested in the idea of spaceflight. By
September 1939, at the beginning of World War II, the BIS numbered about 100 mem-
bers, including several Germans. The BIS periodical, the Journal of the British Interplanetary
Society, began publication in January 1934, and it quickly became a persistent and powerful
voice on behalf of space exploration, The BIS did not undertake field work with rockets
(although several members did conduct some crude experiments with potential solid pro-
pellants), but in 1938-1939 its members designed a lunar landing vehicle which influenced
the Lunar Module used in Project Apollo during the 1960s. s" [I-10]
34. The standard work on the rocket societies is Frank H. Winter, Prelude to the Space Age: The Rocket
Societies, 1924-I 940 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1983). A briefer discussion is available in
Winter, Rockets into Space, pp. 34-42.
35. Winter, Rockets into Space, p. 37.
36. Wernher yon Braun, "German Rocketry," in Arthur C. Clarke, ed., The Coming of the Space Age (New
York: Meredith Press, 1967), pp. 33-55. Von Braun's public relations skills were exceptional throughout his
career. Evidence of this can be found in the more than eight linear feet of materials by von Braun held in the
Biographical Files of the NASA Historical Reference Collection.
37. Winter, Prelude to the Space Age, pp. 73-85; Eugene M. Emme, ed., Aeronautics and Astronautics: An
Amelican Chronology of Science and TechTzologyin the Exploration of Space, 1915-1960 (Washington, DC: National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1961), p. 31.
38. Winter, Prelude to the ,SpaceAge, pp. 87-97; The British Interplanetary Society: Ongm and History (London:
British Interplanetary Society Diamond Jubilee Handbook, 1993), pp. 6, 17; H.E. Ross, "The British Interplan-
etary Society's Astronautical Studies, 1937-1939," in Durant and James, eds., FzrstSteps Toward Space, pp. 209-16;
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Whileboththeindividualandsocietalprecursorsofspaceflights ruggledalongas
bestheycould,beginningin 1936theGuggenheimAeronauticalLaboratory,California
InstituteofTechnology(GALCIT),inPasadena,California,begantopursueitsownrocket
researchprogram,s9FrankJ.Malina,ayoungCahechPh.D.studentatthetime,persuaded
GALCITtoadoptaresearchagendaforthedesignofahigh-altitudesoundingrocketand
enthusiasticallybeganexperimentation.UsingsomeoftheideasfromtheresearchofEugen
S_mgerinAustriandGoddardinNewMexico,Malinandadesignteam---composedof,
amongothers,H.S.Tsien,aChinesenationalwhowaslaterdeportedandbecamethe
architectoftheICBMandspacelauncherprogramsforthePeople'sRepublicofChina--
beganwork.NobelPrize-winningphysicistRobertA.Millikan,chairoftheCaltechexecu-
tivecouncil,wasespeciallysupportiveof thisworkbecausehewantedtousesounding
rocketsforcosmicrayresearch.MillikantriedtopersuadeGoddardtojoin thisresearch
project--MalinaevenvisitedhimathiscomplexnearRoswell,NewMexico,in August
1936---butGoddardrefused.4°In a letterevealingmuchof Goddard'ssecretiveness,in
September1936hewrotedisparaginglyofMalinatoRobertMillikan.Goddardcommented
thatbehadtriedtohelpMalinawithsomeofhisquestions,but"Inaturallycannotturn
overtheresultsofmanyearsofinvestigation,stillincomplete,foruseasastudent'sthe-
sis.'_
Beginningin late1936Malinandhiscolleaguesstartedthestatictestingofrocket
enginesin thecanyonsabovetheRoseBowl,withmixedresults.It wasnot until
November 28, 1936, for example, that the motor ran at all, and then only for 15 seconds. A
series of tests thereafter brought incremental improvements; a year later Malina and an
associate had learned enough to distill the results into the first scholarly paper on rocketry
to come out of GALCIT. [I-11 ] The test results showed that with proper fuels and motor
efficiency a rocket could be constructed with the capability to ascend as high as 1,000 miles. '2
Because of this research GALCIT's rocketry team obtained funding from outside
sources, among them General H.H. (Hap) Arnold, soon to become the Army Air Corps
Chief of Staff; he visited GALCIT in the spring of 1938 and was enthusiastic about the work
on rockets he saw Malina and co-workers doing. That fall he arranged for additional fund-
ing from the National Academy of Sciences to proceed with the project, with the specific
goal of research on the possibilities of rocket-assisted takeoff for aircraft. The committee
that approved this funding did so with some consternation that it might be money poorly
spent. Finally, Jerome C. Hunsaker, head of the Aeronautics Department of the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology, told the committee that he would be glad to have Theodore
von K_rm_in, director of GALCIT, "take the Buck Rogers job. ''4' GALCIT accepted the task,
and beginning in 1939 Malina and his rocket team began working on what became the
JATO project. Although Malina always expressed misgivings about working on weaponry,
and after World War II accepted employment with the United Nations so he could help
prevent such conflict from taking place again, the difficult political climate in 1939
prompted him to support the development of U.S. military capability as a deterrent to
39. The history of this organization has been explored in Clayton R. Koppes, JPL and the American Space
Program:A History of theJet Propulsion Laboratory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).
40. Malina reflected that while Goddard was pleasant during a visit to his Roswell, New Mexico, facility in
August 1936, he left two specific impressions. First, he was bitter toward the press, and therefore exceptionally
secretive about his work. Second, "he felt that rockets were his private preserve, so that others working on them
took on the aspect of intruders." Malina recalled that Goddard showed him no technical details and declined to
participate in the GALCIT program. See FrankJ. Malina, "On the GALCIT Rocket Research Project, 1936-
1938," in Durant and James, eds., First Steps Toward Space, pp. 113-27, quote from p. 117.
41. R.H. Goddard to Robert A. Millikan, September 1, 1936, in Goddard and Pendray, eds., Papers of
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42. FrankJ. Malina and Apollo M.O. Smith, "Flight Analysis of the Sounding Rocket,"Journal of Aeronau-
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etry at Cahech," Engineering and Science 31 (February 1968): 9-13, 30-32.
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fascism.Asaresult,MalinandGALCITengagedthroughoutthewaryearsin rocketry
researchformilitarypurposes.44
The Rocket and Modern War
Although the work of Goddard, Oberth, and others was pathbreaking, World War II
truly altered the course of rocket development. Prior to that conflict technological progress
in rocketry had been erratic. The war, however, forced nations to focus attention on the
activity and to fund research and development. Such research and development was ori-
ented, of course, toward the advancement of rocket-borne weapons rather than rockets
for space exploration and other peaceful purposes. This would remain the case even after
the war, as competing nations perceived and supported advances in space technology largely
because of their military potential and the national prestige associated with them. The
security role of the Department of Defense and the function of NASA as a civilian space
agency have been inextricably related ever since.
During World War II virtually every belligerent was involved in developing some type
of rocket technology. As an example, the Soviet Union fielded the "Katusha," a solid-fuel
rocket six feet in length that carried nearly fifty pounds of explosives and could be fired
from either a ground- or truck-mounted launcher. Italy conducted research on solid- and
liquid-fuel rockets for small, infantry-carried weapons and torpedoes. Other nations de-
veloped various types of hand-held anti-tank and anti-aircraft rockets? _
Just before the entry of the United States into World War II, the nation's military
began in earnest to acquire a rocket capability, and several efforts were aimed in that
direction. One of the most significant was at GALCIT, renamed the Jet Propulsion Labora-
tory (JPL) in 1943, where von K_rm/m, Malina, and a group of talented young engineers
made important strides based on their research from the latter 1930s. They developed in
1941, for instance, the firstJATO solid-fuel rocket system2 _
In March 1942 the GALCIT team that had developed theJATO system founded Aerojet
Engineering Corporation as a vehicle for mass-producing and marketing this new technol-
ogy; the new company quickly became one of the leading manufacturers of rockets in the
United States. Malina recalled that the movement of scientists and engineers into business
did not sit well with the military. Within two months of creating Aerojet, von Kfirmfin had
brought in two big military production contracts for JATO systems, but the Army Air
Forces--successor to the Army Air Corps---canceled its contract even before production
began. Von K_rm_tn and Malina flew to Washington, D.C., to protest the decision, and
learned that concerns about conflict of interest had prompted the cancellation. "We like
you very much, doctor," Colonel Benjamin Chidlaw told von K,_rm_in, "but only in cap and
gown to advise us what to do in science. The derby hat of the businessman doesn't befit
you." The leaders of Aerojet were able to overcome this problem only because of the dearth
of rocket expertise in the United States, but it ceased to be a problem after 1944 when the
General Tire and Rubber Company bought a controlling interest in Aerojet and divorced
it from itsJPL ties2 7
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Even as these activities were taking place, in 1943JPL engineers concluded in a re-
port to the Army Air Forces that "the development of a long-range rocket projectile is
within engineering feasibility" and asked for funding to bring it to a reality J" [I-12] With
some investment financing from the Army, JPL conducted research on engines and other
components. Then on January 16, 1945, Malina sent to the Army Ordnance Section a
proposal for a liquid-fuel "sounding" rocket that would be able to launch a 25-pound pay-
load to an altitude of 100,000 feet. What emerged from these recommendations was a
decision to develop the WAC Corporal, first flown on October 11, 1945; the WAC Corporal
became a significant launch vehicle in post-war rocket research? _
Less significant, but deserving of attention if only because it was the first U.S. corpo-
ration dedicated solely to the development of liquid rocket engines and accessory equip-
ment, Reaction Motors, Inc. (RMI), came into being less than two weeks after the United
States entered World War II. Based at Pompton Plains, New Jersey, its founders had been
longtime rocket enthusiasts intimately connected with the American Interplanetary Soci-
ety/American Rocket Society. All were convinced of the military and business potential of
the rocket in the expanding world conflict. The company's leadership negotiated a con-
tract with the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics to develop a 445-Newton (100-pound) thrust
regeneratively cooled rocket motor, which was to be employed by the Navy to assist large,
heavily laden flying boats during takeoff. By the end of November 1943, RMI was heavily
involved with naval research in Annapolis. There, a nitric acid-based rocket program was
underway at the Naval Engineering Experiment Station (NEES) where Robert H. Goddard
was working on pumps and turbines. Goddard's work was put to good use by RMI, which
by early 1944 had succeeded in testing a liquid-fueled engine mounted in a Navy PBM3C
flying boat. The company then went on to develop the rocket engine that propelled the
first piloted aircraft to fly faster than the speed of sound, the Air Force X-1 in 1947. There-
after, RMI contributed critical engine components to virtually all U.S. rocket programs, x°
While the developments in the United States ultimately proved more significant,
laying as they did the foundation of much post-war rocket technology, it was in Germany
that the most spectacular early successes in developing an operational rocket capability
took place. This was probably the case largely because in 1932 the German army hired the
charismatic and politically astute Wernher yon Braun, then only twenty years old, to work
in its military rocket program. While he was the first VfR member to go to work for the
German military, he was far from the last.
Von Braun's motivations for this move, with the hindsight of Hitler's rise to power in
Germany and the devastation and terror of World War II, have been questioned and criti-
cized. For some he was a visionary who foresaw the potential of human spaceflight, but for
others he was little more than an arms merchant who developed brutal weapons of mass
destruction. In reality, he seems to have been something of both, all the while never evinc-
ing Malina's type of hesitancy about the morality of using scientific and technical knowl-
edge to kill as many people and destroy as many resources as possible. In the 1960s, as the
United States was involved in a race with the Soviet Union to see who could land a human
on the Moon first, political humorist Tom Lehrer wrote a song about von Braun's prag-
matic approach to serving whoever would let him build rockets regardless of their pur-
pose. "Don't say that he's hypocritical, say rather that he's apolitical," Lehrer wrote. "'Once
the rockets are up, who cares where they come down? That's not my department,' says
Wernher von Braun." Lehrer's biting satire captured the ambivalence of von Braun's atti-
48. Theodore yon Kfirm_in, _Memorandum on the Possibilities of Long-Range Rocket Projectiles," No-
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tude on moral questions associated with the use of rocket technology. 5_
With military oversight provided by General Walter Dornberger, Germany developed
two important aerospace weapons, the V-1 "Buzz Bomb" and the V-2 rocket, the latter built
under von Braun's direction. The V-l, first used in June 1944, had one substantial weak-
ness; it was relatively slow, with a top speed of 400 miles per hour. This made it possible for
allied pilots and and-aircraft operators to destroy it. Of the more than 8,000 of these weap-
ons launched, over half were destroyed before reaching their targets. But the "Buzz Bombs"
that reached London extracted a toll: several thousand people were killed and wounded? _
While the V-1 was essentially an air-breathing cruise missile, the second Gelman
weapon was the first true ballistic missile. The brainchild ofWernher von Braun's rocket
team operating at a secret laboratory at PeenemCmde on the Baltic coast, this rocket was
the immediate antecedent of some of those used in the U.S. space program. A liquid pro-
pellant missile 46 feet in height and weighing 27,000 pounds at launch, the V-2, called the
A-4 by the Germans involved in the project, flew at speeds in excess of 3,500 miles per hour
and delivered a 2,200-pound warhead 200 miles away. First successfully flown in October
1942, it was employed against targets in Europe beginning in September 1944, and by the
end of the war 1,155 had been fired against England and another 1,675 had been launched
against Antwerp and other continental targets. The guidance system for these missiles was
imperfect, and many did not reach their targets, but they struck without warning and
there was no defense against them. As a result the V-2s had a terror factor far beyond their
capabilities."
Germany's astounding success in developing a ballistic missile while the other com-
batants had not done so was no accident, and it was in no small measure the result of
personalities involved in the research. Before 1941 the United Suites had led the world in
rocket technology, chiefly because of Goddard's work. But he failed to gain the significant
support of either other scientists or the U.S. government. On the other hand, the ener-
getic Oberth courted his scientific colleagues and those in the German government. For
instance, as early as 1999 Oberth had helped kindle the fires of rocketry's promise in
Walter Dornberger, later the military commander of the German rocket program. No
similar level of salesmanship took place in any other nation. Popular and top-level supptut
was therefore lacking, and Germany was able to capitalize on this with the V-2 develop-
ment during the war.
Post-War Rocket Technology and Space Science
As World War II was winding down, U.S. military forces brought captured V-ls and
V-2s back to the United States for examination. Clearly the technology employed in both
of these weapons was worthy of study, and they were the top priority for military intelli-
gence officials sifting through what remained of the impressive array of German military
technology. Along with them_as part of a secret military operation called Project
Paperclip_came many of the scientists and engineers who had developed these weapons,
notably von Braun who intentionally surrendered to the United States in hopes that he
could continue his rocketry experiments under U.S. sponsorship. He calculated that his
work would be better supported and he would have a freer hand in the United States than
in the Soviet Union. The German rocket team was installed at Fort Bliss in El Paso, Texas,
and launch facilities for the V-2 test program were set up at the nearby White Sands Prov-
ing Ground in New Mexico. Later, in 1950 yon Braun's team of over 100 people was moved
51. Wayne Biddle, "Science, Morality and the \'-2/' New I'b)k 71me_,October 2, 1992, p. A31; Tom Leln e_,
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totheRedstoneArsenalnearHuntsville,Alabama,toconcentrateonthedevelopmentof
anewmissilefortheArmy.Meanwhile,inanoperationamedProjectHermes,thefirst
successful U.S. test firing of the captured V-2s took place at White Sands on April 16, 1946.
Between 1946 and 1951, 67 captured V-2s were test-launched on non-orbital flights. The
result was a significant expansion of the U.S. knowledge of rocketry. 5¢
Although the U.S. Army was using these captured V-2 rockets to learn more about
the technology, late in 1945 it offered scientists the opportunity to put experiments on
them to study the upper atmosphere. Immediately thereafter the War Department estab-
lished an Upper Atmosphere Research Panel, and although its name and scope of respon-
sibilities changed periodically during the next several years it continued to coordinate
these activities until the birth of NASA in 1958. It prioritized the use of these sounding
rockets to study solar and stellar ultraviolet radiation, the aurora, and the nature of the
upper atmosphere. As a result, the panel served as the "godfather" of the infant field of
space science. Scientific data, while desired, was not the primary purpose of these flights,
for Army Ordnance was interested mostly in learning about rocketry to aid in the develop-
ment of a more advanced generation of weapons. 55
Throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s rocket technicians conducted ever more
demanding test flights and scientists conducted increasingly more complex scientific in-
vestigations made possible by the rocket technology. One of the most important series of
flights was Project Bumper, which utilized a smaller Army WAC Corporal missile, produced
atJPL, as a second stage ofa V-2 to obtain data on both high altitudes and the principles of
two-stage rockets. The only fully successful launch took place on February 24, 1949, when
the V-2/WAC Corporal system reached an altitude of 244 miles and a velocity of 5,150
miles per hour. Much more useful was the Aerobee, a scaled-up version of the WAC Corpo-
ral developed byJPL, which could launch at a very economical cost a sizable payload to an
aldtude of 130 miles. The reliable little booster enjoyed a long career from its first instru-
mented firing on November 24, 1947, until the January 17, 1985, launch of the 1,037th
and last Aerobee. Additionally, the Naval Research Laboratory was involved in sounding
rocket research, non-orbital instrument launches, using the Viking launch vehicle built by
the Glenn L. Martin Company. Viking 1 was launched from White Sands on May 3, 1949,
while the twelfth and last Viking took off on February 4, 1955. The program produced
significant scientific information about the upper atmosphere and took impressive high-
altitude photographs of Earth. Most important, the Viking pioneered the use ofa gimballed
engine to control flight and paved the way for later orbiting scientific satellites) 6
In virtually every instance, rockets developed during the 1950s resulted from the
adoption of a basic system built on components that had been tested earlier and mated
together into a new booster. For instance, the Scout booster began in 1957 as an attempt
by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics to build a solid-fuel rocket that could
launch a small scientific payload into orbit. To achieve this end, researchers investigated
various solid-rocket configurations and finally decided to combine a Jupiter Senior (100,000
pounds of thrust), built by the Aerojet Corporation, with a second stage composed of a
Sergeant missile base and two new upper stages descended from the research effort that
produced the Vanguard. The Scout's four-stage booster could place a 330-pound satellite
into orbit, and it quickly became a workhorse in orbiting small scientific payloads. It was
first launched on July 1, 1960, and despite some early deficiencies, by the end of 1968, had
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achievedan85-percentlaunchsuccessrate?7
TheArmyalsodevelopedtheRedstonerocketduringthissameperiod,amissile
capableofsendingasmallwarheadamaximumof500miles.Builtunderthedirectionof
yonBraunandhisGermanrocketeamin theearly1950s,theRedstonetookmanyfea-
turesfromtheV-2,addedanenginefromtheNavahotestmissile,andincorporated some
of the electronic components from other rocket test programs. The first Redstone was
launched from Cape Canaveral, Florida, on August 90, 1953. An additional 36 Redstone
launches took place through 1958. This rocket led to the development of theJupiter C, an
intermediate-range ballistic missile that could deliver a nuclear warhead to a target after a
non-orbital flight through space. Its capability for this mission was tested on May 16, 1958,
when combat-ready troops first fired the rocket. The missile was placed on active service
with U.S. units in Germany the next month, and served until 1963. The Redstone later
served as the launch vehicle for the first U.S. suborbital launches of astronauts Alan B.
Shepard and Gus Grissom in 1961. _
The Development of Ballistic Missiles
During this same era all the U.S. armed services worked toward the fielding of inter-
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that could deliver warheads to targets half a world
away. Gompetition was keen among the services for a mission in the new "high ground" of
space, whose military importance was not lost on the leaders of the world. In April 1946
the Army Air Forces gave the Consolidated Vultee Aircraft (Convair) Division a study con-
tract for an ICBM. This led directly to the development of the Atlas ICBM in the 1950s. At
first many engineers believed Atlas to he a high-risk proposition. To limit its weight, Convair
Corp. engineers under the direction of Karel J. Bossart, a pre-World War II immigrant
from Belgium, designed the booster with a very thin, internally pressurized fuselage in-
stead of massive suuts and a thick metal skin. The "steel balloon," as it was sometimes
called, employed engineering techniques that ran counter to the conservative engineer-
ing approach used by Wernher yon Braun and his "Rocket Team" at Huntsville, Alabama.
Von Braun, according to Bossart, needlessly designed his boosters like "bridges," to with-
stand any possible shock. For his part, von Braun thought the Atlas was too flimsy to hold
up during launch. The reservations began to melt away, however, when Bossart's team
pressurized one of the boosters and dared one ofvon Braun's engineers to knock a hole in
it with a sledge hammer. The blow left the booster unharmed, but the recoil from the
hammer nearly clubbed the engineer29
The Titan ICBM effort emerged not long thereafter, and proved to be an enormously
important ICBM program and later a civil and military space launch asset. To consolidate
efforts, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson issued a decision on November 26, 1956,
that effectively took the Army out of the ICBM business and assigned responsibility for
land-based systems to the Air Force and sea-launched missiles to the Navy. The Na W imme-
diately stepped up work for the development of the submarine-launched Polaris ICBM,
which first successfully operated in January 1960.
The Air Force did the same with land-based ICBMs, and its efforts were already well-
developed at the time of the 1956 decision. The Atlas received high priority from the
White House and hard-driving management from Brigadier General Bernard A. Schriever,
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aflamboyantandintenseAir Force leader. The first Atlas rocket was test fired on June 11,
1955, and a later generation rocket became operational in 1959. These systems were fol-
lowed in quick succession by the Titan ICBM and the Thor intermediate-range ballistic
missile. By the latter 1950s, therefore, rocket technology had developed sufficiently for the
creation of a viable ballistic missile capability. This was a revolutionary development that
gave humanity for the first time in its history the ability to attack one continent from
another. It effectively shrank the size of the globe, and the United States--which had at-
ways before been protected from outside attack by two massive oceans--could no longer
rely on natural defensive boundaries or distance from its enemies. 6°
Space and the American Imagination
The development of the United States' rocketry capability, especially with the work
on the ICBMs, signaled for the rest of the world that the United States could project mili-
tary might anywhere in the world. In addition, this military capability could be used tot
the peaceful projection of a human presence into space. The dreams of Verne and Wells
were combined with the pioneering rocketry work of Goddard and Oberth and later de-
velopments in technology to create the probability of a dawning space age. Another ingre-
dient entered into this arena, however--imagination, the intangible quality that prompted
humans to want to move beyond the atmosphere. There was an especially significant space-
flight "imagination" that came to the fore after World War II and that urged the imple-
mentation of an aggressive spaceflight program. It was seen in science fiction books and
film, but more importantly, it was fostered by serious and respected scientists, engineers,
and politicians. The popular culture became imbued with the romance of spaceflight, and
the practical developments in technology reinforced these perceptions that space travel
might actually be, for the first time in human history, possible. 6'
The decade following the war brought a change in perceptions, as most Americans
went from skepticism about the probabilities of spaceflight to an acceptance of it as a near-
term reality. This can be seen in the public opinion polls of the era. For instance, in De-
cember 1949 Gallup pollsters found that only 15 percent of Americans believed humans
would reach the Moon within 50 years, while 15 percent had no opinion and a whopping
70 percent believed that it would not happen within that time. In October 1957, at the
same time as the launching of Sputnik I, only 25 percent believed that it would take longer
than 25 years for humanity to reach the Moon, while 41 percent believed firmly that it
would happen within 25 years and 34 percent were not sure. An important shift in percep-
tions took place during that era, and it was largely the result of well-known advances in
rocket technology coupled with a public relations campaign based on the real possibility
of spaceflight. 62
Clearly, one of the most important groups that had been consistently enthralled with
the promise of spaceflight were the science fiction aficionados and the futurists, many of
whom were one and the same. Many science fiction writers were basically hacks writing for
a specialized market, but a few broke the boundaries of the genre in the post-war era and
contributed significantly to public perceptions of space travel. Perhaps the three most
significant authors in this category were Robert A. Heinlein, Isaac Asimov, and Arthur C.
Clarke, all of whom took pains to make their science fiction novels and short stories both
believable as reality and exciting as works of literature. They found a ready audience in the
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environment of the Cold War, as ever-increasing numbers of Americans could both envi-
sion and understand the advance of technology and technocracy, and the merger of bu-
reaucratic and technical expertise in government. Asimov, for one, featured robots in his
writings, something more and more Americans could understand as machines of all types
took over an ever-increasing part of the workload. Both Asimov and Heinlein played out
their stories within the context of complex galactic politics, not unlike those perceived by
Americans in the world situation2 _
Asimov and Clarke also bridged the gap between science fiction and science fact in
some very fundamental ways. They each wrote both fiction and popular scientific studies
relative to spaceflight, physics, and astronomy. They also identified some interesting po-
tential uses for space technology. For example, in February 1945 Clarke described the use
of the German V-2 as a launcher for ionospheric research, even as the war was going on.
He specifically suggested that by putting a second stage on a V-2 the rocket could generate
enough velocity' to launch a small satellite into orbit. "Both of these developments demand
nothing in the way of technical resources," he wrote, adding that they "should come within
the next five or ten years." He later described the possibility of placing three satellites in
geosynchronous orbit 120 degrees apart to "give television and microwave coverage to the
entire planet. ''u Later that same year Clarke elaborated on the communications implica-
tions of satellites and set in motion the ideas that eventually led to the global communica-
tions system first put in place during the 1960s. _5
Another important way in which the U.S. public became aware that flight into space
was a possibility revolved around the rise of films depicting space travel that were firmly
rooted in scientific reality. One of the keys in this process was the work of film producer-
director George Pal, a master of special effects, who made several space-oriented movies in
the 1950s. e6 Especially memorable were two films, The Day the Earth Stood Still (1950), di-
rected by Robert Wise, in which the benevolent alien Klaatu warns the Earth to shape up
and control its aggressiveness by disarming, and Forln'dden Planet (1956), about the extinct
Krell superintelligent society and the Monster from the Id. 67These films excited the public
with ideas of spaceflight, exploration, and contact with alien civilizations. It is often easy to
forget that these sophisticated visions of space travel occurred before Sputnik.
Even more important than science fiction literature and film were the public writ-
ings and speeches of serious and respected scientists, engineers, and politicians who fos-
tered dreams of spaceflight. Among the most important of these was Wernher von Braun,
ensconced in his Army rocket center at Huntsville, Alabama. Von Braun, in addition to
being a superbly effective technological entrepreneur within the governmental system, by
the early 1950s had learned and was applying daily the skills of public relations on behalf
of space travel. His background as a serious rocket engineer, a German emigrt, a hand-
some aristocrat, and a charismatic leader all combined to create a positive impression on
the U.S. public. When he managed to seize the powerful print and electronic communica-
tion media that the science fiction writers and film makers had been using, no one during
the 1950s was a more effective promoter of spaceflight to the public than yon Braun. _
In 1952 yon Braun burst on the broad public stage with a series of articles in Collier's
63. Sam Moskowitz, "The Growth of Science Fiction from 1900 to the early 1950s," in Frederick I. Ordway
III and Randy Lieberman, eds., Blueprint for Space: ScienceFiction to ScienceFact (Washington, DC: Smithsonian
Institution Press, 1992), pp. 69-82; Eric Burgess, "Into Space," Aeronautics, November 1946, pp. 52-57.
64. Arthur C. Clarke, "V2 for Ionospheric Research?," Wireless World, February 1945, p. 58.
65. Arthur C. Clarke, "Extra-Terrestrial Relays: Can Rocket Stations Give World-Wide Radio Coverage?,"
Wireless World, October 1945, pp. 305-308.
66. On Pal's career see, Gall Morgan Hickman, TheFilms of GeorgePal (South Berwick: A.S. Barnes. 1977);
Robert A. Heinlein, _Shooting Destination Moon," Astounding ScienceFiction, July 1950, p. 6.
67. w.J. Stuart, Forb*dden Planet (New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1956); H. Bates, "Farewell to the
Master," Astounding ScienceFiction, October 1940, p. 58ff.
68. See. as an example of his exceptionally sophisticated spaceflight promoting, Wernber yon Braun, The
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magazine about the possibilities of spaceflight. The genesis of this series began innocently
enough. In 1951 Willy Ley, a former member of the German VfR and himself a skilled
promoter of spaceflight, organized a Space Travel Symposium that took place on Colum-
bus Day at the Hayden Planetarium in New York City. Ley wrote to participants that "the
time is now ripe to make the public realize that the problem of space travel is to be re-
garded as a serious branch of science and technology," and he urged them to emphasize
that fact in their lectures. 69 By happenstance, two CoUier's writers attended this meeting.
They were most impressed with the ideas presented and suggested to Collier's managing
editor, Gordon Manning, that his magazine publish several articles promoting the scien-
tific possibility of spaceflight. Recognizing that this idea might have real appeal, Manning
asked an assistant editor, Cornelius Ryan, to organize some discussions with Ley and oth-
ers, among them yon Braun. Out of this came a series of important Collier's articles over a
two-year period, each expertly illustrated with striking images by some of the best illustra-
tors of the era. 7°
The first issue of Collier's devoted to space appeared on March 22, 1952. In it readers
were asked "What Are We Waiting For?" and were urged to support an aggressive space
program. An editorial suggested that spaceflight was possible, not just science fiction, and
that it was inevitable that humanity would venture outward. It framed the exploration of
space in the context of the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union and concluded that
"Collier's believes that the time has come for Washington to give priority of attention to
the matter of space superiority. The rearmament gap between the East and West has been
steadily closing. And nothing, in our opinion, should be left undone that might guarantee
the peace of the world. It's as simple as that. ''71 [I-13]
Von Braun led off the Collitr's issue with an impressionistic article describing the
overall features of an aggressive spaceflight program. He advocated the orbiting of an
artificial satellite to learn more about spaceflight followed by the first orbital flights by
humans, development of a reusable spacecraft for travel to and from Earth orbit, the build-
ing of a permanently inhabited space station, and finally human exploration of the Moon
and planets by spacecraft launched from the space station. [I-14] Willy Ley and several
other writers then followed with elaborations on various aspects of spaceflight, ranging
from technological viability to space law to biomedicinefl The series concluded with a
special issue of the magazine devoted to Mars, in which yon Braun and others described
how to get there and predicted what might be found based on recent scientific data. 7s
[I-15, 1-16]
The Collier's series catapulted von Braun into the public spotlight like none of his
previous research activities had been able to do. The magazine was one of the four highest-
circulation periodicals in the United States during the early 1950s, with over 3 million
copies produced each week. If estimates of readership were indeed four or five people per
copy, as the magazine claimed, something on the order of 15 million people were exposed
to these spaceflight ideas. Collier's, seeing that it had a potential blockbuster, did its part by
hyping the series with window ads of the space artwork appearing in the magazine, send-
ing out more than 19,000 press releases, and preparing media kits. It set up interviews on
radio and television for von Braun and the other space writers, but especially von Braun,
whose natural charisma and enthusiasm for spaceflight translated well through that me-
dium. Von Braun appeared on NBC's "Camel News Caravan" withJohn Cameron Swayze,
on NBC's "Today" show with Dave Garroway, and on CBS's "Gary Moore" program. While
Collier's was interested in selling magazines with these public appearances, von Braun was
69. Willy Ley to Heinz Haber, et al.,June 13, 1951, Hayden Planetarium Library, New York, NY
70. On these articles see Randy Liebermann, "The CoUier'sand Disney Series," in Ordway and Leibermann,
eds., Blueprint for Space, pp. 135-44.
71. "What Are We Waiting For?," CoUier's,March 22, 1952, p. 23.
72. "Man Will Conquer Space Soon" series, CoUier's, March 22, 1952, pp. 23-76ff.
73. Wernher yon Braun with Cornelius Ryan, "Can We Get to Mars?," Collier's, April 30, 1954, pp. 22-28.
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interestedinsellingtheideaofspacetraveltothepublic.TM
Following close on the heels of the CoUier's series, Walt Disney Productions contacted
von Braun--through Willy Ley--and asked his assistance in the production of three shows
for Disney's weekly television series. The first of these, "Man in Space," premiered on Disney's
show on March 9, 1955, with an estimated audience of 42 million. The second show, "Man
and the Moon," also aired in 1955 and sported the powerful image of a wheel-like space
station as a launching point for a mission to the Moon. The final show, "Mars and Beyond,"
premiered on December 4, 1957, after the launching of Spumik I. Von Braun appeared in
all three films to explain his concepts for human spaceflight, while Disney's characteristic
animation illustrated the basic principles and ideas with wit and humor. 75
While some scientists and engineers criticized von Braun for his blatant promotion
of both spaceflight and himself, the CoUier's series of articles and especially the three Disney
television programs were exceptionally important in changing public attitudes toward space-
flight. Media observers noted the favorable response to the three Disney shows from the
public, and recognized that "the thinking of the best scientific minds working on space
projects today" went into them, "making the picture[s] more fact than fantasy. ''7_
Although an overstatement, some have suggested that the airing of the first Disney
space film on March 9, 1955, contributed to President Dwight D. Eisenhower'sJuly 1955
decision to embrace the launching of a scientific satellite as part of the U.S.'s contribution
to research during the International Geophysical Year (IGY) in 1957-1958. [I-17] When
Disney studio executives wanted to emphasize this possibility, however, yon Braun told
them, "For God's sake don't put it that this show triggered the presidential announce-
ment." He was apparently concerned that Eisenhower might be embarrassed at the sug-
gestion that a media event influenced his support for the IGYsatellitefl 7 Regardless of tile
impetus for Eisenhower's decision, von Braun and the Disney series helped shape the
public's perception of spaceflight as something that was no longer fantasy.
Closely tied to the growing public perception of spaceflight as a possibility ill tile
1950swas the postwar Unidentified Flying Object (UFO) craze that took place in the United
States. Between 1947 and 1960 a total of 6,593 UFO sightings were reported in the United
States. Many people considered them to be of extraterrestrial origin. The reports slowly
began to increase, with 79 reported in 1947, and remained stable until 1951, when 1,501
were recorded. There seems to be a direct tie between public perception of the reality of
space travel and these UFO sightings, especially when considering that 701 of the 1957
reports came after the launch of Sputnik I on October 4. ,8
The U.S. Air Force considered the UFO phenomenon significant enough to begin in
December 1947 a project to investigate occurrences, especially with a view to learn if "some
foreign nation had a form of propulsion possibly nuclear, which is outside our domestic
knowledge."79 Although the researchers recognized the possibility that the UFOs might be
extraterrestrial, few thought it was probable and emphasized explanations of the phenom-
ena that were more earthly. For instance, the Scientific Advisory Panel of the Central Intel-
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Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 199I), pp. 128-29.
78. Lawrence J. Tacker, Flying Saucers and the U.S. AirForce (Princeton: D. van Nostrand Co., 19601),p. 82.
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ligence Agency considered in January 1955 the UFO issue in the United States. [I-18]
After a lengthy discussion, members of the panel "concluded that reasonable explanations
could be suggested for most sightings." Moreover, concerning one of the central questions
this body had about UFOs, it "concluded unanimously that there was no evidence of a
direct threat to national security in the objects sighted..80
A report released by the Air Force in 1957 reached similar conclusions. It said:
first, there is no evidence that the "unknowns" were inimical or hostile; second, there is no
evidence that these "unknowns" were interplanetary space ships; third, there is no evidence that these
unknowns represented technological developments or principles outside the range of our present day
scientific knowledge;fourth, there is no evidence that these "unknowns" were a threat to the security of
the country; and finally there was no physical evidence or material evidence, not even a minute
fragment, of a so-called 'flying saucer" was ever found, s_
Even with these studies, however, a fair percentage of Americans still believed that UFOs
were probably of extraterrestrial origin.
Explanations of why several thousand people saw something they could not identi_
and thought was an extraterrestrial spacecraft have ranged far and wide. Humanity has
long been intensely interested in supernatural occurrences. The ancient Greeks had their
gods who came down from Mount Olympus; people of the Medieval era saw appearances
of angels, the Virgin, and devils, as well as fairies and elves. UFO sightings in the 1940s and
1950s--none of which apparently produced any physical evidence--are essentially in the
same category.
Humans have always been fascinated and terrified of the unknown. While some feared
the stars and planets, others studied them. While some spoke of "the harmony of the
spheres," others warned that comets and other stellar phenomena foretold of humanity's
destruction. Reports of encounters with extraterrestrials were a response to the duality of
fascination and terror of humanity over contact with alien species. Some of the reports
were in part a Cold War phenomenon, as Americans longed for the help of a benevolent,
wise, and powerful alien race who could chaperon humanity through the possibility of
nuclear holocaust d la Klaatu from The Day the Earth Stood Still. Some reported incidents
were negative, harkening back to the terror expressed in Wells' War of the Worlds. Some
reports reflected American perception of the technological possibilities of space travel.
Moreover, if the Earth was on the verge of a space age, what about more advanced civiliza-
tions on other worlds? Might they someday journey to Earth? To some the UFOs spoke to
the nightmares of humanity. But to others they spoke to some of the sublime dreams of
humanity, and they were therefore significant at the time because of what they signaled
about public perceptions of what was possible in the emergent space age. "*
Conclusion
The combination of technological and scientific advance, political competition with
the Soviet Union, and changes in popular opinion about spaceflight came together in a
very specific way in the 1950s to affect public policy in favor of an aggressive space pro-
gram. This found tangible expression in 1952 when the International Council of Scientific
80. "Report of Meetings of Scientific Advisory Panel on Unidentified Flying Objects Convened by Otfice
of Scientific Intelligence, CIA, January 14-18, 1953," copy in "NACA-UFO, 1948-1958," folder, NASA Historical
Reference Collection.
81. "Air Force's 10 Year Study of Unidentified Flying Objects," Department of Defense, Office of Public
Information, News Release No. 1083-58, November 5, 1957, copy in "NACA-UFO, 1948-1958," folder, NASA
Historical Reference Collection.
82. Carl Sagan, Broca's Brain: Reflections on the Romance of Science (New York: Ballantine Books, 1974), pp.
65-70; Philip Klass, UFOs Explained (New York: Random House, 1974); Carl Sagan and Thornton Page, eds.,
UFOs: A Scientific Debate (New York: W,W. Norton and Co., 1973).
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Unions (ICSU) started planning for an International Polar Year, the third in a series of
scientific activities designed to study geophysical phenomena in remote reaches of the
planet. The Council agreed that July 1, 1957, to December 31, 1958, would be the period
of emphasis in polar research, in part because of a predicted expansion of solar activity;
the previous polar years had taken place in 1882-1883 and 1932-1933. Late in 1952 the
ICSU expanded the scope of the scientific research effort to include studies that would be
conducted using rockets with instrument packages in the upper atmosphere and changed
the name to the International Geophysical Year (IGY) to reflect the larger scientific objec-
tives. In October 1954 at a meeting in Rome, Italy, the Council adopted another resolution
calling for the launch of artificial satellites during the IGYto help map the Earth's surface.
The Soviet Union immediately announced plans to orbit an IGYsatellite, virtually assuring
that the United States would respond, and this, coupled with the military satellite pro-
gram, set both the agenda and the stage for most space efforts through 1958. The next
year the United States announced Project Vanguard, its own IGY scientific satellite pro-
gram.S'
By the end of 1956, less than a year before the launch of Sputnik, the United States
was involved in two modest space programs that were moving ahead slowly and staying
within strict budgetary constraints. One was a highly visible scientific program as part of
the IGY, and the other was a highly classified program to orbit a military reconnaissance
satellite. They shared two attributes. They each were separate from the ballistic missile
program underway in the Department of Defense, but they shared in the fruits of its re-
search and adapted some of its launch vehicles. They also were oriented toward satisfying
a national goal of establishing "freedom of space" for all orbiting satellites. The IGY scien-
tific effort could help establish the precedent of access to space, while a military satellite
might excite other nations to press for limiting such access. Because of this goal a military
satellite, in which the Eisenhower Administration was most interested, could not under
any circumstances precede scientific satellites into orbit. The IGYsatellite program, there-
fore, was a means of securing the larger goal of open access to space. Before it could do so,
on October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik I and began the space age in a way
that had not been anticipated by the leaders of the United States.
83. A good account of the IGY satellite projects can be found in Bulkeley, Sputniks Crisis and Early United
States Space Pohcy,pp. 89-122.
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Documents I-1 and I-2
Document rifle: Medieval universe at the time of Dante, as presented in The D/v/he Comedy,
from Edward R. Harrison, Cosmology: The Science of the Universe (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981), p. 77.
Docmnent title: The infinite universe of Thomas Digges, from Edward R. Harrison, Cos-
mology: The Science of the Universe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981 ), p. 79.
Source: Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press.
The ancient conception of the universe as Christianized by Thomas Aquinas in the
thirteenth century was carried to its logical conclusion by Dante in his classic work, The
Divine Comedy. In this representation, I-1, hell became a nether-region inside the Earth's
crust, purgatory was the sunlunar region, and the ethereal regions were found to be ideal
for the residence of hierarchies of angelic beings. The astronomer and mathematician
Thomas Digges modified Dante's medieval conceptions of the universe in his Deschption of
the Caelestiall Orbes (1576), 1-2, by adopting a Copernican view that placed the Sun in the
center of the universe and by eliminating the outermost of the crystalline orbs and dis-
persing stars throughout an infinite universe beyond.
Document I-1
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Document I-3
Document title: Edward E. Hale, "The Brick Moon," The Atlantic Monthly, October 1869,
pp. 451-60, November 1869, pp. 603-11, December 1869, pp. 679-88, February 1870,
pp. 215-22. Also published in His Level Best, and Other Stories (Boston: James R. Osgood &
Co., 1873) pp. 30-124.
Edward Everett Hale was an author and clergyman who was best known for his 1863
short story "The Man Without a Country" (about a member of the Burr Conspiracy being
exiled from the United States) He was widely regarded as one of the foremost literary
figures of his time and was the primary speaker at Gettysburg in 1863 when Lincoln gave
his famous address.
According to Hale, the idea for '°The Brick Moon" was inspired by Richard Adams
Locke's Moon Hoax. Hale further stated that while attending Cambridge University in 1838,
the idea came from "an old chart, dreams and plans of college days" and was written while
working in a room of his brother's, a professor, at Union College, Schenectady, New York,
in 1869. The story was serialized in October, November, and December 1869 in TheAtlan-
tic Monthly, and a short sequel, "Life in the Brick Moon," appeared in the same magazine
in February 1870.
Despite claims by both the Germans and Russians that Oberth and Tsiolkovskiy were
the first to discuss Earth satellites, Hale's story is the first account of an artificial Earth
satellite In addition to being the first to mention the concept, Hale also outlined several
uses for such an object, navigation being the most important in his view.
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The Brick Moon
FROM THE PAPERS OF CAPTAIN FREDERIC INGHAM
I.--PREPARATION.
[451] I have no sort of objection now to telling the whole story. The subscribers, of
course, have a right to know what became of their money. The astronomers may as well
know all about it, before they announce any more asteroids with an enormous movement
in declination. And experimenters on the longitude may as well know, so that they may act
advisedly in attempting another brick moon or in refusing to do so.
It all began more than thirty years ago, when we were in college; as most good things
begin. We were studying in the book which has gray sides and a green back, and is called
"Cambridge Astronomy" because it is translated from the French. We came across this
business of the longitude, and, as we talked, in the gloom and glamour of the old South
Middle dining-hall, we had going the usual number of students' stories about rewards
offered by the Board of Longitude for discoveries in that matter,--stories, all of which, so
far as I know, are lies. Like all boys, we had tried our hands at perpetual motion. For me, I
was sure I could square the circle, if they would give me chalk enough. But as to this
business of the longitude, it was reserved for Q, to make the happy hit and to explain it to
the rest of us.
I wonder if I can explain it to an unlearned world, which has not studies the book
with gray sides and a green cambric back. Let us try.
You know then, dear world that when you look at the North Star, it always appears to
you at just the same height above the horizon or what is between you and the horizon: say
the Dwight School-house, or the houses in Concord Street; or to me, just now, North Col-
lege. You know also that, if you were to travel to the North Pole, the North Star would be
just over your head. And, if you were to travel to the equator, it would be just on your
horizon, if you could see it at all through the red, dusty, hazy mist in the north,--as you
could not. If you were just half-way between pole and equator, on the line [452] between
us and Canada, the North Star would be half-way up, or 45 ° from the horizon. So you
would know there that you were 45 ° from the equator. There in Boston, you would find it
was 42020 ' from the horizon. So you know there that you are 42020 ' from the equator. At
Seattle again you would find it was 47o40 ' high, so our friends at Seattle know that they are
at 47040 ' from the equator. The latitude of a place, in other words, is found very easily by
any observation which shows how high the North Star is; if you do not want to measure the
North Star. you may take any star when it is just to north of you, and measure its height;
walt twelve hours, and if you can find it, measure its height again. Split the difference, and
that is the altitude of the pole, or the latitude of you, the observer.
"Of course we know this," says the graduating world. "Do you suppose that is what we
borrow your book for, to have you spell out your miserable elementary astronomy?" At
which rebuffI should shrink distressed, but that a chorus of voices an octave higher comes
up with, "Dear Mr. Ingham, we are ever so much obliged to you; we did not know it at all
before, and you make it perfectly clear."
Thank you, my dear, and you, and you. We will not care what the others say. If you do
understand it, or do know it, it is more than Mr. Charles Reade knew, or he would not have
made his two lovers on the island guess at their latitude, as they did. If they had either of
them been educated at a respectable academy for the Middle Classes, they would have
fared better.
Now about the longitude.
The latitude, which you have found, measures your distance north or south from the
equator or the pole. To find your longitude, you want to find your distance east or west
from the meridian of Greenwich. Now if any one would build a good tall tower at Green-
wich, straight into the sky,--say a hundred miles into the sky,--of course if you and I were
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eastorwestofit, andcouldseeit,wecouldtellhowfareastorwestwewerebymeasuring
theapparentheightofthetoweraboveourhorizon.If wecouldseesofar,whenthelan-
ternwithaDrummond'slight,"eversobright,"ontheyverytopofthetower,appearedto
beonourhorizon,weshouldknowwe.wereeighthundredandseventy-threemilesaway
fromit.Thetopof thetowerwouldanswerforusastheNorthStardoeswhenweare
measuringthelatitude.Ifwewerenearer,ourhorizonwouldmakealongeranglewiththe
linefromthetoptoourplaceofvision.Ifwewerefartheraway,weshouldneedahighertower.
ButnobodywillbuildanysuchtoweratGreenwich,orelsewhereonthatmeridian,
oronanymeridian.Youseethattobeofusetothehalftheworldnearesttoit, it would
havetobesohighthatthediameteroftheworldwouldseemnothinginproportion.And
then,fortheotherhalfoftheworldyouwouldhavetoerectanothertowerashighonthe
otherside.ItwasthisdifficultythatmadeQ.suggesttheexpedientoftheBrickMoon.
Foryouseethatif, bygoodluck,therewerearinglikeSaturn'swhichstretched
roundtheworld,abovegreenwichandthemeridianofGreenwich,andif it wouldstay
aboveGreenwich,turningwiththeworld,anyonewhowantedtomeasurehislongitude
ordistancefromGreenwichwouldlookoutofwindowandseehowhighthisringwas
abovehishorizon.AtGreenwichit wouldbeoverhisheadexactly.AtNewOrleans,which
isquarteroundtheworldfromGreenwich,itwouldbejustinhishorizon.Alittlewestof
NewOrleansyouwouldbegintolookfortheotherhalfoftheringonthewestinsteadof
theeast;andifyouwentalittlewestoftheFeejeeIslandstheringwouldbeoveryourhead
again.Soifweonlyhadaringlikethat,notroundtheequatoroftheworld,--asSaturn's
ringisaroundSaturn,--butverticaltotheplaneof theequator,asthebrassringof an
artificialglobegoes,onlyfarhigherinproportion,--[453]"fromthatring,"saidQ.,pen-
sively,"wecouldcalculatehelongitude."
Failingthat,aftervariouspropositions,hesuggestedtheBrickMoon.Theplanwas
this:If fromthesurfaceof theearth,byagiganticpea-shooter,youcouldshootapea
upwardfromGreenwich,aimednorthwardaswellasupward;ifyoudroveitsofastandfar
thatwhenitspowerofascentwasexhausted,andit begantofall,it shouldcleartheearth,
andpassoutsidetheNorthPole;ifyouhadgivenit sufficientpowertogetit halfroundthe
earthwithouttouching,thatpeawouldcleartheearthforever.Itwouldcontinuetorotate
abovetheNorthPole,abovetheFeejeeIslandplace,abovetheSouthPoleandGreenwich,
forever,withtheimpulsewithwhichit hadfirstclearedouratmosphereandattraction.If
onlywecouldseethatpeaasit revolvedin thatconvenientorbit,thenwecouldmeasure
thelongitudefromthat,assoonasweknewhowhightheorbitwas,aswellasif it werethe
ringofSaturn.
"Butapeaissosmall!"
"Yes,"saidQ.,"butwemustmakealargepea."Thenwefelltoworkonplansfor
makingthepeaverylargeandverylight.Large,--thatit mightbeseenfarawaybystorm-
tossednavigators:light,--thatit mightbetheeasierblownfourthousandandoddmiles
intotheair;lestit shouldfallontheheadsoftheGreenlandersor thePatagonians;lest
theyshouldbeinjuredandtheworldloseitsnewmoon.But,ofcourse,allthislath-and-
plasterhadtobegivenup.Forthemotionthroughtheairwouldsetfiretothismoonjust
asit doestootheraerolites,andallyourlath-and-plasterwouldgatherintoafewwhite
drops,whichnoRosset lescopeevencoulddiscern."No,"saidQ.bravely,"attheleastit
mustbeverysubstantial.It muststandfirewell,verywell.Ironwillnotanswer.It mustbe
brick;wemusthaveBrickMoon.
Thenwehadtocalculateitssize.Youcansee,ontheoldmoon,anedificetwohun-
dredfeetlongwithanyofthefinerefractorsofourday.Butnosuchrefractorsasthosecan
becarriedbythepoorlittlefishermenwhomwewantedtobefriend,thebonesofwhose
shipsliewhiteonsomanycliffs,theirnamesunreportedatanyLloyd'sorbyanyRoss,-
themselvestheownersandtheirsonsthecrew.Ontheotherhand,wedidnotwantour
moontwohundredandfiftythousandmilesaway,astheoldmoonis,whichIwillcallthe
Thornbushmoon,fordistinction.Wedidnotcarehownearitwas,indeed,if it wereonly
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far enough away to be seen, in practice, from almost the whole world. There must be a
little strip where they could not see it from the surface, unless we threw it infinitely high.
"But they need not look from the surface," said Q.; "they might climb to the mast-head.
And if they did not see it at all, they would know that they were ninety degrees from the
meridian."
This difficulty about what we call "the strip," however, led to an improvement in the
plan, which made it better in every way. It was clear that even if "the strip" were quite wide,
the moon would have to be a good way off, and, in proportion, hard to see. If, however, we
would satisfy ourselves with a moon four thousand miles away, that could be seen on the
earth's surface for three or four thousand miles on each side; and twice three thousand, or
six thousand, is one fourth of the largest circumference of the earth. We did not dare have
it nearer than four thousand miles, since even at that distance, it would be eclipsed three
hours out of every night; and we wanted it bright and distinct, and not of that lurid, cop-
per, eclipse colon But at four thousand miles' distance the moon could be seen by a belt of
observers six or eight thousand miles in diameter. "Start, then, two moon,"--this was my
contribution to the plan. "Suppose one over the meridian or Greenwich, and the other
over that of New Orleans. Take care that there is a little difference in the radii of their
orbits, lest they 'collide' some foul day. Then, in most places, one or other, perhaps
[454] two will come in sight. So much the less risk of clouds: and everywhere there may be
one, except when it is cloudy. Neither need be more than four thousand miles off; so
much the larger and more beautiful will they be. If on the old Thornbush moon old Herschel
with his reflector could see a town-house two hundred feet long, on the Brick Moon young
Herschel will be able to see a dab of mortar a foot and half long, if he wants to. And people
without the reflector, with their opera-glasses, will be able to see sufficiently well." And to
this they agreed: that eventually there must be two Brick Moons. Indeed, it were better that
there should be four, as each must be below the horizon half the time. That is only as many
as Jupiter has. But it was also agreed that we might begin with one.
Why we settled on two hundred feet of diameter I hardly know. I think it was from the
statement of dear John Farrar's about the impossibility of there being a state house two
hundred feet long not yet discovered, on the sunny side of old Thornbush. That, some-
how, made two hundred our fixed point. Besides, a moon of two hundred feet diameter
did not seem quite unmanageable. Yet it was evident that a smaller moon would be of no
use, unless we meant to have them near the world, when there would be so many that they
would be confusing, and eclipsed most of the time. And four thousand miles is a good way
off to see a moon even two hundred feet in diameter.
Small though we made them on paper, these two-hundred-foot moons were still too
much for us. Of course we meant to build them hollow. But even if hollow there must be
some thickness, and the quantity of brick would at best be enormous. Then, to get them
up! The pea-shooter, of course, was only an illustration. It was long after that time that
Rodman and other guns sent iron balls five or six miles in distance,--say two miles, more
or less, in height.
Iron is much heavier than hollow brick, but you can build no gun with a bore of two
hundred feet now,--far less could you then. No. Q. again suggested the method of shoot-
ing off the moon. It was not to be by any of your sudden explosions. It was to be done as all
great things are done,--hy the gradual and silent accumulation of power. You all know
that a fly-wheel--heavy, very heavy on the circumference, light, very light within it--was
made to save up power, from the time when it was produced to the time when it was wanted.
Yes? Then, before we began even to build the moon, before we even began to make the
brick, we would build two gigantic fly-wheels, the diameter of each should be "ever so
great," the circumference heavy beyond all precedent, and thundering strong, so that no
temptation might burst it. They should revolve, their edges nearly touching, in opposite
directions, for years, if it were necessary, to accumulate power, driven by some waterfall
now wasted to the world. One should be a little heavier than the other. When the Brick
Moon was finished, and all was ready, it should be gently rolled down a gigantic groove
provided for it, fill it lighted on the edge of both wheels at the same instant. Of course it
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wouldnotrestthere,nottheten-thousandthpartofasecond.It wouldbesnappedup-
ward,asadropofwaterfromagrindstone.Upwardandupward;buttheheavierwheel
wouldhavedeflectedit a littlefromthevertical.Upwardandnorthwardit wouldrise,
therefore,till it hadpassedtheaxisof theworld.It would,of course,feeltheworld's
attractionallthetime,whichwouldbenditsflightgently,butstillitwouldleavetheworld
moreandmorebehind.Upwardstill,butnowsouthward,till it hadtraversedmorethan
onehundredandeightydegreesofacircle.Littleresistance,indeed,afterit hadcleared
thefortyor fiftymilesofvisibleatmosphere."Nowletit fall,"saidQ.,inspiredwiththe
vision."Letit fall,andthesoonerthebetter!Thecurveit isnowonwillforeverclearthe
world;[455]andoverthemeridianofthatlonelywaterfall,--ifonlywehaverightlyad-justedthegiganticflies,--willforeverrevolve,in itsobedientorbit,theBrickMoon,the
blessingofallseamen,--asconstantinallchangeasitsoldersisterhasbeenfickle,andthe
secondcynosureofallloversuponthewaves,andofallgirlsleftbehindthem."Amen,"
wecried,andthenwesatinsilencetill theclockstruckten;thenshookeachothergravely
bythehand,andlefttheSouthMiddledining-hall.
Of waterfalls there were plenty that we knew.
Fly-wheels could be built of oak and pine, and hooped with iron. Fly-wheels did not
discourage us.
But brick? One brick is, say, sixty-four cubic inches only. This moon,--though we
made it hollow,--see,--it must take twelve million brick.
The brick alone will cost sixty thousand dollars!
The brick alone would cost sixty thousand dollars. There the scheme of the Brick
Moon hung, an airy vision, for seventeen years,--the years that changed us from young
men into men. The brick alone, sixty thousand dollars! For, to boys who have still left a few
of their college bills unpaid, who cannot think of buying that lovely little Elzevir which
Smith has for sale at auction, of which Smith does not dream of the value, sixty thousand
dollars seems as intangible as sixty million sestertia. Clarke, second, how much are sixty
million sestertia stated in cowries? How much in currency, gold being at 1.37 _/,? Right; go
up. Stop, I forget myselfl
So, to resume, the project of the Brick Moon hung in the ideal, an airy vision, a vision
as lovely and as distant as the Brick Moon itself, at this calm moment of midnight when I
write, as it poises itself over the shoulder of Orion, in my southern horizon. Stop! I antici-
pate. Let me keep--as we say in Beadle's Dime Series--to the even current of my story.
Seventeen years passed by, we were no longer boys, though we felt so. For myself, to
this hour, I never enter board meeting, committee meeting, or synod, without the queer
question, what would happen should any one discover that this bearded man was only a
big boy disguised? that the frock-coat and the round hat are none of mine, and that, if I
should be spurned from the assembly as an interloper, a judicious public, learning all the
facts, would give a verdict, "Served him right." This consideration helps me through man),
bored meetings which would be else so dismal. What did my old copy say? "Boards are
made of wood, they are long and narrow." But we do not get on!
Seventeen years after, I say, or should have said, dear Orcutt entered my room at
Haguadavick again. I had not seen him since the Commencement day when we parted at
Cambridge. He looked the same, and yet not the same. His smile was the same, his voice,
his tender look of sympathy when I spoke to him of a great sorrow, his childlike love of fun.
His waistband was different, his pantaloons were different, his smooth chin was buried in
a full beard, and he weighed two hundred pounds if he weighed a gramme. O, the good
time we had, so like the times of old! Those were happy days for me in Naguadavick. At
that moment my double was at work for me at a meeting of the publishing committee of
the Sandemanian Review, so I called Orcutt up to my own snuggery, and we talked over old
times; talked till tea was ready. Polly came up through the orchard and made tea for us
herself there. We talked on and on, till nine, ten at night, and then it was that dear Orcutt
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asked me if I remembered the Brick Moon. Remember it? of course I did. And without
leaving my chair I opened the drawer of my writing-desk, and handed him a portfolio full
of working-drawings on which I had engaged myself for my "third ''_ all that winter.
[456] Orcutt was delighted. He turned them over hastily but intelligently, and said:
"I am so glad. I could not think you had forgotten. And I have seen Brannan, and Brannan
has not forgotten." "Now do you know," said he, "In all this railroading of mine, I have not
forgotten. I have learned many things that will help. When I built the great tunnel for the
Cattawissa and Opelousas, by which we got rid of the old inclined planes, there was never
a stone bigger than a peach-stone within two hundred miles of us. I baked the brick of that
tunnel on the line with my own kilns. Ingham, I have made more brick, I believe, than any
man living in the world!"
'_ou are the providential man," said I.
"Am I not, Fred? More than that," said he; "I have succeeded in things the world
counts worth more than brick. I have made brick, and I have made money!"
"One of us make money?" asked I, amazed.
"Even so," said dear Orcutt; "one of us has made money." And he proceeded to tell
me how. It was not in building tunnels, nor in making brick. No! It was by buying up the
original stock of the Cattawissa and Opelousas, at a moment when that stock had hardly a
nominal price in the market. There were the first mortgage bonds, and the second mort-
gage bonds, and the third, and I know not how much floating debt; and, worse than all,
the reputation of the road lost, and deservedly lost. Every locomotive it had was asthmatic.
Every car it had bore the marks of unprecedented accidents, for which no one was to
blame. Rival lines, I know not how many, were cutting each other's throats for its legiti-
mate business. At this juncture, dear George invested all his earnings as a contractor, in
the despised original stock,--he actually bought it for $ '/4 per cent,ugood shares that
had cost a round hundred to every wretch who had subscribed. Six thousand eight hun-
dred dollars--every cent he had--did George thus invest. Then he went himself to the
trustees of the first mortgage, to the trustees of the second, and to the trustees of the third,
and told them what he had done.
Now it is personal presence that moves the world. Dear Orcutt has found that out
since, if he did not know it before. The trustees who would have sniffed had George writ-
ten to them, turned round from their desks, and begged him to take a chair, when he
came to talk with them. Had he put every penny he was worth into that stock? Then it was
worth something which they did not know of, for George Orcutt was no fool about rail-
roads. The man who bridged the Lower Rapidan when a freshet was running was no fool
"What were his plans?"
George did not tell--no, not to lordly trustees--what his plans were. He had plans,
but he kept them to himself. All he told them was that he had plans. On those plans he had
staked his all. Now would they or would they not agree to put him in charge of the running
of that road, for twelve months, on a nominal salary. The superintendent they had was a
rascal. He had proved that by running away. They knew that George was not a rascal. He
knew that he could make this road pay expenses, pay bond-holders, and pay a dividend,--
a thing no one else had dreamed of for twenty years. Could they do better than try him?
Of course they could not, and they knew they could not. Of course, they sniffed and
talked, and waited, and pretended they did not know, and that they must consult, and so
forth and so on. But of course they all did try him, on his own terms. He was put in charge
of the running of that road.
In one week he showed he should redeem it. In three months he did redeem it!
He advertised boldly the first day: "Infant children at treble pn'ce. "
The novelty attracted instant remark. And it showed many things. First, it showed he
was a humane man, who wished to save human life. He would [457] leave these innocents
in their cradles, where they belonged.
Second, and chiefly, the world of travellers saw that the Crichton, the Amadis, the
1. "Every man," says Dr. Peabody. "should have a vocation and an avocation." To which I add, "A third."
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perfectchevalierofthefuture,hadarisen,--arailroadmanagercaringforthecomfortof
hispassengers!
ThefirstweekthenumberoftheC.andO.'spassengerswasdoubled:inaweekor
twomorefreightbegantocomein,indriblets,onthelinewhichitsownershadgoneover.
Assoonastheshopscouldturnthemout,somecarswereputon,witharmsonwhich
travellerscouldresttheirelbows,withheadrestswheretheycouldtakenapsif theywere
weary.ThesexcitedsomuchcuriositythatonewasexhibitedinthemuseumatCattawissa
andanotheratOpelousas.It maynotbegenerallyknownthatthereceivedcarofthe
Americanroadswasdevisedto secureapremiumofferedbythePawtucketandPodunk
Company.Theirreceiptsweregrowingsolargethattheyfearedtheyshouldforfeittheir
charter.Theyadvertised,therefore,foracarinwhichnomancouldsleepatnightorrest
byday,--inwhichthebackshouldbestraight,hebeadsofpassengersunsupported,the
feet entangled in the vice, the elbows ahvays knocked by the passing conductor. The pat-
tern was produced which immediately came into use on all the American roads. But on the
Cattawissa and Opelousas this time-honored pattern was set aside.
Of course you see the result. Men went hundreds of miles out of their way to ride on
the C. and O. The third mortgage was paid off; a reserve fund was piled up for the second;
the trustees of the first lived in dread of being paid; and George's stock, whicb he bought
at 3 7,, rose to 147 before two years had gone by! So was it that, as we sat together in the
snuggery, George was worth wellnigh three hundred thousand dollars. Some of his eggs
were in the basket where they were laid; some he bad taken out and placed in other bas-
kets; some in nests where various hens were brooding over them. Sound eggs they were,
wherever placed; and such was the victory of which George had come to tell.
One of us had made money!
On his way he had seen Brannan. Brannan, the pure-minded, right-minded, shifty
man of tact, man of brain, man of heart, and man of word, who held New ,Mtona in the
hollow of his hand. Brannan had made no money. Not he, nor ever will. But Brannan
could do much what he pleased in this world, without money. For whenever Brannan
studied the rights and the wrongs of any enterprise, all men knew that what Brannan
decided about it was wellnigh the eternal truth; and therefore all men of sense were accus-
tomed to place great confidence in his prophecies. But, more than this, and better, Brannan
was an unconscious dog, who believed in the people. So, when he knew what was the right
and what was the wrong, be could stand up before two or three thousand people and tell
ti_em what was right and what was wrong, and tell them with the same siinplicity and tresh-
ness with which he would talk to little Horace on his knee. Of the thousands who heard
him there would not be one in a hundred who knew that this was eloquence. They were
fain to say, as they sat in their shops, talking, that Brannan was not eloquent. Nay, they went
so far as to regret that Brannan was not eloquent! If he were only as eloquent as Carker was
or as Barker was, how excellent he would be! But when a month after, it was necessary for
them to do anything about the thing he had been speaking of, they did what Brannan had
told them to do; forgetting, most likely, that he had ever told them, and fancying that these
were their own ideas, which, in fact, had, from his liquid, ponderous, transparent, and
invisible common sense, distilled unconsciously into their being. I wonder whether Brannan
ever knew that he was eloquent. What I knew, and what dear George knew, was, that he was
one of the leaders of men!
Courage, my friends, we are steadily advancing to the Brick Moon!
[458] For George had stopped, and seen Brannan; and Brannan had not forgotten.
Seventeen years Brannan had remembered, and not a ship had been lost on a lee-shore
because her longitude was wrong,--not a baby had wailed its last as it was ground between
wrecked spar and cruel rock,--not a swollen corpse unknown had been flung up upon the
sand and been buried with a nameless epitaph,--but Brannan had recollected the Brick
Moon, and had, in the memory-chamber which rejected nothing, stored away the story of
the horror. And now, George was ready to consecrate a round hundred thousand to the
building of the Moon; and Brannan was ready, in the thousand ways in which wise men
move the people to and fro, to persuade them to give to us a hundred thousand more; and
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George had come to ask me if I were not ready to undertake with them the final great
effort, of which our old calculations were the embryo. For this I was now to contribute the
mathematical certainty and the lore borrowed from naval science, which should blossom
and bear fruit when the Brick Moon was snapped like a cherry from the ways on which it
was built, was launched into the air by power gathered from a thousand freshets, and,
poised at last in its own pre-calculated region of the ether, should begin its course of eter-
nal blessings in one unchanging meridian!
Vision of Beneficence and Wonder! Of course I consented.
O that you were not so eager for the end! O that I might tell you, what now you will
never know,--of the great campaign which we then and there inaugurated! How the hor-
rible loss of the Royal Martyr, whose longitude was three degrees awry, startled the whole
world, and gave us a point to start from. How I explained to George that he must not
subscribe the one hundred thousand dollars in a moment. It must come in bits, when "the
cause" needed a stimulus, or the public needed encouragement. How we caught neophyte
editors, and explained to them enough to make them think the Moon was wellnigh their
own invention and their own thunder. How, beginning in Boston, we sent round to all the
men of science, all those of philanthropy, and all those of commerce, three thousand
circulars, inviting them to a private meeting at George's parlors at the Revere. How, be-
sides ourselves, and some nice, respectable-looking old gentlemen Brannan had brought
over from Podunk with him, paying their fares both ways, there were present only three
men,--all adventurers whose projects had failed,--besides the representatives of the press.
How, of these representatives, some understood the whole, and some understood noth-
ing. How, the next day, all gave us "first-rate notices." How, a few days after, in the lower
Horticultural Hall, we had our first public meeting. How Haliburton brought us fifty people
who loved him,--his Bible class, most of them,into help fill up; how, besides these there
were not three persons whom we had not asked personally, or one who could invent an
excuse to stay away. How we had hung the walls with intelligible and unintelligible dia-
grams. How I opened the meeting. Of that meeting, indeed, I must tell something.
First, I spoke. I did not pretend to unfold the scheme. I did not attempt any rhetoric.
But I did not make any apologies. I told them simply of the dangers of lee-shores. I told
them where they were most dangerous,mwhen seamen came upon them unawares. I ex-
plained to them that, though the costly chronometer, frequently adjusted, made a delusive
guide to the voyager who often made a harbor, still the adjustment was treacherous, the
instrument beyond the use of the poor, and that, once astray, its error increased forever. 1
said that we believed we had a method which, if the means were supplied for the experi-
ment, would give the humblest fisherman the very certainty of sunrise and of sunset in his
calculations of his place upon the world. And I said that whenever a man knew his place in
this world it [459] was always likely all would go well. Then I sat down.
Then dear George spoke,--simply, but very briefly. He said he was a stranger to the
Boston people, and that those who knew him at all knew he was not a talking man. He was
a civil engineer, and his business was to calculate and to build, and not to talk. But he had
come here to say that he had studied this new plan for the longitude from the Top to the
Bottom, and that he believed in it through and through. There was his opinion, if that was
worth anything to anybody. If that meeting resolved to go forward with the enterprise, or
if anybody proposed to, he should offer his services in any capacity, and without any pay,
for its success. If he might only work as a bricklayer, he would work as a bricklayer. For he
believed, on his soul, that the success of this enterprise promised more for mankind than
any enterprise which was ever likely to call for the devotion of his life. "And to the good of
mankind," he said, very simply, "my life is devoted." Then he sat down.
Then Brannan got up. Up to this time, excepting that George had dropped this hint
about bricklaying, nobody had said a word about the Moon, far less hinted what it was to
be made of. So Ben had the whole to open. He did it as if he had been talking to a bright
boy of ten years old. He made those people think that he respected them as his equals.
But, in fact, he chose every word, as if not one of them knew anything. He explained, as if
it were rather more simple to explain than to take for granted. But he explained as if, were
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they talking, they might be explaining to him. He led them from point to point,--oh! so
much more clearly than I have been leading you,--till, as their mouths dropped a little
open in their eager interest, and their lids forgot to wink in their gaze upon his face, and
so their eyebrows seemed a little lifted in curiosity,--till, I say, each man felt as if he were
himself the inventor, who had bridged difficulty after difficulty; as if, indeed, the whole
were too simple to be called difficult or complicated. The only wonder was that the Board
of Longitude, or the Emperor Napoleon, or the Smithsonian, or somebody, had not sent
this little planet on its voyage of blessing long before. Not a syllable that you would have
called rhetoric, not a word that you would have thought prepared; and then Brannan sat
down.
That was Ben Brannan's way. For my part, I like it better than eloquence.
Then I got up again. We would answer any questions, I said. We represented people
who were eager to go forward with this work. (Alas! except Q., all of those represented
were on the stage.) We could not go forward without the general assistance of the commu-
nity. It was not an enterprise which the government could be asked to favor. It was not an
enterprise which would yield one penny of profit to any human being. We had therefore,
purely on the ground of its benefit to mankind, brought it before an assembly of Boston
men and women.
Then there was a pause, and we could hear our watches tick, and our hearts beat.
Dear George asked me in a whisper if he should say anything more, but I thought not. The
pause became painful, and then Tom Coram, prince of merchants, rose. Had any calcula-
tion been made of the probable cost of the experiment of one moon?
I said the calculations were on the table. The brick alone would cost $60,000. Mr.
Orcutt had computed that $214,729 would complete two fly-wheels and one moon. This
made no allowance for whitewashing the moon, which was not strictly necessary. The fly-
wheels and water-power would be equally valuable for the succeeding moons, if any were
attempted, and therefore the second moon could be turned off, it was hoped, for $159,732.
Thomas Coram had been standing all the time I spoke, and in an instant he said: "I
am no mathematician. But I have had a ship ground to pieces under me on the Laccaqdives
because our [460] chronometer was wrong. You need $250,000 to build your first moon. I
will be one of twenty men to furnish the money; or I will pay $10,000 tomorrow for this
purpose, to any person who may be named as treasurer, to be repaid to me if the moon is
not finished this day twenty years."
That was as long a speech as Tom Coram ever made. But it was pointed. The small
audience tapped applause.
Orcutt looked at me, and I nodded. "I will be another of the twenty men," cried he.
"And I another," said an old bluff Englishman, whom nobody had invited; who proved to
be a Mr. Robert Boll, a Sheffield man, who came in from curiosity. He stopped after the
meeting; said he should leave the country the next week, and I have never seen him since.
But his bill of exchange came all the same.
That was all the public subscribing. Enough more than we had hoped for. We tried to
make Coram treasurer, but he refused. We had to make Haliburton treasurer, though we
should have liked a man better known than he then was. Then we adjourned. Some nice
ladies then came up, and gave, one a dollar, and one five dollars, and one fifty, and so,
on,--and some men who have stuck by ever since. I always, in my own mind, call each of
those women Damaris, and each of those man Dionysus. But those are not their real names.
How I am wasting time on an old story! Then some of these ladies came the next day
and proposed a fair; and out of that, six months after, grew the great Longitude Fair, that
you will all remember, if you went to it, I am sure. And the papers the next day gave us first-
rate reports; and then, two by two, with our subscription-books, we went at it. But I must
not tell the details of that subscription. There were two or three men who subscribed
$5,000 each, because they were perfectly certain the amount would never be raised. They
wanted, for once, to get the credit of liberality for nothing. There were many men and
many women who subscribed from one dollar up to one thousand, not because they cared
a straw for the longitude, nor because they believed in the least in the project; but because
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they believed in Brannan, in Orcutt, in Q., or in me. Love goes far in this world of ours.
Some few men subscribed because others had done it: it was the thing to do, and they must
not be out of fashion. And three or four, at least, subscribed because each hour of their
lives there came up the memory of the day when the news came that the -- was lost,
George, or Harry, or John, in the _, and they knew that George, or Harry, or John
might have been at home, had it been easier than it is to read the courses of the stars!
Fair, subscriptions, and Orcutt's reserve,--we counted up $162,000, or nearly so.
There would be a little more when all was paid in.
But we could not use a cent, except Orcutt's and our own little subscriptions, till we
had got the whole. And at this point it seemed as if the whole world was sick of us, and that
we had gathered every penny that was in store for us. The orange was squeezed dry!
II.--HOW WE BUILT IT.
[603] The orange was squeezed dry! And how little any of us knew,--skilful George
Orcutt, thoughtful Ben Brannan, loyal Haliburton, ingenious Q., or poor painstaking I,--
how little we knew, or any of us, where was another orange, or how we could mix malic acid
and tartaric acid, and citric acid and auric acid and sugar and water so as to imitate orange-
juice, and fill up the bank-account enough to draw in the conditioned subscriptions, and
so begin to build the Moon. How often, as I lay awake at night, have I added up the differ-
ent subscriptions in some new order, as if that would help the matter: and how steadily
they have come out one hundred and sixty-two thousand dollars, or even less, when I must
needs, in my sleepiness, forget somebody's name! So Haliburton put into railroad stocks
all the money he collected, and the rest of us ground on at our mills, or flew up on our own
wings towards Heaven. Thus Orcutt built more tunnels, Q. prepared for more commence-
ments, Haliburton calculated more policies, Ben Brannan created more civilization, and I,
as I could, healed the hurt of my people of Naguadavick for the months there were left to
me of my stay in that thriving town.
None of us had the wit to see how the problem was to be wrought out further. No.
The best things come to us when we have faithfully and well made all the preparation and
done our best; but they come in some way that is none of ours. So was it now, that to build
the BRICK MOON it was necessary that I should be turned out of Naguadavick ignomini-
ously, and that Jeff. Davis and some seven or eight other bad men should create the Great
Rebellion. Hear how it happened.
Dennis Shea, my Double,---otherwise, indeed, called by my name and legally so,-
undid me, as my friends supposed, one evening at a public meeting called by poor Isaacs
in Naguadavick. Of that transaction I have no occasion here to tell the story. But of that
transaction one consequence is that the BRICK MOON now moves in ether. I stop writing,
to rest my eye upon it, through a little telescope of Alvan Clark's here, which is always
trained near it. It is moving on as placidly as ever.
It came about thus. The morning after poor Dennis, whom I have long since for-
given, made his extraordinary speeches, without any authority from me, in the Town Hall
at Naguadavlck, I thought, and my wife agreed with me, that we had better both leave town
with the children. Auchmuty, our dear friend, thought so too. We left in the ten-thirty
Accommodation for Skowhegan, and so came to Township No. 9 in the 3d Range, and
there for years we resided. That whole range of townships [604] was set off under a provi-
sion admirable in its character, that the first settled minister in each town should receive
one hundred acres of land as the "minister's grant," and the first settled schoohnaster
eighty. To No. 9, therefore, I came. I constituted a little Sandemanian church. Auchmuty
and Delafield came up and installed me, and with these hands I built the cabin in which,
with Polly and the little ones, I have since spent many happy nights and days. This is not
the place for me to publish a map, which I have by me, of No. 9, nor an account of its many
advantages for settlers. Should I ever print my papers called "Stay-at-home Robinsons," it
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willbeeasywiththemtoexplainitstopographyandgeography.Sufficeit nowtosay,that,
withAliceandBerthandPolly,I tooktrampsupanddownthroughthelumbermen's
roads,andsoonknewthegeneralfeaturesofthelayoftheland.Norwasit long,ofcourse,
beforewecameoutonedayuponthecuriousland-slides,whichhavemorethanonce
avertedtheflowoftheLittleCarrotookRiver,whereit haswashedtherocksawaysofaras
toletdownonesectionmoreoftheoverlyingyieldingyellowclay.
Thinkhowmyeyesflashed,andmywife's,as,strugglingthroughawildernessof
moosewood,wecameoutoneafternoononthisfrontofyellowclay!Yellowclay,ofcourse,
whenproperlytreatedbyfire,isbrick!Hereweweresurroundedbyforests,onlywaitingto
beburned;yonderwasclay,onlywaitingtobebaked.Pollylookedatme,andI lookedat
her,andwithonevoice,wecriedout,"TheMOON!"
Forherewasthisshoutingriveratourfeet,whosepowerhadbeenrunningtowaste
sincethedaywhentheLaurentianhillsfirstheavedthemselvesabovethehotAtlantic;and
thatday,I aminformedbyMr.Agassiz,wasthefirstdayin thehistoryofthissolidworld.
Herewaswater-powerenoughforfortyfly-wheels,wereit necessarytosendheavenward
twentymoons.Herewasolidtimberenoughforahundredams,yetonlyonewasneces-
sarytogivemotiontothefly-wheels.Herewasretirement,--freedomfromcriticism,an
escapefromthejournalists,whowouldnotembarrassu bytellingofeverycrackedbrick
whichhadtoberejectedfromthestructure.WehadlivedinNo.9nowforsixweeks,and
notan"owncorrespondent"ofthemallhadyettoldwhatRev.Mr.Inghamhadfordinner.
OfcourseIwrotetoGeorgeOrcuttatonceofourgreatdiscovery,andhecameupat
oncetoexaminethesituation.Onthewhole,it pleasedhim.Hecouldnottakethesite
proposedfor thedam,becausethisveryclaytheremadethechanneltreacherous,and
therewasdangerthatthestreamwouldworkoutanewcareer.Butlowerdownwetounda
stonygorgewithwhichGeorgewasatisfied;hetracedoutalineforarailwaybywhich,of
theirownweight,hebrick-carscouldruntothecentrings;heshoweduswhere,withsome
excavations,thefly-wheelscouldbeplacedexactlyabovethegreatmill-wheels,thatno
powermightbewasted,andexplainedtoushow,whenthegiganticsnucturewasfinished,
theBRICKMOONwouldgentlyrolldownitswaysupontherapidwheels,tobelaunched
instantintothesky!
ShallI everforgethathappyOctoberdayofanticipation!
WespentmanyofthoseOctoberclaysintentativesurveys.AliceandBerthawereour
chain-men,i telligentandobedient.I droveforGeorgehisstakes,or I cutawayhisbrush,
or I raisedandloweredtheshieldatwhichhesighted;andatnoonPollyappearedwith
herbaskets,andwewoulddinealfresco, on a pretty point which, not many months after,
was wholly covered by the eastern end of the dam. When the fieldwork was finished we
retired to the cabin for days, and calculated and drew, and drew and calculated. Estimates
for feeding Irishmen, estimates of hay for mules,--George was sure he could work mules
better than oxen,--estimates for cement, estimates [605] for the preliminary saw-mills,
estimates for rail for the little brickroad, for wheels, for spikes, and for cutting ties; what
did we not estimate for--on a basis almost wholly new, you will observe. For here the brick
would cost us less than our old conceptions,_our water-power cost us almost nothing,-
but our stores and our wages would cost us much more.
These estimates are now to me very curious,_a monument, indeed, to dear George's
memory, that in the result they proved so accurate. I would gladly print them here at
length, with some illustrative cuts, but that I know the impatience of the public, and its
indifference to detail. If we are ever able to print a proper memorial of George, that,
perhaps, will be the fitter place for them. Suffice it to say that with the subtractions thus
made from the original estimates,---even with the additions forced upon us by working in
a wilderness,_George was satisfied that a money charge of $197,327 would build and start
THE MOON. As soon as we had determined the site, we marked off eighty acres, which
contained all the essential localities, up and down the little Carrotook River,--I engaged
George for the first schoolmaster in No. 9, and he took these eighty acres for the
schoolmaster's reservation. Alice and Bertha went to school to him the next day, taking
lessons in civil engineering; and I wrote to the Brigham trustees to notify them that I had
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engaged a teacher, and that he had selected his land.
Of course we remembered, still, that we were near forty thousand dollars short of the
new estimates, and also that much of our money would not be paid us but on condition
that two hundred and fifty thousand were raised. But George said that his own subscrip-
tion was wholly unhampered: with that we would go to work on the preliminary work of
the dam, and on the flies. Then, if the flies would hold together,--and they should hold if
mortise and iron could hold them,--they might be at work summers and winters, days and
nights, storing up Power for us. This would encourage the subscribers, nay, would encour-
age us; and all this preliminary work would be out of the way when we were really ready to
begin upon the MOON.
Brannan, Haliburton, and Q. readily agreed to this when they were consulted. They
were the other trustees under an instrument which we had got St. Leger to draw up. George
gave up, as soon as he might, his other appointments; and taught me, meanwhile, where
and how I was to rig a little saw-mill, to cut some necessary lumber. I engaged a gang of
men to cut the timber for the dam, and to have it ready; and, with the next spring, we were
well at work on the dam and on the flies! These needed, of course, the most solid founda-
tion. The least irregularity of their movement might send the MOON awry.
Ah me! would I not gladly tell the history of every bar of iron which was bent into the
tires of those flies, and of every log which was mortised into its place in the dam, nay, of
every curling mass of foam which played in the eddies beneath, when the dam was fin-
ished, and the waste water ran so smoothly over? Alas! that one drop should be wasted of
water that might move a world, although a small onel I almost dare say that I remember
each and all these,--with such hope and happiness did I lend myself, as I could, each day
to the great enterprise; lending to dear George, who was here and there and everywhere,
and was this and that and everybody,--lending to him, I say, such a poor help as I could
lend, in whatever way. We waked, in the two cabins, in those happy clays,just before the sun
came up, when the birds were in their loudest clamor of morning joy. Wrapped each in a
blanket, George and I stepped out from our doors, each trying to call the other, and often
meeting on the grass between. We ran to the river and plunged in,--O, how cold it was!-
laughed and screamed like boys, rubbed ourselves aglow, and ran home to [606] build
Polly's fire beneath the open chimney which stood beside my cabin. The bread had risen
in the night. The water soon boiled above the logs. The children came, laughing, out
upon the grass, barefoot, and fearless of the dew. Then Polly appeared with her gridiron
and bear-steak, or with her griddle and eggs, and, in fewer minutes than this page has cost
me, the breakfast was ready for Alice to carry, dish by dish, to the white-clad table on the
piazza. Not Raphael and Adam more enjoyed their watermelons, fox-grapes, and late blue-
berriesT And, in the long croon of the breakfast, lingering at the board, we revenged our-
selves for the haste with which it had been prepared.
When we were well at table, a horn from the cabins below sounded the reveille for
the drowsier workmen. Soon above the larches rose the blue of their smokes; and when we
were at last nodding to the children, to say that they might leave the table, and Polly was
folding her napkin as to say she wished we were gone, we would see tall Asaph Langdon,
then foreman of the carpenters, sauntering up the valley with a roll of paper, or an adze, or
a shingle with some calculations on it,mwith something on which he wanted Mr. Orcutt's
directions for the day.
An hour of nothings set the carnal machinery of the day agoing. We fed the horses,
the cows, the pigs, and the hens. We collected the eggs and cleaned the hen-houses and
the barns. We brought in wood enough for the day's fire, and water enough for the day's
cooking and cleanliness. These heads describe what I and the children did. Polly's life
during that hour was more mysterious. That great first hour of the day is devoted with
women to the deepest arcana of the Eleusinian mysteries of the divine science of house-
keeping. She who can meet the requisitions of that hour wisely and bravely conquers in
the Day's Batde. But what she does in it, let no man try to say! It can be named, but not
described, in the comprehensive formula, 'Just stepping round."
That hour well given to chores and to digestion, the children went to Mr. Orcutt's
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open-airschool,andI tomyrusticstudy,--aseparatecabin,witharoughsquaretableinit,
andsomebook-boxesquallyrude.Nomanenteredit,exceptingGeorgeandme.Here
fortwohoursIworkedundisturbed,--howhappytheworld,hadit neitherpostmanor
door-bell!--workeduponmyTracesofSandemanianismin theSixthandSeventhCentu-
ries,andthenwasreadytorendersuchservicetoTheCauseandtoGeorgeastheday
mightdemand.ThusI rodetoLincolnortoFoxcrofttoordersupplies;I tookmygunand
layinwaitonChairbackforabear;I transferredtothehewnlumbertheanglesorbevels
fromthecarefuldrawings:asbestI could,I filledanapostle'spart,andbecameallthings
toall thesemenaroundme.Happythosedays!--andthusthedamwasbuilt;in such
Arcadiansimplicitywasrearedthemightywheel;thusgrewoneachsidethetowerswhich
wereto supporttheflies;andthus,toourdelightnotunmixedwithwonder,atoneday,
norin ten;butinayearortwoofhappylife,--fullofthejoyofjoys,--the'Joyofeventtill
living."
Yet,forallthis,$162,000wasnot$197,000,farlesswasit $250,000;andbutforJeff.
DavisandhiscrewtheBRICKMOONwouldnothavebeenborn.
ButatlastJeff.Daviswasready."Mypreparationsbeingcompleted,"wroteGeneral
Beauregard,"IopenedfireonFortSumter."Littledidheknowit,--butin thatexplosion
theBRICKMOONalsowasliftedintothesky!
Littledidweknowit,when,fourweeksafter,Georgecameupfromthesettlements,
allexcitedwiththenews!Thewheelshadbeenturningnowforfourdays,fasterofcourse
andfaster.Georgehadgonedownformoneytopayoff[607]themen,andhebroughtus
upthenewsthattheRebellionhadbegun.
'"rhelastofthishappylife,"hesaid;"thelast,alas,ofourdearMOON."Howlittleheknewandwe[
Buthepaidoff themen,andtheypackedtheirtrapsanddisappeared,and,before
twomonthswereover,werein thelinesbeforetheenemy.Georgepackedup,badeus
sadlygoodby,andbeforeaweekhadofferedhisservicetoGovernorFentoninAlbany.
Forus,it tookratherlonger;butweweresoonpacked;Pollytookthechildrento her
sister's,andIwentontotheDepartmenttooffermyservicethere.Nosignoflifeleftin
No.9,butthetwogiganticFly-Wheels,movingfasterandfasterbydayandbynight,and
accumulatingPowertill itwasneeded.If onlytheywouldholdtogethertill themoment
came!
Soweallgroundthroughthefirstslowyearofthewar.Georgeinhisplace,I inmine,
Brannanin his,--weliftedaswecould.Buthowheavytheweightseemed!It wasin the
secondyear,whenthesecondlargeloanwasplaced,thatHaliburtonwrotetome,--Igot
theletter,I thinkatHiltonHead,--thathehadsoldouteverypennyofourrailroadstocks,
atthehighpriceswhichrailroadstocksthenbore,andhadinvestedthewholefifty-nine
thousandin thenewGovernments."I couldnotcallaboardmeeting,"saidHaliburton,
"forI amhereonlyonleaveofabsence,andtherestareallaway.Butthecaseisclear
enough.If thegovernmentgoesup,theMOONwillnevergoup;and,forone,I donot
lookbeyondtheveil."Sohewrotetousall,andofcourseweallapproved.
SoitwasthatJeff.Davisalsoserved.DeepmusthatmangointothePitwhodoesnot
serve,thoughunconscious.Forthusit wasthat,in thefourthyearofthewar,whengold
wasat290,Haliburtonwasreceivingonhisfifty-ninethousanddollarseventeenpercent
interestincurrency;thuswasit that,beforethewarwasover,hehadpiledup,compound-
inghisinterest,morethanfiftypercentadditiontohiscapital;thuswasit that,assoonas
peacecame,allhisstockswereatahandsomepercentage;thuswasit that,beforeI re-
turnedfromSouthAmerica,hereportedtoallthesubscribersthatthefullquarter-million
wasecured;thuswasit that,whenI returnedafterthatlongcruiseofminein theFlorida,
I foundPollyandthechildrenagainatNo.9,Georgetherealso,directingaworkingparty
ofnearlyeightybricklayersandhodmen,thelowercentringswellnighfilledtotheirdiam-
eter,andtheBRICKMOON,totheeye,seemingalmosthalfcompleted.
Hereit isthatI regretmostofallthatI cannotprinttheworking-drawingswiththis
paper.If youwillcutopentheseed-vesselofSpergulariaRubra,oranyothercarpelthat
hasafreecentral placenta, and observe how the circular seeds cling around the circular
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centre, you will have some idea of the arrangement of a transverse horizontal section of
the completed MOON. Lay three croquet-balls on the piazza, and call one or two of the
children to help you poise seven in one place above the three; then let another child place
three more above the seven, and you have the core of the MOON completely. If you want a
more poedcai illustration, it was what Mr. Wordsworth calls a mass
"Of conglobated bubbles undissolved."
Any secdon through any diameter looked like an immense rose-window, of six circles
grouped round a seventh. In truth, each of these sections would reveal the existence of
seven chambers in the moon,---each a sphere itself,--whose arches gave solidity to the
whole; while yet, of the whole moon, the greater part was air. In all there were thirteen of
these moonlets, if I am so to call them; though no one section, of course, would reveal so
many. Sustained on each side by their groined arches, the surface of the whole moon was
built over them and under them,--simply two domes connected at the bases. The cham-
bers themselves were [608] made lighter by leaving large, round windows or open circles
in the parts of their vaults farthest from their points of contact, so that each of them looked
not unlike the outer sphere of a Japanese ivory nest of concentric balls. You see the object
was to make a moon, which, when left to its own gravity, should be tidy supported or
braced within. Dear George was sure that, by this constant repetition of arches, we should
with the least weight unite the greatest strength. I believe it still, and experience has proved
that there is strength enough.
When I went up to No. 9, on my return from South America, I found the lower
centring up, and half full of the working-bees,--who were really Keltic laborers,--all busy
in bringing up the lower half-dome of the shell. This lower centring was of wood, in form
exacdy like a Roman amphitheatre if the seats of it be circular; on this the lower or in-
verted brick dome was laid. The whole fabric was on one of the terraces which were heaved
up in some old geological cataclysm, when some lake gave way, and the Carratook River
was born. The level was higher than that of the top of the fly-wheels, which, with an awful
velocity now, were circling in their wild career in the ravine below. Three of the lowest
moonlets, as I have called them,--separate croquet-balls, if you take my other illustra-
don,--had been completed; their centrings had been taken to pieces and drawn out through
the holes, and were now set up again with other new centrings for the second story of cells.
I was received with wonder and delight. I had telegraphed my arrival, but the des-
patches had never been forwarded from Skowhegan. Of course, we all had a deal to tell;
and, for me, there was no end to inquiries which I had to make in turn. I was never tired of"
exploring the various spheres, and the nameless spaces between them. I was never tired of
talking with the laborers. All of us, indeed, became skilful bricklayers; and on a pleasant
afternoon you might see Alice and Bertha, and George and me, all laying brick together,-
Polly sitting in the shade of some wail which had been built high enough, and reading to
us from Jean Ingelow or Monte-Cristo or Jane Austen, while little Clara brought to us our
mortar. Happily and lightly went by that summer. Haliburton and his wife made us a visit;
Ben Brannan brought up his wife and children; Mrs. Haliburton herself put in the key-
stone to the central chamber, which had always been named G. on the plans; and at her
suggestion, it was named Grace now, because her mother's name was Hannah. Before
winter we had passed the diameter of I,J, and K, the three uppermost cells of all; and the
surrounding shell was closing in upon them. On the whole, the funds had held out amaz-
ingly well. The wages had been rather higher than we meant; but the men had no chances
at liquor or dissipation, and had worked faster than we expected; and, with our new brick-
machines, we made brick inconceivably fast, while their quality was so good that dear George
said there was never so litde waste. We celebrated Thanksgiving of that year together,--my
family and his family. We had paid off all the laborers; and there were left, of that busy
village, only Asaph Langdon and his family, Levi Jordan and Levi Ross, Horace Leonard
and Seth Whitman with theirs. "Theirs," I say, but Ross had no family. He was a nice young
fellow who was there as Haliburton's representative, to take care of the accounts and the
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pay-roll;Jordan was the head of the brick-kilns; Leonard, of the carpenters; and Whitman,
of the commissariat,--and a good commissary Whitman was.
We celebrated Thanksgiving together! Ah me! what a cheerful, pleasant time we had;
how happy the children were together! Polly and I and our bairns were to go to Boston the
next day. I was to spend the winter in one final effort to get twenty-five thousand dollars
more if I could, with which we might paint the MOON, or put on some ground felspalhic
granite dust, in a sort of paste, which in its hot flight [609] through the air might fuse into
a white enamel. All of us who saw the MOON were so delighted with its success that we felt
sure "the friends" would not pause about this trifle. The rest of them were to stay there to
watch the winter, and to be ready to begin work the moment the snow had gone. Thanks-
giving afternoon,--how well I remember it,--that good fellow, Whitman, came and asked
Polly and me to visit his family in their new quarters. They had moved for the winter into
cells B and E, so lofty, spacious, and warm, and so nmch drier than their log cabins. Mrs.
Whitman, I remember, was very cheerful and jolly; made my children eat another piece of
pie, and stuffed their pockets with raisins; and then with great ceremony and fun we chris-
tened room B by the name of Bertha, and E, Ellen, which was Mrs. Whitman's name. And
the next day we bade them all good by, little thinking what we said, and with endless prom-
ises of what we would send and bring them in the spring.
Here are the scraps of letters from Orcutt, dear fellow, which tell what more there is
left to tell:--
"December 10th.
".... After you left we were a little blue, and hung round loose for a day or two. Sun-
day we missed you especially, but Asaph made a good substitute, and Mrs. Leonard led the
singing. The next day we moved the Leonards into L and M, which we christened Leonard
and Mary (Mary is for your wife). They are pretty dark, but very dry. Leonard has swung
hammocks, as Whitman did.
"Asaph came to me Tuesday and said he thought they had better turn to and put a
shed over the unfinished circle, and so take occasion of warm days for dry work there.
This we have done, and the occupation is good for us...."
"December 25th.
"I have had no chance to write for a fortnight. The truth is, that the weather has been
so open that I let Asaph go down to No. 7 and to Wilder's, and engage five-and-twenty of
the best of the men, who, we knew, were hanging round there. We have all been at work
most of the time since, with very good success. H is now wholly covered in, and the cen tring
is out. The men have named it Haliburton. I is well advanced. J is as you left it. The work
has been good for us all, morally."
"February 11 th.
".... We got your mail unexpectedly by some lumbermen on their way to the 9th
Range. One of them has cut himself, and takes this down.
"You will be amazed to hear that I and Kare both done. We have had splendid weather,
and have worked half the time. We had a great jollification when K was closed in,--called
it Kilpatrick, for Seth's old general. I wish you could just run up and see us. You must be
quick, if you want to put in any of the last licks...."
"March 12th.
"DEAR FRED,--I have but an instant. By all means made your preparations to be here
by the end of the month or early in next month. The weather has been faultless, you know.
Asaph got in a dozen more men, and we have brought tip the surface farther than you
could dream. The ways are well forward, and I cannot see why, if the fieshet hold off a
little, we should not launch her by the 10th or 12th. I do not think it worth while to wait fin.
paint or enamel. Telegraph Brannan that he must be here. You will be anmsed by our
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quarters. We, who were the last outsiders, move into A and D tomorrow, for a few weeks. It
is much warmer there.
"Ever yours,
"G.O."
I telegraphed Brannan, and in reply he came with his wife and his children to Bos-
ton. I told him that he could not possibly get up there, as the roads then were; but Ben said
he would go to Skowhegan, and take his chance there. He would, of course, communicate
with me as soon as he got there. Accordingly I got a note from him at [610] Skowhegan,
saying he had hired a sleigh to go over to No. 9; and in four days more I got this letter:--
"March 27th.
"DEAR FRED,--I am most glad I came, and I beg you to bring your wife as soon as
possible. The river is very full, the wheels, to which Leonard has added two auxiliaries, are
moving as if they could not hold out long, the ways are all but ready, and we thing we must
not wait. Start with all hands as soon as you can. I had no difficulty in coming over from
Skowhegan. We did it in two days."
This note I sent at once to Haliburton; and we got all the children ready for a winter
journey, as the spectacle of the launch of the MOON was one to be remembered their life
long. But it was clearly impossible to attempt, at that season, to get the subscribers to-
gether. Just as we started, this despatch from Skowhegan was brought me,--the last word
I got from them:--
"Stop for nothing. There is a jam below us in the stream, and we fear back-water.
"ORCUTT."
Of course we could not go faster than we could. We missed no connection. At
Skowhegan, Haliburton and I took a cutter, leaving the ladies and children to follow at
once in larger sleighs. We drove all night, changed horses at Prospect, and kept on all the
next day. At No. 7 we had to wait over night. We started early in the morning, and came
down the Spoonwood Bill at four in the afternoon, in full sight of our little _dllage.
It was quiet as the grave! Not a smoke, not man, not an adze-blow, nor the tick of a
trowel. Only the gigantic fly-wheels were whirling ao I saw them last.
There was the lower Coliseum-like centring, somewhat as I first saw it.
But where was the Brick Dome of the MOON?
"Good Heavens! has it fallen on them all? cried I.
Haliburton lashed the beast till he fairly ran down that steep hill. We turned a little
point, and came out in front of the centring. There was no MOON there! An empty
amphitheatre, with not a brick nor a splinter within!
We were speechless. We left the cutter. We ran up the stairways to the terrace. We ran
by the familiar paths into the centring. We came out upon the ways, which we had never
seen before. These told the story too well! The ground and crushed surface of the timbers,
scorched by the rapidity with which THE MOON had slid down, told that they had done
the duty for which they were built.
It was too clear that in some wild rush of the waters the ground had yielded a trifle.
We could not find that the foundations had sunk more than six inches, but that was enough.
In that fatal six inches' decline of the centring, the MOON had been launched upon the
ways just as George had intended that it should be when he was ready. But it had slid, not
rolled, down upon these angry fly-wheels, and in an instant, with all our friends, it had
been hurled into the sky!
'Whey have gone up!" said Haliburton; "She has gone up!" said I;--both in one breath.
And with a common instinct, we looked up into the blue.
But of course she was not there.
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Notashredofletteroranyothertidingscouldwefindinan},oftheshanties.It was
indeedsixweeksinceGeorgeandFannyandtheirchildrenhadmovedintoAnnieand
Diamond,--twounoccupiedcellsoftheMOON,--somuchmorecomfortablehadthe
cellsprovedthanthecabins,forwinterlife.ReturningtoNo.7,wefoundthereman},of
thelaborers,whowereastonishedatwhatwetoldthem.Theyhadbeenpaidoff onthe
30th,andtoldtocomeupagainonthe15thofApril,toseethelaunch.Oneofthem,a
mannamedRob.Shea,toldmethatGeorgekepthiscousinPetertohelp[611] himmove
backintohishousethebeginningofthenextweek.
AndthatwasthelastI knewofanyofthemformorethanayear.AtfirstI expected,
eachhour,tohearthattheyhadfallensomewhere.Buttimepassedby,andofsuchafall,
wheremanknowstheworld'ssurface,therewasnotale.I answered,asbestI could,the
lettersoftheirfriends,bysayingI didnotknowwheretheywere,andhadnotheardfrom
them.Myrealthoughtwas,thatif thisfatalMOONdidindeedpassouratmosphere,allin
it musthavebeenburnedtodeathin thetransit.ButthisI whisperedtonoonesaveto
PollyandAnnieandHatiburton.InthisterribledoubtI remained,till I noticedonedayin
the"AstronomicalRecord"thememorandum,whichyouperhapsremember,oftheobser-
vation,byDr.Zitta,ofanewasteroid,withanenormousmovementindeclination.
III.--FULFILMENT.
[679] Looking back upon it now, it seems inconceivable that we said as little to each
other as we did, of this horrible catastrophe. That night we did not pretend to sleep. We sat
in one of the deserted cabins, now talking fast, now sitting and brooding, without speak-
ing, perhaps, for hours. Riding back the next day to meet the women and children, we still
brooded, or we discussed this "if," that "if," and yet others. But after we had once opened
it all to them,--and when we had once answered the children's horribly naive questions as
best we could,--we very seldom spoke to each other of it again. It was too hateful, all of it,
to talk about. I went round to Tom Coram's office one day, and told him all I knew. He saw
it was dreadful to me, and, with his eyes full,just squeezed my hand, and never said one
word more. We lay awake nights, pondering an wondering, but hardly ever did I to
Haliburton or he to me explain our respective notions as they came and went. I believe my
general impression was that of which I have spoken, that they were all burned to death on
the instant, as the little aerolite fused in its passage through our atmosphere. I believe
Haliburton's thought more often was that theywere conscious of what had happened, and
gasped out their lives in one or two breathless minutes,--so horrible long!--as they shot
outside of our atmosphere. But it was all too terrible for words. And that which we could
not but think upon, in those dreadful waking nights, we scarcely whispered even to our
wives.
Of course I looked and he looked for the miserable thing. But we looked in vain. I
returned to the few subscribers the money which I had scraped together towards white-
washing the moon,-- "shrouding its guilty face with innocent white" indeed! But we agreed
to spend the wretched trifle of the other money, left in the treasury after paying the last
bills, for the largest Alvan Clark telescope that we could buy; and we were fortunate in
obtaining cheap a second-hand one which came to the hammer when the property of the
Shubeal Academy was sold by the mortgagees. But we had, of course, scarce a hint what-
ever as to where the miserable object was to be found. All we could do was to carry the glass
to No. 9, to train it there on the meridian of No. 9, and take turns every night in watching
the field, in the hope that this child of sorrow might drift across it in its path of ruin. But,
though everything else seemed to drift by, from east to west, nothing came from south to
north, as we expected. For a whole month of spring, another of autumn, another of sum-
mer, and another of winter, did Haliburton and his wife and Polly and I glue our eyes to
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thateyeglass,fromthetwilightofeveningtothetwilightofmorning,andthedeadhulk
neverhoveinsight.Whereverlseitwas,it seemednottobeonthatmeridian,whichwas
whereit oughtobeandwasmadetobe!Hadeveranydeadmassofmatterwroughtsuch
ruintoitsmakers,and,ofitsownstupidinertia,sofalsifiedallthepropheciesofitsbirth!
O,thetotaldepravityofthings!
It wasmorethanayearafterthefatalnight,--ifit allhappenedill tilenight,as1
suppose,--that,sI dreamilyreadthroughthe"AstronomicalRecord"in thenewreading-
roomoftheCollegeLibraryatCambridge,I lightedonthisscrap:--
"ProfessorKarlZittaof BreslauwritestotheAstronomische Nachrichten to claim the
discovery of a new asteroid observed by him on the night of March 31st.
[680]
(92)
App. A.R. App. Decl.
Bresl. MT h.m. s. h.m. s. ° " Size.
March 31 12 53 51.9 15 39 52.32 --23 50 26.1 12.9
April 1 1 3 2.1 15 39 52.32 --23 9 1.9 12.9
"He proposes for the asteroid the name of Phoebe. Dr. Zitta states that in the short
period which he had for observing Phoebe, for an hour after midnight, her motion in R.
A. seemed slight and her motion in declination very rapid."
After this, however, for months, nay even to this moment, nothing more was hea,-d of
Dr. Zitta of Breslau.
But, one morning, before I was up, Haliburton came banging at nay door on D Street.
The mood had taken him, as he returned from some private theatricals at Cambridge, to
take the comfort of the new reading-room at night, and thus express in practice his grati-
tude to the overseers of the college for keeping it open through all the twenty-tour hours.
Poor Haliburton, he did not sleep well in those times! Well, as he read away on the
Astronomische Nachrichten itself, what should he find but this in German, which he copied
for me, and then, all on foot in the rain and darkness, tramped over with, to South Bos-
ton:-
'q'he most enlightened head professor Dr. Gmelin writes to the director of the Porpol
Astronomik at St. Petersburg, to claim the discovery of an asteroid in a very high southern
latitude, of a wider inclination of the orbit, as will be noticed, than any asteroid yet ob-
served.
"Planet's apparent ot 21" 20 = 51'.40. Planet's apparent _--39 ° 31' 11".9. Comparison
star 0t.
"Dr. Gmelin publishes no separate second observation, but is confident that the dec-
lination is diminishing. Dr. Gmelin suggests for the name of this extra-zodiacal planet "Io,"
as appropriate to its wanderings from the accustomed ways of planetary life, and trusts that
the very distinguished Herr Peters, the godfather of so many planets, will relinquish this
name, already claimed for the asteroid (85) observed by him, September 15, 1865."
I had run down stairs almost as I was, slippers and dressing-gown being the only
claims I had on society. But to me, as to Haliburton, this stuff about "extra-zodiacal wan-
dering" blazed out upon the page, and though there was no evidence that the "most
enlightened" Gmelin found anything the next night, yet, if his "diminishing" meant an D
thing, there was, with Zitta's observation,--whoever Zitta might be,--something to start
upon. We rushed upon some old bound volumes of the Record and spotted the "enlight-
ened Gmelin." He was chief of a college at Taganrog, where perhaps they had a spyglass.
This gave us the parallax of his observation. Breslau, of course, we knew, and so we could
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placeZitta's,andwiththesepoordataI wentoworktoconstruct,if I could,anorbitfor
thisIo-Phoebemassofbrickandmortar.Haliburton,notstrongin sphericaltrigonom-
etry,lookedoutlogarithmsformetill breakfast,and,assoonasit woulddo,wentoverto
Mrs.Bowdoin,toborrowhertelescope,oursbeingleftatNo.9.
Mrs.Bowdoinwaskind,asshealwayswas,andatnoonHaliburtonappearedin tri-
umphwiththeboxesonENolan'sjob-wagon.WealwaysemployE,inmemoryofdearold
Phil.Wegotthetelescoperigged,andwaitedfor night,only,alas!to bedisappointed
again.Iohadwanderedsomewhereelse,and,withalloursweepingbackandforthonthe
tentativecurveIhadlaidout,Iowouldnotappear.Wespentthatnightinvain.
Butwewerenotgoingtogiveit upso.Phoebemighthavegoneroundtheworld
twicebeforeshebecameIo;mighthavegonethreetimes,four,five,six,--nay,sixhun-
dred,--whoknew!Nay,whoknewhowfaroffPhoeb-Io[681]wasor Io-Phoebe?Wesent
overforAnnie,andsheandPollyandGeorgeandIwentoworkagain.Wecalculatedin
thenextweeksixty-sevenorbitsonthesuppositionfsomanydifferentdistancesfromour
surface.I laidoutonapaper,whichwestuckuponthewallopposite,thefornmla,and
thenonewomanandonemanattackedeachsetofelements,eachhavingtheLogarithmic
Tables,andsoinaweek'sworking-time,thesixty-sevenorbitswerecompleted.Sixty-seven
possibleplacesforIo-PhoebetobeinontheforthcomingFridayevening.Ofthesesixty-
seven,forty-onewereobservableaboveourhorizonthatnight.
Shewasnotinoneoftheforty-one,nornearit.
ButDespair,f Giottobecorrect,isthechiefofsins.Sohashedepictedherin the
frescoftheArenainPadua.Nosin,that,ofours!?ffter searching all that Friday night, we
slept all Saturday (sleeping after sweeping). We all came to the Chapel, Sunday, kept awake
there, and taught our Sunday classes special lessons on Perseverance. On Monday, we be-
gan again, and that week we calculated sixty-seven more orbits. I am sure I do not know
why we stopped at sixty-seven. All of these were on the supposition that the revolution of
the Brick Moon, or Io-Phoebe, was so fast that it would require either fifteen days to com-
plete its orbit, or sixteen days, or seventeen days, and so on up to eighty-one days. And,
with these orbits, on the next Friday we waited for the darkness. As we sat at tea, I asked if
I should begin observing at the smallest or at the largest orbit. And there was a great
clamor of diverse opinions. But little Bertha said, "Begin in the middle."
"And what is the middle?" said George, chaffing the little girl.
But she was not to be dismayed. She had been in and out all the week, and knew that
the first orbit was of fifteen days and the last of eighty-one; and, with true Lincoln School
precision, she said, "The mean of the smallest orbit and the largest orbit is forty-eight
days."
"Amen!:" said I, as we all laughed. "On forty-eight days we will begin."
Alice ran to the sheets, turned up that number, and read, "R. A. 27 ° 11'. South decli-
nation 34 ° 49'."
"Convenient places," said George; "good omen, Bertha, my darling! If we find her
there, Alice and Bertha and Clara shall all have new dolls."
It was the first word of pleasantry that had been spoken about the horrid thing since
Spoonwood Hill!
Night came at last. We trained the glass on the fated spot. I bade Polly take the eye-
glass. She did so, shook her head uneasily, screwed the tube northward herself a moment,
and then screamed, "It is there! it is there,--a clear disk,_gibbous shape,--and very sharp
on the upper edge. Look! look! as big again as Jupiter!"
Polly was right! The Brick Moon was found!
Now we had found it, we never lost it. Zitta and Gmelin, I suppose, had had foggy
nights and stormy weather often. But we had some one at the eyeglass all that night, and
before morning had very respectable elements, good measurements of angular distance
when we got one, and another star in the field of our lowest power. For we could see her
even with a good French opera-glass I had, and with a night-glass which I used to carry on
the South Atlantic Station. It certainly was an extraordinary illustration of Orcutt's engi-
neering ability, that, flying off as she did, without leave or license, she should have gained
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so nearly the orbit of our original plan,--nine thousand miles from the earth's centre, five
thousand from the surface. He had always stuck to the hope of this, and on his very last
tests of the Flies he had said they were almost up to it. But for this accuracy of his, I can
hardly suppose we should have found her to this hour, since she had failed, by what cause
I then did not know, to take her intended place on the meridian of No. 9. At five thousand
miles the MOON appeared as large as the largest satellite of Jupiter [682] appears. And
Polly was right in that first observation, when she said she got a good disk with that admi-
rable glass of Mrs. Bowdoin.
The orbit was not on the meridian of No. 9, nor did it remain on any meridian. But
itwas very nearly South and North.--an enormous motion in declination with a very slight
retrograde motion in Right Ascension. At five thousand miles the MOON showed as large
as a circle two miles and a third in diameter would have shown on old Thornbush, as we
always called her older sister. We longed for an eclipse of Thornbush by B. M., but no such
lucky chance is on the cards in any place accessible to us for many years. Of course, with a
MOON so near us the terrestrial parallax is enormous.
Now, you know, dear reader, that the gigantic reflector of Lord Rosse, and the exquis-
ite fifteen-inch refractors of the modern observatories, eliminate from the chaotic rub-
bish-heap of the surface of old Thornbush much smaller objects than such a circle as I
have named. If you have read Mr. Locke's amusing Moon Hoax as often as I have, you have
those details fresh in your memory. As John Farrar taught us when all this began,--and as
I have said already,--if there were a State House in Thornbush two hundred feet long, the
first Herschel would have seen it. His magnifying power was 6450; that would have brought
this deaf and dumb State House within some forty miles. Go up on Mt. Washington and
see white sails eighty miles away, beyond Portland, with your naked eye, and you will find
how well he would have seen that State House with his reflector. Lord Rosse's statement is,
that with his reflector he can see objects on old Thornbush two hundred and fifty-two feet
long. If he can do that he can see on our B. M. objects which are five feet long; and, of
course, we were beside ourselves to get control of some instrument which had some
approach to such power. Haliburton was for at once building a reflector at No. 9; and
perhaps he will do it yet, for Haliburton has been successful in his paper-making and lum-
bering. But I went to work more promptly.
I remembered, not an apothecary, but an observatory, which had been dormant, as
we say of volcanoes, now for ten or a dozen years,--no matter why! The trustees had quar-
relled with the director, or the funds had given out, or the director had been shot at the
head of his division,---one of those accidents had happened which will happen even in
observatories which have fifteen-inch equatorials; and so the equatorial here had been left
as useless as a cannon whose metal has been strained or its reputation stained in an experi-
ment. The observatory at Tamworth, dedicated with such enthusiasm,--"another light-
house in the skies,"--had been, so long as I have said, worthless to the world. To Tamworth,
therefore, I travelled. In the neighborhood of the observatory I took lodgings. To the
church where worshipped the family which lived in the observatory buildings I repaired;
after two Sundays I established acquaintance with John Donald, the head of this family.
On the evening of the third, I made acquaintance with his wife in a visit to them. Before
three Sundays more he had recommended me to the surviving trustees as his successor as
janitor to the buildings. He himself had accepted promotion, and gone, with his house-
hold, to keep a store for Haliburton in North Ovid. I sent for Polly and the children, to
establish them in the janitor's rooms; and, after writing to her, with trembling eye I waited
for the Brick Moon to pass over the field of the fifteen-inch equatorial.
Night came. I was "sole lone!" B. M. came, more than filled the field of vision, of
course! but for that I was ready. Heavens! how changed. Red no longer, but green as a
meadow in the spring. Still I could seewblack on the green--the large twenty-foot circles
which I remembered so well, which broke the concave of the dome; and, on the upper
edge--were these palm-trees! They were. No, they [683] were hemlocks by their shape,
and among them were moving to and fro------flies? Of course, I cannot see flies! But some-
thing is moving,--coming, going. One, two, three, ten; there are more than thirty in all!
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They are men and women and their children!
Could it be possible! It was possible! Orcutt and Brannan and the rest of them had
survived that giddy flight through the ether, and were going and coming on the surface of
their own little world, bound to it by its own attraction and living by its own laws!
As I watched, I saw one of them leap from that surface. He passed wholly out of my
field of vision, but in a minute, more or less, returned. Why not! Of course, the attraction
of his world must be very small, while he retained the same power of muscle he had when
he was here. They must be horribly crowded, I thought. No. They had three acres of sur-
face, and there were but thirty-seven of them. Not so much crowded as people are in
Roxbury, not nearly so much as in Boston; and, besides, these people are living under-
ground, and have the whole of their surface for their exercise.
I watched their every movement as they approached the edge and as they left it.
Often they passed beyond it, so that I could see them no more. Often they sheltered them-
selves from that tropical sun beneath the trees. Think of living on a world where from the
vertical heat of the hottest noon of the equator to the twilight of the poles is a walk of only
fifth paces! What atmosphere they had, to temper and diffuse those rays, I could not then
conjecture.
I knew that at half past ten they would pass into the inevitable eclipse which struck
them every night at this period of their orbit, and must, I thought, be a luxury to them, as
recalling old memories of night when they were on this world. As they approached the line
of shadow, some fifteen minutes before it was due, I counted on the edge thirty-seven
specks arranged evidently in order; and, at one moment, as by one signal, all thirty-seven
jumped into the air,--high jumps. Again they did it, and again. Then a low jump; then a
high one. I caught the idea in a moment. They were telegraphing to our world, in the
hope of an observer. Long leaps and short leaps,--the long and short of Morse's Tele-
graph Alphabet,--were communicating ideas. My paper and pencil had been of course
before me. I jotted down the despatch, whose language I knew perfectly:--
"Show 'I understand' on the Saw-Mill Flat."
"Show 'I understand' on the Saw-Mill Flat."
"Show 'I understand' on the Saw-Mill Flat."
By "I understand" they meant the responsive signal given, in all telegraphy, by an
operator who has received and understood a message.
As soon as this exercise had been three times repeated, they proceeded in a solid
body--much the most apparent object I had had until now--to Circle No. 3, and then
evidently descended into the MOON
The eclipse soon began, hut I knew the MOON's path now, and followed the dusky,
coppery spot without difficulty. At 1.33 it emerged, and in a very few moments I saw the
solid column pass from Circle No. 3 again, deploy on the edge again, and repeat three
times the signal:--
"Show 'I understand' on the Saw-Mill Flat."
"Show 'I understand' on the Saw-Mill Flat."
"Show 'I understand' on the Saw-Mill Flat."
It was clear that Orcutt had known that the edge of his little world would be most easy
of observation, and that he had guessed that the moments of obscuration and of emersion
were the moments when observers would be most careful. After this signal they broke up
again, and I could not follow them. With daylight I sent offa despatch to [684] Haliburton,
and, grateful and happy in comparison, sank into the first sleep not haunted by horrid
dreams, which I had known for years.
Haliburton knew that George Orcutt had taken with him a good Dolland's refractor,
which he had bought in London, of a two-inch glass. He knew that this would give Orcutt
a very considerable power, if he could only adjust it accurately enough to find No. 9 in the
3d Range. Orcutt had chosen well in selecting the "Saw-Mill Flat," a large meadow, easily
distinguished by the peculiar shape of the mill-pond which we had made. Eager though
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Haliburton was, to join me, he loyally took moneys, caught the first train to Skowhegan,
and, travelling thence, in thirty-six hours more was again descending Spoonwood Hill, for
the first time since our futile observations. The snow lay white upon the Flat. With Bob
Shea's help, he rapidly unrolled a piece of black cambric twenty yards long, and pinned it
to the crust upon the snow; another by its side, and another. Much cambric had he left.
They had carried down with them enough for the funerals of two Presidents. Haliburton
showed the symbols for "I understand," but he could not resist also displaying .... ,
which are the dots and lines to represent O.K., which, he says is the shortest message of
comfort. And not having exhausted the space on the Flat, he and Robert, before night
closed in, made a gigantic O.K., fifteen yards from top to bottom, and in marks that were
fifteen feet through.
I had telegraphed my great news to Haliburton on Monday night. Tuesday night he
was at Skowhegan. Thursday night he was at No. 9. Friday he and Rob. stretched their
cambric. Meanwhile, every day I slept, Every night I was glued to the eye-piece. Fifteen
minutes before the eclipse every night this weird dance of leaps two hundred feet high,
followed by hops of twenty feet high, mingled always in the steady order I have described,
spelt out the ghasdy message:--
"Show 'I understand' on the Saw-Mill Flat."
,_md every morning, as the eclipse ended, I saw the column creep along to the ho,'i-
zon, and again, as the duty of opening day, spell out the same:--
"Show 'I understand' on the Saw-Mill Flat."
They had done this twice in every twenty-four hours for nearly two years. For three
nights steadily, I read these signals twice each night; only these, and nothing more.
But Friday night all was changed. After "Attention," that dreadful "Show" did not
come, but this cheerful signal:--
"Hurrah. All well. Air, food, and friends! what more can man require? Hurrah."
How like George! How like Ben Brannan! How like George's wife! How like them all!
And theywere all well! Yet poor/could not answer. Nay, I could only guess what Haliburton
had done. But I have never, I believe, been so grateful since I was born!
After a pause, the united line of leapers resumed their jumps and hops. Long and
short spelled out:--
'q(our O.K. is twice as large as it need be."
Of the meaning of this, lonely I had, of course, no idea.
"I have a power of seven hundred," continued George. How did he get that? He has
never told us. But this I can see, that all our analogies deceive us,--ofviews of the sea from
Mt. Washington, or of the Boston State House from Wachusett. For in these views we look
through forty or eighty miles of dense terrestrial atmosphere. But Orcutt was looking nearly
vertically through an atmosphere which was, most of it, rare indeed, and pure indeed,
compared with its lowest stratum.
In the record-book of my observations these despatches are entered as 12 and 13. Of
course it was impossible for me to reply. All I could do was to telegraph these in the morn-
ing to Skowhegan, sending them to the [685] care of the Moores, that they might forward
them. But the next night showed that this had not been necessary.
Friday night George and the others went on for a quarter of an hour. Then they
would rest, saying "two," "three," or whatever their next signal time would be. Before morn-
ing I had these despatches: m
14. "Write to all hands that we are doing well. Langdon's baby is named Io, and
Leonard's is named Phoebe."
How queer that wasl What a coincidence! And they had some humor there.
15 was: "Our atmosphere stuck to us. It weighs three tenths of an inch---our weight."
16. "Our rain-fall is regular as the clock. We have made a cistern of Kilpatrick." This
meant the spherical chamber of that name.
17. "Write to Darwin that he is all right. We began with lichens and have come as far
as palms and hemlocks."
These were the first night's messages. I had scarcely covered the eye-glasses, and
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adjustedtheequatorialfortheday,whenthebellannouncedthecarriageinwhichPolly
andthechildrencamefromthestationtorelievemeinmysolitaryser_iceasjanitor.I had
thejoyofshowingherthegoodnews.Thisnight'sworkseemedtofill ourcup.Foralltile
daybefore,whenIwasawake,I hadbeenhauntedbythefearoffamineforthem.True.I
knewthattheyhadstoredawayinchambersH,I,andJtheporkandflourwhichwehad
sentupfortheworkmenthroughthesummer,andthecornandoatsforthehorses.Butthiscouldnotlastorever.
Now,however,thatit provedthatinatropicalclimatetheywereformingtheirown
soil,developingtheirownpalms,andeventuallyeventheirbread-fruitandbananas,phmt-
ingtheirownoatsandmaize,anddevelopingrice,wheat,andallothercereals,harvesting
thesesix,eight,or tentimes--foraughtI couldsee--inoneofouryears,--whythen,there
wasnodangeroftamineforthem.If,asI thought,the},carriedupwiththemhea_,'drifts
oficeandsnowin thetwochamberswhichwerenotcoveredinwhentheystarted,why,
theyhadwatersin theirfirmamentquitesufficientforallpurposesofthirstandofablu-
tion.AndwhatI hadseenoftheirexerciseshowedthattheywereinstrengthsufficientfor
theproperdevelopmentof heirlittleworld.
Pollyhadthe messages by heart before an hour was over, and the little girls, of course,
knew them sooner than she.
Haliburton, meanwhile, had brought out the Shubael refl'actor (Alvan Clark), ,rod
by night of Friday was in readiness to see what he could see. Shubael of course gave him no
such luxury of detail as did my fifteen-inch equatorial. But still he had no difficulty in
making out groves of hemlock, and the circular openings. And although he could not
make out my thirty-seven flies, still when 10.15 came he saw distinctly the black squat-e
crossing from hole Mary to the edge, and begin its Dervish dances. They were on his edge
more precisely than on mine. For Orcutt knew nothing of Tamworth, and had thought his
best chance was to display for No. 9. So was it that, at the same moment with me, Haliburton
also was spelling out Orcutt & Co.'s joyous "Hurrah!"
"Thtephen," lisps Celia, "promith that you will look at yon moon [old Thornhush] at
the inthtant I do." So was it with me and Haliburton.
He was of course informed long before the Moores' messenger came, that, in Orcutt's
judgment, twenty feet of length were sufficient for his signals. Orcutt's atmosphere, of
course, must be exquisitely clear.
So, on Saturday, Rob. and Haliburton pulled up all their cambric and arranged it on
the Flat again, in letters of twenty feet, in this legend:--
RAH. AL WEL.
Haliburton said he could not waste flat or cambric on spelling.
[686] He had had all night since half past ten to consider what next was most impor-
tant tot them to know; and a very difficult question it was, you will observe. They had been
gone nearly two years, and much had happened. Which thing was, on the whole, the most
interesting and important? He had said we were all well. What then? Did you never find
yourself in the same difficuhy? When your husband had come home from sea, and kissed
you and the children, and wondered at their size, did you never sit silent, and have to think
what you should say? Were you never fairly relieved when little Phil said, blustering, "I got
three eggs today." The truth is, that silence is very satisfactory intercourse, if we only know
all is well. When De Sauty got his original cable going, he had not much to tell after all;
only that consols were a quarter per cent higher than they were the day before. "Send me
news," lisped he--poor lonely myth!--from Bull's Bay to Valentia,--"send me news; they
are mad for news." But how if there be no news worth sending? What do I read in my cable
despatch to-day? Only that the Harvard crew pulled at Putney yesterday, which 1 knew
before I opened tim paper, and that there bad been a riot in Spain, which I also knew.
Here is a letter just brought me by the mail from Moreau, Tazewell County, Iowa. It is
written by Follansbee, in a good cheerful hand. How glad I am to hear from Follansbee!
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Yes;butdoI careone straw whether Follansbee planted spring wheat or winter wheat? Not
I. All I care for is Follansbee's way of telling it. All these are the remarks by which Haliburton
explains the character of the messages he sent in reply to George Orcutt's autographs,
which were so thoroughly satisfactory.
Should he say Mr. Borie had left the Navy Department, and Mr. Robeson come in?
Should he say the Lords had backed down on the Disendowment Bill? Should he say the
telegraph had been landed at Duxbury? Should he say Ingham had removed to Tamworth?
What did they care for this? What does anybody ever care for facts? Should he say that the
State Constable was enforcing the liquor law on whiskey, but was winking at lager? All this
would take him a week, in the most severe condensation,--and for what good? as Haliburton
asked. Yet these were the things that the newspapers told, and they told nothing else.
There was a nice little poem of Jean Ingelow's in a Transcript Haliburton had with him.
He said he was really tempted to spell that out. It was better worth it than all the rest of the
newspaper stuff, and would be remembered a thousand years after that was forgotten.
"What they wanted," says Haliburton, '_was sentiment. That is all that survives and is eter-
nal." So he and Rob. laid out their cambric thus:--
RAH. AL WEL. SO GLAD.
Haliburton hesitated whether he would not add, "Power 5000," to indicate the full
power I was using at Tamworth. But he determined not to, and, I think, wisely. The conve-
nience was so great, of receiving the signal at the spot where it could be answered, that for
the present he thought it best that they should go on as they did. That night, however, to
his dismay, clouds gathered and a grim snow-storm began. He got no observations; and
the next day it stormed so heavily that he could not lay his signals out. For me at Tamworth,
I had a heavy storm all day, but at midnight it was clear; and as soon as the regular eclipse
was past George began with what we saw was an account of the great anaclysm which sent
them there. You observe that Orcutt had far greater power of communicating with us than
we had with him. He knew this. And it was fortunate he had. For he had, on his little world,
much more of interest to tell than we had, on our large one.
18. "It stormed hard. We were all asleep, and knew nothing till morning; the ham-
mocks turned so slowly."
Here was another revelation and relief. I had always supposed that, if [687] they
knew anything before they were roasted to death, they had had one wild moment of hor-
ror. Instead of this, the gentle slide of the MOON had not wakened them; the flight up-
ward had been as easy as itwas rapid, the change from one centre of gravity to another had
of course been slow,--and they had actually slept through the whole. After the dancers
had rested once, Orcutt continued:--
19. "We cleared E.A. in two seconds, I think. Our outer surface fused and cracked
somewhat. So much the better for us."
They moved so fast that the heat of their friction through the air could not propagate
itself through the whole brick surface. Indeed, there could have been but little friction
after the first five or ten miles. By E.A. he means earth's atmosphere.
His 20th despatch is: "I have no observations of ascent. But by theory our positive
ascent ceased in two minutes five seconds, when we fell into our proper orbit, which, as I
calculate, is 5,100 miles from your mean surface,"
In all this, observe, George dropped no word of regret through these five thousand
miles.
His 21st despatch is: "Our rotation on our axis is made once in seven hours, our axis
being exactly vertical to the plane of our own orbit. But in each of your daily rotations we
get sunned all round."
Of course, they never had lost their identity with us, so far as our rotation and revolu-
tion went: our inertia was theirs; all the fatal Fly-Wheels had given them was an additional
motion in space of their own.
This was the last despatch before daylight of Sunday morning; and the terrible snow-
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stormofMarch,sweepingourhemisphere,cutoffourcommunicationwiththem,bothat
TamworthandNo.9,forseveraldays.
Butherewasamplefoodforreflection.Ourfriendswereinaworldoftheirown,all
thirty-sevenofthemwell,andit seemedtheyhadtwomorelittlegirlsaddedtotheirnum-
bersincetheystarted.Theyhadplentyofvegetablestoeat,withprospectofnewtropical
varietiesaccordingtoDr.Darwin.Rob.Sheawasurethattheycarrieduphens;hesaidhe
knewMrs.WhitmanhadseveralMiddlesexesandMrs.Leonard two or three Black Spanish
fowls, which had been given her by some friends in Foxcroft. Even if they had not yet had
time enough for these to develop into Alderneys and venison, they would not be without
animal food.
When at last it cleared off, Haliburton had to telegraph: "Repeat from 21 "; and this
took all his cambric, though he had doubled his stock. Orcutt replied the next night:--
22. "I can see your storms. We have none. When we want to change climate we can
walk in less than a minute from midsummer to the depth of winter. But in the inside we
have eleven different temperatures, which do not change."
On the whole there is a certain convenience in such an arrangement. With No. 23 he
went back to his story:--
"It took us many days, one or two of our months, to adjust ourselves to our new
condition. Our greatest grief is that we are not on the meridian. Do you know why?"
Loyal George! He was willing to exile himself and his race from the most of mankind,
if only the great purpose of his life could be fulfilled. But his great regret was that it was not
fulfilled. He was not on the meridian. I did not know why. But Haliburton, with infinite
labor, spelt out on the Flat,
CYC. PROJECT. AD FIN.,
by which he meant, "See article Projectiles in the Cyclopaedia at the end"; and there in-
deed is the only explanation to be given. When you fire a shot, why does it ever go to the
right or left of the plane in which it is projected? Dr. Hutton ascribes it to a whirling
motion acquired by the bullet by friction with the gun. Euler thinks it due chiefly to the
irregularity of the shape of the ball. In our case the B. M. was regular enough. But on one
side, being wholly unprepared for flight, she [688] was heavily stored with pork and corn,
while her other chambers had in some of them hea W drifts of snow, and some only a few
men and women and hens.
Before Orcutt saw Haliburton's advice, he had sent us 24 and 95.
24. 'R_re have established a Sandemanian church, and Brannan preaches. My son
Edward and Alice Whitman are to be married this evening."
This despatch unfortunately did not reach Haliburton, though I got it. So, all the
happy pair received for our wedding-present was the advice to look in the Cyclopaedia at
article Projectiles near the end.
25 was:--
"We shall act 'As You Like It' after the wedding. Dead-head tickets for all of the old
set who will come."
Actually, in one week's reunion we had come to joking.
The next night we got 26:--
"Alice says she will not read the Cyclopaedia in the honeymoon, but is much obliged
to Mr. Haliburton for his advice."
"How did she ever know it was I?" wrote the matter-of-fact Haliburton to me.
27. "Alice wants to know if Mr. Haliburton will not send here for some rags; says we
have plenty, with little need for clothes."
And then despatches began to be more serious again. Brannan and Orcutt had failed
in the great scheme for the longitude, to which they had sacrificed their lives,--if, indeed,
it were a sacrifice to retire with those they love best to a world of their own. But none the
less did they devote themselves, with the rare power of observation they had, to the benefit
of our world. Thus, in 28:--
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'`your North Pole is an open ocean. It was black, which we think means water, fiom
August 1st to September 29th. Your South Pole is on an island bigger than New Holland.
Your Antarctic Continent is a great cluster of islands."
29. "Your Nyanzas are only two of a large group of African lakes. The green of Africa,
where there is no water, is wonderful at our distance."
30. "We have not the last numbers of 'Foul Play.' Tell us, in a word or two, how they,
got home. We can see what we suppose their island was."
31. "We should like to know who proved Right in 'He Knew He was Right.'"
This was a good night's work, as they were then telegraphing. As soon as it cleared,
Haliburton displayed,--
BEST HOPES. CARRIER DUCKS.
This was Haliburton's masterpiece. He had no room for more, howeveL and was
obliged to reserve for the next day his answer to No. 31, which was simply,
SHE.
A real equinoctial now parted us for nearly a week, and at the end of that time they
were so low in our northern horizon that we could not make out their signals; we and they
were obliged to wait till they had passed through two thirds of their month before we could
communicate again. I used the time in speeding to No. 9. We got a few carpenters to-
gether, and arranged on the Flat two long movable black plattorms, which ran in and out
on railroad-wheels on tracks, from under green platforms; so that we could display, one or
both as we chose, and then withdraw them. With this apparatus we could give forty-live
signals in a minute, corresponding to the line and dot of the telegraph; and thus could
compass some twenty letters in that time, and make out perhaps two hundred and fifty
words in an hour. Haliburton thought that, with some improvements, he could send one
of Mr. Buchanan's messages up in thirty-seven working-nights.
[215] IV.--INDEPENDENCE.
I own to a certain mortification in confessing that after this interregnum, forced
upon us by so long a period of non-intercourse, we never resumed precisely the same
constancy of communication as that which I have tried to describe at the beginning. The
apology for this benumbment, if I may so call it, will suggest itself to the thoughtful reader.
It is indeed astonishing to think that we so readily accept a position when we once
understand it. You buy a new house. You are fool enough to take out a staircase that you
may put in a bathing-room. This will be done in a fi3rtnight, everybody tells you, and then
everybody begins. Plumbers, masons, carpenters, plasterers, skimmers, bell-hangers, speak-
ing-tube men, men who make furnace-pipe, paper-hangers, men who scrape off the old
paper, and other men who take off the old paint with alkali, gas men, city water men, and
painters begin. To them are joined a considerable number of furnace-men's assistants,
stovepipe-men's assistants, mason's assistants, and hodmen who assist the assistants of the
masons, the furnace-men, and the pipe-men. For a day or two these all take possession of
the house and reduce it to chaos. In the language of Scripture, they enter in and dwell
there. Compare, for the details, Matt. xii.45. Then you revisit it at the end of the formight,
and find it in chaos, with the woman whom you employed to wash the attics the only
person on the scene. You ask her where the paper-hanger is; and she says he can do noth-
ing because the plaster is not dry. You ask why the plaster is not dry, and are told it is
because the furnace-man has not come. You send for him, and he says he did come, but
the stove-pipe man was away. You send for him, and he says he lost a day in coming, but
that the mason had not cut the right hole in the chinmey. _im go and find the mason, and
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hesaystheyareallfools,andthatthereisnothingin the house that need take two days to
finish.
Then you curse, not the day in which you were born, but the day in which bath-rooms
were invented. You say, truly, that your father and mother, from whom you inherit every
moral and physical faculty you prize, never had a bath-room till they were past sixty, )'et
they thrived, and their children. You sneak through back streets, fearful lest your friends
shall ask you when your house will be finished. You are sunk in wretchedness, unable even
to read you proofs accurately, far less able to attend the primary meetings of the part), with
which you vote, or to discharge any of the duties of a good citizen. Life is wholly embit-
tered to you.
Yet, six weeks after, you sit before a soft-coal fire, in your new house, with the feeling
that you have always lived there. You are not even grateful that you are there. You have
forgotten the plumber's name; and if you met in the street that nice carpenter that drove
things through, you would just nod to him, and would not think of kissing him or embrac-
ing him.
Thus completely have you accepted the situation.
Let me confess that the same experience is that with which, at this writing, I regard
the BRICK MOON. It is there in ether. I cannot keep it. I cannot get it down. I cannot well
go to it,--though possibly that might be done, as you will see. They are all very happy
there,--much happier, as far as I can see, than if they lived in sixth floors in Paris, in
lodgings in London, or even in tenement-houses in Phoenix Place, Boston. There are
disadvantages attached to their position; but there are also advantages. And what most of
all tends to our accepting the situation is, that there is "nothing that we can do about it," as
Q. says, but to keep up our correspondence with them, and to express our sympathies.
For them, their responsibilities are reduced, in somewhat the same proportion
[216] as the gravitation which binds them down,--I had almost said to earth,--which binds
them down to brick, I mean. This decrease of responsibility must make them as light-
hearted as the loss of gravitation makes them light-bodied.
On which point I ask for a moment's attention. And as these sheets leave my hand, an
illustration turns up, which well serves me. It is the 23rd of October. Yesterday morning all
wakeful women in New England were sure there was some one under the bed. This is a
certain sign of an earthquake. And when we read the evening newspapers we were made
sure there had been an earthquake. What blessings the newspapers are,--and how much
information they give us! Well, they said it was not very severe here, but perhaps it was
more severe elsewhere; hopes really arising in the editorial mind, that in some Caraccas or
Lisbon all churches and the cathedral might have fallen. I did not hope for that. But I did
have just the faintest feeling, that/f--if--if--it should prove that the world had blown up
into six or eight pieces, and they had gone off into separate orbits, life would be vastly
easier for all of us, on whichever bit we happened to be.
That thing has happened, they say, once. Whenever the big planet between Mars and
Jupiter blew up, and divided himself into one hundred and two or more asteroids, the
people on each one only knew there had been an earthquake, until they read their morn-
ingjournals. And then, all that they knew at first was that telegraphic communication had
ceased beyond--say two hundred miles. Gradually people and despatches came in, who
said that they had parted company with some of the other islands and continents. But, as I
say, on each piece the people not only weighed much less, but were much lighter-hearted,
had less responsibility.
Now will you imagine the enthusiasm here, at Miss Hale's school, when it should be
announced that geography, in future, would be confined to the study of the region east of
the Mississippi and west of the Adantic,--the earth having parted at the seams so named.
No more study of Italian, German, French, or Sclavonic,--the people speaking those lan-
guages being now in different orbits or other worlds, hnagine also the superior ease of the
office-work of the A.B.C.EM. and kindred societies, the duties of instruction and civilizing,
of evangelizing in general, being reduced within so much narrower bounds. For you and
me also, who cannot decide what Mr. Gladstone ought to do with the land tenure in Ire-
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land, and who distress ourselves so much about it in conversation, what a satisfaction to
know that Great Britain is flung offwith one rate of movement, Ireland with another, and
the Isle of Man with another, into space, with no more chance of meeting again than there
is that you shall have the same hand at whist tonight that you had last night! Even Victoria
would sleep easier, and I am sure Mr. Gladstone would.
Thus, I say, were Orcutt's and Brannan's responsibilities so diminished, that after the
first I began to see that their contracted position had its decided compensating ameliora-
tions.
In these views, I need not say, the women of our little circle never shared. After we got
the new telegraph arrangement in good running-order, I observed that Polly and Annie
Haliburton had many private conversations, and the secret came out one morning, when,
rising early in the cabins, we men found they had deserted us, and then, going in search of
them, found them running the signal boards in and out as rapidly as they could, to tell
Mrs. Brannan and the bride Alice Orcutt that flounces were worn an inch and half deeper,
and that people trimmed now with harmonizing colors and not with contrasts. I did not
say that I believed they wore fig-leaves in B. M., but that was my private impression.
After all, it was hard to laugh at the [217] girls, as these ladies will be called, should
they live to be as old as Helen was when she charmed the Trojan senate (that was ninety-
three, if Heyne be right in his calculations). It was hard to laugh at them, because this was
simple benevolence, and the same benevolence led to a much more practical suggestion,
when Polly came to me and told me she had been putting up some baby things for little Io
and Phoebe, and some playthings for the older children, and she thought we might "sen
dup a bundle."
Of course we could. There were the Flies still moving! or we might go ourselves!
[And here the reader must indulge me in a long parenthesis. I beg him to bear me witness that I
never made one before. This parenthesis is on the tense that ! am obliged to use in sending to the press
these minutes. The reader observes that the last transactions mentioned happen in April and May,
1871. Those to be narrated are the sequence of those already told. Speaking of them in 1870 with the
coarse tenses of the English language is very difficult. One needs, for accuracy, a pure future, a second
future, a paulo-post future, and a paulum-ante future, none of which does this language have. Fail-
ing this, one would be glad of an a-orist,--tense without time,--if the grammarians will not swoon at
hearing such language. But the English tongue hath not that either. Doth the learned reader remember
that the Hebrew,--language of history and prophec_;--hath only a past and a future tense, but hath
no present? Yet that language succeeded tolerably in expressing the present griefs or joys of David and
of Solomon. Bear with me, then, 0 critic! if even in 1870 1 use the so-called past tenses in narrating
what remaineth of this history up to the summer of 1872. End of the parenthesis. ]
On careful consideration, however, no one volunteers to go. To go, if you observe,
would require that a man envelope himself thickly in asbestos or some similar non-
conducting substance, leap boldly on the rapid Flies, and so be shot through the earth's
atmosphere in two seconds and a fraction, carrying with him all the time in a non-conduct-
ing receiver the condensed air he needed, and landing quietly on B.M. by a pre-calculated
orbit. At the bottom of our hearts I think we were all afraid. Some of us confessed to fear;
others said, and said truly, that the population of the Moon was already dense, and that it
did not seem reasonable or worth while, on any account, to make it denser. Nor has any
movement been renewed for going. But the plan of the bundle of "things" seemed more
feasible, as the things would not require oxygen. The only precaution seemed to be that
which was necessary for protecting the parcel against combustion as it shot through the
earth's atmosphere. We had not asbestos enough. It was at first proposed to pack them all
in one of Professor Horsford's safes. But when I telegraphed this plan to Orcutt, he de-
murred. Their atmosphere was but shallow, and with a little too much force the corner of
the safe night knock a very bad hole in the surface of his world. He said if we would send
up first a collection of things of no great weight, but of considerable bulk, he would risk
that, but he would rather have no compact metals.
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I satisfiedmyself,therefore,withaplanwhichI stillthinkgood.Makingtheparcel
upinheavyoldwoollencarpets,andcordingit withworstedcords,wewouldcaseit ina
carpet-baglargerthanitself,andfill intheintersticewithdrysand,asourbestnonconduc-
tor;cordingthistightlyagain,wewouldrenewthesamecasing,withmoresand;andso
continuallyoffersurfacesofsandandwoollen,tillwehadfiveseparatelayersbetweenthe
parcelandtheair.Ourcalculationwasthataperceptibletimewouldbenecessaryforthe
burninganddisintegratingofeachsand-bag.Ifeachone,ontheaverage,wouldstandtwo
fifthsof asecond,theinnerparcelwouldget[218]throughtheearth'satmosphere
unconsumed.If,ontheotherhand,theylastedalittlelonger,thebag,asit fellonB.M.,
wouldnotbeundulyheavy.Ofcoursewecouldtaketheirnightfortheexperiment,sothat
wemightbesuretheyshouldallbeinbedandoutoftheway.
Wehadveryfunnyandverymerrytimesinselectingthingsimportantenoughandat
thesametimebulkyandlightenoughtobesafe.AliceandBerthatonceinsistedthat
theremustberoomforthechildren'splaythings.Theywantedtosendthemostapproved
oftheoldones,andtoaddsomenewpresents.Therewasawoollysheepinparticular,and
awatering-potthatRosehadgivenFanny,aboutwhichtherewasomesentiment;boxesof
dominos,packsofcards,magneticfishes,bowsandarrows,checker-boardsandcroquet
sets.PollyandAnnieweremoreconsiderate.DowntoColemanandCompanytheysentan
orderfor pins,needles,hooksandeyes,buttons,tapes,andI knownotwhatessentials.
India-rubbershoesforthechildrenMrs.Haliburtoni sistedonsending.Haliburtonhim-
selfboughtopen-eye-shut-eyedolls,thoughI feltthatwaxhadbeen,sinceIcarus'sdays,
theworstarticleinsuchanadventure.Forthebabieshehadindia-rubberrings:hehadtin
cowsandcarvedwoodenlionsforthebiggerchildren,drawing-toolsforthoseolderyet,
andaboxofcrochettoolsfortheladies.FormypartI piledinliterature,--asetofmyown
works,theLegislativeReportsoftheStateofMaine,JeanIngelow,asI saidor intimated,
andbothvolumesof theEarthlyParadise.All thesewerepackedin sand,bagged,and
corded,--bagged,sanded,andcordedagain,--yetagainandagain,--fivetimes.Thenthe
wholeawaitedOrcutt'sordersandourcalculations.
Atlasthemomentcame.Wehad,atOrcutt'sorder,readtherevolutionsoftheFlies
to7230,whichwas,asnearlyasheknew,thespeedonthefatalnight.Wehadsoakedthe
bagforneartwelvehours,and,atthemomentagreedupon,rolleditontheFlies,andsaw
it shotintotheair.It wasosmallthatitwentoutofsightoosoonforustoseeit takefire.
Ofcoursewewatchedeagerlyforsignaltime.TheywereallinbedonB.M.whenwe
letfly.Butthedespatchwasasaddisappointment.
107."Nothinghascomethroughbuttwocroquetballsandachinahorse.Butwe
shallsendtheboyshuntinginbushes,andwemayfindmore."
108."TwoHarpersandanAtlantic,badlysinged.Butwecanreadallbuttheparts
whichweremostdry."
109."Weseemanysmallarticlesrevolvingrounduswhichmayperhapsfallin."
Theyneverdidfallin,however.Thetruthwas,thatallthebagshadburnedthrough.
Thesand,I suppose,wentoitsownplace,whereverthatwas.Andalltheotherthingsin
ourbundlebecamelittleasteroidsoraerolitesin orbitsof theirown,exceptawell-
disposedscoreor two,whichperseveredfarenoughtogetwithintheattractionofBrick
Moon,andtotaketorevolvingthere,nothavinghitquitesquare,asthecroquetballsdid.
TheyhadfivevolumesoftheCongressionalGlobewhirlingroundlikebatswithinahun-
dredfeetoftheirheads.Anotherbody,whichI amafraidwas'q'heInghamPapers,"flewa
littlehigher,notquitesoheavy.Thentherewasanabsurdprocessionfthewoollysheep,
achinacow,anpairofindia-rubbers,alobsterHaliburtonhadchosentosend,awooden
lion,thewaxdoll,aSalter'sbalance,theNewYorkObserver,thebowandarrows,a
Nurembergnanny-goat,Rose'swatering-pot,andthemagneticfishes,whichgravelycircled
roundandroundthemslowly,andmadethepettyzodiacoftheirpettyworld.
Wehaveneversentanotherparcelsince,butweprobablyshallatChristmas,gauging
theFliesperhapstoonerevolutionmore.Thetruthis,thatalthough[219]wehavenever
statedtoeachotherinwordsourdifferenceofopinionorfeeling,thereisadifferenceof
habitof thoughtinourlittlecircleastothepositionwhichtheB.M.holds.Somewhat
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similar is the difference to habit of thought in which different statesmen of England re-
gard their colonies.
Is B.M. a part of our world, or is it not? Should its inhabitants be encouraged to
maintain their connections with us, or is it better for them to "accept the situation" and
gradually wean themselves from us and from our affairs? It would be idle to determine this
question in the abstract: it is perhaps idle to decide any question of casuistry in the ab-
stract. But, in practice, there are constandy arising questions which really require some
decision of this abstract problem for their solution.
For instance, when that terrible breach occurred in the Sandemanian church, which
parted it into the Old School and New School parties, Haliburton thought it very impor-
tant that Brannan and Orcutt and the church in B.M. under Brannan's ministry should
give in their adhesion to our side. Their church would count one more in our registry', and
the weight of its influence would not be lost. He therefore spent eight or nine clays in
telegraphing, from the early proofs, a copy of the address of the chatauque Synod to
Brannan, and asked Brannan if he were not willing to have his name signed to it when it
was printed. And the only thing which Haliburton takes sorely in the whole experience of
the Brick Moon, for the beginning, is that neither Orcutt nor Brannan has ever sent one
word of acknowledgment of the despatch. Once, when Haliburton was very low-spirited, I
heard him even say that he believed they had never read a word of it, and that he thought
he and Rob. Shea had had their labor for their pains in running the signals out and in.
Then he felt quite sure that they would have to establish civil government there. So
he made up an excellent collection of books,--De Lolme on the British Constitution;
Montesquieu on Laws; Story, Kent, John Adams, and all the authorities here; with ten
copies of his own address delivered before the Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society
of Podunk, on the "Abnormal Truths of Social Order." He telegraphed to know what night
he should send them, and Orcutt replied:--
129. "Go to thunder with your old law-books. We have not had a primary meeting nor
a justice court since we have been here, and, D.V., we never will have."
Haliburton says this is as bad as the state of things in Kansas, when, because Frank
Pierce would not give them any judges or laws to their mind, they lived a year or so without
any. Orcutt added in his next despatch:--
130. "Have not you any new novels? Send up Scribe and the Arabian Nights and
Robinson Crusoe and the Three Guardsmen, and Mrs. Whitney's books. We have Thackeray
and Miss Austen."
When he read this, Haliburton felt as if they were not only light-footed, but light-
headed. And he consulted me quite seriously as to telegraphing to them "Pycroft's Course
on Reading." I coaxed him out of that, and he satisfied himself with a serious expostula-
tion with George as to the way in which their young folks would grow up. George replied
by telegraphing Brannan's last sermon, 1 Thessalonians iv. 11. The sermon had four heads,
must have occupied an hour and half in delivery, and took five nights to telegraph. I had
another engagement, so that Haliburton had to sit it all out with this eye to Shubael; and
he has never entered on that line of discussion again. It was as well, perhaps, that he got
enough of it.
The women have never had any misunderstandings. When we had received two or
three hundred despatches from B.M., Annie Haliburton came to me and said, in that
pretty way of hers, that she thought they had a right to their turn again. She said this lore
about the Albert Nyanza and the [220] North Pole was all very well, but, for her part, she
wanted to know how they lived, what they did, and what they talked about, whether they
took summer journeys, and how and what was the form of society where thirty-seven people
lived in such close quarters. This about "the form of society" was merely wool pulled over
my eyes. So she said she thought her husband and I had better go off to the Biennial
Convention at Assumpink, as she knew we wanted to do, and she and Bridget and Polly
and Cordelia would watch for the signals, and would make the replies. She thought they
would get on better if we were out of the way.
So we went to the convention, as she called it, which was really not properly a conven-
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tion, but the Forty-fifth Biennial General Synod, and we left the girls to their own sweet
way.
Shall I confess that tile,,' kept no record of their own signals, and did not rententber
very accurately what they were? "I was not going to keep a string of 'says Fs' and 'says
site's,'" said Polly, boldly. "It shall not be written on my tomb that I have left more annals
for people to file or study or bind or dust or catalogue." But they told us that they had
begun by asking the "bricks" if they remembered what Maria Theresa said to her ladies-in-
waiting2 Quicker than an}' signal had ever been answered, George Orcutt's part}' replied
from the moon, "We hear, and we obey." Then the women-kind had it all to themselves.
The brick-women explained at once to our girls that they had sent their men round to the
other side to cut ice, and that they were manning the telescope, and running the signals
for themselves, and that they could have a nice talk without any bother about the law-
books or the magnetic pole. As I say, I do not know what questions Polly and Annie put;
hut,--to give them their due,--they had put on paper a coherent record of tile results
arrived at in the answers; though, what were the numbers of the despatches, or in what
order they came, I do not know; for the session of the synod kept us at "Assampink tot two
or three weeks.
Mrs. Brannan was the spokesman. "We tried a good many experiments about day and
night. It was very funny at first, not to know when it would be light and when dark, for
really the names day and night do not express a great deal for us. Of course the pendulum
clocks all went wrong till the men got them overhauled, and I think watches and clocks
both will soon go out of fashion. But we have settled down on much the old hours, getting
up, without reference to daylight, by our great gong, at your eight o'clock. But when the
eclipse season comes, we vary from that for signalling.
"We still make separate families, and Alice's is the seventh. We tried hotel life, and we
like it, for there has never been the first quarrel here. You can't quarrel here, where you
are never sick, never tired, and need not be ever hungry. But we were satisfied that it was
nicer for the children, and for all round, to live separately, and come together at parties, to
church, at signal time, and so on. We had something to say then, something to teach, and
something to learn.
"Since the carices developed so nicely into flax, we have had one great COlnfort, which
we had lost before, in being able to make and use paper. We have had great tim, and we
think the children have made great improvement in writing novels for the Union. The
Union to the old Union for Christian work that we had in dear old No. 9. We have two
serial novels going on, one called 'Diana of Carrotook,' and the other called 'Ups and
Downs'; the first by Levi Ross, and the other by my Blanche. They are really very good, and
I wish we could send them to you. But they would not be worth despatching.
"We get up at eight; dress, and fix [221] up at home; a sniff of air, as people choose;
breakfast; and then we meet for prayers outside. Where we meet depends on the tempera-
ture; for we can choose any temperature we want, from boiling water down, which is
convenient. After prayers an hour's talk, lounging, walking, and so on; no flirting, but a
favorite time with the young folks.
'When comes work. Three hours' head-work is the maximum in that line. Of women's
work, as in all worlds, there are twenty-four in one of your days, but for my part I like it.
Farmers and carpenters have their own laws, as the light serves and the seasons. Dinner is
seven hours after breakfast began; always an hour long, as breakfast was. Then every hu-
man being sleeps for an hour. Big gong again, and we ride, walk, swim, telegraph, or what
not, as the case may be. We have no horses yet, but the Shanghaes are coming up into very
good dodos and ostriches, quite big enough for a trot for the children.
"Only two persons of a family take tea at home. The rest always go out to tea without
invitation. At 9 P.M. big gong again, and we meet in 'Grace,' which is the prettiest hall,
church, concert-room, that you ever saw. We have singing, lectures, theatre, dancing, talk,
2. Maria V's husband, Francis, Duke of Tuscany, was hanging about loose one day, and the Empress, who
had got a little tired, said to the maids of honor, "Girls, whenever you marry, take care and choose a husband
who has something to do outside of the house."
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or what the mistress of the night determines, till the curfew sounds at ten, and then we all
go home. Evening prayers are in the separate households, and every one is in bed by
midnight. The only law on the statute-book is that every one shall sleep nine hours out of
every twenty-four.
"Only one thing interrupts this general order. Three taps on the gong means 'tele-
graph,' and then, I tell you, we are all on hand."
"You cannot think how quickly the days and years go by!"
Of course, however, as I said, this could not last. We could not subdue our world, and
be spending all our time in telegraphing our dear B.M. Could it be possible?--perhaps it
was possible,--that they there had something else to think of and to do, besides attending
to our affairs. Certainly their indifference to Grant's fourth Proclamation, and to Mr. Fish's
celebrated protocol in the Tahiti business, looked that way. Could it be that little witch of
a Belle Brannan really cared more for their performance of Midsummer Night's Dream,
or her father's birthday, than she cared for that pleasant little account I telegraphed up to
all the children, of the way we went to muster when we were boys together? Ah well! I
ought not to have supposed that all worlds were like this old world. Indeed, I often say this
is the queerest world I ever knew. Perhaps theirs is not so queer, and it is I who am the
oddity.
Of course it could not last. We just arranged correspondence days, when we would
send to them, and they to us. I was meanwhile turned out from my place at Tamworth
Observatory. Not but I did my work well, and Polly hers. The observer's room was a miracle
of neatness. The children were kept in the basement. Visitors were received with great
courtesy; and all the fees were sent to the treasurer; he got three dollars and eleven cents
one summer,--that was the year General Grant came there; and that was the largest amount
that they ever received from any source but begging. I was not unfaithful to my trust. Nor
was it for such infidelity that I was removed. No! But it was discovered that I was a
Sandemanian; a Glassite, as in derision I was called. The annual meeting of the trustees
came round. There was a large Mechanics' Fair in Tamworth at the time, and an Agricul-
tural Convention. There was no horserace at the convention, but there were two competi-
tive examinations in which running horses competed with each other, and trotting horses
competed with each other, and five thousand dollars was given to the best runner and the
best trotter. These causes drew all the trustees together. The Rev. Cephas Philpotts pre-
sided. His doctrines with [922] regard to free agency were considered much more sound
than mine. He took the chair,--in that pretty observatory parlor, which Polly had made so
bright with smilax and ivy. Of course I took no chair; I waited, as a janitor should, at the
door. Then a brief address. Dr. Philpotts trusted that the observatory might always be
administered in the interests of science, of true science; of that science which rightly dis-
tinguishes between unlicensed liberty and true freedom; between the unrestrained voli-
tion and the freedom of the will. He became eloquent, he became noisy. He sat down.
Then three other men spoke, on similar subjects. Then the executive committee which
had appointed me was dismissed with thanks. Then a new executive committee was cho-
sen, with Dr. Philpotts at the head. The next day I was discharged. And the next week the
Philpotts family moved into the observatory, and their second girl now takes care of the
instruments.
I returned to the cure of souls and to healing the hurt of my people. On observation
days somebody runs down to No. 9, and by means of Shubael communicates with B.M. We
love them, and they love us all the same.
Nor do we grieve for them as we did. Coming home from Pigeon Cove in October,
with those nice Wadsworth people, we fell to talking as to the why and wherefore of the
summer life we had led. How was it that it was so charming? And why were we a little loath
to come back to more comfortable surroundings? "I hate the school," said George
Wadsworth. "I hate the making calls," said his mother. "I hate the office hour," said her
poor husband; "if there were only a dozen I would not mind, but seventeen hundred thou-
sand in sixty minutes is too many." So that led to asking how many of us there had been at
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Pigeon Cove. The children counted up all the six families,--the Haliburtons, the
Wadsworths, the Pontefracts, the Midges, the Hayeses, and the Inghams, and the two good-
natured girls,--thirty-seven in all,--and the two babies born this summer. "Really," said
Mrs. Wadsworth, "I have not spoken to a human being besides these since June; and what
is more, Mrs. Ingham, I have not wanted to. We have really lived in a little world of our own."
"World of our own!" Polly fairly jumped from her seat, to Mrs. Wadsworth's wonder.
So we had--lived in a world of our own. Polly reads no newspaper since the "Sandemanian"
was merged. She has a letter or two tumble in sometimes, but not many; and the truth was
that she had been more secluded from General Grant and Mr. Gladstone and the Khedive,
and the rest of the important people, than had Brannan or Ross or any of thein!
And it had been the happiest summer she had ever known.
Can it be possible that all human sympathies can thrive, and all human powers be
exercised, and all human joys increase, if we live with all our might with the thirty or forty"
people next to us, telegraphing kindly to all other people, to be sure? Can it be possible
that our passion for large cities, and large parties, and large theatres, and large churches,
develops no faith nor hope nor love which would not find aliment and exercise in a little
'%'orld of our own"?
Document I-4
Document title: Percival Lowell, Mars (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1895), pp. 201-12.
Percival Lowell, a Brahmin from Massachusetts, became interested in Mars during
the latter part of the nineteenth century. Using personal funds and grants from other
sources he built what became the Lowell Observatory near Flagstaff, Arizona, to study the
planets. This research led him to publish Mars and Its Canals in 1906, which argued that
Mars had once been a watery planet and that the topographical features known as canals
had been built by intelligent beings. Over the course of the next forty years others used
Lowell's observations of Mars as a foundation for their arguments. The idea of intelligent
life on Mars stayed in the popular imagination for a long time.
[201] To review, now, the chain of reasoning by which we have been led to regard it
probable that upon the surface of Mars we see the effects of local intelligence. We find, in
the first place, that the broad physical conditions of the planet are not antagonistic to
some form of life; secondly, that there is an apparent dearth of water upon the planet's
surface, and therefore, if beings of sufficient intelligence inhabited it, they would have to
resort to irrigation to support life; thirdly, that there turns out to be a network of markings
covering the disk precisely counterparting what a system of irrigation would look like; and,
lastly, that there is a set of spots placed where we should expect to find the lands thus
artificially fertilized, and behaving as such constructed oases should. All this, of course,
may be a set of coincidences, signifying nothing; but the probability points the other way.
As to details of explanation, any we may adopt will undoubtedly be found, on closer ac-
quaintance, to vary from the actual Martian state of things; for any Martian life must differ
markedly from our own.
[202] The fundamental fact in the matter is the dearth of water. If we keep this in
mind we shall see that many of the objections that spontaneously arise answer themselves.
The supposed herculean task of constructing such canals disappears at once for, if the
canals be dug for irrigation purposes, it is evident that what we see, and call by ellipsis the
canal, is not really the canal at all, but the strip of fertilized land bordering it,--the
thread of water in the midst of it, the canal itself, being far too small to be perceptible. In
the case of an irrigation canal seen at a distance, it is always the strip of verdure, not the
canal, that is visible, as we see in looking from afar upon irrigated country on the Earth.
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Wemay,perhaps,inconclusion,considerforamomenthowdifferentin itsdetails
existenceonMarsmustbefromexistenceontheEarth.Onepointoutofmanybearingon
thesubject,hesimplestandmostcertainofall,istheeffectofmeresizeofhabitatupon
thesizeoftheinhabitant;forgeometricalconditionsalonearemostpotentfactorsinthe
problemoflife.Volumeandmassdeterminetheforceofgravityuponthesurfaceof a
planet,andthisismorefar-reachinginitseffectsthanmightatfirstbethought.Gravityon
thesurfaceof Marsisonlya littlemorethanonethirdwhatit ison thesurfaceof the
Earth.Thiswouldworkin twowaystoverydifferentconditionsofexistencefromthoseto
whichweareaccustomed.Tobeginwith,threetimesasmuchwork,asforexample,in
diggingacanal,couldbedonebythesamexpenditureof muscularforce.If wewere
transportedtoMars,we[203]shouldhepleasinglysurprisedtofindallourmanuallabor
suddenlyightenedthreefold.But,indirectly,theremightresultayetgreatergaintoour
capabilities;forif Naturechoseshecouldaffordtheretobuildherinhabitantsonthree
timesthescaleshedoesonEarthwithouttheireverfindingit outexceptbyinterplanetary
comparison.Letusseehow.
Asweallknow,alargemanismoreunwieldythanasmallone.Anelephantrefusesto
hoplikeaflea;notbecauseh considerstheactundignified,butsimplybecausehecannot
bringit about.Ifwecould,weshouldalljumpstraightacrossthestreet,insteadofpain-
fullypaddlingthroughthemud.OurinabilitytodosodependsuponthesizeoftheEarth,
notuponwhatit atfirstseemstodependon,thesizeofthestreet.
Toseethis,letusconsidertheverysimplestcase,thatof standingerect.Tothis
every-dayfeatopposesitselftheweightofthebodysimply,athingofthreedimensions,
height,breadth,andthickness,whiletheabilitytoaccomplishitresidesinthecross-section
ofthe[204]musclesof theknee,athingofonlytwodimensions,breadthandthickness.
Consequently,apersonhalfaslargeagainasanotherhasaboutwicethesupportingca-
pacityof thatother,butabouthreetimesasmuchtosupport.Standingthereforetires
himoutmorequickly.If hissizeweretogoonincreasing,hewouldatlastreachastature
atwhichhewouldnolongerbeabletostandatall,butwouldhavetoliedown.Youshall
seethesameffectinquiteinanimateobjects.Taketwocylindersofparaffinewax,one
madeintoanordinarycandle,theotherintoagiganticfacsimileofone,andthenstand
bothupontheirbases.Tothesmallonenothinghappens.Thebigone,however,beginsto
settle,thebaseactuallymadeviscousbythepressureoftheweightabove.
Nowapplythisprincipletoapossibleinhabitantof Mars,andsupposehimtobe
constructedthreetimesaslargeasahumanbeingin everydimension.If hewereon
Earth,hewouldweightwenty-seventimesasmuch,butonthesurfaceofMars,sincegrav-
itythereisonlyaboutonethirdofwhatit ishere,hewouldweighbutninetimesasmuch.
Thecross-sectionof hismuscleswouldbeninetimesasgreat.Thereforetheratioof his
supportingpowertotheweighthemustsupportwouldbethesameasours.Consequently,
hewouldbeabletostandwithaslittlefatigueaswe.Now[205]considertheworkhe
mightbeableto do.Hismuscles,havinglength,breadth,andthickness,wouldall be
twenty-seventimesaseffectiveasours.Hewouldprovetwenty-seventimesasstrongaswe,
andcouldaccomplishtwenty-seventimesasmuch.Buthewouldfurtherworkuponwhat
required,owingtodecreasedgravity,butonethirdtheefforttoovercome.Hiseffective
force,therefore,wouldbeeighty-onetimesasgreatasman's,whetherindiggingcanalsor
inotherbodilyoccupation.AsgravityonthesurfaceofMarsisreallyalittlemorethanone
thirdthatatthesurfaceoftheEarth,thetrueratioisnoteighty-one,butaboutfifty;thatis,
aMartianwouldbe,physically,fifty-foldmoreefficientthanman.
Asthereaderwillobserve,thereisnothingproblematicalabouthisdeductionwhat-
ever.Itexpressesanabstractratioofphysicalcapabilitieswhichmustexistbetweenthetwo
planets,quiteirrespectiveofwhethertherebedenizensoneither,orhowotherconditions
mayfurtheraffectheirforms.Asthereadermustalsonote,thedeductionreferstothe
possibility,nottotheprobability,ofsuchgiants;thecalculationbeingintroducedsimply
toshowhowdifferentfromusanyMartiansmaybe,nothowdifferenttheyare.
It mustalsoberememberedthatthequestionoftheirsizehasnothingtodowiththe[206]questionoftheirexistence.Theargumentsfortheirpresencearequiteapartfrom
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anyconsiderationfavoirdupois.NoHerculeanlaborsneedtobeaccountedfor;and,if
theydid,brainisfarmorepotentothetaskthanbrawn.
Somethingmorewemaydeduceabouthecharacteristicsof possibleMartians,
dependentuponMarsitself,aresultoftheageoftheworldtheywouldlivein.
Aplanetmayinaveryrealsensebesaidtohavelifeofitsown,ofwhichwhatwecall
lifemayormaynotbeasubsequentdetail.It isborn,hasitsfieryyouth,sobersintomiddle
age,andjustbeforethishappensbringsforth,if it begoingtodosoatall,thecreatureson
itssurfacewhichare,in asense,itsoffspring.Thespeedwithwhichit runsthroughits
gamutofchangepriortoproductiondependsuponitssize;forthesmallerthebodythe
quickerit cools,andwithit lossofheatmeansbeginningoflifeforitsoffspring.It cools
quickerbecause,aswesawinapreviouschapter,it hasrelativelyessinsideforitsoutside,
andit isthroughitsoutsidethatitsinsidecools.Afterit hasthusbecomecapableofbear-
inglife,theSunquickensthatlifeandsupportsit forweknownothowlong.Butitsdura-
tionismeasuredatthemostbytheSun'slife.Now,inasmuchastimeandspacearenot,as
somephilosophershavefromtheirtoomundanestandpoint[207]supposed,formsofour
intellect,butessentialttributesoftheuniverse,thetimetakenbyanyprocessaffectsthe
characteroftheprocessit elf,asdoesalsothesizeofthebodyundergoingit.Thechanges
broughtaboutinalargeplanetbyitscoolingarenot,therefore,thesameasthosebrought
aboutinasmallone.Physically,chemically,and,toourpresentend,organically,thetwo
resultsarequitediverse.Sodifferent,indeed,aretheythatunlesstheplanethaveatleast
acertainsizeitwillneverproducewhatwecallife,meaningourparticularchainofchanges
orcloselyalliedformsofit, atall.Aswesawin thecaseofatmosphere,it willlackeventhe
premisetosuchconclusion.
Whatevertheparticularplanet'slineof development,however,in itsownline,it
proceedsto greaterandgreaterdegreesofevolution,till theprocessstops,dependent,
probably,upontheSun.Thepointofdevelopmentat ainedis,asregardsitscapabilities,
measuredbytheplanet'sownage,sincetheonefollowsupontheother.
Now,inthespecialcaseofMars,wehavebeforeusthespectacleofaworldrelatively
welloninyears,aworldmucholderthantheEarth.TosomuchabouthisageMarsbears
evidenceonhisface.Heshowsunmistakablesignsofbeingold.Advancingplanetaryyears
havelefttheirmarklegiblethere.Hiscontinentsareall[208]smootheddown;hisoceans
havealldriedup.Teres atque rotundus, he is a steady-going body now. If once he had a
chaotic youth, it has long since passed away. Although called after the most turbulent of
the gods, he is at the present time, whatever he may have been once, one of the most
peaceable of the heavenly host. His name is a sad misnomer; indeed, the ancients seem to
have been singularly unfortunate in their choice of planetary cognomens. With Mars so
peaceful, Jupiter so young, and Venus bashfully draped in cloud, the planet's names ac-
cord but ill with their temperaments.
Mars being thus old himself, we know that evolution on his surface must be similarly
advanced. This only informs us of Its condition relative to the planet's capabilities. Of its
actual state our data are not definite enough to furnish much deduction. But front the fact
that our own development has been comparatively a recent thing, and that a long time
would be needed to bring even Mars to his present geological condition, we may judge any
life he may support to be not only relatively, but really older than our own.
From the little we can see, such appears to be the case. The evidence of handicraft, if
such it be, points to a highly intelligent mind behind it. Irrigation, unscientifically con-
ducted, would not give us such truly wonderful mathematical [209] fitness in the several
parts to the whole as we there behold. A mind of no mean order would seem to have
presided over the system we see,--a mind certainly of considerably more comprehensive-
ness than that which presides over the various departments of our own public works. Party
politics, at all events, have had no part in them; for the system is planet wide. Quite possi-
bly, such Martian folk are possessed of inventions of which we have not dreamed, and with
them electrophones and kinetoscopes are things of a bygone past, preserved with venera-
tion in museums as relics of the clumsy contrivances of the simple childhood of the race.
Certainly what we see hints at the existence of beings who are in advance of, not behind us,
58 PRELUDETO THE SPACE AGE
in the journey of life.
Startling as the outcome of these observations may appear at first, in truth there is
nothing startling about it whatever. Such possibility has been quite on the cards ever since
the existence of Mars itself was recognized by the Chaldean shepherds, or whoever the still
more primeval astronomers may have been. Its strangeness is a purely subjective phenom-
enon, arising from the instinctive reluctance of man to admit the possibility of peers. Such
would be comic were it not the inevitable consequence of the constitution of the universe.
To be shy of anything resembling himself is part and parcel [210] of man's own individual-
ity. Like the savage who fears nothing so much as a strange man, like Crusoe who grows
pale at the sight of footprints not his own, the civilized thinker instinctively turns from the
thought of mind other than the one he himself knows. To admit into his conception of the
cosmos other finite minds as factors has in it something of the weird. Any hypothesis to
explain the facts, no matter how improbable or even palpably absurd it be, is better than
this. Snow-caps of solid carbonic acid gas, a planet cracked in a positively mono-maniacal
manner, meteors ploughing tracks across its surface with such mathematical precision that
they must have been educated to the performance, and so forth and so on, in hypotheses
each more astounding than its predecessor, commend themselves to man, if only by such
means he may escape the admission of anything approaching his kind. Surely all this is
puerile, and should as speedily as possible be outgrown. It is simply an instinct like any
other, the projection of the instinct of self-preservation. We ought, therefore, to rise above
it, and, where probability points to other things, boldly accept the fact provisionally, as we
should the presence of oxygen, or iron, or anything else. Let us not cheat ourselves with
words. Conservatism sounds finely, and covers any amount of ignorance and fear.
[211 ] We must be just as careful not to run to the other extreme, and draw deduc-
tions of purely local outgrowth. To talk of Martian beings is not to mean Martian men.Just
as the probabilities point to the one, so do they point away from the other. Even on this
Earth man is of the nature of an accident. He is the survival of by no means the highest
physical organism. He is not even a high form of mammal. Mind has been his making, For
aught we can see, some lizard or batrachian might just as well have popped into his place
early in the race, and been now the dominant creature of this Earth. Under different
physical conditions, he would have been certain to do so. Amid the surroundings that exist
on Mars, surroundings so different from our own, we may be practically sure other organ-
isms have been evolved of which we have no cognizance. What manner of beings they may
be we lack the data even to conceive.
For answers to such problems we must look to the future. That Mars seems to be
inhabited is not the last, but the first word on the subject More important than the mere
fact of the existence of living beings there, is the question of what they may be like. Whether
we ourselves shall live to learn this cannot, of course, be foretold. One thing, however, we
can do, and that speedily: look at things from a standpoint raised above our local point of
view; [212] free our minds at least from the shackles that of necessity tether our bodies;
recognize the possibility of others in the same light that we do the certainty of ourselves.
That we are the sum and substance of the capabilities of the cosmos is something so pre-
posterous as to be exquisitely comic. We pride ourselves upon being men of the world,
forgetting that this is but objectionable singularity, unless we are, in some wise, men of
more worlds than one. For, after all, we are but a link in a chain. Man is merely this earth's
highest production up to date. That he in any sense gauges the possibilities of the universe
is humorous. He does not, as we can easily foresee, even gauge those of this planet. He has
been steadily bettering from an immemorial past, and will apparently continue to improve
through an incalculable future. Still less does he gauge the universe about him. He merely
typifies in an imperfect way what is going on elsewhere, and what, to a mathematical cer-
tainty, is in some corners of the cosmos indefinitely excelled.
If astronomy teaches anything, it teaches that man is but a detail in the evolution
of the universe, and that resemblant though diverse details are inevitably to be expected in
the host of orbs around him. He learns that, though he will probably never find his double
anywhere, he is destined to discover any number of cousins scattered through space.
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Document I-5
Document fl0e: A.A. Blagonravov, Editor in Chief, Collected Works ofKE. Tsiolkovskiy, Vol-
ume H - Reactive Flying Machines, Translation of "ILE. Tsiolkovskiy, Sobraniye Sochineniy,
Tom II - Reaktivnyye Letatal'nyye Apparaty," Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, Moscow,
1954, NASA Tr F-237, 1965, pp. 72-117.
Konstantin Tsiolkovskiy was a school teacher who lived in the small town of Kaluga,
Russia. He is regarded by the Russians as the founder of Soviet rocketry, much as Robert
Goddard and Hermann Oberth are regarded as the fathers of American and (;erman
rocketry in their respective countries. He is responsible for associating the term Spumik,
or "fellow traveller," to artificial satellites. But Tsiolkovskiy's work was almost entirely theo-
retical and was not widely known or translated outside of Russia, until after his death.
This article, written in 1898 and first published in 1903, established the fundamen-
tals of orbital mechanics and proposed the then-radical use of both liquid oxygen and
liquid hydrogen as fuel. It appeared seventeen years before Goddard repeated much of
the work in the United States and twenty-three years before he began the first experiments
with liquid propellants. It was also the first detailed discussion of a manned space station.
The fact that it was not translated until much later meant that its impact on rocket re-
search around the world was minimal.
[72]
Exploration of the Universe with Reaction Machines
Heights Reached by Balloons; Their Size and Weight;
the Temperature and Density of the Atmosphere
1. So far small unmanned aerostats carrying automatic observation equipment have
risen to altitudes of not more than 22 kin.
Above this height the difficulties of ascending to higher altitudes by balloon increases
rapidly.
Suppose an aerostat is required to climb to an altitude of 27 km carrying a load of
1 kg. The air density at an altitude of 27 km is about 1/50 of the density at the surface
(760 mm pressure and 0°C). This means that at this altitude a balloon must occupy a
volume 50 times greater than on the ground. At sea level, it is filled with, say, at least
2 cubic meters of hydrogen, which at the given altitude will occupy 100 cubic meters. At
the same time, the balloon will lift a load of 1 kg, i.e., the automatic instruments, and the
balloon itself will weigh about 1 kg. Assuming the diameter of the envelope to be 5.8 m
meters, its surface area will be at least 103 square meters. Therefore, every square meter of
the material, including the reinforcing mesh sewn into it, should weigh 10 g.
One square meter of ordinary writing paper weighs 100 g, while one square meter of
cigarette paper weights 50 g. Thus even cigarette paper would be five times heavier than
the material needed for our balloon. Such a material could not be used in the balloon, as
an envelope made from it would tear and allow the gas to leak at a rapid rate.
Large balloons may have thicker envelopes. Thus, a balloon [73] with the
unprecedentedly large diameter of 58 meters would have an envelope, one square meter
of which would weigh about 100 g, i.e., about as much as ordinary writing paper. It would
lift a load of 1,000 kg, which is much more than an automatic recorder would weigh.
If we reduce this load to one kilogram, using the same gigantic aerostat, we can make
the envelope twice as heavy. In general, such a balloon, while expensive, would be per-
fectly feasible. At an altitude of 27 km it would occupy a volume of 100,000 cubic meters,
and the surface area of its envelope would be 10,300 square meters.
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And yet, how miserable these results seem! A mere 27 kin. How then could the in-
struments be raised higher? The aerostat would have to be still larger. But here it should
not be forgotten that as the size increases the forces acting on the envelope dominate
more and more over the resistance of the material.
Raising instruments beyond the limits of the atmosphere by means of an aerostat is,
of course, inconceivable; observations of shooting stars reveal that those limits lie no higher
than 200-300 kin. In theory, the top of the atmosphere may even be set at 54 km, if we base
our calculations on a decrease in air temperature by 5°C per kilometer, which is fairly close
to reality, at least with respect to the accessible layers of the atmosphere.*
I present a table of altitudes, temperatures and air densities calculated on this basis.
It shows how rapidly the difficulties increase with altitude.
The divisor in the last column indicates the degree of difficulty in constructing a
balloon. [74]
Depth of atmo- Temperature Air
sphere in km t in °C Density
0 0 1
6 - 30 1:2
12 - 60 1 : 4.32
18 - 90 1 : 10.6
24 - 120 1 : 30.5
30 - 150 1 : 116
36 - 180 1 : 584
42 - 210 1 : 3900
48 - 240 1 : 28 000
54.5 - 272 0
2. Let us now consider another possible means of reaching high-altitudesmcannon-
launched projectiles.
In practice, the initial velocity of a shell does not exceed 1,200 m/sec. Such a projec-
tile, if launched vertically, would rise to an "altitude of 73 km, if the ascent took place in a
vacuum. In air, however, the height reached would be much lower depending on the shape
and mass of the projectile.
If the shape of the projectile were suitable, it might reach a considerable height; but
instruments could not be housed inside the projectile, since they would be smashed into
fragments on its return to Earth or even while it was still moving through the barrel of the
cannon. The danger would be less if the projectile were shot from a [75] tube, but even
then it would still be enormous. Suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that the gas pressure
on the projectile was uniform, so that the acceleration was W m/sec _.Then the same accel-
eration would also be imparted to all the objects inside the projectile, objects forced to
share the same motion. As a result, inside the projectile there would develop a relative,
* Editor's note: According to recent data, in the stratosphere, between 11 and 35 km. the temperature is
constant and equal to -56.5°C. In the region between 35 and 50 km a rise in temperature to -30-35°C is observed.
* It is now known that the decrease in temperature continues only as far up as the boundar?' of the tropo-
sphere, i.e., up to 11 km.
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apparentgravity,*equaltoW/g,wheregisaccelerationduetogravityattheEarth'sur-face.
ThelengthofthecannonL may be expressed by the formula
whence
g 2
L
2(W-g)'
V 2
W =-_+g,
where V is the velocity acquired by the prqiectile on lea_ing the muzzle.
It is clear from the formula that W, and hence the increase in relative grax4ty in the
projectile, decreases with increasing barrel length ifV is constant, i.e., the longer the can-
non the greater the safety of the instruments during the firing of the projectile. But even
if the cannon were, in theory, extremely long, which is not feasible in practice, the appar-
ent gravity in the projectile, as the latter accelerates through the barrel, would [76] be-
come so enormous that the sensitive instruments would hardly be able to withstand it. This
would make it all the more impossible to dispatch a living organism in the projectile,
should this be found necessary.
3. Let us assume that we have succeeded in building a cannon approximately 300 m
tall. Suppose it has been erected next to the Eiffel Tower which, of course, is the same
height, and let the projectile, under the unitorm pressure of the gases, attain a muzzle
velocity sufficient to carry it beyond the limits of the atmosphere, e.g., to an altitudt, of
300 km above the surface. Then the velocity V required for this purpose may be calculated
from the formula
V = 2_.h **,
where h is the maximum altitude (we obtain approximately 2,450 m/sec). From the last
two formulas, on eliminating V, we obtain
W h
--=--+|;
g L
where W/g expresses the relative or apparent gravity within the projectile. From the for-
mulawe find it to be equal to 1001.
Therefore, the weight of all the instruments inside the projectile would increase by
more than a thousandfold, i.e., an object weighing one kilogram would experience a pres-
sure of 1,000 kg [77] due to the apparent grax4ty. There is hardly any physical instrument
that can withstand such a pressure. And what a tremendous shock would be experienced
by a living organism in a short-barreled cannon and during the ascent to an altitude of
more than 300 kin!
In order not to lead anyone astray by the words "relative or apparent gravity," let me
say that by this 1 mean a force dependent on the acceleration of a body (for example, a
projectile). It also appears during the uniform motion of a body, provided this motion is
curvilinear; it is then termed centrifugal force. In general, relative grax4ty ahvays appears
* g force (Editor's note).
**In these calculations air resistance was not taken into account (Editor's l/ote)
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whenever a body is acted upon by some mechanical force that disturbs its inertial motion.
Relative gravity operates as long as the force engendering it continues to act; once the
latter ceases to act, the relative gravity disappears without a trace. If I term this force grav-
ity, it is only because its temporary effect is exacdy the same as that of a gravitational force.
Just as every material point of a body is subject to gravitation, so relative gravity affects
every particle of a body enclosed in a projectile; this is because relative gravity depends on
inertia, by which all the material parts of a body are equally affected. Thus, the instru-
ments inside the projectile will become 1,001 times heavier. Even if they could be
preserved intact through this terrifying, though momentary (0.24 sec) intensification in
reladve gravity, there would still be many other obstacles to the use of cannons as a means
of reaching the celestial space.
First and foremost, there is the difficulty of building such cannons, even in the fu-
ture; second, there is the tremendous initial velocity of the projectile. Actually, in the dense
lower layers of the atmosphere the projectile would lose much of its velocity owing to air
resistance; now this loss in velocity would also considerably reduce the altitude reached by
the projectile. Besides, it is difficult to obtain a uniform gas pressure on the projectile, as
the latter moves through the cannon barrel, so that the intensification of gravity will be
much greater than calculated (1,001). Finally, the safe return of projectile to Earth would
be more than doubtful.
Rocket Versus Cannon
4. Thus, the tremendous increase in gravity alone is definitely enough to dispel any
notion of using cannons for our purpose.
Instead of cannons or aerostats, I propose the use of reaction [78] machines to ex-
plore the atmosphere. By reaction machine I mean a kind of rocket, but a specially de-
signed rocket on a grandiose scale. The idea is not new, but the calculations yield such
remarkable results that they simply cannot be ignored.
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Figure 1
A -Freely evaporating liquid oxygen at very low temperature.
B-Liquid hydrocarbon.
C -Crew, breathing apparatus, etc.
I am far from having investigated every side of the matter, nor have I attempted to
solve the practical problems relating to the feasibility of the concept; however, it is already
possible to behold, across the veil, such tantalizing and significant glimpses of the distant
future as could hardly be dreamed of.
Visualize the following projectile: an elongated metal chamber (the shape of least
resistance) equipped with electric light, oxygen, and means of absorbing carbon dioxide,
odors, and other animal secretions; a chamber, in short, designed to protect not only vari-
ous physical instruments but also a human pilot (we shall consider the problem in its
broadest terms). The chamber is pardy occupied by a large store of substances which, on
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beingmixed,immediatelyformanexplosivemass.Thismixture,onexplodinginacon-
trolledand[79]fairlyuniformmanneratachosenpoint,flowsin theformof hotgases
throughtubeswithflaredends(Fig.1),shapedlikeacornucopiaoratrumpet.These
tubesarearrangedlengthwisealongthewallsofthechamber.At thenarrowendof the
tubetheexplosivesaremixed:thisiswherethedense,burninggasesareobtained.After
undergoingintenserarefactionandcooling,thegasesexplodeoutwardintospaceata
tremendousrelativevelocityattheother,flaredendofthetube.Clearly,underdefinite
conditions,uchaprojectilewillascendlikearocket.
Automaticnstrumentsareneededtocontrolthemotionoftherocket,asI shallcall
it, andtheforceoftheexplosioni accordancewithapredeterminedschedule.
Schematic View of the Rocket
The two liquid gases are separated by a partition. The place where the gases are
mixed and exploded is shown, as is the flared outlet for the intensely rarefied and cooled
vapors. The tube is surrounded by a jacket with a rapidly circulating liquid metal. The
control surfaces serving to steer the rocket are also visible.
If the resultant of the explosion forces does not pass through the center of inertia of
the projectile, the projectile will rotate and, therefore, will not be suitable. Now, it is quite
impossible to attain a mathematically precise coincidence of this kind, because the center
of inertia is bound to fluctuate owing to the motion of the substances contained by the
projectile, in the same way as the direction of the resultant of the gas pressure inside a
cannon barrel cannot be mathematically fixed. So long as the projectile is still in the air, it
can be guided with control surfaces like a bird, but what can be done in an airless medium
where the ether can not provide any appreciable support?
If the resultant is as close as possible to the center of inertia of the projectile, the
rotation will be fairly slow. But as soon as it commences, we can shift some mass inside the
projectile until the ensuing displacement of the center of inertia causes the projectile to
incline in the opposite direction. Thus, by sensing the movements of the projectile and
shifting a small mass inside it, we can cause the projectile to swing now in one, now in the
other direction, so that the general direction of action of the explosives and the general
direction of motion of the projectile do not change.
[80] It may be that manual steering of the projectile will be not only difficult but
even infeasible. In this case, it will be necessary to resort to automatic control.
The Earth's gravitational attraction cannot be used as the principal regulating force,
since the projectile will be governed only by relative gravity due to the acceleration W, the
direction of which will coincide with the relative direction of the outflowing gases or be
directly opposite to their resultant pressure. And since this direction varies with the rota-
tion of the projectile, the relative gravity is unsuitable as the basis of a guidance system.
On the other hand, it is possible to use a magnetic needle or the strength of the
Sun's rays focused by means of a biconvex lens. Whenever the projectile rotates, the small,
bright image of the sun will change its relative position in the projectile, thus causing the
expansion of a gas, or creating a pressure or an electric current, and hence the movement
of a counterweight to restore the direction of the projectile, so that the light spot again
falls on a neutral, insensitive part of the mechanism.
There should be two such automatically actuated masses.
Another basis for the guidance system of the projectile could be a small chamber
with two disks rapidly rotating in different planes. The chamber is suspended so that its
position or, more exactly, direction is independent of the direction of the projectile. When
the projectile rotates, the chamber (if we ignore the friction) retains the same absolute
direction (relative to the stars) thanks to its inertia; this property manifests itself to a high
degree when the chamber disks rotate rapidly. If fine springs attached to the chamber
changed their relative position during the rotation of the projectile, this change could be
used to excite a current and produce a shift in the position of the counterweights.
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Lastly,rotationofthemouthofthetubemightalsoserveasameansofkeepingthe
projectileoncourse.Thesimplestmeansof steeringtherocketwouldbedualcontrol
surfacesmountedexternally,closeto themouthof thetube.Asforpreventingtherota-
uonoftherocketabouti slongitudinalxis,thiscanbeaccomplishedbyrotatingaplate
locatedinthegasflowandalignedwiththedirectionofthisflow.*
[81] Advantages of the Rocket
5. Before expounding the theory of the rocket or similar reaction-propelled devices,
I shall try to interest the reader in the advantages of the rocket as compared with the
cannon-launched projectile:
a) Our device, compared with the gigantic cannon, is as light as a feather, rela-
tively cheap, and comparatively easy to realize.
b) The pressure of the explosives, being fairly uniform, creates a uniform accel-
eration which develops a relative gravity; we can adjust the magnitude of this temporary
gravity as desired, i.e., by regulating the force of the explosion, and make it arbitrarily
small or many times greater than normal terrestrial gravity. If we assume for simplicity's
sake that the force of the explosion diminishes in proportion to the mass of the projectile
plus the mass of the remaining, still unexploded fuel, the acceleration of the projectile,
and hence the relative gravity, will be constant. Thus, with respect to apparent gravity, a
rocket can safely be used to dispatch not only measuring instruments but also human
beings, whereas a cannon-launched projectile, even one shot from a colossal cannon as tall
as the Eiffel Towel-, involves a 1,001-fold increase in relative gravity in ascending to 300 kin.
c) Another important advantage of the rocket is that its velocity can be made to
increase at a desired rate and in a desired direction; it may be kept constant; or it may
uniformly decrease, thus making possible a safe landing. Everything depends on a reliable
explosion regulator.
d) At take-off, when the atmosphere is dense and the air resistance at high speeds
enormous, the rocket moves comparatively slowly and therefore the losses due to air resis-
tance are low; moreover, the rocket does not become overheated.
The velocity of a rocket increases only very slowly; but later on, as it ascends to more
and more rarefied layers of the atmosphere, it can be made to increase more rapidly, until,
finally, in airless space the velocity reaches a maximum. Thus, the work done in overcom-
ing air resistance is reduced to a minimum.
[82] The Rocket in an Atmosphereless, Gravitationless Medium
The Mass Ratio of the Rocket
6. First let us consider the effect in an atmosphereless, gravitationless medium. As
regards the atmosphere, we shall consider only its resistance to the motion of the projec-
tile, disregarding its resistance to the expulsion of exhaust gases. The effect of the atmo-
sphere on the explosion is not altogether clear; on the one hand, it is favorable, since the
exploding substances receive some support from the material medium, thus contributing
to an increase in the rocket's velocity; on the other hand, the density and pressure of the
atmosphere interfere with the expansion of the gases beyond certain known limits, so that
these gases do not acquire the velocity they would acquire if expelled in a void. The latter
effect is unfavorable, since the increase in the velocity of the rocket is proportional to the
*It is noteworthy that here Tsiolkovskiy anticipates the development of modern exhaust control vanes (Editor's
D,Ote ).
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velocity of the expelled explosion products.
7. Let us denote by M the mass the projectile together with all it contains, except the
supply of explosives; by M 2, the total mass of the explosives; and, lastly, by M, the variable
mass of the explosives remaining in the projectile in unexploded form at a given instant.
Thus, the total mass of the rocket at the commencement of the explosion will be: (M
+ M_); some time later, however, it will be expressed by the variable (M + M); and finally,
when the explosion ends, by the constant M.
In order for the rocket to attain its maximum velocity, it must expel the explosion
products in a fixed direction relative to the stars. Theretore it must not rotate and, in
order for it not to rotate, the resultant of the explosive forces--which passes through their
center of pressure--must at the same time pass through the center of inertia of the whole
complex of speeding masses. We have already solved the problem of how to accomplish
this in practice.
Thus, assuming the optimal expulsion of the gases in a single direction, we obtain
the following differential equation based on the law of conservation of momentum:
[83] dV(M_ + M) = V_dM (8)
9. Here dM is an infinitely small mass of explosive material expelled from the mouth
of the tube at a constant (relative to the rocket) velocity V_.
10. I should point out that on the basis of the law of relative motion, given the same
conditions, the relative velocity of the exhaust elements is the same throughout the period
of the explosion, dV is the increment in the velocity of the rocket together with the re-
maining unconsumed explosives; this increment, dV, is due to the expulsion of an ele-
ment dM at the velocity V. We shall determine the latter in the proper place.
1 1. Separating the variables in equation (8) and integrating, we obtain
or
ll.fdV=_[ dM +C
•/ M_+M '
(12)
V
--=-ln(MI+M)+C. (13)
V1
where C is a constant. When M = M_, i.e., before the explosion, V = O; thus we find
and hence
C=+ln (MI+M2) ; (14)
_V_V In (15)
V1 MI+M )'
[84] The velocity of the projectile will be a maximum when M = 0, i.e., when the
entire fuel supply M 2 has been burned; then, putting M = 0 in the preceding equation, we
have
(16)
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HenceweseethatthevelocityVof theprojectileincreaseswithoutlimitwithin-
creasein theamountM2ofexplosives.Thismeansthatwecanattaindifferentfinalveloci-
tiesfordifferentvoyages,dependingonthestoreofexplosivestakenonboard.Equation(16)alsoshowsthatadefinitequantityofexplosiveisconsumed,thevelocityoftherocket
doesnotdependontherateoruniformityof theexplosion,solongastheparticlesof
exhaustmaterialmoveatthesamevelocityV withrespecttotheprojectile.
17.However,asthequantityM2increases,thevelocityVoftherocketincreasesver
moreslowly,thoughwithoutlimit.It increasesmoreor lessasthelogarithmof thein-
creasein theamountofexplosivesM_(ifM2islargecomparedwithM, i.e.,if themassof
theexplosivesis everaltimeslargerthanthemassoftheprojectile).
18.Furthercalculationswillbeofinterest,oncewehavedeterminedV, i.e.,the
relativeandfinalvelocityoftheexplosionproducts.Sinceagasorvaporleavingthemouth
of thetubeismuchrarefiedandcooled(if thetubeissufficientlyong)andmayeven
solidify--turnintoparticlesof dustrushingatterrificspeeds--itmaybeassumedthat,
whenanexplosionoccurs,theentireenergyofcombustionor chemical combination is
transformed into the motion of the combustion products or into kinetic energy. In fact,
imagine a given amount of gas expanding in a void, without any restrictions: it will expand
in all directions and, consequently, cool until it turns into droplets of liquid or a mist.
This mist will turn into minute crystals, no longer due to expansion but rather to
evaporation and radiation into space.
[85] On expanding the gas will release all its manifest and part of its latent energy,
which will ultimately be converted into rapid motion of the minute crystals in all direc-
tions - since the gas expanded freely, If, however, the gas is forced to expand in a tubular
chamber, the tube will orient the motion of the gas molecules in a fixed direction, which is
the method we use to propel our rocket.
It would seem that the energy of molecular motion is converted into kinetic motion
as long as a substance remains in the gaseous or vapor state. But this is not quite so. In fact,
part of the substance may turn to liquid; this involves the release of energy (latent heat of
vaporization), which is transmitted to the part remaining as a vapor, thus delaying its tran-
sition to the liquid state.
We can observe an effect of this kind in a steam cylinder when steam does work
owing to its own expansion and the valve from the boiler to the cylinder is closed. In this
case, whatever the temperature of the steam, part of it turns into a mist, i.e., the liquid
state, while the rest remains as a vapor and continues to do work, borrowing the latent
heat of the condensed and liquefied fraction.
Thus, the molecular energy will continue to be transformed into kinetic energy at
least until the liquid state is reached. Once the entire mass turns into droplets, the conver-
sion to kinetic energywill cease almost completely, because the vapors of liquids and solids
have only an insignificant pressure when the temperature is low, and their practical utiliza-
tion is difficult, requiring enormous tubes.
In addition, an insignificant part of the energy is lost, i.e., is not converted into
kinetic energy, due to friction against the walls of the tube and the radiation of heat from
the heated parts of the tube. However, the tube can be encased in a jacket through which
a liquid metal is circulated; this liquid metal will convey heat from the intensely heated
end of the tube to the end cooled by the rarefaction of the vapor. Thus, the losses due to
radiation and conduction can also be recovered or minimized. In view of the short dura-
tion of the explosion, which takes 2 to 5 min at most, the loss due to radiation is negligible,
even without any special precautions; the circulation of the liquid metal in the tube jacket
is more important for another purpose: the maintenance of a uniformly low tube wall
temperature, i.e., the preservation of the mechanical strength of the tube. Despite this it
may happen that part of the tube will melt, oxidize, and be carried away by the gases and
vapors. To prevent this, the inside walls of the tube could be lined with some special refrac-
tory material: carbon, tungsten, etc. Some of the carbon may burn away, but the relatively
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coolmetaltubewillsufferlittlelossofstrength.
Asforthegaseousproductofcombustionfcarbon--carbon[86]dioxide--thiswill
onlyintensifythethrustoftherocket.Somekindofcruciblematerial,somemixtureof
substances,mightbeused.However,I shallnotattempttosolvetheseandotherproblems
pertainingtoreaction-propulsionmachines.
InmanycasesI amlimitedtoguessesorhypotheses.I amnotdeludingmyselfandI
amperfectlyawarethatI amnotsolvingtheprobleminitsentirety,thatathousandtimes
moreworkthanI havedonemustbeinvestedinitssolution.Myaimistoarouseinterestby
pointingoutitsgreatfuturesignificanceandthefeasibilityofasolution....
Theliquefactionof hydrogenandoxygeninvolvesnospecialdifficulty.Hydrogen
couldbereplacedbyliquidor liquefiedhydrocarbons,forexample,byacetyleneoroil.
Theseliquidsmustbeseparatedbyapartition.Theirtemperatureisverylow;thereforeit
wouldbeexpedienttoallowthemtosurroundeitherjacketswithcirculatingliquidtnetal
or thetubesthemselves.
Experiencewillshowwhichisbetter.Somemetalsbecomestrongerwhencooled;
thesearethemetalsthatshouldbeemployed,copper,forexample.I donotrecallthis
clearly,butit seemsthatexperimentsontheresistanceofironin liquidairhaverevealed
thatitsstrengthatsuchlowtemperaturesisvirtuallydozensof timesgreater.I cannot
guaranteethereliabilityof thesexperiments,but,in relationtotheproblemdiscussed
here,theydeservethemostdiligentattention.*(Whynotcoolordinarycannonin the
samewaybeforefiring,sinceliquidairisnowsoeasilyobtainable.)[87]Liquidoxygenandliquidhydrogen,whenpumpedfromlandsandsuppliedin
afixedratiotothenarrowinletofthetube,wheretheyprogressivelycombine,constitute
anexcellentexplosive.Thewatervaporobtainedfromthechemicalcombinationofthese
liquidswillexpandatatremendouslyhightemperatureinthedirectionofthewideendor
mouthof thetube,until it coolstoa liquidracingtowardtheoutletin theformofan
uhrafinemist.
19.Hydrogenandoxygeninthegaseousstaterelease3825caloriesoncombiningto
form1kgofwater.Bytheword"calorie"I meantheamountofheatrequiredtoraiseone
kilogramofwaterthrough1°C.
Thisfigure(3825calories)willbesomewhatlowerin thepresentcase,sincethe
oxygenandhydrogenarein theliquidratherthanin thegaseousstate,towhichthis
particularnumberofcaloriesrelates.In fact,theliquidsmustfirstbeheatedandthen
convertedtothegaseousstate,whichrequiresomexpenditureofenergy.Inviewofthe
insignificantamountofenergyrequired,ascomparedwiththechemicalenergy,weshall
notreducethisfigure(thequestionhasnotbeencompletelyclarifiedbyscience;butwe
aremerelytakingoxygenandhydrogenasanexample).
Assumingthemechanicalequivalentofheatobe427kgm,wefindthat3825calo-
riescorrespondsto1633kgmofwork;thisisenoughtoraisetheexplosionproducts,i.e.,
onekilogramofmatter,toanaltitudeof 1633kmabovethesurfaceoftheEarth,thatthe
forceofgravityisconstant.Thiswork,convertedintomotion,correspondstothekinetic
*Theauthormentionsametal,iron,whichasprovedtobeunsuitablewithregardtoitsstrengthatlow
temperatures,asalreadypointedoutbyR.Lademanninhisarticle"ZumRaketenproblem"(OntheRocketProblem)intheissueofApril28.1927,oftheperiodicalZFM.
Theauthorrepliesintheappendixtothebook"Kosmicheskayara et ,opyinayapodgotovka"(TheSpaceRocket- ExperimentalPreparations):
"Concerningtheincreaseinthestrengthofironatthetemperatureofliquidair,in1903Imerelyre-peatedinformationthatI hadreadelsewhere,andI shallcertainlyotinsistthatit istrue,onceithasbeenprovedtobeuntrue.Inpractice,the xplosiontubecouldnotattainsuchadegreeofcoldness.Iti cooledby
oilwhich,inturn,iscooledbyliquidair.Itisenoughifthetubedoesnotmeltorburn,thepetroleumdoesnotboil,andtheliquidairdoesnotvaporizetooquickly.Thereisnoneedtoreacht etemperatureofliquidairintheexplosiontube."(Editor'snotein "IzbrannyyetrudyK.E.Tsiolkovskogo"(SelectedWorksofK.E.
Tsiolkovskiy),BookII -"Reaktivnoyedvizheniye"(Reactionpropulsion),Moscow,ONTI,1934.)
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energyofamassofonekilogram ovingatavelocityof5700m/sec.I knowofnogroupof
substancesthat,oncombiningchemically,couldreleasesuchatremendousamountof
energyperunitmassoftheresultingproduct.Moreover,somesubstancesoncombining
donotformvolatileproductsatall,whichisnotatallsuitableforourpurposes.Thus,
silicon,onburninginoxygen(Si+O_= Sit2),releasesanenormousamountof heat,
namely,3654caloriesperunitofmassof theresultingproduct(SiO_)but,[88]unfortu-
natelytheproductisnon-volatile.
Havingtakenliquidoxygenandhydrogenasthemostsuitablematerialsforcreating
anexplosion,I gaveasomewhatexaggeratedfigurefor theirchemicalenergyperunit
massofproduct(H_O),sinceinarocketheexplosivesubstancesmustbein theliquid
andnotthegaseousstateand,moreover,ataverylowtemperature.
I consideritpertinenttoconsolethereaderwiththethoughtthatwemayexpectnot
onlythisenergy(3825calories)butanincomparablygreaterenergyin thefuture,if and
whenourstillembryonicdeasarefoundtobefeasible.Infact,onconsideringtheamount
ofenergyproducedbyvariouschemicalprocesses,wefindthatasageneralrule,though
naturallywithsomexceptions,theamountofenergyperunitmassoftheproductsof
chemicalcombinationdependsontheatomicweightofthecombiningelements:thelower
theatomicweight,hegreatertheheatreleasedduringchemicalcombination.Thus,the
formationofsulfurdioxideisaccompaniedbythereleaseofonly1250calories,andthe
formationofcupricoxidebyonly546calories,whereaswhencarbondioxideCOisformed,
thecarbonreleases2204caloriesperunitmassofCO,_hydrogencombiningwithoxygen,
aswehaveseen,releasesvenmore(3825).
TorelatethesedatatotheideaI havejustformulated,letmeremindyouthatthe
atomicweightsoftheelementsnamedare:hydrogen,1;oxygen,15;carbon,12;sulfur,32;
silicon,28;copper,63.
Ofcourse,manyexceptionstothisrulecanbecited,butingeneralit isvalid.Infact,
if weimagineaseriesofpointstheabscissasofwhichexpressthesum(ormathematical
product)oftheatomicweightsofthecombiningelements,andtheordinates--thecorre-
spondingenergyof chemicalcombination,then,ondrawingasmoothcurvethrough
thesepoints(asclosetothemaspossible),weobserveasteadydecreasein theordinates
withincreasein theabscissas,ju tasourtheorysuggests.Forthisreason,if atsometime
so-calledsimplesubstancesprovetobecomplexandareseparatedintonewelements,the
atomicweightsoftheselementsshouldbesmallerthanthoseof thesimplesubstances
knowntous.
Accordingly,newlydiscoveredlements,uponcombiningchemically,mustrelease
anincomparablylargeramountofenergythanbodiescurrentlyconsideredsimpleand
havingacomparativelylargeatomicweight.
Theveryexistenceof theetherwithitsalmostinfiniteexpansibilityandtheenor-
mousvelocityofitsatomsimpliesthattheseatomshaveaninfinitesimallysmallatomic
weightandinfiniteenergywhentheycombine.
[89]20.Howeverthismaybe,forthetimebeingwecannotcountonmorethan
5700m/secasthemaximumV (see15and19).Withtime,however,whoknows,this
figuremayincreaseseveraltimesover.
Assuming5700m/sec,wecancalculatefromformula(16)notonlythevelocityratio
V/V butalsotheabsolutevalueofthefinal(maximum)velocityV oftheprojectileasa
functionofits M----L2ratio.
M1
21.It isevidentfromformula(16)thatthemassoftherocketogetherwithallpas-
sengersandequipment,M maybearbitrarilylargewithouttherebydetractinginanyway
fromthevelocityVof theprojectile,solongasthesupplyofexplosives,M _,increasesin
directproportiontoM_.
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Thus, projectiles of any size with any number of passengers may be given any desired
velocity. However, as we have seen, an increase in the velocity of the rocket is accompanied
by an incomparably more rapid increase in the mass of the explosives. Therefi_re, though
it may be easy to increase the mass of a projectile destined for outer space, it is correspond-
ingly difficult to increase its velocity.
Flight Velocities as a Function of Fuel Consumption
22. From equation (16) we obtain the following table.
[89]
M 2
M1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
1
2
3
4
5
6
Velocity M2 V Velocity
V 1 m/sec M i V i m/'sec
0.095 543 7 2.079 11 800
0.182 1 037 8 2.197 12 500
0.262 I 493 9 2.303 13 100
0.336 1 915 10 2.398 13 650
0.405 2 308 19 2.996 17 100
0.693 3 920 20 3.044 17 330
1.098 6 260 30 3.434 19 560
1.386 7 880 50 3.932 22 400
1.609 9 170 100 4.615 26 280
1.792 10 100 193 5.268 30 038
1.946 11 100 Infinite Infinite Infinite
[90] 23. From this table it is clear that the velocities attainable by reaction propulsion
are far from negligible. Thus, when the mass of explosives exceeds 193 times the mass M l
of the projectile (rocket), the velocity during the final moments of the explosion, when
the entire supply of explosives M_ has been consumed, is equal to the velocity of the Earth
around the Sun. It should not be supposed that such an enormous mass of explosives
requires a commensurate amount of high-strength material for the vessels in which it is
stored. In fact, hydrogen and oxygen in liquid form develop high pressure only if the
vessels containing them are closed and if the gases themselves get heated due to the influ-
ence surrounding, comparatively warm bodies. [91 ] In the present case, the liquefied gases
must have a free outlet to the tube into which they flow constantly in liquid form and
where, on chemically combining, they explode.
The continuous and rapid flow of gases, corresponding to the evaporation of the
liquids, cools the latter until their vapors exert hardly any pressure on the surrounding
walls. Thus, the vessels containing the explosives need not be made very massive.
24. When the mass of the explosives is equal to tlle mass of the rocket (M-_l=ll, the
velocity of the latter is nearly twice as great as would be necessary for a stone or cannon
ball, launched by "Selenians" from the surface of the Moon, to leave the IVloon forever and
become an Earth satellite, a second Moon.
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Thisvelocity(3920m/sec)isnearlyenoughforbodieslaunchedfromthesurfaceof
MarsorMercurytoleavetheseplanetsforever.
If themassratio--M_=3 then,whentheentiresupplyofexplosiveshasbeencon-
M1
sumed,theprojectilewillhaveattainedavelocityalmostgreatenoughtocauseit to re-
volvelikeasatelliteaboutheEarthbeyondthelimitsoftheatmosphere.
If M2=6,thevelocityoftherocketwillbenearlygreatenoughforit toleaveEarthM1
foreverandrevolvearoundtheSunlikeanindependentplanet.If thesupplyofexplosives
isbigenough,theasteroidbeltandeventheheavyplanetscouldbereached.
25.It isevident from the table that even if the supply of explosives is small, the final
velocity of the projectile will still be adequate for practical purposes. Thus, if the fuel sup-
ply accounts for only 0.1 of the rockets weight, the velocity will be 543 m/sec, which is
sufficient for the rocket to ascend to 15 km. The table also shows that if the supply is small,
after completion of the explosion the velocity will be approximately proportional to the
mass of the fuel (M,); therefore, in this case, the maximum height will be proportional to
the square of this mass (M_). Thus, if the supply of explosives is equal to half the rocket's
mass (_-] = 0.5, the rocket will fly far beyond the limits of the atmosphere.
[92] Efficiency of Rocket During Ascent
26. It is of interest to determine the fraction of the total work done by the explosives,
i.e., their chemical energy, that is transmitted to the rocket.
g 2
The work done by the explosives may be expressed as " I Mg; the mechanical work
2
V 2
done by a rocket with the velocity V may be expressed in the same unite: --M 1, or, on the
2
basis of formula (16)
V 2 V_ . ( M_') }2.
--M 1 =--Ml_ln/l+-- /
2 2 ( Ml)
On dividing the work done by the rocket by the work done by the explosives, we
obtain
From this formula we can derive the table of energy utilization by the rocket.
From the table and the formula it is clear that when the amount of explosives is very
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M2
small,theutilization(efficiency)isequalto -- i.e.,thesmallertherelativeamountof
M1
explosives.*
[93]
M2
Mt
Utilization
0.1 0.090
0.2 0.165
0.3 0.223
0.4 0.282
O.5 O.328
1 O.480
2 0.600
3 0.64
4 0.65
5 0.64
6 0.63
M2 Utilization
Ml
7 0.62
8 0.60
9 0.59
10 0.58
19 0.47
20 0.46
30 0.39
50 0.31
100 0.21
193 0.144
Infinity Zero
[94]Further,astherelativeamountofexplosivesincreases,theutilizationincreases
andreachesamaximum(0.65)whenMJM =4.
Anyfurtherincreasein theproportionofexplosiveswillgraduallybutsteadilyre-
ducetheirutilization.Whenthesupplyofexplosivesisinfinitelylarge,theutilizationfalls
tozero,justaswhenthesupplyisinfinitelysmall.It isalsoclearfromthetablethatwhen
M_/Mrangesbetween2and10theutilizationexceedsonehalf,i e.,morethanhalfthe
potentialenergyoftheexplosivesistransmittedtotherocketin theformofkineticen-
ergy.Ingeneral,from1to20it isextremelyhighandcloseto0.5.
Rockets Under the Influence of Gravity. Vertical Ascent
27. We have determined the velocity acquired by the rocket in a gravitationless vacuum
as a function of the mass of the rocket, the mass of the explosives and their energy of
chemical combination.
We shall now consider the effect of gravity on the vertical motion of the projectile.
When not influenced by gravity, the rocket can acquire dizzy speeds and can utilize a
considerable proportion of the explosive energy. This also holds true in a gravitational
2 3 4
X X X
*In fact, in (l+x)=x---+ .... ...
2 3 4
Therefore, approximately, M1 {ln(l+ M2) }_= M--AL.M--_= M---_2
M_ ( Mx) M_ M_ M1 "
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environment, so long as the explosion is instantaneous. But this kind of explosion is not
suitable for our purposes, since it would result in a lethal shock which could be endured
neither by the projectile nor by the equipment and passengers. Clearly, we need a slow
explosion; but if the explosion is slow, the useful effect diminishes and may even vanish.
Suppose the explosion is so weak that the resulting acceleration of the rocket is equal
to the Earth's acceleration g. Then throughout the explosion the projectile will hang mo-
tionlessly in the air without support.
Of course, it will not acquire any velocity, and the utilization of the explosives, in
whatever quantity they are present, will be zero. Thus, it is extremely important to analyze
the effect of gravity on the projectile.
[95] Determining the Acquired Velocity. Examination of the Numerical
Values Obtained. Maximum Height.
When a rocket moves in a gravitationless medium, the time t during which its entire
supply of explosives is consumed, is
V
t =--, (28)
P
where V is the velocity of the projectile on completion of the explosion, and p is the con-
stant acceleration imparted to the rocket by the explosives per second.*
In this simple case of uniform acceleration the force of the explosion, i.e., the amount
of fuel expended during the explosion per unit of time, will not be constant, but will
continually diminish in proportion to the decrease in the mass of the projectile as its sup-
ply of explosives is depleted.
29. Knowing p, or the acceleration in a gravitationless medium, we can also deter-
mine the apparent (temporary) gravity inside the rocket during its acceleration or during
the explosion.
Taking the force of gravity at the Earth's surface as unity, we find the temporary
gravity to be p/g, where g is the Earth's acceleration; this formula shows how many times
the pressure acting on the base of all the objects in the rocket exceeds the pressure that
acts on the same objects when placed on the living room table under normal conditions. It
is highly important to know the value of relative gravity in the projectile, since it affects the
reliability of the instruments and the health of those setting out to explore the frontiers of
space.
[96] 30. Under the influence of a constant or variable gravity of any intensity, the
time taken to consume a given supply of explosives will be the same as when there is no
gravity at all; it can be expressed by formula (28) or by the following formula:
V_
t= , (31)
p-g
where V, is velocity of the rocket on completion of the explosion in a gravitational medium
with constant acceleration g. Here, of course, it is assumed that p and g are parallel and
opposite; p-g expresses the visible acceleration of the projectile (with respect to the Earth),
which is the result of two opposite forces: the force of the explosion and the force of
gravity.
*It is assumed that the mass of the rocket varies in accordance with an exponential law; then the accelera-
tion p due to the thrust will be constant (Editor's note).
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32. The action of the force of gravity on the projectile in no way affects the relative
gravity inside the projectile, and here the formula p/g still applies. For example, if p = 0,
i.e., if there is no explosion, there is no temporary gravity, because p/g = 0. This means
that if the explosion ceases and the projectile moves in some direction solely due to its own
momentum and the gravitational attraction of the Sun, Earth, and other stars and planets,
an observer inside the projectile will himself apparently be completely weightless, and not
even the most sensitive spring balance will register when used to weigh any of the objects
present inside the rocket along with the observer. On falling or rising inside the rocket
under the action of inertia, even at the very surface of the Earth, the observer will not
experience the least heaviness unless, of course, the projectile encounters some obstacle
in the form of, say, the resistance of the atmosphere, water or solid earth.
33. If p = g, i.e., if the pressure of the exploding gases is equal to the weight of the
projectile (p/g = 1), the relative granary will be equal to terrestrial gravity. If it was station-
ary at the outset, the projectile will remain stationary throughout the explosion. If, how-
ever, the projectile had a certain (upward, lateral, downward) velocity before the explo-
sion, this velocity will remain absolutely unchanged until the entire supply of explosives is
consumed; thus the body, that is, the rocket, is balanced and moves as if by inertia in a
[97] gravitational medium.
On the basis of formulas (28) and (31) we obtain
Hence, knowing the velocity V that must be acquired by the projectile after the ex-
plosion, we can calculate V, from which, with the aid of formula (16), we can also deter-
mine the necessary amount of explosives M
From equations (16) and (34) we obtain:
, P/ _,Ml )
36. From this, as from the preceding formula, it follows that the velocity acquired by
the rocket is smaller in the presence of gravity than in its absence (16). The velocity V may
even be zero despite an abundant supply of explosives if (p/g) = 1, i.e., if the acceleration
imparted to the projectile by the explosives is equal to the terrestrial acceleration, or if the
gas pressure is equal and directly opposite to the effect of gravitational attraction (cf. for-
mulas (34) and (35)).
In this case the rocket will stand motionless for a few minutes without rising and,
once the supply of explosives has been consumed, will fall like a stone.
37. The greater the value of p in relation to g, the greater the velocity Va acquired by
the projectile, given a specific amount of explosives M (formula (35)).
[98] Therefore, if the aim is to climb higher, p must be made as large as possible, i.e., the
explosion must be as energetic as possible. This, however, requires, first, a sturdier and
more massive projectile and, second, sturdier equipment and instruments inside the pro-
jectile, because, according to (32), the relative gravity inside the projectile will be exu-emely
large and, in particular, dangerous to any human observer aboard the rocket.
At any rate, on the basis of formula (35) in the limit
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i.e., if p is infinitely large or the explosion instantaneous, the velocity V of the rocket in a
gravitational environment will be the same as in a gravitadonless environment.
According to formula (30), the explosion dme is independent of gravity; it depends
solely on the ratio M2/M; and the rate of explosion p.
39. It is important to determine this rate. Suppose in formula (28) V = 11,100 m/sec
(22) and p = g = 9.9 m/sec _, then t = 1133 sec. This means that in a gravitationless medium
the rocket would fly for less than 19 minutes with uniform acceleration, even if the amount
of explosives were six times the mass of the projectile (22).
In the event of the explosion occurring at the surface of our planet, however, the
rocket would stand motionless for the same period of time.
40. In M_/M_ = 1 then according to the table, V = 3920 m/sec; therefore t = 400 sec or
6-2/s min.
When M2/M; = 0.1 V = 543 m/sec, t = 55.4 sec, i.e., less than a minute. In this case the
projectile would stand motionless at the Earth's surface for 55-1/2 sec.
Hence we can see that an explosion at the surface of a planet, and in general in any
medium that is not free of gravity, may be completely ineffective--even if it occurs over a
prolonged period of time--if it is of insufficient force; in fact, the projectile then [99]
remains stationary and will have no translational velocity unless some has been previously
acquired (It will then move over a certain distance at uniform speed). If this motion is
upward, the projectile will do some work. If the original velocity is horizontal, the motion
will also be horizontal; then no work will be done,* but the projectile could serve the same
purpose as a locomotive, steamship or stearable aerostat. The projectile could function in
this way only for a few minutes, while the explosion takes place, but even during such a
short period of time it could traverse considerable distances, particularly when moving
above the atmosphere. However, we do not consider that the rocket is of any practical
value for flights through the air.
The time during which a projectile can remain in a gravitational medium propor-
tional to g, i.e., to the force of gravity.
Thus, on the Moon the projectile could stand motionless, without support, for
2 hours if M2 =6.
M1
41. In formula (35) for an environment with _ = 10 let us put M2 = 1; we than calcu-
P M_
late V_ = 9990 m/sec. Accordingly, the relative gravity will be 10 g, i.e., throughout the
explosion time (about 2 rain), a person weighing 70 kg will experience gravity ten times as
great as on Earth, and, on a spring balance, will weigh 700 kg. This gravity can be safely
endured by the traveler only if he observes special precautions: if he is immersed in a
special fluid, under special conditions.
On the basis of formula (28) we can also calculate the explosion time, or the dura-
tion of the period of intensified gravity; we obtain 113 sec, i.e., less than 2 min. This is very
little, and it is amazing that in such a negligible interval of time a projectile could acquire
a velocity nearly sufficient to leave the Earth and move around the Sun like a new planet.
We found V_ = 9990 m/sec, i.e., a velocity only slightly less than the velocity V acquir-
able in a gravitationless medium under the same explosion conditions (22).
But since during the explosion the projectile also climbs to a [100] certain height,
the idea suggests itself that the total work done by the explosives is not less than in a
gravitationless medium.
*If no allowance is made for the work done in overcoming atmospheric drag (Editor's note).
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44.Weshallnowconsiderthisquestion.
Theaccelerationf theprojectilein agravitationalmediummaybeexpressedas:
p,=p-g.
AtadistanceofnotmorethanseveralhundredverstsfromtheEarth'surfacewe
canassumethatgisconstant;thisdoesnotintroduceanyappreciableerror,andmoreover
theerrorwillbeonthesafeside,i.e.,theactualfigureswillbemorefavorablethanthose
calculated.
Theheighthreachedbytheprojectileduringtimet (explosiontime)willbe
1 2_p-g t2 (45)h=_p_t--'7- '
Eliminatingt, inaccordancewithequation(31)weobtain
2
h= V2
2(p-g)'
(46)
where V, is the velocity of the projectile in a gravitational medium after the entire supply
of explosives has been consumed. Now, on eliminating V_, from (34) and (46) we obtain
h = P-g "V2 = ,-_'_(1-£/ (47)
2p_ ' p \ P1'
where V. is the velocity acquired by the rocket in a gravitationless medium.
[ 101 ] Efficiency
The useful work done by the explosives in such a medium may be expressed by:*
V 2
T = --. (48)
2g
On the other hand, depending on the height reached by the projectile and its velocity, at
the end of the explosion, the work T done in a gravitational medium may be expressed as
W 2
Tj =h+ " 2.
2g
The ratio of T-A-I(T being the ideal value) is thus
T
(49)
(50)
On eliminating h and V by means of formulas (46) and (34), we find
*The calculations in formulas (48) and (49) are for a projectile with a weight equal to unity (Editor's
note).
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[102] T---L= (1- _), (51)
T
i.e., the work done in a gravitational medium by a given mass of explosives M2 is less than
in a gravitationless medium: this difference g is the smaller the higher the exhaust veloc-
ity of the gases or the greater the pressure p. For example, under the conditions of note 41
the loss is only _/_0, while the utilization, according to (51), is 0.9. When p = g, or when the
projectile hovers in the air, lacking even a constant velocity, the loss will be complete ( 1)
and the utilization will be zero. The utilization will also be zero if the projectile has a
constant horizontal velocity.
52. In note 41 we found V = 9990 m/sec. Applying formula (46) to this case, we lind
h = 565 km; this means that during the explosion the projectile will uavel far beyond the
limits of the atmosphere and at the same time acquire a velocity of 9990 m/see.
Note that this velocity is less than that in a gravitationless medium by 1110 m/see or
exactly _/10of the velocity in a gravitationless medium (22).
Hence it is clear that the loss of velocity obeys the same law as the loss of work (51).
Strictly, this also follows from formula (34) which, after transformation, yields
From (51) we find
V2 =V(1-_) or V-V,_ = V '_-p"
where T 1is the work done on the projectile by the explosives in a [103] gravitational me-
dium with an acceleration equal to g.
In order for the projectile to perform the necessary work of climbing, overcoming
atmospheric resistance, and acquiring the desired velocity, the total work done most equal
Y_.
Having calculated all these forms of work, we find T from formula (56). Knowing T,
we can calculate V, i.e., the velocity in a gravitationless medium, from the formula
Knowing V, we can also calculate the required mass of explosives from formula (16).
Thus, we find
NIT 2 = .rVl 1 |e
I V2In the calculations, for the sake of brevity, M l • I has been replaced by T.
_ 2g
Thus, knowing the mass of the projectile M1, together with all it contains apart from
the fuel M 2 the mechanical work T 2done by explosives when their mass is equal to that of
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theprojectile M, the work T which must be done by the projectile during its vertical
ascent, the acceleration due to the explosion p and gravity g, we can also determine the
amount of explosives M2 required to lift the mass M1 of the projectile.
The ratio --T1 in the formula will not change if we reduce it by [104] M, so that T
T2
and T_ may be construed as the mechanical work T done by a unit mass of the projectile
and the mechanical work T2 done by a unit of explosives, respectively.
In general, the gravity g may be construed as the sum of the accelerations due to
gravity and the resistance of the medium. But gravity steadily decreases with increasing
distance from the Earth's center, so that an increasing fraction of the mechanical work of
the explosives is utilized. On the other hand, atmospheric resistance, while very insignifi-
cant in comparison with the weight of the projectile, as we shall see, reduces the utilization
of the energy of the explosives.
Further, it can be seen that the latter losses, which continue for some time as the
projectile races through the atmosphere, are abundantly offset by the gain due to the
decrease in gravitational attraction at the considerable distances (500 km) at which the
explosion ceases.
Thus, formula (20) can be boldly applied to the vertical flight of a projectile, despite
the complications due to the variation in gravity and the resistance of the atmosphere g =
9.8.
Gravitational Field. Vertical Return to Earth
59. First let us consider the process of stopping in a gravitationless medium or a
momentary halt in a gravitational medium.
Suppose, for example, that, owing to the force produced by the explosion of some
(not all) of the gases, a rocket acquires a velocity of 10,000 m/sec (22). Now in order to
stop it, we must give it the same velocity but in the opposite direction. Clearly, in accor-
dance with (22), the remaining amount of explosives must be five times greater than the
mass M1 of the projectile. Therefore, on completion of the first part of the explosion (in
order to acquire translational velocity) the projectile must have a supply of explosives, the
mass of which may be expressed as 5M, = M_.
60. The total mass including the explosives will be M 2 + M_ = 5M_ + M 1 -- 6M v This
mass 6M must have been given a velocity of 10,000 m/sec by the original explosion, and
this requires an additional amount of explosives which should also be five times greater
(22) than [105] the mass of the projectile plus the mass of the explosives needed to stop
the rocket, i.e., 6M_ X 5; thus we obtain 30 M] which, together with the explosives needed
for stopping the rocket, makes 35 M.
Using the symbol q = M2 to denote the number of times the mass of the explosives
Ml
exceeds the mass of the projectile, we may express as follows the above reasoning concern-
ing the total mass of explosives M---A-sneeded to acquire and annihilate a given velocity as
M1
follows:
Ms --q+(1 +q).q = q(2 +q),
Mt
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or, adding and subtracting one from the second part of this equation, we obtain
whence we find
M---_3= l+2q+q 2 -1 =(l+q) 2 -1.
Ml
(61)
M3 +1=(1+q)2. (62)
M1
This last expression is easy to remember.
If q is very small, the amount of explosives is approximately 2q (because q_ will be
negligible), i.e., twice as much as needed solely for acquiring a given velocity.
63. On the basis of the above formulas and table (22) we compile the following table:
[106]
V, m/sec
M....._2
M1
M 3
M1
V, m/sec
543 0.1 0.21 11 800
1 037 0.2 0.44 12 500
1 493 0.3 0.69 13 100
1 915 0.4 0.96 13 650
2 308 0.5 1.25 17 100
3 920 1 3 17 330
6 260 2 8 19 560
7 880 3 15 22 400
9 170 4 24 26 280
10 100 5 35 30 038
11 100 6 48
7 63
8 80
9 99
10 120
19 399
20 440
30 960
50 2 60O
100 10 200
193 37 248
[107] It is evident from this table that if we wanted to acquire and lose a very high
velocity an impossibly large supply of explosives would be needed.
From (62) and (16) we have
M 3 _ M -_v
*"3 = e-q__
_+l=e , or -1.
M1 Mi
2V.
Note that the radio --- is positive, because the velocities of the projectile and the
V1
gases are opposite in direction and therefore differ in sign.
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64.Ifweareinagravitationalmedium,then,in thesimplecaseofverticalmotion,
theprocessofcomingtoahaltdescendingtoEarthwillbeasfollows:when,owingtoits
acquiredvelocity,therockethasrisentoacertainaltitudeandstoppedthere,itsearth-
wardfallwillbegin.
Whentheprojectilereachesthepointin itsflightwheretheactionoftheexplosives
ceased,it issubjectedagaintotheactionoftheremainderinthecasedirectionandorder.
Clearly,whentheexplosivesceasetoactandtheentiresupplyisconsumed,therocketwill
cometoahaltattheEarth'surface,whencetheflightbegan.Themethodof ascentis
exactlythesameasthemethodofdescent,theonlydifferencebeingthatthevelocitiesare
reversedateverypointalongthepath.
Comingtoahaltinagravitationalfieldrequiresmoreworkandexplosivesthanina
gravitationlessmedium,andthereforeq[in formulas(61)and(62)]mustbegreater.
Denotingthisgreatervalueofqbyql,onthebasisoftheforegoing,wefindthat
&= x--z_=1-£ (65)
ql T p'
whence
[108] ql = q(_-_g) ;
substituting q, for q in equation (62), we obtain
(66)
here M 4 denotes the amount or mass of explosives needed to ascend from a given point
and return to the same point for a rocket coming to a complete stop and traveling in a
gravitational medium.
67. On the basis of this last formula we can compile the following table, assuming
that p/g = 10, i.e., that the pressure of the explosives is 10 times greater than the weight of
the rocket together with the remaining explosives.
Gravitational Field. Oblique Ascent
68. Although a vertical ascent would appear to be more expedient, since the atmo-
sphere is then traversed more rapidly and the projectile rises to a greater height, the work
done in rising through the atmosphere is very insignificant compared with the total work
done by the explosives and, moreover, given an oblique ascent it is possible to construct a
permanent observatory that would travel for an indeterminate length of time around the
Earth, like the Moon, beyond the limits of the atmosphere. Furthermore, and most impor-
tant, in an oblique ascent far more of the explosive energy is utilized than in a vertical ascent.
Let us first consider the special case of horizontal rocket flight [Fig. 2].
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[1o9] In a Gravitational Field
V, m/sec
i 2
Ms
M___.!4
Mt
543 O. 1 0.235
1 497 0.3 0.778
2 308 0.5 1.420
3 920
6 _60
7 880
9 170
10 100
1.0
5
11 100 6
11 800 7
4.957
9.38_
17.78
_8._
41.9_
57.78
76.05
Denoting by R the resultant of the horizontal acceleration of the rocket, by p the
acceleration due to the explosion, and by g the acceleration due to gravity, we have
2
R = %/-p-p_ -g (70)
[ 110] On the basis of the latter formula,* the kinetic energy acquired by the projec-
tile during dine t equals
- P -g t 2 , (71)
2 _g / 2g 2g
P
P
Figure 2
where t is the explosion time. This is also the total useful work done on the rocket. In fact,
if we assume the direction of gravity to be constant (which in practice is true only for a
short trajectory) the rocket does not climb at all. The work done by the explosives on the
rocket in a gravitationless medium is**
*Here Tsiolkovskiy calculates the work done by the resultant referred to unit weight of the rocket (Editor's
note).
**Tsiolkovskiy calculates the work done by the reaction force referred to unit weight of the rocket (Editor's
note).
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Pt2P= p2t2
2 g 2g
(72)
Dividing the useful work (71) by the total work (72), we obtain [ 111 ] the efficiency
for horizontal flight.
2 a 2 ,)
'_,e-J--t. > t -1 _"( _g ).(_g 1- -(p) . (73)
As before, the air resistance has not yet been taken into account.
From this last formula it is evident that the loss of work as compared with a
gra_"itationless medium may be expressed by (£)z. Hence it follows that this loss is much
smaller than during a vertical ascent. Thus, for example, if _ = 1/10, the loss will be 1/100
or 1%, whereas in a vertical ascent it would be expressed by £ i.e. would equal 1/ 10, that
J p_ '
is, 10%.
74, Here is a table in which [3 is the angle of inclination of the force p to the horizon.
Horizontal Motion
__P /g_)2 g
_°
g P P
1 1 1 90
2 1:4 1:2 30
3 1:9 1:3 19.5
4 1 : 16 1:4 14.5
5 1 : 25 1 : 5 11.5
10 1 : 100 1 : 10 5.7
100 1 : 10 000 1:100 0.57
[112] Oblique Ascent. Work done in Lifting the Projectile Referred
to the Work in a Gravitationless Medium. Loss of Work.
75. Now let us solve the general problem--for any angle of inclination of the resultant
R. A horizontal trajectory or resultant is undesirable, since a projectile flying horizontally must
travel a vastly greater distance through the atmosphere and do a correspondingly greater amount
of work in cutting through the air.
Thus, let us keep in mind that a, the angle of inclination of the resultant to the
vertical, is greater than a right angle; we have
R=_/p2+g2+2pg cos y , (76)
where y = _ + [_ (obtuse angle of parallelogram) in accordance with the sketch.
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Further
and
"/= 0_+ [3 ; sin _ : sin 13: sin ), = p : g : R (77)
R_+g2_p 2COS_ =
2_
(78)
The kinetic energy is expressed by the formula (71), where R is found from equation
(76). The vertical acceleration of the resultant R
R = sin (a-90°)R = --cos txR.
[ 113] Therefore, the work done in lifting the projectile will be
(79)
Rlt2 =-c°sOtRt2 , (80)
2 2
where t is the explosion time for the entire supply of explosives. The total work done on
the projectile in a gravitational medium [in accordance with (71) and (80)]
T_=R_t2_ Rt 2 cosoe Rt 2 R=-- (---cosa) .
2g 2 2 g
(81)
Here ascent of the projectile through unit height in a medium with an acceleration
of one g is taken as the unit of work. If_ )) 90 °, in the case of the ascent of the projectile, for
example, then (-cos 00 is positive, and vice versa.
2
In a gravitationless medium the work will be P---t 2=T in accordance with (72), (let
2g
us not forget that the explosion time t is independent of the gravitational forces).
Taking the ratio of these two values of the work, we obtain the efficiency of the explo-
sion as compared with its efficiency in a gravitationless medium, namely:
T1 = Rt2(R_cosa) : (p.__2t ) _.R(R_g cosa) .
T 2 q 2g p p p
(82)
Eliminating R in accordance with formula (76), we find
[114] T_ =l+g-_+2 cosT.g-cosa.gJl+g-_+2 cos7 g .
T p P PV P P
Formulas (51) and (73), for example, are merely special cases of this formula, as may
be readily ascertained.
84. We shall now find a use for this formula. Assume that a rocket is ascending at an
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angle of 14.5 ° to the horizon; the sine of this angle is 0.25; this means that the atmospheric
resistance is four times greater than the value for vertical flight, since it is more or less
inversely proportional to the sine of the angle of inclination (or - 90 °) of the trajectory to
the horizontal.
85. The angle _ = 90 + 14 '/2 = 104 '/_°; cos c_ = 0.25; knowing a we can also find _. In
fact, from (77) we find
sin 13=sin 0_g ;
P
fir
thus, if _' =0.1 ;
P
sin [3 = 0.0968; [_ = 5 1/2°,
whence
T = 110°, cos T = 0.342.
Now we calculate the efficiency to be 0.966. The loss is 0.034 or about _/20 or, more
accurately, 3.4%.
This loss is one-third of the loss in a vertical ascent, not a bad result, especially if we
consider that, even in an oblique ascent (14 1/2°), the atmospheric resistance is still less
than 1% of the work done in lifting the projectile.
[115 ] Oblique Motion
c_-90
Degrees
0 90 5 '/4
2 92 5 y,
95 5*/,
Utilization Loss
95 2/, 0.9900 1:100
97 2/, 0.9860 1 : 72
0.9800100 % 1:53
10 100 5 */, 105 */, 0.9731 1:37
15 105 5 V2 1101/2 0.9651 1:29
20 110 5 V_ 115_/$ 0.9573 1:23.4
30 120 5 125 0.9426 1:17.4
40 130 41/_ 134 V_ 0.9300 1:14.3
45 135 4 139 0.9246 1:13.3
1809O 0.90000 180 1:10
[116] 86. We propose the above table for various approaches: the first column shows
the inclination to the horizontal; the last column, the loss of work; [_ is the deviation of the
direction of the pressure exerted by the explosives from the actual line of motion (69).
87. For very small angles of inclination (_t- 90 °) the formula can be much simplified,
by replacing the trigonometric values by their arcs and making other simplifications.
We then obtain the following expression for the loss of work:
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2
x 2 + ax (1- x) + 62x2 (x--6),
2 2
where 8 denotes the angle of inclination (cx -90°), expressed as the length of its arc, the
radius of white is equal to unity, and x denotes the ratio g/p. On discarding the small
quantities of higher orders, we obtain for the loss
x2+Sx= _ 2+8g_
(p) p '
Let us put 8 = 0.02 N, where 0.02 is the part of a circle corresponding to roughly 1°
(1 _/7) and N is the number of these new degrees. Then the loss of work may be roughly
expressed as
2
_-_2+0.02gN.
p P
From this formula we can readily compile the following table, assuming that
_=0.1 :
p
[117]
N 0 0.5 1 2 3 4 5
Loss 1/100 1/91 1/83 1/70 1/60 1/55 1/50
6 10
1/45 1/33
Hence we see that even at large angles (up to 10 °) the discrepancy between this table
and the previous, more accurate one is quite small.
We could have considered many other factors too: the work done by gravity, the
resistance of the atmosphere; we still have not explained how the explorer could spend a
long, even unlimited, time in an environment without even a trace of oxygen. We have not
even mentioned the heating of the projectile during its short flight through the atmo-
sphere, nor have we given a general picture of the flight itself and of the extremely inter-
esting phenomena that would (theoretically) accompany it. We have scarcely outlined the
magnificent prospects of eventually attaining this still distant goal. Lastly, we could also
have considered the subject of rocket trajectories in outer space.
Document I-6
Document fl0e: Hermann Oberth, Rockets in Planetary Space, Translation of "Die Rakete
zu den Planetr_iumen," Verlag von R. Oldenbourg, Munich and Berlin, 1923, NASA TI"
F-9277, December 1964, Introduction.
Hermann Oberth was born in Transylvania, but considered himself German. In this
publication he was the first person to outline many of the fundamentals of spaceflight and
to ground them in mathematics and engineering. He proposed that a rocket could be
launched to orbit the Earth and that it could travel through the vacuum of space. He also
addressed the subject of various rocket fuels and proposed a large rocket that used alcohol
and liquid hydrogen as propellant. Oberth's work served as the inspiration for many later
pioneers in Germany, particularly Wernher von Braun.
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Oberthlaterefinedhisproposalsin thebookWege zur Raumschiffahrt ( Ways to Space-
flight), which later served as the basis for the spaceship depicted in Fritz Lang's 1929 mo-
tion picture Frau im Mond ( The Girl in the Moon). This was the public's first exposure to a
realistic spacecraft on the movie screen.
[1] Section 1. Introduction
1. Given the present state of science and technology, it is possible to build machines
which can climb higher than the limits of the atmosphere of the earth.
2. With additional refinement, these machines will be able to attain such velocities
that, left to themselves in space, they need not fall back to the earth's surface, and they
may even leave the field of gravitation of the earth.
3. These machines can be so constructed that men can be lifted in them, apparently
with complete safety.
4. Given certain economical situations, the construction of such machines may even
become profitable. Such conditions may prevail within a few decades.
In this work, I intend to prove these four statements. I will first derive some formulas
which will give us the necessary theoretical insight into the manner of functioning and the
performance capability of these machines. In Part II, I will show that their construction is
technically possible, and in Part III I will come to a discussion of the prospects for their
invention.
I have strived to be brief. I have been able frequently to simplify the mathematical
derivations and formulas by using approximated values, which are easy to use mathemati-
cally, for certain quantities. This procedure was used especially when, in the course of a
discussion, the facts of a matter could be made more clear. (Incidentally, I have also fre-
quently indicated the actual value of the result, or at least shown how it could be deter-
mined from the approximated value, and sometimes I have simply estimated the error.)
Technical problems, the solution of which no one doubts, have been covered only briefly.
In Part III, I have limited myself to indications, since the subjects treated here still lie
rather far off.
It has been my purpose here to cover no more than seemed necessary for an under-
standing of the invention and for an evaluation of the feasibility, because:
Firstly, it is by no means my intent here to describe a particular model of a machine
with all its details, but only to show that machines of this sort are possible. (For example, I
need not calculate the exact altitude which a certain rocket might reach ifI can show that
it is at least possible of meeting the minimum demands placed upon it. Thus I set a con-
stant value c on [2] the exhaust velocity (cf. page 3), even though this value can vary in
some cases by as much as 9%, and I discussed the case in which the rocket travels at a
velocity of v (cf. page 6), even though the fuel is not consumed most efficiently at this
speed. If I estimate the power of the rocket, based upon v and the most unfavorable value
of c, and find that the rocket is capable under these circumstances of attaining a required
final velocity and altitude, then I have also shown that, in actuality, it can surely attain
them.) I believe that the entire picture is clearer ifI do not go into too much detail.
Secondly, there are some things which I wish not to reveal (particularly technical
solutions which appear favorable), because these are not protected literary property. If my
ideas should one day be put into practice, I will naturally want to furnish the exact plans,
computations and methods of computation.
Finally, I make no secret of the fact that I consider some of the provisions, in their
pre_nt form, as by no means being definitive solutions. As I worked out my plans and corn-
Ier*riots, I naturally had to consider each detail. In so doing, I could at least determine
86 PRELUDE TO THE SPACE AGE
mine that there were no insurmountable difficulties. At the same time, however, it was clear
to me that some individual questions could be solved only after the most basic special stud-
ies and experimentation lasting perhaps years, at least if the optimum solution were sought.
Document I-7
Document fl0e: Robert H. Goddard, A Method of Reaching Extreme Altitudes, Smithsonian
Miscellaneous Collections, Volume 71, Number 2 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institu-
tion Press, 1919). The plates have been omitted from these documents.
Document I-8
Document title: "Topics of the Times," New York Times, January 18, 1920, p. 12.
Even before Robert Goddard retreated to New Mexico and began conducting most
of his research in seclusion, he rarely published, mostly because of the skepticism and even
outright ridicule reflected in the New York Times story printed here. His paper, A Method of
Reaching Extreme Altitudes, was published as part of the Smithsonian Institution's Miscella-
neous Collections series, and was a relatively standard scientific publication that would
impress colleagues but few others. The first edition was bound in brown paper and num-
bered 1,750 copies, of which Goddard received 90 complimentary ones. The publication
went unnoticed for eight days before suddenly becoming front-page news in several news-
papers, including the Boston American, the New York Times, the Milwaukee Sentinel and the
San Francisco Examiner. The stories focused exclusively on the most esoteric part of the
study, a proposal for traveling to the Moon, which had been played up in an accompanying
press release from the Smithsonian. The furor in response to this proposal angered
Goddard, particularly since he felt his concept of a rocket itself was being maligned. The
controversy did attract the attention of a misinformed editor of the New York Times, who
derided Goddard's lack of knowledge about ordinary physics. Contrary to the editor's
claims, Goddard's speculation on the operation of a rocket in a vacuum was widely ac-
cepted at the time, and proved sound in later application.
Document I-7
Preface
The theoretical work herein presented was developed while the writer was at Princeton
University in 1912-1913, the basis of the calculations being the assumption that, if nitrocel-
lulose smokeless powder were employed as propellant in a rocket, under such conditions
as are here explained, an efficiency of 50 percent might be expected.
Actual experimental investigations were not undertaken until 1915-1916, at which
time the tests concerning ordinary rockets, steel chambers and nozzles, and trials in vacuo,
were performed at Clark University. The original calculations were then repeated, using
the data from these experiments, and both the theoretical and experimental results were
submitted, in manuscript, to the Smithsonian Institution, in December 1916. This manu-
script is here presented in the original form, save for the notes at the end which are now
added.
A grant of $5000 from the Hodgkins Fund, Smithsonian Institution, under which
work is being done at present, was advanced toward the development of a reloading, or
multiple-charge rocket, herein explained in principle, and this work was begun at the
Worcester Polytechnic Institute in 1917, and was later undertaken as a war proposition. It
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was continued, from June 1918 up to very nearly the time of signing of the Armistice, at
the Mount Wilson Observatory of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, where most of
the experimental results were obtained ....
[1 ] Outline
A search for methods of raising recording apparatus beyond the range for sounding
balloons (about 20 miles) led the writer to develop a theory of rocket action, in general,
taking into account air resistance and gravity. The problem was to determine the mini-
mum initial mass of an ideal rocket necessary, in order that on continuous loss of mass, a
final mass of one pound would remain, at any desired altitude.
An approximate method was found necessary, in solving this problem, in order to
avoid an unsolved problem in the calculus of variations. The solution that was obtained
revealed the fact that surprisingly small initial masses would be necessary (Table VII) p-0-
vided the gases were ejected from the rocket at a high velocity, and also provided that most of the
rocket consisted of propellant material. The reason for this is, very briefly, that the velocity
enters exponentially in the expression for the initial mass. Thus if the velocity of the ejected
gases be increased fivefold, for example, the initial mass necessary to reach a given height
will be reduced to thefifth rootof that required for the lesser velocity. (A simple calculation
shows at once the effectiveness of a rocket apparatus of high efficiency.)
It was obviously desirable to perform certain experiments: First, with the object of
finding just how inefficient an ordinary rocket is, and second, to determine to what extent
the efficiency could be increased in a rocket of new design. The term "efficiency" here
means the ratio of the kinetic energy being calculated from the average velocity of ejec-
tion, which was obtained indirectly by observations on the recoil of the rocket.
It was found that not only does the powder in an ordinary rocket constitute but a
small fraction of the total mass ( I/4 or 1/5), but that, furthermore, the efficiency is only
2 percent, the average velocity of ejection being about 1000 ft/sec (Table I). This was true
[2] even in the case of the Coston ship rocket, which was found to have a range of a
quarter of a mile.
Experiments were next performed with the object of increasing the average velocity
of ejection of the gases. Charges of dense smokeless powder were fired in strong steel
chambers, these chambers being provided with smooth tapered nozzles, the object of which
was to obtain the work of expansion of the gases, much as is done in the de Laval steam
turbine. The efficiencies and velocities obtained in this way were remarkably high (Table
II), the highest efficiency, or rather "duty," being over 64 percent, and the highest average
velocity of ejection being slightly under 8000 ft/sec, which exceeds any velocity hitherto
attained by matter in appreciable amounts.
These velocities were proved to be real velocities, and not merely effects due to reac-
tion against the air, by firing the same steel chambers in vacuo, and observing the recoil.
The velocities obtained in this way were not much different from those obtained in air
(Table III).
It will be evident that a heavy steel chamber, such as was used in the above-mentioned
experiments, could not compete with the ordinary rocket, even with the high velocities
which were obtained. If, however, successive charges were fired in the same chamber, much as
in a rapid-fire gun, most of the mass of the rocket could consist of propellant, and the superiority
over the ordinary rocket could be increased enormously. Such reloading mechanisms,
together with what is termed a "primary and secondary" rocket principle, are the subject
of certain United States Patents. Inasmuch as these two features are self-evidently opera-
five, itwas not considered necessary to perform experiments concerning them, in order to
be certain of the practicability of the general method.
Regarding the heights that could be reached by the above method: an application of
the theory to cases which the experiments show must be realizable in practice indicates
that a mass of one pound could be elevated to altitudes of 35, 72, and 232 miles, by employ-
ing initial masses of from 3.6 to 12.6, from 5.1 to 24.3, and from 9.8 to 89.6 lb, respectively
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(Table VII). If a device of the Coston ship-rocket type were used instead, the initial masses
would be of the order of magnitude of those above, raised to the 27th power. It should be
understood that if the mass of the recording instruments alone were one pound, the en-
tire final mass would be 3 or 4 pounds.
[3] Regarding the possibility of recovering apparatus upon its return, calculations show
that the dmes of ascent and descent will be short, and that a small parachute should be
sufficient to ensure safe landing.
Calculations indicate, further, that with a rocket of high efficiency, consisting chiefly
of propellant material, it should be possible to send small masses even to such great dis-
tances as to escape the earth's attraction.
In conclusion, it is believed that not only has a new and valuable method of reaching
high altitudes been shown to be operative in theory, but that the experiments herein de-
scribed settle all the points upon which there could be reasonable doubt.
The following discussion is divided into three parts: Part I, theory; Part II, experi-
ments; Part III, calculations, based upon the theory and the experimental results.
Importance of the Subject
The greatest altitude at which soundings of the atmosphere have been made by bal-
loons, namely, about 20 miles, is but a small fraction of the height to which the atmo-
sphere is supposed to extend. In fact, the most interesting, and in some ways the most
important, part of the atmosphere lies in this unexplored region, a means of exploring
which has, up to the present, not seriously been suggested.
A few of the more important matters to be investigated in this region are the follow-
ing: the density, chemical constitution, and temperature of the atmosphere, as well as the
height to which it extends. Other problems are the nature of the aurora, and (with appa-
ratus held by gyroscopes in a fixed direction in space) the nature of the cx, [3, and _ radio-
active rays from matter in the sun as well as the ultraviolet spectrum of this body.
Speculations have been made as to the nature of the upper atmosphere--those by
Wegener' being, perhaps, the most plausible. By estimating the temperature and percent-
age composition of the gases present in the atmosphere, Wegener calculates the partial
pressures of the constituent gases, and concludes that there are four rather distinct re-
gions or spheres of the atmosphere in which certain gases predominate: the troposphere,
in which are the clouds; the stratosphere, predominatingly nitrogen; the hydrogen sphere;
and the [4] geocoronium sphere. This highest sphere appears to consist essentially of an
element, "geocoronium," a gas undiscovered at the surface of the earth, having a spec-
trum which is the single aurora line, 557 I.tll, and being 0.4 as heavy as hydrogen. The
existence of such a gas is in agreement with Nichoison's theory of the atom, and its inves-
tigation would, of course, be a matter of considerable importance to astronomy and phys-
ics as well as to meteorology. It is of interest to note that the greatest altitude attained by
sounding balloons extends but one-third through the second region, or stratosphere.
No instruments for obtaining data at these high altitudes are herein discussed, but it
will be at once evident that their construction is a problem of small difficulty compared
with the attainment of the desired altitudes.
[5] Part I. Theory
Method to Be Employed
It is possible to obtain a suggestion as the method that must be employed from the
fundamental principles of mechanics, together with a consideration of the conditions of
the problem. We are at once limited to an apparatus which reacts against matter, this mat-
ter being carried by the apparatus in question. For the entire system we must have: First,
1 A. Wegener,Phys.Zeitscher12, pp. 170-178,214-222, 1911.
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action in accordance with Newton's third law of motion; and, second, energy' supplied
from some source or sources must be used to give kinetic and potential energy to the
apparatus that is being raised; kinetic energy to the matter which, by reaction, produces
the desired motion of the apparatus; and also sufficient energy to overcome air resistance.
We are at once limited, since subatomic energy is not available, to a means of propul-
sion in which jets of gas are employed. This will be evident from the following consider-
at.ion: First, the matter which, by its being ejected furnishes the necessary reaction, must
be taken with the apparatus in reasonably small amounts. Second, energy must be taken
with the apparatus in as large amounts as possible. Now, inasmuch as the maximum amount
of energy associated with the minimum amount of matter occurs with chemical energy,
both the matter and the energy for reaction must be supplied by a substance which, on
burning or exploding, liberates a large amount of energy, and permits the ejection of the
products that are formed. An ideal substance is evidently smokeless powder, which fur-
nishes a large amount of energy, but does not explode with such violence as to be uncon-
trollable.
The apparatus must obviously be constructed on the principle of the rocket. An ordi-
nary rocket, however, of reasonably small bulk, can rise to but a very limited altitude. This
is due to the fact that the part of the rocket that furnishes the energy is but a rather small
fraction of the total mass of the rocket; and also to the fact that only a part of this energy is
converted into kinetic energy of the mass which is expelled. It will be expected, then, that
the ordinary rocket is an inefficient heat engine. Experiments will be described below
which show that this is true to a surprising degree.
[6] By the application of several new principles, an efficiency manyfold greater than that
of the ordinary rocket is possible; experimental demonstrations of which will also be de-
scribed below. Inasmuch as these principles are of some value for military purposes, the
writer has protected himself, as well as aerological science in America, by certain United
States Patents, of which the following have already been issued: Nos. 1,102,653, 1,103,503,
1,191,299, 1,194,496.
The principles concerning efficiency are essentially three in number. The first con-
cerns thermodynamic efficiency, and is the use of a smooth nozzle, of proper length and
taper, through which the gaseous products of combustion are discharged. By this means
the work of expansion of the gases is obtained as kinetic energy, and also complete com-
bustion is ensured.
The second principle is embodied in a reloading device, whereby a large mass of
explosive material is used, a little at time, in a small, strong, combustion chamber. This
enables high chamber pressures to be employed, impossible in an ordinary paper rocket,
and also permits most of the mass of the rocket to consist of propellant material.
The third principle consists in the employment of a primary and secondary rocket
apparatus, the secondary (a copy in miniature of the primary) being fired when the pri-
mary has reached the upper limit of its flight. This is most clearly shown, in principle, in
U.S. Patent No. 1,102,653.
By this means the large ratio of propellant material is total mass is kept sensibly the
same during the entire flight. This last principle is obviously to avoid damage when the
discarded casings reach the ground, each should be fitted with a parachute device, as
explained in U.S. Patent No. 1,191,299.
Experiments will be described below which show that, by application of the above
principles, it is possible to convert the rocket from a very inefficient heat engine into the
most efficient heat engine that ever has been devised.
Statement of the Problem
Before describing the experiments that have been performed, it will be well to de-
duce the theory of rocket action in general, in order [7] to show the tremendous impor-
tance of efficiency in the attainment of very high altitudes. A statement of the problem will
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therefore be made, which will lead to the differential equation of the motion. An approxi-
mate solution of this equation will be made for the initial mass required to raise a mass of
one pound to any desired altitude, when said initial mass is a minimum.
A particular form of ideal rocket is chosen for the discussion as being very amenable
to theoretical treatment, and at the same time embodying all of the essential points of the
practical apparatus. Referring to Fig. 1, a mass H, weighing 1 lb is to be raised as high as
possible in a vertical direction _° by a rocket formed of a cone P, of propellant material,
surrounded by a casing K The material Pis expelled downward with a constant velocity c.
It is further supposed that the casing Kdrops away continuously as the propellant material
P burns, so that the base of the rocket always remains plane. It will be seen that this ap-
proximates to the case of a rocket in which the casing and firing chamber of a primary
rocket are discarded after the magazine has been exhausted of cartridges, as well as to the
case in which cartridge shells are ejected as fast as the cartridges are fired.
Fig. 1
[8] Let us call
M = the
m = the
v = the
c = the
R =
g =
dm =
k =
d'v =
initial mass of the rocket
mass that has been ejected up to the time t
velocity of the rocket, at time t
velocity of ejection of the mass expelled
the force, in absolute units, due to air resistance
the acceleration of gravity
the mass expelled during the time dt
the constant fraction of the mass dra that consists of casing/_ expelled with
zero velocity relative to the remainder of the rocket
the increment of velocity given the remaining mass of the rocket
The differential equation for this ideal rocket will be the analytical statement of
Newton's third law, obtained by equating the momentum at a time t to that at the time t +
dr, plus the impulse of the forces of air resistance and gravity,
(M- m) v = dm(1 - k) (v- c) + vk dm + (M- m- dm) ( v + dv) + [R+ g( M- m) ] dt
If we neglect terms of the second order, this equation reduces to
c(1- k)dm= (M- m)dv+ [R+ g(M- m)]dt (1)
A check upon the correctness of this equation may be had from the analytical expres-
sion for the conservation of energy, obtained by equadng the heat energy evolved by the
burning of the mass of propellant, din(l- k), to the additional kinetic energy of the system
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produced by this mass plus the work done against gravity and air resistance during the
time dt. The equation thus derived is found to be identical with Eq. (1).
Reduction of Equation to the Simplest Form
In the most general case, it will be found that R and g are most simply expressed
when in terms of v and s. In particular, the [9] quantity R, the air resistance of the rocket
at time t, depends not only upon the density of the air and the velocity of the rocket, but
also upon the cross section Sat the time t. The cross section Sshould obviously be as small
as possible; and this condition will be satisfied at all times, provided it is the following func-
tion of the mass of the rocket (M- m),
S = A(M- m) _'' (2)
where A is a constant of proportionality. This condition is evidently satisfied by the ideal
rocket, Fig. 1. Equation (2) expresses the fact that the shape of the rocket apparatus is at
all times similar to the shape at the start; or, expressed differently, Smust vary as the square
of the linear dimensions, whereas the mass (M- m) varies as the cube. Provision that this
condition may approximately be fulfilled is contained in the principle of primary and
secondary rockets.
The resistance R may be taken as independent of the length of the rocket by neglect-
ing "skin friction." For velocities exceeding that of sound this is entirely permissible, pro-
vided the cross section is greatest at the head of the apparatus, as shown in U.S. Patent No.
1,102,653.
The quantities R, g, and a are evidently expressible most simply in terms of the alti-
tude s, provided the cross section S is also so expressed, giving, in place of Eq. (1),
c( 1-k)dm = (M - m)dv + v@s)[R(s) +g(s)(M -m)]ds (3)
Rigorous Solution for Minimum M at Present Impossible
The success of the method depends entirely upon the possibility of using an initial
mass M of explosive material that is not impracticably large. It amounts to the same thing,
of course, if we say that the mass ejected up to the time t (i.e. m) must be a minimum,
conditions for the existence of a minimum being involved in the integration of the equa-
tion of motion.
That a minimum mass m exists when a required mass is to be given an assigned up-
ward velocity at a given altitude is evident intuitively from the following consideration: If,
at an intermediate altitude, the velocity of ascent be very great, the air resistance R (de-
pending upon the square of the velocity) will also be great. On the other hand, if the
velocity of ascent be very small, force will be required to overcome gravity for a long period
of time. In both cases the mass necessary to be expelled will be excessively large.
[ 10] Evidently, then, the velocity of ascent must have some special value at each point of
the ascent. In other words, it is necessary to determine an unknown function fl_s), defined
by
=f(s)
such that m is a minimum.
It is possible to putJ(s) and (df(s)/ds) ds in place of v and dv, in Eq. (3), and to obtain
m by integration. But in order that m shall be a minimum 8m must be put equal to zero,
and the function f(s) determined. The procedure necessary for this determination pre-
sents a new and unsolved problem in the calculus of variations.
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Solution of the Minimum Problem by an Approximate Method
In order to obtain a solution that will be sufficiently exact to show the possibilities of
the method, and will at the same time avoid the difficulties involved in the employment of
the rigorous method just described, use may be made of the fact that if we divide the
altitude into a large number of parts, let us say n, we may consider the quantities R, g, and
also the acceleration, to be constant over each interval.
If we denote by a the constant acceleration defined by v = atin any interval, we shall
have, in place of the equation of motion (3), a linear equation of the first order in m and
t, as follows:
dm_ (M-m)(a+g)+ R
dt c(1-k)
the solution of which, on multiplying and dividing the right number of (a + g), is
[ ,l M(o+,>+,,Iro[ ,I.F 1
m=eL-c(-'_-k) J a+g (J Lc(l-k) J Lc(l-k)J
L-(__k) ] '_+g e t +c (4)
where Cis an arbitrary constant.
This constant is at once determined as -1 from the fact that m must equal zero when
t=0.
We then have
This equation applies, of course, to each interval, R, g, and a, being considered con-
stant. We may make a further simplification if, [11] for each interval, we determine what
initial mass M would be required when the final mass in the interval is one pound. The initial mass
at the beginning of the first interval, or what may be called the "total initial mass," required
to propel the apparatus through the n intervals will then be the product of the n quantities
obtained in this way.
If we thus place the final mass (M- m), in any interval equal to unity, we have
M = m + 1 and when this relation is used in Eq. (5), we have for the mass at the beginning
of the interval in question
M:3-_-le[ a+g tI 11+ea+------_-gt
_+gt L_(_-k>J- j _(1-k) (6)
Now the initial mass that would be required to give the one pound mass the same
velocity at the end of the interval, if R and g had both been zero, is from (6),
at
M=e -- (7)
c(1-k)
The ratio of Eq. (6) to Eq. (7) is a measure of the additional mass that is required for
overcoming the two resistances R and g; and when this ratio is least, we know that M is a
EXPLORINGTHEUNKNOWN 93
minimumfortheintervalinquestion.The"totalinitialmass"requiredtoraiseonepound
to anydesiredaltitudemaythusbehadastheproductof theminimumM's for each
interval obtained in this way.
From Eqs. (6) and (7) we see at once the importance of high efficiency, if the "total
initial mass" is to be reduced to a minimum. Consider the exponent of e. The quantities a,
g, and t depend upon the particular ascent that is to be made, whereas c(1 - k) depends
entirely upon the efficiency of the rocket, c being the velocity of expulsion of the gases,
and k the fraction of the entire mass that consists of loading and firing mechanism, and of
magazine. In order to see the importance of making c(1 - k) as large as possible, suppose
that it were decreased tenfold. Then
e a+g---t
c(1-k)
would be raised to the lOth power, in other words, the mass for each interval would be the
original value multiplied by itself ten times.
[12] Part II. Experiments
F_iency of Ordinary Rocket
The average velocity of ejection of the gases expelled from two sizes of ordinary
rocket were determined by a ballistic pendulum. The smaller rockets C, Fig. 1, averaged
120 gm, with a powder charge of 23 gm; and the larger, S, the well-known Coston ship
rocket, weighed 640 gm, with a powder charge of 130 gm. Fig. 2, shows the rockets as
compared with a yardstick Y.
The ballistic pendulum, was a massive compound pendulum weighing 70.64 kg
(155 lb) with a half period of 4.4 sec; large compared with the duration of discharge of the
rockets. The efficiencies were obtained from the average velocity of ejection of the gases,
found by the usual ballistic-pendulum method, together with the heat value of the powder
of the rockets, obtained by a bomb calorimeter for the writer by a Worcester chemist.
The results of these experiments are given in Table I. It will be seen from the table
that the efficiency of the ordinary rocket is close to 2 percent; *' slightly less for the smaller,
and slightly more for the larger, rockets, and also that the average velocity of the ejected
gases is of the order to 1000 ft/sec. It was found by experiment that a Coston ship rocket,
lightened to 510 gm by the removal of the red fire, had a range of a quarter of a mile, the
highest point of the trajectory being slightly under 490 ft. A range as large as this is rather
remarkable in view of the surprisingly small efficiency of this rocket.
Table I
Type of rocket Efficiency Mean efficiency Velocity corresponding
to mean efficiency
Common
Common
Common
Common
Coston ship
Coston ship
Coston ship
2.54%
1.45
1.40
1.95
1.75%
2.27
2.62
1.86%
2.21%
957.6 ft/sec
1029.25 R/sec
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[ 13 ] Experiments in Air with Small Steel Chambers
An apparatus was next constructed, with a view to increasing the efficiency, embody-
ing three radical changes, namely, the use of smokeless powder, of much higher heat value
than the black powder employed in ordinary rockets; the use of a strong steel chamber, to
permit employment of high pressures; and the use of a tapered nozzle, similar to a steam
turbine nozzle, to make available the work of expansion.
Two sizes of chamber were used, one l/_-in, diameter, and one 1-in. diameter. The
inside and outside diameters of the smaller chamber, Fig. 2a, were, respectively, 1.28 cm
and 3.63 cm. The nozzle, polished until very smooth, was of 8 ° taper, and was adapted to
permit the use of two extensions of different lengths. The length of the chamber, as the
distance/in the figure will be called, could be altered by putting in or removing cylindrical
tempered-steel plugs of various lengths, held in place by the breechblock ....
Two small chambers were used, practically identical in all respects, one of the soft
tool steel, and one of best selected nickel-steel gun-barrel stock, treated to give 100,000 lb
tensile strength, for which the writer wishes to express his indebtedness to the Winchester
Repeating Arms Company.
Table lI
Experi-
ment Chamber
no.
1 Soft steel
2 Soft steel
3 Soft steel
4 Soft steel
5 Soft steel
6 Soft steel
7 Soft steel
8 Soft steel
9 Soft steel
10 Soft steel
11 Soft steel
12 Soft steel
13 Soft steel
14 Soft steel
29 Nickel steel
44 Nickel steel
46 Nickel steel
Length
of Total
chamber mass
l M
cm gm
0.69 3,540.1
0.69 3,541.9
1.01 3,538.8
0.69 3,541.9
1.01 3,538.8
0.69 3,547.9
0.69 3,540.1
0.69 3,540.1
1.01 3,645.8
1.01 3,645.8
0.69 3,648.93
0.69 3,533.9
0.69 3,645.8
0.69 3,533.9
0.69 3,553.5
1.01 6,273.5
0.69 6,270.5
Length
0f
nozzle
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Short
Short
Short
Long
Long
Long
Medium
Long
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Small
Mass
of
Kind Mass waddin_
of of and
powder powder wire
51
52
Chrome-nickel 2.28 19,324.0
! steel [ [
Chrome-nickel 2.28 [ 19,324.0
steel
16.29
16.29
gm gm
Du Pont 0.7795 0.034_
Du Pont 0.7060 0.038_
Du Pont 1.0025 0.037C
Infallible 0.8247 0.0395
Infallible 1.2015 0.038C
Du Pont 0.7074 0.037C
Infallible 0.8533 0.037C
Du Pont 0.6825 0.0355
Infallible 1.2397 0.037(
Du Pont 0.9625 0.036_
Du Pont 0.7361 0.038(
Infallible 0.8985 0.0391
Infallible 0.9068 0.039(
Du Pont 0.7465 0.037_
Infallible 1.0264 0.044_
Infallible 1.2731 0.042C
Infallible 1.4849 0.040_
Du Pont 8.0522
Infallible 9.0259
Large
0.3184
0.3271
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U
'B (b) w-(a)
Fig. 2
The charge of powder P, Fig. 2, was fired electrically, by a hot wire in the following
way: A fine copper wire w, 0.12-mm diameter, passed through the wadding, Fig. 2b, consist-
ing of two disks of stiff cardboard, and this copper wire joined a short length of platinum
or platenoid wire of 0.1-mm diameter f, extending across the inner [14] part of the
chamber
d l
cm
11.55
10.30
15.80
13.60
2O.55
9.43
12.59
9.35
20.18
14.20
10.22
13.90
13.85
10.07
17.95
12.58
14.78
Displacement
corrected
¢m
Length
of
pendulum
Velocity
km/sec fl/sec
11.41
10.19
15.70
13.50
20.46
9.38
12.53
9.31
20.10
14.10
10.10
13.83
13.80
10.00
17.85
12.38
14.68
11.62
10.35
15.85
13.65
20.59
9.45
12.62
9.37
20.22
14.25
10.28
13.94
13.87
10.10
18.00
12.68
14.93
79.15
79.15
79.15
79.15
79.50
79.50
79.50
79.50
79.50
79.50
79.50
79.50
79.50
79.50
79.50
79.50
79.50
1.781
1.738
1.907
1.976
2.082
1.585
1.766
1.626
2.045
1.834
1.704
1.850
1.882
1.609
1.969
2.127
2.154
5,843
5,703
6,257
6,484
6,832
5,203
5,793
5,336
6,709
6,018
5,592
6,069
6,177
5,279
6,460
6,981
7,064
Efficiency
percent
39.01
37.16
44.73
37.13
41.88
30.93
30.12
32.54
40.39
41.38
35.74
33.05
34.24
31.38
37.44
43.73
44.78
chamber
5.02 2.290 7,515 64.53
7.08 2.434 7,987 57.25
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wadding, in contact with the powder. To the other end of this platinum wire, a short length
of the copper wire passed to the side of the wadding, and made electrical contact with the
wall of the chamber. A fine steel wire W, 0.24 mm in diameter, served to pull the copper
wire w tightly enough to prevent contact of the latter with the nozzle. The wire W was so
held that, although it exerted a pull on the wire w, it nevertheless offered no resistance in
the direction of motion of the ejected gases.
Two dense smokeless powders were used: Du Pont pistol powder No. 3, a very rapid
dense nitrocellulose powder, and Infallible shotgun powder, of the Hercules Powder Com-
pany. The heat values in all cases were found by bomb calorimeter? All determinations
were made in an atmosphere of carbon dioxide, in order to avoid any heat due to the
oxygen of the air. The average heat values were the following:
Powder, in ordinary rocket
Powder, in Coston ship rocket
Du Pont Pistol No. 3
Infallible
545.0 cal/gm
528.3
972.5
1238.5
The ballistic pendulum used in determining the average velocity of ejection, for the
small chambers, consisted essentially of a plank B, carrying weights, and supporting the
chamber, or gun, C, in a horizontal position. This plank was supported by fine steel wires
in such a manner that it remained horizontal during motion. In order to make certain that
the plank actually was horizontal in all positions, a test was frequently made by mounting a
small vertical mirror on the plank, with its plane perpendicular to the axis of the gun, and
observing the image of a horizontal objectmas a lead pencil--held several feet away while
the pendulum was swinging. Current for firing the charge was led through two drops of
mercury to wires on the plank. A record of the displacements was made by a stylus consist-
ing of a steel rod S, pointed and hardened at the lower end. This rod slid freely in a vertical
brass sleeve, attached to the under side of the plank, and made a mark upon a smoked-
glass strip G. In this way the first backward and forward displacements of the pendulum
were recorded, and the elimination of friction was thereby made possible.
The data and results of these experiments are given in Table II, in which d is the
displacement corrected for friction.
[15] The velocities and efficiencies were obtained from the usual expression for the veloc-
ity in which a ballistic pendulum, with the bob constantly horizontal, is used, namely,
[16] v = 3,/_/2g/(1- cos O)
rn
where M = the total weight of the bob
m = the mass ejected; powder plus wadding
l = the length of the pendulum
0 = the angle through which the pendulum swings
g = the acceleration of gravity
The cosine of 0was corrected for friction by observing the two first displacements d_ and d_
and obtaining therefrom
d = dl _-_2
It will be noticed that the highest velocity was obtained with Infallible powder, and
1. It was found necessary to use a sample exceeding a certain mass, as otherwise the heat value depended
upon the mass of the sample.
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was over 7000 ft/sec. The corresponding efficiency was close to 50 percent. In view of the
fact that this velocity, corresponding to c in the exponents of Eqs. (6) and (7), is sevenfold
greater than for an ordinary rocket, it is easily seen that the employment of a chamber and
nozzle such as has just been described must make an enormous reduction in initial mass as
compared with that necessary for an ordinary rocket ....
[17] Exper/ments w/th Large Chamber
Inasmuch as all the steel chambers employed in the preceding experiments were of
the same internal diameter (1.26 cm), itwas considered desirable that at least a few experi-
ments should be performed with a larger chamber, first, in order to be certain that a large
chamber is operative; and second, to see if such a chamber is not even more efficient than
a small chamber. This latter is to be expected for the reason that heat and frictional losses
should increase as the square of the linear dimensions of the chamber; and hence increase
in a less proportion than the mass of powder that can be used with safety, which will vary as
the cube of the linear dimensions. Evidence in support of this expectation has already been
given. Thus, for ordinary rockets, the larger rocket has the higher efficiency, as evident
from Table I.
The large chamber was of nickel-alloy steel (Samson No. 3A), of 115,000 lb tensile
strength, for which the writer takes opportunity of thanking the Carpenter Steel Com-
pany. This chamber had inside diameter, and diameter of throat, both twice as large as
those of the chambers previously used; the thickness of wall of the chamber and the taper
of the nozzle were, however, the same. The inside of the nozzle was well polished. Figure 3
shows a section of the chamber; the outer boundary being indicated by dotted lines, P
being the powder, and Wthe wadding. It will be noticed that the wadding is just twice the
size of that previously used ....
i i "
l'c'"___-_-_ .......................................................
P W
Fig. 3
The chamber was held in the lower end of a [18] 3 _/_-ft length of 2-in. pipe Pby
setscrews. Within this pipe, above the chamber, was fastened a length of 2-in. steel shafting,
to increase the mass of the movable system. This system was supported by 72-in. steel pin E.
On firing, the recoil lifted the above system vertically upward against gravity, the
extent of this lift, or displacement, being recorded by a thin lead pencil, slidable in a brass
sleeve set in the pipe at right angles to the pin E. The point of the pencil was pressed
against a vertical cardboard Cby the expelled gases will be called the "direct-lift" method;
and the theory is given in Appendix A.
Although rebound of the gases from the ground would probably have been negli-
gible, such rebound was eliminated by a short plank D, covered with a piece of heavy sheet
iron, and supported at an angle of 45 ° with the horizontal. This served to deflect the gases
to one side.
The results of two experiments, 51 and 52, with this large chamber, are given in Table
II. In experiment 51, with Du Pont powder, the powder was packed rather loosely. Any
increase in internal diameter was inappreciable, certainly under 0.01 mm. In experiment
52, the Infallible powder was somewhat compressed. After firing, the chamber was tbund
to be slightly bulged for a short distance around the middle of the powder chamber, the
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inside diameter being increased from 2.6 cm to 2.7 cm, and the outside diameter from
5.08 cm to 5.14 cm. The efficiency (64.53 percent) in experiment 51 and the velocity
(7987 ft/sec) in experiment 52 were, respectively, the highest obtained in any of the ex-
periments.
The conclusions to be drawn from these two experiments are, first, that large cham-
bers can be operated, under proper conditions, [ 19] without involving undue pressures;
and second, that large chambers, even with comparatively short nozzles, are more efficient
and give higher velocities than small chambers.
It is obvious that large grains of powder should be used in large chambers if danger-
ous pressures are to be avoided. The bulging in experiment 52 is to be explained by the
grains of powder being too small for a chamber of the size under consideration. It is pos-
sible, however, that pressures even as great as that developed in experiment 52 could be
employed in practice provided the chamber were of "built-up" construction. A similar
result might possibly be had if several shots had been fired, of successively increasing
amounts of powder. The result of this would have been a hardening of the wall of the
chamber by stretching. Such a phenomenon was observed with the soft-steel chamber
already described, which was distended by the first few shots of Infallible powder, but
thereafter remained unchanged with loads as great as those first used. _
Experiments in Vacuo
Introductory
Having obtained average velocities of ejection up to nearly 8000 ft/sec in air, it re-
mained to determine to what extent these represented reaction against the air in the nozzle,
or immediately beyond. Although it might be supposed that the reaction due to the air is
small, from the fact that the air in the nozzle and immediately beyond is of small mass, it is
by no means self-evident that the reaction is zero. For example, when dynamite, lying on
an iron plate, is exploded, the particles which constituted the dynamite are moved very
rapidly upward, and the reaction to this motion bends the iron plate downward; but reac-
tion of the said particles against the air as they move upward may also play an important
role in bending the iron. The experiments now to be described were undertaken with the
view of finding to what extend, if any, the %,elocity in air" was a fictitious velocity. The
experiments were performed with the smaller soft tool-steel and nickel-steel chambers
that have already been described.
Method of Supporting the Chamber in Vacuo
For the sake of convenience, the chamber, or gun, should evidently be mounted in a
vertical position, so that the expelled gases are shot downward, and the chamber is moved
upward by the reaction, either being lifted bodily, or suspended by a spring and set in
vibration.
[20] The whole suspended system was therefore designed to be contained in a 3-in. steel
pipe, all the essential parts being fastened to a cap, fitting on the top of this pipe. This was
done not only for the sake of convenience in handling the heavy chamber, but also from
the fact that the only joint that would have to be made airtight for each shot would be at
the 3-in. cap.
The means of supporting the chamber from the cap is shown in Plate 6, Fig. 2, and
Plate 7, Fig. 1, the apparatus being shown dismantled in Plate 7, Fig. 2. Two 3/8-in. steel
rods R, R were threaded tightly by taper (pipe) threads into the cap C These rods were
joined by a yoke, at their lower ends, which served to keep them always parallel. Two
collars, or holders, Hand H', free to slide along the rods R, R, held the chamber or gun, by
three screws in each holder. The inner ends of the screws of the lower holder were made
conical, and these fitted into conical depressions c, Fig 2a [page 349], drilled in the side of
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thegun,sothatthelowerholdercouldthusberigidlyattachedtothegun.Thiswasmade
necessaryinorderthatleadsleeves,fittingthegunandrestinguponthelowerholderH',
could be used to increase the mass of the suspended system. Three such sleeves were used,
the two largest being molded around thin steel tubes which closely fitted the gun. The
rods R, Rwere lubricated with Vaseline. Two 78-in. steel pins were driven through the rods
R, R, just above the yoke Y, in order that the latter could not be driven offby the fall of the
heavy chamber and weights when direct lift was employed.
In the experiments in which the chamber and lead sleeves were suspended by a spring,
the latter was hooked at its upper end to a screw eye fixed in the cap C. The lower end of
the spring was hooked through a small cylinder of fiber. A record of the displacements of
the suspended system was made by a stylus S, Plate 6, Fig. 2, in the upper holder H. This
stylus was kept pressed against a long narrow strip of smoked glass G by a spring of fine
steel wire. This strip of smoked glass was held between two clamps, fastened to a rod, the
upper end of which was secured to the cap C, and the lower end to the yoke E Except for
the largest charges used, it was possible to measure the displacements on both sides of the
zero position, and thereby to calculate the decrement and eliminate friction.
When the chamber was suspended by a spring, a deflection as large as a centimeter
was unavoidably produced merely by placing the cap C on the 3-in. pipe or removing it,
although, in all cases the [21] system would return to within I mm (usually much less than
this) of the zero position after being displaced. In order to avoid any such displacement as
that just mentioned, an eccentric clamp K, Plate 7, Fig. 1, was employed to keep the sus-
pended system rigidly in its zero position during assembling and dismounting the apparatus.
This clamp consisted of an eccentric rod/_ free to turn in a hold in the cap C, the
lower end being held in a bearing in the yoke Y. Through the upper end of this rod was
pinned a small rod K', at right angles to/¢ The surface of the rod Kwas smeared with a
mixture of beeswax, resin, and Venice turpentine; and the hole in the cap through which
Kprojected was rendered airtight by wax of the same composition.
The suspended system was assembled while the cap Cwas held by a support touching
its under side. When the assembling was complete, the wax was heated by a small alcohol
blowtorch until it was soft, then a rubber band was slipped around the rod K' and the
outlet pipe E. A trial showed that the cap could now be put in place on the pipe and
removed, without the suspended system moving appreciably. After the cap C was in posi-
tion on the pipe, the rubber band was removed, and the wax heated until the rod Kcould
be turned out of engagement with the holders H, H'. After a shot had been fired, the
clamp was again placed in operation until the system had been taken from the 3-in. pipe
and the smoked glass removed.
The circuit which carried the electric current to ignite the charge consisted of the
insulated wire W, Plate 7, Fig. 1, which passed through a tapered plug of shellacked hard
fiber, in the cap C, thence through a glass tube to the yoke Y, to which it was fastened.
Below the yoke it was wrapped with insulating tape, except at the lower end where it was
shaped to hold the 0.24-ram steel wire, attached to the fine copper wire from the wadding.
From the chamber the current passed up the rods R, R and out of the cap, around which
was wrapped a heavy bare copper wire V, which together with W, constituted the terminals
of the circuit. It should be mentioned, in passing, that a small amount of black powder B,
Fig. 2a [page 349], placed over the platinum fuse wire on the wadding, was found neces-
sary as a primer in order to ignite dense smokeless powders in vacuo.
In order to make the joint between the cap and the pipe airtight during a determina-
tion, the following device was adopted. The outside of the cap C and also a locknut were
both turned down to the same diameter. The locknut was made fast to the pipe. These
were [22] then painted on the outside with melted wax consisting of equal parts beeswax
and resin with a little Venice turpentine.
When a determination was to be made, the cap was screwed into position, a wide
rubber band was slipped over the junction between cap and locknut, and the outside of
this rubber band was heated with an alcohol blast torch. The result was a joint, for all
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practical purposes, absolutely airtight, which could, nevertheless, be dismounted at once
after pulling off the rubber band.
Theory of the Experiments in Vacuo
The expressions for the velocity of the expelled gases are easily obtained for the two
types of motion of the suspended system that were employed, namely, simple harmonic
motion produced by a spring, and direct lift.
Simple harmonic motion. Results obtained with simple harmonic motion (slightly
damped, of course) were naturally more accurate than with direct lift, as it was impossible
in the latter case to eliminate friction. The theory, for simple harmonic motion, in which
account is taken of friction is described in Appendix B. The spring was one made to speci-
fications, particularly as regards the magnitude of the force per-centimeter-increase-in-
length by the Morgan Spring Company of Worcester, Massachusetts. Care was taken to
make certain that in no experiment was the extension of the spring reduced to such a low
value as not to lie upon the rectilinear line part of the calibration curve.
Direct lift. The theory of the motion, in this case, has already been given under Appendix
A. In this case it might be assumed that a correction could be made for friction by multi-
plying the displacement s by some particular decrement d_l/d _ obtained in the experi-
ments with simple harmonic motion, that might reasonably apply. This, as will be shown
below, was found to give results in good agreement for the two types of motion, if the
direct lift was about 2 cm; but not if it was much larger. It was found that very little fric-
tional resistance was experienced when the mass Mwas raised by hand, provided the axis
of the gun were kept strictly vertical, but a very considerable resistance was experienced if
the axis was inclined to one side so that the holders H, H' rubbed against the rods R, R.
This sidewise pressure did not take place when the spring was used. It was also found that
the trace upon the smoked glass was always slightly sinuous, with direct lift, and [23] straight
with the spring. The simple harmonic motion was, therefore, much the more preferable,
but could not be used when the powder charges were large.
Means of Eliminating Gaseous Rebound
It should be remembered that the real object of the vacuum experiments is to ascer-
tain what the reaction experienced by the chamber would be, if a given charge of powder
were fired in the chamber many miles above the earth's surface. A container is therefore
necessary, which, for the purpose at hand, approaches most nearly a container of unlim-
ited capacity. A length of 3-in. pipe, closed at the ends, is evidently unsuitable, because the
gas, fired from one end, is sure to rebound from the other end with considerable velocity,
and hence to produce a much larger displacement than ought really to be observed.
Moreover, any tank of finite size must necessarily produce a finite amount of rebound,
from the fact that the whole action is equivalent to liberating suddenly, in the tank, 1 or
2 liters of gas at atmospheric pressure.
There are two possible methods for reducing the velocity of the gas sufficiently to
produce a negligible rebound: a disintegration method, whereby the stream is broken up
into many small streams, sent in all directions (i.e. virtually reconverted into heat); and
second, a friction method, whereby the individual stream remains moving in one direction,
but is gradually slowed down by friction against a solid surface.
As will be shown below, accurate results were obtained by the first method, in what
may be called the "cylindrical" tank; and these results were checked satisfactorily by the
second method, in what will be called the "circular" tank.
The cylindrical tank was 10 ft 5 in. high and weighed about 500 lb. It consisted of a
6-ft length T, Fig. 4 and Plate 8, Fig. 1, of 12-in. steel pipe, with threaded caps on the ends,
Entering the upper cap at a slight angle was the 3-in. pipe P, 4 1/2 ft long, which supported
the cap Cof Plate 6, Fig. 2, and Plate 7, Fig. 1. The 12-in. pipe was sawn across at the dotted
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line T O, so that any device could be placed in the interior of this tank, or removed from it,
as desired. The upper section of the tank was lifted off as occasion demanded by a block
and tackle. The two ends to be joined were first painted with the wax previously described;
and after the tank had been assembled, the joint was painted on the outside with the same
wax W, and the entire tank thereafter painted with asphalt varnish.
[24]
Fig. 4
This tank was used under three conditions:
1. Tank empty, with the elbow E to direct the gas into a swirl such that the gas, while
in motion, would not tend to return up the pipe P. In this case some rebound was to be
expected from this elbow. This expectation was realized in practice.
2. Tank empty, and elbow cut offalong the dotted line E 0. In this case, more rebound
was to be expected than in Case 1, which was borne out in practice.
3. Elbow E cut at E0, and tank half filled with 1/_-in. square-mesh wire fencing. Two
separate devices constructed of this wire fencing were used one above the other. The gas
first passed through an Archimedes spiral J, of 2-ft fencing, comprising eight turns,
[25] held apart by iron wires bound into the fencing. This construction allowed most of
the gas to penetrate the spiral to a considerable distance before being disturbed, and, of
course, eliminated regular reflection. This second device J', placed under the first, con-
sisted of a number of 12-in. circular disks of the same fencing, bound to two */4-in. iron
rods Qby iron wires. These disks were spaced 1 in. apart. The three upper disks were single
disks, the next lower two were double, with the strands extending in different directions,
the next two were triple, and the lowest disk of all, 2 in. from the bottom of the tank, was
composed of six individual disks. This lower device necessarily offered large resistance to
the passage of the gas; yet strong rebound from any part of it was prevented by the spiral
just described. With this third arrangement, small rebound was to be expected, which also
was borne out in practice.
This tank was exhausted by way of a stopcock at its lower end, S; and air was also
admitted through this same stopcock.
The circular tank, Plate 8, Fig. 2, was 10 ft high and weighed about 200 lb. It con-
sisted of a straight length of 3-in. pipe, carefully fitted, and welded autogenously, to a 4-ft.
3-in. U-pipe. The straight pipe entered the U-pipe on the inner side of the latter, and at as
sharp an angle as possible. Another similar U-pipe was bolted to the first by flanges, with
l/l,-in, sheetrubber packing between.
In this tank, the gases were shot down the straight pipe, entered the upper U-pipe at
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a small angle, thus avoiding any considerable rebound, and thence passed around the
circular partmnot returning up the straight pipe until the velocity had been gready re-
duced by friction.
In order to make the time, during which the velocity was being reduced, as long as
possible, the pipes were carefully cleaned of scale. They were first pickled, and then cleaned
by drawing through them, a number of times; first, a scraper of sheet iron; second, a stiff
cylindrical bristle brush, and finally a cloth. All but the most firmly adhering scale was
thereby removed. Further, care was taken to cut the hole in the rubber washers, between
the flanges, so wide that compression by the flanges would not spread the rubber into the
pipe and thereby obstruct the flow of gas.
Notwithstanding all these precautions, evidence was had that the gases became stopped
very rapidly. This was to be expected inasmuch as there is solid matter, namely, the wad-
ding and wire, that is [26] ejected with the gas, which accumulates with each successive
shot. This solid matter must offer considerable frictional resistance to motion along the U-
pipe, and, since the mass of gas is only of the order of a gram, must necessarily act to stop
the flow in a very short time. This interval of time was great enough, however, so that this
second method afforded a satisfactory check upon the first method.
A possible modification of the above two methods would have been to provide some
sort of trapdoor arrangement whereby the gases, after having been reduced in speed in a
container as just described, would have been prevented from returning upward into the
3-in. pipe Pby this trap, which would be sprung at the instant of firing. In this way gaseous
rebound would be entirely eliminated. It was found, however, that results with the two
methods already described could be checked sufficiently to make this modification unnec-
essary.
The tanks were exhausted by a rotary oil pump, No. 1, of the American Rotary Pump
Company, supported by a water jet pump. In this way the pressure in the cylindrical tank
could be reduced to 1.5 mm of mercury in 25 minutes and to the same pressure in the
circular tank, in 10 minutes. The pressures employed in the experiments ranged from
7.5 mm to 0.5 mm.
Methods of Detecting and Measuring Gaseous Rebound
With the two tanks used in the experiments, it was obviously impossible to eliminate
gaseous rebound entirely, from the fact that, even if the velocity of the bases is reduced to
zero, there still remains the effect of introducing suddenly a certain quantity of gas into
the tank. It became necessary, then, to devise some means of detecting, and, if possible, of
measuring, the extent of the rebound.
Three devices were employed, one for detecting a force of rebound, and two for mea-
suring the magnitude of the impulse per unit area produced by the rebounding gas. These
latter devices, from the fact that quantitative measurements were possible with them, will
be called "impulse meters."
Tissue-paper Detector
The detector for indicating the force of the rebound consisted of a strip of delicate
tissue paper L Plate 6, Fig. 2, and text figure 5a, 0.02 mm thick, with its ends glued to an
iron wire W, as shown in Fig. 5a. This iron wire was fastened to the yoke Y, Plate 7, Fig. 1,
and held the tissue paper, with its plane horizontal, between the chamber and the wall of
the 3-in. pipe P. In many of [27] the experiments, the paper was cut one-third the way
across in two places before being used, as shown by the dotted lines bin Fig. 5a. Since the
tissue paper has very litde mass, the tearing depends upon the magnitude of the force that
is momentarily applied, and not upon the force times its duration--i.e, the impulse of the
force. The tissue paper will tear, then, if the force produced by the first upward rush of gas,
past the chamber into the space in the B-in. pipe above the chamber, exceeds a certain
value. This first upward rush of gas will, of course, produce a greater force than any subse-
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quent rush, as the gas is continually losing velocity, Even though the magnitude of the
force that will just tear the tissue paper be not known, it may safely be assumed that if the
first upward rush does not tear the paper, the force due to rebound that acts upon the gun
must be small compared with the impulse produced by the explosion of the powder.
(0
X _
J
-W
LI
Fig. 5
[28] It should be noted that the tissue paper tells nothing as to whether or not there are
a number of successive reflections or rebounds gradually decreasing in magnitude; nei-
ther does it give information concerning the downward pressure the gases exert upon the
chamber tending to decrease the displacement, after they have accumulated in the space
between the top of the chamber and the cap C, Plate 6, Fig. 2.
Direct-lift Impulse Meter
A section of the direct-lift impulse meter is shown in Fig. 5b. It is also shown in the
photograph Plate 6, Fig. 2, at A. A small cylinder A of aluminum of 1.46 gm mass, hollowed
at one end for lightness, was turned down to slide easily in a glass tube G. This tube Gwas
fastened by de Khotinsky cement to an iron wire W, which was in turn fastened to the yoke
Y, Plate 7, Fig. 1, so that the glass tube G was held in a vertical position, between the
chamber and the wall of the 3-in. pipe--similarly to the tissue paper. Two small wires C, C
of spring brass were cemented to the top of the aluminum cylinder, the free ends just
touching on opposite sides of the glass tube. The inside of the glass tube was smoked with
camphor smoke above the point marked X, so that a record was made of any upward
displacement of the aluminum cylinder. The cylinder was prevented from dropping out of
the glass tube by a fine steel wire w cemented to the tube and extending across the lower
end.
The theory of the direct-lift impulse meter is given in Appendix C. From the theory,
we may derive an expression for the ratio Qof the momentum given the gun by the gas-
eous rebound, to the observed momentum of the suspended system.
There are two disadvantages of this form of impulse meter. First, friction acts un-
avoidably to reduce the displacement. Second, any jar to which the apparatus is subjected
on firing will cause the aluminum cylinder to jump, and thus give a spurious displacement.
This latter fact rendered the meter useless for experiments in which direct lift of the cham-
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ber took place, as there was always much jar when the heavy chamber fell back, after being
displaced upward.
This impulse meter, it will be observed, gave a mean measurement of any successive
up-and-down rushes of gas.
[29] Spring Impulse Meter
A section of the spring impulse meter is shown in Fig. 5c. The apparatus consisted of
an aluminum disk D, cemented to a lead rod L, of combined mass 5.295 gm, supported by
a fine brass spiral spring S. The disk Dwas of a size sufficient to slide easily in a glass tube G.
The upper end of the spring protruded through a small hole in the glass tube, and was
fastened at this point by de Khotinsky cement, it thus being easy to make the top of the
[30] Table III
Experi- Type Length Total Length
merit of of mass of
no. motion chamber M nozzle
l +'/sm
cm g'm
15 S.H.M. 0.69 3156.9 Long
16 S.H.M. 0.69 3156.9 Long
17 S.H.M. 0.69 3156.9 Long
18 S.H.M. 0.69 3156.9 Long
19 S.H.M 0.69 3158.9 Long
20 S.H.M. 0.69 3156.9 Long
21 IS.H.M. 0.69 3156.9 Long
22 S.H.M. 0.69 3156.9 Long
23 ' S.H.M. 0.69 3156.9 Long
24 S.H.M. 0.69 3156.9 Long
25 S.H.M. 0.69 2768.1 Medium
26 S.H.M. 0.69 2768.1 Medium
27 S.H.M. 0.69 2353.8 Short
28 S.H.M. 0.69 2353.8 Short
30 S.H.M. 0.95 3339.6 Medium
31 ]Lift 0.95 2020.7 Medium
32 Lift 0.95 2020.7 Medium
33 Lift 0.95 2020.7 Medium
34 Lift 0.95 2020.7 Medium
55 S.H.M. 0.95 3339.6 Medium
36 S,H.M. 0.95 3339.6 Medium
37 Lift 0.95 2020.7 Medium
38 Lift 0.95 2135.7 Long
39 Lift 0.95 2135.7 Long
40 Lift 0.69 2023.4 Medium
41 Lift 0.69 2023.4 Medium
42 Lift 0.95 1914.3 Short
43 Lift 0.95 2020.7 Medium
45 Lift 1.25 2020.7 Medium
47 Lift 1.42 3040.5 Medium
48 Lift 1.42 3040.8 Medium
49 Lift 1.42 2020.7 Medium
50 Lift 1.57 3039.0 Medium
Kind
of
powder
Du Pont
Du Pont
Du Pont
Du Pont
Du Pont
Du Pont
Du Pont
Du Pont
Du Pont
Du Pont
Du Pont
Du Pont
Du Pont
Du Pont
Infallible
Infallible
Infallible
Infallible
Infallible
Infallible
Infallible
Infallible
Infallible
Infallible
Du Pont
Du Pont
Infallible
Infallible
Infallible
Infallible
Infallible
Infallible
Infallible
M_,55
4
powder
gnl
0.6747
0.6761
0.6913
0.6929
0.6741
0.7161
0.6495
0.6679
0.6681
0.6693
0.6998
0.6715
0.6686
0.6673
0.9186
0.9210
0.9210
0.9210
0.9210
0.9210
0.9210
0.9210
0.9210
0.9210
0.6715
0.6715
0.9210
0.9210
1.2581
1.4540
1.3997
1.3997
1.5200
Mass
of
wadding
and wire
gTn
0.0538
0.0526
0.0508
0.0536
0.0529
0.0516
0.0536
0.0568
0.0537
0.0556
0.0504
0.0530
0.0510
0.0510
0.0556
0.0518
0.0601
0.0625
0.0648
0.0614
0.0639
0.0619
0.O672
0.0608
0.0576
0.0599
0.0551
0.0641
0.0582
O.0603
0.O607
0.0619
0.0630
Mass
4
b_
powd_
gm
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.007
O.OO7
0.007
0.007
0.007
0,007
0.007
0.010
0.012
0.020
0.020
0.020
0.020
0.020
0.020
0.020
0.020
0.007
0.007
0.020
0.020
0.020
0.020
0.020
0.020
0.030
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lead rod level with the zero of a paper scale K pasted to the outside of the glass tube. A
piece of white paper placed behind the tube G made the motion of the lead rod L very
clearly discernible.
This impulse meter was placed in a hole in the upper cap of the 12-in. pipe of the
cylindrical tank at D, Fig. 4 and Plate 8, Fig. 1, the same distance from the wall of the 12-in.
pipe as the center of the 3-in. pipe. It projected 1 in. through the 12-in. cap which was
practically the same as the distance the 3-in. pipe projected. The tube Gwas kept in posi-
tion in the cap by being wrapped tighflywith insulating tape, the joint being finally painted
with the wax already described.
The theory of the spring impulse meter is given in Appendix D, where Q is the ratio
already defined in connection with the direct-lift impulse meter. There are two reasons
why the ratio Qobtained in the Appendix should be larger than the true percentage at the
Displacement
d, d_ Cor-
rected
d
C?n £_rt ctn
Tank
4.58
4.78
4.68
4.85
4.66
5.00
4.73
4.63
4.43
4.68
4.97
4.70
5.05
5.10
7.37
4.60
5.87
5.3O
5.50
7.22
7.18
5.19
4.83
5.07
2.03
1.95
5.70
5.37
11.38
6.50
6.03
13.00
7.28
4.22
4.70
4.52
4.55
4.37
4.77
4.45
4.34
4.13
4.48
4.31
3.85
(#20)
(#20)
(#2O)
(#25)
(#2O)
(#25)
(#25)
(#20)
(#20)
(#25)
(#25)
(#25)
(#25)
(#25)
(#2O)
(#25)
(#25)
(#25)
(#25)
(#25)
(#25)
Pressure
in tank
Before! After
mm mm
4.97 Cylindrical 5.0 5.5
4.82 Cylindrical 5.0 10.0
4.70 Cylindrical 4.5 9.0
5.01 Cylindrical 7.0 11.2
4.81 Cylindrical 5.5 10.5
5.12 Cylindrical 7.5 13.0
4.87 Cylindrical 6.5 10.5
4.78 Circular 1.5 13.5
4.59 Cylindrical 1.5 5.5
4.78 Circular 7.5 22.0
5.33 Circular 1.5 14.5
5.19 Cylindrical 1.5 5.0
5.17 Circular 1.5 13.0
5.22 iCylindrical 1.5 5.5
7.91 Circular 1.5 21.0
4.94 Cylindrical 1.5 7.5
5.90 Circular 1.5 21.0
5.69 Circular 4.5 25.5
5.90 Cylindrical 2.5 8.0
7.39 Cylindrical 1.5 6.0
7.35 Cylindrical 3.5 9.5
5.57 Cylindrical 1.5 7.0
5.18 Cylindrical 1.5 7.0
5.45 Cylindrical 1.5 7.0
2.18 Cylindrical 1.5 4.5
2.09 Cylindrical 0.5 3.0
5.83 ,Cylindrical 1.5 7.0
5.76 Cylindrical 1.0 6.0
11.65 Cylindrical 1.5 8.0
6.98 iCylindrical 1.5 9.0
6.47 Cylindrical 1.5 8.5
13.96 Cylindrical 1.5 8.5
7.82 Cylindrical 1.5 9.5
Rebound Velocity
impluse
Paper to total Effic-
detector impuls_ iency
Q
percent km/sec fl/sec _ercent
0.000 1.711 5614 36.0_
Torn 0,756 1.729 5671 36.7, _
Torn 0.000 1.671 5481 34.3"
Torn 0.000 1.774 5821 38.7',
Torn 0.000 1.728 5668' 36,7]
Not torn 0.000 1.683 5524 34.8{
Not torn 0.000 1.780 5840 38.9;
Not torn 0.560 1.719 5642 36.3]
Not torn 0,000 1.653 5423 33.61
Not torn 0.000 1.719 5642 36.3_
Not torn 0.000 1.767 5801 38.4(
Not torn 0.000 1.749 5740 37.6[
Not torn -- 1,614 5296 32.0_
Not torn -- 1.630 5347 32.6_
Not torn -- 2.405 7893 55.9(
Torn -- 1.997 6550 39.4(
Torn -- 2.191 7189 46.3_
Torn m 2.127 6980 43.7]
Not torn -- 2.162 7093 45.H
Not torn -- 2.336 7665 52.7,"
Torn m 2.319 7610 51.9{
Not torn -- 2.106 6911 42.8,_
Not torn -- 2.136 7010 44.0 ¢.
Not torn -- 2.202 7227 46.8{
Not torn -- 1.797 5897 39.7_
Not torn -- 1.748 5735 37.9_
Torn _ 2.055 6745 40.8"
Not torn 0.326 2.137 7011 44.1_
Not torn 0.677 2.340 7680 52.9."
Torn 0.690 2.318 7606 51.8 ¢.
Nottorn 0.730 2.314 7593 51.7_
Not torn 0.735 2.257 7404 49.1 ¢.
Not torn 0.790 2.332 7653 52.5{
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top of the 3-in. pipe. In the first place, friction in the 3-in. pipe will decrease the velocity of
the rebounding gas; and, further, the disk D, Fig. 5, is fairly tight-fitting in the glass tube G,
whereas there is a considerable space between the gun and the 3-in. pipe, through which
the gas may pass and, accumulating above, exert a downward pressure on the top of the
gun.
One important advantage of the spring impulse meter over that employing direct lift
is that the former has very little friction, so that the readings are very reliable. Another
advantage is that the displacement of the former will include without any uncertainty the
effect of any number of rebounds following one another in rapid succession--i.e, the
effect of multiple reflections of the gas, if such reflections are present.
Explanation of Table III
In the vacuum experiments, the soft-steel chamber was used for Du Pont powder,
and the nickel-steel chamber for Infallible powder.
The three nozzles called short, medium, and long, were respectively, 9.64, 15.88, and
22.08 cm from the throat to the muzzle.
[31] The length of chamber l, in the third column, is taken as the distance shown in Fig.
2a.
In the cases of simple harmonic motion in which d is not given in the table, the
displacements were so large that d, was prevented from reaching its full extent by the yoke
Y, Plate 7, Fig. 1. Correction for friction was made in these cases by choosing the decre-
ment from some other experiment that would be likely to apply, The number of this ex-
periment is written in parentheses, in the table, in place of d_. The same procedure is
followed in the experiments with direct lift.
Of the experiments in the cylindrical tank, 15 and 16 were performed with the elbow
E, Fig;. 4, at the lower end of the 3-in. pipe; experiment 17 was performed with this elbow
also in place, with the addition of a sheet-iron sleeve in the pipe, to decrease the curvature
at the elbow experiments 18 and 19 were performed with the tank empty; and the remain-
ing experiments were performed with the fencing, already described, in position.
The tissue paper was usually torn at one end, and not torn completely off. It was only
torn completely off, with small charges, in the experiments with the cylindrical tank empty
(experiments 18 and 19). The tissue paper was cut one-third across at each end, as already
explained, in experiments 15 to 33, inclusive.
The direct-lift impulse meter was used in experiments 15 to 26, inclusive. In cases in
which there was impact of the chamber against the yoke, or pins, at the lower ends of" the
rods R, R, plate 6, Fig. 2, this impulse meter was useless because of the jar. Only in experi-
ments 16 and 22 was there a measurable displacement, the negligible displacements in the
other cases being doubtless due to friction. The spring impulse meter was used only in the
last six vacuum experiments.
An inspection of Tables II and III will show that the results, under the same condi-
tions, are in sufficiently close agreement to warrant the comparison of results obtained
under various circumstances of firing.
D/scuss/on of Resu/ts
1. There is a general tendency for the velocities in vacuo to be larger than those in
air, for the same length of chamber I and the same mass of powder.
With Du Pont powder, the medium and short nozzles give greater velocities in vacuo.
The long nozzle, however, does not show results very much different from those obtained
in air.
[32] There is a large difference, however, with Infallible powder, with all three nozzles.
For the medium nozzle a comparison of experiments 4 to 12, inclusive, with 35 and
36 shows that the increase amounts to 22 percent of the velocity in air.
2. The medium nozzle gives, in general, greater velocities than the abort or the long
EXPLORINGTHE UNKNO_,_,._ 107
nozzle with the name length of chamber I and approximately the same charges of powder.
In all cases, the abort nozzle gives less velocity than the medium or the long nozzle, which
is to be expected.
3. The results show no appreciable dependence of the velocities upon tile pressure
in the tank between 7.Smm and 0.5mm, and it is safe to conclude that the velocities are
practically the same from atmospheric pressure down to zero pressure, except as regards
the slight increase of velocity with decreasing pressure already mentioned.
4. A comparison of the results when the chamber moved under the influence of the
spring with those in which the chamber was merely lifted, shows that the agreement of
results obtained by the two methods is good, provided the displacement in the direct-lift
experiment is small (compare experiments 40 and 41 _4th 26). If, on the other hand, the
displacement in the direct-lilt experiment is large, this method gives considerably lesser
velocities than 37, and 43 makes it evident that all the velocities obtained by experiments
in which the lift exceeded 4 cm are from 300 to 600 ft/sec too small. This is a very impor-
tant conclusion, for it means that the highest velocities in vacuo, recorded in Table III, are
doubtless considerably less than those which were actually attained.
5. A comparison of the results obtained by means of the circular tank with those
obtained by means of the cylindrical tank shows that the velocities range about 100 ft/sec
higher for the circular tank--a difference that is so small as to be well within the accidental
variations of the experiments.
Concerning the behavior of the cylindrical tank under different conditions, a com-
parison of experiments shows that the velocities are much the same for all cases. Hence it
is safe to conclude that the rebound, at least for small charges, is not excessive even if an
empty tank is used, providing it is sufficiently large.
A check of some interest, on the effectiveness of the cylindrical tank, with the re-
tarder J, J' in position inside, was the sound of the shot, which resembled a sharp blow of a
hammer on the lower [33] cap of the 12-in. pipe. The impart was most clearly discernible
when the hand was on the lowest part of the tank. The sound, in the case of the circular
tank, did not appear to come from any particular part. When the tank was grasped during
firing, a throb of the entire tank was noticed.
6. Concerning the proportion of the measured reaction that is due to gaseous re-
bound, the tissue-paper detector, as has already been explained, does not give any infor-
mation. All that this detector really shows is that the force exerted by the initial upward
rush of gas past the chamber is not excessive. The fact that the tissue paper is sometimes
torn and sometimes not under identical conditions of firing, shows either that this force
differs more or less in various parts of the tank (i.e., the upward rush of gas is not perfectly
homogeneous) or that the tissue paper is weakened by each successive shot. This last ex-
planation is the more probable; for fine particles of the wadding rush upward with the gas,
as is proved by fine markings on the smoked glass, arid also from the fact that, after a
number of shots, the tissue paper is found to be perforated with very small holes.
The gaseous rebound could not be measured accurately with the direct-lift impulse
meter. Thus of all the experiments in which this meter could be used, 15 to 26 inclusive,
only two, 16 and 22, gave readable displacements; the failure to obtain readable displace-
ments in the other eases being doubtless due to friction, as already mentioned. It will be
noticed that the impulse is under 1 percent.
The spring impulse meter used in the last five experiments gave reliable results be-
cause of the very slight friction during operation. This impulse meter shows that, if the
momentum of the chamber were to be corrected for gaseous rebound, this correction
would be much less than 1 percent of the momentum of the chamber. But as has been
stated above, the impulse of the rebound at the chamber must be less than that at the
impulse meter, from the fact that gases may pass readily behind the chamber and exert a
downward pressure, and also because of friction in the 3-in. pipe. The effect of gaseoas
rebound is therefore negligible, and no account of it has been taken in calculating the
velocities and efficiencies.
It now becomes possible to find, from the experimental results, the highest velocity
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in vacuo upon which dependence may be placed. This is evidently the result of experi-
ment 45 and is 2.54 km/sec or 7680 ft/sec. It is well worth noticing, however, that experi-
ment 50 would have given, without doubt, a velocity even higher, had friction properly
been taken into account.
C34] D/scuss/on of Possible E_lanagom
1. The fact that the velocities are higher in vacuo than in air seems explicable only by
there being conditions of ignition different in vacuo from those in air; although this may
also have been due to the air in the nozzle interfering with the streamlines of the gas, thus
producing a jet not stricdy unidirectional. It should be remarked that the highest velocity
in vacuo recorded, experiment 23, may have been due to unusually good circumstances of
ignition; but it may also have been due, in part, to being performed in the circular tank.
2. The fact that the medium nozzle gives in general velocities higher than the long
nozzle shows that very likely after travelling the distance from the throat equal approxi-
mately to the length of the medium nozzle, the gas is moving so rapidly that it fails to
expand fast enough to fill the cross section of the nozzle. A discontinuity in flow is pro-
duced at the place where the gas leaves the wall of the nozzle, and this produces eddying
and a consequent loss of unidirectional velocity. The efficiency could doubtless be in-
creased by constructing the nozzle in the form of a straight portion, corresponding to a
cone of 8 ° taper, for the length of the medium nozzle with the section beyond this point in
the form of a curve concave to the axis of the nozzle.
Conclusions from Experiments
1. The experiments in air and in vacuo prove what was suggested by the photographs
of the flash in air, namely, that the phenomenon is really a jet of gas having an extremely
high velocity and is not merely an effect of reaction against the air.
2. The velocity attainable depends to a certain extent upon the manner of loading,
upon the circumstances of ignition, and upon the form of the nozzle. Hence, in practice,
care should be taken to design the cartridge and the nozzle for the density of air at which
they are to be used, and to test them in an atmosphere of this particular density.
It is with pleasure that the writer acknowledges the use, as honorary fellow in physics,
of the laboratory facilities, and especially the rotary pump, at the Physics Laboratory at
Clark University where these experiments were performed.
Significance of the Above Experiments as Regards Constructing a Practical Apparatus
It will be well to dwell at some length upon the significance of the above experi-
ments. In the first place, the lifting power of both [35] powders is remarkable. Experiment
51 shows, for example, that 42 lb can be raised 2 in. by the reaction from less than 0.018 lab
of powder. One interesting result is the very high efficiency of the apparatus considered as
a heat engine. It exceeds, by a wide margin, the highest efficiency for a heat engine so far
attained--the "net efficiency" or duty of the Diesel (internal-combustion) engine being
about 40 percent, and that for the best reciprocating steam engine but 21 percent. This
high efficiency is, of course, the result of three things: the absence of much heat loss due
to the suddenness of the explosion; the almost entire absence of friction; and the high
temperature of burning. Owing to these features, it is doubtful if even the most perfect
turbine or reciprocating engine could compete successfully with the type of heat engine
under consideration.
It is, however, the velocity c in Eqs. (6) and (7) which is of the most interest. The
highest velocity obtained in the present experiments is 13 ft/sec under 8000 ft/sec, thus
exceeding a mile and a half per second (the "parabolic velocity" at the surface of the
moon), and also exceeding anything hitherto attained except with minute quantities of
matter by means of electrical discharges in vacuum tubes. Inasmuch as the higher veloci-
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tiesrangebetweensevenandeighffoldthatof theCostonrocket,weshouldexpecta
reductionofinitialmassestobemadepossiblebyemploymentofthesteelchambe,,toat
leastheseventhrootofthemassesnecessaryforachamberliketheCostonrocket.
Thesuppositionis,ofcourse,thatthemassofpropellantmaterialcanbemadeso
largeincomparisonwiththemassof thesteelchamber,thatthelatteriscomparatively
negligible.Noattemptwasmadein thepresentexperimentstoreducethechambertoits
minimumweight;in fact,themoremassiveitwas,themoresatisfactorilycouldtheballistic
experimentsbeperformed.Theminimumweightpossible,forthesamethicknessofwall
asin theexperiments,wascalculatedbyestimating,first,thevolumeofachamberf om
whichallsuperfluousmetalhadbeenremoved,asshownbythefull linesinFig.3,and
thencalculatingthemassofthisreducedchamber,f omthemeasureddensityofthesteel.
Theminimummassesofchamberpergramofpowderpluswadding,estimatedinthiswa),
were145,150,and120gin,respectively,for experiments50,51,and52.In thelasttwo
cases,asmallerbreechblockould oubtlesshavebeenused,ase_4dentfromFig.3;andin
thefirsttwocases,thechamberwall,itself,couldsafelyhavebeenreducedin thickness.
Moreimportantstill,a"built-up"constructionwouldmuchreducethemassashasalready
beenexplained.[36]Itshouldbementionedthat,foranyparticularchamber,itwillbenecessarytodeter-
minethemaximumpossiblepowderchargetoanicety,fromthefacthat,asmodernrifle
practicehasdemonstrated,onechargeofdensesmokelesspowdermaybeperfectlysafe
foranynumberofshots,whereasaslightlylargeramount,or thesameamountslightly
morecompressed(astateinwhichthepowdermustexistin thepresentchamber)will
resultinverydangerouspressures.
Butthewholequestionofratioofmassofpowdertochamberiswithoutdoubtrela-
tivelyunimportantforthefollowingreason:Thephotographsoftheflash,inexperiments
9and11,inwhichtheflashwasaccidentallyreflectedin thenozzleofthegun,showthe
nozzleappearingstationaryin thephotograph,thusdemonstratingthatthedurationof
theflashisverysmall;butthis,asalreadyexplained,ismuchlongerthanthetimeduring
whichthegasesareleavingthenozzle.Thetimeoffiringis,therefore,exuemelyshort.
Thisistobeexpected,inasmuchasthehighpressureinthechambersetsinmotiononly
thesmallmassofgasandwadding,andhencemustexistforamuchshortertimethanthe
pressureinarifleorpistol.Forthisreasontheheathatisdevelopedinthemachinegun,
duetothehotgasesremainingin thebarrelforanappreciabletimeduringeachshot,as
wellasthatduetothefrictionofthebullet,willbeabsentinthetypeofrapid-firemecha-
nismunderdiscussion.Hence,alargenumberof shots,equivalenttoamassof powder
greatlyexceedingthatofthechamber,maybefiredin rapidsuccessionwithoutserious
heating.TM
[37] Part III. Calculations Based on Theory and Experiment
Application of Approximate Method
As already explained this method consists in employing the equations and
and
R{ia+ ,l} a+,,M= a--'_g e /_ j-1 +e c(1-k) (6)
M = at (7)
e--
c(l-k)
to obtain a minimum M in each interval, where
M = The initial mass, for the interval, when the final mass is one pound, and
] 10 PRELUDETOTHESPACEAGE
R ----"
g =
t --
c(1-k) --
the air resistance in poundals over the cross section S, at the altitude of the
rocket. If we call Pthe air resistance per unit cross section, we shall have for R,
PS(p/po) where p is the density at the altitude of the rocket, and to is the
density at sea level.
the acceleration in feet per second _, taken conatant throughout
the interval,
the acceleration of gravity,
the time of ascent through the interval, arid
what will be called the "effective velocity," for the reason that the problem
would remain unchanged if the rocket were considered to be composed
entirely of propellant material, ejected with the velocity c(1-k). It will be re-
membered that c actually stands for the true velocity of ejection of the propel-
lant, and k for the fraction of the entire mass that consists of material other
than propellant. The effective velocity is taken constant throughout any one
calculation.
The altitude is divided into intervals short enough to justify the quantities involved
in the above equations being taken as constants. The equations are then used to find the
minimum value of Mfor each interval--the mean values of R and g, in the interval being
employed--and the "total initial mass required to raise a final mass of one pound to a
desired altitude is then obtained as the product of these M's.
[38] Values of the Quantities Oea_rring in the Equations
The effective velocity c(1-k). The calculation which follows has been carried out with the
assumption l_ of a velocity of ejection of 7500 ft/sec and a constant k equal to 1/_. This
velocity is considerably less than those that were actually obtained, both in air and in vacuo.
The "effective velocity" will thus be
c(1-k) = 7000 ft/sec
It should be noticed that k could be VI_ and yet not necessitate a larger velocity of
ejection than 7640 ft/sec, which is also under the highest velocities obtained in the experi-
menu. It is important at this point to remember that the velocities in vacuo would doubt-
less have been found to be considerably higher than the above value, if friction could have
been eliminated in the "direct-lift" method.
The quality I_ The mean value of R for any interval is most easily obtained from a
graphical representation of P as a function of v, the mean value of P between the begin-
ning and end of the interval being taken. Three curves have been used for this purpose:
for velocities ranging from zero to 1000 ft/sec, 1000 to 3000 ft/sec, and from 3000 ft/sec
upward. The first curve represented the experimental results of A. Frank _ obtained with
prolate ellipsoids. The second curve represented the experimental results ofA. Mallock,'
whereas the third curve represented an empirical formula by Mallock, _which agrees well
with experimental results up to 4500 ft/sec--the highest velocity that has been attained by
projectiles---and hence may be used for still higher velocities with a fair degree of safety.
Mallock's expression, reduced to the absolute fps system and multiplied by 1/4, the coeffi-
cient for projectiles with pointed heads, becomes
3 A. Frank, Zeitschr. VereinDeutsches lng. 55. pp. 593-612, 1906.
4 A. Mallock, Proc. Roy. Soc.79A. pp. 262-275, 1907.
5 A. Mallock, Proc. Roy. Soc. 79A. pp. 267, 1907.
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where v'= the velocity with which a wave is propagated in the air immediately in front of
the projectile; which equals the velocity of the body when that velocity exceeds
the velocity of sound in the undisturbed gas
a= the velocity of sound in the undisturbed gas
The constant, 480 poundals, must be added for velocities over 2400 ft/sec owing to the
vacuum in the rear of the projectile.
[39] The quantity p. The above expression (8), for the resistance, holds only at atmospheric
pressure. At high altitudes the pressure, of course, decreases greatly. If we call p the mean
density throughout any interval of altitude, and po the density at sea level, the right mem-
ber of (8). On being multiplied by Sand p/po, will give the air resistance R experienced by
the rocket.
A curve representing the relation between density and altitude up to 120,000 fl is
shown in Fig. 6. This curve is derived from a table of pressures and temperatures in
Arrhenius's Lebrbuch der kosmischen Physik. The ordinates of the curve are the numbers
p/p_
Beyond 120,000 ft the density is calculated by the empirical rule which assumes the
density to become halved at every increase in altitude of 3.5 miles. A comparison was made
between two values obtained in this way and those obtained from the very probable pres-
sures deduced by Wegener, in the following way: The mean density between two levels for
which Wegener gives pressures was obtained by multiplying the difference in pressure by
13.6, and dividing by the difference in level in centimeters. A comparison showed that the
densities used in the present calculations beyond 123,000 ft were from three- to twentyfold
larger than those derived from Wegener's data, so that the values used in the present case
were doubtless perfectly safe.
Densities beyond 700,000 ft within the geocoronium sphere must be negligible, for
not only is the density very small but the resistance to motion is very small--due, accord-
ing to Wegener, to the properties of geocoroniesio--a conclusion which is supported by
the fact that meteors remain, for the most part, invisible above this level.
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[40] D/v/s/on of the Altitude into Intervals
In dividing the altitude into intervals the only condition that must be fulfilled is that
the densities in any interval shall not differ widely from the mean value in the interval.
The least number of intervals which satisfy this condition are given in Table IV. The mean
densities in intervals s, to s6 inclusive, were obtained from Fig. 6, on which these intervals
are marked. The remaining densities were estimated as already explained.
Table IV
Interval
$1
s_
s_
s4
s5
s6
s7
ss
s9 (a=150)
s_ (a-50)
Length of
interval, fi
5,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
40,000
40,000
75,000
300,000
3,415,000
8,810,000
Height of upper
end of interval
above sea level,
ft
5,000
15,000
25,000
45,000
85,000
125,000
200,000
500,000
3,915,000
9,310,000
Mean densi_,
in mvns of po
0.928
0.730
0.520
0.278
0.080
0.015
0.0026
0.000025
t_/lean
gravity'
chosen, in
te'ym5 of
gravity at
sea level
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.839
0.684
Calculation of Minimum Mass for Each Interval
Tables V and VI are calculated for a start, respectively, from sea level and from an
altitude of 15,000 ft--i.e., the beginning of s,. The procedure in each case is, however,
identical.
The process of calculation is as follows: At the beginning of any interval we have the
velocity already acquired during the previous intervals, let us say vo. This velocity is, of
course, zero at the beginning of the first interval. Assume any final velocity at random, v_
for the interval in question.
[41] The value of at may be had from the equation
vl = vo + at (9)
and t is at once obtained from the relation
i.e,,
s=vot+ l/,zaY
S
t = (10)
vo + 1/2at
whence, of course, a is at once known.
The calculation of
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exp a+_g t and eXPc at
cta-_) (l-k)
calls for no comment; and R is obtained as P, the mean ordinate between Vo and v,, from
curves as already explained, multiplied by S and p/po.
The value of M, the initial mass, for the interval, necessary in order that the final
mass in the interval shall be one pound, is then obtained from Eq. (7); and finally, the
ratio of Eq. (6) to Eq. (7) is calculated, i.e.,
M
exp [at/c(1-k)]
This is the ratio of the initial mass necessary, including losses due to both R and g, to the
mass necessary to give the one pound the same velocity v,, without overcoming R and g;
and the entire calculation must be repeated until a minimum value of this ratio is ob-
tained-when the corresponding mass M will be the minimum mass for the interval in
question. Each minimum M is marked in the tables by an asterisk.
This process is carried out for each interval beginning with the first.
It should be noticed that, although P and the density are not really constant in any
interval, the result obtained by taking the mean of the quantities must nevertheless give
results close to the truth, owing to the fact that Pincreases during the ascent, whereas the
density decreases.
Explanation of Tables V, and 1,7
It should first be explained why no minimum M has been calculated for the intervals
sT, and s,. Although the minima for the preceding intervals are clearly defined, a trial will
show that a minimum M can occur, for s, and s,, only for extremely high velocities v,;
although for s,, a secondary minimum occurs for v_ = 8000 ft/sec. Even for v_ = 30,000 ft/
sec the minimum has not yet been attained for this interval, although the acceleration
required to produce this velocity is 6000 ft/secL The reason for this state of affairs is evi-
dent at once from the fact that the density ratio p/po is very small for sT, and also from the
fact that a occurs in the denominator of the term containing Rin Eq. (6), so that the large
acceleration counterbalances the increase in R
Thus, in order that the initial mass for sT,shall be a minimum, the acceleration must
become very large, with consequent severe strains in the rocket apparatus and instruments
carried by the rocket, to say nothing of the difficulty of firing with sufficient rapidity to
produce such large accelerations. It thus becomes advisable to choose a moderate accel-
eration in s_, s8and not to assign a velocity v_, as was done in thepreceding intervals. Two
accelerations are chosen: 50 ft/sec 2and 150 ft/sec _, respectively. The interval sg, also calcu-
lated for assigned accelerations, will be explained in detail below. In all cases, when either
one of these accelerations is mentioned in connection with ss, and sg, this acceleration will
be understood as having been taken also in the preceding intervals, beyond s.
In order to see how far the effective velocity c(1-k) may fall short of 7000 ft/sec and
still not render the rocket impracticable, a few additional columns for M are calculated.
In the first of the additional columns, M:, the effective velocity is taken as 3500 t/
sec, namely, half that of the preceding calculations. This allows considerable inefficiency
of the apparatus, in a number of ways. For example, the product
c(1-k) = 3500
may be given by the same proportionality k as before, but with a velocity of ejection of the
gases as low as 3750 ft/sec. On the other hand, the velocity of ejection may be as large as
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before (i.e., 7300 ft/sec); and the proportionality k increased to 0.533; meaning, of course,
that the rocket now consists more of mechanism than of propellant.
The second additional calculations M_, are c_exl5 d out under the assumption that a
reloading mechanism is used, with k as in the original calculations (k = _/,_), but that the
velocity of expulsion of the gases is the mean found by experiment for the Coston ship
rockets, namely, 1029.25 ft/sec. In this case the effective velocity is
c(1-k) = 1029.25 (1- '/15) = 960.ft/sec
The third additional calculations MR2are carried out for the case of a rocket built up
of Coston rockets in bundles (shown in Fig. 7), the lowest bundle of which is fired first and
Table V
s5
s6
s_(a= 150)
(a= 50)
ss(a = 150)
(a= 50)
sg(a = 150)
(a= 50)
500 500 20.0 25 .0716 .1630 1.074 1.176 7.36 6.85 .120
800 800 12.5 64 .1145 .1720 1.120 1.186 20.0 18.5 .193
1,000 1,000 10.0 100 .143 .1890 1.153 1.207 31.25 29.0 .219
1,200 1,200 8.34 144 .172 .212 1.185 1.235 61.4 57.0 .323
1,500 1,500 6.7 226 .215 .2475 1.242 1.276 104.6 98.0 .378
2,000 2,000 5.0 400 .287 .309 1.332 1.362 202.5 188.0 .436
1,100 100 9.54 10.47 .0143 .0578 1.014 1.061 153.3 112.1 2.64
1,200 200 9.1 22.0 .0286 .0704 1.034 1.073 166.6 121.6 2.24
1,400 400 _8.33 47.9 '.0574 .0954 1.060 1.100 216.0 158.7 11.97
1,300 100 8.0 12.5 i.0143 .0508 1.014 1.052 250.0 130.0 2.925
1,400 200 7.7 25.8 .0286 .0637 1.034 1.066 262.8 136.9 2.37
1,600 400 7.15 156.4 .0574 .0906 1.06 1.096 294.5 152.6 I1.74
1,500 100 13.8 7.23 .0143 .0775 1.014 1.080 339.0 94.3 2.42
1,600 200 13.33 15.0 .0286 .0898 1.034 1.094 372.0 101.5 2.17
1,700 300 12.9 23.24 .0429 .1022 1.046 1.107 394.0 109.4 11.975
1,800 400 12.5 33.251.0574 .1170 1.060 1.123 424.0 118.0 I1.81
1,700 100 24.25 4.125 .0143 .1258 1.014 1.133 439.0 35.1 .974
1,800 200 23.7 !8.45 .0286 .1366 1.034 1.146 480.0 38.4 .951
2,000 400 22.24 18.0 .0574 .159 1.06 1.173 535.0 42.8 .854
1,900 100 21.7 4.62 .0143 .1135 1.014 1.12 567. 8.50 .232
2,000 200 21.1 9.50 .0286 .1255 1.034 1.133 603. 9.01 .2175
2,200 400 20.0 20.0 .0574 .1490 1.06 1.16 669. 10.02 .1923
5,160 3,160 21.0 150 .4523 .5452 1.572 1.725 1,878. 4.84 .0264
3,393 1,393 27.8 50 .199 .3276 1.218 1.387 1,122. 3.1 .0355
10,79( 5,630 37.5 150 .804 .976 2.23 2.65 10,600. 0.272 .00141
6,833 2,840 55.8 50 .399 .652 1.49 1.92 4,000. 0.0994 .0012
33,790 23,000 153.5 150 3.29 3.89 26.9 48.8
30,533 23,700 472.5 50 3.38 4.85 29.13 129.0
exp exp p, R, R
v,, t, at a+g t at (a+g) t poundals PS(p/pd
Interval t/see at see a cO-k) cO-k) c(1-k) c(1-k) persqin, a+g
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then released; after which the bundle above is fired and then released, and so on. For the
Coston ship rocket (having a range of a quarter of a mile, with the charge of red fire
removed, as already stated) the ratio of the powder charge to the remaining mass of the
rocket is found to be closely 1/4. Hence the "effective velocity" in this case is only
c(1-k) = 1029.25(1-4/5) = 257.3 ft/sec
The M's in the last two cases are calculated only for the accelerations that make M
minima for the first case (effective velocity, 7500 ft/sec). Hence in these cases, the M's are
not minima, although only in the last two cases is there probably much discrepancy from
the actual minima.
[42]
M,
lb
1.1972
1.2218
.252
1.311
1.380
1.5195
1.222
1.237
.297
.204
1.222
1.261
1.273
1.297
1.319
1.346
1.262
1.2845
.321
1.1478
1.162
1.1907
1.7442
1.4007
2.6524
1.9211
48.8
129.0
M / exp
at
c(1-k)
1.113
1.092
1.086
1.106
1.112
1.138
1.206
1.199
1.223
1.186
1.182
1.191
1.255
1.253
1.26
1.267
1.245
1.242
1.246
1.13
1.123
1.124
1.108
1.15
1.19
1.293
exp
2(a+g) t
c(l-k)
1.458
1.150
1.137
1.198
lb
1.5584
1.4860
1.462
1.626
exp
7.28(a+g) t
c(1-k)
3.94
1.665
1.589
1.92
lb
4.586
3.155
2.974
3.91
exp
27.2(a+g) t
c(l-k)
167.3
6.73
5.62
11.33
lb
203.90
20.60
16.52
33.73
l'zme tt
i_p_r ¢n
_ntcrtra_
se_
10.0
19.1
26.8
40.13
1.313 1.711 2.694 4.304 40.70 88.45 63.83
1.280 1.3406 2.488 2.810 29.76 36.02 84.93
2.97 3.022 52.6 53.96 2.63 X 10 ' 2.70 X 10 ° 105.9:
1.900 1.9319 10.79 11.13 7.03 X 10 s 7.28 X 102 112.7:
7.02 7.0288 1,192.0 1,193.7 2.88 X 10" 2.88 X 10 l' 143.4
3.680 3.6832 117.4 117.54 4.67 x 107 4.67 x 107 168.5
2,380.0 2,380.0 1,906 X 10 _ 1,906 X 1012 5.74 X 1045 5.74 x 1045 296.9
16,700.0 16,700.0 1,995 x 10 _5 1,995 x 10 _ 1.25 X 10 _7 I 1.25 x 1057 641.0
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The cross section, throughout any interval, is taken as 1 sq in, except for interval s_. It
will be seen from the table that this isjustifiable, as the largest mass in intervals s, to s8does
not differ much from one pound.
Fig. 7
[44] Table VI
Interval
S_
S4
S_
v,,
_/sec
500
800
1,000
1,500
900
1,000
1,300
1,800
1,100
1,200
1,300
1,400
1,500
2,000
1,600
1,800
1,900
2,000
'2,100
2,200
500
8OO
1,000
1,500
100
2OO
500
1,000
100
2OO
300
4O0
5OO
1,OOO
300
500
600
700
800
900
l,
Sec
40.
25.
20.
13.4
23.7
22.2
19.1
15.4
38.1
36.5
34.75
33.3
32.1
26.1
27.7
25.7
25.0
24.2
23.6
22.8
12.5
32.0
50.0
112.0
4.23
9.00
26.2
65.0
2.625
5.47
8.64
12.0
15.60
21.40
10.8
19.5
24.0
28.9
33.8
40.0
at
c(1-k)
a+g t
c(1-k)
exp exp
at (a÷g) t
c(]-k) c(l-k)
0.0124 0.1888 1.013 1.207
0.0286 0.1960 1.03 1.215
0.0430 0.202 1.044 1.223
0.0571 0.210 1.058 1.233
0.0715 0.2192 1.073 1.245
0.1147 0.268 1.12 1.308
0.0430 0.1690 1.045 1.184
0.0714 0.1890 1.074 1.206
0.0857 0.201 1.091 1.223
0.1002 0.212 1.105 t.234
0.1142 0.224 1.118 1.249
0.1285 0,237 1.124 1.266
0.0143 0.1227 1.013 1.132
0.0286 0.1305 1.034 1.137
0.0714 0.1645 1.073 1.177
0.1430 0.2136 1.152 1.238
0.0715 0.205 1.074 1.29
0.1147 0.2277 1.120 1.256
0.142 0.235 1.152 1.263
0.2145 0.277 1.24 1.318
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Calculation of Minimum Mass to Raise One Pound to Various Altitudes in the Atmosphere
The "total initial masses" required to raise one pound from sea level to the upper
end of intervals s_, s_, s, are given its Table VII. They are obtained by multiplying together
the minimum masses (marked by stars in Table V), from s_up to and including the interval
in question, and represent, as already explained, the mass in pounds of a rocket which,
starting at sea level, would become reduced to one pound at the altitude given.
The highest altitude attained by the one pound mass is not, however, the upper end
of the interval in question, but is a very considerable distance higher. This, of course,
follows from the fact that the one pound teaches the upper end of each interval with a
considerable velocity,, and will continue to else after propulsion has ceased until this veloc-
ity is reduced to zero, by gravity and air resistance.
If we call vo the velocity with which the pound mass reaches the upper end of the
particular interval where propulsion ceases, b the distance beyond which, the one pound
will rise (the cross section still being 1 sq in.), and p the mean air resistance in poundals
[47] over the distance b, we have, by the principle of work and energy,
2
h- v?l
2(g+p)
The values of pare small, owing to small amaospheric density being 1.59 poundals for
the b beyond sd 0.28 beyond s, (a=50); and 0.465 beyond s_ (a=150). For s8 the low density
makes this quantity negligible.
The altitudes obtained by adding to the interval the corresponding b are called the
"greatest altitude attained" in Table VII.
[46]
M / exp
poundals R, _ M, at
per sq in. PS(p/po) a +g lb c(1 -k)
11.53 5.97 0.134 1.329 1.236
30.7 16.00 0.250 1.300 1.162
46.7 24.3 0.295 1.341 1.165
165.0 83.3 0.570 1.499 1.207
95.7 27.7 0.764 1.232 1.216
108.8 31.4 0.767 1.242 1.200
165.0 46.25 0.794 1.318 1.227
305.0 87.90 0.908 1.455 1.263
150.1 12.0 0.347 1.278 1.261
170.0 13.55 0.362 1.293 1.255
195.0 15.65 0.384 1.306 1.250
218.0 17.49 0.397 1.325 1.252
243.5 19.45 0.520 1,372 1.280
417.0 33.4 0.623 1.501 1.340
343.0 5.16 0.1203 1.206 1.153
406.0 6.10 0.1186 1.230 1.147
430.0 6.43 0.1150 1.248 1.142
460.0 6.90 0.1134 1.260 1.140
510.0 7.65 0.1165 1.278 1.142
534.0 8.02 0.1115 1.295 1.151
exp
2(a+g) t
c(1-k)
1.574
1.293
1.495
1.522
ma,
tb
1.718
1.518
1.685
1.581
exp
728(a+g) t
c(1-k)
5.225
2.581
4.32
4.66
AIR_,
lb
6.545
3.794
5.594
5.075
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Obviously if the start is made at a high elevation, the "total initial mass" required to
reach a given height will be less than for a start at less level, due not only to the fact that the
apparatus is not raised through so great a height, but also to the fact that the denser part
of the atmosphere is avoided. Table VI gives minimum masses M, calculated for a start with
zero velocity from the beginning of interval s, (i.e., 15,000 ft), the effective velocity being
7000 ft/sec, as in Table V.
It happens that the velocity v,, for minimum M in the interval s6 of Table VI is the
same as the v, for the same interval in Table V. The calculations that have been made for
the intervals beyond s6 apply therefore to the present case, and the only difference be-
tween the two cases is that the masses required to reach s, will be greater for the start at sea
level than for the start at 15,000 ft.
The calculations beginning at 15,000 ft have been carried out in Table VII for all but
the lowest "effective velocity;" and it will be observed that the start from a high elevation
becomes important only for the lower "effective velocities."
The most striking as well as the most important conclusion to be drawn from Table
VII is the small "total initial mass" required to raise one pound to very great altitudes when
the "effective velocity" is 7000 ft/sec, the mass for the height of 437 miles (2,510,000 ft),
for example, being but 12.33 lb, starting from sea level. Even for an "effective velocity" of
3500 ft/sec, which allows of considerable inefficiency in the rocket apparatus, the mass is
sufficiently moderate to render the method perfecdy practicable, for in this case an alti-
tude of over 230 miles from sea level, practically the limit of the earth's atmosphere, re-
quires under 90 lb'6; and an altitude of 118 miles, close under the geocoronium sphere,
only 38 lb. For a start at 15,000 ft, the masses are, of course, less, namely, 49.3 lb and
20.9 lb, respectivelyY
[48] The enormous difference between the total initial masses required for low efficiency
rockets compared with those for high, may at first appear surprising; but they should be
expected from the exponential nature of Eqs. (6) and (7). Thus if the "effective velocity" is
reduced from 7000 ft/sec to half this value, the minimum masses for each interval, ne-
glecting air resistance, will be those for 7000 ft/sec squared; and including air resistance,
still greater. Similarly for an effective velocity of 906 ft/sec which is that for reloading
Table VII
/nterna/
Altitude
of upper end
of intervals, fl
Greatest
altitude
attainea_ fl
Time to reach
greatest altitude
from sea level, sec
s_ 125,00 184,100 144.13
s, (a = 50) 200,000 377,500 217.73
(a= 150) 200,000 610,000 265.93
ss (a= 50) 500,000 1,228,000 380.53
(a = 150) 500,000 2,310,000 475.23
s_ (a= 50) 9,310,000 oo oo
(a= 150) 3,915,000 to
Total initial masses (in lb)
Starting
c( 1 - k) c( 1 - k)
= 7,000 = 3,500
3.665 12.61
5.14 24.36
6.40 38.10
9.875 89.60
12.33 267.70
1,274.0 1.497 × 10 _
602.0 6.37 x lO S
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rockets having the same velocity of ejection as Conton ship rockets, the minimum masses
will be those for 7000 ft/sec raised [49] to the Z28thpower; and for bundles for groups of
ship rockets, as shown in Fig. 7, the minimum masses will be those for 7000 ft/sec, raised to
the 27.2th power. Even when air resistance is entirely neglected in the calculation for the
last case, the masses are of much the same magnitude, as shown in Table VII. The large
values of the masses M_,, and M_, simply express the impossibility of employing rockets of
low efficiency. Attention may be called to the particular case under MR2 (the groups of slip
rockets indicated in Fig. 7) in which one pound is raised to the altitude of 1,228,000 ft
(232 miles); the "total initial mass" in this case, even neglecting air resistance entirely, is
2.89 x 1018 lb, or over sixfold greater than the entire mass of the earth.
These large numbers, to be sure, agree with one's first impression as to the probable
initial mass of a rocket designed to reach extreme altitudes; but the comparatively small
initial masses, possible with high efficiency, are not intuitively evident until one realizes
what an enormous reduction is involved in extracting anything at large as the 27th root of
a number.
It should be observed that the apparatus is taken as weighing one pound. Strictly
speaking, if the recording instruments have a mass of one pound, the entire final mass of
the apparatus must be at least 3 or 4 lb. The mass for the recording instruments may be
considered as being very small, yet many valuable researches could, of course, be per-
formed with an apparatus weighing no more than this. _BThe entire final apparatus should,
if possible, be designed to weigh not over 3 or 4 lb at most, unless the efficiency of the
apparatus is so high that the "effective velocity," c(a-k), is at least in the neighborhood of
7000 ft/sec. An examination of Table VII makes very evident the necessity of securing
maximum effectiveness of the apparatus before a rocket for such a purpose as meteorological work, for
example, is constructed; in order to make the method as inexpensive as possible. It should be re-
marked, however, that the "total initial mass" will really not be increased in as large a
proportion as the final mass if the latter is made greater than one pound by virtue of Eq. (2).
Before proceeding further it will be well to consider carefully the question of air
resistance as dependent upon the cross section of the rocket during flight. It has already
been assumed that the cross section, in the calculation of the minimum M for each
for one pound final mass
from sea level Starting from 15,000fi
c( 1 - k) c( 1 - k) c( 1 - k) c( 1 - k) c( 1 - k) c( 1 - k)
= 960 = 257,3 = 257.3 = 7,000 = 3,500 = 960
R taken =0
2,030.0 7.40 × 109 8.63 x 108 2.66 6.95 702.0
2.26 x 104 5.46 x 101_ 6.08 x 10 l_ 3.74 13.38 7,820
1.096 × 10 _ 2.00 x 1015 2.28 x 10 _4 4.65 20.90 37,800
2.66 x 106 2.55 x 1019 2.89 x 10 TM 7.19 49.30 9.17 × 10 _
1.318 × 10 _ 5.77 x 10 _ 6.53 × 109 8.97 147.30 4.51 × 107
5.32 × 10 _t 3.21 × 10 '6 3.63 × 10 n 926.0 8.22 × 10 _ 1.82 × 102
2.49 × 102° 3.32 x 10 '1 3.76 × 10 '° 438.0 3.51 × 105 8.59 × 10 _'
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Interval, was 1 sq in. If we make the apparatus as long, narrow, and compact as possible,
the assumption of a cross section of 1 sq [50] in. for an apparatus weighing one pound will
not be unreasonable. A glance at Tables V and VI will show that, for "effective velocities" of
7000 ft/sec and 3500 ft/sec, the mass at the beginning of any interval (except sg) does not
greatly exceed one pound--the mass at the end of each interval being one poundpso that
the computations are in agreement with this assumption of area of cross section. For the
two cases of the adapted Coston rockets, the masses at the beginning of the intervals are
much larger; and hence we see that the "total initial masses" in Table VII, large as they are,
would have been even larger if a proper value of cross section had been employed.
The important point is, however, that cross-sectional areas of even less than 1 sq in.
should have been used. The reason for this is obvious when one remembers that in calculat-
ing the "total initial masses," when we multiply minimum masses M together, we are also
multiplying the cross sections in the same ratio. In other words, we are considering num-
bers of rockets, each of 1 sq in. cross section, grouped together side by side, into a bundle.
But such an arrangement would have its cross section proportional to its mass and
not to the 2/s power of its mass, as would be the case if the shape of the rocket apparatus were at
all times similar to the shape at the start (as in the ideal rocket, Fig. 1). This constant similarity
of shape is, as we have seen in Eq. (2), one of the conditions for a minimum initial mass.
Hence the "total initial masses" that have been calculated are really larger than the true
minima, which would be obtained only by repeating the calculations, assuming a smaller
cross secdon except in the last few intervals, in which the rocket has become so small that
the condition of 1 sq in. per pound is approximately satisfied.
Before leaving the subject of air resistance, attention should be called to the fact that the
velocities (Table V) do not exceed that for which air resistance has been studied by Mallock
until in sT, for a = 150 ft/sec *, and in ss, for a = 50 ft/sec*; and furthermore, that the velocities do
not become much in excess until the densities have become almost negligible.
Check or Approximate Method of Calculation
A simple calculation, involving only the most elementary formulas instead of Eqs.
(6) and (7), will show that the "total initial masses" in Table VII cannot be far from the
truth.
Consider, for simplicity, a rocket of the form shown in Fig. 1, and suppose that one-
third of the mass of the rocket is fired downward, [51] with a velocity of 7000 ft/sec at the
first shot; one-third of the remaining mass, at the second shot; and so on, for successive
shots. From the principle of the conservation of momentum it will be evident that the
mass that remains is given an additional upward velocity of 35000 ft/sec after each shot.
Thus, after the fourth shot, the mass that remains is '6/82, of practically _/5, of the
initial mass, and the velocity is 14,000 ft/sec. This velocity is sufficient, if we neglect air
resistance, to raise the part of the rocket that remains to an altitude of 580 miles (by the
familiar relation v_=2gh). Although the range would be much reduced if air resistance
were considered, it should nevertheless be remembered that the values in Table VII are
calculated for the condition under which air resistance is a minimum.
The above simple case is not realizable in practice because of the large mass of pro-
pellant for each shot compared with the total mass--i.e., provision is not made for the
mass of the chamber. The result will be the same, however, if smaller charges are fired in
rapid succession, as will be evident from a calculation similar to the above, which is carried
out in Appendix E, under the assumption of smaller charges for successive shots.
Recovery of Apparatus on Return
A point of considerable practical importance is the question of finding the apparatus
on its return, and of following it during flight, both of which depend in a large measure
upon the time of flight.
Concerning the times of ascent, Table VII shows that these are remarkably short. For
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example, a height of over 250 miles is reached in less than 6 1/2 minutes (ss; a= 50). The
reason is, of course, that the rocket under present discussion possesses the advantage of
the bullet in attaining a high velocity, with the added advantage of starting gradually from
rest. In fact, the motion fulfills closely the ideal conditions for extremely rapid transit--
namely, starting from rest with the maximum acceleration possible, and reversing this ac-
celeration, in direction, at the middle of the journey.
The short time of ascent and descent is, of course, highly advantageous as regards
following the apparatus during ascent, and recovering it on landing. The path can be
followed, by day, by the ejection of smoke at intervals, and at night by flashes. Any distinc-
tive feature, as, for example, a long black streamer, could assist in rendering the instru-
ments visible on the return.
[52] Some means will, of course, be necessary to check the velocity of the returning in-
struments. It might not appear, at first sight, that a parachute would be operative at a
velocity of 10,000 ft/sec or more; but it should be remembered that this velocity will occur
in air of very small density, so that the pressure, or force per unit area of the parachute,
would not be excessive, notwithstanding the high velocity of the apparatus. The magni-
tudes of the air resistance will, of course, be much larger than would be indicated from the
values of R in Tables V and VI, from the fact that, for motion with the parachute, the cross
section will be much larger in proportion to the mass of the rocket than for the cases
presented in these tables.
If the parachute is so large that the velocity will be decreased greatly when the denser
air is reached, the descent will be so slow that finding of the apparatus will not be so easy as
would be the case with a more rapid descent. For this reason, part of the parachute device
must be lost automatically when the apparatus has fallen into air of a certain density; or
else the parachute must be small enough to facilitate a rapid descent, with additional
parachute devices rendered operative as the rocket nears the ground. Such devices are not
described in the present paper, but can be of simple and light construction.
The effectiveness of a parachute of even moderate size, operating in a region where
the density is small, may be demonstrated by the following concrete example. Suppose
that an apparatus weighing 1 lb and having a parachute of 1 sq ft area descends from the
altitude 1,228,000 ft (over 200 miles), and does not encounter any atmospheric resistance
until it is level with the upper limit of s6 ( 125,000 ft). This condition will not, of course, be
that which would actually obtain in practice, for a continually increasing resistance will be
experienced as the apparatus descends; but if a sufficient braking action can be shown to
exist in the present example, the parachute device will afortiori be satisfactory in practice.
The velocity acquired by the apparatus in falling freely under the influence of gravity
between the two levels is
_/64 x 1,103,000 = 8400 ft/sec
Now the air resistance in poundals per square inch of section at atmospheric pres-
sure for this velocity is, from the plot of Mallock's formula, 360 × 32 poundais per square
inch, making the value of R for the area of the parachute
R= 1,653,000 poundals/in. _
[53] But the actual resistance is R, multiplied by the relative density at 125,000 ft which is
approximately 0.01, giving for the resistance
F= 16,530 poundals/in/
A retarding acceleration must therefore act upon the apparatus, of amount given by
F
a=--= 16,530 fl/sec 2
M
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Hence it is safe to say that, long before the apparatus had fallen to the 125,000-)2 level, the
velocity would have been reduced to, and maintained at, a safe valve, with the employment of even a
smallparachute. This case, it should be noticed, is entirely different from that of a falling
meteor, in that the apparatus under discussion falls from rest, at the highest point reached;
whereas the meteor enters the earth's atmosphere with an enormous initial velocity.
If it is considered desirable, for any reason, to dispense with a sufficiently large para-
chute, the retarding of the apparatus may be accomplished to any degree by having the
rocket consist, at its highest point of flight, not merely of instruments plus parachute, but
of instruments together with a chamber, and considerable propellant material. Then, af-
ter the rocket has descended to some lower level, let us say, to the upper limit of s6, this
propellant material can be ejected, so that the velocity is considerably checked before the
apparatus reaches as low an altitude as, say, 5000 ft. For the cases in which the effective
velocity c(1-k) is as large as 7000 ft/sec there is little inconvenience in increasing the mass
in this way. But for the case in which c(1-k) = 3500, this method can hardly be as satisfac-
tory as the parachute method; for if the "final" mass to be elevated is made a number of
pounds, let us say n, the "total initial mass" (which is large even for one pound final mass)
will be n-fold larger, and the apparatus correspondingly more expensive.
Applicaaons to Daily Observations
Before leaving the subject of the attainment of high altitudes within the earth's atmo-
sphere, it will be well to mention briefly another application of the method herein dis-
cussed: namely, to the sending daily of small recording instruments to moderate altitudes,
such as 5 or 6 miles. As is already understood, simultaneous daily observations of the verti-
cal gradients of pressure, temperature, and wind velocity, at a large number of stations
would doubtless be of great value in weather forecasting. The method herein described
[54] is evidently well suited for such a purpose, in that the time of rise and fall would be
short, so that the apparatus could easily be found on the return. Thus the expense would
be slight, being simply that of a fresh magazine of cartridges for each day.
For this work, as well as for that previously described, the head of the rocket should
be prevented from rotating, by means of a gyroscope, such as is explained in U.S. Patent
No. 1,102,653.
Calculation of Minimum Mass Required to Raise One Pound to an "Infinite" M6tude
From the fact that the preceding calculation leads us to conclude that such an ex-
treme altitude as 2,310,000 ft (over 437 miles) can be reached by the employment of a
moderate mass, provided the efficiency is high, it becomes of interest to speculate as to
whether or not a velocity as high as the "parabolic" velocity for the earth could be attained
by an apparatus of reasonably small initial mass.
Theoretically, a mass projected from the surface of the earth with a velocity of
6.95 miles/sec would, neglecting air resistance, reach an infinite distance, after an infinite
time; or, in short, would never return. Such a projection without air resistance, is, of course,
impossible. Moreover, the mass would not reach infinity but would come under the gravi-
tational influence of some other heavenly body.
We may, however, consider the following conceivable case: Ifa rocket apparatus such
as has here been discussed were projected to the upper end of interval ss, with an accelera-
tion of 50 or 150 ft/sec _, and this acceleration were maintained to a sufficient distance
beyond ss, until the parabolic velocity were attained, the mass finally remaining would
certainly never return.
If we designate as the upper end of s9 the height at which the velocity of ascent be-
comes the "parabolic" velocity, it will be evident that this height will be different for the
two accelerations chosen, inasmuch as the "parabolic" velocity decreases with increasing
distance from the center of the earth.
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If we call n = the "parabolic" velocity at a distance H above the surface of the earth
v_ = the velocity acquired at the upper end of interval so,
s_ the height of the upper end of SOabove sea level
we have, taking the radius of the earth as 20,900,000 ft,
u= vl+ at (11)
H= so+ vlt + l/2af (12)
[55] and also the equation relating "parabolic" velocity to distance from the center of the earth
36,700 = 520,900,000+ H (13)
On putting the values of u and H, from (11) and (12), in (13), we have
_/20,900,000 x 36,700 = (v 1+ at) _/21,400,000+ vlt + 1/2at 2
(14)
Equation (14) is a biquadratic in t, from which t may easily be obtained (by trial and
error). The values of t, for the two accelerations chosen, given in Table V, enable u and the
initial masses for so to be at once obtained.
The effect of air resistance in s_ is negligible, if we accept Wegener's conclusions,
above mentioned, concerning the properties of geocoronium. But even if we use the em-
pirical rule of a fall of density to one-half for every 3.5 miles, we shall find the reduction of
velocity very small on passing from the upper end of s, (500,000 it) to 1,000,000 ft (beyond
which the density is negligible). This is shown in Appendix E
The "total initial masses," to raise one pound to an "infinite" altitude for the two
accelerations chosen, are given in Table VII. It will be observed that they are astonishingly
small, provided the efficiency is high. Thus with an "effective velocity" of 7000 ft/sec, and
an acceleration of 150 ft/sec _, the "total initial mass," starting at sea level, is 602 lb, and
starting from 15,000 ft is 438 lb. 19The mass required increases enormously with decreasing
efficiency, for, with but half of the former "effective velocity" (3500 ft/sec), the "total ini-
tial mass," even for a start from 15,000 ft, is 351,000 lb. The masses would obviously be
slightly less if the acceleration exceeded 150 ft/sec _.
It is of interest to speculate upon the possibility of proving that such extreme alti-
tudes load been reached even if they actually were attained. In general, the proving would
be a difficult matter. Thus, even ifa mass of flash powder, arranged to be ignited automati-
cally after a long interval of time, were projected vertically upward, the light would at best
be very faint, and it would be difficult to foretell, even approximately, the direction in
which it would be most likely to appear.
The only reliable procedure would be to send the smallest mass of flash powder
possible to the dark surface of the moon when in conjunction (i.e., the "new" moon), in
such a way that it would be [56] ignited on impact. The light would then be visible in a
powerful telescope. Further, the larger the aperture of the telescope, the greater would be
the ease of seeing the flash, from the fact that a telescope enhances the brightness of point
sources, and dims a faint background.
An experiment was performed to find the minimum mass of flash powder that should
be visible at any particular distance. In order to reproduce, approximately, the conditions
that would obtain at the surface of the moon, the flash powder was placed in small cap-
sules C, Plate 9, Fig. 1, held in glass tubes 7; closed by rubber stoppers. The tubes were
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exhaustedtoa pressure of from 3 to 10 cm of mercury, and sealed, the stoppers being
painted with wax, to preserve the vacuum. Two shellacked wires, passing to the powder,
permitted firing of the powder by an automobile spark coil.
It was found that Victor flash powder was slightly superior to a mixture of powdered
magnesium and sodium nitrate, in atomic proportions, and much superior to a mixture of
powdered magnesium and potassium chlorate, also in atomic proportions.
In the actual test, six samples of Victor flash powder, varying weight from 0.05 gm to
0.0029 gm, were placed in tubes as shown in Plate 9, Fig. 1, and these tubes were fastened
in blackened compartments of a box, Plate 9, Fig. 2, and Plate 10, Fig. 1. The ignition
system was placed in the back of the same box, as shown in Plate 10, Fig. 2. This system
comprised a spark coil, operated by three triple cells of Eveready battery, placed two by
two in parallel. The charge was fired on closing the primary switch at the left. The six-point
switch at the right served to connect the tubes, in order, to the high-tension side of the
coil.
The flashes were observed at a distance of 2.24 miles on a fairly clear night; and it was
found that a mass of 0.0029 gm of Victor flash powder was visible, and that 0.015 gm was
strikingly visible, all the observations being made with the unaided eye. The minimum
mass of flash powder visible at this distance is thus surprisingly small.
From these experiments it is seen that if this flash powder were exploded on the
surface of the moon, distant 220,000 miles, and a telescope of 1-ft aperture were used--
the exit pupil being not greater than the pupil of the eye (e.g., 2mm)--we should need a
mass of flash powder of
2.67 lb to be just visible
13.82 lb orless to be strikingly visible
[57] If we consider the final mass of the last "secondary" rocket plus the mass of the flash
powder and its container, to be four times the mass of the flash powder alone, we should
have, for the final mass of the rocket, four times the above masses. These final masses
correspond to the "one pound final mass" which has been mentioned throughout the
calculations.
The "total initial masses," or the masses necessary for the start at the earth, are at
once obtained from the data given in Table VII. Thus if the start is made from sea level,
and the "effective velocity of ejection" is 7000 ft/sec, we need 602 lb for every pound that
is to be sent to "infinity.'
We arrive, then, at the conclusion that the "total initial masses" necessary would be
6,436 lb or 3.21 tons; flash just visible
33,278 lb or 16.63 tons (or less); flash strikingly visible
A "total initial mass" of 8 or 10 tons would, without doubt, raise sufficient flash pow-
der for clear visibility. _'
These masses could, of course, be much reduced by the employment of a larger
telescope. For example, with an aperture of 2 ft, the masses would be reduced to one-
fourth of those just given. The use of such a large telescope would, however, limit consid-
erably the possible number of observers. In all cases, the magnification should be so low
that the entire lunar disk is in the field of the telescope.
It should be added that the probability of collision of a small object with meteors of
the visible type is negligible, so is indicated in Appendix G.
This plan of sending a mass of flash powder to the surface of the moon, although a
matter of much general interest, is not of obvious scientific importance. There are, how-
ever, developments of the general method under discussion, which involve a number of
1. A simple calculation 2°will show that the total initial mass required to send one pound to the surface of
the moon is but slighdy less than that required to send the mass to "infinity."
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important features not herein mentioned, which could lead to results of much scientific
interest. These developments involve many experimental difficulties, to be sure; but they
depend upon nothing that is really impossible.
[58] Summary
1. An important part of the atmosphere, that extends for many miles beyond the
reach of sounding balloons, has up to the present time been considered inaccessible. Data
of great value in meteorology and in solar physics could be obtained by recording instru-
ments sent into this region.
2. The rocket, in principle, is ideally suited for reaching high altitudes, m that it
carries apparatus without jar, and does not depend upon the presence of air for propul-
sion. A new form of rocket apparatus, which embodies a number of improvements over
the common form, is described in the present paper.
3. A theoretical treatment of the rocket principle shows that, if the velocity of- expul-
sion of the gases were considerably increased and the ratio of propellant material to the
entire rocket were also increased, a tremendous increase in range would result, from tim
fact that these two quantities enter exponentially in the expression for the initial mass of
the rocket necessary to raise given mass to a given height.
4. Experiments with ordinary rockets show that the efficiency of such rockets is of
the order of 2 percent, and the velocity of ejection of the gases, 1000 ft/sec. For small
rockets the values are slightly less.
With a special type of steel chamber and nozzle, an efficiency has been obtained with
smokeless powder of over 64 percent (higher than that of any heat engine ever betore
tested) ; and a velocity of nearly 8000 ft/sec, which is the highest velocity so far obtained in
any way except in electrical discharge work.
5. Experiments were repeated with the same chambers in vacuo, which demon strated
that the high velocity of the ejected gases was a real velocity and not merely an ettcct oi
reaction against the air. In fact, experiments performed at pressures such as probably exist
at an altitude of 30 miles gave velocities even higher than those obtained in air at atmo-
spheric pressure, the increase in velocity probably being due to a difference in ignition.
Results of the experiments indicate also that this velocity could be exceeded, with a modi-
fied form of apparatus.
[59] 6. Experiments with a large chamber demonstrated not only that large chambers are
operative, but that the velocities and efficiencies are higher than for small chambers.
7. A calculation based upon the theory, invoMng data that is in part that obtained by
experiments, and in part what is considered as realizable in practice, indicates that the
initial mass required to raise recording instruments of the order of one pound, even to the
extreme upper atmosphere, is moderate. The initial mass necessary is likewise not exces-
sive, even if the effective velocity is reduced by half. Calculations show, however, that any
apparatus in which ordinary rockets are used would be impracticable owing to the very
large initial masses that would be required.
8. The recovery of the apparatus on its return, need not be a difficult matter, from
the fact that the time of ascent even to great altitudes in the atmosphere will be compara-
tively short, owing to the high speed of the rocket throughout the greater part of its course.
The time of descent will also be short; but free fall can be satisfactorily prevented by a
suitable parachute. A parachute will be operative for the reason that high velocities and
small atmospheric densities are essentially the same as low velocities and ordinary density.
9. Even if a mass of the order of a pound were propelled by the apparatus under
consideration until it possessed sufficient velocity to escape the earth's attraction, the ini-
tial mass need not be unreasonably large, for an effective velocity of ejection which is
without doubt attainable. A method is suggested whereby the passage of a body to such an
extreme altitude could be demonstrated.
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Conclusion
Although the present paper is not the description of a working mode, it is believed,
nevertheless, that the theory and experiments, herein described, together setde all points
that could seriously be questioned, and that it remains only to perform certain necessary
preliminary experiments before an apparatus can be constructed that will carry recording
instruments to any desired altitude. 2'
[60] AppendixA
Theory of the Motion with Direct Lift
Let M= the mass of the suspended system, comprising the chamber together with any
parts rigidly attached thereto
rn_= the mass of the expelled charge, comprising wadding and the attached copper
wire, the smokeless powder charge (and also, in the experiments in vacuo, the
black powder priming charge)
V= the initial upward velocity of the mass M
v = the average downward velocity of the mass M0
s= the upward displacement of the mass M
We have at once for the initial velocity of the mass M
W = 2gs
and employing the conservation of momentum, we have for the kinetic energy per gram
of mass _, expelled,
v 2 M 2
y =---¢gs
,no
Appendix B
Theory of Displacements for Simple Harmonic Motion
In addition to the notation given under Appendix A, the following additional nota-
tion must be employed:
Let m, =the mass of the spring
Fj =the force in dynes which produces until extension of the spring
M, =the mass in dynes which produces unit extension of the spring
s =the upward displacement of M, resulting from the firing, that would
be had if there were no friction
Then, allowing for the mass of the spring, we have, from the theory of simple har-
monic motion:
Fx= M+ x
where x is any displacement and p is the period of the motion,
[61] But Vis the maximum velocity during the motion and hence V= cos, where s is the
maximum displacement and 0_ is a constant, having the usual significance; also
p= 2__
o)
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Hence
mlg _, 3 ) s 2
But by the conservation of linear momentum,
Hence
mlg=(M+m31( mov )2 1
_. _ LM+m_3) s_
giving, for the kinetic energy per gram of mass expelled,
v 2 (M+rr_/3)(mlg ) s2
2 2m0 z
From this it is possible to obtain the efficiency, by dividing by the heat value of the
powder, in ergs; and also the velocity in kilometers per second by multiplying by 2, extract-
ing the square root, and dividing by 10 _.
Correction of the Displacement s for Friction
The displacement s in the preceding calculation is assumed to be the corrected
displacement. This is obtained from the upward displacement s_ and the downward dis-
placement s_, as
S
----51 --
Appendix C
Theory of Direct4ifl Impulse Meter
The theory of the direct-lift impulse-meter is as follows:
Calling I the momentum of the gas that strikes the end of the aluminum cylinder,
m_ = the mass of the aluminum cylinder
V, = the initial upward velocity of the cylinder
A, = the area of cross section of the cylinder
A t = the area of cross section of the suspended system comprising the gun, lead weight,
and holders
s = the displacement of the aluminum cylinder, as obtained [62] from the trace on
the smoked-glass tube
Thus we have, by the principle of the conservation of linear momentum, for the momen-
tum per unit area produced by the gaseous rebound,
I._ = mcV...__._c= mc _
Ac Ac Ac
Hence the momentum communicated to the suspended system by the gaseous rebound is
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m cAg _/2gs
ac
and calling Q the ratio or the momentum given the gun by gaseous rebound to the ob-
served momentum of the suspended system, we have
Q = mcA_ _l"_
moAcv
Appendix D
Theory of Sp_ng Impulse Meter
The theory of the spring impulse meter is as follows: If we use the same notation as in
the preceding case, calling, in addition, the mass of the spring m, and the mass required
for unit extension of the spring m, we have, by the same theory as that for the gun sus-
pended by a spring,
Vc 4me + 1/3rn_
Hence the momentum per unit area, communicated to the upper cap of the 12-in. pipe,
when the chamber is fired, is
I (mc+l/3m3)V c _/mc+l/3m3 m3_lgs
A c A_ A_
Hence the momentum that would be communicated to the suspended system by the gas-
eous rebound, provided the system were at the top of the 12-in. pipe, would be
Ag 4mc + l/3m3 m_f_lgs
A,
and the percentage Q of the momentum communicated by the gaseous rebound to the
observed momentum of the suspended system is
Ag ÷V3m3
Q:-
Acmov
[63] Appendix E
Check on Approximate Method of Calculation for Small Charges Fired in Rapid Succession
Consider a rocket weighing 10 lb, having 2 lb of propelling material, fired 2 oz at a
time, eight times per second, with a velocity of 6000 ft/sec--much less than the highest
velocity attained in the experiments, either in air or in vacuo.
Let us suppose that, for simplicity, the rocket is directed upward and that each shot
takes place instantly (a supposition not far from the truth); the velocity remaining con-
stant between successive shots.
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After the first shot, the mass, 9 7/8 lb, has an upward velocity vo is at once found by the
conservation of momentum. But it is decreased by gra_4ty until, at the end of _/s sec, it is
reduced to
VO t = 'UO -- gt
the space passed over during this time being
s = rot-1/2gt 2
We have then, v0'= 71.8 ft/sec, and s = 9.23 ft.
At the beginning of the second interval of l/s sec, and additional velocity is given the
remaining mass, of 76.8 ft/sec, and the final velocity' and space passed over may be tbund
in the same way. By completing the calculations for the remaining intervals we shall have
for time just under 1/2 sec,
v'= 293.1 ft/sec s = 91.93 ft
for time just under 1 sec,
v0' = 603.8 ft/sec s = 335.48 ft and
for time just under 2 sec,
v0'= 1284.1 ft/sec s =1315.68 ft/sec
These figures compare well with those in Table V, for s_. In the present check, air
resistance would doubtless be unimportant until the velocity had reached 1000 ft/sec or
so; but the velocity would, even if decreased somewhat by air resistance, compare favorably
with that of a projectile fired from a gun.
No more elaborate calculation is necessary to demonstrate the importance of the
device, even for military purposes alone; for it combines portability and cheapness (no
gun is required for firing it) with a range which compares favorably with the best artillery.
Further, all difficulties of the nature of erosion are, of course, avoided.
[64] Appendix F
Proof that the Retardation between 500,000 Feet and 1,000,000 Feet is Negligible
The falling off of velocity w, due to air resistance, is given by
P-_--sh = 1/2MoWl 2
Po
where P---the mean air resistance in poundals per square inch between the altitudes
500,000 and 1,000,000 ft from the previously mentioned velocity curves, the
pressure being considered at atmospheric
P = the mean density over this distance
S = the mean area of cross section of the apparatus throughout the distance, taken
as 25 sq in, in view of the the average mass 340 throughout the interval
h = the distance traversed: 500,000 ft
It is thus found that the loss of velocity w is less than 10 ft/sec (for a = 150 ft/sec) even
when P/Po is taken as constant throughout the distance and equal to that at 500,000 ft (i.e.,
2.73 x 10-9).
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Appendix G
Probability of Collision with Meteors
The probability of collision with meteors of 'Msible" size is negligible. This can be
shown by deriving an expression for the probability of collision of a sphere with particles
moving in directions at random, all having constant velocity, the expression being ob-
tained on the assumption that the speed of the sphere is small compared with the speed of
the particles.
If we accept Newton's estimate 7 of the average distance apart of meteors as being
250 miles, we have by considering collision between very small meteors of velocity
30 miles/see, and a sphere 1 ft in diameter of velocity 1 mile/see, moving over a distance
of 220,000 miles, the probability 23 as 1.23 x 10-8; which is, of course, practically negli-
gible. The value would be slightly greater if the meteors were considered as having a diam-
eter of several centimeters, rather than being particles_'; the probability would be less,
however, if meteor swarms were avoided.
[65] Notes
10. A step-by-step method of solution similar to that herein employed can evidently be used for oblique
projection---other conditions remaining the same.
11. If the efficiency is estimated by the kinetic energy of the rocket itself (from the velocity the average
mass of the rocket would acquire, by virtue of the recoil of the gases ejected with the "average velocity" mea-
sured), the efficiencies will, of course, be less than the two values given in Table 1, being, respectively, 0.39 and
0.50 percent.
12. Since this manuscript was written, rockets with a single charge, constructed along the general lines
here explained, have been considerably further developed.
13. Chambers of considerably reduced weight have since been made and tested for velocities comparable
to those here mentioned. For two particular types of loading device, the ratios of weight of chamber to weight of
charge (here, 120) were, respectively 63 (also 30 for this case, but at a sacrifice of velocity) and 29; the ratio, for
the nozzles, being reducible to comparatively small values. In neither of these cases was any special attempt
made to reduce the weight of the chambers.
14. Later experiments support this prediction, and also demonstrate that firing of the charges can take
place in rapid succession.
15. The values of c and (l-k, here assigned), were chosen as being the largest that could reasonably be
expected. Later experiments have shown that lower values are more easily realizable, but it should at the same
time be understood that no special attempt has been made to obtain experimentally the h_ghest values of these quantitie_s.
The numbers chosen may, then, he considered as at least possible limiting values.
It is well to mention, in this connection, that the developments with the multiple-charge rocket have, so
far, exceeded original expectations. This is in accord with the fact that the experimental results have, from the
start, been more favorable than were expected. Thus an efficiency of 50 percent was at first considered the limit
of what could be attained, and 4000 to 5000 ft/sec, the highest possible velocity. Further it was naturally not
expected that the velocities obtained in vacuo would actually exceed those in air; nor were chambers as light as
those at present used considered producible without considerable experimental difficulty.
16. Distribution of mass among the secondary rockets for cases of large total initial mass. For very great altitudes,
secondary rockets will be necessary, as already explained, in order to keep the proportion of propellant to total
weight sensibly constant. The most extreme cases will require groups of secondary rockets, which groups are
discharged in succession.
There are, under arty circumstances, two possibilities: either the secondaries may be small, so that each
time a secondary rocket, or group of secondaries, is discarded, the total mass is not appreciably changed, as
indicated schematically at (a), Fig. 8; or a series of as large secondaries as possible may be used (b), Fig. 8, in
which case the empty casings constitute a considerable fraction of the entire weight at the time the discarding
takes place.
[66] Insofar as avoiding difficulties of construction is concerned, the use of a smaller number of larger second-
aries is preferable, but they should be long and narrow, as otherwise the air resistance on the nearly empty
casings will be greater for the same weight of propellant than would be the case (a), were used, in as compact an
arrangement as possible. It should be explained, also, that if very small secondaries were employed, the metal of
the magazines and casings would become a considerable fraction of the entire weight, as the amount of surface
enclosing the propellant would then be a maximum.
7, Newton, Encyc. Brit., 9 ed., v. 16.
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(.) (b)
Fig. 8
Possibility of employing case (b). A rough calculation shows at once the possibility of using a comparatively
small number of large secondaries [67] (or groups), provided, as is, of course, to be expected from dimensional
considerations, that the larger any individual rocket, the less, in proportion, need be the ratio of weight of
metal to weight of propellant.
Such a calculation can be made by finding the number of secondary rockets, for case (b), that would be
required for the same total initial mass, other conditions being the same, as for continuous loss of mass with
zero relative velocity, which is practically case (a).
For the latter, Eq. (7), in which R and g are neglected, is evidently sufficient for the purpose, for the
reason that the form of the expression, so far as (I-k) is concerned, is the same whether or not R and g are
included.
Let us now find what conditions must hold for case (b), in order that the total initial mass shall equal that
for case (a). Assume, first, that the casings are discarded successively at the end of n equal intervals of time, no
mass being discarded except at these times; the velocity of gas ejection being c, as before. The total initial mass
is obtained as the product of the initial masses for each interval, from Eq (7) with k = 0, assuming the final mass
for each interval is, as before 1 lb, after first multiplying the initial masses by a greater factor than unity, the
excess over unit being the weight h of the casings which are discarded at the end of the intervals.
If, in case (a), we divide the time into n equal intervals in the same way, we shall have, as the condition
that the total initial masses are the same in the two cases,
M = exp_ = (1 + h)" exp a(t/_n)n (15)
ctt-_) c
We obtain, then, on combining (15) with (7),
M k =(l+h)"
from which n = k 1°----_--_-- (16)
log (l+h)
Let us assume, for case (a) (many small secondary rockets), as well as for case (b) (large secondary rock-
ets), that the ratio of mass of metal to mass of propellant is the minimum reasonable amount that can be
expected, which may be put tentatively, at least, as 1:14 and 1:18, respectively.
Two cases will suffice for purpose of illustration: one in which the ratio of initial to final mass is moder-
ately large, e.g., 40, and the other in which the ratio is extreme, e.g., 600.
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The number of secondaries (or separate groups) for (b), for these two cases, are, from (16), 5 and 9
respectively, n being necessarily an integer.
It is to be understood that the numbers could be made even smaller, although this would necessitate
larger total initial masses,
17. If the start were made at a greater elevation than 15,000 ft, for example, at 20,000 or 25,000 d, the
reduction of the "total initial mass" would, of course, be considerably greater. Further, if the rocket were of
comparatively small mass, it could be raised to an even greater initial height by balloons.
18. Actually, 300 gm would be sufficient, for many researches.
19. Attention is called to the fact that hydrogen and oxygen, combining in atomic proportions, afford
the greatest heat per unit mass of all chemical transformations. For this reason, if the calculations are made
under the [68] assumption that hydrogen and oxygen are used (in the liquid or solid state, to avoid weight of
the container), giving the same efficiency as that for which Infallible smokeless powder produces respective
velocities of, for example, 5500 ft/sec and 7500 ft/sec, the velocities (deducting 218.47 cal/gm as the latent
heat plus specific heat, from boiling point to ordinary temperature) would be 9400 ft/sec and 11,900 ft/sec;
and the total initial masses for a start from 15,000 ft, respectively, 199 lb and 43.5 lb.
Incidentally, except for difficulties of application, the use of hydrogen and oxygen would have several
other evident advantages.
20. This calculation is made under the assumption of stationary centers for the earth and moon.
21. The time of transit for the case under discussion would, of course, be comparatively large. If, how-
ever, the final velocity were to exceed by 1000 or 9000 ft/sec the velocity calculated, the time would be reduced
to a day or two.
The time can be calculated from solution, by Plans (Memorie della Reale Accademia della Scienze di
Torino, Set. 2, vol. 20, 1865, pp. 1-86), of the analogous problem of the determination of the initial velocity and
time of transit of a body, such as a volcanic rock, projected from the moon toward the earth.
22. At the time of signing of the Armistice, the net result of the development of a reloading mechanism
had been the demonstration of an operative apparatus that was simple and travelled straight, with the essential
parts sufficiendy strong and light, using a few cartridges of simple form.
The work remaining, upon which progress has since been made, has been the adaptation of the device
for a large proportionate weight of propellant.
23. The probable number of collisions here calculated is the sum of the probable numbers obtained by
taking of velocity of the spherical body, and of the meteors, separately equal to zero.
Let v = velocity of the spherical body
V = velocity of the meteors
n = the number of meteors per unit volume, which number is, of course, a fraction
(mutual collisions between meteors being neglected)
S = the area of cross section of the spherical body
For v = 0, the meteors, if any, which strike the sphere during the time t to t + dt will have come from a
spherical shell of radii Vt and V(t + dO, neglecting the diameter of the spherical body in comparison with th at of
the spherical shell. Further, the probable number in any small volume, in this shell, which are so directed as to
strike the body, is
S
4ffV2t 2
being the ratio of the solid angle subtended at the element, by the spherical body, to the whole solid angle 47t.
Hence the probable number of collisions N, from all directions, between the time t_ and t r is, evidently,
N = nSV(q-t_)
For V=0, and expression of the same form is obtained for the probable number of meteors within the
space swept out by the spherical body.
[68] The sum of these separate probable numbers is the number 1.23 x 104 in Appendix G.
In general, for any values of o and V, the meteors reaching the spherical body at successive instants come
from a spherical surface of increasing radius Vt, with moving center distant vt in front of the initial position of
the spherical body.
It should be explained that when v differs but litde from V, the relative velocity of the body and meteors
is small enough to be neglected, for meteors on this expanding spherical surface lying outside a certain cone,
the vertex of which coincides with the moving center of the spherical body.
Also ifv exceeds V, the only part of the expanding spherical surface which is to be considered is that lying
outside the contact circle of the tangent cone, the vertex of which also coincides with the moving center of the
spherical body.
Attention is called to the fact that, even if meteor swarms were not avoided, the probable number of
collisions would be reduced if the direction of motion were substantially that of the swarm.
24. No difference in the calculation would be necessary if the radius of the sphere were to be increased
by the diameter of the meteors, these being then considered as particles.
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Document I-8
Topics of the Times
New York Times,January 18, 1920, p, 12 col. 5.
A Severe Stain on Credulity
As a method of sending a missile to the higher, and even to the highest, part of the
earth's atmospheric envelope, Professor Goddard's multiple-charge rocket is a practicable,
and therefore promising device. Such a rocket, too, might carry self-recording instrumen ts
to be released at the limit of its flight, and conceivably parachutes would bring them safely
to the ground. It is not obvious, however, that the instruments would return to the point of
departure; indeed, it is obvious that they would not, for parachutes drift exactly as bal-
loons do. And the rocket, or what was left of it after the last explosion, would have to be
aimed with amazing skill, and in a dead calm, to fall on the spot whence it started.
But that is a slight inconvenience, at least from the scientific standpoint, though it
might be serious enough from that of the always innocent bystander a few hundred or
thousand yards away from the firing line. It is when one considers the multiple-charge
rocket as a traveler to the moon that one begins to doubt and looks again, to see if the
dispatch announcing the professor's purposes and hopes says that he is working under the
auspices of the Smithsonian Institution. It does say so, and therefore the impulse to do
more than doubt the practicability of such a device for such a purpose must be--well,
controlled. Still, to be filled with uneasy wonder and to express it will be safe enough, for
after the rocket quits our air and really starts on its longer journey, its flight would be
neither accelerated nor maintained by the explosion of the charges it then might have
left. To claim that it would be is to deny a fundamental law of dynamics, and only
Dr. Einstein and his chosen dozen, so few and fit, are licensed to do that.
His Plan Is Not Original
That Professor Goddard, with his "chair" in Clark College and the countenancing of'
the Smithsonian Institution, does not know the relation of action to reaction, and of the
need to have something better than a vacuum against which to react--to say that would be
absurd. Of course he only seems to lack the knowledge ladled out daily in high schools.
But there are such things as Intentional mistakes or oversights, and, as it happens,
Jules Verne, who also knew a thing or two in assorted sciences--and had, besides, a surpris-
ing amount of prophetic power---deliberately seemed to make the same mistake that Pro-
fessor Goddard seems to make. For the Frenchman, having got his travelers to go toward
the moon into the desperate fix of riding a tiny satellite of the satellite, saved them from
circling it forever by means of an explosion, rocket fashion, where an explosion would not
have had in the slightest degree the effect of releasing them from their dreadful slavery.
That was one of Verne's few scientific slips, or else it was a deliberate step aside from
scientific accuracy, pardonable enough in him as a romancer, but its like is not so easily
explained when made by a savant who isn't writing a novel of adventure.
All the same, if Professor Goddard's rocket attains sufficient speed before it passes
out of our atmospherewand if its aiming takes into account all of the many deflective
forces that will affect its flight, it may reach the moon. That the rocket could carry enough
explosive to make on impact a flash large and bright enough to be seen from the earth by
the biggest of our telescopes--that will be believed when it is done.
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Document I-9
Document title: Robert H. Goddard, Liquid_ropellant Rocket Development, Smithsonian Mis-
cellaneous Collections, Volume 95, Number 3 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution
Press, 1936). The plates have been omitted from this document.
Goddard was conducting tests with liquid-fueled rockets in seclusion in the New
Mexican desert when his friend, Charles Lindbergh, began urging him to publish the
results. Lindbergh encouraged Goddard to accept an invitation to address an annual con-
vention of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). Goddard
presented the results of his liquid-propeUant rocket experiments at the AAAS convention
in St. Louis on December 31, 1935. Goddard was genuinely pleased with the warm recep-
tion his work received and was finally convinced by Lindbergh to publish the results. The
subsequent paper published by the Smithsonian Institution on March 16, 1936, consisted
of ten pages of test and twelve pages of plates illustrating his experiments. It was his first
published paper since his previous Smithsonian publication in 1919. The response was
overwhelmingly favorable, for Goddard had demonstrated the practicality and scientific
basis for rocket research and development.
[1] Liquid-propellant Rocket Development
The following is a report made by the writer to The Daniel and Florence Guggenheim
Foundation concerning the rocket development carried out under his direction in Roswell,
New Mexico, from July 1930 to July 1932 and from September 1934 to September 1935,
supported by this Foundation.
This report is a presentation of the general plan of attack on the problem of develop-
ing a sounding rocket, and the results obtained. Further details will be set forth in a later
paper, after the main objects of the research have been attained.
In_oducflon
In a previous paper _the author developed a theory of rocket performance and made
calculations regarding the heights that might reasonably be expected for a rocket having a
high velocity of the ejected gases and a mass at all times small in proportion to the weight
of propellant material. It was shown that these conditions would be satisfied by having a
tapered nozzle through which the gaseous products of combustion were discharged, _ by
feeding successive portions of propellant material into the rocket combustion chambers)
and further by employing a series of rockets, of decreasing size, each fired when the rocket
immediately below was employ of fuel.' Experimental results with power rockets were also
presented in this paper.
Since the above was published, work has been carried on for the purpose of making
practical a plan of rocket propulsion set forth in 1914 s which may be called the liquid-
propellant type of rocket. In this rocket, a liquid fuel and combustion-supporting liquid
are fed under pressure into a combustion chamber provided with a conical nozzle through
which the products of combustion are discharged. [2] The advantages of the liquid-pro-
pellant rocket are that the propellant materials possess several times the energy of pow-
ders, per unit mass, and that moderate pressures may be employed, thus avoiding the
weight of the strong combustion chambers that would be necessary if propulsion took
place by successive explosions.
1. Smithsonian Misc. Coll., vol. 71, no. 2, 1919.
2. U.S. Patent, "Rocket Apparatus," No. 1,102,653,July 7, 1914.
3. U.S. Patent, "Rocket Apparatus," No. 1,103,503,July 14, 1914.
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Experiments with liquid oxygen and various liquid hydrocarbons, including gasoline
and liquid propane, as well as ether, were made during the writer's spare time from 1920 to
1922, under a grant by Clark University. Although oxygen and hydrogen, as earlier sug-
gested,' possess the greatest heat energy per unit mass, it seems likely that liquid oxygen
and liquid methane would afford the greatest heat value of the combinations which could
be used without considerable difficulty. The most practical combination, however, appears
to be liquid oxygen and gasoline.
In these experiments it was shown that a rocket chamber and nozzle, since termed a
"rocket motor," could use liquid oxygen together with a liquid fuel, and could exert a
lifting force without danger of explosion and without damage to the chamber and nozzle.
These rockets were held by springs in a testing frame, and the liquids were forced into the
chamber by the pressure of a noninflammable gas.
The experiments were continued from 1922 to 1930, chiefly under grants from the
Smithsonian Institution. Although this work will be made the subject of a later report, it is
desirable in the present paper to call attention to some of the results obtained.
On November 1, 1923, a rocket motor operated in the testing frame, using liquid
oxygen and gasoline, both supplied by pumps on the rocket.
In December 1925 the simpler plan previously employed of having the liquids fed to
the chamber under the pressure of an inert gas in a tank on the rocket was again em-
ployed, and the rocket developed by means of the tests was constructed so that it could be
operated independently of the testing frame.
The first flight of a liquid-oxygen-gasoline rocket was obtained on March 16, 1926 in
Auburn, Massachusetts, and was reported to the Smithsonian Institution May 5, 1926. This
rocket is shown in the frame from which it was fired, in Plate 1, Fig. 1. Pressure was pro-
duced initially by an outside pressure tank, and after launching by an alcohol heater on
the rocket.
It will be seen from the photograph that the combustion chamber and nozzle were
located forward of the remainder of the rocket, to which connection was made by two
pipes. This plan was of advantage [3] in keeping the flame away from the tanks, but was of
no value in producing stabilization. This is evident from the fact that the direction of the
propelling force lay along the axis of the rocket, and not in the direction in which it was
intended the rocket should travel, the condition therefore being the same as that in which
the chamber is at the rear of the rocket. The case is altogether different from pulling an
object upward by a force which is constantly vertical, when stability depends merely on
having the force applied above the center of gravity.
Plate 1, Fig. 2, shows an assistant igniting the rocket, and Plate 2, Fig. 1, shows the
group that witnessed the flight, except for the camera operator. The rocket traveled a
distance of 184 feet in 2.5 seconds, as timed by a stopwatch, making the speed along the
trajectory about 60 miles per hour.
Other short flights of liquid oxygen-gasoline rockets were made in Auburn, that of
July 17, 1929 happening to attract public attention owing to a report from someone who
witnessed the flight from a distance and mistook the rocket for a flaming airplane. In this
flight the rocket carried a small barometer and a camera, both of which were retrieved
intact after the flight (Plate 2, Fig. 2). The combustion chamber was located at the rear of
the rocket, which is, incidentally, the best location, inasmuch as no part of the rocket is in
the high-velocity stream of ejected gases, and none of the gases are directed at an angle
with the rocket axis.
During the college year 1929-1930 tests were carried on at Fort Devens, Massachusetts,
on a location which was kindly placed at the disposal of the writer by the War Department.
Progress was made, however, with difficulty, chiefly owing to transportation conditions in
the winter.
At about this time Col. Charles A. Lindbergh became interested in the work and
brought the matter to the attention of the late Daniel Guggenheim. The latter made a
grant which permitted the research to be continued under ideal conditions, namely, in
4. Smithsonian Misc.Coll., vo171, no. 2, 1919.
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easternNewMexico;andClarkUniversityatthesametimegrantedthewriterleaveof
absence.AnadditionalgrantwasmadebytheCarnegieInstitutionofWashingtontohelp
ingettingestablished.
Itwasdecidedthatthedevelopmentshouldbecarriedonfortwoyears,attheendof
whichtime a grant making possible two further years' work would be made if an advisory
committee, formed at the time the grant was made, should decide that this was justified by
the results obtained during the first two years. This advisory committee [4] was as follows:
Dr.John C. Merriam, chairman; Dr. C.G. Abbot; Dr. Walter S. Adams; Dr. Wallace W. Atwood;
Colonel Henry Breckinridge; Dr. John A. Fleming; Col. Charles A. Lindbergh; Dr. C.E
Marvin; and Dr. Robert A. Millikan.
The Establishment in New Mexico
Although much of the eastern part of New Mexico appeared to be suitable country
for flights because of clear air, few storms, moderate winds, and level terrain, it was de-
cided to locate in Roswell, where power and transportation facilities were available.
A shop 30 by 55 feet was erected in September 1930 (Plate 3, Figs. 1, 2), and the
60-foot tower previously used in Auburn at Fort Devens was erected about 15 miles away
(Plate 4, Fig. 1). A second tower, 20 feet high (Plate 4, Fig. 2), was built near the shop for
static tests, that is, those in which the rocket was prevented from rising by heavy weights, so
that the lift and general performance could be studied. These static tests may be thought
of as "idling" the rocket motor. A cement gas deflector was constructed under each tower,
as may be seen in Plate 4, Figs. 1, 2, whereby the gases from the rocket were directed
toward the rear, thus avoiding a cloud of dust which might otherwise hide the rocket dur-
ing a test.
Static Tests of 1930-1932
Although, as has been stated combustion chambers which operated satisfactorily had
been constructed at Clark University, it appeared desirable to conduct a series of thorough
tests in which the operating conditions were varied, the lift being recorded as a function of
the time. Various modifications in the manner of feeding the liquids under pressure to the
combustion chamber were tested, as well as variations in the proportions of the liquids,
and in the size and shape of the chambers. The chief conclusions reached were that satis-
factory operation of the combustion chambers could be obtained with considerable varia-
tion of conditions, and that larger chambers afforded better operation than those of smaller
size.
As will be seen from Plate 4, Fig. 2, the supporting frame for the rocket was held
down by four steel barrels containing water. Either two of for barrels could be filled, and in
the latter case the total weight was about 2000 pounds. This weight was supported by a
strong compression spring, which made possible the recording of the lift on a revolving
drum (Plate 5, Fig. 1) driven by clockwork.
[5] The combustion chamber finally decided upon for use in flights was 5 3/4 inches in
diameter and weighed 5 pounds. The maximum lift obtained was 289 pounds, and the
period of combustion usually exceeded 20 seconds. The shifting force was forced to be
very steady, the variation of lift being within 5 percent.
The masses of liquids used during the lifting period were the quantities most diffi-
cult to determine. Using the largest likely value of the total mass of liquids ejected and the
integral of the lift-time curve obtained mechanically, the velocity of the ejected gases was
estimated to be over 5000 feet per second. This gave for the mechanical horsepower of the
jet 1030 horsepower, and the horsepower per pound of the combustion chamber, consid-
ered as a rocket motor, 206 horsepower. It was found possible to use the chambers repeatedly.
The results of this part of the development were very important, for a rocket to reach
great heights can obviously not be made unless a combustion chamber, or rocket motor,
can be constructed that is both extremely light and can be used without danger of burning
through or exploding.
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Flights During the Period 1930-1932
The first flight obtained during this period was on December 30, 1930, with a rocket
11 feet long, weighing 33.5 pounds. The height obtained was 2000 feet, and the maximum
speed was about 500 miles per hour. A gas pressure tank was used on the rocket to force
the liquid oxygen and the gasoline into the combustion chamber.
In further flights pressure was obtained by gas pressure on the rocket, and also by
pumping liquid nitrogen through a vaporizer, the latter means first being employed in a
flight on April 19, 1932.
In order to avoid accident, a remote-control system was constructed in September
1931, whereby the operator and observers could be stationed 1000 feet from the tower,
and the rocket fired and released at will from this point. This arrangement has proved very
satisfactory. Plate 5, Fig. 2, shows the cable being unwound between the tower and the
1000-foot shelter, the latter being seen in the distance, and Plate 6, Fig. 1, shows the con-
trol keys being operated at the shelter, which is provided with sandbags on the roof as
protection against possible accident. Plate 5, Fig. 2, shows also the level and open nature of
the country.
One observer was stationed 3000 feet from the tower, in the rear of the 1000-foot
shelter, with a recording telescope (Plate 6, Fig. 2). Two pencils attached to his telescope
gave a record of altitude and azimuth respectively, of the rocket, the records being made
on a paper [6] strip, moved at a constant speed by clockwork. The sights at the front and
rear of the telescope, similar to those on a rifle, were used in following the rocket when the
speed was high. In Plate 7, Fig. 1, which shows the clock mechanism in detail, the observer
is indicating the altitude trace. This device proved satisfactory except when the trajectory
of the rocket was in the plane of the tower and the telescope. For great heights, shortwave
radio direction finders, for following the rocket during the decent, will be preferable to
telescopes.
During this period a number of flights were made for the purpose of testing the
regulation of the nitrogen gas pressure. A beginning on the problem of automatically
stabilized vertical flight was also made, and the first flight with gyroscopically controlled
vanes was obtained on April 19, 1932 which the same model that employed the first liquid-
nitrogen tank. The method of stabilization consisted in forcing vanes into the blast of the
rocket s by means of gas pressure, this pressure being controlled by a small gyroscope.
As has been found by later tests, the vanes used in the flight of April 19, 1932 were
too small to produce sufficiendy rapid correction. Nevertheless, the two vanes which, by
entering the rocket blast, should have moved the rocket back to the vertical position were
found to be warmer than the others after the rocket landed,
This part of the development work, being for the purpose of obtaining satisfactory
and reproducible performance of the rocket in the air, was conducted without any special
attempt to secure great lighmess, and therefore great altitudes.
In May 1932 the result that had been obtained were placed before the advisory com-
mittee, which voted to recommend the two additional years of development. Owing to the
economic conditions then existing, however, it was found impossible to continue the flights
in New Mexico.
A grant from the Smithsonian Institution enabled the writer, who resumed full-time
teaching in Clark University in the fall of 1932, to carry out tests that did not require
flights, in the physics laboratories of the University during 1932-1933, and a grant was
received from the Daniel and Florence Guggenheim Foundation which made possible a
more extended program of the same nature in 1933-1934.
Resumption of Flights in New Mexico
A grant made by the Daniel and Florence Guggenheim Foundation in August 1934,
together with leave of absence for the writer granted [7] by the Trustees of Clark
5. u.s. Patent, "Mechanism for Directing Flight," No. 1,879, 187, September 1932.
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University, made it possible to continue the development on a scale permitting actual
flights to be made. This was very desirable, as further laboratory work could not be carried
out effectively without flights in which to test performance under practical conditions.
Work was begun in September 1934, the shop being put in running order and the
equipment at the tower for the flights being replaced. The system of remote control previ-
ously used was further improved and simplified, and a concrete dugout (Plate 7, Fig. 2)
was constructed 50 feet from the launching tower in order to make it possible for an ob-
server to watch the launching of the rocket at close range ....
Development of Stabilized Right
It was of the first importance to perfect the means of keeping the rockets in a vertical
course automatically, work on which was begun in the preceding series of flights, since a
rocket cannot rise vertically to a very great height without a correction being made when
it deviates from the vertical course. Such correction is especially important at the time the
rocket starts to rise, for a rocket of very great range [8] must be loaded with a maximum
amount of propellant and consequently must start with as small an acceleration as pos-
sible. At these small initial velocities fixed air vanes, especially those of large size, are worse
than useless, as they increase the deviations due to the wind. It should be remarked that
fixed air vanes should preferably be small, or dispensed with entirely, it automatic stabiliza-
tion is employed, to minimize air resistance.
In order to make the construction of the rockets as rapid as possible, combustion
chambers were used of the same size as those in the work of 1930-1932, together with the
simplest means of supplying pressure, namely, the use of a tank of compressed nitrogen
gas on the rocket. The rockets were, at the same time, made as nearly streamline as pos-
sible without resorting to special means for forming the jacket or casing.
Pendulum Stabilizer
A pendulum stabilizer was used in the first of the new series of flights to test the
directing vanes, for the reason that such a stabilizer could be more easily constructed and
repaired than a gyroscope stabilizer, and would require very little adjustment. A pendu-
lum stabilizer could correct the flight for the first few hundred feet, where the accelera-
tion is small, but it would not be satisfactory where the acceleration is large, since the axis
of the pendulum extends in a direction which is the resultant of the acceleration of the
rocket and the acceleration of gravity, and is therefore inclined from the vertical as soon as
the rocket ceases to move in a vertical direction. The pendulum stabilizer, as was expected,
gave an indication of operating the vanes for the first few hundred feet, but not thereafter.
The rocket rose about 1000 feet continued in a horizontal direction for a dme, and finally
landed 11,000 feet from the tower, traveling at a velocity of over 700 miles per hour near
the end of the period of propulsion, as observed with the recording telescope.
Gyroscope Stabilizer
Inasmuch as control by a small gyroscope is the best as well as the lightest means of
operating the directing vanes, the action of the gyroscope being independent of the direc-
tion and acceleration of the rocket, a gyroscope having the necessary characteristics was
developed after numerous tests.
The gyroscope, shown in Plate 8, Fig. 1, was set to apply controlling force when the
axis of the rocket deviated 10 ° or more from the vertical. In the first flight of the present
series of tests with gyroscopic [9] control, on March 28, 1935, the rocket as viewed from
the 1000-foot shelter traveled first to the left and then to the right, thereafter describing a
smooth and rather flat trajectory. This result was encouraging, as it indicated the presence
of an actual stabilizing force of sufficient magnitude to turn the rocket back to a vertical
course. The greatest height in this flight was 4800 feet, the horizontal distance 13,000 feet,
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and the maximum speed 550 miles per hour.
In subsequent flights, with adjustments and improvements in the stabilizing arrange-
ments, the rockets have been stabilized up to the time propulsion ceased, the trajectory
being a smooth curve beyond this point. In the rockets so far used, the vanes have moved
only during the period of propulsion, but with a continuation of the supply of compressed
gas the vanes could evidently act against the slipstream of air as long as the rocket was in
motion in air of appreciable density. The oscillations each side of the vertical varied from
10 ° to 30 ° and occupied from 1 to 2 seconds. Inasmuch as the rockets started slowly, the
first few hundred feet of the flight reminded one of a fish swimming in a vertical direction.
The gyroscope and directing vanes were tested carefully before each flight, by inclining
and rotating the rocket while it was suspended from the 20-foot tower (Plate 8, Fig. 2).
The rocket is shown in the launching tower, ready for a flight, in the close-up (Plate 9,
Fig. 1) and also in Plate 9, Fig. 2, which shows the entire tower.
The behavior of the rocket in stabilized flight is shown in Plates 10 and 11, which are
enlarged from 16-ram motion-picture films of the flights. The time intervals are 1.0 sec-
ond for the first 5 seconds, and 0.5 second thereafter. The 60-foot tower from which the
rockets rise (Plate 9, Fig. 2) appears small in the first few of each set of motion pictures,
since the camera was 1000 feet away, at the shelter shown in Plate 6, Fig. 1. The continually
increasing speed of the rockets, with the accompanying steady roar, makes the flights very
impressive. In the two flights for which the moving pictures are shown, the rocket left a
smoke trail and had a small, intensely white flame issuing from the nozzle, which at times
nearly disappeared with no decrease in roar or propelling force. This smoke may be avoided
by varying the proportion of the fluids used in the rocket, but is of advantage in following
the path of the rocket. The occasional white flashes below the rocket, seen in the photo-
graphs are explosions of gasoline vapor in the air.
Plate 10 shows the flight of October 29, 1935, in which the rocket rose 4000 feet, and
Plate 11 shows the flight of May 31, 1935, in which the rocket rose 7500 feet. The oscilla-
tions from side to side, [10] above mentioned, are evident in the two sets of photographs.
These photographs also show the slow rise of the rocket from the launching tower, but do
not show the very great increase in speed that takes place a few seconds after leaving the
tower, for the reason that the motion picture camera followed the rockets in flight.
A lengthwise quadrant of the rocket casing was painted red in order to show to what
extent rotation about the long axis occurred in flight. Such rotation as was observed was
always slow, being at the rate of 20 to 60 seconds for one rotation.
As in the flights of 1930-1932 to study rocket performance in the air, no attempt was
made in the flights of 1934-1935 to reduce the weight of the rockets, which varied from
58 to 85 pounds. A reduction of weight would be useless before a vertical course of the
rocket could be maintained automatically. The speed of 700 miles per hour, although high,
was not as much as could be obtained by a light rocket, and the heights, also, were much
less than could be obtained by a light rocket of the same power.
It is worth mentioning that inasmuch as the delicate directional apparatus functioned
while their rockets were in flight, it would be possible to carry recording instruments on
the rocket without damage or changes in adjustment.
Further Development
The next step in the development of the liquid-propellant rocket is the reduction of
weight to a minimum. Some progress along this line has already been made. This work,
when completed, will be made the subject of a later report.
Conclusion
The chief accomplishments to date are the development of a combustion chamber,
or rocket motor, that is extremely light and powerful and can be used repeatedly, and of a
means of stabilization that operates automatically while the rocket is in flight.
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Document 1-10
Document title: H.E. Ross, "The B.I.S. Space-ship," Journal of the British Interplanetary
Society, 5 (January 1939), 4-9.
The British Interplanetary Society was formed in 1933. This article, by H.E. Ross, one
of the society's leaders, oudined the society's most important and well-known contribution
to spaceflight, a manned lunar mission. Casual meetings on the subject began in London,
leading to the formation of a Technical Committee in February 1937. The committee was
split into smaller task groups, including one assigned to conduct extremely crude propel-
lant tests. The result was a solid-propellant spaceship for carrying humans to the Moon
and returning them to Earth. Despite the proposal's reliance upon solid propulsion (the
committee, ignorant of yon Braun's ongoing secret research in Germany, had determined
that the pumps and cooling systems required for liquid propulsion were too complex and
expensive to develop), it effectively outlined the lunar mission conducted by the United
States thirty years later.
[4]
The B.I.S. Space-ship
by H. E. Ross
The B.I.S. space-ship design, as shown on the cover of this issue, is such a radical
departure from all previously conceived ideas of a space-ship that a full explanation is
called for.
In designing a space-ship the designer has a completely different problem to that
involved in the design of any other means of transport. A motor car, railway train, aeroplane
or ship consists basically of a vessel and a fuel tank, in the latter being placed the fuel
required for a journey or journeys. The shortest space-ship voyage, however, is the journey
to the Moon, and with the most optimistic estimates of the fuel energy and motor effi-
ciency the quantity of fuel required will still be such that the fuel tank would require to be
much larger than the rest of the ship. Consequently we must revert to the old system of
petrol cars, so designing our ship that the cans can be attached outside the ship and thrown
away when empty. The last condition does not mean that the cans are cheap--they are
actually precision engineering jobs, and horribly expensive--but the cost of the fuel needed
to bring them back would be even greater. We find by careful calculation that with the best
fuels and motors that we can afford it will require about 1,000 tonnes (metric ') of fuel to
take a 1 tonne [5] vessel to the moon and back, so our designers' problem has been to
design a 1 tonne space-ship with containers for 1,000 tonnes of fuel attached outside and
detachable.
The nature of rocket motors has also affected the design considerably. With such
motors as aero-engines a larger unit can be made lighter in proportion to its power than a
small unit, but in the case of rocket motors quite the reverse is the case; in tact the
1. A metric tonne is roughly equivalent to an English ton.
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proportionate weight of rocket motors rises so steeply that a motor of more than about
100,000 H.P. is hardly feasible, and as the lifting of the 1,000 tonnes at the start calls for
many millions of H.P. this requires a considerable number of small units. Again, since the
cost of the motors is less than the cost of the fuel required to bring them back, and as only
a few small motors will be required to land the one tonne ship on its return against over a
hundred large ones at the start, the motors are jettisoned after use.
For a maximum fuel economy, anything which is to be jettisoned should be jetti-
soned as soon as possible, and this has led to the cellular space-ship design, with hundreds
of small units each comprising a motor and its fuel tank, and each so attached that as soon
as it ceases to thrust it fails off. This early detachment ofail dead weight has resulted in an
enormous increase of efficiency over earlier designs, and has reduced the fuel required
for a return voyage to the moon from millions of tonnes to thousands of tonnes.
Owing to the large number of small units, it is possible to start a motor and run it till
its load of fuel is exhausted, controlling both thrust and direction by the rate at which
fresh tubes are fired. This makes it possible to use solid fuel for the main thrust, with
consequent considerable saving in weight, and giving the additional advantages that the
strength of the fuel helps to support the parts above and its high density makes the ship
very compact. Liquid fuel motors are, however, provide for stages requiring fine control,
and also steam jet motors for steering.
Diagram 2 (right) shows the spaceship as it reaches the moon. The approximately
hemispherical portion (to the downward pointing cone) is the life container. The portion
between the two cones contains the air-lock, air-conditioning plant, heavy stores, batteries
and liquid fuel and steam jet motors, etc. Below this are the solid fuel tubes for the return
voyage. The whole of the remainder of the vessel (diagrams 1 and 3, consists of the tubes
for the outward voyage, which have to be jettisoned by the time of arrival at the moon.
It will be seen that the streamlining is conspicuous by its absence. The form of the
ship has been largely dictated by other considerations, and as compared to the terrific
power needed to [6] lift the vessel out of the earth's gravitational field the total air resis-
tance is quite negligible (less than 1%), this does not matter greatly. The diameter of the
front of the ship is determined as being the smallest reasonable size for the life container.
(It should be noted that this design is for a very small space-ship, about the overall size of
a large barge. On larger ships this restriction will be somewhat modified). The diameter of
the rear of the ship is determined by the firing area required. Too small an area calls tbr
excessive pressures in the motors, and consequently excessively heavy construction. The
two diameters being approximately the same has led to the straight-sided form. An in-
crease in central diameter would mean improved streamlining, but this would only de-
crease the resistance below the velocity of sound, and this is only a small proportion of the
whole. On the other hand, the straight-sided form gives the greatest strength, which is of
major importance, and also serves to minimize frictional heating. The main body of the
space-ship, comprising the motor tubes, is hexagonal in shape; this form giving the closest
possible stacking of the tubes.
The form of the nose is intended not so much to reduce the resistance at low veloci-
ties, as to split the air at high velocities (several times the velocity of sound), so as to main-
tain a partial vacuum along the sides. The frontal paraboloidal portion, seen in diagrams
1, 2 and 3, is a reinforced ceramic carapace, capable of withstanding a temperature of
1500°C in air, and by its form the frictional heating is made a maximum on this portion
and minimized on the sides. The carapace (which, of course, has no portholes) is de-
tached once the vessel has got away from the earth.
The tubes are stacked in conical layers for greater structural stability, since, apart
from the vessel properwthe top portion--the whole strength lies in the tubes, and these
are not rigidly fixed together, but simply stacked and held in position by one-way bolts and
light webs.
The firing order of the tubes is in rings starting from outside and progressing in-
wards towards the center. While the motors are firing their thrust holds them in place;
when expended, the acceleration of the ship causes them to release from position and
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they drop off. Those in the inner rings of the bank not yet used do not position themselves
for release until their firing thrust carries them a fractional distance up the release bolts.
A light metal sheath embraces the outermost ring of tubes; this and the webs are discarded
when the whole of the previous bank of motors has been jettisoned.
Diagram 4 gives sections through the vessel at various levels and shows maximum
periphery of the carapace. The top half of the diagram represents a section through the
large motor tubes [7] stacked in banks A to E; these are used to obtain release from Earth.
The lower half of diagram 4 shows the medium and small tubes used for deceleration of
the moon (the ship, having been turned end to end, approaches stern first). Fine control
for the actual landing is provided by the vertical liquid fuel motors seen within the two
cones in diagram 2 and about the hexagon angles in diagram 5. The inner small tubes in
diagram 4 are shown in a section through two banks (ref. diagram 2), the lower of these
being used for control of deceleration when approaching the moon and the upper bank
(ref. diagram 2, right), being used for the return journey.
[8] Adjacent to the top of the liquid fuel motors (diagram 2), are shown four of the
tangential tubes. These are necessary in order to provide the crew with artificial gravita-
tion, which is achieved by rotating the ship (approximately 1 revolution in 3 _/2 seconds).
The g value desired is therefor under control of the crew. Not only is this artificial gravita-
tion considered a necessary precaution (the physical affect of long periods of non-gravita-
tion being at present unknown), but in any case haphazard rotation of the vessel would
almost certainly take place, making navigational observations impossible. Hence control
of rotation is essential. Again, before the moon landing can be attempted it is necessary to
stop rotation in order to prevent disaster to the ship when it touches ground.
It is not anticipated that the space-ship can be so accurately manoeuvred that its
landing will be without shock. Hydraulic shock absorber arms are therefor incorporated;
one of these being shown attached to the frame on the right hand side of diagram 2.
These are normally collapsed within the hull, and are extended just prior to landing.
The firing of the motor tubes is carried out by an automatic electrical selector sys-
tem, but manual control is used for navigational corrections. The ship, being in rotation,
is kept thrusting in the correct direction, but this does not prevent "wobble" if firing is not
equal on all sides. Manual control of stability is maintained during the first few seconds of
ascent, and after that a pendulum conductor automatically controls stability. The main
wiring cable to the tubes is led down a central column, provided at each band level with a
plug connection which brakes away when its purpose has been served and is then jetti-
soned.
The hemispherical front of the life-compartment (diagram 2 and 3), is of very light
nature; this being made possible on account of the protective carapace above. The seg-
mented carapace (diagram 8), is, of course, discarded after passing out of Earth's atmo-
sphere, and protection of the life-compartment shell is not [9] needed for the ascent from
Moon. The return into Earth's atmosphere will be done at low velocities, hence heating of
its shell will not be excessive.
Owing to the small scale of the diagrams it has not been possible to show many of the
filaments and accessories within the life-compartment, but the following can be noted.
Diagram 2 shows one of the seats for the crew of three. These can also be seen pointing
radially in diagram 6. The controls for firing are placed on the arms of the chairs, and the
chairs themselves move on rails around the life-compartment. The crew recline on these
chairs with their heads towards the center of the ship and a circular catwalk is provided for
them and around the circumference of the chamber (diagram 2 and 3).
For observation purposes ports are provided in the dome of the life compartment
(one shown in diagram 2 and twelve in diagram 7). Under the flange of the carapace, in
the rim of the floor of the life-compartment (diagram 1, 2, and 6) are the back-viewing
ports; these are covered during thrusting periods. Three forward-viewing ports in the top
of the life compartment shell are also provided, see diagram 2 and 7. It should be noted
that observation of direction cannot be made during the initial thrusting period in ascent
from Earth--it being impossible to see backwards through the tail-blast of the ship--the
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carapace prevents vision in other directions, and in any case the period is too short to
allow of stellar observations. Therefore navigation during this period must be clone en-
tirely by means of internal instruments, which consist of an altimeter, speedometer and
accelerometer. Another essential is, of course, a chronometer and gyroscope ensures main-
tenance of direction. A suspended pendulum provides indication of "wobble" and modi-
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fled sextants and rangefinders are used to determine position. These instruments are placed
in convenient juxtaposition to the crew. The cylindrical objects shown just above the cat-
walk, against the ports (diagram 2) are coelostats. These are synchronized, motor-driven
mirror devices something similar to a stroboscope, and it is by means of these that a sta-
tionary view of the heavens is provided for navigational observations while the ship is in
rotation. The girder structure in the center of the live-compartment is a support for the
light shell and also serves to carry navigation instruments. In diagram 1 beneath the cara-
pace and in diagram 6 can be seen the spidered outer and inner doors respectively of the
air-lock shown in diagram 5.
A launching device for this ship is necessary on its take-off from Earth, but, being
accessory to the ship and somewhat complicated, this will be discussed in a subsequent
issue of the Journal.
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Frank Malina was a Ph.D. student at Caltech in 1936 when he persuaded the
Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory, California Institute of Technology (GALCIT), to
develop a sounding rocket. He received support in this effort in part because the presi-
dent of Caltech, Robert A. Millikan, wanted to use rockets for cosmic ray research. In late
1936, a research team began experimenting with rocket engines in the canyons above the
Rose Bowl. The tests met with limited success. But by 1938, enough information had been
gathered for Malina and a colleague, AM.O. Smith, to publish GALCIT's first scholarly
paper on rocket research. The paper demonstrated that a rocket capable of taking a pay-
load up to 1,000 miles altitude could be developed.
(199] Flight Analysis of the Sounding Rocket
FrankJ. Malina and A. M. O, Smith, California Institute of Technology
Presented at the Aerodynamics Session, Sixth Annual Meeting, I.Ae.S.
January 26, 1938
Introduction
In attempting to reach altitudes above those obtainable by sounding balloons, the
rocket motor may be utilized to propel a suitable body. In this analysis a wingless shell of
revolution will be considered in vertical flight. It was felt that, before entering into practi-
cal experimentation, it was desirable to have a preliminary performance analysis based on
simplified assumptions, using the most recent data for air resistance at high speeds. As a
matter of fact, this analysis was completed without the knowledge of a similar investiga-
tion/ However, as this treatment is more general in discussing the influence of the design
parameters and more suitable for application to particular cases, the authors believe it is
worth while to present the analysis.
The equations of motion for flight in vacuo have been included to show the optimum
pertbrmance and for comparison purposes. Alter developing similar expressions for flight
with air resistance, a series of calculations was carried out using the method of step-by-step
integration. The dimensions of the rocket chosen were felt to be feasible for practical
1.Ley, Willy, and Schaefer, Herbert, LesFusees VolomesMeteorol%nques,L'Aerophile, Vol. 44, No. 10, p. 228-
232, October, 1936.
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construction. The motor efficiencies for the two cases were chosen to match closely the
reported results of R. H. Goddard 2and Eugene Stinger?
The calculations have not been extended to further cases, as the amount of labor
that would be required was not felt justified at the present time.
Assumptions and Notation
Throughout this analysis, the assumption will be made that the rocket motor sup-
plies a thrust of constant magnitude for the period of powered flight. This means that the
rate of flow of combustibles and the effective exhaust velocity remain constant. This as-
sumption is of a conservative nature, as theoretical considerations show that the thermal
efficiency of the rocket motor and, therefore, the thrust, will increase as the ratio between
chamber pressure and exhaust pressure increases.
It has been assumed that the acceleration due to gravity remains constant, This as-
sumption is also conservative.
The following notation has been used for the quantities involved:
I Weight,W
Direction 1 Inertia, _a
of !
Flight
_ Drag, D
¥
l Thrust, F
Fig. 1. Forces acting on a rocket in vertical flight.
F -_
m =
c =
wo--
W =
a o _
a _
g =
V =
V =
1
h =
t =
A =
thrust in lbs.
mass of exhaust gases flowing per second
F/m = effective exhaust velocity in fc/sec.
initial weight of rocket, lbs.
instantaneous weight of rocket, lbs.
weight of fuel and oxidizer carried, lbs.
Wm/W 0, rado of weight of fuel plus oxidizer to initial weight of rocket
initial acceleration, ft./sec?
instantaneous acceleration, ft./sec. _
acceleration of gravity, ft./sec?
instantaneous velocity, ft./sec.
velocity of sound, ft./sec.
altitude above sea level, ft.
time, sec.
largest cross-sectional area of rocket, sq. ft.
2.Africano, Alfred, RocketMotorEfficiencies,Astronautics, No. 34,p. 5,June, 1936.
3. Sftrtger,Eugen, NeuereErgebnissederRaketenflug_echnik,Flug, Special Publication No. 1,pp. 6-9,
December, 1934.
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D = drag due to air resistance, lbs.
o = air density ratio
Po = mass density of air at sea level
In Fig. 1 the forces acting on the rocket in vertical flight are shown.
Summing the forces:
Z Forces = 0 = F - W- D - (W/g)a
The thrust developed by the motor is expressed by
(1)
F = mc (2)
Then from Eqs. (1) and (2):
a = (me- W-D)g/W (3)
[200] If the rate of flow of combustibles is constant during powered flight, one can write:
W = W0 - mgt (4)
At the start of the flight,
W=Wo, a=ao, V=O,D=O
Then Eq. (3) becomes
(5)
ao= mc- Wog/W (6)
and
m = Woao+ g)/cg (7)
Eq. (3) can now be evaluated, using Eq. (4) and Eq. (7), and for the acceleration at
any instant
(ao+g) g D
a=-g4 t(ao +g ) Wo (8)1 t(a° +g) 1-
£ c
Flight in Vacuo
With no air resistance, the third term of Eq. (8) vanishes so that
dV (ao + _,)
a=m=-g+
at
c
Integrating Eq. (9) one has, for the velocity at any instant:
(9)
(10)
Integrating Eq. (10) one has, for the height at any instant:
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h=__gt2+ct+( c2 _ctllog[1 t(a°+g)l+vot+h o
_.ao +g ) c .
(11)
The maximum acceleration and maximum velocity will occur at the time that the
fuel is exhausted. The time at which thrust ceases is expressed, using Eq. (4), by the rela-
tion
(1-¢)W o =Wo-mgt p (12)
Introducing Eq. (7) into Eq. (12), one obtains, for the duration of powered flight:
tp = _c/(a o +g) (13)
If, at the start of the flight, Vo = 0 and ho = 0, then
a° +g (14)
amax = -g "_ c -
v.._. =-cILa0g-----_(++g tog (1-C,] (15/
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Fig. 2. Variation ofh . g/c _ with at g for various _ for flight in vacuo.
The maximum height reached will be the sum of the height at the time the fuel is
exhausted and the height resulting from coasting. The height resulting from coasting is
given by the expression:
h c = gmax. 2 / 2g (16)
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Adding this to Eq. ( 11 ) and evaluating t from Eq. (13), the maxinmm height reached is
hm_'_ = -_-{ [l°g (1-_')]22 v _'+ log (1- _')}(a0 / g) + 1 (17)
Eq. (17) shows that three parameters determine the rocket performance in vacuo.
They are a_, _', and c. In Fig. 2 the variation of h,g/? is plotted for various values of a flg
and 5. The importance of having a large percentage of combustibles is clearly shown. The
initial acceleration, a_, is important until values in the neighborhood of 6g are reached.
form
Flight through a Resisting Medium
Considering flight through the air, the drag of tile rocket can be expressed in the
D = poaV2CD A / 2 (18)
which, substituted in Eq. (8), gives
a = -g÷
1
(% +g) gpocrV 2 CDA
t(ao+g)c 2[1. t(ao-+g)]c W°
(19)
This is the fundamental equation for vertical rocket flight. In addition to the pertor-
mance parameters for flight in vacuo, the ratio C_A/W oalso has important significance in
the construction of the sounding rocket. As it appears in a term which reduces the accel-
eration of the rocket, it should be as small as possible. A rocket [201 ] of given initial weight
should have as small a cross-section as possible and be of a shape that minimizes the drag
coefficient.
5O
CDI40 I--,_
30 _,)!
20
10
00 .5 1.0 1.5 2.0 --_ 2.5
Vs
Fig. 3. Variation of the drag coefficient, Cp,with V/V.
As the density ratio, 6, and the drag coefficient, C,, will be subject to great changes
during flight, and are difficult to express accurately analytically two ways of solving Eq.
(19) are open. First, approximations can be made for the variation ofo and Co to make an
analytic solution possible, or second, a step-by-step method of integration of any degree of
accuracy can be applied. The first method is quite likely to lead to extremely large errors,
so that the second method has been chosen.
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The variation of a with height was obtained from references (4) and (5). The varia-
tion of CDwith the velocity of flight was taken from reference (6). It has been assumed, due
to the lack of information, that the drag of the rocket was identical to the drag of a shell
without a jet issuing at its base. The variation of the drag coefficient is reproduced from
reference (6) in Fig. 3.
To describe the rocket flight, the following equations were used in the numerical
calculations:
(a° +g) gP°a"V2"-I CDA (20)
1 tn(aO +g) 2 1
C
g n = gn_ 1 + an_lAt (21)
h n = hn_ 1 + V._ 1 At + (a._ 1 / 2)(At) 2 (22)
where
At = time interval under consideration
n = number of the interval in the rsteps of the calculation
The acceleration during coasting is given by
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Fig. 4. Rocket performance for flight with air resistance, using a motor giving an
effective exhaust velocity of 5000 ft./sec.
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where
F = weight of the empty rocket plus air resistance or
P°a"v2"- g
a c
" L 2(1-_) Wo j
(24)
In the following results to be presented, it was necessary to select dimensions of what
may be called a typical sounding rocket. Therefore, the results will apply only to rockets
having the same value of the ratio CoA/W o. For rockets with a different value of the ratio,
this analysis serves only as a guide to the performance to be expected.
In Fig. 4 are shown the performance curves of a rocket with c - 5000 ft./sec., _= 0.70,
and 120 = 30 ft./see?. The retarding influence of the air is made evident [202] by the
decrease in the acceleration as the velocity of sound is approached. The high density of
the air at the time the fuel was exhausted prevented the rocket from coasting very high.
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Max Shell DA- 75 Ft - /
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a 0 - 35 Ft/Sec' 6 Ft __ _V (Ft/Sec)
600,000 --¢_ 10,000/See 1 1,400
tp-25 _ Sec /
550,000 1,200
t
500,000 / 1,000
450,000 / SO0400,000 600
/
350,000 80 400
Fuel
- --/, / la (Ft/Sec')
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300.000 --_ g / ¢ . "_
200 000 ' 0 0
150,000 , - i; "- .40 -200
_ _0
Sound _ t ]_"_ I _'_',
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o ,'-_>_'1 i I ' -16o
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Fig. 5. Rocket performance for flight with air resistance, using a motor giving an
effective exhaust velocity of 10,000 ft./sec.
The performance curves shown in Fig. 5 are those for an identical rocket, but with a
much more efficient motor which gives an exhaust velocity, c, of 10,000 ft./see. For the
same amount of thrust, the rate of flow of combustible is much smaller, so that the period
of powered flight is greatly prolonged. This allows the rocket to get over the hump of the
drag curve, and also to travel through less dense air. The velocity at the end of the powered
flight will thus be much higher than before, causing the rocket to coast to a much higher
altitude.
In Fig. 6 the variation of altitude with the initial acceleration is shown for the two
cases. The importance of a high value of the exhaust velocity, c, is clearly e_4dent. This
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Fig. 6. Effect of a0 on altitude to be reached for several performance parameter
combinations.
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shows that effort should be directed to develop a motor of high efficiency before flight
attempts are made.
This figure also shows that there is a definite initial acceleration corresponding to
the maximum possible height. This differs from flight in vacuofor which the height reached
continually increases with the initial acceleration (see Fig. 2). A high velocity of flight
through the dense lower levels of the aunosphere causes the combustibles to be rapidly
"eaten up." The advantage to be gained by starting the rocket from a high point is shown
in the figure by the calculated height for a rocket started from an initial altitude of
10,000 ft.
The variation of maximum height to be reached with the exhaust velocity, c, for flight
in vacuo and in air, is shown in Fig. 7. This figure clearly illustrates the amount of height
lost due to resistance of the air.
Higher altitudes may be reached by using this step-rocket. A rocket made up of three
steps, respectively, of 600, 200, and 100 lbs., the lightest being fired last, with c of
10,000 ft./sec., a0of 40 ft./sec.2, and _for each step of 0.70, starting from sea level, reaches
a calculated altitude of 5,100,000 ft. and a maximum velocity of 11,000 m.p.h.
This analysis definitely shows that, if a rocket motor of high efficiency can be con-
structed, far greater altitudes can be reached than is possible by any other known means.
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Initially, Frank Malina started rocketry research in 1936 with the intention of lofting
scientific payloads to high altitudes. But by 1938 GALCIT started receiving money from
the National Academy of Sciences, at Army General Henry H. (Hap) Arnold's urging, to
develop rockets for assisting heavily-laden aircraft and seaplanes during takeoff. This ini-
tial military research later advanced, during World War II, to the study of rockets as weap-
ons of war. In 1943 GALCIT was renamed the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. This report to the
Army Air Forces, with a cover letter by Theodore yon K_rm_in, the director of GALCIT and
then JPL, concluded that the development of long-range rocket projectiles was feasible
and recommended their development at once. By this time, the Germans had already
developed and tested the V-2.
H.S. Tsien, the co-author of this secret report, was a Chinese national who was later
deported back to China, where he was instrumental in the development of the Chinese
ICBM program.
[ 1] Memorandum
on
The Possibilities of Long-Range Rocket Projects
by Th. von K_rm_m
Recent progress in the field of jet propulsion by the Air Corps Jet Propulsion Re-
search Project, the National Defense Research Committee and the Aerojet Engineering
Corporation indicates that the development of a long-range rocket projectile is within
engineering feasibility. During the past year reports reached this country crediting the
Germans with the possession of extremely large rocket projectiles capable of transmitted
to me by the Material Command, Experimental Engineering Division, for Study and
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Comment. Comments were submitted in a later dated August 2, 1943.
At the instance of Col W. H.Joiner, A.A.E Materiel Command Liaison Officer at the
California Institute of Technology, two of my associates, Drs. E J. Malina and H. S. Tsien,
prepared a preliminary review and analysis of performance and design of long-rang pro-
jectiles which constitutes the substance of this Memorandum. The results of this study
show that ranges in excess of 100 miles cannot be realized with propulsive equipment now
available in this country. However, with the equipment already developed for super-perfor-
mance of aircraft, rocket projectiles can be constructed which have a greater range and a
much larger explosive load than rocket projectiles currendy being used by the Armed
Forces. Furthermore, by developing a special type of propulsive [2] equipment of the
"athodyd" which utilizes atmospheric air, rangers comparable to those claimed by the Ger-
mans might be reached.
It is certain that the solution of the engineering problems connected with such a
special jet unit requires considerable time. On the other hand, a large amount of informa-
tion of immediate usefulness can be accumulated by experimentation with projectiles uti-
lizing aircraft super-performance equipment. The development program should consist
of the following coordinated phases:
First, firing tests of a projectile propelled by a restricted burning solid propellant
unit produced by the Aerojet Engineering Corporation and accelerated during launching
by unrestricted burning solid propellant rockets developed by the NDRC. This projectile
would weight approximately 350 Ibs and would carry a 50 lb explosive load for a distance
of about 10 miles. The firing tests would supply information on problems of launching,
stability and control, and for the verification of performance calculations.
Second, the design of a 2000 lb rocket projectile propelled by a liquid propellant jet
unit of the type developed by the Air CorpsJet Propulsion Research Project and manufac-
tured by the Aerojet Engineering Corporation. This projectile would carry an explosive
load of 200 lbs for approximately 12 miles. This phase should be started as soon as suffi-
cient information has been obtained from Phase I on the design of the projectile shape,
stabilization fins and launching technique. At this point the program under Phase I should
initiate experiments on the effect of adding wings to the projectile.
Third, it is desirable simultaneously with the first and second phases of projectile
development to make a study of the design and [3] characteristics of the "athodyd" type
propulsion unit. The "athodyd" or aero-thermodynamic duct jet unit is similar to other
thermal jet units that have been developed, with the exception that pressure in the com-
bustion chamber is obtained directly from the dynamic pressure of air resulting from the
velocity of flight. The "athodyd" is expected to be more efficient at flight velocities that
exceed the velocity of sound. The best means of investigating this type of unit would be to
make a ground installation in which tests would be carried out using a compressor unit
which is capable of blowing through a duct and combustion chamber system a consider-
able quantity of air. It appears that such compressor units could be made available in the
Los Angeles area. The development of the "athodyd" type unit is not only important of the
long range projectile but also has important implications in the general propulsion of
aircraft at very high speeds.
Fourth, upon obtaining design information from the first two phases on projectile
development and results of the special jet unit development program mentioned under
Phase 3, the design and construction of a projectile of 10,000 lbs weight or larger with a
range of the order of 75 miles would be undertaken.
It is believed that the projectiles developed in the first two phases would possess
immediate military usefulness which would justify the effort expended independently of
the general development program. Furthermore, the knowledge that would be obtained
on the behavior of wings and control surfaces at supersonic velocities would be most valu-
able to the designer of high speed aircraft and remotely controlled unmanned missiles. It
[4] is understood that missiles such as glide bombs now being developed will be equipped
with jet propulsion units. The studies described above will give important information on
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the possibilities of accelerating such devices up to and beyond sonic velocities, On the
other hand, the results collected from the ground launching tests will give important data
also for the case of launching rocket propelled devices from aircraft and from surface
vessels. In fact, the absence of recoil forces opens up a wide field for application of jet
propulsion units. The studies described above will give important information on the pos-
sibilities of accelerating such devices up to and beyond sonic velocities. On the other hand,
the results collected from the ground launching tests will give important data also for the
case of launching rocket propelled devices from aircraft and from surface vessels. In fact,
the absence of recoil forces opens up a wide field for application of jet propulsion to large
caliber and long range missiles.
[5] A Review and Preliminary Analysis
of Long-Range Rocket Projectiles
by H. S. Tsien and E J. Malina
I. Consideration of Various Jet Propulsion Methods
The propulsion of missiles or projectiles for military purposes has been the subject
of intensive development for many centuries. Perhaps the oldest method that does not
utilize muscular energy is that of rocket or jet propulsion. The propulsive force in jet
propulsion is obtained from the reaction of a high speed gaseous mass ejected from the
body to be propelled. The first jet propelled missiles used black powder for the generation
of a high pressure gas. Although the black powder rocket reached a fairly high state of
development, it was handicapped by incorre_zt design features and a propellant of low
energy content. Its use as a military weapon was discontinued during the middle of the
19th century.
During the last twenty-five years,jet propulsion has staged a comeback with the assis-
tance of new engineering knowledge and better propellants. Several jet propulsion
methods are available, each with its own advantages and limitations. The methods can be
divided into two main classes, characterized by independence or dependence on atmo-
spheric air.
These two classes can be further subdivided as follows:
Methods independent of atmospheric air
1. Solid propellant types
a. Unrestricted burning, short duration (0.01 to 2 seconds)
b. Restricted burning, long duration (5 to 60 seconds)
2. Liquid propellant types
a. Nitric acid type oxidizers (duration limited only by amount of propellant
carried) [6]
b. Liquid oxygen oxidizer (duration limited only by amount of propellant
carried)
Methods dependent on atmospheric air
3. Thermal jet propulsion types
a. Air compressor type
b. Aero-thermodynamic duct type
The salient points of the above types will now be discussed to support the analyses of
the long range rocket projectiles in the following parts of this Memorandum.
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1. Solid propellant types
a. Unrestricted burning, short duration jet units
The unrestricted burning solid propellant jet unit has been developed to a high
degree of perfection by the NDRC. This type uses a smokeless powder (ballistite) grain
which has a large burning surface. The jet unit is capable of delivering a high thrust for a
short period of time. Units have been tested that deliver as high as 100,000 lb thrust for a
very small fraction of a second. The duration is limited by the grain web thickness that can
practically be produced and the feasible dimensions of the jet unit.
The fact that this type of jet unit gives a high impulse in a very short time makes it
especially suitable for short range missiles such as the Bazooka shell, anti-aircraft rockets,
etc. The use of the unrestricted burning jet unit for projectiles whose range exceeds 7 or
8 miles does not appear practical because of the excessive impulse required. [7] The short
duration jet unit would become very large in cross section and also the initial acceleration
of the projectile would introduce difficult engineering problems. However, as will be pointed
out later, the use of the short duration rocket is required in launching a long range projec-
tile.
The general specifications of two short duration jet units developed by the NDRC
are listed in Table I.
b. Restricted burning, long duration jet units
The restricted burning solid propellant jet unit was developed by the Air Corps Jet
Propulsion Research Project at the California Institute of Technology especially for assist-
ing the take-off of aircraft. The development has been extended to production types by
the Aerojet Engineering Corporation. The units utilize an asphalt-base propellant charge
which burns on one surface only. The burning takes place in parallel layers perpendicular
to the axis of the jet unit. Jet units have been tested that deliver 1000 lb thrust for as long
as 45 seconds. Durations of this order of magnitude are near the maximum practically
attainable. Thrusts of between 2000 and 3000 lb are believed feasible.
The propellant developed for the restricted burning jet unit is not as effective as the
ballistite charges of the unrestricted burning units. At a chamber pressure of 2000 lb per
sq in, the former type gives an exhaust velocity of approximately 5500 ft per sec, whereas
the latter type gives approximately 6300 ft per sec. On the other hand, [8] the asphalt base
propellant is much less sensitive to ambient temperature changes, which is of prime im-
portance in assisted take-off applications and also in projectiles propelled over a large
fraction of their flight path.
The specifications of two Aerojet restricted burning solid propellant jet units are
listed in Table II, and a drawing is shown in Figure 1.
2. Liquid propellant types
a. Nitric acid type oxidizers
Liquid propellant type jet units that have reached the highest stage of development
utilize a propellant consisting of two components -- an oxidizer and a fuel. Single liquid
compounds exist which contain enough oxygen to sustain combustion; however, their in-
vestigation is in preliminary stages. The Germans are reported to have such a propellant.
The ACJP Project, the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics Project, and the Aerojet Engi-
neering Corporation have carried the development of a liquid propellant jet until utiliz-
ing nitric acid type oxidizers and fuels spontaneously ignitable with the oxidizers to a high
degree of reliability. The jet units have been developed primarily for assisting the take-off
of aircraft.
Jet units have been tested by the ACJP Project in which a single motor delivered
6000 lb thrust for 20 seconds, and a motor which delivered 1000 lb thrust for a continuous
period exceeding 5 minutes.
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[9] At the optimum propellant mixture ratio, and effective exhaustvelocity of 6000 ft per
sec can be expected at a chamber pressure of 300 psi abs and 6400 ft per sec at 500 psi abs.
The chamber pressure attained is controlled by the feed pressure applied to the propel-
lant components. Two methods are available for obtaining feed pressure -- compressed
gas and pumps. The proper choice of a feed system requires a detailed analysis of the
application in mind, and the only general rule that can be safely formulated states that for
durations exceeding one minute, the pump system is the lightest.
As mentioned above, effective exhaust velocities of the order of 6400 ft per sec can
be reached at chamber pressures around 500 psi abs. However, this velociw is obtained at
the price of increasing the feed pressure by 200 psi, which is likely to nullify the improved
propellant consumption by the additional weight required in the feed system.
The specifications of the Aerojet production unit 25 ALD-1000 and the Aerojet
X40ALJ-6000 unit, which has been designed but not built, together with estimates of a
4000 lb thrust 35 second unit, are listed in Table III. The estimates of the 4000 lb thrust
unit are believed to be too conservative and that the duration could be increased by
5 seconds by reducing the empty weight of the unit and increasing the propellant weight
carried. At the same time the diameter of the tanks could be reduced from 24 in to 20 in.
b, Liquid oxygen type oxidizer
Work with liquid oxygen in combination with various fuels [10] as a propellant for
liquid type jet units has been carried out by Goddard, the American Rocket Society, the
Navy Bureau of Aeronautics Project and the ACJP Project. The discussion in connection
with nitric acid type oxidizers in the preceding section holds when liquid oxygen is used
with the exceptions that will be noted.
Tests at the ACJP Project with the liquid oxygen-gasoline combination have shown
that effective exhaust velocities as high as 8500 ft per sec can be obtained at chamber
pressures around 500 psi abs as compared to 6400 ft per sec for the nitric acid oxidizer.
The design of a liquid oxygen-gasoline jet motor that can operate at the high combustion
temperatures attendant with high exhaust velocities has not as yet been satisfactorily ac-
complished.
The utilization of liquid oxygen in military projectiles is believed to be of doubtful
feasibility since it cannot be stored in closed containers because of its very low boiling
temperature.
3. Thermal Jet Propulsions Types
a. Air compressor type
The jet units so far discussed made use of a propellant whose oxidizer was :arried
within the body to be propelled. For that reason the propulsion did not depend on the
presence of atmospheric air, and operation could be maintained in empty space.
When flight is to be performed within the lower layers of the atmosphere, it does not
seem logical to carry an [11] oxidizer when oxygen is on all sides during the flight. How-
ever, it is unfortunate from the point of view of propulsion that the oxygen in air is only
available at such a low density and pressure.
Jet propulsion units have been developed that use the oxygen in air to burn a fuel.
In general, the thermal jet propulsion unit consists of the following components: an inlet
duct to a compressor, a compressor, a combustion chamber, a gas turbine, and an outlet
duct or nozzle. In the following section on the aero-thermodynamic duct jet unit it will be
shown that under certain conditions the dynamic pressure of air due to the motion of a
body can be utilized without the addition of a compressor and a gas turbine.
In the thermal jet propulsion unit the compressor is inserted in order to increase the
pressure in the combustion chamber and thus improve the thermod_lamic efficiency of
the unit at low flight velocities. After the air passes through the compressor, it enters the
combustion chamber where a fuel such as gasoline is injected. The fuel burns, and heats
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the air. The hot air at high pressure then drives the gas turbine which furnishes the power
for the compressor. The exhaust from the turbine, being still at a higher pressure than
that of the atmosphere, discharges through the nozzle and a net propulsive thrust is im-
parted to the body.
A number of systems similar to the one described have [12] been developed and
thrusts as high as 2700 lb have been obtained from thermaljet units. The thermal jet unit
is a complex heavy piece of machinery involving the use of a high speed compressor driven
by a gas turbine. It is believed that this type of propulsive unit is not at the present time
suitable for the propulsion of projectiles, even though the propellant consumption is 6 to
10 times lower than for jet units utilizing a liquid or solid oxidizer.
b. Aero-thermodynamic duct type (athodyd) (Ramjet)
If flight is to be carried out at velocities near and above the velocity of sound, it may
be possible to dispense with the necessity of a compressor in a thermal jet propulsion unit.
The Germans are reported to have developed a device of this type referred to as an
"athodyd." Pressure in a combustion chamber is obtained direcdy from the dynamic pres-
sure of air resulting from the velocity of flight. Air is taken in the forward end of the tube,
slowed down by means ofa diffusor before entering the combustion chamber, and permit-
ted to escape through a nozzle after its temperature has been raised by injecting fuel into
the combustion chamber.
There may be possibilities of installing such devices in large projectiles. Propulsion
from them is obtained after the projectile has reached a high velocity by some other form
of propulsion. In the part of this Memorandum on the reported German projectiles a
further discussion of the aero-theromo-dynamic duct will be made.
[13] II. Specifications and Performance of Two Projectiles
Using Available Jet Units
1. Specifications
Due to the novelty of the subject of long range rocket projectiles, it seems desirable
to work out a program of accelerated development starting with projectiles that can be
designed with available jet propulsion units. The problems of launching, stability and other
engineering problems can be studied with these projectiles. After an analysis of the avail-
able design information concerning both the solid propellant and the liquid propellant
units, it is concluded that the following two models of long range rocket projectiles are
within immediate possibility:
LRRP-I: (Fig 2) Solid Propellant
Initial weight 350 lb
Thrust 1150 lb
Propellant weight 130 lb
Empty Weight 220 lb
Explosive load 50 lb
Duration of thrust 20 sec
Maximum diameter 10 in
Length 81 in
LRRP-II: (Fig 3) Liquid Propellant
Initial weight 2000 lb
Thrust 4000 lb
Propellant weight 830 lb
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Empty Weight 970 lb
Explosive load 200 lb
Duration of thrust 35 sec
Maximum diameter 2 ft
Length 16 ft
2. Equations of Motion of a Rocket Projectile
For the calculation of performance of the projectile, the following assumptions are
made:
a. The resistance is always that of a projectile whose [14] axis is tangent to the trajectory.
b. The gravitational acceleration is a constant, invariant with altitude.
c. The density and temperature of the atmosphere are functions of the altitude as given by
Table IV according to the Standard Atmosphere.
For a satisfactorily stabilized projectile, the deviation of the axis of the projectile
from the tangent to the trajectory must be small. Furthermore, it is known that the in-
crease in air resistance due to small yaw is negligible. Therefore, the first assumption is
justified. The second assumption is quite accurate due to the small altitudes involved com-
pared with the radius of the earth.
If M is the mass of the projectile, v the velocity and 0 the inclination of the trajectory
at the time instant t, the equations of motion of the projectile are
MdV=F-D-Mg sing (1)
dt
My d® =-Mg cosQ (2)
dt
where g is the gravitational acceleration, F the thrust, and D the air resistance. The first
equation expresses the acceleration along the trajectory while the second equation ex-
presses the balance of centrifugal forces (Fig 4). For the time being, the projectile is as-
sumed to be without wings. The effect of the addition of wings will be considered in a later
paragraph. The value of F during the [15] powered flight is a constant, neglecting the
effect of reduction of atmospheric pressure on the operation of the rocket motor.
The air resistance D can be expressed as
D = lgo V2CD _d 2 (3)
£_ 4
where _ is the density, Co the drag coefficient and d the maximum diameter of the projec-
tile. The drag coefficient is a function of Mach number or the ratio of the flight velocity to
the velocity of sound at the altitude. Variations in the Reynolds' number or the variation in
the kinematical viscosity of air will also influence the drag coefficient, but this effect is not
large and will be neglected. The values of C_ for the projectiles concerned are given in the
Table V and plotted in Figure 5. These values are obtained by adding an appropriate amount
of skin friction to the resistance coefficient of a modern artillery shell. The additional skin
friction is necessary in order to account for the length of the rocket projectile and the tail fins.
During the powe.,'ed flight, those values of drag coefficient are conservative. This is
due to the fact that an appreciable fraction of the total resistance of an artillery shell
comes from the suction at the base of the shell. This suction is certainly absent during the
discharge of gases from the rocket motor. Hence the estimated drag coefficient of the
shell is too high for the powered flight.
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[16] Let: M0= the initial mass of the projectile
v0= the launching velocity of the projectile
@0= the launching angle of the projectile
= v / v 0 ratio of the flight velocity to the launching velocity
then Eq (2) can be integrated as
l+sin®_l+sin° 0 2g f dt
1-sin _- 1-sin---_0 e- v'_ j0 _- (4)
The equation gives the angle of inclination, if { is obtained as a function of time t. To
obtain the latter relation, Eq (1) has to be solved. That equation can be written in the
more convenient form as
d__ g
at Vo
l ( _ v2_a2r__£__1  o'o4
1 mtlMog [2 Mog
aCo¢ 2
- sin ®]
(5)
where m is the mass discharge of the rocket motor per second, and o is the ratio of the
densities at sea-level and at altitude _o/go 0 .
At the end of the powered flight, the thrust is zero, and the mass of the projectile is
M j, equal to the sum of the empty mass and the explosive mass. Therefore, Eq (5) reduces
to the following form for coasting
dA--_fo Ldt-_o\2 Mog
(6)
Eqs (4), (5), and (6) determine completely the performance of the projectile of the
launching conditions are given.
3. Performance without Wings
To obtain the performance, Eqs (4), (5), and (6) have to be integrated numerically;
assuming values for v0 and @0, the main results for the two models for long range rocket
projectiles are the following:
[17] LRRP-I: v0 = 160 ft/sec
@0 = 660
Range = 52,700 fl = 9.98 miles
Altitude reached = 18,200 ft
Velocity at end of powered flight = 1,623 ft/sec
LRRP-II: v 0 = 160 ft/sec
(_0 = 82°
Range = 61,600 ft = 11.66 miles
Altitude reached = 29,200 ft
Velocity at end of powered flight = 1,428 ft/sec
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Thedetailsof theperformancearegiveninTables\r[ andVII.Thisperformance
calculationisofcourseconservativeinthesensethatthelaunchingangles@,,arereason-
ablychosenbutnottheoptimum.It isinterestingtonoticethattheactualrangeduring
coastingisapproximately50%ofthetheoreticalcoastingdistancewithoutairresistance.
Thisfactwillbeusedin thenextsectionoftheMemorandum.
Thelaunchingangleisaveryhighcomparedwithordinaryartillerypractice.The
reasonisthatdueto therathersmalllaunchingvelocityoftheseprojectiles,thegravita-
tionalpullmakestheinitialpartofthetrajectoryhighlycurved.Ontheotherhand,in
ordertoextendthecoastingrange,theinclinationoftheprojectileatthebeginningof
coastingshouldbebetween30°and40°.Thisconditioncanonlybemetbyusingverylarge
launchingangles.ThetrajectoriesforthetwocasesinvestigatedareplottedinFigs6and7.
4.Performance with Wings
All the calculations made above are made under the assumption that the projectile is
without wings. The addition of wings produces a life force which is perpendicular to the
trajectory, a wing resistance along the trajectory and an aerodynamic moment. The lift
force (Fig 8) tends to balance the component of gravitational pull normal to the trajec-
tory. If the forces normal to the trajectory are completely [18] balanced, then the trajec-
tory will be a straight line. In general, the curvanture of the trajectory will be much smaller
than that without wings. This effect is beneficial in reaching altitude, as the arc length of
the trajectory that the projectile has to travel is smaller and hence the work done for a
given resistance is also smaller. However, the addition of wings does increase the drag of
the projectile, because of the added skin friction and the induced drag of the wings. There-
fore, these two effects tend to cancel each other and in absence of complete data for
airfoils at very high speeds, it is reasonable to assume that the maximum altitude reached
the distance covered up to the maximum altitude are approximately the same as those for
wingless projectiles.
After the maximum altitude is reached, the projectile will glide toward its target.
This part of the flight path can be approximated by a straight line with a slope equal to the
average value of the ratio between the drag force and the lift force. In subsonic flight, the
ratio is quite small due to the efficiency of the wing at lower velocities. A study of available
test data on airfoils in supersonic flow shows that this ratio is about 1:4. As an approxima-
tion then, the guide will be taken as straight line with a slope equal to 1:4. Then the range
estimate of winged projectiles with fundamental designs similar to LRRP-I and LRRP-II is
as follows:
LRRP-I-W
LRRP-II-W:
Range -- 19.7 miles
Range -- 28.8 miles
Thus the addition of wings to the projectile is capable of greatly extending the range
of the projectile. However, there are several disadvantages which must be considered. First
of all, the striking speed of the projectile is greatly reduced due to the extended coasting.
Secondly, the addition of wings involves also [ 19] an increase in structural weight of the
projectile and therefore a reduction in payload of a fixed initial gross weight. Finally, the
problem of stability and control is greatly complicated, which may require intensive study
and research.
[20] HI. General Performance Estimate and Related Problems
To study the possible development of the long range rocket projectile, a general
performance estimate has to be made. However, the problem is quite complicated and
involves many variables. To simplify the problem, a basic model of wingless projectile is
assumed and its performance is analyzed. Then by using the results obtained for this basic
model, the effect of the variation on propellant consumption is calculated approximately.
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The final result will be presented as the ratio of total impulse and initial weight plotted
against range for different values of propellant consumption.
1. Performance of a Basic Projectile
Take an improved design of the projectile as follows:
Initial weight
Maximum diameter
Length
Propellant consumption
Effective exhaust velocity
of rocket monitor
Launching velocity
= 10,000 lb
= 2.52 ft
-- 25.2 ft
= 5.03 lb/sec for 1,000 lb thrust
= 6400 ft/sec
= 160 ft/sec
The drag coefficient Co for this projectile is assumed to be slightly lower than that for
LRRP-I and LRRP-II due to improved design and reduction in skin friction at higher
Reynolds numbers. The values of Coare given in Table VIII and Fig 9.
Previous experience obtained in analyzing the performance of sounding rockets"
shows that the magnitude of acceleration during the powered flight does not influence
the range drastically. Therefore, for the convenience of calculation the acceleration will
be assumed to be constant and equal to twice the gravitational acceleration or 2g. In other
words,
[21] v = v0 +2gt (7)
Then the trajectory during the powered flight can be immediately deduced from
Eq (2). The horizontal distance x at the instant t is given by
x=V_° 4kll(_-l)-k2(_f_-l)+k_(tan-l"_-(-tan-a l-)l (8)
2g 13 T kj
where
k = _. 4 2 ) (9)
=v/v 0 = l+2gt (10)
v0
The altitude y at the instant t is given by
y= 2k'(_- 1)-2(_2-1)-2k4 log k2 +_ l
k2+l j (11)
These formulae determine the velocity and altitude at any instant t, and hence the
air resistance D. By denoting D / Mog by r.
,_ 2/_,2
1 ga0v0 -_-a
r = tyCn_ 2 -- 0.01516 cr CD¢ 2 (12)
2 Mog
then Eq (1) can be used to calculate the ratio of mass Mat the instant t and the initial mass,
34o.The result is
*EJ. "Malina and A. M. O. Smith, "FlightAnalysisof the Sounding Rocket." J. AE. Sc.,Vol,5. pp. 199-
202,(1938).
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M 1 e -_ l
M0=2 k_ 2(k2+ 1)4° eS° - r(k2+_)4°e_d_ (13)
(k2+_)40
The ratio _ of propellant discharged to the initial mass is of course . There-
M0
fore if c= effective exhaust velocity of the jet motor, the ratio _ of the total impulse up to
the instant t to the initial weight is given by
M c _c (seconds) (14)
£1 : (1-_'o) 3---_.2- 32.2
The result calculated for @0 = 78* is given in Table IX.
[22] In Table IX, the values of v, sin @, x, and y are given together with _. If the propul-
sion is stopped at the instant t, the projectile will coast with an initial velocity v and inclina-
tion @. The distance covered by coasting, neglecting air resistance can then be easily
determined. According to the analysis in Part II, the air resistance will reduce this distance
by 50%. By applying this reduction factor, the range of the projectile by stopping propul-
sion at various t can be calculated. Fig 10 shows the impulse ratio _ plotted against range.
This can be taken as an estimate of the performance of a long range rocket projectile.
This estimate is of course somewhat conservative as no attempt is made to the vary the
launching angel @0 to obtain its optimum value.
2. Performance at other Values of Propellant Consumption
If the propellant consumption is different from the value 5.03 lb/sec per 1000 lb
thrust, or the effective exhaust velocity c is different from 6400 ft/sec, then the mass at the
end of the powered flight will also be different assuming the same initial weight, accelera-
tion and duration of the thrust. Let f_, and 4, be the impulse ratio and fuel weight ratio
corresponding to c = q = 6400 ft/sec respectively, taken by Eq (14)
6400
_l = _'1_ (15)
32.2
C
f/= _32.2
Now if the projectile with exhaust velocity c has the same launching angle and accel-
eration as the basic projectile, the trajectory, the velocity and the inclination at the end of
powered flight will be the same. Hence the range obtained is also approximately the same.
However, the impulse ratio will be different. First of all the mass at the end of the powered
flight is now M 0 (1- _) instead of M 0 (1- _1)- The thrust towards the end of powered flight
is therefore Mo(1-_)(a+g sine) instead [23] of Mo(1-_l)(a+g sine) where a is the ac-
celeration along the trajectory. The difference is M0(._l-_)(a+g sin_. At the initial in-
stant, this difference does not exist as the initial mass is taken as the same. Hence if t is the
duration of powered flight the additional impulse necessary is approximately
1 1
_m0 (_- _)(a +g sin®)t. But g =_ a for the basic projectile, and sin °_< 1, hence the addi-
1 3
tional impulse is less than _ M o(_t - _)_ at = 0.75 M 0 (_1 - 5)(v_ - v 0) where v is the veloc-
ity at the end of powered flight. Vois much smaller than v therefore it can be neglected in
comparison with v c Then the impulse ratio can be written as
f_ = f_l +0.75(_1 - _') v_ 16
g
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Eqs (15) and (16) then given
1+0.75 vC
12 C 1 17
12_ 1+0.75v_
C
This relation can then be used to calculate the impulse weight ratio necessary for a
given range at various values of c. The result is plotted in Fig 10. An example of how to use
this chart will be given in Section III (4) of this memorandum.
3. Launching of the Projectile
In all the performance analyses carried out in the preceding sections, the launching
velocity of the projectile is assumed to be 160 ft/sec. This speed is chosen from the consider-
ation of stability. It is felt that for speeds lower then 160 ft/sec, the tail fins can hardly be
expected to give the necessary restoring force when the projectile is disturbed into a yaw. To
obtain this launching velocity and to aim the projectile a launcher is necessary. For quick
aiming of the projectile and easy transportation, [24] the length of the launcher should be
made as short as possible. This means that the projectile should be accelerated as quickly as
possible. Quick accelerations can be achieved by using a very large launching thrust. This
thrust, being of very short duration, can best be supplied by the unrestricted burning solid
propellant rocket.
If 34 ° is the mass of the projectile during the launching run, which can be assumed to
be constant, a the constant acceleration, Q0 the launching angle and v o the launching
velocity, then the thrust F ° required for launching is
F°=M°a+M°g sine0 (18)
But a = v02 / 2L where L is the length of the launching run,
Hence
(19)
The duration Tof the launching run is of course given by
L
T=2-- (20)
U o
Let L=25 ft, v o =160 ft/sec, the T = 0.312 sec, a = 15.9 Assuming M°= 1.2 M 0 and
sin (_o= 1 then
F°/Mog=20.3 (21)
In other words, the launching thrust should be approximately 20 times the weight of
the projectile at the beginning of flight. For LRRP-I, the thrust is then 7,000 lb while for
LRRP-II, this thrust is 40,000 lb. Thus, the unrestricted burning solid propellant rocket is
well suited for the launching purpose.
[25] A preliminary design for the LRRP-1 launcher is shown in Figs 11 and 12.
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4.Application of the Analysis
Fig 10 can be used to estimate the range of different projectiles of similar propor-
tions to the basic projectile of 10,000 lb initial weight. For instance, if the effective exhaust
velocity c is 6400 ft/sec, then with a propellant weight 62% of the initial weight, Eq (15)
gives f_ =123.2. By using the curve in Fig 10 labeled c = 6400 ft/sec, the range is deter-
mined as 57.5 miles.
This value of propellant weight is rather high and may be difficult to achieve m a
practical construction. To obtain a range in excess of 100 miles, it may be necessary to
reduce the propellant consumption or to increase the effective exhaust velocity. With an
exhaust velocity c = 9600 ft/sec, a 100 mile range requires f_ = 152 according to Fig 10.
The propellant weight is then only 51% of the initial weight. This may well be within the
realm of possibility.
The launching thrust for such a projectile is, according to Eq (21) about 200,000 lbs.
The time duration of launching run is 0.312 sec and length 25 ft.
5. The Effect of Wings
The addition of wings to the projectile can greatly reduce the guide angle during the
coasting flight of the projectile as discussed in Part III. If sufficient wing area is added, the
range can be extended by as much as 100%. However, as stated in Part III there are several
disadvantages to this practice. The main objections are the reduction in striking speed of
the projectile and the increase in structural weight. It then seems that the compromise
solution would be the addition of a stub wing to the projectile. The range can then be
extended by approximately [26] 50% of that without wings, and at the same time the
striking velocity and low structural weight can be maintained.
Another possible solution is to drop the wings at an altitude of about 20,000 ft; after
the major portion of coasting flight is completed. This can be accomplished by a time fuse
or relay which acts automatically at predetermined time. After dropping the wings, the
projectile gains speed rapidly and thus will be able to strike the target with necessary veloci_'
6. Stability and Control
For the wingless projectile, the problem of stability is relatively well-known. The ex-
perience and knowledge gained in bomb design and in the design of short range rocket
projectiles can be immediately utilized. If the projectile is launched with a sufficient veloc-
ity for the fins to act, it is believed that the projectile will be inherently stable and the
stability problem in connection with optimum fin design can be solved within a reasonably
short time by a series of firing tests.
In the case of winged projectiles remote control might especially be required in ap-
plications in which a small evasive target is to be attacked. It is understood that both the
Army Air Forces and the Navy are investigating control methods and devices and full col-
laboration with the groups concerned with this problem would be highly desirable.
The problem of stability and control for a winged projectile is believed to be much
more difficult due to lack of knowledge and experience on wing design for supersonic
speeds. A carefully laid program is necessary for a coordinated investigation of wings by
both theoretical analysis and experimental observations.
[27] IV. Analysis of Information Available on
the German Long-Range Rocket Projectile
In this part an attempt is made to reconstruct the German long range rocket projec-
tile on the basis of prisoner of war reports contained in the following British Intelligence
reports: A.I. (K) Report No. 184A/1943, A.I. (K) Report No. 227A/1943, and A.I. (K)
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Report No. 246B/1943. Upon reconstructing the LRRP an analysis of performance is made
along the lines discussed in Part III of this Memorandum.
In Table X the specifications of the LRRP as given by various prisoners of war are
listed.
In addition to the data in Table X the following information on the propulsive meth-
ods utilized is given:
(i) Projectile propelled by athodyds or rockets or combination of both. When the
rocket is nearly burnt out a fuse ignites the burner in the athodyds.
(ii) Around the circumference of the rocket container there are a number of rear-
ward - firing jets, probably six, which function from 10 to 70 seconds according to setting.
When they have burned out, the propulsion of the projectile is taken over by the athodyds
and the rocket portion falls off in one piece.
(iii) In one flight rockets burned for 18 or 19 seconds and the rocket - container
became detached after the projectile had traveled a distance of about 9.3 miles.
(iv) The speed of the rocket gases is about 11.500 ft/sec and the athodyds take over
propulsion when the projectile reaches a speed of 3280 ft/sec, with an initial acceleration
of 8g.
[28] (v) When the athodyds cease functioning the projectile would have reached a speed
of 6500 to 9200 ft/sec and the projectile would have covered half its course.
(vi) The athodyds were said to consume about 125 liters of fuel per second and to
have an initial efficiency of 65%, rising to a terminal efficiency of 68 to 70%.
(vii) The pressure in the combustion chambers is between 80 and 100 atmospheres
and the maximum temperatures probably of the order of 3,400 to 3,800 ° C. To prevent
overheating of the combustion chambers the nozzles are made to function alternately in
two sets of three, so that while one set of three is propelling the projectile, the other set is
cooling off.
(viii) The combustion chambers are cooled by means of an air jacket with the intake
in front and the venting rearwards. It is claimed that this jacket reduces the efficiency of
the athodyds only by some 4%.
(ix) The combustion chambers on the projectile were ellipsoidal. There were six
athodyds, each of which was housed in a cylinder, and the six cylinders in turn were filled
into a larger cylinder which exactly fitted the rear portion of the projectile.
(x) The fuel reservoir extended down the center of the projectile between the athodyd
housings.
A drawing of the projectile made by one of the prisoners of war is reproduced in Fig 13.
The following information is given on the fuel utilized:
(i) The new fuel looks like water, and the specific gravity of its various modifications
varies between 0.5 and 0.7; it burns without the addition of oxygen to CO_ and H20, and its
heat of combustion is 43,600 Btu per lb, most of which is heat of [29] decomposition.
(ii) The new fuel is slightly yellowish in color, and is translucent. The specific gravity
is thought to be 0.92.
(iii) Its general formula is C H_0sx and ifa benzene ring is considered as monoplanar
the first step in the synthesis is to interlock three such rings mutually at right angles and to
substitute oxygen as necessary.
(iv) The lowest calorific content of the fuel is 63,000 Btu per pound.
(v) The rocket attachment is the athodyd--propelled projectile is provided with a
normal propellant in solid form, but the athodyds in the main portion of the projectile are
fed by the new fuel in liquid form.
From the information above the following specifications will be chosen for the Ger-
man projectile and then its performance estimated.
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Initial weight, lb
Athodyd propellent weight, 1b
Booster rocket section, lb
Weight of projectile after booster
rocket section dropped, lb
Explosive load, lb (10% of above)
Diameter, ft
Length, ft
Initial acceleration, ft/sec 2
132,000
33,000
55,000
77,000
7,700
7.5
20
36
If we assume that the projectile is launched at an initial velocity of 160 ft per _ec the
launching run required is
_= 1602 =356L = v° Ft, say 350 Ft
2a 2x36
[30] This value checks with the size of launching pit described by the prisoners of war.
The initial thrust required can be calculated from the equation Eq (19)
v 2
o o 0
V =M (_+g sinG0)
Let us assume that Go = 90° so that sin Q0 = 1, then
Fo = 132,000( 160 _ +32.2)=282,000 lbs.
32.2 2x350
If six solid propellant rockets are used as boosters then each rocket must deliver
47,000 lb. The exhaust velocity of the rockets is said to be 11,500 ft per sec, and the rockets
act for a period of 10 to 70 seconds. Let us assume that they act for 20 seconds, then the
weight of propellant in the rockets will be
F o
W = r -g t = 282000 x32.2 x 20 = 15,800 lbs.
c 11,500
If the rockets act for 60 seconds then the propellant weight would be
W=15,000 x 3 = 47,000 lbs.
One of the prisoners of war states that the booster rockets, which are dropped when
the rockets cease, weights 55,000 lb. This would check with the above calculation for a
duration of 60 seconds. However, it is believed that an exhaust velocity of 11,500 ft per sec
is excessive and a more probable value is 6,500 ft per sec. On this basis for a 20 second
duration
W = 282,000 x32.2x20 = 28,000 Ibs.
6,500
If one half of the weight of the booster rockets is in the form of propellant the value
of 55,000 lb checks with the 2 x 28,000 = 56,000 lb very well. This will be used for later
calculations.
[31] It will therefore be assumed that there are six solid propellant rockets each deliver-
ing 47,400 lb thrust for 20 seconds. At this point it should be a noted that a solid propel-
lant rocket that delivers 47,400 lb thrust with an exhaust velocity of 6,500 ft per sec would
have a diameter of 4.25 ft if the density of the propellant is 100 lb per cu ft and its rate of
burning 2 in per sec.
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The athodyds are said to take over propulsion when the rocket container drops off.
If the athodyds deliver a thrust to give the same ratio of thrust to initial projectile weight as
the rockets then their thrust is
282,000 x 77,000
F = - 165,000 lbs.
132,000
If there are six athodyds then each athodyd must deliver 27,500 lb thrust.
The athodyds are said to consume about 125 liters of fuel per second. If the density is
0.92 then this corresponds to 250 lb per sec. It is not stated if all six or each one consumes
this amount of fuel. If all consume this amount then the effective exhaust velocity based
on the fuel above is
165,000 ×32. 2
c = = 21,300 Ft / sec.
250
This value of effective exhaust velocity is believed to be too high. A reasonable esti-
mate shows that c is probably around 12,000 ft/sec. By assuming the same fuel consump-
tion as before the thrust of the athodyds becomes 93,000 lbs. If the total weight of the
propellant is 33,000 lbs, the duration would be 33,000/250 = 132 seconds.
Then impulse imparted to the projectile by the athodyds is then 93,000 × 132 =
12,270,000 lb sec. The impulse imparted to the projectile, excluding the booster rockets,
after the launching run is then 282,000 × 77,000/132,000 × 10 = 1,643,000 lb sec. The total
impulse imparted to [32] the projectile alone after the launching run is then 12,270,000 +
1,643,000 -- 13,910,000 lb sec. The impulse weight ratio U2 is then 13,910,000/77,000 =
180.6. By using Fig 10 the ragne is estimated to be 140 to 150 miles, This checks very
closely with the information given by the prisoners of war.
From the above analysis, a summary of the data for the German long range rocket
projectile is given in Table XI. The velocities are estimated from the thrust data and are, of
course, only a rough approximation.
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[33] Table I
Jet Unit NDRC-CIT 3A NDRC Budd 4.5"
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Ave. Thrust, 1 b 2,000 6,000
Duration, sec 0.90 0.18
Impulse, lb sec 1,800 1,080
Eft. exhaust velocity, ft/sec 6,300 6,700
Propellant weight, lb 8.5 4.8
Motor weight (full), lb 41.5 30
Motor length, in 40.0 23.25
Motor 0. D., in 3.25 4.5
Table II
Jet Unit Aerojet Aerojet
X20AS-1000 X30AS-1000
Ave. Thrust, lb 1,000 1,000
Duration, sec 20 30
Impulse, lb sec 23,000 34,500
Eff. exhaust velocity, ft/sec 5,500 5,500
Propellant weight, lb 130 195
Motor weight (full), lb 270 385
Motor length, in 56.5 73.5
Motor O.D., in 9.625 9.625
Table III
Jet Unit Aerojet Aerojet
25ALD-1000 X40ALJ-6000
Estimated
Projectile
4000 lb-Thrust
30 sec Unit
Ave. Thrust, lb 1,000 6,000 4,000
Duration, sec 25 40 35
Impulse, lb sec 28,000 240,000 140,000
Eft. exhaust velocity, ft/sec 5,500 5,800 5,800
Propellant and nitrogen wt., lb 173 1,500 830
Jet unit weight (full), lb 420 2,900 1,700
Length of unit, in 69.0 104 144
Diameter of unit, in -- -- 24
Max. width, in 22.5 38
Max. height, in 24.0 47
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Table IV
Altitude Temp. Vel. of Sound Pressure Density
Ft. °E abs ft/sec Ratio Ratio
0 519.0 1120 1.0000 1.0000
1000 515.4 1116 .9643 .9710
2000 511.8 1112 .9297 .9428
3000 508.4 1109 .8962 .9151
4000 504.8 1105 .8636 .8881
5000 501.2 1101 .8320 .8616
6000 497.6 1097 .8013 .8358
7000 494.0 1093 .7716 .8106
8000 490.6 1089 .7426 .7859
9000 487.0 1085 .7147 .7618
10000 483.4 1081 .6876 .7364
11000 479.8 1077 .6613 .7154
12000 476.2 1073 .6366 .6931
13000 472.6 1069 .6112 6712
14000 469.1 1065 .5874 .6499
15000 465.5 1061 ,5642 ..6291
16000 461.9 1057 .5418 .6088
17000 458.3 1053 .5201 .5891
18000 454.7 1048 .4992 .5693
19000 451.3 1044 .4789 .5509
20000 447.7 1040 .4593 .5327
21000 444.1 1036 .4404 .5148
22000 440.5 1032 .4221 .4974
23000 436.9 1028 .4045 .4805
24000 433.5 1023 .3874 .4640
25000 429.9 1019 .3709 .4480
26000 426.3 1015 .3550 .4323
27000 422.7 1011 .3396 .4171
28000 419.1 1007 .3249 .4023
29000 415.5 1002 .3105 .3879
30000 412.1 997.9 .2968 .3740
31000 408.5 993,5 .2836 .3603
32000 404.9 989.1 .2708 .3472
33000 401.3 984.7 .2584 .3343
34000 397.7 980.3 .2466 ,3218
35000 394.3 976.1 .2351 .3098
36000 393.0 974.5 .2242 .2962
37000 393.0 974.5 .2137 .2824
38000 393.0 974.5 .2038 .2692
39000 393.0 974.5 .1942 .2566
40000 393.0 974.5 .1851 .2447
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[35]
Altitude Temp. Vel. of Sound Pressure Density
Ft. °E abs ft/sec Ratio Ratio
41000 393.0 974.5 .1766 .2332
42000 393.0 974.5 .1683 .2224
43000 393.0 974.5 .1605 .2120
43000 393.0 974.5 .1530 .2121
45000 393.0 974.5 .1458 .1926
46000 393.0 974.5 .1391 .1837
47000 393.0 974.5 .1325 .1751
48000 393.0 974.5 .1264 .1669
49000 393.0 974.5 .1205 .1591
50000 393.0 974.5 .1149 .1517
51000 393.0 974.5 .1095 .1446
52000 393.0 974.5 .1044 .1379
53000 393.0 974.5 .09953 .1315
54000 393.0 974.5 .09489 .1254
55000 393.0 974.5 .09047 .1195
56000 393.0 974.5 .08625 .1139
57000 393.0 974.5 .08222 .1086
58000 393.0 974.5 .07839 .1036
59000 393.0 974.5 .07474 .09872
60000 393.0 974.5 .07125 .09412
61000 393.0 974.5 .06793 .08974
62000 393.0 974.5 .06476 .08555
63000 393.0 974.5 .06174 .08155
64000 393.0 974.5 .05886 .07775
65000 393.0 974.5 .05612 .07413
66000 393.0 974.5 .05350 .07067
67000 393.0 974.5 .05100 .06737
68000 393.0 974.5 .04862 .06422
69000 393.0 974.5 .04636 .06123
70000 393.0 974.5 .04420 .05838
71000 393.0 974.5 .04345 .05739
72000 393.0 974.5 .04017 .05306
73000 393.0 974.5 .03829 .05058
74000 393.0 974.5 .03651 .04823
75000 393.0 974.5 .03480 .04597
76000 393.0 974.5 .03318 .04383
77000 393.0 974.5 .03163 .04178
78000 393.0 974.5 .03016 .03984
79000 393.0 974.5 .02875 .03798
80000 393.0 974.5 .02741 .03621
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Altitude Temp. Vel. of Sound Pressure Density
Ft. °E abs ft/sec Ratio Ratio
81000 393.0 974.5 .02613 .03452
82000 393.0 974.5 .02491 .03291
83000 393.0 974.5 .02375 .03160
84000 393.0 974.5 .02265 .02991
85000 393.0 974.5 .02159 .02852
86000 393.0 974.5 .02058 .02719
87000 393.0 974.5 .01962 .02592
88000 393.0 974.5 .01871 .02471
89000 393.0 974.5 .01783 .02356
90000 393.0 974.5 .01700 .02246
91000 393.0 974.5 .01621 .02141
92000 393.0 974.5 .01545 .02041
93000 393.0 974.5 .01473 .01946
94000 393.0 974.5 .01405 .01855
95000 393.0 974.5 .01339 .01769
96000 393.0 974.5 .01277 .01686
97000 393.0 974.5 .01217 .01608
98000 393.0 974.5 .01160 .01533
99000 393.0 974.5 .01106 .01461
100000 393.0 974.5 .01055 .01393
101000 393.0 974.5 .01005 .01328
102000 393.0 974.5 ,009585 .01266
103000 393.0 974.5 .009138 .01207
104000 393.0 974.5 .008712 .01151
105000 393.0 974.5 .008306 .01097
106000 393.0 974.5 .007919 .01046
107000 393.0 974.5 .007549 .009972
108000 393.0 974.5 .007197 .009507
109000 393.0 974.5 .006862 .009064
110000 393.0 974.5 .006541 .008641
111000 393.0 974.5 .006236 .008238
112000 393.0 974.5 .005946 .007854
113000 393.0 974.5 .005668 .007488
114000 393.0 974.5 .005404 .007138
115000 393.0 974.5 .005152 .006805
116000 393.0 974.5 .004912 .006488
117000 393.0 974.5 .004683 .006185
118000 393.0 974.5 .004464 .005897
119000 393.0 974.5 .004256 .005622
120000 393.0 974.5 .004058 .005360
121000 393.0 974.5 .003868 .005110
122000 393.0 974.5 .003688 .004871
123000 393.0 974.5 .003516 .004644
124000 393.0 974.5 .003352 .004428
125000 393.0 974.5 .003196 .004221
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[37] Table V
Drag Coefficient C for LRRP-I & LRRP-II
Mach Number, v/v Drag Coefficient, C,,
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0 0.3636
0.25 0.3568
0.50 0.3317
0.75 0.2974
0.95 0.3889
1.00 0.5354
1.10 0.5444
1.50 0A910
2.00 0.4274
2.50 0.3944
3.00 0.3684
3.50 0.3434
4.0O 0.3224
[38] Table VI
Performance of LRRP-I
Launching Velocity vo, ft/sec
Launching Aalgle
m/Mo_ sec
F/M°g
2 _ov24d'e / Mog
Altitude at end of Powered Flight, ft
Distance at end of Powered Flight, ft
Velocity at end of Powered Flight, ft/sec
Inclination of Trajectory at end of Powered Flight
Maximum Altitude reached, ft
Range, ft
Distance Covered by Coasting, ft
Distance Covered by Coasting, No Air Resistance, ft
Ratio of Coasting Distance with and without Air-
Resistance
160
66 °
0.01856
3.288
0.05225
12,063
14,340
1,623
31.2 °
18,200
52,700
38,360
88,700
0.433
174
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Table VII
Performance of LRRP4I
Launching Velocity v0, ft/sec 160
Launching Angle, 82 °
m/Mo_ sec "_ 0.01185
F/M°g 2.000
l _ov_ _d_ / Mog 0.0478
2 "4
Altitude at end of Powered Flight, ft 21,606
Distance at end of Powered Flight, ft 17,190
Velocity at end of Powered Flight, ft/sec 1,428
Inclination at end of Powered Flight 37.0 °
Maximum Altitude reached, ft 29,200
Range, ft 61,600
Distance covered by Coasting, ft 43,410
Distance covered by Coasting, No Air Resistance, ft 82,100
Ratio of Coasting Distance with and without Air 0.528
Resistance
[40] Table VIII
Drag Coefficient C D for the Basic Projectile
Mach Number, v/v, Drag Coefficient, C D
0 0.3353
0.25 0.3285
0.50 0.3034
0.75 0.2691
0.95 0.3606
1.00 0.5071
1.10 0.5161
1.50 0.4627
2.00 0.3991
2.50 0.3661
3.00 0.3401
3.50 0.3151
4.00 0.2941
[41]
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TableIX
PerformanceoftheBasicProjectile
vo = 160 ft/sec
@o = 78°
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t,sec x, ft y, ft vc, _ sin@ cos@ Range,
ft/sec Miles
39.75 79,470 80,490 2720 118.9 0.580 0.815 43.3
44.72 87,520 86,050 3040 121.4 0.567 0.823 50.7
49.69 95,810 91,770 3360 123.8 0.553 0.833 58.5
54.66 104,700 97,510 3680 126.2 0.540 0.841 67.0
59.63 113,930 103,330 4000 128.5 0.5275 0.849 75.9
64.60 123,580 109,270 4320 130.7 0.5185 0.855 85.5
69.57 133,670 115,210 4640 133.0 0.502 0.865 95.2
74.53 144,270 121,250 4960 135.0 0.490 0.872 105.1
[42]
Initial
Wt.
lb
220,000
132,000
132,000
Prop. ExpIo-
Wt. five
lb lb
Table X
Max, Length Flight Range
Dia Speed
ft ft ft/sec miles
Initial Rocket Rocket Rocket Launchin
Accel Container Container Container DitL_nce
ft/sec t Wt,, Ib Dia.. ft Length, ft ft
33,000 8.2 16.4 - 3280 310 36.0
19.6
33,000 155 257.6 55,000 9.8- 13.1 394
8G 11.5 (pit)
308 19.8 125
7.4 6560 125 257.6
(Ave.) 8G
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[43] Table XI
Estimated Performance of a German Long Range Rocket Projectile
Items Magnitude
Initial Weight, lb 132,000
Rocket Booster Weight, lb 55,000
Projectile Weight, Booster Rejected, lb 77,000
Rocket Propellant Weight, lb 28,000
Athodyd Propellant Weight, lb 33,000
Effective Exhaust Velocity of Rockets, ft/sec 6,500
Effective Exhaust Velocity of Athodyd, ft/sec 12,000
Duration of Rockets, sec 20
Duraction of Athodyds, sec 132
Launching Velocity, ft/sec 160
Velocity at Instant of Rejection of Rockets, ft/sec 800
Maximum Velocity of Projectile, ft/sec 6000
Distance Travelled before Rocket Rejection, miles 1.8
Range, Miles 145
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Document title: The Editors of Collier's, "What Are We Waiting For?," and Dr. Wernher von
Braun, "Crossing the Last Frontier," Collier's, March 22, 1952, pp. 23-29, 27-73.
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Document rifle: Dr. Wernher yon Braun, "Man on the Moon: The Journey," CoUier's, Octo-
ber 18, 1952, pp. 52-59.
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Document title: Dr. Fred L. Whipple, "Is There Life on Mars?," Collier's, April 30, 1954, p. 21.
Document 1-16
Document title: Dr. Wernher von Braun with Cornelius Ryan, "Can We Get to Mars?,"
Collier's, April 30, 1954, pp. 22-29.
Collier's was a popular, family-oriented information magazine similar to Life and The
Saturday Evening Post. Such magazines flourished in the post-war period until the advent of
television and at its peak, Collier's had a circulation of over 3 million. On Columbus Day
1951, a Space Travel Symposium was held at the Hayden Planetarium of the New York,
Museum of Natural History. The event had been organized by Willy Ley, a German emigr6
and author of the 1949 best-selling book, The Conquest of Space. Two journalists from CoUier's
were present at the symposium and notified their managing editor, Gordon Manning,
about what was discussed there. His interest piqued, Manning sent associate editor Cornelius
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RyantoaconferenceonspacemedicineheldinSanAntonio,Texas,inNovember1951.
AftertalkingtoWernhervonBraun,FredWhipple,andJosephKaplanattheconference,
Ryanbecameenthusiasticabouttheprospectsofspacetravel.RyanconvincedManningto
holdaninternalCoUier's symposium on the subject. Based on this internal symposium, a
series of eight feature articles appeared in the magazine from 1952 to 1954. The articles
were authored by noted experts such as von Braun,James Van Allen, Fred Whipple, Fritz
Haber, and Joseph Kaplan. The articles were accompanied by illustrations by Chesley
Bonestell, who had illustrated Ley's book, as well as by Fred Freeman and Rolf Klep.
These articles were the first to be published in a mainstream publication exposing
the American public to the details of space exploration. They later led to a series of Disney
animated films on the same subject and contributed to the popular historical image of
space exploration.
Document 1-13
[23] What Are We Waiting For?
On the following pages Collier's presents what may be one of the most important
scientific symposiums ever published by an national magazine. It is the story of the inevita-
bility of man's conquest of space.
What you will read is not science fiction. It is serious fact. Moreover, it is an urgent
warning that the U.S. must immediately embark on a long-range development program to
secure for the West "space superiority." If we do not, somebody else will. That somebody
else very probably would be the Soviet Union.
The scientists of the Soviet Union, like those of the U.S., have reached the conclu-
sion that it is now possible to establish an artificial satellite or "space station" in which man
can live and work far beyond the earth's atmosphere. In the past it has been correctly said
that the first nation to do this will control the earth. And it is too much to assume that
Moscow's military planners have overlooked the military potentialities of such an instru-
ment.
A ruthless foe established on a space station could actually subjugate the peoples of
the world. Sweeping around the earth in a fixed orbit. Like a second moon, this man-made
island in the heavens could be used as a platform from which to launch guided missiles.
Armed with atomic war heads, radar-controlled projectiles could be aimed at any target on
the earth's surface with devastating accuracy.
Furthermore, because of the enormous speeds and relatively small size, it would be
almost impossible to intercept them. In other words: whoever is the first to build a station
in space can prevent any other nation from doing likewise.
We know that the Soviet Union, like the U.S., has an extensive guided missile and
rocket program under way. Recently, however the Soviets, intimated that they were investi-
gating the development of huge rockets capable of leaving the earth's atmosphere. One of
their top scientists, Dr, M. K. Tikhonravov, a member of the Red Army's Military Academy
of Artillery, let it be known that on the basis of Soviet scientific development such rocket
ships could be built and, also, that the creation of a space station was not only feasible but
definitely probable. Soviet engineers could even now, he declared, calculate precisely the
characteristics of such space vehicles; and be added that Soviet developments in this field
equaled, if not exceeded, those of the Western World.
We have already learned, to our sorrow, that Soviet scientists and engineers should
never be underestimated. They produced the atomic bomb ),ears earlier than was antici-
pated. Our air superiority over the Korean battlefields is being challenged by their excel-
lent MIG-15 jet fighters which, at certain altitudes, have proved much faster than ours.
And while it is not believed that the Soviet Union has actually begun work on a major
project to capture space superiority, U.S. scientists point out that the basic knowledge for
such a program has been available for the last 20 years.
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What is the U.S. doing, if anything, in this field?
In December, 1948, the late James Forrestal, then Secretary of Defense, spoke of the
existence of an "earth satellite vehicle program." But in the opinion of competent military
observers this was little more than a preliminary study. And so far as is known today, little
further progress has been made. Collier's feels justified in asking; What are we waiting for?
We have the scientists and the engineers. We enjoy industrial superiority. We have
the inventive genius. Why therefore, have we not embarked on a major space program
equivalent to that which was undertaken in developing the atomic bomb? The issue is
virtually the same.
The atomic bomb was enabled the U.S. to buy time since the end of World War II.
Speaking in Boston 1949, Winston Churchill put it this way: "Europe would have been
communized and London under bombardment sometime ago but for the deterrent of the
atomic bomb in the hands of the United States." The same could be said for a space sta-
tion. In the hands of the West a space station, permanently established beyond the atmo-
sphere, would be the greatest hope for peace the world has ever known. No nation could
undertake preparations for war without the certain knowledge that it was being observed
by the ever-watching eyes aboard the "sentinel in space." It would be the end of Iron Cur-
tains wherever they might be.
Furthermore, the establishment of a space station would mean the dawning of a new
era for mankind. For the first time, exploration of the heavens would be possible, and the
great secrets of the universe would be revealed.
When the atomic bomb prograrn--the Manhattan Project--was initiated, nobody
really knew whether such a weapon could actually be made. The famous Smyth Report on
atomic energy tells us that among the scientists where were many who had grave and fun-
damental doubts of the success of the undertaking. It was a two-billion-dollar technical
gamble.
Such would not be the case with a space program. The claim that huge rocket shops
can be built and a space station created still stands unchallenged by any serious scientist.
Our engineers can spell out right now (as you will see) the technical specifications for the
rocket ship and space station in cut-and-dried figures. And they detail the design features.
All they need is time (about 10 years), money and authority.
Even the cost has been estimated: $4,000,000,000. And when one considers that we
have spent nearly $54,000,000,000 on rearmament since the Korean war began, the ex-
penditure of $4,000,000,000 to produce an instrument which would guarantee the peace
of the world seems negligible.
Collier's became interested in this whole program last October when members of
our editorial staff attended the First Annual Symposium on Space Travel, held at New
York's Hayden Planetarium. On the basis of their findings. Collier's invited the top scien-
tists in the field of space research to New York for a series of discussions. The magazine
symposium on these pages was born of these round table sessions.
The scientists who have worked with us over the last five months on this project and
whose views are presented in succeeding pages are:
* Dr. Wernher yon Braun, Technical Director of the Army Ordnance Guided Missiles
Development Group. At forty, he is considered the foremost rocket engineer in the world
today. He was brought to this country from Germany by the U.S. government in 1945.
o Dr. Fred L. Whipple, Chairman Department of Astronomy, Harvard University. One
of the nations outstanding astronomers, he has spent most of his forty-five years studying
the behavior of meteorites.
• Dr. Joseph Kaplan, Professor of Physics at UCLA. One of the nation's top physicists
and a world renowned authority on the upper atmosphere, the forty-nine-year-old scien-
tists was decorated in 1947 for work in connection with B-29 bomber operations.
• Dr. Heinz Haber, of the U.S. Air Force's Department of Space Medicine. Author of
more than 25 scientific papers since our government brought him to this country from
Germany in 1947. Dr. Haber, thirty-eight, is one of a small group of scientists working on
the medical aspects of man in space.
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• Willy Ley, who acted as adviser to Collier's in the preparation of this project. Mr.
Ley, forty-six is perhaps the best-known magazine science writer in the U.S. today. Origi-
nally a paleontologist, he was one of the founders of the German Rocket Society in 1927
and was Dr. Wernher yon Braun's first tutor in rocket research.
Others who made outstanding contributions to this issue include:
• Oscar Schachter, Deputy Director of the UN Legal department. A recognized au-
thority on international law, this thirty-six-year-old lawyer has frequently given legal advice
on matters pertaining to international scientific questions, which lately have included the
problems of space travel.
• Chesley Bonestell, whose art has appeared in the pages of Collier's many times
before. Famous for his astronomical painting, Mr. Bonestell began his career as an archi-
tect, but has spent most of his life painting for magazines and lately for Hollywood.
• Artists Fred Freeman and Rolf Klep. Both spent many months working in conjunc-
tion with the scientists.
For Collier's, associate editor Cornelius Ryan supervised assembly of the material for
the symposium. The views expressed by the contributors are necessarily their own and in
no way reflect those of the organizations to which they are attached.
Collier's believes that the time has come for Washington to give priority of attention
to the matter of space superiority. The rearmament gap between the East and West has
been steadily closing. And nothing, in our opinion, should be left undone that might
guarantee the peace of the world. It's as simple as that.
THE EDITORS
[25] Crossing the Last Frontier
By Dr. Wernher von Braun
Technical Director, Army Ordnance Guided Missiles
Development Group, Huntsville, Alabama
Scientists and engineers now how to build a station in Space that would circle the
earth 1,075 miles up. The job would take 10 years, and cost twice as much as the atom
bomb. If we do it, we can not only preserve the peace butwe can take a long step toward
uniting mankind.
[26] Within the next 10 or 15 years, the Earth will have a new companion in the skies, a
man-made satellite that could be either the greatest force for peace ever devised, or one of
the most terrible weapons of war--depending on who makes and controls it. Inhabited by
humans, and visible from the ground as a fast-moving star, it will sweep around the earth
at an incredible rate of speed in that dark void beyond the atmosphere which is known as
"space."
In the opinion of many top experts, this artificial moon--which will be carried into
space, piece by piece, by rocket ships---will travel along a celestial route 1,075 miles above
the earth, completing a trip around the globe every two hours. Nature will provide the
motive power; a neat balance between its speed and the earth's gravitational pull will keep
it on course (just as the moon is fixed in its orbit by the same two factors). The speed at
which the 250 foot-wide, '_vheel"-shaped satellite will move will be an almost unbelievable
4.4 miles per second, or 15,840 miles per hour--20 time the speed of sound. However, this
terrific velocitywill not be apparent to its occupants. To them, the space station will appear
to be a perfectly steady platform.
From this platform, a trip to the moon itself will be just a step, as scientists reckon
distance in space.
The choice of the so-called "two-hour" orbit--in preference to a faster one, closer to
the earth or a slower one like the 29-day orbit of the moon--has one major advantage:
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although far enough up to avoid the hazards of the earth's atmosphere it is close enough
to afford a superb observation post.
Technicians in this space station--using specially designed, powerful telescopes at-
tached to large optical screen radarscopes and cameras---will keep under constant inspec-
tion every ocean, content, country and city. Even small towns will be clearty visible through
optical instruments that will give the watchers in space the same vantage point enjoyed by
a man in an observation plane only 5,000 feet off the ground.
Nothing will go unobserved. Within each two-hour period as the earth revolves in-
side the satellite's orbit one twelfth of the globe's territory will pass into the view of the
space station occupants within each 24-hour period the entire surface of the earth will
have been visible.
Over North America for example, the space station might pass over the East Coast at
say 10:00 am and after having completed a full revolution around the earth would--be-
cause the [27] earth itself has turned meanwhile--pass over the West Coast two hours
later. In the course of that one revolution it would have been north as far as Nome, Alaska,
and south almost to Little America on the Antarctic Continent. At 10:00 am the next day,
it would appear once again over the East Coast.
Despite the vast territory thus covered, selected spots on the earth could receive
pinpoint examination. For example, troop maneuvers, planes being readied on the flight
deck of an aircraft cartier, or bombers forming into groups over an airfield will be clearly
discernible. Because of the telescopic eyes and cameras of the space station, it will be
almost impossible for any nadon to hide warlike preparations for any length of time.
These things we know from High-altitude photographs and astronomical studies: to
the naked eye, the earth, more than 1,000 miles below, will appear an awe-inspiring sight.
One the earth's "day" side, the space station's crew will see glaring white patches of over-
cast reflecting the light of the sun. The continents will stand out in shades of gray and
brown bordering the brilliant blue of the seas. North America will look like a great patch-
work of brown, gray and green reaching all the way to the snow-covered Rockies. And one
polar cap--whichever happens to be enjoying summer at the time--will show as a blinding
white, too brilliant to look at with the naked eye.
On the earth's "night" side, the world's cities will be clearly visible as twinkling points
of light. Surrounded by the hazy aura of its atmosphereDthat great ocean of air in which
we live--the earth will be framed by the absolute black of space.
Development of the space station is as inevitable as the rising of the sun; man has
already poked his nose into space and he is not likely to pull it back.
On the 14th of September, 1944, a German V-2 rocket, launched from a small island
in the Baltic, soared to a peak altitude of 109 miles. Two years later on December 17, 1946,
another V-2, fired at the Army Ordnance's White Sands Proving Ground, New Mexico,
reached a height of 114 miles--more then five times the highest altitude ever attained by
a metrological sounding balloon. And on the 24th of February, 1949, a "two-stage rocket"
(small rocket names the "WAC Corporal" fired from the nose of a V-2 acting as carrier or
"first stage") soared up to a height of 250 miles---roughly the distance between New York
and Washington, but straight upl
These projectiles utilized the same principle of propulsion as the jet airplane. It is
based on Isaac Newton's third law of motion, which can be stated in this way: for every
action there most be a reaction of equal force, but in the opposite direction. A good ex-
ample is the firing of a bullet from a rifle. When you pull the trigger the bullet speeds out
of the barrel, there is a recoil which slams the rifle butt back against your shoulder. If the
rifle were lighter and the explosion of the cartridge more powerful, the gun might go
flying over your shoulder for a considerable distance.
This is the way a rocket works. The body of the rocket is like the rifle barrel; the
gasses ejected from its tail are like the bullet. And the power of a rocket is measured not in
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horsepower, but in pounds or tons of recoil----called "thrust." Because it depends on the
recoil principle, this method of propulsion does not require air.
There is nothing mysterious about making use of this principle as the first step to-
ward making our space station a reality. On the basis of present engineering knowledge,
only a determined effort and the money to back it up are required. And if we don't do it,
another nation--possibly less peace-minded--will. If we were to begin in immediately, and
could keep going at top speed, the whole program would take about 10 years. The esti-
mated cost would be $4,000,000,000--about twice the cost of developing the atomic bomb,
but less then one quarter the price of military materials ordered by the Defense Depart-
ment during the last half of 1951.
Our first need would be a huge rocket capable of carrying a crew and some 30 or
40 tons of cargo into the "two-hour" orbit. This can be built. To understand how, we again
use the modern gun as an example.
A shell swiftly attains a certain speed within the gun barrel, then merely coasts through
a curved path toward its target. A long-range rocket also requires its initial speed during a
comparatively short time, then is carried by momentum.
For example, the V-2 rocket in a 200-mile flight is under power for only 65 seconds,
during which it travels 20 miles. At the end of this 65-second period of propulsion it reaches
a cut-off speed of 3,600 miles per hour; it coasts the remaining 180 miles. Logically, there-
fore, if we want to step up the range of the rocket, we must increase its speed during the
period of powered flight. If we could step up its cut-off speed to 8,280 miles per hour, it
would travel 1,000 miles.
To make a shell hit its target, the gun barrel has to be elevated and pointed in the
proper direction. If the barrel were pointed straight up into the sky the shell would climb
to a certain altitude and simply fall back, landing quite close to the gun. Exactly the same
thing happens when a rocket is fired vertically. But to make the rocket reach a distant
target after its vertical take-off, it must be tilted after it reaches a certain height above the
ground. In rockets capable of carrying a crew and cargo, the tilting would be done by
swivel-mounded rocket motors, which by blasting sideways, would cause the rocket to veer.
Employing this method, at a cutoff speed of 17,460 miles per hour, a rocket would
coast halfway around the globe before striking ground. And by boosting to just a litre
higher cut-off speed--4.86 miles per second or 17,500 miles per hour--its coasting path,
after the power had been cut off would match the curvature of the earth. The rocket
would actually be "falling around the earth," because its speed and the earth's gravita-
tional pull would balance exacfly.
It would never fall back to the ground, for it would now be an artificial satellite,
circling according to the same laws that govern the moon's path about the earth.
Making it do this would require delicate timing--but when you think of the split-
second predictions of the eclipses, you will grant that there can hardly be any branch of
natural science more accurate than the one dealing with the motion of heavenly bodies.
Will it be possible to attain this fantastic speed of 17,500 miles per hour necessary to
reach our chosen two-hour orbit? This is almost five times as fast as the V-2. Of course, we
can replace the V-2's alcohol and liquid oxygen by a more powerful propellants, and even,
by improving the design, reduce the rocket's dead weight and thereby boost the speed by
some 40 or 50 per cent; but we would still have a long way to go.
The WAC Corporal, starting from the nose of a V-2 and climbing to 250 miles, has
shown us what we must do if we want to step up drastically the speed of a rocket. The WAC
started its own rocket motor the moment the V-2 carrying it had reached it maximum
speed. It thereby added its own speed to that already achieved by the first stage. As men-
tioned earlier, such a piggyback arrangement is called "two-stage rocket;" and by putting a
two-stage rocket on [28] another still larger booster we get a three-stage rocket. A three-
stage rocket then, could treble the speed attainable by one rocket stage alone (which would
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give it enough speed to become a satellite).
In fact, it could do even better. The three-stage rocket may be considered as a rocket
with three sets of motors; after the first set has given its utmost and has expired, it is jetti-
soned--and so is the second set in its turn. The third stage or nose of the rocket continues
on its way, relieved of all that excess weight.
Besides the loss of the first two stages, other factors make the rocket's journey easier
the higher it goes. First, the atmosphere is dense, and tends to hinder the passage of the
rocket; once past it, the going is faster. Second, the rocket motors operate more efficiendy
in the rarefied upper layers of the atmosphere. Third, after passing through the densest
portion of the atmosphere, the rocket no longer need climb vertically.
Imagine the size of this huge three-stage rocket ship: it stands 265 feet tall approxi-
mately the height of a 24-story office building. Its base measures 65 feet in diameter. And
the over-all weight of this monster rocket ship is 14,000,000 pounds, or 4,000 tons---about
the same weight as a light destroyer.
Its three huge power plants are driven by a combination of nitric acid and hydrazine,
the latter being a liquid compound of nitrogen and hydrogen somewhat resembling its
better-known cousin ammonia. These propellants are fed into the rocket motors by means
of turbopumps.
Fifty-one rocket motors, pushing with a combined thrust of 14,000 tons, power the
first stage (tail section). These motors consume a total of 5,250 tons of propellants in the
incredibly short time of 84 seconds. Thus, in less than a minute and a half, the rocket loses
75 percent of its total original weight.
The second stage (middle section), mounted on top of the first, has 34 rocket motors
with a total thrust of 1,750 tons and burns 700 tons of propellants. It operates for only
124 seconds.
The third and final stage (nose section)--carrying the crew, equipment and pay-
load--has five rocket motors with a combined thrust of 200 tons. This "Body" or cabin
stage of the rocket ship carries 90 tons of propellants, including ample reserves for the
return trip to earth. In addition, it is capable of carrying a cargo or payload of about 36
tons into our two-hour orbit 1,075 miles above sea level. (Also, in expectation of the turn
trip, the nose section will have wings something like an airplane's. They will be used only
during the decent, after re-entry the earth's atmosphere.)
Years before the actual take-off, smaller rocket ships, called instrument carriers, will
have been sent up to the two-hour orbit. They will circle there, sending back information
by the same electronic method already in use with current rockets. Based on the data thus
obtained, scientists, astronomers and engineers, along with experts from the armed forces,
will plan the complete development of the huge cargo-carrying rocket ship.
The choice of the take-off site poses another problem, because of the vast amount of
auxiliary equipment--such as fuel storage tanks and machine shops, and other items like
radio, radar, astronomical and meteorological stations--an extensive area is required. Fur-
thermore, it is essential, for reasons which will be explained later that the rocket ship fly
over the ocean during the early part of the flight. The tiny U.S. possession known asJohnston
Island, in the Pacific, or the Air Force Proving Ground at Cocoa, Florida, are presently
considered by the experts to be suitable sites.
At the launching area, the heavy rocket ship is assembled on a great platform. Then
the platform is wheeled into place over a tunnel-like '_jet deflector" which drains off the
fiery gases of the first stage's rocket motors. Finally, with a mighty roar which is heard
many miles away, the rocket ship slowly takes offmso slowly, in fact that in the first second
is travels less then 15 feet. Gradually, however, it begins to pickup speed, and 20 seconds
later it has disappeared into the clouds.
Because of the terrific acceleration which will be experienced one minute later, the
crewmlocated of course, in the nosemwili be lying flat in "contour" chairs at take-off,
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facing up. Throughout the whole of its flight to the two-hour orbit, the rocket is under the
control of an automatic gyropilot. The timing of its flight and the various maneuvers which
take place have to be so precise that only a machine can be trusted to do the job.
After a short interval, the automatic pilot tilts the rocket into a shallow path, by
84 seconds after take-offwhen, the fuels of the first stage (tail section) are nearly exhausted,
the rocket ship is climbing at a genre angle of 20.5 degrees.
When it reaches an altitude of 24.9 miles it will have a speed of 1.46 miles per second
or 5,256 miles per hour. To enable the upper stages to break away from the tail or first
stage the tail's power has to be throttled down to almost zero. The motors of the second
stage now begin to operate, and the connection between the now-useless first stage and
the rest of the rocket ship is severed. The tail section drops behind, while the two upper
stages of the rocket ship forge ahead.
After the separation, a ring-shaped ribbon parachute, made of fine steal wire mesh,
is automatically released by the first stage. This chute has a diameter of 27 feet and gradu-
ally it slows down the tail section. But under its own momentum, this empty hull continues
to climb, reaching a height of 40 miles before slowly descending. It is because the tail
section could be irreparably damaged if it struck solid ground (and might be dangerous,
besides) that the initial part of the trip must be over sea. After the first stage lands in the
water, it is collected and brought back to the launching site.
The same procedure is repeated 124 seconds later. The second stage (middle sec-
tion) is dropped into the ocean. The rocket ship by this time has attained an altitude of
40 miles and 332 miles from the take-off site. It also has reached a tremendous speed--
14,364 miles per hour.
Now the third and last stage--the nose section or cabin equipped space ship proper--
proceeds under the power of its own rocket motors.Just 84 seconds after the dropping of
the second stage, the rocket ship, now moving at 18,468 miles per hour reaches a height of
63.3 miles above the earth.
At this point we must recall the comparison between the rocket and the coasting rifle
shell to understand what occurs. The moment the rocket reaches a speed of 18,468 miles
per hour at an altitude of 63.3 miles, the motors are cut offeven though the fuel supply is
by no means exhausted. The rocket ship continues on an unpowered trajectory until it
reaches 1,075 miles above the earth. This is the high point, or "apogee"; in this case it is
exactly halfway around the globe from the cut-off place. The rocket ship is now in the two-
hour orbit where we intend to build the space station.
Just one more maneuver has to be performed however. In coasting up from 63.3
miles to 1,075 miles, the rocket ship has been slowed by the earth's gravitational pull to
14,770 miles per hour. This is not sufficient to keep the ship in our chosen orbit. If we do
not increase the speed the craft will swing back halfway around the earth to the 63.3 mile
altitude. Then it would continue on past the earth until as it curves around to the other
side of the globe, it would be back at the same apogee at the 1,075-mile altitude.
The rocket ship would already be a satellite and behave like a second moon in the
heavens, swinging on its elliptical path over and over for a long time. One might ask: Why
not be satisfied with this? The reason is that part of this particular orbit is in the atmo-
sphere at only 63.3 miles. And while the air resistance there is very low, in time it would
cause the rocket ship to fall back to earth.
Our chosen two-hour orbit is one which, at all points, is exactly 1,075 miles above the
earth. The last maneuver which stabilizes the rocket ship in this orbit, is accomplished by
turning on the rocket motors for about 15 seconds. The velocity is thus increased by
1,030 miles per hour bringing the total speed to 15,800 miles per hour. This is the speed
necessary for remaining in the orbit permanently. We have reached our goal.
[29] An extraordinary fact about the flight from the earth is this: it has taken only
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56 minutes, during which the rocket ship was powered for only five minutes.
From our vantage point, 1,075 miles up, the earth to the rocket ship's crew appears
to be rotating once every two hours. This apparent fast spin of the globe is the only indica-
tion of the tremendous speed at which the rocket ship is moving. The earth, of course, still
requires a full _4 hours to complete one revolution on its axis, but the rocket ship is mak-
ing 19 revolutions around the earth during the time the earth makes one.
We now begin to unload the 36 tons of cargo which we have carried up with us. But
how and where shall we unload the material? There is nothing but the blackness of empty
space all around us.
We simply dump it out of the ship. For the cargo, too has become a satellite! So have
the crew members. Wearing grotesque-looking pressurized suits and carrying oxygen for
breathing they can now leave the rocket ship and float about unsupported.
Just as a man on the ground is not conscious of the fact that he is moving with the
earth around the sun at the rate of 66,600 miles per hour, so the men in the space ship are
not aware of the fantastic speed with which they are going around the earth. Unlike men
on the ground, however, the men in space do not experience any gravitational pull. If one
of them, while working, should drift off into space, it will be far less serious than slipping
off a scaffold. Drifting off merely means that the man has acquired a very slight speed in
an unforeseen direction.
He can stop himself in the same manner in which any speed is increased or stopped
in space--by reaction. He must do this, theoretically, by firing a revolver in the direction of
his inadvertent movement. But in actual practice the suit will be equipped with small rocket
motor. He could also propel himself by squirting some compressed oxygen from a tank on
his back. It is highly probable, however, that each crew member will have a safety, line
securing him to the rocket as he works. The tools he uses will also be secured to him by
lines; otherwise they might float away into space.
The spacemen--for that is what the crew members now are--will begin sorting the
equipment brought up. Floating in strange positions among structural units and machin-
ery, their work will proceed in absolute silence, for there is no air to carry sound. Only
when two people are working on the same piece of material, both actually touching it, will
one be able to hear the noises made by another, because sound is conducted by most
materials. They will, however, be able to converse with built-in '_valkie-talkie" radio equip-
ment. The cargo moves easily; there is no weight, and no friction. To push it, our crew
member need only turn on his rocket motor (if he shoved a heavy piece of equipment
without rocket power, he might fly backward!).
Obviously the pay load of our rocket ship--though equivalent to that of two huge
Super Constellations---will not be sufficient to begin construction of the huge, three-deck,
250-foot-wide space station. Many more loads will be required. Other rocket ships, all timed
to arrive at the same point in a continuous procession as the work progresses, will carry up
the reminder of the prefabricated satellite. This will be an expensive proposition. Each
rocket trip will cost more than half a million dollars for propellants alone. Thus, weight and
shipping space limitations will greatly affect the specifications of a space station.
In at least one design, the station consists of 20 sections made of flexible nylon-and-
plastic fabric. Each of these sections is an independent unit which later, after assembly into
a closed ring, will provide compartmentation similar to that found in submarines. To save
shipping space, these sections will be carried to the orbit in a collapsed condition. After
the %¢heel" has been put together and sealed, it will then be inflated like an automobile
tire to slightly less than normal atmospheric pressure. This pressure will not only provide
a breathable atmosphere within the ring but will give the whole structure its necessary
rigidity. The atmosphere will, of course, have to be renewed as the men inside exhaust it.
On solid earth, most of our daily activities are conditioned by gravity. We put some-
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thing on a table and it stays there because the earth attracts it, pulling it against the table.
When we pour a glass of milk, gravity draws it out of the bottle and we catch falling liquid
in a glass. In space, however, everything is weightless. And this includes man.
This odd condition in no way spells danger, at least for a limited period of time. We
experience weightlessness for short periods when we jump from a diving board into a
pool. To be sure, there are some medical men who are concerned at the prospect of per-
manent weightlessnessnnot because of any known danger, but because of the unknown
possibilities. Most experts discount these nameless fears.
However, there can be no doubt that permanent weightlessness might often prove
inconvenient. What we require, therefore, is a "synthetic" gravity within the space station.
And we can produce centrifugal force--which acts as a substitute for gravity--by making
the "wheel" slowly spin about its hub (a part of which can be made stationary).
To the space station proper, we attach a tiny rocket motor which can produce enough
power to rotate the satellite. Since [72] there is no resistance which would slow the "wheel"
down, the rocket motor does not have to function continuously. It will operate only long
enough to give the desired rotation. Then it is shut off.
Now, how fast would we like our station to spin? That depends on how much "syn-
thetic gravity" we want. If your 250-foot ring performed one full revolution every 12.3 sec-
onds we would get a synthetic gravity equal to that which we normally experience on the
ground. This is known as "one gravity" or, abbreviated, "1 g." For a number of reasons, it
may be advantageous not to produce one full "g." Consequently, the ring can spin more
slowly: for example, it might make one full revolution every 22 seconds, which would re-
sult in a "synthetic gravity" of about one third of normal surface gravity.
The centrifugal force created by the slow spin of the space station forces everything
out from the hub. No matter where the crew members sit, stand or walk inside, their heads
will always point toward the hub. In other words, the inside wall of the "wheel's" outer rim
serves as the floor.
How about the temperature within the space station? Maybe you, too have heard the
old fairy tale that outer space is extremely coldnabsolute zero. It's cold, all right but not
that cold--and not in the satellite. The ironical fact is that the engineering problem in this
respect will be to keep the space station comfortably cool, rather than to heat it up. In
outer space, the temperature of any structure depends entirely on its absorption and dissi-
pation of the sun's rays. The space station happens to be in the unfortunate position of
receiving not only direct heat from the sun but also reflected heat from the earth.
If we paint the space station white, it will then absorb a minimum of solar heat. Being
surrounded by a perfect vacuum, it will be, except for its shape, a sort of thermos bottle
which keeps hot what is hot and cold what is cold.
In addition, we can scatter over the surface of the space station a number of black
patches which, in turn, can be covered by shutters closely resembling white Venetian blinds.
When these blinds are open on the sunny side, the black patches will absorb more heat
and warm up the station. When the blinds are open on the shaded side, black patches will
absorb more heat and warm up the station. When the blinds are open on the shaded side,
the black patches will radiate more heat into space, thereby cooling the station. Operate
all these blinds with little electric motors, hook them to a thermostat, and tie the whole
system in with the station's air conditioning plant--and there's your temperature control
system.
Inflating the space station with air will, as we have indicated, provide a breathable
atmosphere for a limited time only. The crew will consume oxygen at a rate of approxi-
mately three pounds per man per day. At intervals, therefore, this life-giving oxygen will
have to be replenished by supply ships from earth. At the same time, carbon dioxide and
toxic or odorous products must be constantly removed from the air-circulation system.
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The air must also be dehumidified inasmuch as through breathing and perspiration each
crew member will loose more than three pounds of water per day to the air system (just as
men do on earth).
This water can be collected in a dehumidifier, from which it can economically be
salvaged, purified and reused.
Both the air-conditioning and water recovery units need power. So do the radar sys-
tems, radio transmitters, astronomical equipment, electronic cookers and other machin-
ery. As a source for this power we have the sun. On the earth, solar power is reliable in only
a few places where clouds rarely obscure the sky, but in space there are no clouds, and the
sun is the simplest answer to the station's power needs.
Our power plant will consist of a condensing mirror and boiler. The condensing
mirror will be a highly polished sheet metal trough running around the "wheel." The
position of the space station can be arranged so that the side to which the mirror is at-
tached will always point toward the sun. The mirror then focuses the sun's rays on a steel
pipe which runs the length of the mirrored trough. Liquid mercury is fed under pressure
into one end of this pipe and hot mercury vapor is taken out at the other end. This vapor
drives a turbogenerator which produces about 500 kilowatts of electricity.
Of course, the mercury vapor has to be used over and over again so after it has done
its work in the turbine it is returned to the "boiler" pipe in the mirror. Before this can be
done, the vapor has to be condensed back into liquid mercury by cooling. This is achieved
by passing the vapor through pipes located behind the mirror in the shade. These pipes
dissipate the heat of the vapor into space.
Thus we have within the space station a complete synthetic environment capable of
sustaining man in space. Of course, man will face hazards---some of them, like cosmic
radiation and possible collision with meteorites, potentially severe. These problems are
being studied, however, and they are considered far from insurmountable.
Our '`wheel" will not be alone in the two-hour orbit. There will nearly always be one
or two rocket ships unloading supplies. They will be parked some distance away to avoid
the possibility of damaging the space station by collision or by the blast from the vehicle's
rocket motors. To ferry men and materials from rocket ship to space stadon, small rocket-
powered metal craft of limited range, shaped very much like overgrown watermelons, will
be used. These "space taxis" will be pressurized and, after boarding them, passengers can
remove their space suits.
On approaching the space station, the tiny shutde-craft will drive direcdy into an air
lock at the top or bottom of the stationary hub. The space taxi will be built to fit exactly
into the airlock, sealing the opening like a plug. The occupants can then enter the space
stadon proper without having been exposed to the airlessness of space at any time since
leaving the air lock of the rocket ship.
There will also be a space observatory, a small structure some distance away from the
main satellite, housing telescopic cameras for taking long exposure photographs. (The
space station itself will carry extremely powerful cameras but its spin, though slow, will
permit only slow exposures.) The space observatory will not be manned, for if it were, the
movements of an operator would disturb the alignment. Floating outside the structure in
space suits, technicians will load a camera with special plates or film, and then withdraw.
The camera will be aimed and the shutter snapped by remote radio control from the space
station.
Most of the pictures taken of the earth, however, will be by the space station's cam-
eras. The observatory will be used manly to record the outer reaches of the universe, from
the neighboring planets to the distant galaxies of stars. This mapping of the heavens will
produce results which no observatory on earth could possibly duplicate. And, while the
scientists are probing the secrets of the universe with their cameras, they will also be plan-
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ning another trip through spaceDthis time to examine the moon.
Suppose we take the power plant out of our rocket ship's last stage and attach it to a
lightweight skeleton frame of aluminum girders. Then we suspend some large collapsible
fuel containers in this structure and fill them with propellants. Finally, we connect some
plumbing and wiring and top the whole structure with a cabin for the crew, completely
equipped with air and water regeneration systems, and navigation and guidance equipment.
The result will be an oddly shaped vehicle [73] not much larger than the rocket
ship's third stage, but capable of carrying a crew of several people to a point beyond the
rear side of the moon, then back to the space station. This vehicle will bear little resem-
blance to the moon rockets depicted in science fiction. There is a very simple reason:
conventional streamlining is not necessary in space.
The space station, as mentioned previously has a speed of 15,840 miles per hour.
Our round-the-moon ship, to leave the two hour orbit, has to have a speed of 22,100 miles
per hour to cover the 938,000 mile distance to the moon. This additional speed is acquired
by means of a short rocket blast lasting barely two minutes. This throws the round-the-
moon ship into a long arch or ellipse, with its remotest point beyond the moon. The space
ship will then coast out this distance, unpowered, like a thrown stone. It will lose speed
along the way, due to the steady action of the earth's gravitational pull--which, though
weakening with distance extends far out into space.
Roughly five days after departure, the space ship will come almost to a standstill and
if we have timed our departure correctly the moon will now pass some 200 miles below us
with the earth on its far side. On this one trip we can photograph most of the unknown
half of the moon, the half which has never been seen from the earth. Furthermore, we
now have an excellent opportunity to view the earth from the farthest point yet, at this
distance it appears not unlike a miniature reproduction of itself (from the vicinity of the
moon the earth will look about four times as large as the full moon does to earth-bound
man).
It is not necessary to turn on the space ship's motors for the return trip. The moon's
gravity is too slightly to affect us substantially; like the shell which was fired vertically we
simply "fall back" to the space station's orbit. The long five day "fall" causes the space ship
to regain its initial speed of 22,100 miles per hour. This is 6,340 miles faster than the speed
of the space station, but, as we have fallen back tail first, we simply turn on the motors for
just two minutes, which reduces our speed to the correct rate which permits us to re-enter
the two-hour orbit.
Besides its use as a springboard for the exploration of the solar system, and as a
watchdog of the peace, the space station will have many other functions. Meteorologists,
by observing cloud patterns over large areas of the earth, will be able to predict the result-
ant weather more easily more accurately and further into the future. Navigators on the
seas and in the air will utilize the space station as a "fix" for it will always be recognizable.
But there will also be another possible use for the space station--and a most terrify-
ing one. It can be converted into a terribly effective atomic bomb carrier.
Small winged rocket missiles with atomic war heads could be launched from the
station in such a manner that they would strike their targets at supersonic speeds. By simul-
taneous radar tracking from both missile and target, these atomic-headed rockers could
be accurately guided to any spot on the earth.
In view of the station's ability to pass over all inhabited regions on earth, such atom
bombing techniques would offer the satellite's builders the most important tactical and
strategic advance in military history. Furthermore its observers probably could spot in
plenty of time any attempt by an enemy to launch a rocket aimed at colliding with the
giant "wheel" and intercept it.
We have discussed how to get from the ground to the two-hour orbit, how to build
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the space station and how to get a look at the unknown half of the moon by way of a round
trip from our station in space. But how do we return to earth?
Unlike the ascent to the orbit, which was controlled by an automatic pilot, the decent
is in the hands of an experienced "space pilot."
To leave the two-hour orbit in the third stage, or nose section, of the rocket ship, the
pilot slows down the vehicle in the same manner in which the returning around-the-moon
ship slowed down. He reduces the speed by 1,070 miles per hour. Unpowered, the rocket
ship the swings back toward the earth. After 51 minutes, during which we half circumnavi-
gate the globe, the rocket ship enters the upper layers of the atmosphere. Again, it has
fallen tail first; now the pilot turns it so that it enters the atmosphere nose first.
¢¢ _ ¢t
About 50 miles above the earth, due to our downward gravity powered swing from
the space station's orbit our speed had increased to 18,500 miles per hour. At his altitude
there is already considerable resistance.
With its wings and control surfaces, the rocket closely resembles an airplane. At first
however, the wings do not have to carry the rocket ship. On the contrary, they must pre-
vent it from soaring out of the atmosphere and back into the space station's orbit again.
His eyes glued to the altimeter, the pilot will push his control stick forward and force
the ship to stay at an altitude of exactly 50 miles. At this height, the air resistance gradually
slows the rocket ship down. Only then can the descent into the denser atmosphere begin,
from there on the wings bear more and more of the ship's weight. After covering a dis-
tance of about 10,000 miles in the atmosphere, the rocket's speed will still be as high as
13,300 miles per hour. After another 3,000 miles the speed will be down to 5,760 miles per
hour. The rocket ship will by now have descended to a height of 29 miles.
The progress of the ship through the upper atmosphere has been so fast that air
friction has heated the outer metal skin of body and wings to a temperature of about
1,300 degrees Fahrenheit. The rocket ship has actually turned color, from steel blue to
cherry redl This should not cause undo concern however inasmuch as we have heat resis-
tant steels which can easily endure such temperatures. The canopy and windows will be
built of double parted glass with a liquid coolant flowing between the panes. And the crew
and cargo spaces will be properly heat-insulated and cooled by means of a refrigerator-
type air conditioning system. Similar problems have already been solved on a somewhat
smaller scale in present-day supersonic airplanes.
At a point 15 miles above the earth the rocket ship finally slows down to the speed of
sound--roughly 750 miles per hour. From here on, it spirals down to the ground like a
normal airplane. It can land on conventional landing gear, on a runway adjacent to the
launching site. The touch-down speed will be approximately 65 miles per hour, which is
less than that of today's air liners. And if the pilot should miss the runway a small rocket
motor will enable him to circle once more and make a second approach.
After a thorough checkup, the third stage will be ready for another ascent into the
orbit. The first and second stages (or tail and middle sections), which were parachuted
down to the ocean, have been collected in specially made seagoing dry docks. They were
calculated to fall at 189 miles and 906 miles respectively from the launching site. They will
be found relatively undamaged, because at a point 150 feet above the water their para-
chute fall was broken by a set of cordite rockets which were automatically set off by a
proximity fuse.
They, too, undergo a through inspection with some replacement of parts damaged
by the ditching. Then all three stages are put together again in a towerlike hanger, right on
the launching platform, and, after refueling and final check, platform and ship are wheeled
out to the launching site--ready for another journey into man's oldest and last frontier:
the heavens themselves.
THEEND
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[52] Man on the Moon: The Journey
By Dr. Wernher yon Braun
Technical Director, Army Ordnance Guided Missiles Development Group,
Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama
For five days, the expectation speeds through space on its historic voyage--50 men on three
ungainly craft, bound for the great unknown
HERE is how we shall go to the moon. The pioneer expedition, 50 scientists and
technicians, will take off from the space station's orbit in three clumsy-looking but highly
efficient rocket ships. They won't be streamlined: all travel will be in space, where there is
no air to impede motion. Two will be loaded with propellant for the five day, 239,000-mile
trip and the return journey. The third, which will not return will carry only enough pro-
pellant for a one-way trip; the extra room will be filled with supplies and equipment for the
scientists' six-week stay.
On the outward voyage, the rocket ships will hit a top speed of 19,500 miles per hour
about 33 minutes after departure. Then the motors will be stopped and the ships will fall
the rest of the way to the moon.
[53] Such a trip takes a great deal of planning. For a beginning we must decide what flight
path to follow, how to construct the ships and where to land. But the project could be
completed within the next 25 years. There are no problems involved to which we don't
have the answers----or the ability to find them--right now.
First, where shall we land? We may have a wide choice, once we have had a close look
at the moon. We'll get that look on a preliminary survey flight. A small rocket ship taking
off from the space station will take us to within 50 miles of the moon to get pictures of its
meteor-pitted surface--including the "back" part never visible from the earth.
We'll study the photographs for a suitable site. Several considerations limit our selec-
tion. Because the Moon's surface has 14,600,000 square miles--about one thirteenth that
of the earth--we won't be able to explore more than a small area in detail, perhaps part of
a section 500 miles in diameter. Our scientists want to see as many kinds of lunar features
as possible, so we'll pick a spot of particular interest to them. We want radio contact with
the earth so that means we'll have to stick to the moon's "face" for radio waves won't reach
across space to any point the eye won't reach.
We can't land at the moon's equator because its noonday temperatures reach an
unbearable 220-degrees Fahrenheit, more than hot enough to boil water. We can't land
where the surface is too rugged because we need a flat place to set down. Yet the site can't
be too fiat either--grain sized meteors constantly bombard the moon at speeds of several
miles a second; we have to set camp in a crevice where we have protection from these bullets.
There's one section of the moon that meets all our requirements, and unless some-
thing better turns up on closer inspection that's where we land. It's an area called Sinus
Rolls or Dewy Bay on the northern branch of a plain known as Oceanus Procellarum or
Stormy Ocean (so called by early astronomers who thought the moon's plains were great
seas). Dr. Fred L. Whipple chairman of Harvard University astronomy department, says
Sinus Rolis is ideal for our purposes--about 650 miles from the lunar north pole where the
daylight temperature averages a reasonably pleasant 40 degrees and the terrain is flat enough
to land on, yet irregular enough to hide [54] in. With a sausfactory site located we start
detailed planning.
To save fuel and time, we want to take the shortest practical course. The moon moves
around the earth in an elliptical path once every 27 l/_ days. The space station, our point
of departure, circles the earth once every two hours. Every two weeks their paths are such
that a rocket ship from the space station will intercept the moon in just five days. The best
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conditions for the return trip will occur two weeks later, and again two weeks after that
with their stay limited to multiples of two weeks our scientists have set themselves a six
week limit for the first exploration of the moon--long enough to accomplish some con-
structive research, but not long enough to require a prohibitive supply of essentials like
liquid oxygen, water and food.
Six months before our scheduled take-off, we begin piling up construction materials,
supplies and equipment at the space station. This operation is a massive, impressive one,
involving huge shuttling cargo rocket ships, scores of hard working handlers, and tremen-
dous amounts of equipment. Twice a day pairs of sleek rocket transports from the earth
sweep into the satellite's orbit and swarms of workers unload the 36 tons of cargo each
carries. With the arrival of the first shipment of material, work on the first of the three
moon-going space craft gets underway picking up intensity as more and more equipment
arrives.
The supplies are not stacked inside the space station; they're just left floating in
space. They don't have to be secured and here's why: the satellite is traveling around the
earth at 15,840 miles an hour; at that speed, it can't be affected by the earth's gravity, so it
doesn't fall, and it never slows down because there's no air resistance. The same applies to
any other object brought into the orbit at the same speed: to park beside the space station
a rocket ship merely adjusts its speed to 15,840 miles per hour: and it, too, becomes a
satellite. Crates moved out of its hold are traveling at the same speed in relation to the
earth, so they also are weighdess satellites.
As the weeks pass and the unloading of cargo ships continues, the construction area
covers several littered square miles. Tons of equipment lie aboutbaluminum girders, col-
lapsed nylon-and-plastic fuel tanks, rocket motor units, turbopumps, bundles of thin alu-
minum plates are a great many nylon bags containing smaller parts. It's a bewildering
scene, but not to the moon-ship builders. All construction parts are color-coded--with
blue tipped cross braces fitting into blue sockets red joining members keyed to others of
the same color and so forth. Work proceeds swiftly.
In fact, the workers accomplish wonders, considering the obstacles confronting a
man forced to struggle with unwieldy objects in space. The men move clumsily, hampered
by bulky pressurized suits equipped with such necessities of space-life as air conditioning,
oxygen tanks, walkie-talkie radios, and tiny rocket motors for propulsion. The work is labo-
rious, for although objects are weightless they still have inertia. A man who shoves a one-
ton girder makes it move all right but he makes himself move too. As his inertia is less than
the girder's he shoots backward much farther than he pushes the big piece of metal for-
ward.
The small personal rocket motors help the workers move some of the construction
parts; the big stuff is hitched to space taxis, tiny pressurized rocket vehicles used for short
trips outside the space station.
As the framework of the new rocket ships takes form; big, folded nylon-and plastic
bundles are brought over. They're the personnel cabins; pumped full of air, they become
spherical, and plastic astrodomes are fitted to the top of sides of each. Other sacks are
pumped full of propellant and balloon into the shapes of globes and cylinders. Soon the
three moon-going space ships begin to emerge in their final form. The two round-trip
ships resemble and arrangement of hourglasses inside a metal framework; the one-way
cargo carrier has much the same framework, but instead of hourglasses it has a central
structure which looks like a great silo.
Dimensions of the Rocket Ship
Each ship is 160 feet long (nine feet more than the height of the Statue of Liberty)
and about 110 feet wide. Each has at its base a battery of 30 rocket motors, and each is
topped by the sphere which houses the crew members, scientists and technicians on five
floors. Under the sphere are two long arms set on a circular track which enables them to
rotate almost a full 360 degrees. These light booms which fold against the vehicles during
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take-offand landing to avoid damage, carry two vital pieces of equipment: a radio antenna
dish for short-wave communication and a solar mirror generating power.
The solar mirror is a curved sheet of highly polished metal which concentrates the
sun's rays on a mercury-filled pipe. The intense heat vaporizes the mercury, and the vapor
drives a turbo-generator, producing 35 kilowatts of electric power--enough to run a small
factory. Its work done, the vapor cools, returns to its liquid state and starts the cycle all over
again.
Under the radi_, and mirror booms of the passenger ships hang 18 propellant tanks
carrying nearly 800,000 gallons of ammonialike hydrazine (our fuel) and oxygen-rich ni-
tric acid (the combustion agent). Four of the 18 tanks are outsized spheres, more than
33 feet in diameter. They are attached to light frames on the outside of the rocket ship's
structure. More than half our propellant supply--580,000 gallons--is in these large balls:
that's the amount needed for take-off. As soon as it's exhausted, the big tanks will be
jetisoned. Four other large tanks carry propellant for the landing; they will be left on the
moon.
We also carry a supply of hydrogen peroxide [56] to run the turbopumps which
force the propellant into the rocket motors. Besides the 14 cylindrical propellant tanks
and the four spherical ones, eight small helium containers are strung throughout the
framework. The lighter-than-air helium will be pumped into partly emptied fuel tanks to
keep their shape under acceleration and to create pressure for the turbopumps.
The cost of the propellant required for this first trip to the moon, the bulk of it used
for the supply ships during the build-up period, is enormous--about $300,000,000, roughly
60 percent of the half-billion-dollar cost of the entire operation. (That doesn't count the
$4,000,000,000 cost of erecting the space station, whose main purpose is strategic rather
then scientific.)
The cargo ship carries only enough fuel for a one-way trip so it has fewer tanks; four
discardable spheres like those on the passenger craft, and four cylindrical containers with
162,000 gallons of propellant for the moon landing.
In one respect, the cargo carrier is the most interesting of the three space vehicles.
Its big silo-like storage cabin, 75 feet long and 36 feet wide, was built to serve a double
purpose. Once we reach the moon and the big cranes folded against the framework have
swung out and unloaded the 285 tons of supplies in a cylinder, the silo will be detached
from the rest of the rocket ship. The winch-driven cables slung from the cranes will then
raise half of the cylinder, in sections, which it will deposit on trailers drawn by tractors.
The tractors will take them to a protective crevice on the moon's surface at the place
chosen for our camp. Then the other lengthwise half will be similarly moved---giving us
two ready-to-use Quonset huts.
Now that we have our space ships built and have provided ourselves with living quarters
for our stay on the moon. A couple of important items remain; we must protect ourselves
against two of the principal hazards of space travel, flying meteors and extreme temperatures.
For Protection Against Meteors
To guard against meteors, all vital parts of the three craft--propellant tanks, person-
nel spheres, cargo cabin--are given a thin covering of sheet metal, set on studs which leave
at least one inch space between this outer shield and inside wall. The covering, called
meter bumper, will take the full impact of the flying particles (we don't expect to be struck
by any meteors much larger than a grain of sand) and will cause them to disintegrate
before they can do damage.
For protection against excessive heat, all parts of the three rocket ships are painted
white because white absorbs little of the sun's radiation. Then, to guard against cold, small
black patches are scattered over the tanks and personnel spheres. The patches are covered
by white blinds, automatically controlled by thermostats. When the blinds on the sunny
side are open, the spots absorb heat and warm the cabins and tanks when the blinds are
closed and all white surface is exposed to the sun permitting little heat to enter. When the
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blinds on the shaded side are open, the black spots radiate heat and the temperature
drops.
Now we're ready to take off from the space station's orbit to the moon.
The bustle of our departuremhurrying space taxis, the nervous last-minute checks
by engineers, the loading of late cargo and finally the take-off itselfwwill be watched by
millions. Television cameras on the space station will transmit the scene to receivers all
over the world. And people on the earth's dark side will be able to turn from their screens
to catch a fleeting glimpse of light--high in the heavens---the combined flash ofg0 rocket
motors, looking from the earth like the sudden birth of a new short lived star.
Our departure is slow. The big rocket ships rise ponderously, one after the other,
green flames streaming from their batteries of rockets, and then they pick up speed. Actu-
ally we don't need to gain much speed. The velocity required to get us to our destination is
19,500 miles an hour but we've had a running start, while "resting" in the space station's
orbit, we are really streaking through space at 15,840 miles an hour. We need an additional
3,660 miles an hour.
Thirty-three minutes from take-off we have it. Now we cut offour motors; momen-
tum and the moon's gravity will do the rest.
The moon itself is visible to us as we coast through space, but it's so far off one side
that it's hard to believe we won't miss it. In the five days of our journey, though, it will travel
a great distance and so will we; at the end of that time we shall reach the farthest point, or
apogee, of our elliptical course, and the moon shall be right in front of us.
The earth is visible, too---an enormous ball most of it bulking pale black against the
deeper black of space but with a wide crescent of day light where the sun strikes it. Within
the crescent, the continents enjoying summer stand out as vast green terrain maps sur-
rounded by the brilliant [58] blue of the oceans. Patches of white cloud obscure some of
the detail; other white blobs are snow and ice on mountains ranges and polar areas.
Against the blackness of the earth's night side is a gleaming spot--the space station,
reflecting the light of the sun.
Two hours and 54 minutes after departure we are 17,750 miles from the earth's sur-
face. Our speed has dropped sharply to 10,500 miles and hour. Five hours and eight min-
utes en route, the earth is 32,950 miles away, and our speed is 8,000 miles an hour; after 20
hours, we're 132,000 miles from the earth traveling at 4,300 miles an hour.
On this first day, we discard the empty departure tanks. Engineers in protective suits
step outside the cabin, stand for a moment in space, then make their way down the girders
to the big spheres. They pump any remaining propellant into reserve tanks, disconnect
the useless containers, and give them a gentle shove. For a while the tanks drift along
beside us; soon they float out of sight. Eventually they will crash on the moon.
There is no hazard for the engineers in this operation. As a precaution they are
secured to the ship by safety lines. But they could probably have done as well without
them. There is no air in space to blow them away.
That's just one of the peculiarities of space to which we must adapt ourselves. Lack-
ing a natural sequence of night and day, we live by an arbitrary time schedule. Because
nothing has weight; cooking and eating are special problems. Kitchen utensils have mag-
netic strips or clamps so they won't float away. The heating of food is done on electronic
ranges. They have many advantages: they're clean, easy to operate, and their short-wave
rays don't burn up precious oxygen.
Difficulties of Dining in Space
We have no knives, spoons or forks. All solid food is precut; all liquids are served in
plastic bottles and forced directly into the mouth by squeezing. Our mess kits had spring
operated covers; our only eating utensils are tonglike devices; if we open the covers care-
fully, we can grab a mouthful of food without getting it all over the cabin.
From the start of the trip, the ship's crew has been maintaining a round-the-clock
schedule, standing eight hour watches. Captains, navigators and radio men spend most of
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theirtimecheckingandrecheckingourflighttrack,readyto startuptherocketsfora
changeincourseif anerrorturnsup.Techniciansbackup thisoperationwithreports
fromthecomplexanddelicate"electronicbrains"--computers,gyroscopes,switchboards
andotherinstruments--onthecontroldeck.Otherspecialistskeepwatchovertheair-
conditioning,temperature,pressureandoxygensystems.
Butthebusiestcrewmembersarethemaintenanceengineersandtheirassistants,
tirelessmenwhobeenbustingbackandforthbetweenshipsinceshortlyafterthevoyage
started,anxiouslycheckingpropellanttanks,tubing,rocketmotors,turbopumpsandall
othervitalequipment.Excessiveh atcouldcausedangeroushairlinecracksin therocket
motors;unexpectedlylargemeteorscouldsmasht roughthethinbumpersurrounding
thepropellanttanks;fittingscouldcomeloose.Theengineershavetobecareful.
Wearestillslowingdown.Atthestartofthefourthday,ourspeedhasdroppedto
800[59]milesanhour,onlyslightlymorethanthespeedof aconventionaljet fighter.
Ahead,theharshsurfacefeaturesof themoonareclearlyoutlined.Behind,theblue-
greenballoftheearthappearstobebarelyayardindiameter.
Ourfleetof unpoweredrocketshipsisnowpassingtheneutralpointbetweenthe
gravitationalfieldsoftheearthandthemoon.OurmomentumhasdroppedofftoalmGst
nothing--yetwe'reaboutopickupspeed.Fornowwebeginfallingtowardthemoon,
about23,600milesaway.Withnoatmospheretoslowuswe'llsmashintothemoonat
6,000milesanhourunlesswedosomethingaboutit.
Rotating the Moon Ship
This is what we do: aboard each ship, near its center of gravity is a positioning device
consisting of three fly-wheels set at right angles to one another and operated by electric
motors. One of the wheels heads in the same direction as our flight path--in other words;
along the longitudinal axis of the vehicle, like the rear wheels of a car. Another parallels
the latitudinal axis, like steering wheel of an ocean vessel. The third lies along the horizon-
tal axis like the rear steering wheel of a hook and ladder truck. If we start anyone of the
wheels spinning it causes our rocket ship to turn slowly in the other direction (pilots know
this "torque" effect as increased power causes a plane's propeller to spin more rapidly in
one direction, the pilot has to fight his controls to keep the plane from rolling in the other
direction).
The captain of our space ship orders the longitudinal flywheel set in motion. Slowly
our craft begins to cartwheel; when it has turned a revolution, it stops. We are going to-
ward the moon tail-end-first, a position which will enable us to brake our fall with our
rocket motors when the right time comes.
Tension increases aboard the three ships. The landing is tricky--so tricky that it will
be done entirely by automatic pilot, to diminish the possibility of human error. Our scien-
tists compute our rate of descent, the spot at which we expect to strike; the speed and
direction of the moon (it's traveling at 2,280 miles an hour at right angles to our path).
These and other essential statistics are fed into a tape. The tape, based on the same prin-
ciple as the player-piano roll and the automatic business-machine card, will control the
automatic pilot. (Actually, a number of tapes intended to provide for all eventualities will
be fixed up long before the flight, but last minute-checks are necessary to see which tape
to use and to see whether a manual correction of our course is required before the autopi-
lot takes over.)
Now we lower part of our landing gear--four spiderlike legs, hinged to the square
rocket assembly, which have been folded against the framework.
As we near the end of our trip, the gravity of the moon which is still to one side of us,
begins to pull us off our elliptical course, and we turn the ship to conform to this change
of direction. At an altitude of 550 miles the rocket motors begin firing; we feel the shock of
their blasts inside the personnel sphere and suddenly our weight returns. Objects which
have been not secured before hand tumble to the floor. The force of the rocket motors is
such that we have about one third our normal earth weight.
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The final 10 minutes are especially tense. The tape-guided automatic pilots are now
in full control. We fall more and more slowly, floating over the landing area like descend-
ing helicopters as we approach, the fifth leg of our landing gearma big telescoping shock
absorber which has been housed in the center of the rocket assembly is lowered through
the fiery blast of the motors. The long green rocket flames being to slash against the baked
lunar surface. Swirling clouds of brown-gray dust are thrown out sideways; they settle im-
mediately instead of hanging in air, as they would on the earth.
The broad round shoe of the telescopic landing leg digs into the soft volcanic ground.
If it strikes too hard an electronic mechanism inside it immediately calls on the rocket
motors for more power to cushion the blow. For a few seconds, we balance on the single
leg then the four outrigger legs slide out to help support the weight of the ship, and are
locked into position. The whirring of machinery dies away. There is absolute silence. We
have reached the moon.
Now we shall explore it.
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[21] Is There Life on Mars?
By Dr. Fred L. Whipple
Chairman, Department of Astronomy, Harvard University
Astronomers--planning togive the great red planet its closest scrutiny in history this summerm
are nearer than ever before to answering the most fascinating question of all.
On July 2nd, the planet Mars, swinging through its lopsided orbit around the sun,
will be closer to the earth than any time since 1941. All over the world scientists will train
batteries of telescopes and cameras on the big red sphere in history's greatest effort to
unravel some of the mystery surrounding this most intriguing of the planets.
Next to Venus, Mars is our closet planetary neighbor. Even so, it will be 40,000,000
miles away as it passes by this summer (compared to 250,000,000 miles at its farthest point
from the earth); on the most powerful of telescopes it will look no larger than a coffee
saucer. Still it will be close enough to provide astronomers important facts about its size,
atmosphere and surface conditions_and the possibility that some kind of life exists there.
We already know a great deal.
Mars's diameter is roughly half the size of the earth, the Martian day is 24 hours,
37 minutes long, but its year is nearly twice as long as ours---67 Martian days. During
daylight hours the temperature on Mars shoots into the eighties, but at night a numbing
cold grips the planet; the temperature drops suddenly to 95 below zero, Fahrenheit.
There is no evidence of oxygen on Mars's thin blue atmosphere. Moreover, its atmo-
spheric pressure is so low that an earth man couldn't survive without a pressurized suit. If
life of any kind does exist on Mars it must be extremely rugged.
Through the telescope, astronomers can clearly see Mars's great reddish deserts,
blue-tinted cloud formations and--especially conspicuous---its distinctive polar caps.
The Martian polar caps cover about 4,000,000 square miles in the wintertime--an
area roughly half the size of the North American continent. But as they melt in spring
strange blue-green areas develop near their retreating edges. Some months later these
color patches, now covering great areas of the planet's surface turn brownish, finally in the
deep of Martin Winter they're dark chocolate color. Do the seasonal color variations indi-
cate some sort of planet vegetable life? That's one of the riddles we'd like to solve.
There's another big question mark: Mars's so-called canals. Although most modern
astronomers have long since discounted the once popular theory that the faint tracings
seen by some on Mars are actually a network of waterways (and, therefore perhaps con-
structed by intelligent beings), we still don't know what they are--or if they exist at all.
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The "canals" have had a controversial history. They were first reported in 1877 by an
Italian astronomer named Giovanni Schiaparelli who said he had seen delicate lines trac-
ing a gridlike pattern over vast areas of the planet. He called them canali--'canals" or
"channels."
Since Schaparelli, many astronomers (especially Dr. Percival Lowell, who established
an observatory for the primary purpose of studying Mars) have reported observing the
delicate vein-like lines. Others,just as keensighted, have spent years studying the Martian
face without once seeing the disputed markings.
This year we may get an opportunity to clear up the canal confusion once and for all.
An American team sponsoredjoindy by the National Geographic Society and Lowell Ob-
servatory, will photograph Mars from Bloemfontein, South Africa, where Mars will appear
almost directly over head nightly during early July. The U.S. team, using new photographic
techniques and the latest in fast film emulsions, expects to get the most detailed photo-
graphs of the planet yet obtained.
But great as the 1934 Mars observation program promises to be, it's only the curtain
raiser for 1956, when Mars will approach to within 35,000,000 miles of the earth. Not for
another 15 years, in 1971, will it be so close again.
When all the finding have been evaluated we may be able to make some intelligent
guesses as to the possibilities of life on Mars. Chances are that bacteria are the only type of
animal life which could exist in a planet's oxygenless atmosphere. There also may be some
sort of tough primitive plant life--perhaps lichens or mosses which produce their own
oxygen and water. Such plants might explain the changing colors of the Martian seasons.
There's one other possibility.
How can we say with absolute certainty that there isn't a different form of life existing
on Mars--a kind of life that we know nothing about? We can't. There's only one way to
find out for sure what is on Mars--and that's to go there.
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[22] Can We Get to Mars?
By Dr. Wernher yon Braun with Cornelius Ryan
Chief, Guided Missile Development Division,
Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama
[23] Man's trial-blaxingjourney to Mars will be a breath-taking experience
-.-with problems to match
The first man who set out for Mars had better make sure they leave everything at
home in apple-pie order. They won't get back to earth for more than two and a half years.
The difficulties of a trip to Mars are formidable. The outbound journey, following a
huge arc 255,000,000 miles long, will take eight months---even with rocket ships that travel
many thousands of miles an hour. For more than a year, the explorers will have to live on
the great red planet, waiting for it to swing into a favorable position for the return trip.
Another eight months will pass before the 70 members of the pioneer expedition set foot
on earth again. All during that time, they will be exposed to a multitude of dangers and
strains, some of them impossible to foresee on the basis of today's knowledge.
Will man ever go to Mars? I am sure he will--but it will be a century or more before
he's ready. In that time scientists and engineers will learn more about the physical and
mental rigors of interplanetary flight--and about the known dangers of life on another
planet. Some of that information may become available within the next 25 years or so,
through the erection of a space station above the earth (where telescope viewings will not
be blurred by the earth's atmosphere) and through the subsequent exploration of the
moon, as described in previous issues of Collier's.
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Even now science can detail the technical requirements of a Mars expedition down
to the last ton of fuel. Our knowledge of the laws governing the solar system--so accurate
that astronomers can predict an eclipse of the sun to within a fraction of a second--en-
ables scientists to determine exactly the speed a space ship must have to reach Mars, the
course that will intercept the planet's orbit at exactly the right moment, the methods to be
used for the landing, take-off and other maneuvering. [24] We know, from these calcula-
tions, that we already have chemical rocket fuels adequate for the trip.
Better propellants are almost certain to emerge during the next 100 years. In fact,
scientific advances will undoubtedly make obsolete many of the engineering concepts on
which this article, and the accompanying illustrations, are based. Nevertheless, it's pos-
sible to discuss the problems of a flight to Mars in terms of what is known today. We can
assume, for example, that such an expedition will involve about 70 scientists and crew
members. A force that size would require a flotilla of 10 massive space ships, each weighing
more than 4,000 tons--not only because there's safety in numbers, but because of the tons
of fuel, scientific equipment, rations, oxygen, water and the like necessary for the trip and
for a stay of about 31 months away from earth.
All that information can be computed scientifically. But science can't apply a slide
rule to man; he's the unknown quantity, the weak spot that makes a Mars expedition a
project for the far distant, rather than the immediate, future. The 70 explorers will endure
hazards and stresses the like of which no men before them have ever known. Some of these
hardships must be eased--or at least better understood--before the long voyage becomes
practical.
For months at a time, during the actual period of travel, the expedition members will
be weightless. Can the human body stand prolonged weightlessness? The crews of rocket
ships plying between the ground and earth's space station about 1,000 miles away will soon
grow accustomed to the absence of gravity--but they will experience this odd sensation for
no more than a few hours at a time. Prolonged weightlessness will be a different story.
Over a period of months in outer space, muscles accustomed to fighting the pull of
gravity could shrink from disuse--just as do the muscles of people who are bedridden or
encased in plaster casts for a long time. The members of a Mars expedition might be
seriously handicapped by such a disability. Faced with a rigorous work schedule on the
unexplored planet, they will have to be strong and fit upon arrival.
The problem will have to be solved aboard the space vehicles. Some sort of elaborate
spring exercisers may be the answer. Or perhaps synthetic gravity could be produced aboard
the rocket ships by designing them to rotate as they coast through space, creating enough
centrifugal force to act as a substitute for gravity.
Far worse than the risk of atrophied muscles is the hazard of cosmic rays. An over-
dose of these deep-penetrating atomic particles, which act like the invisible radiation of an
atomic-bomb burst, can cause blindness, cell damage and possibly cancer.
Scientists have measured the intensity of cosmic radiation close to the earth. They
have learned that the rays dissipate harmlessly in our atmosphere. They also have deduced
that man can safely venture as far as the moon without risking an overdose of radiation.
But that's a comparatively brief trip. What will happen to men who are exposed to rays for
months on end? There is no material that offers practical protection against cosmic rays---
practical, that is for space travel. Space engineers could provide a barrier by making the
cabin walls of lead several feet thick--but that would add hundreds of tons to the weight of
the space vehicle. A more realistic plan might be to surround the cabin with the fuel tanks,
thus providing the added safeguard of a two- or three- foot thickness of liquid.
The best bet would seem to be a reliance on man's ingenuity; by the time an expedi-
tion from the earth is ready to take off for Mars, perhaps in the mid-2000s, it is quite likely
that researchers will have perfected a drug which will enable men to endure radiation for
comparatively long periods. Unmanned rockets, equipped with instruments which send
information back to earth, probably will blaze the first trail to our sister planet, helping to
clear up many mysteries of the journey.
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SmallMeteors Could Do Little Damage
Meteors, for example. Many billions of these tiny bullets, most of them about the size
of a grain of sand, speed wildly through space at speeds of more than 150,000 miles an
hour. For short trips, we can protect space ships from these lightning fast pellets by cover-
ing all vital areas--fuel tanks, rocket motors, cargo bins, cabins and the like--with light
metal outer shields called meteor bumpers. The tiny meteors will explode against this
outer shell, leaving the inner skin of the ship--and the occupants--unharmed.
But in the 16 months of space travel required for a visit to mars, much larger projec-
tiles might be encountered. Scientists know that the density of large meteors is greater
near the red planet than it is around the earth. If, by some chance, a rock the size of a
baseball should plow through the thin shell of one of the rocketships it could do terrible
damage--especially if it struck a large solid object inside. A meteor that size, traveling at
terrific speed, could explode with the force of 100 pounds of TNT. In the cabin of a space
vehicle, such an explosion would cause tremendous destruction.
Fortunately, meteors that size will be extremely rare, even near Mars.
Dime-sized chunks are more likely to be encountered. They will be a danger, too,
although not so bad as the larger rocks. They'll rip through the bumper and skin like
machine-gun bullets. If they strike anything solid, they'll explode with some force. If not,
they'll leave through the other side of the ship--but even then they may cause trouble
Holes will have to be plugged to maintain cabin pressure. The shock wave created by the
meteors' extreme speed may hurt the ship's occupants: there will be a deafening report
and a blinding flash; the friction created by their passage through the cabin atmosphere
will create enough heat to singe the [25] eyebrows of a man standing close by. And, of
course, a person in the direct path of a pebble-sized meteor could be severely iniured. A
fragile piece of machinery could be destroyed, and it's even possible that the entire rocket
ship would have to be abandoned after sustaining one or more hits by space projectiles
that size (astronomers estimate that one out of 10 ships on a 16-month voyage might be
damaged badly, although even that is unlikely).
If one of the Mars-bound vehicles does suffer serious damage, the incident needn't
be disastrous. In a pinch, a disabled space vehicle can be abandoned easily. All of the ships
will carry small self propelled craft--space taxis---which are easily built and easily maneu-
vered. They will be fully pressurized, and will be used for routine trips between the ships of
the convoy, as well as for emergencies. If for some reason the space taxis aren't available to
the occupants of a damaged ship, they will be able to don pressurized suits and step calmly
out into space. Individual rocket guns, manually operated, will enable each of them to
make his way to the nearest spaceship in the convoy. Space suited explorers will have no
difficulty traveling between ships. There's no air to impede motion, no gravitational pull
and no sense of speed. When they leave their ship the men will have to overcome only
their own inertia. They'll be traveling through the solar system at more than 70,000 miles
an hour, but they will be no more aware of it then we on earth are aware that every mol-
ecule of our bodies is moving at a speed of 66,600 miles an hour around the sun.
Science ultimately will solve the problems posed by cosmic rays, meteors and other
natural phenomena of space. But man will still face one great hazard: himself.
Man must breathe. He must guard himself against a great variety of illnesses and
ailments. He must be entertained. And he must be protected from many psychological
hazards, some of them still obscure.
How will science provide a synthetic atmosphere within the space-ship cabins and
Martian dwellings for two and a half years? When men are locked into a confined, airtight
area for only a few days or weeks oxygen can be replenished, and exhaled carbon dioxide
and other impurities extracted, without difficulty. Submarine engineers solved the prob-
lem long ago. But a conventional submarine surfaces after a brief submersion and blows
out its stale air. High-altitude pressurized aircraft have mechanisms which automatically
introduce fresh air and expel contaminated air.
There's no breathable air in space or on Mars; the men who visit the red planet will
have to carry with them enough oxygen to last many months.
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When Men Live Too Close Together
During that time they will live, work and perform all bodily functions within the
cramped confines of a rocket-ship cabin or a pressurized--and probably mobile--Martian
dwelling. (I believe the first men to visit Mars will take along inflatable, spherical cabins,
perhaps 30 feet across, which can be mounted atop tractor chassis.) Even with plenty of
oxygen, the atmosphere in those living quarters is sure to pose a problem.
Within the small cabins, the expedition members will wash, perform personal func-
tions, sweat, cough, cook, create garbage. Every one of those activities will feed poisons
into the synthetic air--just as they do within the earth's atmosphere.
No less than 29 toxic agents are generated during the daily routine of the average
American household. Some of them are body wastes, others come from cooking. When
you fry an egg, the burned fat releases a potent irritant called acrolein. Its effect is negli-
gible on earth because the amount is so small that it's almost instandy dissipated in the air.
But that microscopic quandty of acrolein in the personnel quarters of a Mars expedition
could prove dangerous; unless there was some way to remove it from the atmosphere it
would be circulated again and again through the air-conditioning system.
Besides the poisons resulting from cooking and the like, the engineering equipment--
lubricants, hydraulic fluids, plastics, the metals in the vehicles---will give off vapors which
could contaminate the atmosphere.
What can be done about this problem? No one has all the answers right now, but
there's litde doubt that by using chemical filters, and by cooling and washing the air as it
passes through the air-conditioning apparatus, the synthetic atmosphere can be made safe
to live in.
Besides removing the impurities from the man-made air, it may be necessary to add a
few. Man has lived so long with the impurities in the earth's atmosphere that no one knows
whether he can exist without them. By the time of the Mars expedition, the scientists may
decide to add traces of dust, smoke and oil to the synthetic air--and possibly iodine and
salt as well.
I am convinced that we have, or will acquire, the basic knowledge to solve all the
physical problems of a flight to Mars. But how about the psychological problem? Can a
man retain his sanity while cooped up with many other men in a crowded area, perhaps
twice the length of your living room, for more then thirty months?
Share a small room with a dozen people completely cut off from the outside world.
In a few weeks the irritations begin to pile up. At the end of [26] a few months, particularly
if the occupants of the room are chosen haphazardly, someone is likely to go berserk.
Little mannerisms--the way a man cracks his knuckles, blows his nose, the way he grins,
talks or gestures---create tension and hatred which could lead to murder.
Imagine yourself in a space ship millions of miles from earth. You see the same people
every day. The earth, with all it means to you, is just another bright star in the heavens; you
aren't sure you'll ever get back to it. Every noise about the rocket ship suggests a break-
down, every crash a meteor collision. If somebody does crack, you can't call off the expedi-
tion and return to earth. You'll have to take him with you.
The psychological problem probably will be at its worst during the two eight-month
travel periods. On Mars, there will be plenty to do, plenty to see. To be sure, there will be
certain problems on the planet, too. There will be considerable confinement. The scenery
is likely to be grindingly monotonous. The threat of danger from some unknown source
will hang over the explorers constandy. So will the knowledge that an extremely compli-
cated process, subject to possible breakdown, will be required to get them started on their
way back home. Still, Columbus's crew at sea faced much the same problems the explorers
will face on Mars: the fifteenth-century sailors felt the psychological tension, but no one
went mad.
But Columbus traveled only ten weeks to reach America; certainly his men would
never have stood an eight-month voyage. The travelers to Mars will [27] have to, and psy-
chologists undoubtedly will make careful plans to keep up the morale of the voyagers.
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The fleet will be in constant radio communication with the earth (there probably will
be no television transmission, owing to the great distance). Radio programs will help re-
lieve the boredom, but it's possible that the broadcasts will be censored before transmis-
sion; there's no way of telling how a man might react, say, to the news that his home town
was the center of a flood disaster. Knowing would do him no good--and it might cause
him to crack.
Besides radio broadcasts, each ship will be able to receive (and send) radio pictures.
There also will be films which can be circulated among the space ships. Reading matter
will probably be carried in the form of microfilms to save space. These activities--plus
frequent intership visiting, lectures and crew rotations--will help to relieve the monotony.
There is another possibility, seemingly fantastic but worth mentioning briefly be-
cause experimentation already has indicated it may be practical. The nonworking mem-
bers of a Mars expedition may actually hibernate during part of the long voyage. French
doctors have induced a kind of artificial hibernation in certain patients for short periods
in connection with operations for which they will need all their strength (Collier's Decem-
ber 11, 1953---Medicine's New Offensive Against Shock, byJ.D. Ratcliff). The process in-
volves a lowering of the body temperature, and the subsequent slowing down of all normal
physical processes. On a Mars expedition, such a procedure, over a longer [28] period,
would solve much of the psychological problem, would cut sharply into the amount of
food required for the trip, and would, if successful, leave the expedition members in su-
perb physical condition for the ordeal of exploring the planet.
Certainly if a Mars expedition were planned for the next 10 or 15 years, no one
would seriously consider hibernation as a solution for any of the problems of the trip. But
we're talking of a voyage to be made 100 years from now; I believe that if the French
experiments bear fruit, hibernation may actually be considered at that time.
Finally, there has been one engineering development which may also simplify both
the psychological and physical problems of a Mars voyage. Scientists are on the track of a
new fuel, useful only in the vacuum of space, which would be so economical that it would
make possible far greater speeds for space journeys, it could be used to shorten the travel
time, or to lighten the load of each space ship, or both. Obviously, a four- or six-month
Mars flight would create far fewer psychological hazards than a trip lasting eight months.
In any case, it seems certain that members of an expedition to Mars will have to be
selected with great care. Scientists estimate that only one person in every 6,000 will be
qualified, physically, mentally and emotionally, for routine space flight. But can 70 men be
found who will have those qualities--and also the scientific background necessary to ex-
plore Mars? I'm sure of it.
One day a century or so from now, a fleet of rocket ships will take off for Mars. The
trip could be made with 10 ships launched from an orbit 1,000 miles out in space, that
girdles our globe at its equator. (It would take tremendous power and vast quantities of
fuel to leave directly from the earth. Launching a Mars voyage from an orbit about
1,000 miles out, far from the earth's gravitational pull, will require relatively little fuel.)
The Mars-bound vehicles, assembled in the orbit, will look like bulky bundles of girders,
with propellant tanks hung on the outside and great passenger cabins perched on top.
Three of them will have torpedo-shaped noses and massive wings---dismanded, but strapped
to their sides for future use. Those bullet noses will be detached and will serve as landing
craft, the only vehicles that will actually land on the neighbor planet. When the 10 ships
are 5,700 miles from the earth, they will cut off their rocket motors; from there on, they
will coast unpowered toward Mars.
After eight months they will swing into an orbit around Mars, about 600 miles up,
and adjust speed to keep from hurtling into space again. The expedition will take this
intermediate step, instead of preceding directly to Mars, for two main reasons: first, the
ships (except for the three detachable torpedo-shaped noses) will lack the streamlining
required for flight in the Martian atmosphere; second, it will be more economical to avoid
carrying all the fuel needed for the return to earth (which now comprises the bulk of the
cargo) all the way down to Mars and then back up again.
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Upon reaching the 600-mile orbit--and after some exploratory probings of Mars's
atmosphere with unmanned rockets--the first of the three landing craft will be assembled.
The torpedo nose will be unhooked, to become the fuselage of a rocket plane. The wings
and set of landing skis will be attached, and the plane launched toward the surface of
Mars.
The landing of the first plane will be made on the planet's snow covered polar cap--
the only spot where there is any reasonable certainty of finding a smooth surface. Once
down, the pioneer landing party will unload its tractors and supplies, inflate its balloon-
like living quarters, and start on a 4,000 mile overland journey to the Martian equator,
where the expedition's Main base will be set up (it is the most livable part of the planet--
well within the area that scientists want most to investigate). At the equator, the advance
party will construct a landing strip for the other two rocket planes. (The first landing craft
will be abandoned at the pole.)
In all, the expedition will remain on the planet 15 months. That's a long time--but it
still will be too short to learn all that science would like to know about Mars.
When, at last, Mars and the earth begin to swing toward each other in the heavens,
and it's time to go back, the two ships that landed on the equator will be stripped of their
wings and landing gear, set on their tails and, at the proper moment, rocketed back to the
600-mile orbit on the flat leg of the return journey.
What curious information will these first explorers carry back from Mars? Nobody
knows--and its extremely doubtful that anyone now living will ever know. All that can be
said with certainty today is this: the trip can be made, and will be made...someday.
Document 1-17
Document rifle: Statement by James C. Hagerty, The White House, July 29, 1955.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA Headquar-
ters, Washington, D.C.
NSC 5520, "Draft Statement of Policy on U.S. Scientific Satellite Program," recom-
mended the creation of a scientific satellite program as part of the International Geophysi-
cal Year (IGY) as well as the development of satellites for reconnaissance purposes. Based
upon this report, the National Security Council approved the IGY satellite on May 26,
1955. However, it was not until July 28 that a public announcement was made during an
oral briefing at the White House. The formal statement was dated July 29. This statement
emphasized that the satellite program was intended to be the U.S. contribution to the IGY
and that the scientific data was to benefit scientists of all nations.
The White House
Statement by James C. Hagerty
July 29, 1955
On behalf of the President, I am now announcing that the President has approved
plans by this country for going ahead with launching of small unmanned earth-circling
satellites as part of the United States participation in the International Geophysical Year
which takes place between July 1957 and December 1958. This program will for the first
time in history enable scientists throughout the world to make sustained observations in
the regions beyond the earth's atmosphere.
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ThePresidentexpressedpersonalgratificationthattheAmericanprogramwillpro-
videscientistsofallnationsthisimportantanduniqueopportunityfortheadvancement
ofscience.
Documents 1-18 and 1-19
Document rifle: EC. Durant, "Report of Meetings of Scientific Advisory Panel on Uniden-
tiffed Flying Objects Covered by Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA, January 14-18,1953,"
February 16, 1953.
Document title: "Air Force's 10 Year Study of Unidentified Hying Objects," Department
of Defense, Office of Public Information, News Release No. 1083-58, November 5, 1957.
Sources: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA Headquar-
ters, Washington, D.C.
This CIA report on Unidentified Flying Objects (UFOs), which was declassified in
December 1974, is frequently cited by UFO conspiracy theorists who claim that the gov-
ernment is covering up knowledge of extraterrestrial visits. Several studies of UFOs were
conducted by the U.S. military throughout the 1950s and 1960s, partly out of Cold War
concern that UFOs were actually Soviet spycraft, and partly in response to public outcry.
Document 1-18
Report of Meetings of the
Office of Scientific Intelligence Scientific Advisory Panel
on Unidentified Flying Objects
Covered by Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA
January 14-18, 1953
[1] MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
FROM: F. C. Durant
SUBJECT: Report of Meetings of the Office of Scientific Intelligence Scientific Advisory
Panel on Unidentified Flying Objects,January 14- 18, 1953
PURPOSE:
The purpose of this memorandum is to present:
a. A brief history of the meetings of the O/SI Advisory Panel On Unidentified Flying
Objects (Part I),
b. An unofficial supplement to the official Panel Report to AD/SI setting forth com-
ments and suggestions of the Panel Members which they believed were inappropriate for
inclusion in the formal report (Part II).
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Part I: History of Meetings
General
After consideration of the subject of"unidentified flying objects" at the 4 Decem-
ber meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the following action was agreed:
'¢I'he Director of Central Intelligence will:
a. Enlist the services of selected scientists to review and appraise the available evi-
dence in the light of pertinent scientific theories...."
Following the delegation of this action to the Assistant Director for Scientific Intelli-
gence and preliminary investigation, [2] an Advisory Panel of selected scientists was
assembled. In cooperation with the Air Technical Intelligence Center, case histories of
reported sightings and related material were made available for their study and consider-
ation.
Present at the initial meeting (0930 Wednesday, 14January) were: Dr. H P. Robertson,
Dr. Luis W. Alvares, Dr. Thornton Page, Dr. Samuel A. Goudsmit, Mr. Philip G. Strong, Lt.
Col. Frederick C. E. Oder (P&E Division), Mr. David B. Stevenson (W&E Division), and
the writer. Panel Member, Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner, was absent until Friday afternoon. Messrs.
Oder and Stevenson were present throughout the sessions to familiarize themselves with
the subject, represent the substantive interest of their Divisions, and assist in administra-
tive support of the meetings. (A list of personnel concerned with the meetings is given in
Tab A.)
Wednesday Morning
The AD/SI opened the meeting, reviewing CIA interest in the subject and action
taken. This review included the mention of the O/SI Study Group of August 1952 (Strong,
Eng, and Durant) culminating in the briefing of the DCI, the ATIC November 21 briefing,
4 December IAC consideration, visit to ATIC (Chadwell, Robertson and Durant), and
O/SI concern over potential dangers to national security indirecdy related to these sighdngs.
Mr. Strong enumerated these potential dangers. Following this introduction, Mr. Chadwell
turned the meeting over to Dr. Robertson as Chairman of the Panel. Dr. Robertson enu-
merated the evidence available and requested consideration of specific reports and letters
be taken by certain individuals present (Tab B). For example, case histories involving ra-
dar or radar and visual sighdngs were selected for Dr. Alvares while reports of Green Fire-
ball phenomena, nocturnal lights, and suggested programs of investigations were routed
to Dr. Page. Following these remarks, the motion pictures of the sightings at Tremonton,
Utah (2July 1952) and Great Falls, Montana (15 August 1950) were shown. The meeting
adjourned at 1200.
Wednesday Afternoon
The second meeting of the Panel opened at 1400. Lt. R. S. Neasham, USN, and Mr.
Harry Woo of the USN Photo Interpretation Laboratory, Anacostia, presented the results
of their analyses of the films mentioned above. This analysis evolved considerable discus-
sion as elaborated upon below. Besides Panel members and CIA personnel, Capt. E.J.
Ruppelt, Dr. J. Allen Nyack, Mr. DeweyJ. Fournet, Capt. Harry B. Smith (2-e-2), and Dr.
Stephen Possony were present.
Following the Photo Interpretation Lab presentation, Mr. E.J. Ruppelt spoke for
about 40 minutes on ATIC methods of handling and evaluating reports of sighting and
their efforts to improve the quality of reports. The meeting was adjourned at 1715.
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Thursday Morning
The third and fourth meetings of the Panel were held Thursday, 15 January, com-
mencing at 0900 with a two-hour break for luncheon. Besides Panel members and CIA
personnel, Mr. Ruppelt and Dr. Hynak were present for both sessions. In the morning, Mr.
Ruppelt continued his briefing on ATIC collection and analysis procedures. The Project
STORK support at Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, was described by Dr. Hynek. A
number of case histories were discussed in detail and a motion picture fihn of seagulls was
shown. A two hour break for lunch was taken at 1200.
Thursday _gL.'rnoon
At 1400 hours Lt. Col. Oder gave a 40-minute briefing of Project "I_INKLE the
investigatory project conducted by the Air Force Meteorological Research Center at Cam-
bridge, Mass. In this briefing he pointed out the many problems of setting up and man-
ning 24-hour instrumentation watches of patrol cameras searching for sighungs of U.EO. 's_
At 1615 Brig. Gen. William N. Garland joined the meeting with AD/SI. General
Garland expressed his support of the Panel's efforts and stated three personal opinions:
a. That greater use of Air Force intelligence officers in the field (for follow-up inves-
tigation) appeared desirable, but that they required thorough briefing.
b. That vigorous effort should be made to declassify as many of the reports as possible.
c. That some increase in the ATIC section devoted to U.EO. analysis was indicated.
This meeting was adjourned at 1700.
Friday Morning
The fifth session of the Panel convened at 0900 with the same personnel present as
enumerated for Thursday (with the exception of Brig. Gen. Garland).
From 0900-100 [6] there was general discussion and study of reference material,
Also, Dr. Hynek read a prepared paper making certain observations and conclusions. At
1000 Mr. Fournet gave a briefing on his fifteen months experience in Washington as Project
Office for U.F.O.'s and his personal conclusions. There was considerable discussion of
individual case histories of sightings to which he referred. Following Mr. Fournet's presen-
tation, a number of additional case histories were examined and discussed with Messrs.
Fournet, Ruppelt, and Hynek. The meeting adjourned at 1200 for luncheon.
r, iaay a/t_,-,,o_
This session opened at 1400. Besides Panel members and CIA personnel, Dr. Hynek
was present. Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner, as Panel Member, was present at this meeting for the
first time. Progress of the meetings was reviewed by the Panel Chairman and tentative [6]
conclusions reached. A general discussion followed and tentative recommendations con-
sidered. It was agreed that the Chairman should draft a report of the Panel to AD/SI that
evening for review by the Panel the next morning. The meeting adjourned at 1715.
Saturday Morning
At 0945 the Chairman opened the seventh session and submitted a rough draft of
the Panel Report to the members. This draft had been reviewed and approved earlier by
Dr. Berkner. The next two and one-half hours were consumed in discussion and revision of
the draft. At 1100 the AD/SI joined the meeting and reported that he had shown and
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discussed a copy of the initial rough draft to the Director of Intelligence, USAF, whose
reaction was favorable. At 1200 the meeting was adjourned.
Saturday apernoon
At 1400 the eighth and final meeting of the Panel was opened. Discussions and re-
wording of certain sentences of the Report occupied the first hour. (A copy of the final
report is appended as Tab C.) This was followed by a review of work accomplished by the
Panel, and restatement of individual Panel Member's opinions and suggestions on details
that were felt inappropriate for inclusion in the formal report. It was agreed that the writer
would incorporate these comments in an internal report to the AD/SI. The material be-
low represents this information.
Part VI: Comments and Suggestions of Panel
General
The Panel Members were impressed (as have been others, including O/SI person-
nel) in the lack of sound data in the great majority of case histories; also, in the lack of
speedy follow-up due primarily to the modest size and limited facilities of the ATIC section
concerned. Among the case histories of significant sightings discussed in detail were the
following:
Bellefontaine, Ohio (1 August 1952); Tremonton, Utah (2 July 1952); Great Falls,
Montana (15 August 1950); Yaak, Montana (1 September 1952); Washington, D.C. area
(19July 1952); and Haneda A.EB.,Japan (5 August 1952), Port Huran, Michigan (29July
1952); and Presque Isle, Maine (10 October 1952).
After review and discussion of these cases (and about 15 others, in less detail), the
Panel concluded that reasonable explanations could be suggested for most sightings and
"by deduction and scientific method it could be induced (given additional data) that other
cases might be explained in a similar manner." The Panel pointed out that because of the
brevity of some sightings (e.g. 2-5 seconds) and the inability of the witnesses to express
themselves clearly (sometimes) that conclusive explanations could not be expected for
every case reported. Furthermore, it was considered that, normally, it would be a great
waste of effort to try to solve most of the sightings, unless such action would benefit a
training and educational program (see below). The writings of Charles Fort were refer-
enced [8] to show that "strange things in the sky" had been recorded for hundreds of
years. It appeared obvious that there was no single explanation for a majority of the things
seen. The presence of radar and astronomical specialists on the Panel proved of value at
once in their confident recognition of phenomena related to their fields. It was apparent
that specialists in such additional fields as psychology, meteorology, aerodynamics, orni-
thology and military air operations would extend the ability of the Panel to recognize
many more categories of little-known phenomena.
On Lack of Danger
The Panel concluded unanimously that there was no evidence of a direct threat to
national security in the objects sighted. Instances of "Foo Fighters" were cited. These were
unexplained phenomena sighted by aircraft pilots during World War II in both European
and Far East theaters of operation wherein "balls of light" would fly near or with the air-
craft and maneuver rapidly. They were believed to be electrostatic (similar to St. Elmo's
fire) or electromagnetic phenomena or possibly light reflections from ice crystals in the
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air, but their exact cause or nature was never defined. Both Robertson and Alvarez had
been concerned in the investigation of these phenomena, but David T. Griggs (Professor
of Geophysics at the University of California at I.os Angeles) is believed to have been the
most knowledgeable person on this subject. If the term "flying saucers" had been popular
in 1943-1945, these objects would [9] have been so labeled. It was interesting that in at
least two cases reviewed that the object sighted was categorized by Robertson and Alvarez
as probably "Foo Fighters" to date unexplained but not dangerous; they were not happy
thus to dismiss the sightings by calling them names, hwas their feeling that these phenom-
ena are not beyond the domain of present knowledge of physical science, however.
Air Force Reporting System
It was the Panel's opinion that some of the Air Force concern over U.EO.'s (notwith-
standing Air Defense Command anxiety over fast radar tracks) was probably caused by
public pressure. The result today is that the Air Force has instituted a fine channel for
receiving reports of nearly anything anyone sees in the sky and fails to understand. This
has been particularly encouraged in popular articles on this and other subjects, such as
space travel and science fiction. The result is the mass receipt of low-grade reports which
tend to overload channels of communication with material quite irrelevant to hostile ob-
jects that might some day appear. The Panel agreed generally that this mass of poor-quality
reports containing little, if any, scientific data was of no value. Quite the opposite, it was
possibly dangerous in having a military service foster public concern in "nocturnal mean-
dering lights." The implication being, since the interested agency was military, that these
objects were or might be potential direct threats to national security. Accordingly, the
need for deemphasisation made itself apparent. Comments on a possible educational pro-
gram are enumerated below.
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Tab C
SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY PANEL ON
UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECTS
14 - 17January 1953
Field of Competence Organization
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Document 1-19
[1] Air Force's 10 Year
Study of Unidentified Flying Objects
November 5, 1957
In response to queries as to results of previous investigation of Unidentified Flying
Object reports, the Air Force said today that after 10 years of investigation and evaluation
of UFO's, no evidence has been discovered to confirm the existence of so-called "Flying
Saucers."
Reporting, investigation, analysis and evaluation procedures have improved consid-
erably since the first sighting of a "flying saucer" was made on 27June 1947. The study and
analysis of reported sightings of UFO's is conducted by a selected scientific group under
the supervision of the Air Force.
Dr.J. Allen Hynek, Professor of Astrophysics and Astronomy at Ohio State University,
is the Chief Scientific Consultant to the Air Force on the subject of Unidentified Flying
Objects.
The selected, qualified scientists, engineers, and other personnel involved in these
analyses are completely objective and open minded on the subject of "flying saucers." They
apply scientific methods of examination to all cases in reaching their conclusions. The
attempted identification of the phenomenon observed is generally derived from human
impressions and interpretations and not from scientific devices or measurements. The
data in the sightings reported are almost invariably subjective in nature. However, no re-
port is considered unsuitable for study and categorization and no lack of valid evidence of
physical matter in the case studies is assumed to be "prima facie" evidence that so-called
"flying saucers" or interplanetary vehicles do not exist.
General categories of identification are balloons, aircraft, astronomical, other, insuf-
ficient data and unknowns.
Approximately 4,000 balloons are released in the U. S. every day. There are two gen-
eral types of balloons: weather balloons and upper-air research balloons. Balloons will
vary from small types 4 feet in diameter to large types 200 feet in diameter. The majority
released at night carry running lights which often contribute to weird or unusual appear-
ances when observed at night. This also holds true when observed near dawn or sunset
because of the effect of the slant rays of the sun upon the balloon surfaces. The large
balloons, if caught in jet streams, may assume a near horizontal position when partially
inflated, and move with speeds of over 200 MPH. Large types may be [2] observed flat-
tened on top. The effect of the latter two conditions can be starding even to experienced
pilots.
Many modern aircraft, particularly swept and delta wing types, under adverse weather
and sighting conditions are reported as unusual objects and "flying saucers." When ob-
served at high altitudes, reflecting sunlight off their surfaces, or when only their jet ex-
hausts are visible at night, aircraft can have appearances ranging from disc to rocket in
shape. Single jet bombers having multi-jet pods under their swept-back wings have been
reported as UFOs or "saucers" in 'W" formation. Vapor trails will often appear to glow with
fiery red or orange streaks when reflecting sunlight. Afterburners are frequently reported
as UFOs.
The astronomical category includes bright stars, planets, meteors, comets, and other
celestial bodies. When observed through haze, light fog, or moving clouds, the planets
Venus, Mars, and Jupiter have often been reported as unconventional, moving objects.
Attempts to observe astronomical bodies through hand-held binoculars under adverse sky
conditions has been a source of many UFO reports.
The "other" category includes reflections, searchlights, birds, kites, blimps, clouds,
sun-dogs, spurious radar indications, hoaxes, firework displays, flares, fireballs, ice
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crystals, bolides, etc., as examples: Large Canadian geese flying low over a city at night,
with street lights reflecting off their bodies; searchlights playing on scattered clouds, ap-
pearing as moving disc-like shapes.
The insufficient data category include all sightings where essential or pertinent items
of information are missing, making it impossible to form a valid conclusion. These include
description of the size, shape or color of the object; direction and altitude; exact time and
location; wind weather conditions, etc. This category is not used as a convenient way to get
rid of what might be referred to as "unknowns." However, if the data received is insuffi-
cient or unrelated, the analysts must then place that particular report in this category. The
Air Force needs complete information to reach a valid conclusion. Air Force officials stressed
the fact that an observer should send a complete report of a bona fide sighting to the
nearest Air Force activity. There the report will be promptly forwarded to the proper office
for analysis and evaluation.
A sighting is considered an "unknown" when a report contains all pertinent data
necessary to normally suggest at least one valid hypothesis on the cause or explanation of
the sighting but when the description of the object and its maneuvers cannot be corre-
lated with any known object or phenomenon. In its Project Blue Book Special Report #14,
released in October, 1955, the Air Force showed that evaluated sightings in the "unknown"
category had been reduced to 3 percent at that time.
Previously "unknown" sightings had been 9% in 1953 and 1954 and in the previous
years "flying saucer" sightings had run as high as 20% "unknowns." Project Blue Book
Special Report #14, covered "flying saucer" investigations from June 1947 to May 1955.
Latest Air Force statistics show the number of unknowns has since been reduced to less
than 2%.
[3] The following table presents the results of the evaluation of all reports received by
the Air Force from the time that Project Blue Book, Special Report #14, was completed
through June 1957. The table gives the percentage of all the reports received by the Air
Force during each time period.
1955 1956 1957
June thru January thru
December June
Balloons 27.4% 26.0% 26.4%
Aircraft 29.3% 24.6% 28.8%
Astronomical 20.1% 26.3% 24.4%
Other (Hoax, searchlight, birds, etc.) 12.3% 6.8% 6.4%
Insufficient Information 8.8% 14.1% 12.1%
Unknown 2.1% 2.2% 1.9%
TOTAL NUMBER OF SIGHTINGS 273 778 250
Air Force conclusions for the ten years of UFO sightings involving approximately
5,700 reports were: first, there is no evidence that the "unknowns" were inimical or hostile;
second, there is no evidence that these "unknowns" were interplanetary space ships; third,
there is no evidence that these unknowns represented technological developments or prin-
ciples outside the range of our present day scientific knowledge; fourth, there is no evi-
dence that these "unknowns" were a threat to the security of the country; and finally there
was no physical or material evidence, not even a minute fragment, of a so-called "flying
saucer" was ever found.
The Air Force emphasized the belief that if more immediate detailed objective obser-
vational data could have been obtained on the "unknowns" these too would have been
satisfactorily explained.
A critical examination of the reports revealed that a high percentage of them were
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submittedbyseriouspeople,mystifiedbywhatheyhadseenandmotivatedbypatriotic
responsibility.
ReportsofUFOshavearousedmuchinterestonthissubjectthroughoutthecountry
andanumberofcivilianclubs,committeesandorganizationshavebeenformedtostudy
orinvestigateairphenomena.Theseprivateorganizationsarenotgovernmentalagencies
anddonotreflectofficialopinionwith respect to their theories or beliefs based upon
observed phenomena or illusions.
No books, motion pictures, pamphlets, or other informational material on the sub-
ject of unidentified flying objects have been cleared, sponsored, or otherwise coordinated
by the U. S. Air Force, with the exception of the official press releases issued by Headquar-
ters, USAF, in Washington.
The Air Force, assigned the responsibility for the Air Defense of the United States,
will continue to investigate, through the Air Defense Command, all reports of unusual
aerial objects over the U.S., including objects that may become labeled Unidentified Fly-
ing Objects. The services of qualified scientists and technicians will continue to be utilized
to investigate and analyze these reports, and periodic public statements will be made as
warranted.
END
[1 ] Summary
(Analysis of Reports of Unidentified Aerial Objects)
Reports of unidentified aerial objects (popularly termed 'Tlying saucers" or "flying
discs") have been received by the U.S. Air Force since mid-1947 from many and diverse
sources. Although there was no evidence that the unexplained reports of unidentified
objects constituted a threat to the security of the United States, the Air Force determined
that all reports of unidentified aerial objects should be investigated and evaluated to deter-
mine if "flying saucers" represented technological developments not known to this coun-
try.
In order to discover any pertinent trend or pattern inherent in the data, and to
evaluate or explain any trend or pattern found, appropriate methods of reducing these
data from reports of unidentified aerial objects to a form amenable to scientific appraisal
were employed. In general, the original data upon which this study was bases consisted of
impressions and interpretations of apparently unexplainable events, and seldom contained
reliable measurements of physical attributes. This subjectivity of the data presented a ma-
jor limitation to the drawing of significant conclusions, but did not invalidate the applica-
tion of scientific methods of study.
The reports received by the U.S. Air Force on unidentified aerial objects were re-
duced to IBM punched-card abstracts of data by means of logically developed forms and
standardized evaluation procedures. Evaluation of sighting reports, a crucial step in the
preparation of the data for statistical treatment, consisted of an appraisal of the reports
and the subsequent categorization of the object or objects described in each report. A
detailed description of this phase of the study stresses the careful attempt to maintain
complete objectivity and consistency.
Analysis of the refined and evaluated data derived from the original reports of sigh tings
consisted of (1) a systematic attempt to ferret out any distinguishing characteristics inher-
ent in the data of any of their segments, (2) a concentrated study of any trend or pattern
found, and (3) an attempt to determine the probability that any of the UNKNOWNS rep-
resent observations of technological developments not known to this country.
The first step in the analysis of the data revealed the existence of certain apparent
similarities between cases of objects definitely identified and those not identified. Statisti-
cal methods of testing when applied indicated a low probability that these apparent simi-
larities were significant. An attempt to determine the probability that any of the
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UNKNOWNS represented observations of technological developments not known to this
country necessitated a thorough re-examination and re-evaluation of the cases of objects
not originally identified; this led to the conclusion that this probability was very small.
[2] The special study which resulted in this report (Analysis of Reports of Unidentified
Aerial Objects, 5 May 1955) started in 1953. To provide the study group with a complete
set of files, the information cut-offdate was established as of the end of 1952. It will accord-
ingly be noted that the statistics contained in all charts and tables in this report are termi-
nated with the year 1952. In these charts, 3201 cases have been used.
As the study progressed, a constant program was maintained for the purpose of
making comparisons between the current cases received after 1 January 1953, and those
being used for the report. This was done in order that any change or significant trend
which might arise from current developments could be incorporated in the summary of
this report.
The 1953 and 1954 cases show a general and expected trend of increasing percent-
ages in the finally identified categories. They also show decreasing percentages in catego-
ries where there was insufficient information and those where the phenomena could not
be explained. This trend had been anticipated in the light of improved reporting and
investigating procedures.
Official reports on hand at the end of 1954 totaled 4834. Of these, 425 were pro-
duced in 1953 and 429 in 1954. These 1953 and 1954 individual reports (a total of 854),
were evaluated on the same basis as were those received before the end of 1952. The
results are as follows:
Balloons 16 per cent
Aircraft 20 per cent
Astronomical 25 per cent
Other 13 per cent
Insufficient Information 17 per cent
Unknown 9 per cent
As the study of the current cases progressed, it became increasingly obvious that if
reporting and investigating procedures could be further improved, the percentages of
those cases which contained insufficient information and those remaining unexplained
would be greatly reduced. The key to a higher percentage of solutions appeared to be in
rapid "on the spot" investigations by trained personnel. On the basis of this, a revised
program was established by Air Force Regulation 200-2, Subject: "Unidentified Flying
Objects Reporting" (Short Title: UFOB), dated 12 August 1954.
This new program, which had begun to show marked results before January 1955,
provided primarily that the 4602d Air Intelligence Service Squadron (Air Defense Com-
mand) would carry out all field investigations. This squadron has sufficient units and is so
deployed as to be able to arrive "on the spot" within a very short time after a report is
received. After treatment by the 4602d Air Intelligence Service Squadron, all information
is supplied to the Air Technical Intelligence Center for final evaluation. This cooperative
program has resulted, since 1January 1955, in reducing the insufficient information cases
to seven percent and the unknown cases to three percent of the totals.
[3] The period 1 January 1955 to 5 May 1955 accounted for 131 unidentified aerial
object reports received. Evaluation percentages of these are as follows:
Balloons 26 per cent
Aircraft 21 per cent
Astronomical 23 per cent
Other 20 per cent
Insufficient Information 7 per cent
Unknown 3 per cent
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All available data were included in this study which was prepared by a panel of scien-
tists both in an out of the Air Force. On the basis of this study it is believed that all the
unidentified aerial objects could have been explained if more complete observational data
had been available. Insofar as the reported aerial objects which still remain unexplained
are concerned, there exists litre information other than the impressions and interpreta-
tions of their observers. As these impressions and interpretations have been replaced by
the use of improved methods of investigation and reporting, and by scientific analysis, the
number of unexplained cases has decreased rapidly towards the vanishing point.
Therefore, on the basis of this evaluation of the information, it is considered to be
highly improbably that reports of unidentified aerial objects examined in this study repre-
sent observations of technological developments outside of the range of presen t-day scien-
tific knowledge. It is emphasized that there has been a complete lack of any valid evidence
of physical matter in any case of a reported unidentified aerial object.

Chapter Two
Origins of U.S. Space Policy:
Eisenhower, Open Skies, and
Freedom of Space
by R. Cargill Hall
During World War II, America's civilian and military leadership embraced scientific
research for a multitude of advanced weapons.' Indeed, at war's end in 1945, General
H.H. Arnold, commander of the Army Air Forces, could confidently assure Secretary of
War Robert Patterson that the United States would shortly build long-range ballistic mis-
siles to deliver atomic explosives and "space ships capable of operating outside the atmo-
sphere. ''= Thirteen years later, both of the programs that Arnold forecast were underway.
This period, the immediate prelude to the space age, spawned America's civil and military
space programs--programs that were in the beginning opposite sides of the same coin.
These programs were shaped and initiated at the direction of one U.S. president, Dwight
D. Eisenhower. Elements of them would become instrumental in forewarning of surprise
attack, monitoring compliance with international treaties, and maintaining a delicate peace
between the Soviet Union and the United States. For contemporary reasons of national
security, the actions that framed this enterprise and the space policy that President
Eisenhower and his advisors created for it were made obscure even to many of those di-
rectly involved.
Beginnings of the American Space Program
When in late 1945 General Arnold counseled the secretary of war on prospective
weapon developments, he also acted to ensure that the Army Air Forces would in the
future be equipped with modern weapons superior to any held by a potential adversary.
The Army Air Forces commander set up an independent consultant group, Project RAND,
to perform operations research and provide advice. To guide a formative RAND and over-
see aeronautical research, he created a new position at Army Air Forces headquarters, that
of Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Research and Development. Arnold selected Major Gen-
eral Curtis E. LeMay for this position, a young man with a reputation for accomplishing
formidable assignments?
During 1946 and 1947, at a time of demobilization and declining budgets, LeMay
directed improvements in research and development. In March 1946, among the first in-
vestigations at Project RAND, he asked for an engineering analysis of an Earth satellite
1. Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), Chapters 19 and 20.
2. U.S. Army Air Forces, Third Report of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forl:e_ to the Secretary _ War,
by General H.H. Arnold, November 12, 1945, p. 68.
3. Project RAND was contracted to the DouglasAircraft Company m Santa Monica, Caliiornia. "[he acro-
nym is thought by some old-timers to represent Research and Development, and by others, Research fo_ America's
National Defense. See Bruce L.R. Smith, The Rand Corporatwn: Case Stud), o] a N_m-p_dit Advisory ('o_po_atio_
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 40-47.
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vehicle' after learning of a similar investigation at the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics? He
wanted the RAND evaluation completed swiftly, in time to match the Navy presentation
scheduled for the next meeting of the War Department's Aeronautical Board. 6Represen-
tatives of the Army Air Forces and the Navy presented their preliminary findings at a May
15, 1946, meeting of the board's Research and Development Committee. Although RAND
engineers ruled out the satellite as a weapons carrier, they claimed for it a number of
important military support functions, including meteorological observation of cloud pat-
terns and short-range weather forecasting, strategic reconnaissance, and the relaying of
military communications.' [11-2] The Navy representatives likewise emphasized using Earth
satellites in defense support applications: for fleet communications and as a navigation
platform from which to guide missiles and pilotless aircraft? The military members, how-
ever, could not agree on a joint satellite program or confirm that these uses of an Earth
satellite would justify the anticipated costs of building, launching, and operating such a
vehicle.
Studies of automatic Earth satellites continued at RAND and the Navy Bureau of
Aeronautics while the post-war armed services jockeyed for position in a sweeping military
reorganization. President Truman signed the National Security Act on July 26, 1947, that
created the National Military Establishment and separate military departments of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force. Beginning in September 1947, the three service secretaries reported
to a new cabinet officer, the Secretary of Defense. But the reorganization did not immedi-
ately assign to any of the military services responsibility for new weapons. A newly formed
Research and Development Board in the Department of Defense postponed any decisions
of service jurisdiction over deployment or control of intermediate range and interconti-
nental ballistic missiles--rockets that would be required to propel human-made satellites
into Earth orbit?
The Research and Development Board inherited supervision of the satellite studies
in the Defense Department, and assigned them in December 1947 to its Committee on
Guided Missiles. This committee, in turn, formed a Technical Evaluation Group composed
of civilian scientists to evaluate the Navy and Air Force programs and recommend a pre-
ferred course of action. Chaired by Walter MacNair of Bell Laboratories, on March 29,
1948, the group delivered its findings and recommendation. The members judged the
technical feasibility of an Earth satellite to be clearly established; they concluded, however,
that neither service had as yet established a military or scientific utility commensurate with
the vehicle's anticipated costs. Consequently, the group recommended deferring construc-
tion of Earth satellites and consolidating all further studies of their use at RAND.'° Adopted
4. Curtis E. LeMay with Mackinlay Kantor, Mission with LeMay: My Story (Garden City, NY: Doubleday &
Co., 1965), pp. 399-400.
5.1L Cargill Hall, "Earth Satellites, A First Look by the United States Navy," in R. Cargill Hall, ed., History
of Rocketry and Astronautics: Proceedings of the Third through the Sixth History Symposia of the lnternationaI Academy of
Astronautics (San Diego: Univelt, Inc., 1986), AAS History Series, Vol. 7, Part II, pp. 253-278.
6. The Aeronautical Board, formed during World War I and eventually made up of ranking military
members of the Army and Navy air arms, reviewed aeronautical developments and attempted to reconcile "the
viewpoints of the two services for the mutual benefit of aviation." The Earth satellite proposals passed from the
Aeronautical Board to the War Department's Joint Research and Development Board (JRDB) in early 1947 and,
in late 1947, to the JRDB's successor, the Research and Development Board (RDB). Civilian scientists directed
and were well represented on theJRDB and RDB, which evaluated and approved all missile and aeronautical
research and development within the military departments, and attempted, often without success, to prevent
duplication of effort.
7. Douglas Aircraft Company, lnc.,'Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship,"
Report No. SM-11827, May 2, 1946, copy in NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, DC.
8. Research and Development Committee, Aeronautical Board, Case No. 244, Report No. 1, May 15,
1946, pp. 1-2, Archives,Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, CA.
9. Charles S, Maier, introduction to A Scientist at the White House: The Private Diary of President Eisenhower's
SpecialAssistantfor Science and Technology, by George B. Kistiakowsky (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1976), pp. xxxiii-xxxiv, also pp. 95-96; Max Rosenberg, The Air Force and the National Guided Missile Program, 1944-
1950 (Washington, DC: Air Force Historical Division Liaison Office, 1964), pp. 22, 63, 84-85.
10. "Satellite Vehicle Program," Technical Evaluation Group, Committee on Guided Missiles, RDB, GM
13/7, MEG 24/1, March 29, 1948, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
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by the Research and Development Board, these recommendations ended Navy satellite
work for a number of years and focused the study of military satellites at RAND's head-
quarters on the West Coast, in Santa Monica, California?'
RAND's Earth satellite work in the late 1940s and early 1950s embraced system and
subsystem engineering design, the preparation of equipment specifications, and studies of
military uses. [II-5] It attracted a host of uncommonly able individuals, among them James
Lipp, Robert Salter, Merton Davies, Amron Katz, Edward Stearns, William Kellogg, Louis
Ridenour, Francis Clauser, and Eugene Root. Luminaries from academe, such as Bernard
Brodie and Harold Lasswell of Yale University and Ansley Coale of Princeton, participated
in special conferences, such as the one held at RAND in 1949 that surveyed the prospec-
tive political and psychological effects of Earth satellites. '2 All of these men had a hand in
shaping the formative space program. And all of them could agree by the early 1950s that
the most valuable, first-priority use of a satellite vehicle involved one strategic application:
a platform from which to observe and record activity on the Earth.
Back in November 1945, with nuclear weapons and jet aircraft at hand, General Arnold
concluded that the next war would provide the country little opportunity to mobilize,
much less rearm or train reserves. [II-1] The United States could not again afford an
intelligence failure like the one at Pearl Harbor; it could not again be caught unaware in
another surprise attack. In the future, he had cautioned Secretary of War Patterson, "con-
tinuous knowledge of potential enemies," including all facets of their "political, social,
industrial, scientific and military life" would be necessary "to provide warning of impend-
ing danger." Arnold also stated, "the targets of the future may be very large or extremely
small--such as sites for launching guided missiles." Identifying them, like advance warn-
ing, also required "exact intelligence information."'_
The extreme secrecy that cloaked events within the Soviet Union promoted the fo-
cus on intelligence gathering. When relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R.
soured after World War II, little information about contemporary Soviet military capabili-
ties existed in the West. In the absence of hard facts in the late 1940s, U.S. leaders acted on
their perception of a "growing intent toward expansion and aggression on the part of the
Soviet Union. ''14 Shortly after the Soviets detonated an atomic bomb in 1949, the newly
formed Board of National Intelligence Estimates in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
11. In 1948 Project Rand reorganized as a non-profit advisory group, The Rand Corporation. In Wash-
ington, the Defense Department's Research and Development Board continued fitfully to operate until the fall
of 1953 when its functions were subsumed in a new Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and
Development; President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed its first occupant: Donald A. Quarles.
12. Rand Research Memorandum, RM-120, "Conference on Methods for Studying the Psychological
Effects of Unconventional Weapons," January 26-28, 1949; Paul Kecskemeti, RM-567, "The Satellite Rocket
Vehicle: Political and Psychological Problems," October 4, 1950, both in Rand Library, Santa Monica, CA; see
also R. Cargill Hall, "Early U.S. Satellite Proposals," Technolog3 and Culture 4 (Fall 1963): 430-31.
Five months after an atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima, Japan, Louis Ridenour provided the American
public a first, sobering assessment of future international atomic warfare conducted with Earth-mines and Earth-
orbiting satellites. (In the 1950s, fears of a nuclear/thermonuclear surprise attack would move President
Eisenhower to fold Earth satellites into an intelligence system designed to preclude such a catastrophe, and
establish policy ensuring that spaceflight operations remained devoted to "peaceful purposes.") See L.N.
Ridenour, "Pilot Lights of the Apocalypse," and the editor's introductory comment in Fortune 33 (January 1946) :
116-17, 219.
Robert Salter contributed one of the first and most prescient surveys of the prospects for manned space-
flight in 1951, although the title he selected for it, doubtless to avoid peer ridicule, belied the subject. See Robert
M. Salter, "Engineering Techniques in Relation to Human Travel at Upper Altitudes," Physics and Medicine of the
Upper Atmosphere: A Study of the Aeropause (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1952), pp. 480-487.
13. U.S. Army Air Forces, Third Report of the Commanding General, pp. 65-67.
14. Harry R. Borowski, A Hollow Threat: Strategic Air Power and Containment Before Korea (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 6; see also John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelhgence Analysis and Russmn
Military Strength (New York: The Dial Press, 1982), pp. 6-8, 19. See also the newly declassified CIA Office of
Research Estimates and later National Intelligence Estimates at the National Archives, including: Central Intelli-
gence Group, "Soviet Foreign and Military Policy," ORE-1,July 23, 1946; Historical Review Group, CIA, National
Archives, Box 1, Folder 1; and Central Intelligence Agency, "The Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action
During 1949," ORE-46-49, May 3, 1949, Historical Review Group, CIA, National Archives, Box 3, Folder 102.
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warnedofthepossibilityofaSovietnuclearsurpriseattack,albeita limitedone,against
theUnitedStates.Thatprospect,underscoredbythesurpriseKoreanconflictinJune
1950andthedevelopmentof hermonucleardevicesbetween1952and1954,hauntedthe
nation'smilitaryandcivilianleadership.1_
AmongAmerica'sleadersin the1950s,thedesiretoprecludeanuclearor thermo-
nuclearsurpriseattackwasparticularlyacute.AsDwightD.Eisenhower'sbiographeraptly
phrasedit,theyhad"PearlHarborburnedintotheirsoulsinawaythatyoungermen,the
leadersin thelaterdecadesoftheColdWar, had not." Certainly this was true of Eisenhower
in 1953 when he took the oath of office as president, for the subject completely dominated
his thinking about disarmament and relations with the Soviets for the next eight years.
Besides seeking ways to prevent a surprise attack, Eisenhower also sought "to lessen, if he
could not eliminate, the financial cost and the fear that were the price of the Pearl Harbor
mentality."16 To that end, he could agree entirely with General Arnold's views that continu-
ous knowledge of one's potential adversaries was essential "to provide warning of impend-
ing danger." The way to get it, Eisenhower also knew from wartime experience, was through
aerial reconnaissance.
To secure hard intelligence about the Soviet Union, the CIA and the Air Force un-
dertook a variety of projects at the beginning of the 1950s. Intelligence officers sifted
captured German documents for aerial reconnaissance photographs of the U.S.S.R.; that
these photographs dated from the early 1940s suggests the magnitude of the problem
facing U.S. planners. The interrogation of German and Japanese prisoners of war return-
ing from forced labor in the Soviet Union between 1949 and 1953 helped shed more light
on the status of that country's military and industrial might. The Strategic Air Command
began flying aircraft on the periphery of the U.S.S.R. on reconnaissance missions, and
obtained considerable information about border installations and defenses. But these
missions yielded nothing substantial about the Soviet heartland and the state of its economy,
society, or military capabilities and preparations. _7
Seeking this information, RAND proposed and the Air Force conducted the WS 119L
program. Beginning in early January 1956, with the approval of President Eisenhower, Air
Force personnel loaded automatic cameras in gondolas suspended beneath large Skyhook
weather balloons, and during the next four weeks launched 516 of these vehicles in West-
ern Europe. The balloons, equipped with radio beacons that allowed tracking, drifted on
prevailing winds at high altitudes eastward across the Eurasian continent, through Soviet
airspace. Under the terms of international law to which the United States was a party, the
balloons clearly violated Soviet nadonal sovereignty. Those that succeeded in crossing re-
leased their gondolas on parachutes, which were recovered in mid-air by C-119 cargo air-
craft near Japan and Alaska? s Because the aerial path of the balloons could not be con-
trolled, however, the pictures might as easily be of cloud cover or a Siberian forest as of a
factory or an airfield. This program, which produced limited intelligence and strongly
worded Soviet protests, was quietly canceled on February 6, 1956, at the president's direc-
tion. Although the Air Force would subsequently launch a few more of these balloons that
operated at yet higher altitudes, Eisenhower quickly terminated that effort as well. Mean-
while, other, more promising avenues of gathering information had appeared. _9
15.James R. Killian, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the Presi-
dent for Scienceand Technology (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1977), pp. 68, 94; Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p.
21. U.S. intelligence was caught almost completely unaware of the development of the Soviet hydrogen bomb.
See, for example, "Estimate of the Effects of the Soviet Possession of the Atomic Bomb Upon the Security of the
United States and Upon the Probabilities of Direct Soviet Military Action," ORE 91-49, April 6, 1950. Historical
Review Group, CIA, National Archives, Box 4, Folder 131, p. 11.
16. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Volume II, The President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p.
257. The president's decision in favor of aerial reconnaissance is explained on pp. 258-59.
17. David A. Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-!960/'
International Security 7 (Spring 1983) : 20-21; Prados, The Soviet Estimate, pp. 57-58.
18. In the event aerial retrieval failed, the gondolas were designed to float on the ocean's s_zrface and
radiate a signal for twenty-four hours. Although many of the gondolas came down in the Soviet Union, sixty-
seven of them actually reached the recovery area; of these, the Air Force retrieved forty-four.
19. Tom D. Crouch, The Eagle Aloft: Two Centuries of the Balloon in America (Washington, DC: Smithsonian
Institution Press, 1983), pp. 644-49; Ambrose, Eisenhow_ VoL II, pp. 309-11; Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and
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Research and Initial Development
While the CIA and the Air Force endeavored to gather information about the Soviet
Union from any source, the Department of Defense acted on the issue of military roles
and missions. On March 21, 1950, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson assigned the Air
Force responsibility for long-range strategic missiles, including ICBMs. A few weeks later,
the Research and Development Board vested jurisdiction for military satellites in the same
service. With these responsibilities, Air Force leaders directed RAND to complete studies
of a military Earth satellite. _°
The resultant RAND report, issued in April 1951, described a spacecraft fully stabi-
lized on three axes and that employed a television camera to scan the Earth and transmit
the images to receiving stations. [II-3] The television coverage thus acquired, RAND re-
minded the service had to occur when "weather permits ground observation. ''_ The RAND
report encouraged Air Force leaders to believe that directed, periodic observation of the
Soviet Union might soon be conducted from extremely high altitudes. To confirm these
findings, on December 19, 1951, Air Force headquarters authorized the firm to subcon-
tract for detailed spacecraft subsystem studies. A tew weeks later, in January 1952, the ser-
vice convened a seminal "Beacon Hill" stud)' group to assay strategic aerial reconnaissance
under the auspices of Project Lincoln at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 22
The Beacon Hill study group, which first met between January 7 and February 15,
1952, considered improvements in Air Force aerial intelligence processing, sensors, and
vehicles. Chaired by Carl Overhage of Eastman Kodak, the fifteen-member group included
Air Force optics specialist Lieutenant Colonel Richard Leghorn (later, the founder ofItek),
James Baker of the Harvard Observatory, Edwin Land (the founder of Polaroid), Stuart
Miller of Bell Labs, Richard Perkin (co-founder of Perkin-Elmer), scientific consultant
Louis Ridenour, Allen Donovan of Cornell Aeronautical Labs, and Edward Purcell of
Harvard University. These individuals concluded their deliberations in May and issued a
final report in June 1952.
The Beacon Hill report recommended to the Air Force specific improvements in the
orientation, emphasis, and priority assigned to strategic intelligence, and solutions to the
problems involved in its collection, reduction, and use. The study group also suggested
refinements in sensors. The improved sensors, the group advised, could be flown near
Soviet territory in advanced high-altitude aircraft, high-altitude balloons (later, WS 119L),
sounding rockets, and long-range drones such as the Snark or Navaho air-breathing mis-
siles. Whatever the choice of vehicles, study group participants cautioned the service that
actual "intrusion" over Soviet territory and violation of its national sovereignty required
approval of political authorities "at the highest level." Space satellites, mentioned only in
passing and then only as vehicles of the future in the grip of Newtonian mechanics, were,
however, identified as certain intruders that would have to "overfly" the Soviet Union, _s
Eisenhower, p. 12; Paul E. Worthman recollections, cited by W. W. Rostow in Open Skies: Eisenhower's Proposal of
July 21, 1955 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), pp. 189-94. Project "Moby Dick," the test ofWS 119L, was
conducted in the United States during 1952-1955 and accounted for numerous UFO sightings--as did later
tests of the U-2 and A-12.
20. Enclosure with recommendations for guided missiles to Memo 1620/17, for Secretary of Defense
Louis Johnson, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 15, 1950; Memo for the Joint Chiefs of Staff from Louis
Johnson, "Department of Defense Guided Missiles Program," approving recommendations, March 21, 1950;
Report, Air Research and Development Command, Space SystemDevelopment Plan, WDPP-59-11,January 30, 1959,
Tab I, "Background," p. I-l-l, all in NASA Historical Reference Collection.
21..l.E. Lipp, R.M. Salter, Jr., and R.S. Wehner, "The Utility of a Satellite Vehicle for Reconnaissance,"
The RAND Corporation, R-217, April 1951, p. 80, Rand Library.
22. RCA-Rand, "Progress Report (Project Feed Back)," Report RM-999, January 1, 1953, Rand Library.
Background of the Beacon Hill study and related developments in 1951 is contained in Herbert E York and G.
Allen Greb, "Strategic Reconnaissance," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1977, p. 34.
23. "Beacon Hill Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance," Project Lincoln, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, Boston, MA, June 15, 1951, passim, JPL Archives.
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Elsewhere around the country, various firms under contract to RAND were design-
ing and evaluating specific satellite equipment, including a television payload (Radio Cor-
poration of America), vehicle guidance and attitude-control devices (North American
Aviation), and a nuclear auxiliary electrical power source (Westinghouse Electric Corpo-
ration, Bendix Aviation, Allis-Chalmers, and the Vitro Corporation). This effort, known
collectively as Project Feed Back, confirmed that automated satellites could be built with-
out exceptional delays and at an affordable cost. Whatever the legal ramifications of over-
flight in outer space might be, in September 1953, RAND officials recommended that a
satellite be built. 24 [II-4] A few months later, they concluded their preliminary work and
published a final report.
Issued on March 1, 1954, the Project Feed Back report described a military satellite
for observation, mapping, and weather analysis, along with examples of the necessary space
hardware and ground support systems. [II-6] The second stage booster-satellite would be
placed in a low-altitude, "sun synchronous" polar orbit inclined 83 degrees to the equator.
Launched at the proper time of day at this inclination, the satellite would precess in one
year through 360 degrees, allowing a television camera to operate in maximum daylight
brightness throughout all seasons35 RAND engineers estimated this satellite system would
produce "30 million pictures in one year of operation," a sum equivalent to all the pictures
held in the USAF Photo Records and Services Division acquired from all sources in peace
and war over the previous twenty-five years! '_ Where the Air Force might find the photo-
interpreters needed to evaluate this mountain of information, RAND did not say.
In early 1954, however, the problem that faced U.S. policy-makers was not too much
intelligence information about the Soviet Union, but far too litde. Attempts to fly around
the U.S.S.R. had thus far produced inadequate information; details of Soviet military prepa-
rations and capabilities remained as much an enigma as ever. Continued Soviet produc-
tion of atomic weapons, and the means to deliver them, such as the Bison long-range
bomber, combined in August 1953 with the Soviet detonation of a thermonuclear device,
particularly disturbed President Eisenhower. Former Supreme Commander of the Allied
Expeditionary Force in Western Europe, Eisenhower had helped engineer the destruc-
tion of the Axis powers in World War II and knew firsthand the enormous devastation that
accompanied modern total war.
Any aerial surprise attack on the United States with nuclear weapons, even a limited
one, could lay waste to most of the metropolitan areas on the East and West coasts. More-
over, with government agencies unable to gauge the exact nature and extent of a Soviet
military threat, the president found himself at a distinct disadvantage in selecting the ap-
propriate level of military preparedness to combat it. This situation, Eisenhower made
clear at a meeting of his National Security Council on February 24, 1954, had to be re-
solved--and soon. As a first step to counter a possible surprise attack, he had already ap-
proved a prior council recommendation to design and construct, with Canadian approval,
a Distant Early Warning (DEW) picket line of radars across the North American Arctic, to
detect and track any Soviet bombers that might be directed against the two countriesY
Civilian scientists appointed to the Science Advisory Committee in the Office of De-
fense Mobilization, meanwhile, had been examining similar issues under the prodding of
24. Perry, Origim of the USAF Space Program, pp. 35, 39; and Merton E. Davies and William R. Harris.
RAND's Role in the Evolution of Balloon and Satellite Observation Systems and Related U.S. Space 7_chnology (Santa
Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1988), p. 47.
25.J.E. Lipp & R.M. Salter, "Project Feed Back Summary Report," The RAND Corporation, R-262, Vol-
ume lI, March, 1954, pp. 109-10, Rand Library.
26. Ibid., pp. 85-86.
27. Stephen E. Ambrose,/ke's Spies: Eisenhower and theEspionage Establi_hment (Garden City, NY: Doubleday
& Co., 1981), pp. 253, 267; Rpt., Aerospace Defense Command, A Chronology of Air Defense, 1914-1972, ADC
Historical Study No. 19, March 1973, p. 33; see also NSC 159/4 and attached statement of policy on "Continen-
tal Defense," September 25, 1953, and NSC 5408, "Report to the Nadonal Security Council by the National
Security Planning Board," February 1I, 1954, as reprinted in William Z. Slany, ed., Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1952-1954, Volume lI: National Security Affairs, Part 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1984), pp. 475-89, 609-24.
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Trevor Gardner, the "technologically evangelical assistant secretary of the Air Force for
research and development." Learning of these studies, the president's special assistant for
security affairs, General Robert Cuder, invited key committee members to the White House.
Meeting with them on March 27, 1954, Eisenhower discussed his concerns about a sur-
prise attack on the United States and the prospects for avoiding or containing it. "Modern
weapons," he warned, "had made it easier for a hostile nation with a closed society to plan
an attack in secrecy and thus gain an advantage denied to the nation with an open society."
In spite of the Oppenheimer case, he apparently viewed the scientists as honest brokers in
a partisan city, and he challenged them to tackle this problem. **
They did. Lee A. DuBridge, president of the California Institute of Technology and
chair of the Science Advisory Committee, and James R. Killian,Jr., president of the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology, formed a special task force to consider three areas of
national security: continental defense, strike forces, and intelligence, with supporting studies
in communications and technical manpower. Approved by President Eisenhower in the
spring, the Surprise Attack Panel, or the Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP) as it was
subsequendy renamed, chaired by Killian, conducted its work between August 1954 and
January 1955. Its membership included most of those who had produced the Beacon Hill
Report and represented the best that American science and engineering offered. The
panel's extraordinary two-volume report, Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack, was issued on
February 14, 1955. By all published accounts, the report affected the course of national
security affairs enormously. _
The TCP report resulted in a number of significant alterations in U.S. defense pre-
paredness. Among other things, it recommended accelerating procurement of interconti-
nental ballistic missiles (Arias, and later Titan and Minuteman ICBMs), constructing land-
and sea-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles (later Thor, Jupiter, and Polaris IRBMs),
and speeding construction of the DEW line in the Arctic (declared operational in August
1957). The TCP also identified a timetable of changes in the relative military and techni-
cal positions of the two superpowers. Even more important, perhaps, were the recommen-
dations to acquire and use strategic pre-hostilities intelligence. The intelligence panel,
chaired by Edwin Land, urged construction and deployment of the U-2 aircraft s° that could,
if called upon, overfly the Soviet Union at very high altitudes. _' Any mention of the U-2,
however, was excluded from the report proper. In its section on intelligence applications
28. The description of Gardner, and Eisenhower as quoted, in Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, andEisenhower, p.
68; see also, Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 60.
29. Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack, Vol I and Vol If, February 14, 1955, JPL Archives; see also Killian,
Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, pp. 11-12, 70-82; Herbert E York and G. Allen Greb, "Military Research and
Development: A Postwar History," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,January 1977, p. 22; also York and Greb, "Stra-
tegic Reconnaissance," p. 35. For the next two years, the deliberations of the National Security Council turned
frequently to the findings and recommendations contained in this report. See John P. Glennon, ed., Fore/gn
Relations of the United States, 1955-1957: Volume X1X, National Security Policy (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1990), hereafter referred to as Volume XIX.
30. Eisenhower approved development of the U-2 during the TCP deliberations, on November 24, 1954,
and assigned the project to the CIA instead of the Air Force. Under the guidance of Richard M. Bissell,Jr., CIA
Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence, Colonel O.J. Ritland, USAF, and Clarence L. "Kelly"
Johnson of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, the first U-2 was airborne within eight months, on August 6,
1955. Ambrose,/ke's Spies, p. 268; Leonard Mosley, Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, andJohn FosterDulles and
TheirFamily Network (New York: Dial Press, 1978), pp. 365-66.
31. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1965), p.
470; Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, pp. 71-84; Rpt., A Chronologyof Air Defense, 1914-1972, p. 46. The
cleared recommendations of the TCP are reprinted in Volume XIX, pp. 46-56.
Throughout the 1950s Eisenhower withheld knowledge of the U-2's existence from all but those few
directly involved. The program never appeared as an item in National Security Council deliberations until "it
tore its britches" in 1960. Karl G. Harr, Jr., "Eisenhower's Approach to National Security Decision Making," in
Ken neth W. Thompson, ed., The Ezsenhower Presidency:Eleven Intimate PerspectivesofDwight D. Eisenhow_ %7ol.3 in
Portraits of American Presidents (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984), p. 97. The product of the U-2
flights was even more closely held, and Eisenhower refused to refute political charges that an American "bomber
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ofscience,thereportrecommendedbeginningimmediatelyaprogramtodevelopasmall
scientificsatellitethatwouldoperateatextremealtitudesabovenationalairspace,intended
toestablisht eprincipleof"freedomofspace"in internationallawforsubsequentmili-
tarysatellites?_Althoughcommitteememberscouldhopethatscientificsatellitesmight
setsuchaprecedent,JamesKillian,whochairedtheTCP,viewedRAND'sproposedmili-
taryobservationsatelliteasa"peripheralproject"andwouldrefusetosupporti untilthe
SovietslaunchedSputnikI nearlythreeyearslater.
Backinthesummerof1954,shortlyafterauthorizingthesurprise-attackstudy,Presi-
dentEisenhowerapprovedtheformationofanorganizationdevotedexclusivelytothat
subject:heNationalIndicationsCenter.Thiscenter,chairedbytheDeputyDirectorof
CentralIntelligenceandcomposedofspecialistsdrawnfromU.S.intelligenceagencies,
andtheDepartmentsofDefenseandState,formedtheinteragencystaffoftheNational
WatchCommittee,whichconsistedofpresidentialconfidantssuchastheSecretariesof
StateandDefense,andtheDirectorofCentralIntelligence(DCI).CharteredonJuly1,
1954,fortheexpresspurposeof"preventingstrategicsurprise,"thecenterdrewoninfor-
mationfurnishedbyallnationalintelligenceorganizations.Eisenhower,oneof thepar-
ticipants recalled vividly, was a man "boresighted on early warning of surprise attack. "s_
The National Indications Center assessed the military, economic, and social demands
involved in mounting a surprise attack and issued a weekly '_vatch report" to the Watch
Committee members. Staffers expanded a list of key indicators developed earlier under
the direction ofJamesJ. Hitchcock in the CIA, and applied it to developments that would
presage surprise attack in the nuclear age." That is, presuming rational political leader-
ship, one state intending to attack another would need to prepare carefully, say, by dispers-
ing its industry and population many months in advance, and by deploying its military
forces on land and sea just days or hours before "M-Day." Thus, the proper intelligence
"indicators" applied against this matrix would yield readily identifiable signals, much like a
traffic light: greenmnormal activity; amber---caution; and red--warning? 5These strategic
warning indicators, eventually linked to "defense conditions" (DEFCON 5 through 1),
enabled U.S. leaders to mobilize resources and establish force readiness postures. The
military, economic, and technical indicators listed in this matrix successfully predicted the
Suez War in 1956, and have been monitored and reported in one form or another to the
president and other command authorities ever since. The National Indications Center
itself, however, was dissolved in March 197576
32. Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack, Vol. II, pp. 146-48; Memo for the Record, L. B. Kirkpatrick, "Meet-
ing with the President's Board of Consultants, Saturday, 28 Sep. 1957, 11 a.m to 2 p.m.," Eisenhower Library,
Abilene, KS.
33. Interview withJamesJ. Hitchcock, May 23, 1986; Cynthia M. Grabo, "The Watch Committee and the
National Indications Center: The Evolution of U.S. Strategic Warning, 1950-1975," International Journal oflntel-
ligence and Counterintelligence 3 (Fall 1989): 369-70; see also Eisenhower letter to Winston Churchill, cited in
Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, andEisenhower, p. 88. One has only to peruse the documents in Volume X/Xto gain an
appreciation for Eisenhower's fixation on surprise attack and his dedication to forestalling such an event. See
especially [8] at p. 40.
34. A RAND study doubtless figured in these deliberations and actions, though a direct linkage is not
established at this time. One year earlier, three months after President Eisenhower's inauguration, Andrew W.
Marshall and James E Digby issued RAND Special Memorandum SM-14, Tile Military Value ofAdvanced Warning
of Hostilities and its Implications for Intelligence Indicators, April 1953 (rev.July 1953). The authors compared intel-
ligence warning of attack to the performance of military forces, and urged attention to short-term indications
of Soviet preparations for surprise attack. Copies unquestionably circulated within intelligence circles, includ-
ing the CIA.
35. The British first developed an indicators list in 1948 to identify actions the Soviets would have to take
to occupy Berlin. Hitchcock subsequently altered and expanded the list at the CIA in the late 1940s and early
1950s to identify actions that would warn of a surprise attack against the United States. The best available source
in the open literature that describes related RAND activities in the 1940s and 1950s is Davies and Harris, RAND's
Role in the Evolution of Balloon and Satellite Observation Systems and Related U.S. Space Technology.
36. Grabo, "The Watch Committee and the National Indications Center," p. 584; Volume X/X [19]; an-
other survey of this subject in the open literature is Duncan E. MacDonald, "The Requirements for Information
and Systems," in EJ. Ossenbeck and E C. Kroeck, eds., Open Space and Peace:A Symposium on the Effects of Observa-
tion (Stanford, CA: The Hoover Institution, 1964), pp. 64-83. The NSC Planning Board, also at the president's
direction, in November 1954 had established a "net capabilities evaluation subcommittee" that performed a
function similar to the National Indications Center for the council. See [1 and 19] in Volume X1X.
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Establishing National Space Policy
President Eisenhower, to be sure, worried considerably about the danger of a Soviet
surprise attack in the mid-1950s, and judged strategic warning absolutely vital to counter
or preclude it. Shortly after the TCP submitted its report to the National Security Council,
in the spring of 1955 the president's closest advisors determined, if at all possible, to keep
outer space a region open to all, where the spacecraft of any state might overfly all states,
a region free of military posturing. By adopting a policy that favored a legal regime for
outer space analogous to that of the high seas, the United States might make possible the
precedent of "freedom of space" with all that implied for overflight. This choice also fa-
vored non-aggressive, peaceful spaceflight operations, especially the launch of scientific
Earth satellites to explore outer space that civilian scientists now urged as part of the U.S.
contribution to the International Geophysical Year (IGY))7 [II-8, II-11] This program, pro-
posed by the U.S. National Committee for the IGYof the National Academy of Sciences in a
March 14, 1955, report, had been approved by the academy and sent to National Science
Foundation director Alan T. Waterman for government consideration, s8 [II-9]
By this time, a number of prominent scientists and military leaders actively sought
approval for spaceflight missions. A few months after RAND's Feed Back report appeared,
the Air Force had acted on its recommendations. On November 29, 1954, the Air Research
and Development Command issued System Requirement No. 5, which called for competi-
tive system-design studies of a military satellite. On March 16, 1955, while the National
Academy of Sciences was completing its satellite deliberations, the USAF issued General
Operational Requirement No. 80 (SA-2c), which approved construction of and provided
technical requirements for military observation satellites. At the same time, the service
named this observation satellite the WS 117L program. In April, the Naval Research Labo-
ratory submitted to the Defense Department a "Scientific Satellite Program" for the ICY,
eventually known as Vanguard, which proposed using as a first-stage booster the Viking
sounding rocket. Meanwhile, the Army's Redstone rocket team led by Major General John
B. Medaris and Wernher yon Braun had for some months urged a small, inert Earth satel-
lite launched with the Jupiter IRBM, called Project Orbiter (later named Explorer). [II-7]
These and other events soon to follow made 1955 the most momentous of years for the
fledgling U.S. space program. '_
In May 1955, administration officials agreed that the country should launch scien-
tific Earth satellites as a contribution to the ICY. In early May, Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for Research and Development Donald Quarles referred the Army and Navy IGY
satellite proposals to his Committee on Special Capabilities, and requested a scientific
37. In 1952 the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) established a committee to arrange
another International Polar Year to study geophysical phenomena in remote areas of the Earth (two previous
polar years had been conducted, one in 1882-1883 and another in 1932-1933). Late in 1952 the council ex-
panded the scope of this effort, planned for 195%1958, to include rocket research in the upper atmosphere and
changed the name to the International Geophysical Year. In October 1954 the ICSU, meeting in Rome, Italy,
adopted another resolution that called for launching scientific Earth satellites during the ICY. "Editorial Note,"
in John E Glennon, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957: Volume XI, United Nations and General
International Matters (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), [361], pp. 784-85.
38. A few months earlier, in December 1954, the American Rocket Society's Committee on Space Flight
completed a similar report on the utility of scientific Earth satellites, including a proposal by John Robinson
Pierce of Bell Laboratories for a passive communication satellite that much resembled the later Project Echo,
and submitted it to National Science Foundation Director Alan T. Waterman. By the spring of 1955 a number of
Earth-satellite proposals had landed on the desks of officials at the National Science Foundation and the De-
partment of Defense. See R. Cargill Hall, "Origins and Development of the Vanguard and Explorer Satellite
Programs," Airpower Historian 9 (October 1964): 106-108.
39. Ibid., pp. 102-104. Project Orbiter first appeared with the name "A Minimum Satellite Vehicle," the
result of an August 3, 1954, meeting between Army officials at the Redstone Arsenal and Navy representatives
from the Office of Naval Research. See Dr. Wernher von Braun, "A Minimum Satellite Vehicle: Based on compo-
nents available from missile developments of the Army Ordnance Corps," September 15, 1954, NASA Historical
Reference Collection.
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satellite proposal from the Air Force. '° He instructed committee members to evaluate these
proposals and recommend a preferred program. Quarles, who warmly embraced the satel-
lite recommendations of Killian's Technological Capabilities Panel and urged an IGY sat-
ellite program, subsequently drafted a policy for the launching of these and other space-
craft and submitted it on May 20 to the National Security Council (NSC). NSC members
meeting on May 26 endorsed the Quarles' proposal and accompanying national policy
guidance. A scientific satellite program for the IGYwould not interfere with development
of high-priority ICBM and IRBM weapons. Emphasis would be placed on the peaceful
purposes of the endeavor. The scientific satellites would help establish the principle in
international law of "freedom of space" and the right of unimpeded overflight that went
with it, and these IGY satellites would serve as technical precursors for subsequent U.S.
military satellites, "Considerable prestige and psychological benefits," the policy concluded,
"will accrue to the nation which first is successful in launching a satellite.'"' The next day,
"after sleeping on it," President Eisenhower approved this plan. '_ [II-10]
With the president's decision, the United States had tentatively set out to prosecute
two closely associated space programs: instrumented military applications and civilian sci-
entific satellites. Presidential advisors sdll perceived the more complex military spacecraft
to be a long way off, but the IGY scientific satellite program was clearly identified as a
stalking horse to establish the precedent of overflight in space for the eventual operation
of military reconnaissance satellites. Charged with the WS 117L program, the Air Force
earlier in 1955 had selected three firms to compete in a one-year design study of a pre-
ferred vehicle. Neither the military nor the scientific satellite program had selected a con-
tractor to conduct the work, and neither shared a national priority.
In Burbank, California, in Kelly Johnson's Lockheed "skunk works," the U-2 project
unquestionably claimed the highest of national priorities. With the first of these turbojet-
powered gliders nearing completion, Eisenhower learned that the United States could
soon overfly parts of Soviet airspace at will. 4s The U-2 had an anticipated operating ceiling
in excess of 70,000 feet. No known jet fighter operated at altitudes above 50,000 feet. But
however safe piloted aerial overflight, or however attractive this opportunity to acquire
intelligence on Soviet military preparations, might be, any unauthorized penetration of
another state's airspace represented a clear violation of international law--a violation,
that is, unless the leaders concerned agreed to such flights beforehand.
While the U-2 neared its first test flight in Nevada, on July 21, 1955, at a summit
conference in Geneva, Eisenhower advised Soviet leaders of just such a plan. The presi-
dent, in an unannounced addition to a disarmament proposal, direcdy addressed the sub-
ject that most concerned him. The absence of trust and the presence of "terrible weapons"
among states, he asserted, provoked in the world "fears and dangers of surprise attack." To
eliminate these fears, he urged that the Soviet Union and the United States provide "facili-
40. The Air Force proposal, called "World Series," featured an Atlas first stage and Aerobee-Hi second
stage; it was submitted to the Committee on Special Capabilities (Stewart Committee) during the first week of
July 1955. Because World Series conflicted with the WS lI7L program, Air Force leaders gave it scant support.
Throughout the Eisenhower presidency until his death in office, Donald A. Quarles would influence
gready the choice of policy and missions for the civilian and military satellite programs, first as Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense for Research and Development (September 1953 to August 1955), then as Secretary of the Air
Force (August 1955 to April 1957), and finally as Deputy Secretary of Defense (April 1957 to May 1959).
41. Nadonal Security Council, NSC 5520, "Draft Statement of Policy on U.S. Scientific Satellite Program,"
May 20, 1955, pp. 1-3. See also Annex B, accompanying Memorandum from Nelson A. Rockefeller to Mr.James
S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, "U.S. Scientific Satellite Program," May 17, 1955. These documents reprinted,
along with the NSC endorsement, in John P. Glennon, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957: Volume
XI, United Nations and General International Matters (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988),
[340/$41], pp. 723-35, hereafter referred to as Volume X/. Air Force leaders enthusiastically embraced the dic-
tum that IGYsatellites would not interfere with the ICBM, IRBM, and military satellite programs; Perry, Ortg_ns
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42. Eisenhower quoted in Lee Bowen, An AirForce History of Space Activities, 1945-1959 (USAF Historical
Division Liaison Office, August 1964), p, 64. Eisenhower did approve the IGY satellite program in NSC 5520
the next day, on May 27, 1955; see Volume XI [341], p. 733.
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ties for aerial photography to the other country" and conduct mutually supervised recon-
naissance overflights." Before the day ended, the Chair of the Soviet Council of Ministers,
Nikolai Bulganin, and First Secretary of the Communist Party Nikita Khrushchev privately
rejected the president's plan, known eventually as the "Open Skies" doctrine, as an obvi-
ous U.S. attempt to "accumulate target information." "We knew the Soviets wouldn't ac-
cept it," Eisenhower later confided in an interview, "but we took a look and thought it was
a good move. '_5 Though the Soviets might object, they were forewarned. 4_ Eleven months
later, some five months after he terminated the balloon reconnaissance program,
Eisenhower approved the first U-2 overflight of the U.S.S.RY
Back in the United States, late in the evening of July 25, 1955, Eisenhower informed
the nation in a radio address of the results of the summit conference. On July 27, Eisenhower
met with National Science Foundation Director Waterman, Assistant Secretary of Defense
Quarles, and Undersecretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., to discuss how best to make
known the existence of a U.S. IGY satellite program. A general statement, it was decided,
would come from the White House after congressional leaders had been notified. These
statements would emphasize the satellite project "as a contribution benefiting science
throughout the world," and would not link it in any way "to military missile development."
Two days later, on July 29, 1955, the president publicly announced plans for launching
"small unmanned, Earth circling satellites as part of the U.S. participation in the Interna-
tional Geophysical Year" scheduled between July 1957 and December 1958. [I-17] His state-
ment avoided any hint at the underlying purpose of the enterprise, and assigned to the
National Science Foundation responsibility for directing the project, with "logistic and
technical support" to be furnished by the Department of Defense. Donald Quarles' Com-
mittee on Special Capabilities in early August selected for the IGY satellite project the
Naval Research Laboratory's Vanguard proposal, one that combined modified Viking and
Aerobee-Hi sounding rockets for the scientific satellite booster, and placed the U.S. Navy
in charge of logistics and technical support. .8
In June 1956, the Air Force chose Lockheed's Missile Systems Division in Sunnyvale,
California, to design and build the military satellites for the WS 117L program. Lockheed's
winning proposal featured a large, second-stage booster satellite that could be stabilized in
orbit on three axes with a high pointing accuracy. To become known as "Agena," this
vehicle would be designed and tested to meet A.ir Force plans for an operational capability
in the third quarter of 1963. While the diminutive Vanguard scientific satellite was pro-
jected to weigh tens of pounds and be launched by a modified sounding rocket, the
44. "Statement on Disarmament, July 21," The Department of State Bulletin, 33, No. 841, August 1, 1955, p.
174; Elie Abel, "Eisenhower Calls Upon Soviet Union to Exchange Arms Blueprints," New York Timez, July 22,
1955, p. 1; also Prados, The Soviet Estimate, pp. 31-32. The term "Open Skies" was coined later by the popular
press and applied to Eisenhower's statement on disarmament. The background of this proposal, as advanced by
the president's special assistant, Harold Stassen, and debated in the National Security Council, is contained in
John E Glennon, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957: Volume XX, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic
Energy (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), see especially [33 through 48]. By 1956-1957,
Eisenhower and other key administration leaders would view aerial reconnaissance as an "inspection system"
that could serve two critical functions: to forewarn of surprise attack and supervise and verify arms-reduction
and nuclear-test-ban agreements.
45. Herbert S. Parmet, Eisenhower and the Ame_can Crusades (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972),
p. 406; see also W. W. Rostow, Open Skies, pp. 7-8.
46. Richard Leghorn, then working for Eisenhower's special assistant Harold Stassen, wrote the paper on
which the "Open Skies" doctrine was predicated. He also produced the 32-page booklet explaining this disar-
mament proposal given to those attending the Big Four Geneva Conference. Richard S. Leghorn, "U.S. Can
Photograph Russia from the Air Now," U.S. News & World Report, August 5, 1955, pp. 70-75; "Editor's Note" at
p. 71. Cleared by the White House, this important article explained the administration's rationale for Open
Skies and the implications of this plan for arms reduction.
47. Ambrose, /ke_ Spies, pp. 31-34, 266.
48. Attendees at the July 27 meeting included Eisenhower's staff secretary and defense liaison, Colonel
Andrew Goodpaster, U.S. Army. Goodpaster, "Memorandum of Conference with the President, July 27, 1955,
11:45AM." The news release is reprinted in Volume XX [342], p. 734; see also for related events and the Quarles'
IGYselection process, Constance McL. Green and Milton Lomask. Vanguard: A History (Washington DC: NASA
SP-4202, 1970), pp. 37-38.55-56.
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proposed Air Force satellite would weigh thousands of pounds and be launched atop an
Atlas ICBM. '9
Among other payloads, Lockheed recommended for development those projects al-
ready identified by the Navy and RAND, and added one of its own: an infrared radiometer
and telescope to detect the hot exhaust gases emitted by long-range jet bombers and,
more important, large rockets as they ascended under power through the atmosphere.
This novel aircraft-tracker and missile-detection innovation advanced byJosephJ. Knopow,
a young Lockheed engineer, fit nicely into the strategic warning efforts of the day and
unquestionably helped tip the scales in Lockheed's favor?° The Air Force awarded the firm
a contract for this program a few months later, in October 19567'
Thus, a year before Sputnik, the two modest U.S. space programs moved ahead slowly,
staying within strict funding limits and avoiding unwanted interference, with development
of the nation's long-range ballistic missiles just underway. They shared a lower priority
than other high-technology defense department programs. To avoid provoking an inter-
national debate over "freedom of space," Eisenhower administration leaders in 1956 re-
strained government officials from any public discussion of spaceflight? _ At the Pentagon,
after a WS 117L program briefing on November 17, Donald Quarles, now Secretary of the
Air Force, instructed Lieutenant General Donald Putt, Deputy Chief of Staff for Research
and Development, to cease all efforts toward vehicle construction. He expressly forbade
fabrication of a mockup or of the first satellite without his personal permission. A military
satellite, the Air Force learned, would under no circumstances precede a scientific satellite
into orbit? s
In early 1957 President Eisenhower remained undecided whether the United States
needed to launch more than six IGYsatellites for science. Moreover, Secretary of Defense
Charles Wilson remained unimpressed with expensive astronautical ventures of any kind.
49. In the mid 1950s, Convair's James w. Crooks,Jr., constantly reminded audiences at Wright-Patterson
AFB and elsewhere that the Adas could lift the weight of a new Chevrolet, 3,500 lbs., into low-Earth orbit. As
events turned out, Atlas with a powered upper stage could lift a good deal more--about 10,000 Ibs.--into low-
Earth orbit.
50. In time, this payload proposal would be separated and identified as the Missile Detection and Alarm
System (MIDAS), then evolve to become the contemporary Defense Support Program (DSP). Today, this re-
markable set of military satellites can detect and provide advance warning of a missile attack within moments of
a launch at sea or on land.
51. LMSD 1536, Pied Piper Development Plan, Vol II, March I, 1956, Subsystem Plan, A. Airframe, A-Apdx.,
pp. 3-4; and Vol. I, System Plan, passim, Eisenhower Library.
52. Unwitting of the National Security Council deliberations and of the ground rules established for the
nation's space program, contemporary American military leaders failed entirely to comprehend the rationale
that prompted this restriction on public discussion. See, for example, Maj. Gen John B. Medaris, U.S. Army,
with Arthur Gordon, Countdown for Decision (New York: Paperback Library, Inc., 1960), pp. 101, 124; and testi-
mony ofLt. C,en James M. Gavin, Deputy Chief of Staff Research and Development, U.S. Army, in U.S. Senate,
Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs, "Hearings before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee
of the Committee on Armed Services," Part II, 6January 1958, p. 1474, and Part l, 13 December 1957, p. 509.
Air Force General Bernard Schriever, charged with the missile and space efforts of that service in the mid-to-late
1950s, was still fuming in 1985. Recalling a February 1957 speech, he announced that the Air Force was ready to
"move forward rapidly into space. I received instruction the next day from the Pentagon that I shouldn't use the
word 'space' in any of my future speeches. Now that was February 1957'. They [the administration] had the IGY
going, you know, which was kind of a scientific boondoggle." Richard H. Kohn,June 1985 interview with Gener-
als Doolittle, Schriever, Phillips, Marsh, and Dr. Getting, in Jacob Neufeld, ed., USAFResearch and Development
(Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1990) p. 105. Regarding priority, GOR No. 80 of March 16, 1955,
specified a date of "operational availability" for the military satellites in the mid 1960s, a date that bespoke a low
priority and bracketed this system to follow the U-2. Certainly, the first military spaceflights would trail by many
months those of the scientific satellites. IGY space program priorities considered in "Memorandum of Discus-
sion at the 283d Meeting of the National Security Council. Washington, May 3. 1956," in Volume X1 [343], pp.
740-41.
53. USAF Space Programs, I945-1962, Volume l (USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, October 1962). p.
18. The historian added: "...it was apparent that the possible political repercussions arising from use of a mili-
tary space vehicle were causing concern." On the West Coast, Schriever complained vigorously. The next year,
in 1957, he declared, "I finally got $10 million [for WS 117L] from Don Quar[es, who was Secretary of the AiJ
Force, with instructions that we could not use that money in any way except component development. NcJ
systems work whatsoever. $10 million!" Schriever comments m U_?_F [¢e._earch and Development, pp. 105-106. The
Quarles' stricture remained in effect for nearly an entire year, and was not lifted until September 1957.
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'% 'damn orange' up in the air," he snapped to confidants. In May 1957, as costs to build
and launch the original six ICY vehicles soared from an estimated $20 million to $100
million, he told Eisenhower that Earth satellites, whatever their merit, "had too many pro-
moters and no bankers. ''_4 [II-12] Donald Quarles, named Deputy Secretary of Defense
one month earlier, nonetheless supported the U.S. IGYsatellite effort while he kept an eye
on related developments in the U,S.S.R. At his request near the end of June, CIA Director"
Allen Dulles assessed recent Soviet hints of an impending satellite launch. "The U.S. [in-
telligence] community," Dulles advised, "estimates that for prestige and psychological fac-
tors, the U.S.S.R. would endeavor to be the first in launching an earth satellite." Moreover,
he said, it "probably is capable of launching a satellite in 1957. ''_ [II-13] However accurate
the CIA assessment might be, advocates of the WS 117L program found themselves unable
to secure active support within the administration, and in July the Defense Department
imposed sharp spending limits that effectively constrained their work to the "study level.""'
This state of affairs changed dramatically a few months later, in October-November
1957, after the Soviet Union launched Sputniks I and II. Despite presidential assurances,
the Soviet space accomplishments fueled a national debate over U.S. defense and science
policies? 7 [I1-14, II-15] Having downplayed the space program for purposes of their own,
Eisenhower and his advisors underestimated the psychological shock value of the satellites
that RAND had identified, the Technological Capabilities Panel had acknowledged, and
the National Security Council had underscored just a few years before. What began as an
evenly, if slowly paced, research and development effort was soon to receive high priority? _
Sputniks I and II, with their "Pearl Harbor" effect on public opinion, introduced into
space affairs the issues of national pride and international prestige. The administration
now moved quickly to restore confidence at home and prestige abroad. The Defense De-
partment authorized the Army to launch a scientific satellite as a backup to the National
Science Foundation-Navy Vanguard Project: and the president created the Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency (ARPA), assigning it temporary responsibility for directing all U.S.
space projects.James Killian, recendy named Science Advisor to the President, also changed
his mind. More funds were made available to the military space program, and in early 1958
the administration approved launching these satellites sooner with Thor IRBM boosters.
Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy, who succeeded Charles Wilson in Spumik's aftermath,
ordered ARPA to launch space vehicles to "provide a closer look at the moon."_'_'
54. Wilson as quoted by Harr, "Eisenhower's Approach to National Security Decision Making," p. 96. and
as quoted in N_4emorandum of Discussion at the 322d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington,
May 10, 1957," in Volume XI [345], p. 752.
55. ,_len W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, to The Honorable Donald Quarles, Deputy Secre
tary of Defense, July 5, 1957, Eisenhower Library.
56. Quarles subsequently drew congressional fire tor also restricting the flow of funds to the high-priority
missile program. See "Quarles on the Spot," in Washington Roundup, Aviation Week, October 28. 1957, p. 25.
57. In his first news conference after the launch of Sputnik 1on October 9, 1957. President Eisenhowez
let slip his true interest in the event, though it went unnoticed in the excitement of the day. "From what they say
they have put one small ball in the air," the President declared, adding, "at this moment you [don't] have to fear
the intelligence aspects of this." Public Papers of the President of the United States: Dwight David E_senhower, 1957
(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 724.
58. Eisenhower's advisors had anticipated the launch of a Soviet satellite before the United States, and
the Operations Coordinating Board, established within the structure of the National Security Council by Execu-
tive Order 10700, February 25, 1957, had prepared a contingency statement to be handled by the National
Academy of Sciences. See Operations Coordinating Board, "Memorandum of Meeting: Working Group on
Certain ._pects of NSC 5520 (Earth Satellite), Fourth Meeting held 3:30 P.M.,June 17, 1957, Room 357 Execu-
tive Office Building," and attachment: "Contingency Statement; Proposed Statement by Dr. Dedev W. Bronk.
President of the National Academy of Sciences, m the Event the U.S.S.R. Announces Plans for or the Actual
Launching of an Earth Satellite," NASA Historical Reterence Collection; Herbert F. York_ Race to ()bli,,um (New,
kbrk: Simon and Schuster, Clarion Book, 1970), pp. 106, 146.
59. Defense Secretary Wilson had announced plans to resign before the latmch of Spumik I. These
actions and events are described in National Security Cotmcil (NSC) Action No. 1846,January 22. 1958, as cited
in National Security Council, NSC 5814/1, "Preliminary U.S. Policy on Outer Space." August 18. 1958. p. 20;
Mosely, Dulles: ,4,Biograph>ofEleanor, Allen, and John FosterDulle._,p. 432; Prados, The ,SovietEmmate, pp. 106-107:
DOD News Release No. 288-58, March 27, 1958: see also ARPA Orders No. 1-58 and 2-58, March 27, 1958, all in
NASA Historical Reference Collection. The new satellite project is described by Kistiakowsky in A Sczenti_tat the
White House, p. 378.
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There was an undeniable public concern with Soviet leadership in outer space explo-
ration. Eisenhower declared on April 2, 1958, that a unified national space agency had to
be established. _°Few disagreed, certainly not the U.S. scientists who had begun to seriously
consider the future of research in space, the prospects for obtaining more federal funds
for this activity, and the ways of organizing it within the government. 6j [II-16] During the
subsequent dialogue and in legislative action, the nation's political leaders endorsed the
president's choice of civilian control of expanded U.S. space activities. Except for national
defense space operations, for which the Department of Defense remained responsible,
the National Aeronautics and Space Act declared that all non-military aeronautical and
space endeavors sponsored by the United States would be directed by a civilian agency
guided by eight objectives. First among them was basic scientific research, defined as "the
expansion of human knowledge of phenomena in the atmosphere and space .... " Signed
into law by President Eisenhower on July 29, the act wrote a broad and comprehensive
mandate for the peaceful pursuit of new knowledge and accompanying technology in
space. 6' [II-17]
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), formed with the Na-
tional Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) as its nucleus, began operating on
October 1, 1958, with the ongoing scientific satellite and planetary exploration projects
inherited from the National Science Foundation and ARPA. Air Force and other service
leaders, limited exclusively to approved military space missions, still had to translate exist-
ing plans into functioning systems. Those military satellite projects already underway and
projected at the end of 1958 formed the basic military space program. 6s It encompassed
five functional areas and, with one exception, consisted of non-piloted military spaceflight
projects (see Table 1). _ In years to come, the Air Force would for the most part retain
responsibility for technically managing and launching military spacecraft. Operational
direction of the individual projects frequently was assigned elsewhere. 6_
60. Robert Vexler, ed., Dwight D. Eisenhowe't;, 1880-1969, Chronology, Documents, Bibllographical Aids (Dobbs
Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1972), p. 42. NASA's enabling act was drafted by the NACA General Coun-
sel Paul G. Dembling in January-February 1958. Endorsed by James Killian and other White House officials, and
submitted to Congress by the President on April 2, the act passed essentially as first drawn--with the addition of
a National Aeronautics and Space Council perhaps the most notable change. In recent years, however, some
scholars have argued that congressional agitation forced the issue of a civil space agency on a reluctant presi-
dent. See, for example, Derek W. Elliott, "Finding an Appropriate Commitment: Space Policy Development
Under Eisenhower and Kennedy, 1954-1963," Ph.D. dissertation, The George Washington University, May 10,
1992.
61. See Chapter Four of this volume for a discussion of the debate over organizing the space agency.
62. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Sec. 102(a) and 102(c) ; Frank W. Anderson,Jr., Order_ 0f
Magnitude: A History of NACA and NASA, 1915-1980 (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4401, 1981), p. 17; Maier, in
IGstiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House, pp. xxxviii-xxxxix. An elucidation of the reasons for and objectives of
using and exploring space are contained in a contemporary brochure issued by the President's Science Advi-
sory Committee, "Introduction to Outer Space," March 26, 1958, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
63. Various Air Force officials, it is true, attempting to gain responsibility for directing the nation's space
program in 1958, did graft to this basic plan and present to Congress all sorts of exotic space proposals, includ-
ing manned and unmanned orbital bombardment systems and even lunar military bases from which to attack
countries on Earth. Besides flying in the face of stated administration commitments to explore and use outer
space for peaceful and defensive purposes only, these proposals gained few adherents other than those who
already viewed the Soviet sputniks with unalloyed hysteria.
64. This program plan, it is also true, does not appear in this form in contemporary documents. The
proposed manned rocket bomber (ROBO), later called Dyna-soar (X-20), remained the sole exception to space
robotics and in research and development until canceled in the early 1960s. Notwithstanding the variations that
marked it afterward, the 1958 plan featured automated spacecraft and reflects the basic American military
space program in effect today.
65. Neil McElroy, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Respon-
sibility for Space Systems," September 18, 1959, in Alice C. Cole, et. al., eds., The Department of Defense: Documents
on Establishraent and Organization (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1978), p. 325; also DOD
Directive No. 5160.32, "Development of Space Systems," March 6, 1961, as reprinted in Ib/d.
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Functions
Navigation
Meteorology
Communication
Missile Detection
and Space Defense
Reconnaissance
Table 1
Military Space Program Plan
(November 1958)
Projec_
Transit navigation satellite system; assigned to the Navy
on May 9, 1960
Tiros television (RCA) satellite system assigned to NASA;
military system proposed, but held to studies while nego-
tiations for a single civil-military system were underway
with NASA and the Department of Commerce (Weather
Bureau)
Courier active (repeater) strategic and tactical commu-
nication satellite system; assigned to the Army on Sep-
tember 15, 1960
Infrared radiometers that detect focused and Space
Defense heat sources (Missile Detection and
Alarm--MIDAS)
Detection of nuclear detonations (Vela Hotel)
Satellite inspector
ROBO/Dyna-Soar (X-20)
Radar tracking of Earth satellites (SPASUR/SPADATS)
Optical tracking of satellites (from IGY Baker-Nunn
system)
Distant Early Warning (DEW) radar net and, by the early
1960s, the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
(BMEWS) radar net
Other automated satellites
Making Straight the Way
When NASA opened for business in October 1958, periodic U-2 flights over lim-
ited areas of the U.S.S.R. had been underway for two years. The Soviets protested vigor-
ously, albeit privately, through diplomatic channels, and administration leaders knew that
improved ground-to-air missiles would soon preclude all such missions. _ Late in the year,
President Eisenhower officially notified the Russians once again that the United States
specifically sought to allay fears of surprise attack and create an inspection system to super-
vise arms-reduction agreements by means of aerial and space observation. He did so by
66. Eisenhower himself viewed these overflights in Soviet airspace as exceptionally provocative and a
grave violation of national sovereignty; before personally approving each mission, he had to be convinced of
the overriding need for it.
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submittingathird,muchmoresignificantOpenSkiesproposaltanextraordinary"Sur-
priseAttackConference"sponsoredbytheUnitedNationsinGeneva.67
Makinghisproposalthemoreremarkable,Eisenhowerauthorizedhisrepresenta-
fives,WilliamC.Foster,laterheadoftheArmsControlandDisarmamentAgency,and
HarvardchemistGeorgeKistiakowsky,toincludea"sanitized"versionofthethreat-and-
warningportionsofthesurprise-attackindicationsmatrixsuppliedbytheNationalIndica-
tionsCenter.HethusfurnishedSovietofficialskeyindicatorswithwhichtoassessthe
militarystatusofstatesin theNorthAtlanficTreatyOrganization--iftheyhadnotalready
devisedsimilarwarningindicatorsindependently.TheSovietsonceagainrejectedOpen
Skies,thoughtheU.S.positionontheissuewasmadeplain.'_Evenif theSovietscontinued
torejectheconceptininternationalconference,nfightnotthepreceptsofinternational
lawnowbeappliedtoachieveit?
Oneyearearlier,SpumiksI andII hadoverflowni ternationalboundarieswithout
provokingdiplomaticprotests.FourdaysafterSputnikI, in fact,EisenhowerandDeputy
SecretaryofDefenseDonaldQuarlesdiscussedtheissue.Quarlesobserved:"'...tileRus-
sianshave...doneusagoodturn,unintentionally,inestablishingtheconceptoffreedom
ofinternationalspace....ThePresidentthenlookedahead...andaskedaboutareconnais-
sance[satellite]vehicle.'*_TheU.S.IGYExplorerandVanguardsatellitesthatfollowed
thefirstsputniksintoorbitinearly1958likewisetransitedtheworld,andagainnota
singlestateobjectedtotheseoverflights.Thecivilspacecraftwouldmakestraighttheway
fortheirmilitarycounterparts.TestifyingbeforetheU.S.HouseofRepresentativesnMay
1958,QuarlesunderscoredthispointforamemberofCongresskepticalthattheUnited
StatesshouldnotobjectoSovietreconnaissancesatellites."Inamilitarysense,"Quarles
said,carefulto speakonlyfor theDepartmentof Defense,"it seemsto methatobjects
orbitinginouterspacehaveaninternationalcharacter by the very nature of their posiuon
there, and it would he inappropriate for us to take the position that what you could see
from there of our area would be improper for them to see .... I just think we cannot estab-
lish that kind of position that these [military satellites] are improper or objectionable or
offensive. So I would have the view that we would not seek to object to such reconnais-
sance."70 This tenuous "freedom of space" principle, the right of unrestricted overflight in
outer space, the evidence indicates President Eisenhower purposely sought to exploit and
codify, when he signed the 1958 Space Act. That signature formally divided U.S. astronau-
tics between civilian science and military applications directed to "peaceful"--that is, sci-
entific-or defensive and nonaggressive purposes.
67. The second proposal Eisenhower submitted direcdy to Nikolai A. Bulganin, Chairman of the Soviet
Council of Ministers, on March 2, 1956, eight months after the original proposal in Geneva. In it, Eisenhower
agreed to accept on-site inspection teams if the Soviets would accept Open Skies. It, too, was rejected. See
Ambrose, Eisenhower: Volume II, p. 311.
68. Annex 5 and Annex 6 of "Report of the Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible Measures
Which Might be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack and for the Preparation of a Report Thereon to Govern-
ment," United Nadons General Assembly, A/4078, S/4145,January 5, 1959; William C. Foster, "Official Report
of the United States Delegation to the Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible Measures Which Might
be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack and for the Preparation of a Report Thereon to Governments," Geneva,
Switzerland, November lO-December 18, 1958, p. 10, Eisenhower Library.
69. Quarles and Eisenhower remarks quoted in Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Pohti-
cal History of the SpaceAge (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1985), p. 134; an abridged version, less the reference to
military satellites, appears in "Memorandum of a Conference, President's Office, White House, Washington,
October 8, 1957, 8:30 a.m.," Volume XI [347], pp. 755-56. Walter McDougall and Stephen Ambrose, without
access to classified documents, correctly perceived the intent of Eisenhower's satellite decision and the ratio-
hale behind it. McDougall, TheHeavens and theEarth, chapter 5; Ambrose, Eisenhower: VolumelI, pp. 428,513-14.
Quarles, architect of the nation's space policy, reiterated for administration leaders the importance of the
principle "freedom of space" and its implications for military observation satellites at a meeting of the National
Security Council on October 10, 1957, in Volume XI [348], p. 759.
70. U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration, Astronauttcs and
Space Exploration, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 1109.
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President Eisenhower amplified his space policy with National Security Council di-
rectives in.June and August 1958 and January 1960. Anticipating the launch of military
satellites, the first directive called for a "political framework which will place the uses of
U.S. reconnaissance satellites in a political and psychological context most favorable to the
United States." The second directive judged these spacecraft to be of "critical importance
to U.S. national security," identified them with the peaceful uses of outer space, and set as
an objective the "'opening up' of the Soviet Bloc through improved intelligence and pro-
grams of scientific cooperation." The third directive described the military support ntis-
sions in space that fell within the rubric of peaceful uses, identified offensive space-weapon
systems for study, and noted a positive political milestone in international law. The United
Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space now accepted the "per-
missibility of the launching and flight of space vehicles...regardless of what territory they
passed over during the course of their flight through outer space." But the UN Commit-
tee, the directive confided, at the same time stipulated that this principle pertained only to
flights involved in the "peaceful uses of outer space. ''7_ [II-18, II-19, II-20, 1I-21 ]
Hewing to the policy of "freedom of space" and the peaceful space acti_aties they
defined for it, Eisenhower administration officials would in the months ahead permit only
the study of offensive space weapons such as space-based antiballistic missile systems, satel-
lite interceptors, and orbital bombers that could threaten the precedent of free passage. 7_
This space policy, endorsed by President Eisenhower's successor, John E Kennedy, secured
two objectives simultaneously and permitted the launch and operation of military recon-
naissance spacecraft. First, it reinforced the "sputnik precedent" as an accepted principle
among states, officially recognizing free access to and unimpeded passage through outer
space for peaceful purposes. [II-22] Second, by limiting military spacefaring to defense-
support functions, it avoided a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union over observa-
tion of the Earth from space and ensured at least an opportunity to achieve Open Skies at
altitudes above the territorial airspace of nation states. Thus, without formal convention,
the United States could fashion unilaterally an "inspection system" to forewarn of surprise
attack and supervise and verify future arms-reduction and nuclear-test-ban treaties.
But if the IGY scientific satellites had set an international precedent, and if publicly
the United States was committed to a visible space program under civilian management, at
the end of 1958 the actual launch and operation of military spacecraft had still to test
President Eisenhower's policy--and Soviet reaction.
71. NSC 5814, "U.S. Policy on Outer Space,"June 20, 1958, paragraph 54; NSC 5814/1, "Preliminary U.S.
Policy on Outer Space," August 18, 1958, paragraphs 21, 30, and 47; NSC 5918, "U.S. Policy on Outer Space,"
December 17, 1959, paragraphs 18, 19, and 23.
72. The administration's rationale in opposing anything more than the study of space-based weapons is
explained in Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House, pp. 229-30, 239-40, and 245-46. A few days after the
launch of Sputnik t, having just discussed this rationale with Eisenhower, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald
Quarles surprised and chagrined Air Force leaders who briefed him on the military satellite program and the
potential of satellites for offensive applications: "Mr Quarles took very strong and specific exception to the
inclusion in the presentation of any thoughts on the use of a satellite as a (nuclear) weapons carrier and stated
that the Air Force was out of line in advancing this as a possible application of the satellite. He verbally directed
that any such applications not be considered further in Air Force planning. Mthough both General [Curtis]
LeMay and General [Donald] Putt voiced objection to this...on the grounds that we had no assurance that the
U.S.S.R. would not explore this potential of satellites and could be expected to do so, Mr. Quarles remained
adamant." Colonel F. C. E. Oder, USAF, Director, WS l 17L, Memorandum for the Record, "Briefing of Deputy
Secretary of Defense Mr. Quarles on WS 117L on 16 October 1957," October 25, 1957, Eisenhower Library.
Amplifying administration policy ayear later, on October 20, 1958, ARPA Director Roy Johnson ordered
the ,Mr Force to cease using the Weapon System (WS) designation in the military satellite program "to minimize
the aggressive international implications of overflight.... It is desired to emphasize the defensive, surprise-pre-
vention aspects of the system. This change...should reduce the effectiveness of possible diplomatic protest against
peacetime employment." Roy Johnson, Director, ARPA, to Maj. General Bernard Schriever, Cmdr., Air Force
Ballistic Missile Division, Air Research and Development Command, n.s., October 20, 1958, Eisenhower Li-
brary. Despite these and subsequent messages that canceled offensive space-based, weapon-research programs,
Air Force military leaders at that time seemed unable to grasp----_)r unwilling to accept--the meaning of Presi-
dent Eisenhower's "peaceful uses of outer space," or the rationale behind it.
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Document I1-1
Document fl0e: Louis N. Ridenour, "Pilot Lights of the Apocalypse: A Playlet in One Act,"
Fortune, Vol. 33, January 1946.
This brief "playlet" offered the first public account of an intercontinental nuclear
war directed from underground command centers and conducted using space-based weap-
ons. Written by Louis Ridenour, a physicist who helped develop radar technology at MIT's
Radiation Laboratory during World War II, it appeared in print just five months after the
atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Concern over a nuclear surprise attack led President Dwight D. Eisenhower to pro-
pose "Open Skies" and establish a national policy (with the intent to promote an interna-
tional precedent) of "freedom of space." That policy and subsequent precedent permitted
the United States to employ without contest early warning satellites and other Earth-
orbiting observation systems.
Pilot Lights of the Apocalypse
A Playlet in One Act
by Louis N. Ridenour
Louis N. Ridenour wrote "Military Security and the Atomic Bomb" in the November issue of
Fortune, attacking the notion that the U.S. could achieve "security by concealment" of its scientific
knowledge of atomic power Since then the principle underlying his view seems to have been incorpo-
rated in Anglo-American policy. Dr. Ridenour, a nuclear physicist and a professor of physics at the
University of Pennsylvania, went to M.L T. 's Radiation Laboratory four years ago and helped develop
radar weapons there. He believes that while "security by achievement" may determine any victor)', the
difference between victor and vanquished in a war fought with atomic power would be merely a few
percentiles of obliteration. And he fears that such a war will be inescapable if there is an atomic
armaments race, since the slightest err_ such as often occurs when men under great tension become
trigger-happy, would touch off stupendous destruction.
Dr. Ridenour has not tried to unite a fantasy; he has tried to put into the form of a grim playlet
the sober conclusions to which he feels driven by knowledge of physics, weapons, and human behavior.
His moral: we should do all that decently can be done to avoid an atomic-armaments race.
What that "all" may be, he does not, as a natural scientist, attempt to define. Further definition
is the job of social scientists, statesmen, philosophers, and citizens.
The curtain rises to disclose the operations room of the Western Defense Command,
somewhere in the San Francisco area and a hundred feet underground. Two sergeants,
RIGHT, are tending a row of teletype machines that connect the room with the world's
principal cities. Two others, REAR, sit before a sort of telephone switchboard with key
switches, lights, and labels representing the world's major cities. Behind them stands a
captain. At a large desk, CENTER, sit a brigadier general and two colonels, all reading
teletype messages. The wall, LEFT, has a sturdy barred door, a world map, and a framed
motto: "Remember Pearl Harbor."
TIME: Some years after all the industrialized nations have mastered the production and
use of atomic power.
BRIGADIER (laying down the message he has been reading): Nothing much tonight, I'd
say. We'd better get tidied up a little. Captain Briggs!
CAPTAIN (facing about and standing at attention): Yes, sir.
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BRIGADIER: Ready for company?
CAPTAIN: Yes, sir. I think so, sir.
BRIGADIER: See that the men look busy---on their toes and busy.
CAPTAIN: Yes, sir. (A bell rings.) Schwartz, you get the door. (One of the sergeants crosses
to the door and opens it. All stand rigidly at attention. A litde confused, the sergeant goes
through the formality of examining passes. He then admits a group of four: a four-star
general, a major, and two civilians.)
GENERAL: Carry on. (The men relax. The General leads the two civilians over to the
Brigadier and the Colonels. The Major takes up his station by the door. Nobody pays any
attention to him.) Mr. President, this is General Anderson, Watch Officer in charge of the
Operations Room.
THE PRESIDENT: How do you do?
BRIGADIER: How do you do, Sir? (They shake hands.)
GENERAL: Colonel Sparks and Colonel Peabody, Deputy Watch Officers on duty.
THE PRESIDENT: Glad to meet you both. (They shake hands.)
GENERAL: Dr. Thompson--General Anderson, Colonel Sparks, and Colonel Peabody.
(All nod and smile.) Now, Mr. President, this is the nerve center of our counterattack
organization for the western area. The teletype machines you see over there (pointing)
are on radio circuits that connect us with our people in all the principal cities of the world,
and with the other continental defense commands. The stations, and their statuses, are
marked on the map. (He gestures toward the map.) We've just come from the defense
center, where the radar plots are kept and the guns and the fighters controlled. That's
defense. But this is counterattack. Along that wall (waving toward the rear) is our control
board. If you'll step over here, sir, I'll show you how it works.
THE PRESIDENT (moving with the General toward the telephone switchboard against
the back wail): Defense and counterattack, eh? Why keep them separate?
GENERAL: Well, the defense has to move quickly, or it's no good at all. They don't have
time to think. But counterattack--well, counterattack has to move quickly, too. But we
want them to have time to decide what they need to do. You can't tell just from the direc-
tion of an attack who launched it, An attack might be staged entirely by mines planted
inside our borders, so there wouldn't be any direction connected with it. And then again,
we have pretty good information that some other countries besides us have got bombs up
above the stratosphere, 800 miles above the earth, going round us in orbits like little moons.
We put up 2,000 and we can see about 5,400 on our radar. Any time, somebody can call
down that odd 3,400 by radio and send them wherever they want. There's no telling from
trajectory which nation controls those bombs. What this all means is that the data these
fellows here have to go on is mainly political. Radar doesn't do them any good. What they
need is intelligence, and that's what comes in all the time, as complete and up-to-date as
we can get it on the teletypes. In the defense center, you saw scientists and technicians.
The officers here are political scientists.
THE PRESIDENT: That's very interesting. Maybe you'll give me a job here if I ever need
one. I'm a political scientist.
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GENERAL(laughingjustenough):Yes,sir!
THEPRESIDENT:General,youhaven'ttoldmewhatallthesegadgetsaretor.(Hewaves
towardtheswitchboard.)
GENERAL:No,sir,I haven't.Thisisourcounterattackontrolboard.Youseethatevery
stationismarkedwiththenameofacity.Andeverystationhasthreepilotlights:red,
yellow,andgreen.
THEPRESIDENT:Allthegreenonesareon.
GENERAL:That'sright,sir.Wehaveunattendedradiotransmitters,eachwiththreespares,
instationsineverycitycoveredonthisboard.Ifoneofthetransmittersgoesontheblink,
aspareisautomaticallyswitchedon.Butif allfourtransmittersinanystationaredestroyed,
well,welosethesignalfromthatstation.Whenthathappensthegreenlightgoesoutand
theyellowlightcomeson.
THEPRESIDENT:Howaboutheredlight?
GENERAL:Thatcomesoninsteadoftheyellowwhenallourstationsin thewholecitygo
offtheair.Yellowmeanspartialdestructionmredmeansubstantiallycompletedestruc-
tion.
THEPRESIDENT:Andgreenmeanspeace.
GENERAL:Yes,sir.Butthisisn'tjustamonitoringboard.Youseethiskeyhere?
THEPRESIDENT:Yes.
GENERAL:Thatsetsoffourmines.Wehavethemplantedinagreatmanycities,andthe
radiocontrolcircuitcanbeunlockedfromhere.
THEPRESIDENT:Isthewholeworldminednow?
GENERAL:Well,no.Wehaven'tbotheredmuchwithAsia.Andsomecountriesareso
hardtogetintothatcoverageisspotty.Ourschedulecallsforcompletionofmineinstalla-
tionsin twomoreyears.Butwehaveanothercardtoplay.YourememberI toldyouabout
thesatellitebombs--theonesthatarecirclingaround,800milesup?
THEPRESIDENT: Yes.
GENERAL: Well, this other key here will bring them down on the city shown on the marker--
we are looking at Calcutta--one of those satellite bombs every time it is pressed.
THE PRESIDENT: Is one of those bombs earmarked tbr each particular city?
GENERAL: No, sir. The bomb that happens to be in the most favorable location at the
time this key is pressed is the one brought down. It might be any one of the whole 2,000.
THE PRESIDENT: This is all damned clever.
GENERAL: We have Dr. Thompson to thank for most of it. His people worked out all the
technical stuff. All the Army has to do is man the installations and watch the intelligence as
it comes along.
DR. THOMPSON: Good of you to say that, General. But seriously, Mr. President, as people
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pointed out soon after the first atomic bomb was dropped, there isn't any other nation
with the industrial know-bow to do a job like this.
THE PRESIDENT: It's very impressive, I must say. Are the other Defense Commands
equipped the same way?
GENERAL: Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, to guard against accidents, each Defense Command
has two complete operations rooms like this, either one of which can take full control if
the other is destroyed.
THE PRESIDENT: We've kept ahead in the armaments race. Who'd dare attack us when
we're set up like this?
DR. THOMPSON: Surely nobody would. I don't think you need to expect any trouble.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, this has all been very interesting. (To the Brigadier) General,
have you had any exciting times here you can tell me about?
BRIGADIER: Yes, sir. Every time a meteorite comes down--a shooting star, you know--our
radar boys track it, shoot it down, and send us in an alert. We have a few bad moments until
we get the spectrographic report. If it's iron and nickel--and it always has been so far--we
know God sent it, and relax. Someday it'll be uranium, and then we'll have to push a
button. Or plutonium.
THE PRESIDENT: How many shooting stars have you shot?
COLONEL SPARKS (laughing politely): We get an average of twelve a month. In August
it's the worst, of course. The Perseids, you know.
THE PRESIDENT (puzzled): Iran... ?
BRIGADIER (hastily): No, sir. The Perseid meteors. Named after Perseus. Astronomers
are a classical bunch.
THE PRESIDENT (recovering): Oh, sure. (Turning to the Colonels) Gendemen, how do
you like this job?
COLONEL SPARKS: We have a feeling of grave responsibility.
THE PRESIDENT: The fate of the nation is in your hands. But always renqember that our
nation is the most precious.
BOTH COLONELS (awed): Yes, sir.
GENERAL: Well, Mr, President. We've fallen a little behind our schedule. They'll be wait-
ing for us at the mess.
THE PRESIDENT: All right, General, let's get along. General Anderson, Colonel Sparks,
Colonel Peabody, I've enjoyed very much seeing your installation. Keep on your toes. We're
all depending on you.
GENERAL AND COLONELS (together): Yes, sir.
(Schwartz goes over, opens the door, and stands stiffly at attention as the visitors file out
amid a general chorus of "Goodbye" and "Goodbye, sir." Schwartz closes the door. The
Brigadier and Colonels sit at their desks.)
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BRIGADIER:Well,that'sthat.The Old Man gave him a good story; I couldn't have done
better myself.
COLONEL SPARKS (still in the clouds): He is depending on us.
BRIGADIER: Don't take it too hard. All we're supposed to do is make the other guy sorry.
We can't save any lives or rebuild any cities. Never forget what those buttons do.
COLONEL SPARKS: Just the same, sir, I'm glad I was born an American. We've got the
know-how. I'm glad I'm on the side that's ahead in the race.
COLONEL PEABODY (disgusted): Sparks, you talk like a damn high-school kid. For this
job, you're supposed to have some good sense and detachment.
(Just then, there is a dull rumble. The floor and the walls of the room shake, and a couple
of sizable chunks of concrete fall out of the ceiling. The lights go out, except for the green
ones on the control board. Emergency lights, dimmer than the regular ones, come on at
once. All the men are on their feet.)
BRIGADIER: Good Godl What was that? (Recollecting himself) Peabody, get on the phone
to headquarters. Sparks, get out the red-line messages for the last twenty-four hours. Cap-
tain, anything from the defense center?
CAPTAIN: My line to them seems to be out, sir.
BRIGADIER: What have you got for status? Anybody showing yellow or red?
CAFrAIN: San Francisco is red, sir.
COLONEL SPARKS (riffling wildly through teletype messages): Oh,Jesus. This must be it.
San Francisco! (Screaming) San Francisco gone!
BRIGADIER: Shut up, Sparks. Take it easy. (To Peabody) Can't you get headquarters?
COLONEL PEABODY: My line is dead. I can't get reserve operations, either. Maybe this is
the real thing.
COLONEL SPARKS (still half hysterical) : We better do something. Remember what it says
in the book: counterattack must take action before the enemy's destruction of our centers
is complete.
BRIGADIER: First we need an enemy. Who's got the highest negative rating in the latest
State Department digest?
COLONEL PEABODY (who has quietly taken the messages from in front of Sparks): Den-
mark, sir. But it's well below the danger point. All we've got is this: (reading) COPENHAGEN
1635 HOURS 22 JANUARY WIDESPREAD DISAPPROVAL OF WILLIAMS FOUNTAIN,
STATUARY GROUP PRESENTED THE KING DENMARK BYTHE U.S., BEING SHOWN
BYPEOPLE COPENHAGEN. FOUNTAIN HAS BEEN PELTED VEGETABLES BYHOOD-
LUM GROUPS THREE OCCASIONS. FORMAL PROTEST STATING STATUE INSULTS
KING RECEIVED FROM ROYAL ACADEMYART IN FOLLOWING TERMS QUOTE... and
so on. Nothing there, I'd say.
COLONEL SPARKS: Nothing there! San Francisco's in ruins, you damn fool, and we're sitting
here like three warts on a pickle. All that over a lousy set of statues. I say let'em have it.
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BRIGADIER(toPeabody):Isthatthehottestyou'vegot?
COLONELPEABODY:es,sir.I don'tthinkit couldhavebeenDenmark.Thoughthat
sculptor,Williams,doesliveinSanFrancisco.
BRIGADIER:We'dbetterwaitandbesure.Captain,howareyourlinesnow?
COLONELSPARKS(withrisinghysteria):Whathavewegotthisstufforifwedon'tuseit?
MyGod,didn'tyouhearwhathePresidentsaid?He'sdependingonus;they'reallde-
pendingonus.Ifyouhaven'tgottheguts,I have.(Beforehecanbestopped,herushesto
thecontrolboardandshovesasergeanttothefloor.PeabodyisafterSparksinaflash.He
pullshimaroundandknockshimtothefloor.Sparks'sheadhitshard,andheliesstill.
COLONELPEABODY:General,hedidit!Copenhagenshowsred!
SERGEANT(atateletype):Sir,here'samessagefromthedefensecenter.They'vegot
theirlineworkingagain.(Hetearsit offandbringsit totheBrigadier.)
CAPTAIN:Stockholm'sgonered,sir.
COLONELPEABODY:Sure.TheDanesthoughtit wastheSwedes.Thatexport-duties
row.
BRIGADIER: And the Swedes have got two hot arguments on their hands. They'll take the
British, too,just to be sure. The British soak the Russians, and then we're next. (He reads
the message he has been holding, and drops into a chair.) My God! Peabody, that was an
earthquake. Epicenter right smack in San Francisco.
CAPTAIN: London's gone red, sir. And Edinburgh, and Manchester, and Nottingham,
and--
COLONEL PEABODY: Dark ages, here I come. It's a pity the Security Council didn't have
time to consider all this.
BRIGADIER: Peabody, you're beginning to sound a little like Sparks. Come to think of it,
there was nothing wrong with him but too much patriotism and too little sense. Captain,
we probably can't pull this out of the fire, but we've got to try. Send a message on all
circuits. (The Captain sits down at a teletype keyboard.)
CAPTAIN: Ready, sir.
BRIGADIER: To all stations: URGE IMMEDIATE WORLDWIDE BROADCAST THIS MES-
SAGE: DESTRUCTION COPENHAGEN 1910 HOURS THIS DATE INITIATED BYTHIS
STATION THROUGH GRIEVOUS ERROR. ATTACKS MADE SINCE BASED ON IDEA
DESTRUCTION COPENHAGEN WAS ACT OF WAR, WHICH IT WAS NOT REPEAT NOT.
URGE ATTACKS BE STOPPED UNTIL SITUATION CAN BE CLARIFIED. THERE IS NO
REPEAT NO WAR. END.
COLONEL PEABODY (who has been watching board): The hell there isn't. New York's
gone red, and Chicago, and... (The room rocks, the lights go out. With a dull, powerful
rumble, the roof caves in.)
CURTAIN
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Document 11-2
Document title: Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc., "Preliminary Design of an Experimental
World-Circling Spaceship," Report No. SM-11827, May 2, 1946, pp. i-viii, 1-16, 211-12.
Source: Archives, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California.
The newly formed Rand group, a unit of Douglas Aircraft, was directed by General
Curtis LeMay to investigate the possible uses of satellites for the Air Force. LeMay took this
action after he learned that the Navy was conducting a similar study. The resulting report,
released in May 1946, was the first study completed by Rand and the first comprehensive
analysis of the military uses of satellites. It suggested that satellites had broad uses in me-
teorology, reconnaissance, and communications. But while extensive in scope and provid-
ing much new information on the value of satellites, including the possibility of a vehicle
that could carry humans, the report was virtually ignored by the Air Force, which was
unconvinced as to the utility of satellites and unwilling to support a report that questioned
the role of the manned bomber. These excerpts from the report, which contained
236 pages plus several lengthy appendices, give a sense of the broader thinking that guided
the engineering analyses that comprised the bulk of the document.
[i] Summary
This report presents an engineering analysis of the possibilities of designing a man-
made satellite. The questions of power plants, structural weights, multiple stages, opti-
mum design values; trajectories, stability, and landing are considered in detail. The results
are used to furnish designs for two proposed vehicles. The first is a four stage rocket using
alcohol and liquid oxygen as propellants. The second is a two stage rocket using liquid
hydrogen and liquid oxygen as propellants. The latter rocket offers better specific con-
sumption rates, but this is found to be partially offset by the greater structural weight
necessitated by the use of hydrogen. It is concluded that modern technology has advanced
to a point where it now appears feasible to undertake the design of a satellite vehicle.
[ii] Abstract
In this report, we have undertaken a conservative and realistic engineering appraisal
of the possibilities of building a spaceship which will circle the earth as a satellite. The
work has been based on our present state of technological advancement and has not in-
cluded such possible future developments as atomic energy.
If a vehicle can be accelerated to a speed of about 17,000 m.p.h, and aimed properly,
it will revolve on a great circle path above the earth's atmosphere as a new satellite. The
centrifugal force will just balance the pull of gravity. Such a vehicle will make a complete
circuit of the earth in approximately 1-1/2 hours. Of all the possible orbits, most of them
will not pass over the same ground stations on successive circuits because the earth will
turn about _/a6 of a turn under the orbit during each circuit. The equator is the only such
repeating path and consequently is recommended for early attempts at establishing satel-
lites so that a single set of telemetering stations may be used.
Such a vehicle will undoubtedly prove to be of great military value. However, the
present study was centered around a vehicle to be used in obtaining much desired scien-
tific information on cosmic rays, gravitation, geophysics, terrestrial magnetism, astronomy,
meteorology, and properties of the upper atmosphere. For this purpose, a payload of
500 lbs. and 20 cu ft. was selected as a reasonable estimate of the requirements for scien-
tific apparatus capable of obtaining results sufficiently far-reaching to make the undertak-
ing worthwhile. It was found necessary to establish the orbit at an altitude of about 300
miles to insure sufficiently [iii] low drag so that the vehicle could travel for 10 days or
more, without power, before losing satellite speed.
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Theonlytypeof powerplantcapableof acceleratingavehicleto aspeedof
17,000m.p.h,ontheouterlimitsoftheatmosphereistherocket.Thetwomostimportant
performanceharacteristicsofarocketvehiclearetheexhaustvelocityoftherocketand
theratiooftheweightofpropellantstothegrossweight.Verycarefulstudiesweremadeto
establishengineeringestimatesofthevaluesthatcanbeobtainedforthesetwocharacter-istics.
Thestudyofrocketperformanceindicatedthatwhileliquidhydrogenrankshighest
amongfuelshavinglargeexhaustvelocities,itslowdensity,lowtemperatureandwide
explosiverangecausegreatroublein engineeringdesign.Ontheotherhand,alcohol,
thoughhavingalowerexhaustvelocity,hasthebenefitofextensivedevelopmenti the
GermanV-2.Consequentlyi wasdecidedtoconductparallelpreliminarydesignstudies
ofvehiclesusingliquidhydrogen-liquidoxygenandalcohol-liquidoxygenaspropellants.
It hasbeenfrequentlyassumedin thepasthatsnucturalweightratiosbecomein-
creasinglyfavorableasrocketsincreaseinsize,andfixedweightitemsuchasradioequip-
mentbecomeinsignificantweighti ems.However,thestudyofweightratios indicated that
for large sizes the weight of tanks and similar items actually become less favorable. Conse-
quently, there is an optimum middle range of sizes. Improvements in weight ratios over
that of the German V-2 are possible only by the slow process of technological develop-
ment, not by the brute force methods of increase in size. This study showed that an alco-
hol-oxygen vehicle [iv] could be built whose entire structural weight (including motors,
controls, etc.) was about 16% of the gross weight. On the other hand, the difficuhies with
liquid hydrogen, such as increased tank size, necessitated an entire structural weight of
about 25% of the gross weight. These studies also indicated that a maximum acceleration
of about 6.5 times that of gravity gave the best overall performance for the vehicles consid-
ered. If the acceleration is greater, the increased structural design loads increase the struc-
tural weight. If the acceleration is less, rocket thrust is inefficiently used to snpport the
weight of the vehicle without producing the desired acceleration.
Using the above results, it was found that neither hydrogen-oxygen nor alcohol-oxy-
gen is capable of accelerating a single unassisted vehicle to orbital speeds. By the use of a
multi-stage rocket, these velocities can be attained by vehicles feasible within the limits of
our present knowledge. To illustrate the concept of a multi-stage rocket, first consider a
vehicle composed of two parts. The primary vehicle, complete with its rocket motor, tan ks.
propellants and controls is carried along as the "payload" of a similar vehicle of much
greater size. The rocket of the large vehicle is used to accelerate the combination to as
great a speed as possible, after which, the large vehicle is discarded and the small vehicle
accelerates under its own power, adding its velocity increase to that of the large vehicle. By
this means we have obtained an effective decrease in the amount of structural weight that
must be accelerated to high speeds. This same idea can be used in designing vehicles with
a greater number of stages. A careful analysis of the advantages of staging showed that for
a given set of performance requirements, Iv] an optimum number of stages exists. If the
stages are too few in number, the required velocities can be attained only by the undesir-
able process of exchanging payload for fuel. If they are too many, the multiplication of
tanks, motors, etc. eliminates any possible gain in the effective weight ratio. For the alco-
hol-oxygen rocket it was found that four stages were best. For the hydrogen-oxygen rocket,
preliminary analysis indicated that the best choice for the number of stages was two, hut
refinements showed the optimum number of stages was three. Untortunately, insufficient
time was available to change the design, so the work on the hydrogen-oxygen was con>
pleted using two stages. The characteristics of the vehicles studies are tabulated below ....
Vehicle Powered by Alcohol-Oxygen Rockets
! a a 4_
Gross Wt. (lbs.) 233,669 53,689 11,829 2,868
Weight less fuel (lbs.) 93,669 21,489 4,729 1,148
Payload (lbs.) 53,689 11,829 2,868 500
Max. Diameter (in.) 157 138 105 90
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VehiclePoweredbyHydrogen-OxygenRockets
filag_ 1
GrossWt.(lbs.) 291,564 15,364
Weightlessfuel(lbs.) 84,564 4,464
Payload(lbs.) 15,364 500
Max.Diameter(in.) 248 167
[vi] (hadthreestagesbeenusedforthehydrogen-oxygenrockets,theoverallgross
weightofthisvehiclecouldhavebeenreducedtoabout84,000lbs.indicatingthiscombi-
nationshouldbegivenseriousconsiderationinanyfuturestudy).
In arrivingattheabovedesignfigures,adetailedstudywasmadeoftheeffectsof
exhaustvelocity,structuralweight,gravity,drag,acceleration,flight path inclination, and
relative size of stages on the performance of the vehicles so that an optimum design could
be achieved or reasonable compromises made.
It was found that the vehicle could best be guided during its accelerated flight by
mounting control surfaces in the rocket jets and rotating the entire vehicle so that lateral
components of the jet thrust could be used to produce the desired control forces. It is
planned to fire the rocket vertically upward for several miles and then gradually curve the
flight path over in the direction in which it is desired that the vehicle shall travel. In order
to establish the vehicle on an orbit at an aldtude of about 300 miles without using excessive
amounts of control itwas found desirable to allow the vehicle to coast without thrust on an
extended elliptic arc just preceding the firing of the rocket of the last stage. As the vehicle
approaches the summit of this arc, which is at the final altitude, the rocket of the last stage
is fired and the vehicle is accelerated so that it becomes a freely revolving satellite.
It was shown that excessive amounts of rocket propellants are required to make cor-
rections if the orbit is incorrecdy established in direction or in velocity. Therefore, consid-
erable attention was devoted to the stability and control problem during the acceleration
to orbital [vii] speeds. It was concluded that the orbit could be established with sufficient
precision so that the vehicle would not inadvertently re-enter the atmosphere because of
an eccentric orbit.
Once the vehicle has been established on its orbit, the questions arise as to what are
the possibilities of damage by meteorites, what temperatures will it experience, mad can its
orientation in space be controlled? Although the probability of being hit by very small
meteorites is great, it was found that by using reasonable thickness plating, adequate pro-
tecdon could be obtained against all meteorites up to a size where the frequency of occur-
rence was very small. The temperatures of the satellite vehicle will range from about 40°F
when it is on the side of the earth facing the sun to about -20°F when it is in the earth's
shadow. Either small flywheels or small jets of compressed gas appear to offer feasible
methods of controlling the vehicle's orientation after the cessation of rocket thrust.
An investigation was made of the possibility of safely landing the vehicle without
allowing it to enter the atmosphere at such great speeds that it would be destroyed by the
heat of air resistance. It was found that by the use of wings on the small final vehicle, the
rate of descent could be controlled so that the heat would be dissipated by radiation at
temperatures the structure could safely withstand. These same wings could be used to land
the vehicle on the surface of the earth.
An interesting outcome of the study is that the maximum acceleration and tempera-
tures can be kept within limits which can be safely withstood by a human being. Since the
vehicle is not likely to be damaged by meteorites and can be safely brought back to earth,
there is good reason [viii] to hope that future satellite vehicles will be built to carry human
beings.
It has been estimated that to design, construct and launch a satellite vehicle will cost
about $150,000,000. Such an undertaking could be accomplished in approximately 5 years
time. The launching would probably be made from one of the Pacific islands near the
equator. A series of telemetering stations would be established around the equator to ob-
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rain the data from the scientific apparatus contained in the vehicle. The first vehicles will
probably be allowed to burn up on plunging back into the atmosphere. Later vehicles will
be designed so that they can be brought back to earth. Such vehicles can be used either as
long range missiles or for carrying human beings ....
[ 1] 1. Introduction
Technology and experience have now reached the point where it is possible to de-
sign and construct craft which can penetrate the atmosphere and achieve sufficient veloc-
ity to become satellites of the earth. This statement is documented in this report, which is
a design study for a satellite vehicle judiciously based on German experience with V-2, and
which relies for its success only on sound engineering development which can logically be
expected as a consequence of intensive application to this effort. The craft which would
result from such an undertaking would almost certainly do the job of becoming a satellite,
but it would clearly be bulky, expensive, and inefficient in terms of the spaceship we shall
be able to design after twenty years of intensive work in this field. In making the decision as
to whether or not to undertake construction of such a craft now, it is not inappropriate to
view our present situation as similar to that in airplanes prior to the flight of the Wright
brothers. We can see no more clearly all the utility and implications of spaceships than the
Wright brothers could see fleets of B-29's bombing Japan and air transports circling the
globe.
Though the crystal ball is cloudy, two things seem clear:
1. A satellite vehicle with appropriate instrumentation can be expected to be one of
the most potent scientific tools of the Twentieth Century.
[2] 2. The achievement of a satellite craft by the United States would inflame the
imagination of mankind, and would probably produce repercussions in the world compa-
rable to the explosion of the atomic bomb.
Chapter 2 of this report attempts to indicate briefly some of the concrete results to
be derived from a spaceship which circles the world on a stable orbit.
As the first major activity under contract W33-038AC-14105, we have been asked by
the Air Forces to explore the possibilities of making a satellite vehicle, and to present a
program which would aid in the development of such a vehicle. Our approach to this task
is along two related lines:
1. To undertake a design study which will evaluate the possibility of making a satellite
vehicle using known methods of engineering and propulsion.
2. To explore the fields of science in an attempt to discover and to stimulate research
and development along lines which will ultimately be of benefit in the design of such a
satellite vehicle and which will improve its efficiency or decrease its complexity and cost.
This report concerns itself solely with the first line of approach. It is a practical study
based on techniques that we now know. The implications of atomic energy are not consid-
ered here. This and other possibilities in the fields of science may be the subject of future
[3] reports, which will cover the second line of approach.
In the preliminary design study analytical methods have been developed which may
be used as a basis for future studies in this new field of astronautical engineering. Among
these are the following:
1. Analysis of single- and multi-stage rocket performance and methods for selecting
the optimum number of stages for any given application.
2. Dimensional analysis of varying size and gross weight of rockets, deriving laws which
are useful in design scaling. These laws are also of assistance in appraisal of the effect of
shape and proportions on the design of multi-stage rockets.
3. The effect of acceleration and inclination of the trajectory on structural weight
and performance of a satellite rocket.
4. Methods of determining the optimum trajectory for satellite rockets.
5. Variation of rocket performance with altitude and its effect on the proportioning
of stages.
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6. Preliminary study of effect of atmospheric drag on the rocket and how it affects
the choice of stages, acceleration, and trajectory.
7. Analysis of dynamic stability and control throughout the entire trajectory.
[4] 8. Method of safely landing a satellite vehicle.
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the primary contributions of this report
are in methods, and not in the specific figures in this design study. One point in particular
should be highlighted: - the design gross weight, which is of the greatest importance tn estimating cost
or in comparing any two proposals in this field is the least definitely ascertained single feature in the
whole process. This fact is fundamental in the design of a satellite or spaceship, since the
slightest variation in some of the minor details of construction or in propulsive efficiency
of the fuel may result in a large change in gross weight. The figures in this report represent
a reasonable compromise between the extremes which are possible with the data now in
hand. The most important thing is that a satellite vehicle can be made at all in the present
state of the art. Even our more conservative engineers agree that it is definitely possible to
undertake design and construction now of a vehicle which would become a satellite of the
earth.
Another important result of this design study is the conclusion on liquid hydrogen
and oxygen as fuel versus liquid oxygen and alcohol (the Germans' fuel). The relative
merits of these fuels have occasioned spirited controversy ever since liquid fuel rockets
have been under development. In the past, the fact which has clinched the arguments has
been the difficulty of handling, storing, and using liquid hydrogen. The present design
study has approached this subject from another viewpoint. On the assumption that all
these nasty problems can be solved, a design analysis has [5] been made for the structure
and performance of rockets using both types of fuels. Because of the low density of liquid
hydrogen, the greater tankage weight and volume tends to offset the increase in specific
impulse. Early in the design study it was necessary to make a choice of the number of
stages for both proposed vehicles. Based on the design information available, a decision
was made to use four stages for the alcohol-oxygen rocket and two stages for the hydrogen-
oxygen rocket. Of these two designs, the alcohol-oxygen rocket proved to be somewhat
smaller in weight and size. However, the problem was later re-examined when more reli-
able data were available. It was found that, while the choice of four stages for alcohol-
oxygen had been wise, the hydrogen-oxygen rocket could have been substantially improved
by using three stages. The improvement was sufficient to indicate that the three stage
hydrogen-oxygen rocket would have been definitely superior to the four stage alcohol-
oxygen rocket. Unfortunately, the work had progressed so far that it was impossible to
alter the number of stages for the hydrogen-oxygen rocket.
One of the most important conclusions of this design study is that in order to achieve
the required performance it is necessary to have multi-state rockets for either type of fuel.
The general characteristics of both types are shown in the following table:
4 Stage Alcohol-Oxygen Rocket
Payload 500#
Gross weight (lbs.) 233,669
Fuel weight (lbs.) 140,000
3 4
53,689 11,829 2,868
32,200 7,100 1,720
[6]2 Stage Hydrogen-Oxygen Rocket
Payload 500#
Gross weight (lbs.) 291,564
Total Fuel wt. (lbs.) 217,900
2
15,364
10,000
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Thedesignrepresentsa eriesofcompromises.Thepayloadischosentobeassmall
asisconsistentwithcarryingenoughexperimentalequipmenttoachievesignificantre-
suits.Thisisdoneforthepurposeofkeepingthegrossweightwithinreasonablelimits,
sincethegrossweightincreasesroughlyinproportiontothepayloadaboveacertainmini-
mumvalue.Thedesignaltitudewasoriginallychosenas100miles,sincepreviouscalcula-
tionsindicatedthattheatmosphericdragtherewasnotgreatenoughtodisturbtheorbit
ofthesatelliteforafewrevolutions,andsinceforcommunicationspurposesitwasdesir-
abletokeepthesatellitebelowtheionosphere.Themorerefinedragstudiesmadeinthe
presentdesignstudyshowthatthesearlyestimateswerein seriouserror,andindicatethatthesatellitewillhavetobeestablishedataltitudesof300to400milestoensurethe
completionofmultiplerevolutionsaroundtheearth.
It is interestingthatthedesignanalysisshowsthattheoptimumaccelerationsare
wellwithinthelimitswhichthehumanbodycanstand.Further,it appearspossibleto
achieveasafelandingwiththetypeofvehiclewhichisrequired.Futuredevelopmentsmay
bringanincreaseinpayloadanddecreaseingrossweight,sufficienttoproducealarge
mannedspaceshipabletoaccomplishimportantthingsinascientific[7]andmilitaryway.
Weturnnowfromthedesignstudyphasetothebasicresearchapproachof the
scientists.Ourconsultantshaveallmadesuggestionswhichhavebeentakenintoconsider-
ationin thepreparationofthisreport.Inthefutureit isourexpectationthattheservices
ofthesescientistswillbeofthegreatestbenefitinplanningandinitiatingbroadresearch
programstoexplorenewfundamentalpproachestotheproblemofspacetravel.
Therealwhitehopeforthefutureofspaceshipss,ofcourse,atomicenergy.If this
intensesourceofenergycanbeharnessedforrocketpropulsion,thenspaceshipsofmod-
eratesizeandhighperformancemaybecomeareality,andconceivablycouldevenserve
efficientlyasintercontinentalransportsintheremotefuture.Wearefortunateinha_ing
theconsultingservicesofDrs.Mvarez, McMillan, and Ridenour, well known in scientific
circles. Alvarez and McMillan were two of the key men at the Los Alamos Laboratory of the
Manhattan Project. With the benefit of their advice, we hope to achieve a degree of com-
petence in the fields of application of nuclear energy to propulsion.
Alvarez and Ridenour, who are also radar experts, have made basic analyses of the
radio and radar problems associated with a satellite. These are of service in planning the
new equipment which seems to be necessary to make the satellite a useful tool.
Kistiakowsky, a specialist in physical chemistry, has made valuable suggestions for the
development of new rocket propellants.
[8] Schiff has contributed to our knowledge of the optimum trajectories to be used
in launching the vehicle.
More important than the ideas and suggestions received to date is the fact that these
consultants, who are among the leaders in U.S. science, have begun to think and work on
these problems. It is our earnest hope that under the terms of this new study and research
contract with the Army Air Forces we may be able to enlist the active cooperation of an
important fraction of the scientific resources of the country to solve problems in the wholly
new fields which man's imagination has opened. Of these, space travel is one of the most
important and challenging.
[9] 2. The Significance of a Satellite Vehicle
Attempting in early 1946 to estimate the values to be derived from a development
program aimed at the establishment of a satellite circling the earth above the atmosphere
is as difficult as it would have been, some years before the Wright brothers flew at Kitty
Hawk, to visualize the current uses of aviation in war and in peace. Some of the fields in
which important results are to be expected are obvious; others, which may include some of
the most important, will certainly be overlooked because of the novelty of the undertak-
ing. The following considerations assume the future development of a satellite with large
payload. Only a portion of these may be accomplished by the satellite described in the
design study of this report.
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The Military Importance of a Satellite - The military importance of establishing ve-
hicles in satellite orbits arises largely from the circumstance that defenses against airborne
attack are rapidly improving. Modern radar will detect aircraft at distances up to a few
hundred miles, and can give continuous, precise data on their position. And-aircraft artil-
lery and anti-aircraft guided missiles are able to engage such vehicles at considerable range,
and the proximity fuze increases several fold the effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire. Under
these circumstances, a considerable premium is put on high missile velocity, to increase
the difficulty of interception.
This being so, we can assume that an air offensive of the future will be carried out
largely or altogether by high-speed pilotless missiles. The minimum-energy trajectory for
such a space-missile without [10] aerodynamic lift at long range is very fiat, intersecting
the earth at a shallow angle. This means that small errors in the trajectory of such a missile
will produce large errors in the point of impact. It has been suggested that the accuracy
can be increased by firing such a missile along the same general course as that being
followed by a satellite, and at such a time that the two are close to one another at the
center of the trajectory of the missile. Under these circumstances, precise observations of
the position of the missile can be made from the satellite, and a final control impulse
applied to bring the missile down on its intended target. This scheme, while it involves
considerable complexity in instrumentation, seems entirely feasible. Alternatively, the sat-
ellite itself can be considered as the missile. After observations of its trajectory, a control
impulse can be applied in such direction and amount, and at such a time, that the satellite
is brought down on its target.
There is little difference in design and performance between an intercontinental
rocket missile and a satellite. Thus a rocket missile with a free space-trajectory of
6,000 miles requires a minimum energy of launching which corresponds to an initial ve-
locity of 4.4 miles per second, while a satellite requires 5.1. Consequently the development
of a satellite will be directly applicable to the development of an inter-continental rocket
missile.
It should also be remarked that the satellite offers an observation aircraft which can-
not be brought down by an enemy who has not mastered similar techniques. In fact, a
simple computation from the radar [11] equation shows that such a satellite is virtually
undetectable from the ground by means of present-day radar. Perhaps the two most impor-
tant classes of observation which can be made from such a satellite are the spotting of the
points of impact of bombs launched by us, and the observation of weather conditions over
enemy territory. As remarked below, short-range weather forecasting anywhere in the vi-
cinity of the orbit of the satellite is extremely simple.
Certainly the full military usefulness of this technique cannot be evaluated today.
There are doubdess many important possibilities which will be revealed only as work on
the project proceeds.
The Satellite as an Aid to Research - The usefulness of a satellite in scientific re-
search is very great. Typical of the outstanding problems which it can help to attack are the
following:
One of the fastest-moving fields of investigation in modern nuclear physics is the
study of cosmic rays. Even at the highest altitudes which have been reached with unmanned
sounding balloons, a considerable depth of atmosphere has been traversed by the cosmic
rays before their observation. On board such a satellite, the primary cosmic rays could be
studied without the complications which arise within the atmosphere. From this study may
come more important clues to unleashing the energy of the atomic nucleus.
Studies of gravitation with precision hitherto impossible may be made. This is pos-
sible because for the first dme in history, a satellite would provide an acceleration-free
laboratory where the ever present pull of the earth's gravitational field is cancelled by the
centrifugal force [12] of the rotating satellite. Such studies might lead to an understand-
ing of the cause of gravitation--which is now the greatest riddle of physics.
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The variations in the earth's gravitational field over the face of the earth could be
measured from a satellite. This would supply one very fundamental set of data needed by
the geologists and geophysicists to understand the causes of mountain-building, etc.
Similarly, the variations in the earth's magnetic field could be measured with a com-
pleteness and rapidity hitherto impossible.
The satellite laboratory could undertake comprehensive research at the low pres-
sures of space. The value of this in comparison with pressures now attainable in the labora-
tory might be great.
For the astronomer, a satellite would provide great assistance. Dr. Shapley, director of
the Harvard Observatory, has expressed the view that measurements of the ultra-violet
spectrum of the sun and stars would contribute greatly to an understanding of the source
of the sun's surface energy, and perhaps would help explain sunspots. He also looks for-
ward to the satellite observatory to provide an explanation for the "light of the night sky."
Astronomical observations made on the surface of the earth are seriously hampered
by difficulties of "seeing," which arise because of variations in the refractive index of the
column of air through which any terrestrial telescope must view the heavens. These diffi-
curies are greatest in connection with the observation of any celestial body whose image is
an actual disk, within which features of structure can be [13] recognized: the moon, the
sun, the planets, and certain nebulae. A telescope even of modest size could, at a point
outside the earth's atmosphere, make observations on such bodies which would he supe-
rior to those now made with the largest terrestrial telescopes. Because there would be no
scattering of light by an atmosphere, continuous observation of the solar corona and the
solar prominences should also be possible. Astronomical images could, of course, be sent
back to the earth from an unmanned satellite by television means.
From a satellite at an altitude of hundreds of miles, circling the earth in a period of
about one and one half hours, observations of the cloud patterns on the earth, and of
their changes with time, could be made with great ease and convenience. This informa-
tion should be of extreme value in connection with short-range weather forecasting, and
tabulation of such data over a period of time might prove extremely valuable to long-range
weather forecasting. A satellite on a North-South orbit could observe the whole surface of
the world once a day, and entirely in the daylight.
The properties of the ionosphere could be studied in a new way from such a satellite.
Present ionospheric measurements are all made by studying the reflection of radio waves
from the ionized upper atmosphere. A satellite would permit these measurements to be
extended by studying the transmission properties of the ionosphere at various frequen-
cies, angles of incidence, and times. Reflection measurements could also be made from
the top of the ionosphere. Since we now know that disruption of the ionosphere accompa-
nying auroral displays is caused by the impact [14] of a cloud of matter from space, the
satellite could determine the nature, and maybe the source of that cloud.
Biologists and medical scientists would want to study life in the acceleration-free en-
vironment of the satellite. This is an important pre-requisite to space travel by man, and it
may also lead to important new observations in lower forms of life.
The SateUite as a Communications Relay Station - Long-range radio communica-
tion, except at extremely low frequencies (of the order of a few kc/sec), is based entirely
on the reflection of radio waves from the ionosphere. Since the properties of the earth's
ionized layer vary profoundly with the time of day, the season, sunspot activity, and other
factors, it is difficult to maintain reliable long-range communication by means of radio. A
satellite offers the possibility of establishing a relay station above the earth, through which
long-range communications can be maintained independent of any except geometrical
factors.
The enormous bandwidths attainable at microwave frequencies enable a very large
number of independent channels to be handled with simple equipment, and the only
difficulty which the scheme appears to offer is that a low-altitude (300 mile) satellite would
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remain in the view of a single ground station only for about 2,100 miles of its orbit.
For communications purposes it would be desirable to operate the satellites at an
altitude greater than 300 miles. If they could be at such an altitude (approximately
25,000 miles) that their rotational period was the same as that of the earth, not only would
the "shadow" effect of the earth be greatly reduced, but also a given relay station could be
associated with a given communication terminus on the earth, so that the communication
system problem might be very greatly simplified.
[15] An idea of the potential commercial importance of this development may be
gained from the fact that the ionosphere is now used as the equivalent of about
$10,000,000,000. in long-lines, and is jammed to the limit with transmissions.
[16] The Satellite as a Forerunner of Interplanetary Travel - The most fascinating
aspect of successfully launching a satellite would be the pulse quickening stimulation it
would give to considerations of interplanetary travel. Whose imagination is not fired by
the possibility of voyaging out beyond the limits of our earth, traveling to the Moon, to
Venus and Mars? Such thoughts when put on paper now seem like idle fancy. But, a man-
made satellite, circling our globe beyond the limits of the atmosphere is the first step. The
other necessary steps would surely follow in rapid succession. Who would be so bold as to
say that this might not come within our time?...
[211] 14. Possibilities of a Man Carrying Vehicle
Throughout the present design study of a satellite vehicle, it has been assumed that it
would be used primarily as an uninhabited scientific laboratory. Later developments could
alter its capabilities for use as an instrument of warfare.
However, it must be confessed that in the back of many minds of the men working on
this study there lingered the hope that our impartial engineering analysis would bring
forth a vehicle not unsuited to human transportation.
It was of course realized that 500 lbs. and 20 cubic feet were insufficient allotment for
a man who was to spend many days in the vehicle. However, these values were sufficient to
give assurance that livable accommodation could be provided on some future vehicle.
The first question to be considered in determining the possibility of building a man
carrying vehicle is whether prohibitively high accelerations can be avoided during the
ascent. The V-2 gave hope that this was possible. Our own studies have likewise shown that
the optimal accelerations do not exceed about 6.5g. A man can withstand such accelera-
tion for the periods of time involved (several minutes) if he is properly supported with his
trunk lying normal to the directions of the acceleration. In Chapter 8, it will be remem-
bered, the analysis showed that the performance could be improved a small amount by
throttling each rocket motor during the letter portion of its burning period in order to
reduce the structural loads. Under these conditions, the maximum accelerations could be
profitably reduced to about 4 g. All these findings confirm [212] that ascent offers no
insurmountable obstacle to the construction of an inhabited satellite vehicle.
Next we consider the safety and welfare of the man after the vehicle has been estab-
lished on the orbit. Popular fiction writers have devoted considerable thought and inge-
nuity to means of furnishing him with air, food and water. The most ingenious of these
solutions is that of the balanced vivarium in which plants and man completely supply each
others needs. Leaving these problems to the inventors, we ask ourselves the engineering
questions of whether we can provide livable temperatures and a reasonable protection
against meteors. In Chapter 11 we have seen that the answers are tentatively in the affirms-
five.
Lastly we consider the problem of safely returning the vehicle's inhabitant to the
surface of the earth. In Chapter 12, we have seen that, with reasonable area wings, we can
control the descent sufficiently to avoid dangerously high temperatures. These same wings
are adequate to accomplish the final landing on the earth's surface.
The above thoughts are far from final answers on this problem. However, they do
give a note of assurance that the hope of an inhabited satellite is not futile ....
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Document 11-3
Document title: J.E. Lipp, R.M. Salter, Jr., and R.S. Wehner, et.al., "The Utility of a Satel-
lite Vehicle for Reconnaissance," The Rand Corporation, R-217. April 1951, pp. ix, 1-21,
28-39.
Source: National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.
After Rand had recommended advanced study into the uses of satellites for strategic
reconnaissance in November 1950, the Air Force authorized Rand to undertake further
research. The results of a Rand study on "The Utility of a Satellite Vehicle for Reconnais-
sance" were presented to the Air Force in April 1951. They demonstrated the viability of
the concept and recommended further research. This recommendation eventually led to
the much larger "Project Feed Back" [II-7] in 1954. These excerpts from the over-135-page
report contain a general discussion in terms of orbits and instruments of the feasibili_ of
satellite reconnaissance.
[ix] Summary
Utility of an earth-circling space vehicle as a reconnaissance device is considered
here in detail. A satellite (initially placed on its orbit by rocket power) which televises
ground scenes and weather information to surface receiving stations is investigated. Par-
ticular attention is given to the television, communication, and electrical-power-supply
problems, since these are the major determining factors in payload utility of a reconnais-
sance satellite. Some important corollary aspects namely attitude control and equipment
reliability, are also discussed.
In order to round out the study, performance and weight estimates of the rocket
vehicle required to carry a television payload are included.
The general conclusion of the report is that television satellites are feasible and that
they would be useful if built and operated. Various essential lines of research in television,
auxiliary power, and reliability are indicated ....
[ 1 ] Introduction
The basic feasibility of satellites from the point of view of rocket performance was
considered in a previous group of RAND reports, Refs. 3 through 14. That investigation
pointed to several important conclusions. First, the engineering of a rocket vehicle of
adequate performance for use as a satellite would require but minor development beyond
the then-existing technology. Secondly, the payload would have to be small (not more
than 2000 lb) to keep the gross weight within reason; hence destructive payloads are not
likely to be economically worthwhile for many years to come. Thirdly, returning the ve-
hicle to earth intact would be difficult and should not be attempted in the early versions.
The above factors indicated that the payload would be restricted to instrumentation
and communication equipment and prompted the RDB (Technical Evaluation Group)
and the Air Force to request that further attention be given to the question of utility.
RAND's effort since 1947 on the satellite study has been closely tied to the payload--its
description and military usefulness. Most attention has been directed toward reconnais-
sance, since that is a field in which a satellite may very well show advantages over other
types of vehicles.
It now appears fortunate that reconnaissance was selected for the first payload inves-
tigation. As will be seen later in the report, pioneer reconnaissance (general location and
determination of appropriate targets) and weather reconnaissance are suitable with the
resolving power presently available to a satellite television system. These two classes of
reconnaissance have also been growing in importance to the Air Force because of the
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vastness of Russia and the difficulty of gaining information by conventional means.
To explore further the possibility of reconnaissance by means of a satellite, it is nec-
essary to investigate the various constraints imposed in conducting such an observation
from a remote, unattended vehicle.
The first step in such an analysis logically considers the movement of the satellite as
a vehicle with respect to the targets to be viewed. Consideration must be given to the
degrees of freedom at our disposal in the type and position of orbits and to the frequency
of the satellite within the orbit. This approach, from a macroscopic standpoint, gives rise
to information on how often and under what conditions the satellite can be placed over a
given target. This is discussed in Section I, "Satellite Orbits and Ground Coverage."
Naturally following this step is the microscopic inquiry into the feasibility of viewing
a target from the satellite. Television has been selected as the only practical way known at
present for transmitting back to earth that which can be seen from the vehicle. Thus an
evaluation of television-camera-equipment capabilities, along with a discussion of associ-
ated problems of transmission of the picture, is presented in Section II, "Reconnaissance
by Television."
[2] Moreover, since there is an intimate interdependence between the type of recon-
naissance desirable and the most fruitful way of obtaining such reconnaissance, some si-
multaneous consideration should be given to the presentation of satellite position (or-
bits), television scanning, and picture quality. This may be found at the conclusion of
Section II.
The remaining problems can be classed as attendant ones peculiar to obtaining re-
mote television broadcasts from the satellite. In order to scan the surface of the earth with
the television camera, the vehicle must be properly oriented (atdtudewise) with respect to
the earth's surface. This is covered in Section III, "Orbital Attitude Measurement and
Control."
The television and attitude control equipments require electrical energy that must
be supplied by an auxiliary powerplant. A discussion of this powerplant, as well as the
estimated power and weight requirements it must meet, is given in Section IV, "Auxiliary
Powerplant."
Section V, "Reliability of the Satellite," includes an analysis of the anticipated reliabil-
ity of the television and auxiliary equipment. This is a particularly important problem,
since the equipment must operate automatically for a long period in an inaccessible loca-
tion.
Finally, the characteristics of the vehicle itself necessary to place the television pay-
load in a given orbit around the earth are presented in Section VI.
The several appendixes furnish correlative data and extensions of the remarks con-
cerning some of the more salient features resulting from the study of the technical feasibil-
ity of utility of satellites for reconnaissance.
[3] I. Satellite Orbits and Ground Coverage
This section presents a general discussion of the pertinent facts about orbits which
are essential to the utility of a satellite as a reconnaissance vehicle and of the problems
concerning the establishment of a rocket-vehicle satellite on an approximately circular
oblique orbit relative to the earth. Since the primary utility aspect considered is reconnais-
sance, the effect of orbits on scanning (i.e., viewing) angles, as well as some discussion of
the limitations imposed by optical and radio transmission requirements, are included.
Orbits Generally
A satellite is defined as an attendant body revolving about a larger one; a moon and
a man-made object revolving about the earth are thus satellites. The earth itself is a satel-
lite of the sun. The shape of a satellite orbit, which can be either circular or elliptical, is
dependent principally on the initial conditions of velocity, position, and direction of mo-
tion.
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A circular orbit is of course the most desirable for an artificial satellite. Any marked
deviations or eccentricity would cause some portion of the flight path to pass through
more dense atmosphere and thus decrease the endurance of the satellite (for the likely
range of orbital altitudes).
In order to remain on an orbit, the velocity of a satellite must be such that its cen-
trifugal force is sufficient to overcome the earth's gravitational forces upon the satellite at
the orbital altitude. Initial trajectory control is required to be such that the velocity is at
least that necessary for a circular orbit _s at the design altitude, and the path angle is within
t/2°/') These limits are attainable with present control equipment.
RAND's previous studies were devoted primarily to equatorial orbits, which are sdll
of prime interest for preliminary, experimental satellite flights. However, it is obvious that
a reconnaissance satellite must be placed on an oblique orbit _ to view targets of military
interest most efficiently.
[4] Review of Orbital Features
Figure 1 illustrates the orbit of a satellite placed on a circular path. Such a path, if
unperturbed, would maintain a fixed orientation in space (in this case, as in all others to be
discussed here, the centers of the satellite's path reference frame coincide with that of the
earth's). Thus the satellite reference frame would move around the sun with the earth but
would not be affected by the earth's own rotation. Further, the position of the satellite
orbit relative to the sunny side of the earth would change with the earth's seasons. _ Figure
2 depicts this relative change of orbital position for a hypothetical satellite whose orbit is
undisturbed by external influences.
Orbital Regression and Resultant Periods
As pointed out in Ref. 14, the orbit is affected by the presence of other astronomical
bodies, such as the sun and the moon, and by the shape of the earth. The effect of the sun
and the moon on a satellite orbit is nearly identical with their effect upon free-water sur-
faces of the earth (tides) and results in approximately a 3-ft orbital variation.
The oblate shape of the earth, however, exerts a much larger influence on the satel-
lite rocket. The earth's polar diameter is about 95 mi less than its equatorial diameter.
Although a polar orbit will have a vertical variation of approximately 1 mi (an orbit around
the equator will have a negligible variation), this effect of the earth's shape is not of direct
concern. The interesting and important effect is a corollary of the polar [5] perturbation,
namely, a significant regression of the nodes _°_when the satellite orbit is oblique. This
regression is similar to the precession of a gyroscope caused by externally applied torques.
Further, the regression period s°_ of the satellite orbit will vary, depending on the
orbital altitude and obliquity. After the method of Ref. 14, the orbital regression periods
relative to the sunny side of the earth and to celestial space are plotted as functions of
altitude and orbital angle in Fig. 3. For useful reconnaissance orbits, 45 ° to 60 ° obliquity
and 350 to 500 mi altitude, the change in period relative to the earth is not great.
298. Velocities less than that required for a circular orbit obviously prevent the vehicle from establishing
the prescribed orbit; hence the satellite will either fall to earth or assume an elliptical orbit which will cause
marked altitude variations. Velocities greater than required yield less disastrous, but also undesirable, elliptical
paths.
299. In this report an orbit will be designated by the degrees of an angle between it and the equator. An
alternative but equivalent description is the maximum latitude to which the orbit is tangent. Thus a 0° orbit is
equatorial, a 90 ° orbit is polar, and a 56 ° orbit is 560 oblique to the equator and tangent at 56 ° latitude.
300. An exception here is an orbit around the equator where this seasonal change is irrelevant.
301. Regression of the nodes may be visualized as a westerly rotation of the line of intersection (nodal
line) between the satellite's orbital plane and the earth's equatorial plane (see Figs. 1, 4, and 5).
302. Regression period, as used here, is the time required for the intersection line (see footnote above)
to make one complete revolution relative either to the sunny side of the earth or to celestial space, as applicable
(see Fig. 4).
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For iUustrativepu_poses only, a 56 ° oblique orbit, approximately the latitude of Moscow,
will be studied for most of the balance of this discussion. Figure 4 depicts the nodal regres-
sion for a vehicle on such a path. It may be seen in this illustration that the position of the
orbit relative to the sunny side of the earth changes not with the earth's seasons, but much
more rapidly; for this particular orbit, the period relative to the earth is 70 days rather than
a year.
Under these conditions, the satellite can see a given target in the daytime only dur-
ing alternate 3f-day intervals regardless of whether the satellite circles the earth once a
day or a thousand times; Fig. 5 amplifies this point. Thus a single satellite cannot [6] give
a continuous record of daytime viewing of a particular target, but only during alternate
35-day periods. If continuous chronological daytime coverage is desired for longer peri-
ods, a minimum of two vehicles would be required. Further, if contrast requirements ex-
clude twilight intervals, then three satellites operating on 8-hr shifts, with paths as shown
in Fig. 6, are necessary.
Altitude, Velocity, and Duration
So far, discussion has been centered on the path of the satellite in its orbit. Its speed
and altitude will now be considered. Figure 7 gives a plot of the required satellite velocity
as a function of aldtude above the earth for a nearly circular orbit. Since this velocity is
independent of the earth's rotation, a satellite launched eastward gains by the component
of the earth's peripheral speed in that direction. Figure 7 also shows the number of satel-
lite revolutions per day as affected by orbital altitude.
The duration of an orbiting vehicle depends on the amount of atmosphere tending
to slow it down. This in turn means that the higher the altitude, the longer the satellite
[7] can stay up.
Figure 8, taken from Ref. 3, gives anticipated duration as a function of altitude. At a
100-mi altitude the vehicle will be pulled to earth in less than one revolution because of
the atmospheric drag. At 350 mi the duration is about 2 years. At 500 mi the satellite will
stay up around 50 years; at 600 mi, several centuries. From this standpoint alone, it is
desirable to use as high an altitude as possible. Also, the range of line-of-sight '°_ radio
transmission increases with altitude. Counterbalancing these factors is the greater size of
the satellite required to put a given payload on an orbit at higher altitudes (e.g., 10 to
20 per cent higher gross weight is required to increase altitude from 350 to 500 mi; see Fig.
40, page 77). Another deterrent factor is the increased size and weight of camera equip-
ment necessary to scan the earth from higher altitudes, which requires higher resolving
power for an equivalent picture. Therefore, the desirable altitude will represent a compro-
mise between these opposing features but will probably lie between 350 and 500 mi. For
purposes of consistency, a 350-mi altitude will be used in the remainder of this report,
except where altitude is considered as a variable.
Effect of Orbital Altitude on Ground Coverage and Related Problems
At orbital altitudes of 350 to 500 mi, the satellite circles the earth fifteen to fburteen
times a day (see Fig. 7). The satellite tracks cross the equator at intervals of 24 ° to [8] 25 o
longitude or, roughly, there are 1700 mi (measured east-west at the equator) between tracks
for the 350-mi altitude.
At 56 ° latitude, for example, this interval is about 800 mi; near the tangent latitude
the tracks recross each other several times. Figure 9 indicates the tracks for a satellite at an
orbital altitude of 350 mi and at an orbital angle of 56 °. Also shown is the average daytime
coverage during the daylight "season" with a 400-mi optical scan to either side of the satel-
303. Only line-of-sight transmission can be used because high-frequency waves are necessary for televi-
sion equipment. Also, long radio wavelengths will be adversely affected by the ionosphere; for instance, reflec-
tion by the Heaviside layer will prevent such wavelengths from reaching the earth rather than to increase their
range.
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lite(800-mioptical-scanningband);thelight-greenareashowstargetscoveredonceaday;
mediumgreen,thosecoveredtwice;anddarkgreen,thosecoveredthreeormoretimes.
Whiteareas(belowthetangentlatitude)arethoseviewedlessthanonceaday;asindi-
catedinthefigure,fortheassumedsatelliteorbit,coverageinanyonedayisnotcompletebelow30°N.latitude.
The800-mioptical-scanningbandat350mialtituderepresentsapproximatelya94°
includedscanningangle,i e.,a47°scantoeithersideofthevertical.Theincludedangle
ofthehorizonis135°,butthevalueofpicturestakenbeyond45°oneithersideofvertical
isquestionable.Thispointisshownschematicallyin Fig.10,whichalsogivesa plotof
horizonangleasafunctionofaltitude.Adiscussionf theeffectsofscanningangle,as
wellasthoseoftheorbitalinclination,upontheminimumresolvablesurfacedimensionis
presentedinAppendixI.
Properinitialselectionof theorbitalaltitudewouldenablethesatellitetomakean
integralnumberofrevolutionsforonerevolutionoftheearthrelativetotheorbitalplane(notnecessarilyper24-hrday,sincetheorbitalplaneregresses'°').Integral[9]numbersof
satelliterevolutionseveryother(24.3-hr)day,everythirdday,etc.,arealsopossible.Such
orbitalconditions,however,cannotbemadeaccuratelyenoughwithpresentcontrolequip-
menttoaffordthesametraceon theearth'surfacedayafterday.Thusadriftcanbe
expectedsothatthesatellitewillcomewithinafewmilesofitstrackonthepre_4ousday(or thepreviousalternateday,etc.).Thesignificantfactis thatbyadjustinganorbital
periodsothatit isnearlyintegralonalternatedays,onecanobtain,thefollowingday,a
picturein thecenterof thecamerascanofatargetwhichwasontheperipherytheday
before(seeFig.9),except,ofcourse,nearthetangentlatitude,inwhichregionstillgreater
amountsofoverlapareobtained.
Asmentionedearlier,onefactorindicatingthedesirabilityofa500-mialtitudeisthe
needtoreceivethesatellite'stelevisionbroadcastsbystationssitedeitherin friendlyterri-
toriesoronships.Figure11showstheareaofreconnaissanceint restwhichwouldbe
coveredbytransmissionrangesof1396and1743miwith5stationsand2000mi [10]with
4stations(seeFig.22,page30,for rangeasafunctionofaltitudeandelevationangle).
Transmissionmustbe"line-of-sight"becauseof therequiredradiationfrequencies.It is
estimatedthatthemaximumrangeforacceptabletransmission3°5froma350-mialtitudeis
about1400mi.Atthisrange,5stationswouldberequiredtopickupAsiaticobservations,
butabout15percentoftheUSSR,asignificantportionnear105°Elongitude,wouldbe
leftout.Increasingthesatellite'saltitudeto500miaffords(onthesamebasis)arangeof
approximately1750mi.Withthisrangeandthesame5stations,theunobservedareais
reducedtoasmallamount.
Witha2000-mirange(notshown),theunobservedareawouldbeeliminated.How-
ever,byacceptingasmallunobservedareanear95°Elongitude,4sea-bornestationscould
beemployed.Atthislatterange,theorbitalaltituderequiredforequivalentclarityofthe
transmissionexceeds600mi(seeFig.22,page30);it maybepossibletoattaina2000-mi
rangefroma500-mialtitude,althoughsomeuncertaintyandsignaldistortionwouldoc-
curin the100-to250-miextremity.
Thepossibilityofeliminatingso-calledunobservableareasbyusingdelayedbroad-
castingbecomesapparent.I iswelltonote,however,thatthenumberofframestobefiled
wouldcausethetransmittingdevicetobesobulkyandcomplexthatthismethodoesnot
appeartowarrantfurtherinvestigationatthepresenttime.[11] Theeffectofdifferentaltitudesupontargetviewing,aswellasupontelevision
cameraresolutionandcontrast,isdiscussedfurtherin thenextsection.
304.Theperiodfora350-mialtitude,56°orbits24.31hr,whichistermeda aythroughouttheremain-derofthisdiscussion.
305.Itisassumedthataminimumelevationangle(abovethehorizon)of5°beemployedforcompletely
acceptablesignalreception.
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Summary
Tosummarize briefly, the orbiting characteristics are critically dependent on the
altitude; a substantially circular orbit is most desirable. Although equatorial orbits are de-
sirable for test purposes, oblique orbits are necessary for meaningful reconnaissance. For
example, a 350-mi altitude, 56 ° orbit, in combination with an 87-day regression period of
the orbital plane relative to celestial space and to the seasonal motion of the earth around
the sun, will afford daylight views of a specific target during alternate approximately
35-day intervals (one-half the 70-day regression period relative to the earth). Completely
target-system coverage, from the eastern to western limits of Russian-controlled territory,
will reduce the unproductive interval by about one-half.
[12] II. Reconnaissance by Television
In the first section, the macroscopic aspects of satellite reconnaissance have been
discussed, namely, the placement of the vehicle in appropriate orbits for bringing targets
of military significance under scrutiny. The means of viewing and transmitting these scenes
to ground stations will now be weighed. At the present time, it is felt desirable to consider
only remote transmission of picture information by high-frequency radio waves. Other
possible alternatives, such as using a conventional aerial photographic camera and return-
ing the satellite to earth on command, appear to involve difficulties that would make early
versions of the satellite impractical.
Two systems, television and photographic facsimile transmission, are available for
consideration for photographing and sending on reconnaissance data. The latter system
uses a camera film to record temporarily scene information; this film is then scanned
electronically and the impulses transmitted as in the standard "wirephoto" system. A re-
usable film must be employed because, otherwise, roughly a/4 ton of camera film would be
required per month's operation. Since we know of no re-usable film (or other less bulky
storage strip) under development, the photographic facsimile system will be ruled out for
the present; future requirements, such as those for delayed picture transmission, may cause
reconsideration of this system.
The use of television emerges, then, as of prime import in viewing and sending to
ground stations reconnaissance information for recording and for evaluation. The ability
of such a system to accommodate reconnaissance requisites will be considered in detail,
both for viewing weather and for observing ground targets. Each of these latter types of
reconnaissance has its own peculiar needs, which will be discussed first in this section.
The effect of reconnaissance requirements on camera equipment is considered next.
It will be demonstrated that daytime viewing is possible, but nighttime light levels are too
low for practical televising. The discussion of daytime viewing is then expanded to include
specific numbers of the minimum resolvable ground dimensions as functions of scene
contrast, frame speed, and the number of lines per inch resolution of the camera. A corre-
lation between the ground area to be covered and the frame speed, and the need for an
optical-scanning system, are determined. The above investigation is of a general nature
and would apply to any "camera," whether it uses film, is a television tube, or is the human
eye.
Logically following the above discussion, the television camera tubes are examined
in relation to the foregoing optical parameters. The commercial Image Orthicon and the
Vidicon tubes are shown to be within the realm of possibility for satellite viewing.
A discussion is then presented of the television camera system in context with the
reconnaissance requirements and of the various combinations of characteristics that could
be employed to produce an over-all optical-scanning system for use in both weather
[13] and terrestrial reconnaissance. Also included are actual photographs of a simulated
ground scene by a commercial Image Orthicon camera. It is shown that even by present
commercial television standards, useful scene information can be obtained.
The transmission of the televised scenes, the necessary television mechanisms, the
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effectsofsignalwavelength,epositionof thesatelliterelativetogroundstations,and
thepossibilityofenemyinterceptionandjammingareincludedin thenextsubsection.
Followingthisisananalysisofthereceptionandpresentationf thetelevisedsignalas
wouldbedonebythegroundmonitoringstations.
Weightestimatesandpowerequirementsforthesatellitetelevisioncamera-trans-
mittersystemarethenpresented.Foramorecompleteanalysisof thetelevisionsystem's
designconsiderations,seeAppendixII.
Reconnaissance Requirements
To obtain any useful information from altitudes of 350 to 500 mi appears at the
outset to be an extremely difficult operation. It is the purpose here to examine the con-
straints imposed on the television system in conducting reconnaissance of a worthwhile
nature. Two types of observation will be considered: weather and terrestrial.
Weather Reconnaissance
Reference 1 offers a far more complete analysis of the requirements for weather
reconnaissance than can be given here. However, in this report it is desirable to discuss
briefly these requisites for the purpose of continuity. Information in Ref. 1 reveals that
details of cloud structure as small as several hundred feet in dimension may possess meteo-
rological significance. For weather observations, resolutions as poor as 500 to 1000 ft can
be utilized, although a better minimum resolvable dimension would be 200 ft. This latter
resolution is ample to determine a major portion of the characteristics necessary to pre-
dict weather. At this resolution, orientation and structure of clouds, direction of winds,
and presence of fronts can be seen.
To explore deeply into the problem, the prevailing contrasts of weather scenes must
be examined. For weather reconnaissance, the contrast is a function of the albedos _°_of
various types of clouds and of the background. An albedo of 0.8, commonly given for
average cloud formations (see Fig. 49, page 94), is used with the albedos of the various
surface backgrounds to determine the degree of contrast available. Figure 12 shows graphi-
cally that contrasts of 50 per cent or more are produced by virtually all ground-surface
background conditions except that of fresh snow; also shown in Fig. 12 is a similar graph
for smooth sea surfaces and various solar elevations.
An additional feature of weather reconnaissance is the need to encompass the entire
area in question with a daily observational coverage.
At the risk of being premature in describing the television system, a few illustrative
remarks will be made here. An optical-scanning system viewing a band on the earth's sur-
face of 800 mi width and taking frames, or pictures, at the rate of ten per second [14] will
be assumed. A standard Image Orthicon television camera with appropriate optics at the
10 frame/sec speed and for the pertinent contrasts prevailing in weather scenes will re-
solve a dimension of 200 ft. Therefore the conclusion is that such a system could be com-
pletely adequate and useful for meteorological observational purposes.
Terrestrial Reconnaissance
The requirements for viewing targets---of military significance---on the ground are
now considered. Taking the cue from the above discussion, it is apparent that a 200-ft
resolution can be easily attained at prevailing weather contrast levels (which are nearly all
at contrasts above 20 per cent) and that a complete daily area coverage can be expected
with this system. However, that contrasts of less than 20 per cent do exist on military tar-
gets and that a 200-ft resolution will not be completely adequate will be discussed subse-
quently.
306. Albedo is the ratio of the amount of light reflected from a prefecfly diffuse surface to the total light
falling upon it.
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Figure13depictscontraststhatmaybeexpectedfromvariousmilitarytargetsagainst
representativebackgrounds.Year-roundobservationfromthesatellitewillyieldanumber
of picturesof agiventargetduringthedifferentseasons,possiblywithinformative[15]results.Forexample,anasphaltairstripanditsadjacentgroundcovermayhaveno
albedodifference,hencenocontrast,duringthespring-to-fallperiod;duringearlywinter,
however,athinlayerofsnowontheadjacentgroundcover,butmeltedorremovedfrom
theairstrip,mayresultin contrastsa highas85percent.Furthermore,continuedobser-
vationsthroughoutseasonalground-coverariationswilltendtoreducetheeffectiveness
ofcamouflage.It isreadilyapparentthattheconditionsfor takingsuchpicturesarede-
pendentonthenumberofclearclaysduringtheperiodthesatellitepassesover a specified
military target. However, if a continuous chronological record is broadcast from the satel-
lite for a year, it is reasonable to expect that each target will be seen at some time on a clear
day.
The second criterion for terrestrial reconnaissance is, of course, the allowable mini-
mum resolvable surface dimension. The ultimate choice of the figure for this dimension
will remain with intelligence personnel skilled at interpreting information. The 200-ft reso-
lution is probably adequate for ferreting out major airfields and for noting the presence of
large highway or railroad right-of-ways (even though lateral dimensions may be [16] con-
siderably less than 200 ft). Large factory buildings will be seen, although their exact shape
may be indeterminable. Square buildings of 200 ft on a side will tend to be confused with
round fuel-storage tanks of similar size.
A 50-ft resolvable dimension will afford considerable improvement in detailed infor-
mation. The structure of urban areas can be determined. Large aircraft can be identified,
as can gun emplacements, revetments, etc.
Assessment of bomb damage will probably require even better resolving power (per-
haps as low as 10 ft) and may well be beyond the scope of the satellite system.
From the above discussion, it is seen that the previously assumed camera and scan-
ning system is, on the basis of minimum resolvable surface dimension, useful and adequate
for pioneer terrestrial reconnaissance. However, such a system is inadequate for recon-
naissance concerned with detailed target identification. The ways in which detailed recon-
naissance can be achieved are discussed later in this section, but it can be stated briefly
that either a fundamental improvement in the television camera tube or a reduction of the
observable area on the ground--so that complete coverage is not made every day but
every 10 clays or so--must be made.
Summary of Reconnaissance Requirements for the Television System
It has been shown that minimum resolvable dimensions of 50 to 500 ft are accept-
able, depending on the type of observations made. Thus the television camera must be
capable of resolving dimensions on the groundwor near the ground for weather---of the
same order of magnitude measured in feet as _/10 to 1 times that of the optical range
measured in miles. This resolving power, 0.001 ° to 0.01 °, implies a small angle of view, as
will be demonstrated later.
Optical scanning over a reasonably wide swath on the earth's surface will require (in
conjunction with the small field of view) a large number of frames in a given time inter-
val--of the order of 10 to 30 frames/sec.
Contrast levels of 20 per cent or higher will normally be needed.
Nighttime and Color Television
So far, discussion has been predicated on the conditions that would prevail in taking
black-and-white pictures in the daytime. For black-and-white shots at night, the same scene
contrasts would be expected, but the overall scene brightness would be considerably reduced.
The use of television for transmitting scenes viewed by a satellite at night, while physi-
cally possible (see Appendix II), is considered impractical. A camera system sufficiently
flexible to accommodate both daytime and nighttime viewing not only would be complex,
but also would require an f/0.6 optical system, which in turn would require a 30-in. aper-
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ture for a 20-in. focal length (as compared with a 2-in. aperture for daytime viewing). The
total size and weight of such a device as presently conceived would be prohibitive.
Although color television has lower resolution than black-and-white video, the use of
color television might result in more effective photo interpretation. For example, a
[ 17] black airstrip surrounded by green grass can readily be identified in color even though
its black-and-white contrast may be zero. It is doubtful, however, that color television could
counteract camouflage because the TV camera does not see more of the infrared spec-
trum than does the human eye. Size, weight, and complexity of such a system do not war-
rant its further investigation at this time.
Hence the remainder of the section will be devoted to black-and-white television,
with viewing done only in daylight.
Optical System
Resolving Power and Contrast
Resolvable detail in photographs made by satellite television (or an), other type of
camera) is dependent on brightness, scene contrast, exposure time, and geometrical fac-
tors. It is also a function of the inherent resolution of the camera itself. A television catnera
is characterized by the number of television lines per inch (equal to roughly twice tile
number of optical lines per inch) and this parameter is an index of the tube's resolution? _7
In Table 12, on page 102, may be found an enumeration of the minimum surface
dimensions, tS, resolvable by day for various contrasts, TV lines per inch camera resolution,
and frame frequencies and for the various required optical parameters of focal length and
aperture size. Along with _, the relative power, P, required for picture transmission is also
listed.
A digest of Table 12 is given in Table 1, below, which shows what can be accomplished
with an f/10, 2-in. camera aperture, 20-in. focal length camera, operating at a frequency of
10 frames/see.
[18] It is expected that the Image Orthicon camera tube (see page 20) will give
resolutions of the order of 1000 TV lines/in., which means that with the above optical
system, a 200-ft minimum resolvable surface dimension can be anticipated for contrasts as
low as 20 per cent.
By changing the camera optics to restrict the field of view and by increasing frame
frequency, it may be noted from Table 12, page 102, that considerable improvement in o_
can be wrought. Values as low as 6 = 40 ft (at 25 per cent contrast) are obtained with the
same TV tube resolution of 1000 TV lines/in.
The Optical-scanning System
The f/10, 20-in. focal length optical system will view, in a single frame, a ground-
projected square area of 17.5 mi on a side directly under the satellite. (Figure 15, page 22,
shows an equivalent southwest sector of Los Angeles which would be taken by one frame.)
A 47 ° viewing angle will cover a ground-surface width of 800 mi from an altitude of 350 mi.
Because of the curvature and obliquity of the surface of the earth, as shown in Fig. 10,
page 9, the ground area seen by the optical system at 47 ° (the angle measured from the
verucal) is nearly doubled, the transverse ground dimension being about 35 mi. Conse-
quently, 39 to 40 frames are needed to view the 800-mi band in one transverse sweep.
During this same time, the satellite is moving forward 17.5 mi at a speed of approxi-
mately 5 mi/sec, which allows about 3.5 see/transverse sweep and, for 39 to 40 frames,
307. Resolution by a photographic camera is commonly defined by the minimum spacing of lines that
can just be discerned in a photograph by the camera. In television the index is based on the distance from one
of the lines to the center of the intervening space between the lines (this distance being called one television
"line"). Thus one optical line is equivalent, approximately, to two television lines. It should be noted that a
single index of this type is inadequate to describe fully the quality of a camera, and it is assumed in this report
that the television cameras have good characteristics with respect to sensinvity as a function of the various sizes
of the objects viewed.
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checks generally with the previously assumed 10 frames/sec.
The motion of the optical scan must be such that the area under observation is
"stopped" relative to the photocathode, which requires indexing between successive frames
in the transverse sweep, and the fore:and-aft motion to compensate for the satellite's for-
ward motion.
Transverse and longitudinal camera positions relative to the satellite structure are
shown in Fig. 14 as functions of time per frame. Also shown is a proposed scanning system.
It may be possible to synthesize this complex modon by an appropriately designed, con-
tinuously rotating prism (not shown).
Satellite attitude control of yaw, pitch, and roll, relative to "stopping" the picture, is
discussed in Section III. Further discussions of the scanning angle, of the orbital inclina-
tion, of the frame frequency, and of the resolvable surface dimensions are presented in
Appendixes I and II.
The Television Camera
The task of televising a ground scene from a satellite differs from the ordinary video
pickup problem in three principal ways: (1) as just indicated, a high-resolution, scanning,
optical system is required, (2) the equipment must operate over a relatively [19] long
period of time from a remote, unattended station, and (3) each frame is a completely
different picture. This latter subject is discussed further under "Reliability of the Satellite,"
Section V, page 63. It is probable that presently available television-tube resolutions are
adequate for preliminary reconnaissance of either weather or terrain; however, it is antici-
pated that the normal trend in television research will yield higher resolutions by the time
a satellite requires such a system.
[20] Limiting Resolution of Pickup Tubes
The basic elements of modern television camera tubes are (1) a photosensitive tar-
get, upon which the viewed scene is projected and reproduced as a pattern of static elec-
tric charges, and (2) an electron beam which scans the charge pattern on the target, read-
ing and erasing it and transforming it into a time-varying electrical signal. The scanning
beam is usually made to cover the target in a series of horizontal lines or in two interlaced
series of lines, and the beam moves at such speed that the entire picture, or frame, is
scanned in a small fraction of a second. Present commercial television practice employs
525 scanning lines/frames at a rate of 30 frames/sec, and the pickup-tube resolution is
therefore limited to 595 TV lines/flame (or slightly more than 250 optical lines). A more
fundamental limitation on the resolution of a pickup tube than the number of scanning
lines is the finite size of the cross section of the scanning beam or the finite size of the
elements composing the target, whichever is larger. It is of interest to note that the scan-
ning-beam sizes in electron microscopes is an order of magnitude smaller (10 -s rain spot
size).
The resolution of the best available photoemissive pickup tubes (Image Orthicons)
is limited by target structure. This tube uses a thin two-sided target, upon one side of
which the charge pattern representing the scene televised is deposited by secondary emis-
sion. Photoelectrons from the primary cathode, or photo-cathode, of the tube focus upon
the target and impinge upon it under conditions which result in a high secondary emis-
sion ratio; each incident photoelectron ejects several secondary electrons from the target
face, the charge pattern on the target being correspondingly more intense than that on
the photocathode. These secondary electrons are collected by a grid of very fine wire
mounted close to the target on the photocathode side. The grid effectively breaks up the
otherwise continuous target surface into a mosaic of elements of size corresponding to its
mesh spacing. In commercial Image Orthicons, the grid contains slightly more than
500 mesh spacings/linear in., and the limiting resolution is therefore about B00 optical
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lines/in., or 1000 TV lines, of target surface. Experimental Image Orthicons have been
made with fine grid meshes, corresponding to limiting resolutions better than 1500 TV
lines/in.
Resolving power of present photoconductive pickup tubes (Vidicons) is limited by
the cross-sectional size of the scanning beam. The photoconductive process is inherently
more sensitive than photoemission and no preliminary amplification of the target charge
pattern by secondary emission is required; no collecting grid is involved and the Vidicon
target is essentially cc,atinuous. The smallest resolvable target element is therefore deter-
mined approximately by the half-power width of the scanning beam (at the target). In a
recently developed Vidicon, this heamwidth is about 0.00125 inclusive, corresponding to a
limiting tube resolution of about 1600 TV lines to an inch. However, this does not mean
that the present Vidicons have a higher resolution than do Image Orthicons. On the con-
trary, the present target size of the Vidicon is considerably less than 1 in., and the number
of TV lines to a frame is less than in the Image Orthicon. Major difficulty would be experi-
enced in attempting to increase the Vidicon target sizes to about an inch (as in the Image
Orthicon) because of the increasing electrical capacitance of [21] the target. Neverthe-
less, this does not preclude the possibility of using several Vidicons to replace one Image
Orthicon, with the attendant reduction of reliability.
The possibility of a really significant improvement in the limiting resolution of an
Image-Orthicon-type pickup tube is regarded as remote, because of the great difficulties
inherent in constructing and mounting collecting screens composed of conductors much
smaller than about one-thousandth of an inch in diameter. Significant improvement seems
more likely in the case of photoconductive tubes, since much narrower scanning beams
are theoretically possible by improvement of the optical design of the electron gun and of
the focusing and scanning fields. But a limit will soon be reached at which further reduc-
tion in beam spot size results in no further improvement in resolution and at which reso-
lution will be limited by the finite conductivity of the target. This follows from the fact that
the thickness and conductivity of the target must be such as to allow for dissipation of the
charge pattern by conduction through the target in a period not much greater than the
frame time; if the conductivity is such that it permits this desired charge motion, it will also
(assuming isotropic target material) allow charges to move laterally over the target face so
that even an initial point charge will be spread over a circle of diffusion, the diameter of
which will ultimately determine the limiting resolution regardless of the spot size of the
scanning beam.
It appears probable therefore that 1500 TV line/in, is a reasonable maximum value
for the limiting resolution of pickup tubes for some time to come, and that a practical
value for unattended operation of present tubes in a satellite vehicle might well be consid-
erably less than this, say about 1000 TV lines/in ....
[28] Transmission of the Television Pictures
On the basis that the satellite's television camera system can collect valuable informa-
tion, it is necessary to transmit the pictures from the satellite to surface receiving stations
and to record and portray the pictures in useful form. The range at which satellite signals
can be received by ground stations will be discussed first, since this [29] range affects the
disposition of the stations and ultimately determines the completeness of coverage of en-
emy territory by direct broadcast to receiving points in friendly territory. Possible loca-
tions of receiving stations was discussed in Section I.
Next, consideration will be given to the tracking system and to the effects of switch-
ing the television broadcast reception from one station to the succeeding one. The follow-
ing subsection is devoted to the antenna gain and to the power required, since these are
intimately related to the system employed to track the satellite. Logically following this
there is a discussion of the proper choice of wavelength. Finally, the possibilities of inter-
ception and jamming of the television signal will be considered.
Before continuing further, however, it is felt desirable at this point to outline the
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over-all television system. Figure 21 is a block diagram of the proposed system. Component
parts will be (and have been) described as they appear in the discussion.
Range of Transmission
There are quite good reasons for not attempting to track or communicate with the
satellite from surface stations when its angular elevation above the horizon is less than
[30] 50. "°1 Consequently, this value of the elevation angle has been considered as deter-
mining the maximum range over which completely acceptable television transmission
should be required. Because of geographic limitations, however, it may be both desirable
and necessary to transmit at ranges greater than those indicated by the 5° limitation. An
immediately apparent expedient is to consider the use of some portion of the additional
range potentially available by transmitting and receiving when the satellite is at an angular
elevation of less than 5 °. Figure 22 shows maximum radio ranges as functions of altitude at
angular elevations of 0 °, 2°, and 5 °.
[31] Reliable transmission of radio waves several centimeters long can be expected
at a 5°-elevation angle; at angles of 1° or 2°, some dispersion will be prevalent. "°_ The
principal effect will be loss in resolution, but even this may be desirable in place of no
picture at all.
The Tracking System
It is evident that if power requirements are considered, it is necessary for the televi-
sion transmitter to have a directional antenna which can be oriented toward the receiving
station. On the basis of orbital computations, a receiving station will know the approxi-
mate location of the satellite at any given time.
A station with an appropriately sized receiving antenna will be able to track a 350-mi-
altitude satellite for about 3000 mi. The vehicle traverses the distance in approximately
11 min at an average angular tracking rate of 15°/min (the rate is faster at the zenith,
being of the order of 34°/min, or 0.6°/see), this implies that the tracking system must be
carefully keyed in with the satellite's system and, further (within the limits of reasonable
satellite power consumption), that the ground station's antenna should be as small as
possible. The diameters of the satellite's antenna and of the ground station's receiving
antenna are assumed to be 1 ft and 16 ft, respectively. Thus the size of the ground station's
antenna would be small enough to be amenable to reasonable engineering in mounting,
etc.
It is proposed that, for reasons of stability as well as of reliability, the satellite's televi-
sion camera and transmitter system be turned on, warmed up, and adjusted at the start of
the flight, and that it be left on continuously thereafter. The satellite will therefore always
be ready to televise on demand of the appropriate ground station.
Of the many possible methods by which antenna-tracking could be accomplished,
the optimum would be that which minimizes the complexity, weight, and power require-
ments of the space-borne equipment. On this basis, the most attractive system yet consid-
ered is one in which a tracking receiver in the satellite operates on the continuous-wave
signal of a ground beacon to direct the satellite antenna toward the ground station, and--
once the space-borne tracking is accomplished--the ground station's receiving antenna is
directed to follow the satellite by means of an auxiliary tracking receiver operating on the
television signal. The space-borne tracker would operate on a microwave frequency differ-
ent from and considerably lower than that used for television transmission, but would
work through the satellites's television transmitting antenna. The ground beacon would
work into a directional antenna separate from that used for television reception, but would
be slaved to the latter so as to follow the satellite when the ground tracker takes over. The
general nature of the operations of the tracking system is described in the following para-
graphs.
The 1-ft-diameter satellite antenna is mounted in gimbals in such a manner that it is
free to rotate about a vertical axis and so that the antenna axis can assume any angle with
the downward vertical up to a maximum of about 60 ° ( the direction of a ray from the
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satellite in a 350-mi orbit to a ground station at which it subtends to a minimum angle of
11°; see Fig. 23). The dish-shaped antenna is provided with two feeds: one is fixed on the
axis for television transmission at about 10,000 Mc; and the other [32] is offset from the
axis and rotates about the axis so that a conical scan is provided for the tracking receiver at
some suitable lower frequency, say 3000 Mc. In the search phase, the axis of the dish is
maintained at 60 ° from the downward vertical, the antenna assembly rotates about the
vertical axis at a rate of the order of 3 rps, and the nutating feed simultaneously executes a
conical scan at a rate of the order of 30 rps. When the ground station appears above the
horizon with respect to the satellite, the signals from the ground station's beacon will be
received by the conically scanning tracking receiver, which will then operate to disengage
the slow search rotation and to maintain the antenna axis in the direction of the beacon,
using the conventional servo technique. When the satellite reaches the opposite side of its
transit with respect to the ground station, the ground beacon shuts off and the tracker
ceases to operate. The satellite's antenna is then rotated about its axis once at the same
angle with the vertical as was used in transmitting to the last receiving station. If the next
station tracker is not engaged, then the antenna is returned to the primary angle of 60 ° by
stages (probably two revolutions).
This procedure is illustrated in Fig. 24. In the extreme case (provided the next sta-
tion is not over the horizon), a loss of less than 1 sec in reception may be anticipated.
Usually this interval will be about 1/6 sec and will not cause difficulty in continuity of pic-
ture-area coverage since successive disengagements from one station to the next (on alter-
nate days, for example) can be made at different points in the orbit. The 3000-Mc tracking
frequency was chosen, since an included angle (Ao) of 27 1/2° will illuminate the satellite
from a wide range of succeeding ground stations.
Because of the high, and continuously varying, radial velocity of the satellite with
respect to the ground station, the 3000-Mc signal of the ground beacon may suffer a Dop-
pler shift of as much as + 150 kc when it is received at the satellite. The satellite's tracking
receiver must therefore have an effective bandwidth in excess of 300 kc if the complexities
of automatic-frequency search-and-control circuitry are to be avoided. This wide band-
width implies that a directional beacon antenna of rather high gain [33] will be necessary
if the beacon output power is to be reasonable. Fortunately, it is expected that the estab-
lishment of the orbit of the satellite can be made sufficiently precise so that the azimuth
angle at which the satellite will appear above the horizon with respect to a given ground
station, on a given orbital revolution, may be predicted to within one or two degrees.
Hence a beacon antenna having a power gain of about 1000 will yield a broad enough
beam to illuminate the satellite when it appears above the horizon.
The design of the ground station's tracker is virtually unrestricted by considerations
of circuit complexity and power consumption and could take any of several forms. It could,
for example, include a conically scanning tracking receiver similar to that used in the
satellite. Such a tracker could use the television transmitter in the satellite as a beacon.
The ground station's 16-ft-diameter receiving antenna would have a single feed connected
through a power divider to two receivers: one of about 3-Me bandwidth for television re-
ception and the other of about 400-kc bandwidth for tracking. Both receivers would oper-
ate on a television frequency of 10,000 Mc. The feed would be offset from the dish so that
a conical scan at a rate of the order of 30 cps would be provided. The search phase would
consist in aiming the axis of the dish in the direction of the satellite's scheduled appear-
ance and in oscillating the conically scanning feed back and forth through the axis of the
dish in such a manner that the axis of the scan [34] would describe an arc, parallel to and
above the horizon, centered on the direction of the satellite. This oscillatory search scan
would occur at a rate much slower than the conical scan, say of the order of 3 cps. When
the satellite appears, the satellite's tracker first will contact the ground station's beacon,
thus aligning the satellite's transmitting antenna with the ground station. The oscillatory
search motion of the ground station would then be stopped and, with the axis of the coni-
cal scan fixed with respect to the antenna's axis, the entire antenna assembly would be
driven by the usual servo system to follow the satellite.
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Antenna Gain and Power Required
Appendix II develops the relation of antenna sizes (d for the satellite and D for the
ground station), transmitted power, P, transmission wavelength, _., and all the other fac-
tors constraining the signal transmission (signal-to-noise ratio, range, etc.). If these latter
factors are considered as constant, K, then the following relation may be stated:
P=K 3,' =125_, _, (1)
d2D _ d_D 2
where Pis in watts, _, is in centimeters, and d and D are in feet.
The power supplied to the transmitter, E, is not directly proportional to the out-
put power, P, although it is desirable to reduce E to an absolute minimum, not much can
be gained by reducing Pbelow 4 watts. Using 4.4 watts for Pand an assumed wave-length of
3 cm (v = 10,000 Mc) yields d2D 2 = 256. Choosing d = 1 ft yields D = 16 ft. These figures are
purely arbitrary; they are based on engineering judgment and may be considerably differ-
ent from those used in the ultimate system. Wavelength, )_, is discussed later.
It is assumed in the above formula that the two antennas are highly directional, with
half-power beamwidths of 0.80 ° and 13 ° for the ground and the satellite antennas, respec-
tively. Should less directional antennas be employed, considerably greater transmitter power
would be required.
Since the antenna beamwidths are small compared with the total of the solid angles
over which communication will be required, means must be provided for aligning the axes
of the two antennas shortly after the satellite appears above the horizon at a given ground
station and for maintaining that alignment as the satellite passes by in its orbit. This has
been described previously.
Choice of Transmission Wavelength
While the optimum frequency for television transmission between the satellite and
the surface receiving stations will undoubtedly lie in the centimeter wavelength band, its
precise value will be determined as a compromise of many factors. One prime consider-
ation, however, is that of minimizing the required power output of the satellite transmitter,
which, other things being equal, may be accomplished by maximizing the product of the
satellite's transmitting antenna gain and the transmission efficiency of the circuit. A steerable
aperture antenna (such as a conventional paraboloid) is required [35] for transmission
from a satellite in an oblique orbit, and its gain, for a given aperture area, will be inversely
proportional to the square of the transmission wavelength, so that, from this point of view,
the frequency should be as high as possible. The transmission efficiency at very high fre-
quencies will be largely determined by atmospheric absorption (water vapor and oxygen)
and by losses caused by scattering due to condensed cloud and rain droplets, the total
atmospheric losses increasing rapidly with the decrease in wavelength in the high micro-
wave region. (See, for example, Fig. 50, page 109.) The optimum wavelength will depend
on the maximum antenna size, on the minimum satellite elevation angle at which trans-
mission is required, and on the least favorable meteorological condition, which is likely to
be encountered at the ground station. For example, with a 1-ft-diameter transmitting an-
tenna on the satellite, the optimum frequency for transmission at a minimum elevation
angle of 5 ° to a ground station located in a region in which moderate rain is falling at the
rate of 15mm/hr may be shown to be about 15,000 Mc (2-cm wavelength); the optimum
wavelength for transmission under the same conditions, but through a tropical downpour,
would be about 5000 Mc (6-cm wavelength). Many other considerations enter into the
choice of frequency, among which are system losses, ground-receiving, antenna-tracking
accuracy, efficiency and reliability of transmitting tubes, etc., the ultimate optimum prob-
ably being greater than 5000 Mc and less than 15,000 Mc (10,000 Mc has, of course, been
employed in this study).
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Transmissionfthepicturefromthesatellitetoasurfacereceivingstation,aswellas
themethodof presentationorassemblyof individualscenesintoameaningfulwhole,
presentsproblemsregardingdeteriorationftheclarityofthetelevisedpicture,whichare
discussedmorefullyinsubsequentpartsofthissection.Transmissionshouldbedonewith
alarge noughfrequencybandwidthsothatthispartoftheover-allsystemisequivalentto
aconsiderablyhigherresolutionthanthatcomponentlimitingtheresolvingpower,namely,theTVtube.
Enemy Interception and Jamming
Detection and Tracking by Radar. The microwave-radar cross section of the satellite
is estimated as averaging less than about 1 m 2. Detection of so small a target in rapid
motion and at slant ranges, which vary from a maximum of about 1700 mi on the horizon
to a minimum of 350 mi at the zenith, can be shown to be well beyond the capabilities of
the most powerful American radars, either now existent, under development, or being
proposed.
It is conceivable that the satellite might be detected and tracked by a radar designed
expressly for the purpose, one that employs narrow-band techniques at low vhf frequen-
cies at which relatively high average power is available and at which the satellite might
behave as a resonant scatterer of a much higher radar cross section. But the frequencies in
question (20 to 40 Mc) are subject to severe ionospheric attenuation and refraction ef-
fects. The an tenna of such a radar would be enormous, with an aperture area measured in
thousands of square meters. The difficulties involved in searching for and following a
rapidly moving object with such equipment are obvious. Further, [36] even if the system
could be made to work, its accuracy and information rate would probably be too low to be
useful.
Detection and Tracking by Passive Techniques. The power density of the television
signal transmitted from the satellite will be from 10 -_ to 10 _s watts/m 2 at points on the
earth's surface illuminated by the main beam of the satellite's transmitting antenna and
will be of the order of 10 _5 to 10 _s watts/m 2 at surface points outside the beam.
There is little doubt that an enemy equipped with suitable interceptor receivers could
detect and track the satellite by means of its television signal and from a site sufficiently close
to a friendly ground station's receiving station (within about 40 to 200 mi) to be illumi-
nated by the main beam of the satellite's transmitting antenna. The equipment required
would be relatively conventional, based on any of a variety of direction-finders and passive
radar techniques. The tracking would he in direction only, with crude range information
supplied by triangulation from the data obtained at two or more sites. As a primary diffi-
culty would lie in the first acquisition of the satellite's signal, the enemy, unaided by intel-
ligence inibrmation, would have to search through a wide band of frequencies and a solid
angle of nearly 27t for a source of radiation which would be above the horizon at a given
site for a period of only a few minutes per day.
Detection of the satellite's signal by the enemy from sites not illuminated by the main
beam from the satellite would be very difficult. While it could be done, so doing would
require the use of narrow-band search receivers worked into very large antennas. The
probability of making an interception under these conditions would be of the order of
1000 times less than the already low value applied to the more favorable case previously
discussed.
Interception of the Satellite's Transmission (Monitoring), Television transmission from
satellite to surface would require high-gain tracking antennas at both ends of the circuit.
The enemy could receive the message from the satellite only if he had comparable
tracking equipment _s and then only if he managed to acquire the satellite's tracker before
308. It would not be necessary for the enemy actually to receive the signal so long as he was able to
acquire the satellite's antenna by sending in the 300-Mc tracking signal. However, this type of interception (in
effect,jamming) could be overcome by requiring a pulsed tracking signal, similar to an IFF system.
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a friendly receiving station did. Successful interception would require that the enemy know
almost every detail of the system and its operation.
Interference and Other Countermeasures. The television link can be relatively easily
jammed by an enemy who knows the approximate locations of the ground receiving sta-
tion and the frequency of transmission and who is able to get a jammer within line-of-sight
range of a ground station. Even though the ground station's receiving antenna is highly
directional (peak gain probably in excess of 20,000) and tracks the satellite, so that the
jamming signal will be discriminated against by a factor ranging from a minimum of 1000
(for 30 db peak-side lobes) to an average of more than 20,000, the jammer can take tre-
mendous advantage of the pulse transmission. For example, an air-borne pulse jammer of
10- to 100-kw peak output worked into an antenna [37] of modest gain (100 to 10) carried
by an aircraft at 20,000 ft to within -200 mi of the receiving station could prevent reception
of a usable picture. Such jammer powers (peak pulse, at a duty cycle of about 1 per cent)
and antenna sizes are comparable with, or modest compared with, those of ordinary air-
borne radars, and spot.-frequencyjamming is therefore quite feasible.
If the enemy can be denied access to within line-of-sight range of the ground sta-
tions, the television system will be relatively invulnerable to interference by the enemy.
Counter-measures applied at the satellite-end of the circuit presume possession by the
enemy of adequate search and tracking facilities (the difficulties of which were previously
discussed) and can be directed only against the satellite's tracking receiver.
Reception and Presentation of the Television Signal
Reception
A description has already been given of the ground station's receiving antenna and
tracking system. Consideration is now devoted to the assimilation of the TV pictures after
they have arrived at ground level.
Concurrently to read and interpret information on a single television screen at the
rate of 10 completely different frames per second is obviously impossible. Furthermore,
each ground station receives only a piece of the target system under scrutiny. Thus it ap-
pears necessary to record the transmitted data with as litde loss in resolution as possible
and to forward it to a central evaluation center.
At a first glance, it would seem that a prodigious amount of film would be required to
record all the pertinent television frames transmitted. However, analysis reveals that
2.9 hr/day, at most, are spent over USSR and her satellites, China included. At 10 frames/
sec, 2.9 hr are equivalent to 1.0 X l0 s flames/day. It has been shown previously that one
satellite will observe a given area only on alternate 35-day periods in daylight. Thus, for the
first 35 days' operation, 3.5 X 10' frames would be recorded. This is 265,000 ft of 35 mm
camera film, or about that used in filming several feature-length movies.
[38] It is believed that during the first 30 to 40 days' operation a fairly comprehen-
sive picture of the USSR would be obtained, and subsequent operations would be concen-
trated on specific target systems or areas, perhaps with the narrow-scanning-width lens
system previously described.
The equipment required at any forward receiving station is not complex. The receiv-
ing antenna has already been discussed. An ordinary television receiver will probably suf-
fice for monitoring purposes (to see if the picture quality is satisfactory). Its viewing scope,
however, must have a high-persistence screen which will project about one flame out of a
hundred.
For recording, a second television receiver is needed. Its scope must be as large as
possible and its electric beam spot size must be reduced to a minimum; in short, the whole
set must be tailored to the criterion of putting the image on the screen with as litde loss in
resolution as possible.
The image will then be reduced by camera optics to the appropriate film size; 35 mm
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maybeadequate,butifasignificantamountofdetail is lost, then 70 mm can be employed.
The film does not have to be very "fast," but should be of a fine-grain variety? _ The camera
will be similar to a movie camera but will operate at about one-half the frequency.
Each forward station will be furnished with a time schedule for operating the cam-
eras computed on the basis of the satellite's orbit. Such a schedule will vary fro,n day to
day, as mentioned in the discussion on orbits. Some sort of time coding will be included
with each frame; a feed-back from the tracking-antenna control will also be fed into this
coding, but this is only a crude location device to show up any gross errors in evaluation.
Presentation
The central evaluation station will receive the composite films from the forward sta-
tions and assemble the story into an integrated whole. Standard photogrammetric tech-
niques call for synchronizing one or more sets of films, together with overlays, etc., [39] to
aid in interpretation of results. In such a device, the frames are projected in a mosaic form
and compose as the scenes appear on the earth. Also projected could be a master overlay
made up of geographical coordinates and, later, after a number of films are taken, of that
area of the ground already filmed. The over-all area can be enlarged to an), extent neces-
sary for rapid determination of the worth of the films being evaluated. For instance, if a
large area is covered by clouds, then just those frames having glimpses of the ground could
be separated for subsequent addition to the master mosaic of the USSR.
The cloud pictures would be placed on a larger-scaled photomap so that daily weather
maps could be made and preserved.
The entire presentation system should be simple, rapid, reliable, and amenable to
standard evaluation techniques.
Summary
To summarize, a 350-mi altitude satellite, having an f/10, 2-in. aperture, 20-in. focal
length, Image Orthicon TV camera of 1000 TV lines/in, with a speed of 10 frames/sec,
would be capable of resolving scenes of contrast greater than 20 per cent to about 200 ft.
Transmitting and receiving antennas for the described system will require careful analysis
and design, but their accomplishment does not present any serious research problems.
Presentation of the viewed scenes by photographic and photogrammetric methods ap-
pears within the limits of known, practiced techniques.
Such a system, employing presently available equipment, is considered satisfactory
for both weather and pioneer terrestrial reconnaissance. However, in order to obtain ac-
ceptably detailed target evaluation of bomb-damage assessment, the minimum resolvable
surface dimension will have to be improved; several possible methods are suggested.
For example, by keeping the frame speed constant but optically reducing the field of
view and thereby reducing the scanned bandwidth on the ground, acceptable values for
most terrestrial reconnaissance can be attained with present television tubes. This results
in not having a daily coverage of the entire target area.
Other means of improvement of the resolvable surface dimensions are an increase
in the inherent tube resolution (an increase of about 50 per cent is visualized at this time)
and an increase in the frame frequency to 30/sec (about 45 per cent improvement of
resolvable surface dimension).
The estimated over-all power, weight, and space requirements of the electronic trans-
mitting system are 350 watts, 300 lb, and 2.25 ft *, respectively ....
309. Such expedients as, for example, using blue sensitive film with a blue cathode-ray screen can be
used to bring out certain details in the _4ewed scene.
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Document 11-4
Docmnent tide: R.M. Salter, "Engineering Techniques in Relation to Human Travel at
Upper Altitudes," Physics and Medicine of the Upper Atmosphere: A Study of the Aeropause
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1952), pp. 480-487.
Few scientists and engineers outside of the narrow field of rocketry took human
space travel seriously until the mid- to late 1950s. Many felt that it was little more than
science fiction fantasy unworthy of serious study; they frowned upon their peers who de-
voted time and effort to such a frivolous topic. Robert Salter's ardcle was most likely the
first serious treatment in American academic and engineering circles of the problems of
human spaceflight.
[480] Introduction
The subject now under consideration is the current and predicted status of engineer-
ing techniques related to the travel of man in the upper atmosphere. In other words, we
are to discuss the "how" and "when" of manned space flight. The "why" of human partici-
pation in such a venture should also be examined since it is not immediately obvious that
we cannot always substitute electronic equipment in place of a pilot.
In order to correlate properly the various data available it is necessary to distinguish
between physical limitations, those imposed by actual physical laws (or absolute limits),
and purely engineering constraints. Quite often an operation is said to be impractical
when actually it is only infeasible on the basis of current engineering techniques. On the
other hand, physical considerations usually furnish a clear-cut indication that the particu-
lar problem in question either can or cannot be solved. This is not a completely rigorous
limitation, since some phases of physics, notably nuclear physics, are currently in a rather
fluid state so that our ideas may change in the future.
Thus on the basis of the laws of motion, etc., as we now know them, the various
allowable regimes of operation in the aeropause can be enumerated. It can be said that,
without the employment of a rather unique release of nuclear energy, certain modes and
areas of space travel must be excluded. For example, long-duration flights at 50 mi altitude
would be excluded. On the other hand, it now appears that a large portion of space travel
of interest can be accomplished with present-day types of propulsion and energy sources!
The day for successful interplanetary travel awaits only the decision of man to provide the
[481] prodigious and concerted effort required. It might be mentioned in passing that
nuclear fuels are not necessary to such an operation and that the basic techniques re-
quired have been known for centuries. It is pertinent to note, for instance, that a two-stage
rocket was successfully tried in 1855mnearly a hundred years ago.
Regimes of Flight in the Aeropause
Some of the first questions to be answered are, "how high," "how fast," and "how
long" can flight be sustained in the upper atmosphere? Emphasis must be given the last
item if a pilot is carried in the vehicle. Obviously, other than for the purposes of physi-
ological experimentation or establishing a record, one would not conceive of a manned
sounding rocket. Here, there is not time or need to supplant electronic equipment for
making observations. However, in cases where flight duration is of sufficient length that
electronic reliability is a problem, where computer operations (such as having adequate
"memory" included) are too complex, and, in particular, where judgment in unforeseen
circumstances is neededmthen the participation of man will be required. It may be seen
that the first two requisites are limited only by prevailing engineering development, while
the last is clearly a basic constraint.
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Theemploymentofpilotsinsupersonicrocketplanesandinballoonsi anexample
ofpresentapproachestotheproblem,andhasbeencoveredinpre_iouspapers.In the
caseofair-bornevehicles(thoseusingforwardmotiontoderiveliftfromtheatmosphere)
wemustconsiderdurationofflightsaswellasaltitude.It isconvenienttosubdividethis
classofvehiclesintothoseusingrocketenginesandthoseusingair-breathingpowerplants.
Thislattertypeisrepresentedbythevariousjetpropelledaircraftandmissiles.Inorderto
flyatveryhighaltitudesit isnecessaryforsuchavehicletooperateatsupersonicspeeds,
notonlyto providesufficientlift butalsoforadequatehrust.Atanaltitudeof 20mi(32.2km),forexample,therequiredMachnumberforaramjetisover5andtheresultant
incomingairhasastagnationtemperatureoftheorderof2000°F.Sincenergy'mustbe
impartedto thisairathighertemperaturesit maybeseenthatapresentengineering
limitationonsuitablefuelsandmaterialsi approached.Thisisparticularlytruewiththe
useofnuclearheating.Thustheair-breathingvehicleislimitedin altitude.Asfordura-
don,anuclearramjetmightbecapableofcruisingforindefiniteperiodsaroundtheearth
andcomprisesaveryinterestingpossibilityfortravelin thenearaeropause.
[482] Physics and Medicine of the Upper Atmosphere
With rocket vehicles, higher altitudes can be attained. At 50 mi (80.6 km) and at a
near-satellite speed of 4 mi/sec a vehicle can support its weight in gliding. However, in the
region of 20 to 100 miles (32.2 to 160.9 kin), flights with propulsion that can be envisioned
at the present time will be of short duration (an hour or so) and less than a revolution
about the earth. In this altitude region, the justification for incorporating a pilot is doubt-
ful.
The gliding trajectory mentioned above naturally leads us to a satellite. The feasibil-
ity of establishing a vehicle in a stable orbit around the earth has been theoretically dem-
onstrated both here and abroad. Placing the vehicle in the direction of the instaneous
tangent to the earth at the proper speed will result in a circular orbit. At 150 mi (241.4 km)
altitude nearly 5 mi/sec is needed; at 500 mi (804.6 km) this speed is a little slower at
about 41/2 mi/sec. At 150 mi the duration would be of a day or so, drag slowing the vehicle
down. At 500 mi, it is estimated that several decades would elapse before a satellite would
come down of its own accord.
It is apparent that automatic operation of complicated scientific observational equip-
ment is a tenuous proposition for long periods of time. The temptation for employing a
hmnan observer on a one-way basis is ever present, and it is probable that a number of
volunteers willing to devote their lives to science could be obtained. However, it is physi-
cally possible to bring a satellite back without a great additional source of power.
This is not easy and would require considerable development in control equipment.
In launching a satellite, a long, coasting (elliptical) trajectory is indicated, with a small
additional kick provided to pull it into orbit. This same kick in reverse will put the vehicle
back into the original ballistic flight path, but the vehicle might burn on the way down. By
using a carefully selected and maintained gliding trajectory it is believed possible to enter
the atmosphere without disastrous skin temperatures and high landing speeds. In fact,
terminal speeds slighdy over sonic are indicated, at which point parts of the vehicle could
be landed with parachutes.
The main problem, then, of the returnable satellite is that it requires a very accurate
control during the descent phase--automatic programmed control at the least, and possi-
bly the continuously computed variety.
The satellite, especially a returnable one, is important as a step in the direction of
interplanetary space travel. The principle of orbiting [483] about a given planet will un-
doubtedly be incorporated in future vehicle operations. For example, computations have
shown that the establishment of an elliptical orbital path about the earth and moon will
require not appreciably more energy than that of a low-altitude satellite--in fact, the en-
ergy required is less than that needed to establish a circular orbit at 6400 mi (10,299.9 km)
height.
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Toescapefromtheearth'sgravitational field, a velocity of 40 percent more than the
low-altitude satellite or about 7 mi/sec is required. By properly timing the trajectory it
should be possible to arrive at a near planet in a reasonable length of time. Some addi-
tional control thrust will probably be required to allow the vehicle to be captured by this
planet as a satellite. At this point the vehicles can elect to land, or return to earth by orbital
escape at the proper time.
Motivating Techniques Required
It is apparent from the foregoing that, as more complicated operations are visual-
ized, an effectively greater thrust impulse is necessary for a given vehicle. Staging is one
expedient, and an important one, for effecting space travel. However, if it requires a mil-
lion pounds take-offweight to put 10,000 pounds on a distant planet, it will take a billion
pounds initial weight for a round trip (to a planet of similar gravitational pull and return).
This is the weight of ten batdeships. This condition prevails if all the fuel must be carried
with the vehicle.
Instead of multiplying stages the vehicle might carry a pilot plant for making its own
fuel for the return voyage. This would, say, double the pay load and thus only double the
gross weight.
The launching of a one-way space vehicle is felt to be possible with highly developed
structural techniques and chemical fuels. What gains, then, can be made with the use of
nuclear fuels?
Two possibilities exist with nuclear energy, using the fission particles directly, and
degrading the energy into heat for increasing the momentum of a secondary fuel. At first
sight the direct use of fission fragments and neutrons seems attractive. However, at the
vehicle speeds where most of the thrust force is expended, many orders of magnitude
greater energy release is required for the direct employment of fission particles to attain a
given thrust than is needed for sufficient heating of a secondary fuel. This is because the
mass of the particles is so small. One can consider the "dilution" of the particle momen-
tum with inert particles of greater mass. The energy required is proportional to mV _,
[484] while the momentum change for thrust is proportional to mV _ if the velocity of the
particle is greatly different from that of the vehicle, _8 the low-mass, high-energy propellant
is inefficient. (In the above discussion it has been assumed that it is possible to direct the
fission particles rearward, which, in itself, is unrealistic considering the tremendous amount
of heat generated in an absorbing chamber designed for such purposes.)
It is, of course, well known that such orders of energy production are probably physi-
cally realizable, but to accommodate such an energy release in a vehicle is beyond the
scope of present engineering thinking.
On the other hand, the use of a nuclear reactor to heat a secondary propellant does
not impose a large strain on the imagination. The impulse for a given energy release is
roughly proportional to the square roots of the temperatures and to the inverse of the
atomic weights of the propellant components. Thus the ability to use hydrogen or meth-
ane alone, and/or higher temperatures, indicates possibilities for nuclear propulsion.
However, it is not immediately apparent that an improvement over a chemical-fuel system
will result or, if so, that the amount of improvement will be significant.
Engineering Limitations
We have explored, in a qualitative fashion, the allowable regimes of upper atmo-
sphere flight from the standpoint of that which is physically conceivable. How much then
is realizable on the basis of engineering? In other words, if say, a satellite vehicle can be
298, The optimum velocity of the particle is approximately twice that of the vehicle. For particle speeds
significantly greater than vehicle speeds the propulsive efficiency is proportional to Vv/Vp.
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theoretically predicated, do we have the practical engineering know-how to implement
such a venture?
The tentative answer to this question is yes. As a result of war-instigated research we
have V2 rockets and microwave radio techniques. Even in 1945 a satellite vehicle could
have been built in a "quick and dirty" fashion by staging, and by such crude expedients as
clustering existing rocket motors together to form a single power plant. Since then power
plants with improved fuel combinations and of a larger size, better materials for certain
applications such _.s titanium metal, and exploratory research in the near upper atmo-
sphere have tended to guarantee even greater success for such a program.
[485] The fact that a satellite has not been practical in a strict military sense has
retarded its development in favor of guided missiles. On the other hand, the continual
improvements of techniques in propulsion, aerodynamics, structures, and electronics have
been brought about by missile programs.
It is on the subject of electronics that we shall dwell for the moment. Approximately
half of the effort in the V2 development was expended in the simple radio control that
established this vehicle on its relatively short-range ballistic trajectory. With this in mind, it
is not hard to extrapolate to the difficulties involved in guiding a long-range missile over a
complicated trajectory or in placing a satellite in its orbit. As was mentioned previously,
this was one of the considerations in favor of having a pilot in a rocket plane for supersonic
flight research. Ever-increasing needs for more complex control equipment call for better
electronics. This, in turn, requires special consideration of the electron tubes themselves,
which, for a particular application, went through the following interesting stages of evolu-
tion.
Initial forms of radio-detection devices included the crystal detector and the triode.
Subsequent tube development resulted in more and more complex elements within the
tube and in multipurpose tubes. With the recent upsurge of electronic application in mi-
crowave radio and in digital computers (or electronic brains) it has become apparent that
many simple and reliable diodes and triodes are to be preferred for such circuits. Further
exploitation in this direction has centered interest on the semiconductor or transistor,
and the equivalents to both diodes and triodes have been made in this form. What is a
transistor? It is just an improvement of the old cat-whisker-crystal affair used in the early
radio sets. This cycle aptly illustrates an underlying precept of development. As Boss
Kettering says, "the ultimate solution to a problem is usually the simplest." Another way of
stating this is, "If it's complicated, it's wrong."
The transistor consists of a simple blob of material the size of a lead-pencil eraser (or
smaller) with several wires leading to it. Its power requirements may be as small as one-
hundredth that of an equivalent electron tube. The reliability of the transistor also prob-
ably will be considerably better. In short, it has been heralded as the forerunner of the
coming electronic age, where many of man's more menial tasks will be replaced by com-
puter controls.
In the actual construction of an upper-atmosphere vehicle many unforseen prob-
lems undoubtedly will arise. Usually, if a wide gap [486] exists between the physical and
engineering limits on a device, then a large number of possible solutions exist. In the early
days of aircraft, for example, many weird configurations evolved. As research in piston-
engine types progressed it became apparent that monoplanes with thin wings were needed.
Eventually a physical limit ofS00 mph was approached since the additional power required
resulted in a larger engine-cooling drag that offset the benefits of increased engine size.
Thus, considerable work and careful design were required to reach this limiting speed.
By analogy, it may be said that we are still in the Curtiss biplane stase of rocketry, and
such considerations as accessibility of instruments for ground testing frequently predomi-
nate. A good example of such freedom may be found in a recent news release, "Newsmen
who recently attended the firing of a rocket asked why the rocket was exactly 32 inches in
diameter. After a long technical explanation involving the ratio of length to diameter and
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effectsofair drag on a large projectile, the engineer concluded, "Besides, it so happened
that the metal plate we were able to obtain made a cylinder exacdy 32 inches across."
Summary
Past experience has shown that most advances in the field of human endeavor are
not made as a result of some completely new and different concept, but rather by skillful
day-to-day improvement of existing technology. This does not mean that intelligence is
not required. On the contrary, the human mind is quite capable of solving muhi-
parameter problems, an operation which is usually termed ingenuity. Very often a design
created on the back of an old envelope is perfectly suitable (it can also be completely wrong).
The continuing development of computing machinery has resulted in powerful tools
for rapid, simultaneous solution of problems of many variables. However, it should be
emphasized that the machines themselves do not possess intelligence. It is quite embar-
rassing, for example, to find that solutions are insensitive to a given parameter and upon
subsequent investigation find that this factor did not belong in the problem in the first
place.
There is, and will be, no substitute for sound and thoughtful planning and direction
of research. The middle road between the no-stone-left-unturned school and the advo-
cates of the "brilliant hunch" type of investigation will afford the most fruitful course of
action.
[487] Just how long before space travel is accomplished cannot be predicted accu-
rately since a very large weighing factor must be assessed to man's own incentives and
decisions. If it became necessary to our very existence to conduct interplanetary flights
tomorrow, the development period required would be materially shortened-probably within
our lifetime. Without such an impetus it may be many generations before such a program
is attempted. Let us recall that 50 years ago most of the mechanics of a complete rocket
vehicle were known.
To recapitulate, most of the components comprising an upper-atmosphere vehicle
probably will be refinements of existing rocket devices. Rather than having an appreciable
increase in rocket-plane altitude, the next step probably will be a satellite, with a return-
able version used for manned flights. Considerable improvement in electronics from the
standpoint of reliability, weight, and power consumption is indicated. The transistor may
pave the way toward this end. Many of the more complex operations in the development
of rocket vehicles, as well as within the vehicle itself, will be implemented by self-sustaining
computers. In the final analysis, though, man himself, with his ability to use judgment and
his physical limitations, will provide the key to space flight.
Document 11-5
Document title: A.V. Grosse, The Research Institute of Temple University, to Donald A.
Quarles, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, "Report on the
Present Status of the Satellite Problem," August 25, 1953, pp. 2-7.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA Headquar-
ters, Washington, D.C.
In 1959, President Truman requested Aristid V. Grosse, a physicist at Temple Univer-
sity who had worked on the Manhattan Project, to study the "satellite problem." Major
General Kenneth D. Nichols, formerly deputy for Lieutenant General Leslie R. Groves on
the Manhattan Project, arranged Grosse's meetings with space scientists at Huntsville, par-
ticularly Wernher yon Braun. The report was finished after Truman left office; it was deliv-
ered to Donald Quarles, the new Assistant Secretary of Defense for R&D under President
Eisenhower, on September 24, 1953. Quarles later became a major advocate of the use of
space for military purposes. Another copy of the report was sent to Dr. John R. Dunning,
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dean of the School of Engineering, Columbia University. Dunning discussed it with Presi-
dent Eisenhower, and the report contributed to the initiation of Project Vanguard. Grosse's
report represents the first time that the potential propaganda consequences of a Soviet
first launch of a satellite were reported directly to top levels of the government.
[2] The Present Status of the Satellite Problem
A satellite is a man-made or artificial moon which will rotate around the earth be-
yond the furthermost extent of its atmosphere, for many years or indefinitely. After it has
once reached its orbital velocity the centrifugal force of its motion is held in exact balance
by the gravitational attraction of the earth; thus the satellite once on its orbit around the
earth does not require any additional power to keep it there. Usually altitudes of 300 to
1000 miles above the earth's surface are considered.
As an example, at an altitude of 346 miles above sea level the time necessary for the
satellite to travel once around the earth, i.e. its period of revolution, will be exactly
96 minutes or 15 revolutions per day. Its orbital velocity will then be 4.71 miles per second.
Similarly, a satellite at an altitude of 1037 miles above sea level will have a period of revolu-
tion of exactly 120 minutes or 12 revolutions per day and a velocity of 4.37 miles per sec-
ond.
The satellite could be made to travel over the surface of the earth in a wavy line so
that in the course of a few successive clays most of the North American continent, Europe,
Africa and Asia, could be observed from it.
It could be made visible to the naked eye, under clear atmospheric conditions, at
dawn and at dusk as a bright fast moving star.
The technical problem of creating a satellite should logically be divided into the two
following steps:
1, The unmanned satellite and
2. The manned satellite.
[3] The accomplishment of the first step, in the opinion of even the most skeptical
engineers, is possible with the present know-how and engineering knowledge. Since it is
not manned by human beings it would not require any essentially new research and devel-
opment.
A satellite of about 30 feet in length would require the stepping up of the German
V-2 rocket by a take-off weight factor of 6-7. This would require essentially the addition of
a third large stage to the present well known two stage rockets such as the WAC Corporal
mounted on a V-2, which reached an altitude of 250 miles at the White Sands Proving
Grounds in February 1949. A design for such a large stage was already on the drawing
boards of Dr. von Braun and his associates in Peenemiinde, Germany, in 1945. This Ger-
man project "A-9 + A-10" was designed for transatlantic bombing of the United States. The
A-9 stage was a slightly enlarged V-2 (take-off weight 16.3 metric tons vs. 12.8 tons of the
V-2) whereas the A-10 stage had a take-off weight of 69 metric tons. Such a three stage
rocket would use conventional fuels giving a specific thrust of 220-240 seconds (for ex-
ample, liquid oxygen + ethyl alcohol 75%, water 25% = 239 seconds, red fuming nitric acid
+ aniline = 221 seconds). Conventional combustion chambers, pumps, tanks, ignition de-
vices, etc., could be used.
Research scientists have recently demonstrated that much larger specific thrusts can
be realized. For example, a liquid fluorine-liquid hydrogen rocket motor can generate a
thrust of about 380 seconds. This would permit the use of a much smaller rocket to achieve
satellite velocity. However, the engineers feel that this advantage is offset by the necessity
of doing a lot of additional research and development in order to bring the high thrust
rocket motors and their accessories to [4] the same stage of reliability and smoothness of
operation as the conventional rockets. All of this new development would thus cause a loss
in time. This would be unwise because it is felt by all engineers that the present rocket
fuels and motors will be able to do the satellite job.
The second step or a satellite manned by human beings is decidedly a much more
difficult problem. Ultimately, if solved, it would mean the beginning of man's conquest of
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interstellar space and would have infinite possibilities for the human race. The solution of
this problem, however, involves overcoming all the obstacles in the way of man's existence
in the vacuum of outer space. It means the overcoming of the absence of a gravitational
field on the functions of the human body and the effects of cosmic radiation on it. Al-
though all of these problems have a possibility of ultimate solution, it would require at
least a 20-fold expense of human effort, money and time, as compared to Step 1, coupled
with an inestimable amount of human ingenuity and invention.
It is felt that the accomplishment of the first step would help solve many of the prob-
lems of the second. This writer feels that probably after the successful launching of the
first unmanned satellite, a number of such unmanned satellites will be in existence at
various altitudes above the surface of the earth, for various purposes. It is thus felt that at
this time the main effort should be directed toward solving the unmanned satellite problem.
The value of an unmanned satellite would fall into the following categories.
a) Scientific -- with proper electronic and telemetering equipment and devices it
would enable us to obtain valuable scientific information regarding the various physical
conditions existing in outer space. [5] The satellite would need a concentrated source of
energy, which should be light in weight and should produce power for a number ofyears. It is
considered that such a power plant could be produced by using alpha-active radioactive
substances of an average life of a few years in concentrated form, if the appropriate re-
sources of the Atomic Energy Commission could be mobilized.
b) Military- again, with the equipment referred to above coupled with televising
devices, a satellite station could be a valuable observation post.
c) Psychological -- with appropriate signaling or broadcasting devices such a satel-
lite could develop into a highly effective sky messenger of the flee world.
In the opinion of this writer the last item, i.e., the psychological effect, would be
considered of utmost value by the members of the Soviet Politbureau. They would recog-
nize that in the case of atomic and hydrogen bombs the people of the belligerent coun-
tries would be subjected to their effects only after the die of World War III is already cast.
On the other hand, the satellite would have the enormous advantage of influencing the
minds of millions of people the world over during the so-called period of "cold war" or
during the peace years precedinga possible World War III. In the countries of Asia, where
the star gazer since time immemorial has been influencing his countrymen, the spectacle
of a man-made satellite would make a profound impression on the minds of the people.
The Soviet Union has demonstrated that it has been able to develop the atomic bomb and
recently to follow that up with the accomplishment of a thermonuclear reaction on August
12, 1953, [6] as confirmed by the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Ad-
miral L. Strauss, much faster than had been generally expected by our scientists and engi-
neers. The building of an unmanned satellite would be a feat of much smaller magnitude
than the construction of an atomic bomb since all the basic information was available to
the Germans at the end of World War II and is since known both to this country and to the
Soviet Union. Furthermore, the industrial plant necessary for the construction of a satel-
lite is much simpler and is now being developed for the guided missiles programs in both
countries.
In the Soviet Union the construction of a satellite would amount to only a fraction of
the cost in this country, a) because of the use of cheap or slave labor; b) no necessity for
great safety precautions, and c) no need for tracking the satellite in the early stages of its
flight.
Since the Soviet Union has been following us in the atomic and hydrogen bomb
developments, it should not be excluded that the Politbureau might like to take the leadin
the development of a satellite. They may also decide to dispense with a lot of the compli-
cated instrumentation that we would consider necessary to put into our satellite to accom-
plish the main purpose, namely, of putdng a visible satellite into the heavens first. If the
Soviet Union should accomplish this ahead of us it would be a serious blow to the techni-
cal and engineering prestige of America the world over. It would be used by Soviet propa-
ganda for all it is worth. Of course, the probable reaction of the American people to a
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Soviet satellite circling about 300 miles above Washington, New York, Chicago and Los
Angeles, would have to be considered.
At the present time our engineering efforts in this field are limited in scope and
distributed over various government agencies. It [7] is recommended as a first step in
solving the satellite problem that a small but effective committee be set up composed of
our top engineers and scientists in the rocket field, with representatives of the Defense
and State Departments. This Committee should report to the top levels of our govern-
ment and should have for its use and evaluation, all data available to our government and
industry on this subject. It should report in detail as to what steps should be taken to
launch a satellite successfully into outer space and to estimate the cost and time required
for such a development. It is felt that if such a committee were in existence and a definite
decision taken by our government regarding the construction of a satellite, that it would
fire the enthusiasm and imagination of our engineers and scientists and effectivelv in-
crease our success in the whole field of rockets and guided missiles.
Document 11-6
Document tide: J.E. Lipp and R.M. Salter, "Project Feed Back Summary Report," The
Rand Corporation, R-262, Volume II, March, 1954, pp. 50-60. The figures have been omit-
ted from this document.
Source: Archives, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California.
In November 1950, Rand recommended to Air Force headquarters that it pursue
further advanced research on satellite reconnaissance. Two Rand reports, including "The
Utility of a Satellite Vehicle for Reconnaissance" [II-3], were completed in April 1951 and
were enthusiastically received by the Air Force. Some members of the Air Force recog-
nized the valuable role that satellites could play in providing strategic reconnaissance of
areas not reachable by other means. As a result, the Air Research and Development Com-
mand authorized Rand to make specific recommendations on a satellite reconnaissance
system. Project Feed Back involved hundreds of scientists and engineers from Rand and a
host of subcontractors. Its results were presented to the Air Force on March 1, 1954, and
became the basis for the first military satellite program. Many of its specific proposals,
such as the use of television transmission of reconnaissance images, were not adopted
until many years later. The section of the report dealing with "television payload equip-
ment" is still classified. Volume I of this report has not been cleared for public release. In
this excerpt from Volume II, the report discusses the scanning technique that was the basis
for obtaining useful data from Earth orbit. The figures have been omitted.
[50] Scanning
The scanning problem arises for an obvious reason. The limited size and resolving
power of the Image Orthicon result in each picture's being able to contain only a finite
number of bits of information. Elsewhere in this report it is shown that in order to keep
the time between successive views of a particular ground area to a reasonable value, the
television opdcal system must cover a strip extending for 200 mi on each side of the flight
line. If this area were to be covered by a single picture, about 1 in. on a side, the scale
would then be 1:25,000,000; if the spot size of the scanning beam in the camera tube could
be kept down to 0.001 in, the image projected on the ground by the optical system would
be 2100 ft in diameter. Anything much smaller than a mile in its principal dimension
would be difficult to detect.
At the scale of 1:500,000, one picture is about 8 mi on a side. A strip 400 mi wide will
require fifty pictures to cover it. This number of pictures must be transmitted in the time it
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takes the satellite to move forward 8 mi (1.68 sec), requiring a frame rate of about thirty
per second, which is present commercial practice. At this scale, a spot 0.001 in. in diameter
will cover a circle on the ground approximately 40 ft in diameter. Two television lines are
equivalent to one optical line of resolution, and an object, to have a high probability of
detection, must be covered by about two optical resolution lines. This gives, in the present
case, a limiting object size of somewhere between 150 ft and 200 it, approximately the size
of bombing alrcraftmhence the gain realized by the complication of the addition of a
scanning system.
Because the Image Orthicon is an integrating device, it requires a finite exposure
time during which the image must remain fixed on the photocathode. If it were not for
this, the scanning problem would be reduced to the simple one of two cameras viewing the
ground by reflection in continuously rotating mirrors. Two cameras would be required to
eliminate the "dead time," i.e., the time during which the mirror into which each camera
is looking would be [51] returned to its initial position to start a new sweep. But scanning
in the direction of the line of flight is affected by the vehicle's motion. From the stand-
point of reliability and long life, intermittent mechanisms which have been proposed for
the projection of motion pictures from continuously moving film are applicable. A few
of those suggested in Ref. 24 may be difficult to fabricate, but they can be used successfully
here, because many of the restrictions imposed by their application to theater projectors
do not occur (e.g., the f number and back focal length, in particular, present no prob-
lems).
The most promising arrangement that has been investigated is the one proposed by
RCA in their study of the problem. It consists of a number of mirror pairs mounted on the
periphery of a continuously rotating wheel; each mirror pair deflects a ray through a fixed
angle in a plane perpendicular to their line of intersection, independently of any rotation
of the mirror pair about any line parallel to their line of intersection. In Fig. 29, M_ and M_
are two plane mirrors perpendicular to the plane of the paper, and/is their line of inter-
section. If the two mirrors rotate slightly, as a unit, the change of deviation of the ray
produced by reflection in the first mirror is of the same magnitude and opposite sense as
that produced by the second mirror, leaving the deviation produced by the pair of mirrors
unchanged. The deviation of the pair depends, therefore, only on the angle between them.
RCA's device is shown in Figs. 30 and 31. For a scale of 1:500,000, an altitude of 300 mi,
and a strip 200-mi wide on each side of the line of flight, the rotating drum will have
eighteen pairs of mirrors, each pair equally spaced around the periphery.
This drum, whose axis is parallel to the direction of motion of the vehicle, rotates at
a speed of 38.5 revolutions per minute in a clockwise direction as shown. Since there are
eighteen equally spaced pairs of mirrors on the drum, the mirror pairs are spaced 20 deg
apart. Both television cameras are spaced 90 deg apart as in Fig. 31. This means that at the
instant that camera "A" is viewing a ground scene through a mirror pair, camera "B" is
viewing the transition point between two successive mirror pairs. The sequence of ground
scenes scanned is shown in Fig. 32.
Lateral image immobilization is achieved during the entire time that a pair, or part
of a pair, of mirrors is in line with the optical axis of the camera. Except [52] for a short
interval during which the image is recorded, a composite picture of two successive seg-
ments is seen because ofvignetting effects. The situation perhaps can be explained better
by describing the direction of view of one of the cameras. As the drum rotates, a scene,
completely stationary except for the image motion caused by the forward motion of the
vehicle (the lateral scanning introduces no image motion), can be observed for a period
of time depending on the mirror size. The next scene will then be picked up and will start
to blend with the first scene, both remaining completely immobilized. At some point, only
the second scene will be observed; then the entire cycle will be repeated for adjacent fields
of view.
Such a sequence is demonstrated by Fig. 33. The ordinate in this diagram is compa-
rable to the intensity of illumination on the photocathode due to the fields of view indi-
cated by the numbers above each peak, which can be made to correspond to the num-
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bered fields shown in Fig. 31. RCA's proposal to avoid the resulting confusion of images is
to "pulse" the image section of the Image [53] Orthicon. That is, the accelerating poten-
tial will be applied to the photoelectrons liberated by the optical image on the photocath-
ode only during that part of exposure on, say, field 3, when the light from fields 1 and 5 is
less than some minimum value, say 5 percent of full aperture. It should be noted that
because the output of both cameras is to be transmitted over the same carrier wave and
received on the same device, it is important that they be accurately interdigitated timewise.
The curves in Fig. 33 represent the case where the dimensions of the mirror pairs are such
that the full-aperture condition obtains only instantaneously, As the size of the mirrors is
increased, the full-aperture exposure time increases and the exposure curves, shown in
Fig. 34, develop [54] flat tops and bottoms. From the point of view of the most efficient
time use, the optimum is reached when the exposure time is one-fourth of the frame
frequency for both cameras; the exposure curve has the form shown in Fig. 34 for the
camera on one side of the mirror drum.
Starting with field 2 (Fig. 34), full aperture is reached at the abscissa value of 1.5 and
is maintained until 2,5. During this time the accelerating potential is applied and a charge
image is built up on the target plate in the Image Orthicon. From 2.5 to 3.5 the image-
stage voltage is shut off and the scanning beam discharges the image on the target plate.
In this same interval (2.5 to 3.5) the camera on the other side of the mirror drum is being
exposed. At 3.5 a new exposure is started in the first camera at the same time that the
picture in the second camera is being scanned and transmitted. In this way there is always
one and only one picture being exposed. There is no "dead time" for the transmitter.
[55] The price that must be paid for this more efficient use of transmitter and expo-
sure time is, of course, weight and bulk--the scanning drum must be larger. Variation of
the drum radius with the percentage of the exposure time occurring at full aperture is
shown in Fig. 35.
To get the resolving power being discussed, any motion of the image, during the
exposure, that can be predicted must be eliminated. Such an image motion is one that is
due to the high forward velocity of the vehicle--roughly 25,000 ft/sec. At an exposure
time 0.001 sec, the image of the photocathode projected on the ground by the camera lens
will move 25 ft, a barely tolerable amount. If the scanning mirror dimensions are chosen
so that one-quarter of the frame time is available for exposure, the exposure time at
25 frames/sec will be 0.01 sec and the image motion during this time will be 250 ft, requir-
ing some sort of image-motion compensation.
Here again the type of mechanism devised for the projection of motion pictures
from continuously moving film can be used, but there is such a small motion, in terms of
percentage of frame height (at most 1000 ft out of 8 mi), [56] to be corrected that, in
RCA's opinion, it can be handled (electrically) by scanning in the image stage of the cam-
era tube. All that is required is the addition of a coil above the image stage and one below
the image stage, the plane of the coils being parallel to the axis of the tube. These coils can
be energized by a "saw toothed" oscillator whose frequency is equal to the frame frequency.
As the optical image moves on the photocathode, the photoelectrons liberated by a (mov-
ing) point in the image can be brought to a focus at a fixed spot on the target plate where
the charge accumulates. RCA workers say that a motion of 5 percent of the frame height is
easily corrected in this way, whereas 10 percent is possible to correct, but very difficult.
Since the motion in this instance is around 2 percent, it should not be difficult to correct,
The problem of obtaining reconnaissance data is essentially that of typifying various
ground-target scenes with patterns of bits varying in intensity. The number of bits in a
given period of time determines the bandwidth, or the information rate, of the system.
Here, information rates of perhaps three times those of standard television systems have
been considered, i.e., bandwidths of about 8 Mc. It is obvious that all components in the
television system should be compatible with regard to bandwidth.
A bandwidth corresponding to the above frame rate in tube resolution is about
6 1/2 Mc. It is expected that a slightly higher bandwidth may be employed in the surround-
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ing circuitry of the television camera tube so that no unnecessary degradation of signal
will be introduced. Bandwidths of the order of 9 Mc have been employed in the simulation
television setup for the photographs used in Vol. I of this report. However, the use of these
bandwidths is not standard studio pracdce because the standard-tube studio television is
limited by FCC regulations to about 3 _/_ Mc. Otto Schade, of RCA, has used bandwidths
up to 20 Mc in some experimental television equipment, particularly for circuits surrounding
the 4 a/_-in. Image Orthicon camera tube.
The next component encountered by the television signal is the magnetic-tape re-
cording system. Magnetic-tape recorders for the purpose of recording video signals have
already been investigated and brought to a primitive stage of development.
A magnetic-tape recorder (Fig. 36) will be similar in many respects to the home au-
dio-tape recorder except that it will handle much more information in a given length of
time. Two reels, one for feeding the tape and one for winding it, are needed; also, the tape
passes over a capstan and several other pulleys. Heads for recording information magneti-
cally on the tape are provided, both [57] for recording and for playing back the informa-
tion into recording heads, and for taking the information in playback.
An RCA video recording system was exhibited recently. It consists in using either a
single track for the video signal, the black-and-white system, or a color system having three
tracks on the tape. Tape speed is 30 ft/sec.
Bing Crosby Enterprises have a system using a somewhat slower tape speed. In their
device, the black-and-white television is recorded with a number of tracks on the tape.
[58] Both systems are designed for standard studio bandwidths and will have to be
increased by a factor of two or three in order to be compatible with the bandwidth pro-
posed for the Feed Back system. Personnel of both RCA and Bing Crosby Enterprises have
expressed the opinion that within the development period allotted for Feed Back, such a
recording system can be developed.
A suitable tape is one having a cellulose acetate plastic base of 0.0017-in. thickness,
similar to the one developed by Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company. Lubri-
cating methods developed by them are believed to be adequate. The magnedc surface of
the tape is an iron oxide coating of 0.0005-in. thickness, which is impregnated on the
plastic base. It is believed that the tape cannot be run continuously over the capstans for a
year's period. Even if the tape itself can be made to withstand this length of service, it is
probable that the magnetic heads will be worn down because tape has characteristics not
too different from those of crocus cloth. Any system assumed for the present report allows
for intermittent operation and includes motors for starting and stopping the reels every
time a recording or a playback is made. In fact, it is probable that the system will be started
in one direction for recording and played back in the opposite direction. Discussion of the
programming of the record playback magnetic-tape storage may be found under "Com-
munication Link," page 85.
Next, in its progress through the television equipment, the signal encounters a modu-
lator and transmitter unit. These components must have at least the 8-Mc bandwidth pos-
tulated for the other units in a television chain. Engineering of the equipment will be
fairly straightforward.
The transmitter in the vehicle will be a frequency-modulated oscillator operating in
the X-band and having a power output of about 10 watts. Center frequency of the transmis-
sion will be controlled by reference to a very stable high-Q resonant cavity. However, there
is some difficulty in obtaining an output transmitting tube capable of transmitting at the
megacycle frequency required and also having a year's life capability at reasonable power
requirements.
In earlier work it was assumed that 10,000 Mc would be used for the transmission
signal. However, RCA believes that 7500 Mc is a more appropriate figure, and this fre-
quency will give a greater capability in transmission through heavy rainstorms. A frequency
that is too low will require more power input in the transmitter; therefore, the 7500-Mc
frequency is a compromise. RCA has recommended that the output stage be a frequency-
modulated magnetron with a 20-watt output for reasonably low power consumption.
EXPLORINGTHEUNKNOWN 273
However,atpresent,magnetronshavenotbeendevelopedtohaveayear'slife,thelong-
est,perhaps,beingamonth.It isprobable(butnotcertain)thatthelifelengthof the[59]magnetroncanbeimproved.Also,it ispossiblethattraveling-wavetubeswillbedevel-
opedtoastateofrefinementthatwillallowthemtobeconsideredforuseastheFeedBack
transmittingtubes.
For the example selected here, which discussed informally with RCA, two klystrons
developing a total of 5 watts have been used. (A larger antenna compensates for the reduc-
tion in output from the 20 watts stated above.) These tubes now have a reliability compat-
ible with Feed Back requirements (over 10,000-hr lifetime in one reported instance). Pre-
viously, use of the klystron was not felt possible because power requirements of this tube
are quite high. However, in putting together the various parts of the over-all Feed Back
system, it became apparent that the 400-watt input required by the klystrons (compared
with a tenth as much power required by the magnetron) was not dominant in the total
payload power requirement.
Payload power requirements are already in the realm of several kilowatts, so that
once a reactor is selected for the auxiliary powerplant, a 1/2 kw more power can be ob-
tained for about 25 lb additional radiator weight.
A transmitting antenna with a diameter of about 3 1/2 ft is needed for the 5-watt
klystron systems. A 20 watt magnetron, on the other hand, requires only a 1-ft-diameter
antenna. By placing the antennas in the locations shown on the vehicle drawing (see Fig.
1), it should be possible to enclose, within the vehicle, antennas several feet in diameter,
despite their attendant complexity and weight for this particular component.
RCA has proposed an antenna system consisting of two separate paraboloid dishes:
one dish receives the 3000-Mc signal and thus is able to track the ground station by means
of a conical scan, and the other, the transmitting dish, is slaved to follow the receiving dish
by means of a servomechanism.
Rotating parts, such as the antennas, and also the mirror wheel for the optical sys-
tem, are assumed to be counterbalanced by devices of comparable moment of inertia ro-
tating in the opposite direction.
The antenna system is to be mounted just below the throat of the secondstage rocket
motor, so that upon separation of stages it will be exposed to the atmosphere and will be
allowed ample freedom to scan not only direcdy below the vehicle, but to the horizon as
well.
Approximately three video stages of amplification will be necessary between the cam-
era equipment and the output tube. It is estimated that about 300 watts will be required to
operate the transmitter circuits, exclusive of the tube requirements. The temperature of
the compartment which houses the electronic [60] equipment must be regulated to within
about 10 ° C of a desired value, and this eliminates the need for an automatic-frequency
control circuit.
A tracking command receiver will also be included in the television system. It will be
a simple superheterodyne type with a bandwidth sufficient to accommodate the doppler
shifts due to vehicle velocity plus an information bandwidth a few kilocycles wide, which is
sufficient to permit transfer of all needed command information for the most extensive
case in a period of less that 1 rain.
The purpose of this receiver is to receive command information from the ground,
particularly to set up the scanning, recording, playback, and transmitting operation for
successive passes of the vehicle. Commands will be transmitted in the form of Baudot types
of symbols and will be recorded on the rotating drum of the programmer, in accordance
with the present sequence arrangement, which is capable of erasing and changing all of
the drum information in a period of 1 min or less. At the conclusion of each command
cycle, the program drum will be played back to the ground through the data transmitter
and will be checked for accuracy against the transmitted commands.
Also included in the operation is the programmer just mentioned. The programmer
will probably operate in a manner very similar to that of a timer on an automatic washing
machine; i.e., it will consist in a linear sequence of operations. Because successive
274 ORIGINSOFU.S.SPACEPOLICY
programsdifferonlyinvariationsofthelengthoftime(including0) thatoperationscan
takeplace,therequiredprogrammerisinherentlysimple,Morecommentsontheground-
to-vehiclelinkandprogrammingwillbefoundunder"CommunicationLi k,"page85.
ResultsofRCA'sinvestigationsuptothepresenttimearegivenintheirvariousprogress
reports....
Document 11-7
Document title: Wernher yon Braun, "A Minimum Satellite Vehicle: Based on components
available from missile developments of the Army Ordnance Corps," September 15, 1954.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA Headquar-
ters, Washington, D.C.
On June 23, 1954, Frederick C. Durant III, former president of the American Rocket
Society and then current president of the International Astronautical Federation, called
Wernher yon Braun at the Redstone Arsenal and invited him to a meeting two days later in
Washington, D.C., at the Office of Naval Research. At this meeting, plans were discussed
for developing a satellite program using already existing rocket components. Further meet-
ings followed at which the Army gave tentative approval, provided that the cost was not too
great and the plan did not interfere with missile development. Von Braun's secret report,
submitted to the Army in September, summarized what he had said at the earlier meet-
ings. This proposal became the Army's candidate for an IGY satellite project, which was
later abandoned in favor of Project Vanguard.
[ l ] 1. Summary.
a. The realization of a relatively inexpensive Minimum Satellite Vehicle with a pay-
load of 5 lb. is possible with components available from weapons development of the Army
Ordnance Corps. Such components have reached an advanced development stage and are
expected to attain a sufficient degree of reliability by 1956, to warrant their use in a satel-
lite vehicle.
b. In view of the launching and tracking problems of a satellite vehicle it is suggested
to establish a joint Army-Navy-Air Force Minimum Satellite Vehicle Project. Office of Naval
Research, endeavoring to establish a Minimum Satellite Vehicle Project, has expressed
definite interest in the proposal laid down in this memorandum.
c. While the feasibility of a Minimum Satellite Vehicle based on existing Ordnance
Corps hardware may be considered as firmly established, further theoretical investigations,
particularly on the tracking and "lifetime" aspects, are necessary. It is suggested to autho-
rize such studies to the tune of approximately $100,000 for the present fiscal year. Office
of Naval Research representatives have indicated their willingness to financially support
such studies.
2. Introduction
a. A satellite vehicle circling the earth would be of enormous value to science, espe-
cially upper atmosphere, meteorological and radiological research. Up to now any satel-
lite project has been considered an extremely expensive undertaking, and a matter of
more than 10 years even if an all-out effort were made. This memorandum proposes to
show that, by limiting the payload of a first Minimum Satellite Vehicle to approximately
5 Ib, such a project is feasible with presently available missile hardware, and that despite its
payload limitations, such a Minimum Satellite Vehicle Project would be a worthwhile ini-
tial step.
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b. The Office of Naval Research, Washington, D.C., has expressed its desire to sup-
port a Minimum Satellite Vehicle Project. On 25 June 1954 a meeting was held at ONR
during which the desirability of action toward a Minimum Satellite Vehicle was discussed.
Various proposals on how such a project could materialize in the near future were dis-
cussed. At the end of the meeting all participants agreed that the most promising ap-
proach to a Minimum Satellite Vehicle was a 4-stage missile, using a REDSTONE missile as
first stage, and a cluster of LOKI rockets for the three upper stages.
c. The justification of the artificial satellite was summarized as follows:
(1) Upper air research. Due to the stay time of a Satellite Vehicle in outer space
(several days or even months) a tremendous wealth of information, particularly about
primary solar radiation effects on weather and radio communications [2] can be obtained
with one firing. Considering the large number of balloon and rocket ascents presently
conducted to gather such information, an instrumented satellite vehicle would be a very
worthwhile investment.
(2) A rocket capable of carrying the weight of such data collection equipment into
an orbit is still many years off. If payload requirements are drastically reduced, orbital
speed can be reached with a proper combination of existing equipment. Such an experi-
ment could serve to solve the problems of tracking and orbital stability and would be a
logical first step.
(3) The establishment of a man-made satellite, no matter how humble, would be a
scientific achievement of tremendous impact. Since it is a project that could be realized
within a few years with rocket and guided missile experience available now, it is only logical
to assume that other countries could do the same. It would be a blow to U. S. prestige if we
did not do it first.
d. On 3 August 1954 Commander Wright and Lt. Commander Hoover of the Office
of Naval Research visited Redstone Arsenal and discussed the possibilities of Army partici-
pation in a joint Army-Navy-Air Force satellite project with Brig. Gen. H. N. Toftoy and Dr.
W. von Braun.
3. Description of the Minimum Satellite Vehicle.
The proposed Minimum Satellite Vehicle is a 4-stage rocket consisting of the
REDSTONE Missile as 1st stage (or booster), and a three stage missile of clusters of the
solid propellant rocket LOKI IIA with the following staging:
2nd Stage:
3rd Stage:
4th Stage:
Cluster of 24 LOKI IIA rockets
Cluster of 6 LOKI IIA rockets
(attaining satellite speed): 1 LOKI IIA
rocket with 5 lb payload.
a. Description of REDSTONE Missile, used as 1st stage (or booster).
(1) REDSTONE Missiles #27 and #29 for re-entry studies.
The present REDSTONE R&D program provides that missiles #27 and #29 will be
used, among other test purposes, for the study of the re-entry problem of a ballistic 400 to
600 N. Mi.-missile. These two missiles are normal REDSTONE missiles with a few minor
modifications. The [3] usual 6900-1b payload (simulated by a concrete filling in the nose
section during R & D launchings) is utilized for additional propellants. Thus the burning
time is increased from 110 sec to 132.4 sec. The additional propellants are accommodated
in an extra-long tank section. For this purpose the length of the cylindrical midsection of
the missile is extended by 62 in. (This constitutes a minor change since it does not involve
any changes in tooling.) The standard steel warhead hull is replaced by a lightweight alu-
minum hull for the guidance equipment. A special "re-entry nose" of about 24 in. base
diameter and 500 lb. weight, carried in the missile's top, is separated from the missile after
cut-off. Both missile and "re-entry nose" attain an altitude of approximately 265 statute
miles. Fall into the atmosphere from this altitude duplicates the conditions during
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re-entryofaballisticmissileofarangefrom400 to 600 N. Mi. The "nose cones" of missiles
#27 and # 29 will carry telemeter equipment.
(2) REDSTONE as 1st Stage of Minimum Satellite Vehicle.
In the proposed Minimum Satellite Vehicle the 500-lb. "re-entry nose" is replaced by a
three stage LOKI cluster of similar total weight. Thus, after successful firing of missile #27
and #29 a proven design of a booster is available that can be direcdy applied for the Mini-
mum Satellite Vehicle.
b. Description of LOKI Cluster.
LOKI is an unguided, anti-aircraft, solid rocket developed under the auspices of
Redstone Arsenal for the Ordnance Corps. LOKI I is presendy in production in quantity
(59,000 rounds on order). LOKI IIA, an advanced version, is scheduled to soon replace
LOKI I production.
The LOKI clusters for the upper stages of the proposed Minimum Satellite Vehicle
are obtained by bundling LOKI IIA rockets. With a payload of 5 lb, a particularly favorable
staging combination consists of
24 LOKI's as first stage of the cluster (Satellite Vehicle's second stage)
6 LOKI's in the second stage of the cluster (Satellite Vehicle's third stage)
1 LOKI's in the third stage of the cluster (Satellite Vehicle's fourth and final stage).
This combination has been arrived at by comparison of more than 50 different pay-
load and bundling combinations.
[4] Two arrangements of the total LOKI cluster (Satellite Vehicle's 2nd, 3rd and 4th
stage) are shown .... It can be seen that both designs provide for a telescoped arrangement
of the LOKI's. The total LOK/cluster is carried in a zero launcher. The zero launcher can
be rotated about a king-pin mounted on ball bearings.
c. Description of Operation.
(1) The proposed Minimum Satellite Vehicle can be launched with standard
REDSTONE launching equipment according to established REDSTONE procedure. The
modified nose station contains standard REDSTONE guidance and control equipment, In
order to obtain the necessary high accuracy in aiming of the LOKI cluster, the standard
air-bearing type stabilized platform of the REDSTONE will be used as guidance head. The
LOKI cluster and its zero launcher is brought to rotation at 1800 rpm prior to launching of
the entire vehicle by means of an electromotor driven from ground power supply. The
rotational speed is maintained during the REDSTONE boost phase from on-missile power
supply. (The possible disturbing influence of gyroscopic effects on the REDSTONE mis-
sile control during the tiding program have been studied and were found negligible.)
(2) After REDSTONE cut-off (at about 55 miles altitude) the nose station is sepa-
rated from the booster. The nose section's orientation in space is now controlled by the
standard REDSTONE spatial attitude control system, which consists of 8 small compressed-
air jet nozzles. The tilting program in the guidance head, which determines the reference
axes for the desired attitude, continues to run after nose section separation. Due to the
absence of corodynamic forces at the altitudes involved, the dlt program, with the aid of
the compressed air nozzles, now rotate the nose section into such an attitude, that, by
arrival at the apex of its trajectory, it will be parallel to the surface of the earth. The gyro-
scopic effect of the rotating LOKI cluster will thereby be utilized in such manner that the
correcting moments created by the air jets will cause the nose section to "process" into the
desired attitude. The summit of the nose section's trajectory is reached at an altitude of
approximately 186 statute miles.
(3) The first LOKI stage is ignited at the summit point, which is determined accu-
rately by the REDSTONE guidance system in order to avoid a vertical component of the
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trajectory.EachLOKIstagehasaburningtimeof1.9sec.Thelaunchingofthetwosucces-
sivestagesi initiatedwithtimeswitchessetatintervalsofabout2.5sec.[5]Thevelocitiesreachedbythestagesare:
+ REDSTONEnosesectionatsummit 4298ft/sec
+ rotationofearthatequator 1519 ft/sec
5817 ft/sec
+ 2nd stage (24 LOKIs) 6283 ft/sec
+ 3rd stage (6 LOKIs) 7152 fl/sec
+ 4th stage (1 LOKI plus 5 lb pay-
load "Satellite") 6972 ft/sec
+ Total satellite velocity 26224 fl/sec
(4) The satellite thus reaches a velocity exceeding the circular velocity of 25368 ft/sec
at 186 miles altitude by 856 ft/sec. The satellite therefore enters an elliptical orbit around
the earth with the following characteristics:
For 0 ° deviation from
horizontal flight path
of 4th stage
186 mi (300 kin) 819 mi (1318 km)
For 1.6 ° deviation from
horizontal flight path
of 4th stage 155 mi (250 km) 850 mi (1368 kin)
(5) Suppose, now, that the 5-1b payload of the 4th (satellite)-stage has the shape of a
sphere of 20 in. diameter. The lifetime of such a spherical satellite has been determined
on the basis of data of the upper atmosphere as adopted by the Upper Atmosphere Re-
search Panel. For the two orbits listed in the foregoing paragraph the lifetimes were found
to be 360 days (for perigee at 186 mi altitude) and 90 days (for the perigee at 155 mi
altitude). Within these lifetimes the elliptical orbits gradually change to circular orbits at
(approximately) perigeal altitude due to aero-dynamic drag, The circular orbit then rap-
idly converts into a spiral path toward the earth, and the satellite is finally destroyed by
aerodynamic heating like a meteor.
(6) The Minimum Satellite Vehicle can be tracked by optical means. For details see
chapters 4,e. and 4.f.
4. Discussion of Main Problems.
a. REDSTONE Missile.
The REDSTONE missile is being developed as a ground support weapon for a pay-
load of 6900 lbs. As of this date, 4 missiles have been launched, [6] 3 of which were success-
ful .... The R&D program provides that missiles #27 and #29 will be equipped with en-
larged tanks and used for re-entry studies. Launching of those two missiles is scheduled for
Spring of 1956. This particular version of the REDSTONE is suited for the booster for the
proposed Minimum Satellite Vehicle without changes. It is obvious that a high degree of
reliability is a prerequisite for the REDSTONE's application for a satellite project. Thus
the R&D program of the REDSTONE as a weapon will in no way be affected by the pro-
posal presented herein. Its successful completion is rather a prerequisite for the Minimum
Satellite Vehicle.
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b.ClusterLOKIs.
LOKI is an and-aircraft solid propellant rocket developed for the Ordnance Corps.
LOKI I is presently in production (Production cost less than $100.00 per missile) .... The
highest performance is obtained by the improved LOKI IIA type, which is scheduled for
production soon. Performance data of LOKI IIA are summarized in the following table:
Weight of rocket hardware 5 lb
Weight of propellant 17.3 lb
Total weight 22.3 lb
Specific impulse 219 sec
Combustion chamber head pressure 1320 psi
Thrust 2000 lb
Burning time 1.9 sec
The Air Research and Development Command has initiated a program for the devel-
opment of a "Hypersonic Test Vehicle" (HTV). This vehicle is a two-stage solid rocket,
using a cluster of 7 LOKIs in the first, and a cluster of 4 LOKIs in the second stage .... The
first four rounds have been contracted with Aerophysics Development Corporation, Pa-
cific Palisades, California, and will be fired in late 1954, starting about eight weeks from
this writing. Firings will be at White Sands Proving Ground.
In view of Redstone Arsenal's great concern with the problem of re-entry of ballistic
missiles of extended ranges, supporting research funds for FY 1955 and FY 1956 have been
requested for the purpose of expanding this Air Force-sponsored program. Such a joint
Army-Air Force program is expected to furnish, at minimum expense, vitally needed data
on heat transfer, and behavior of structures and material, at Mach numbers from 8 to 13.
[7] The Hypersonic Test Vehicle may be considered a natural forerunner of the three-
stage LOKI cluster for the proposed Minimum Satellite Vehicle. But here again, the Satel-
lite Vehicle Project could never delay the development of the Hypersonic Test Vehicle,
since success with the HTV is a prerequisite for the former.
c. Accuracy of launching LOKI cluster from REDSTONE nose.
An important problem is the accuracy of aiming the REDSTONE nose section with
its LOKI cluster into the horizontal direction at the summit of the first stage trajectory.
This becomes evident by comparing the lifetime of the two orbits described in chapter
3.c. (5). The standard spatial attitude control of the REDSTONE missile nose necessitates
at least two blasts of the control jets for the correction of an angular deviation of any of the
three missile axes: one blast to turn the missile to the zero position and another one to
stop it in this position. In reality the zero position can be approached only after repeated
application of control jets, because of oscillations around the zero position (poor damp-
ing). This spatial attitude control method, therefore, keeps the missile axis continuously
and slowly oscillating around the desired zero position. While this is entirely adequate for
the standard REDSTONE trajectory, it constitutes a severe handicap for the launching of
the LOKI's at the apex of the first-stage trajectory.
The proposed pre-rotation of the zero launcher with its LOKI cluster at 1800 rpm
has the effect that launcher and LOKI cluster are gyro-stabilized as long as no external
forces are applied. But their joint longitudinal axis can be precessed into any desired di-
rection by applying a force perpendicular to the desired angular direction of movement.
The turning of the axis stops, if the applied force stops. It is evident that this method
avoids those undesirable oscillations around the desired firing direction of the LOKIs and
results in a higher accuracy of the aiming of the cluster. The pre-rotation of the LOKI
cluster launcher has the additional and important advantage, that it minimizes the error
introduced by inaccuracies in the alignment of the LOKI bundles, of their thrust axis,
ignition delays, differences in burning times, and possible torques caused in the rockets
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leaving the zero launcher. A preliminary analysis indicates that by using the pre-rotation
method the total error angle built up during the burning time of the three-stage LOKI
cluster may be kept well under 1 degree, which, according to the figures listed in chapter
3.c.(5) is adequate for an extended orbital lifetime of the uppermost stage. The exact
magnitude of such error angles will be known after a number of Hypersonic Test Vehicles
have been launched.
d. A stepping stone: Very high altitude firing of the Minimum Satellite Vehicle.
As an intermediate step toward a Minimum Satellite Vehicle it is suggested to launch
a missile, consisting ofa REDSTONE as a booster, and a LOKI cluster as upper stages, from
the REDSTONE launching site at [8] Patrick Air Force Base, in a nearly vertical trajectory
(approximately 2 degrees). This missile would consist of a REDSTONE (with enlarged
tanks) and a cluster of 24-6-1 LOKIs, and would reach an altitude of 6400 miles (almost
two earth radii!). The purpose of this firingwould be to test the combination of REDSTONE
booster and spinning LOKI cluster during the KEDSTONE flight phase, the technique of
pre-rotation of the LOKI launcher, and the launching of the LOKI bundle. Such a near-
vertical firing would permit accurate tracking from take-off all the way to, and including,
the uppermost stage of the LOKI cluster, and the deviations of the latter's trajectory from
the flight path tangent at REDSTONE cut-off. Additional data could be telemetered if
desired. The velocities reached by the various stages would be
1st stage (REDSTONE) 7900 ft/sec
2nd stage 14150 ft/sec
3rd stage 21300 ft/sec
4th stage 28300 ft/sec
Such an experiment would involve no dangers from the standpoint of flight safety.
The REDSTONE booster would drop into the ocean at a range of about 110 N. Mi. (the
same range as anticipated for re-entry missiles #27 and #29). The upper stages would never
reach the earth surface again but burn up like meteors upon re-entering the atmosphere.
Since LOKI rockets are made of aluminum, re-entry temperatures are sufficient to melt
and even vaporize the falling rockets.
e. Selection of orbit for the Minimum Satellite Vehicle.
The selection of a suitable orbit for the Minimum Satellite Vehicle is closely linked to
the problem of tracking and the number of tracking stations required. As a result of the
combined effects of orbital motion and earth's rotation, any orbit inclined to the equato-
rial plane leads over a vast portion of the earth's surface and the Minimum Satellite Ve-
hicle may thus be visible from many regions on earth. From the "propaganda" angle, this
may be desirable, but it may also entail less desirable political problems. From the scien-
tific aspect the main disadvantage of an inclined orbit lies in the fact that it is impossible to
set up a sufficient number of tracking stadons to "keep an eye" on the Minimum Satellite
Vehicle. It must be kept in mind that the Minimum Satellite Vehicle is of limited lifetime
because it is still affected by drag in the uppermost layers of the atmosphere. This means
that the coordinates of the elliptical path change slightly with each revolution. Such slight
changes, on the other hand, offer an ideal opportunity to determine the atmospheric
density at altitudes from 150 to 800 miles.
Effective tracking requires that the Satellite passes repeatedly over the same station
or stations. Therefore, an orbit in the equatorial [9] plane is most advantageous. In order
to reduce the logistic problem of the firing preparations and launching, the Minimum
Satellite Vehicle could be launched from the Navy's experimental guided missile ship USS
"Norton Sound." In addition to the reasons mentioned before, the equatorial plane offers
the great advantage that a velocity gain of 1519 ft/sec is obtained due to the rotation of the
earth, if the satellite vehicle is launched in an eastern direction.
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f. Visibility of Minimum Satellite Vehicle in the orbit.
Another prerequisite for successful tracking is sufficient light for optical tracking
instruments. The simplest method to provide sufficient illumination and contrast would
be to observe the Satellite shortly before dawn or shortly after sunset. The Satellite, illumi-
nated by sunlight, would then be visible as a fast-moving star against a relatively dark sky. A
study of this possibility indicates that, in order to obtain a brightness equivalent to that of
a star of first magnitude (e.g. "Capella"), the object would have to be at least 20 feet in
diameter. In principle, it appears quite feasible to provide a reflecting surface of this size
even within the payload limitation of 5 lb. A particularly simple solution would be a bal-
loon, carried aloft collapsed in the fourth stage's nose, and inflated with Helium after the
orbit has been attained. However, it is likely that such a balloon would soon be punctured
by cosmic dust particles and become ineffective as a light reflector. Therefore, some kite-
like structure may be better suited.
Unfortunately, the conditions for visibility by a tracking station are severely restricted
by the (unpredictable) deviations from the desired orbit caused by lack of accurate cut-off
velocity control and possible cut-off tangent dispersions of the uppermost stage, as well as
uncertainty of upper atmosphere density. Tracking at dusk and dawn will, therefore, be a
rather haphazardous endeavor and should be supplemented by an active light source in
the uppermost stage. Such possibilities have been discussed with Mr. E.E Martz,Jr., Chief
Optical Systems Section, Flight Determination Laboratory, White Sands Proving Ground.
Mr. Martz has suggested to equip the Minimum Satellite Vehicle's uppermost stage with a
gaseous discharge tube actuated by solar storage cells utilizing the solar radiation during
the sunlit portion of flight and re-emitting as a flashing light during the night. He believes
that use of solar storage batteries such as developed by Bell Telephone and by Wright Field
are promising. It appears probable that such a light source, adequate for instrument track-
ing for a period exceeding one month, can be built within the payload limitation of 5 lb.
Further studies will be required to determine whether the light flashes can be made bright
enough for visibility with the naked eye.
Further methods discussed to improve optical visibility of the satellite vehicle include
painting of the uppermost stage with fluorescent paint (brightness could be doubled be-
cause ultraviolet light is [10] converted into visible light) and luminescent paint (will ab-
sorb sunlight during the day and omit light during the night). There is also a faint possibil-
ity for the successful use of chemical smoke trails, such as used in tracking of solid rockets.
(It has to be further investigated whether this method is suited to a Satellite.) Chemical
flares or shaped charges may also be feasible. Another possibility would utilize solar or
artificially induced fluorescence of sodium, mercury or other metallic vapors. (The fluo-
rescence of such vapors is greatly increased by the high ultra-violet radiation from the sun
in the vacuum of outer space.) Finally, use of fluorescence of solid mediums has been
discussed. (The solid mediums would be activated by small electric current and addition-
ally by solar radiation and radioactive substances.)
For ground tracking stations, normal meteor tracking cameras appear to be best
suited. Such equipment is available at White Sands Proving Ground.
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Documen111-8
Document floe: "On the Utility of an Artificial Unmanned Earth Satellite: A Proposal to
the National Science Foundation, Prepared by the ARS Space Flight Committee, Novem-
ber 24, 1954,"Jet/_pu/a-/on, 25 (February 1955): 71-78. [Copyright American Rocket Soci-
ety (now American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics), 1955. Used with permis-
sion.]
In 1934, the American Interplanetary Society, one of the earliest U.S. advocates of
spaceflight, had changed its name to the American Rocket Society (ARS) to improve its
technical legitimacy. In 1953, the ARS invited Alan T. Waterman, director of the National
Science Foundation (NSF), to attend a meeting of the society's Space Flight Committee.
Soon after, the committee issued a confidential report calling for the NSF to study "the
utility of an unmanned satellite vehicle to science, commerce and industry, and national
defense." This report was followed in 1954 by a formal proposal, "On the Utility of an
Artificial Unmanned Earth Satellite." It was partly because of advocacy groups such as the
ARS that satellites were put on the government's scientific agenda.
[71 ] Introduction
This is a proposal to the National Science Foundation that the Foundation sponsor a
study of the utility of an unmanned, earth-satellite vehicle. The proposal is made by the
American Rocket Society in the normal exercise of its funcfionsJ The role of the Society in
this matter is made clear by the following policy statement adopted by the Board of Direc-
tors: "The American Rocket Society should act as a 'catalyst' and should promote interest
and sound public and professional thinking on the subject of space flight. It should not
attempt to evaluate the merits of individual proposals or undertake work on the subject of
its own accord. It should, however, encourage such activity on the part of other organiza-
tions."
It is apparent, then, that the Society cannot undertake to make the study. It can,
however, serve the National Science Foundation in a number of ways, and believes it is
doing so in bringing this subject to the Foundation's attention. Should the Foundation
elect to sponsor the study the Society could assist by encouraging scientists and engineers
both inside and outside the Society to participate. The Society would be willing to perform
any other service within its functions and abilities to assist the National Science Founda-
tion in implementing this proposal.
1. The American Rocket Society is a professional engineering and scientific organization devoted to the
encouragement of research and development of jet and rocket propulsion devices and their application to
problems of transportation and communication, It is actively concerned with various technical aspects of space
flight, and at the present time is also interested in military applications of the reaction principle.
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Background
The proposal was prepared by a Space Flight Committee appointed by the President
of the Society. The Committee decided that the study of the utility of an unmanned, earth
satellite would be one of the most important steps that could be taken immediately to
advance the cause of space flight, and that this step would also increase the country's
scientific knowledge and, indirectly, promote its defense.
Why an unmanned, earth satellite? Although many satellite proposals have been put
forward, the small, unmanned satellite is the only one for which feasibility can now be
shown. This opinion is held by many responsible engineers and scientists involved in rocket
and guided-missile work and in upper-atmosphere research. At any rate, most of these
people agree that the unmanned earth satellite would be the first step toward more ambi-
tious undertakings. It is felt generally that, although the satellite vehicle has yet to be built,
the components, i.e., power plants, airframes, stabilization systems, etc., are either avail-
able or under development in conjunction with the nadon's guided-missile effort. Fur-
thermore, the country now has nine years of experience in the techniques of instrument-
ing high-altitude sounding rockets, which techniques would have application to the earth
satellite.
Why study utility? Although many claims have been made for the utility of a satellite
vehicle and many uses have been proposed, the subject has not been thoroughly investi-
gated by a responsible organization and, at present, does not rest upon a firm foundation.
On the other hand, enough is known about possible useful purposes so that most cases are
readily amenable to study, and, if such a study were made, reasonably positive conclusions
could be drawn. Because of recent advances in guided missiles, the cost of producing a
small, unmanned satellite is probably not the mammoth sum that was at one time consid-
ered necessary. Nevertheless, the creation of even a small satellite is still a major undertak-
ing and will require a sizable amount of money. It is important that there be justification
for the expenditure of this money. The Society feels that to create a satellite merely for the
purpose of saying it has been done would not justify the cost. Rather, the satellite should
serve useful purposes--purposes which can command the respect of the officials who spon-
sor it, the scientists and engineers who produce it, and the community who pays for it. The
Society feels, therefore, that the study of utility is one of the most important tasks to be
accomplished prior to creation of a satellite.
It was apparent to the Committee in its early deliberations that the subject of utility
could not be entirely divorced from feasibility, and that some concept of feasibility would
have to be assumed. This was done not to be restrictive, but to provide a frame of reference
from which those considering udlity could proceed. It was assumed that it would be fea-
sible to establish a small payload in an orbit, the difficulty increasing with the size of the
payload, and that means could be provided for communicating information from the sat-
ellite to the surface of the earth. With this concept in mind, various fields of udlity were
suggested as follows:
Astronomy and Astrophysics. A satellite could overcome some of the limitations on
observations made through the earth's atmosphere.
Biology. Of early importance would be the effects of outer space radiations on living
cells.
Communication. A satellite might provide a broad-band transoceanic communica-
tion link. A future possibility is that of obtaining continental coverage when the satellite is
used as a relay stadon for radio or television broadcasts.
Geodesy (including Navigation and Mapping). The size and shape of the earth, the
intensity of its gravitational field, and other geodetic constants might be determined more
accurately. Practical benefits to navigation at sea and mapping over large distances would
ensue.
Geophysics (including Meteorology). The study of incoming radiation and its effect
upon the earth's atmosphere might lead eventually to better methods of long-range weather
prediction.
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Experiments Arising from Unusual Environment. The characteristics of the environ-
ment (weightlessness, high vacuum, temperature extremes, etc.) will suggest experiments
that could not be performed elsewhere.
This list is by no means complete--it is probable that the study would reveal other
fields of equal or greater utility.
In order to provide a preliminary sampling of opinion, the committee asked a num-
ber of scientists (chosen at random from those known to Committee members) to give
brief summaries of their opinions on the utility of an unmanned, satellite vehicle. These
papers are presented as appendixes to this proposal and include the following: (A) "Astro-
nomical [72] Observation from a Satellite," by Ira S. Bowen; (B) "Biological Experimenta-
tion with an Unmanned Temporary Satellite," by HermannJ. Schaefer; (C) 'q'he Satellite
Vehicle and Physics of the Earth's Upper Atmosphere," by Homer E. Newell,Jr.; (D) "Com-
ments Concerning Meteorological Interests in an Orbiting, Unmanned Space Vehicle," by
Eugene Bollay; (E) "I'he Geodedc Significance of an Artificial Satellite," by John O'Keefe;
(F) "Orbital Radio Relays," by John R. Pierce.
Recommendation
In view of the facts cited, it is proposed that the National Science Foundation spon-
sor a study of the utility of an artificial, unmanned earth satellite.
ANDREW G. HALEY, President
MILTON W. ROSEN, Chairman,
Space Flight Committee
COMMITFEE MEMBERSHIP: HarryJ. Archer; William J. Barr; B. L. Dorman; An-
drew G. Haley; Kenneth H. Jacobs; Chester M. McCloskey; Keith K. McDaniel; William E
Munger; James R. Patton, Jr.; Richard W. Porter; Darrell C. Romick; Milton W. Rosen;
Michael J. Samek; Howard S. Seifert; Willis Sprattling, Jr.; Kurt R. Stehling; and Ivan E.
Tuhy.
Appendix A
Astronomical Observations from a Satellite
IRA S. BOWEN
Mount Wilson and Palomar Observatories
The following comments are an expansion of a conversation held by H. S. Seifert
with Dr. Ira S. Bowen, Director of the Mount Wilson and Palomar Observatories. The ideas
herein originated with Dr. Bowen and have been reviewed by him for accuracy.
Astronomical observations through the Earth's atmosphere are at present limited by
three factors: (a) The resolution of detail is degraded at least tenfold by atmospheric tur-
bulence (poor seeing). (b) Exposure time, and hence limiting star magnitude, is curtailed
by fogging due to light scattered in the atmosphere. (c) Certain radiations, i.e., regions of
the spectrum, are completely absorbed in the atmosphere. Thus, if optical equipment
equivalent to that now available at the surface could be placed outside the atmosphere,
much additional information in the form of planetary detail, new, remote, or faint objects,
and short wave-length spectra would be obtained. This information would be of great
interest and value to astronomers and to the sciences generally. The ideal situation would
be to place the 200-in. telescope and its accessories on a firm platform such as the moon.
Since optical equipment projected into an orbit on a man-made satellite will be riding
on a small and relatively unsteady base, certain practical limits and difficulties will be found,
as follows:
Angular Resolution. The best optical resolution which the atmosphere will permit,
on days of optimum seeing, which occur only a few times yearly, is of the order of 1/4 to
_/_ sec of arc. The 200-in. telescope would permit a theoretical resolving power of 0.025 sec
of arc, and a 20-in. to 40-in. telescope would permit a resolving power of 0.25 to 0.125 sec
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ofarc,if free from atmospheric effects and geometric distortions. Thus in order to make
use of the transparency of space and secure more detail than can be seen from the ground,
an automatic satellite orienting and guiding system would be needed which was stable to
an accuracy lying between 0.10 and 0.01 sec of arc.
Limiting Magnitude. Because of night sky light scattered by the atmosphere, objects
fainter than a certain limidng magnitude cannot be distinguished from the general back-
ground fog. In the case of the 200-in. telescope, exposures longer than half an hour are,
for this reason, not useful. In order to record objects of the same faintness, as can be done
with the 200-in., a telescope of reasonable size for transport on a satellite, say 30 in., would
require an exposure time of 10 to 24 hours. Since the orbital period is of the order of
1 1/4 hours, of which less than half is spent in the Earth's shadow, a mechanism would be
required for shielding the telescope and camera during the sunlit periods while maintain-
ing precise orientation.
Short Wave-Length Spectra. By the use of sounding rockets equipped with sun-
following servos, it has been possible to photograph solar spectra down to 1200 A with low
resolution. The long exposures required for high-resolution solar and stellar spectra in
this wave-length region cannot be obtained during the few minutes or even seconds of
high-altitude flight time typical of sounding rockets. Adequately high resolution could be
obtained from a spectrograph using light collected with a 12-in. mirror for detailed spec-
tra of the brighter stars, with exposures of several hours. Since the physical dimensions of
the equipment are not large and the orientation tolerances are less strict than for tele-
scopic images, a spectrograph would probably be simpler than a telescope to get into proper
working order.
Telemetering of Data. If one assumes that a photographic plate cannot be recovered
from a satellite, certain problems arise. Any data collected must be capable of being trans-
lated into a radio or optical signal and relayed to the ground. The photographic plate has
the fundamental advantage that photons are registered simultaneously in all resolvable
parts of the spectrum or image. Thus shortening required exposure time. While electronic
photon counters exist which equal or excel the sensitivity of the photographic plate, they
can collect energy from only one part of the spectrum or image at a time, thus increasing
the required exposure time.
A possible technique might be worked out in which plates are exposed and devel-
oped automatically (after the manner of the Polaroid-Land Camera), after which the fixed
image could be scanned and transmitted sequentially when convenient by a photo-
electronic system. Thus the stored data might be held and relayed by a transponder acti-
vated from the earth's surface only when the satellite was within radio range of a particular
ground station, thus eliminating the need for a dozen or more ground telemetering sta-
tions spaced around the equator.
Appendix B
Biological Experimentation with an Unmanned Temporary Satellite
HERMANN J. SCHAEFER
U.S. Naval School of Aviation Medicine
If humans are to fly in the regions at the upper end of and outside the atmosphere,
an "artificial environment" has to be provided which maintains full or near sea-level values
of the various physical conditions. Whereas this task can be handled, though with consid-
erable technical expenditure, for most of the factors involved, two novel phenomena
develop in vehicles moving outside the atmosphere which cannot be compensated very
easily. These are the heavy components of the primary cosmic radiation and the state of
weighdessness. The technical means of restoring normalcy with regard to these condi-
tions, though theoretically available, imply prohibitive measures with regard to weight and
power. The only way out is to study the effects of both influences on the human organism
with the aim in mind that a tolerance can be established which does not impose too severe
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limitations upon the flight of humans in extra-atmospheric regions.
In the discussion of the usefulness of a small artificial satellite for the conquest of
space, the question has been put [73] whether biological experiments could be performed
in such a vehicle for gaining information as to the two aforementioned problems. The
artificial satellite, in this discussion, is conceived as an unmanned and rather small vehicle
which will stay in the orbit a limited time only, a few weeks at the most. A further limitation
is that preferably all experiments are to be carried out by preset servomechanisms and
telemetered recording. This would by-pass the complex and difficult task of recovery.
It should be pointed out from the very beginning that the last-mentioned condition
imposes serious restrictions on any biological cosmic-ray experimentation to the degree
where it seems questionable whether useful experiments can be designed at all. Exposure
to the heavy components of the primary cosmic radiation belongs to the category of so-
called long-dosage long-term irradiations which are characterized by slowly developing,
initially inconspicuous, but insidious tissue damage. The peculiar feature about this expo-
sure hazard is that a total ionization dosage which nominally remains well within the per-
missible limits of the official international definition is actually administered in an
extremely uneven distribution. As a consequence of it, a small number of cells of the
exposed tissue receive ionization dosages up to 10 s times larger than the average total
ionization dosage. It is already well established experimentally that such "heavy nuclei
hits" produce severe local radiation injury in the cellular structure of living tissue. No
information, however, is available on how many of such hits can be administered to the
mammalian organism before a general reaction, i.e., manifest radiation injury, develops.
A conclusive answer to the latter question requires exposure of test animals over an
extended period of time. Rocket or balloon flights are entirely inadequate for this pur-
pose, the former because of the short duration, and the latter because of the too low
altitude. The study of the radiation effects of the genuinely primary cosmic radiation in
regions entirely outside the atmosphere, with exposure times of many days, is of funda-
mental value for both basic research in radiobiology and the development of high altitude
flight. Experiments carried out in an artificial satellite would contribute greatly toward a
solution of this problem and would be incomparably more effective than any balloon or
rocket flight can ever be.
There are a multitude of radiation effects on living tissue which lend themselves to
experiments of the type under consideration. Local radiation injury from heavy nuclei
hits has been demonstrated recently very conspicuously in skin tissue of mice. This reac-
tion, however, requires that the animals be recovered alive. Other reactions exist which are
of similar sensitivity, but could be tested even if the animal were killed while recovering it
as long as the latter is not heavily disfigured or burned. An essential prerequisite for all
these reactions is a meticulous autoptic and microscopic examination. That means that
recovery of the animals is indispensable. It is suggested, therefore, that the problem of
recovery be included in the project from the onset if investigation of biological cosmic-ray
effects is contemplated at all.
The discussion of the biological effects of the primary cosmic radiation would be
incomplete without mentioning a question which actually concerns the physicist. This
question pertains to the fragmentary knowledge of the frequency and the mass spectrum
of super-heavy nuclei. Heretofore, iron (Fe) was considered the heaviest regularly occur-
ring component of the heavy spectrum. However, heavier nuclei have been recorded on
rare occasions, but no statistics have been established thus far with regard to frequency
and mass spectrum. Recordings over extended periods of time in the regions clear of the
atmosphere would rapidly accumulate data on these giant nuclei. Such measurements, in
contradistinction to actual animal experimentation, could be carried out exclusively by
telemetering. As a matter of fact, J. Van Allen has already developed the tools for this t}jJe
of measurement. His pulse ionization chamber has proved a sensitive and reliable instru-
ment for analyzing the heavy nuclei spectrum and has been repeatedly and successfully
used for heavy nuclei recordings at extreme altitudes with rocket balloon iandems. A modi-
fication of his method for use in an artificial satellite should be comparatively easy.
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Theothernovelenvironmentalconditiontobeencounteredinorbitaltraveloutside
theatmosphereisweightlessness.Present-dayknowledgeastoitsphysiologicaleffectsis
scarce.Thestateofweightlessnessor,asit isalsocalled,thegravity-freestate,canbepro-
ducedartificiallyinafreelyfallingelevatorcar,in thewarheadsofrocketsinunpowered
flightsoutsidetheatmosphere,andin thepoweredflightsofhigh-speedaircraftbysteer-
ingalongafreetrajectory.Therocketmethodismosteffectiveandcanproducethestate
ofweightlessnessforaperiodofafewminutes.It cannotbeusedforhumansatthepresent
stateofdevelopment.Secondineffectivenessi thetrajectoryflightofhigh-speedaircraft.
Itspresentlimitstaysatalongestdurationofabout30sec.Itcanandhasbeenappliedto
humans.Nophysiologicaldisturbancesorincapacitationeffectshavebeensofarreported.
Thesamestatementholdsfor animalexperimentswithmiceandmonkeysin rockets.
Consideringtheshortexposuretimeof bothvehicles,thesefindingscannotbeconsid-
eredasconclusiveevidencethatsuchdisturbanceswillnotdevelopeventually.
In ananimalcapsulecarriedbyanartificialsatellitethisproblemcouldbemore
thoroughlystudiedandthesuccessoftheexperiment would not necessarily depend upon
the recovery of the animals. A few telemetering channels, reserved for relaying breath and
pulse frequencies, would provide interesting information. Telemetering of the locomo-
tion of the animals could also be valuable.
It must be admitted, of course, that the more severe effects of weightlessness of long
duration on humans are likely to develop along the psychophysiological line originating
from disorientation. Animal experimentation, therefore, can be of limited value only,
though some disorientation studies have been successfully performed with mice in a rocket
flight.
Evaluating the entire situation on a comparative basis, it must be said that the cos-
mic-ray problem certainly bears the higher practical importance as well as scientific inter-
est. It should weigh heavily in any debate on the justification of the costs involved in a
satellite project, and this all the more since it is closely related and can be combined with
research problems concerning the pure physics of cosmic radiation on which paramount
importance rests with regard to gaining knowledge of the nuclear forces.
Appendix C
The Satellite Vehicle and Physics of the Earth's Upper Atmosphere
HOMER E. NEWELL, JR.
Naval Research Laboratory
The purpose of the present note is to consider the usefulness of the satellite vehicle
for scientific research and to point to a few important experiments which might be done
with such a vehicle.
The gas particles, ions, and radiations of the earth's atmosphere act, react, and inter-
act to produce phenomena which are still not fully understood, such as the ionosphere,
the aurora, and fluctuations in the earth's magnetic field. In an effort to explain these
things a host of researches have been undertaken throughout the past half century; and
the effort continues to grow.
Fundamental to the research of the atmosphere has been and is the question of
energy. The complex and confusing happenings in the atmosphere are simply a manifesta-
tion of [74] an influx of energy from outer space. A detailed knowledge of the nature and
magnitudes of the energies concerned would go a long way toward solving some of the
important problems. But it is right here that the observer on the ground runs into basic
difficulties. The incoming energy in which he has the greatest interest is that which is
absorbed at high altitude. The experimenter is, therefore, prevented from observing it in
its original form. This leaves many a theorist to speculate on one of the most important
ingredients of his theory.
A space station at sufficiently great altitude, say a thousand kilometers or more, would
enable the physicist to monitor the energy influx into the earth's atmosphere. A primary
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carrierofsuchenergywouldbeelectromagneticradiationfromthesun,measurementsof
whichwouldbeofasmuchinteresttothesolarphysicistastothegeophysicist.Energyis
alsobroughtinbyparticlessuchascosmicrays,meteors,andmicrometeorites.Becauseof
theirextremelyhighparticlenergies,thecosmicrayshaveanimportantplaceincurrent
nuclearresearch.Theyproduceasmallbutimportantionizationi theloweratmosphere,
butprobablyhaveanegligibleffectupontheupperatmosphere.Lowerenergyparticles
fromthesunarebelievedtocausetheaurora,and,in fact,protonshavebeenobserved
movingdownwardinauroraldisplays.It alsoappearsasthoughsuchparticleradiations
mayplayasignificantpartin theformationoftheionosphere,particularlytheF-region.At
themomentthequestioniswideopenandisanimportantone.Finally,forthesakeof
completeness,perhapsoneoughtomentionstellarlight,althoughtotheupper-airphysi-
cistthecorrespondingenergiesareentirelynegligibleincomparisonwiththosefoundin
solarlight.
At thepresenttimerocketsarebeingdevotedtoanintensivestudyof thevarious
radiationslistedin theprecedingparagraph.Therocketspermitheexperimenternot
onlytoobserveandmeasuretheradiations,butalsotodeterminethealtitudesatwhich
thedifferentradiationshavetheireffect.Therocketsare,however,one-shotaffairs,and
furnishonlyamatterofminutesinwhichtoobserve.Theyarenotconvenientformaking
a largenumberof measurementsoveranextendedperiodof time.It isherethatthe
satellitewouldbeof considerablevalue.Equipmentcarriedin suchavehiclecouldbe
usedtomeasureaspecificradiationoverlongintervalsoftime.
Arraysof geigercounterscouldbeusedtomonitortheinfluxof cosmicrays.By
usingcounterswithvaryingamountsofmaterialtobepenetratedbytherays,itwouldbe
possibleonthelowenergysidetocountheparticlesin anumberof lowenergybands.
Thesewouldperhapsbethesimplestcosmicrayexperimentsto bedone.Witha little
morecomplication,proportionalcountersandlowefficiencygeigercounterscouldbe
employedtodeterminethechargesontheparticlesobserved.If thesatellitestationwere
madetoencircletheearthinageomagneticmeridianplane,theearth'smagneticfield
couldbeusedasarigidityspectrometer,justasisdonenowinballoonandrocket-borne
experiments.Bycomparingobservationsmadeatdifferentgeomagneticlatitudes,thelow
energyendofthecosmicrayspectrumcouldbestudiedindetail.
Counterswithverythinwindowscouldbeusedtostudyauroralparticles,whichare
ofseveralordersofmagnitudelowerenergythanwhatarecommonlytermedcosmicrays.
Asamatteroffact,it maywellbethatincomingparticleswillbefoundtofill outacontinu-
ousspectrumof energiesbetweenthekilo-electronvoltsnowassociatedwithauroral
particlesandthebillionsof electronvoltsfoundin thecosmicrays.If so,it willbeof
considerableinteresttoobserveandstudytheseparticles.
Photoncounterswithvariousfillingsandwindows,andphotomultipliertubes,are
nowusedin rocketstostudydifferentbandsofsolarelectromagneticradiationfromthe
visiblewavelengthsdownintothex-rayregions.Presenttechniqueswouldbeadaptableto
observationsfromasatellitestation.Suchobservationswouldpermita studyof the
fluctuationsoverextendedperiodsoftimein thedifferentwave-lengthbands.Thesefluc-
tuationsareconnectedwithsolaractivityandgiverisetodistincteffectsin theearth's
atmosphere.Variationsin thenearultra-violet,forexample,causechangesinthedistribu-
tionofozonein theatmosphereandperhapshaveaneffectuponweather.Variationsin
thefarultra-violetandx-rayshaveapronouncedeffectupontheionosphere,andmuch
moredataarerequiredtounderstandtheseffects.
Themagnitudeoftheinfluenceofmeteors,especiallyof micrometeors,uponthe
earth'satmosphereisnotyetfullyknown.Oflatethereissometendencytoascribeconsid-
erablesignificanceto theroleof themicrometeorsin theionizationofthehigheriono-
spheric layers. At present, radar and radio techniques are the primary ones in the study of
these particles, but methods are being worked out for rocket studies. For example, a very
thin sheet of metal used as a resistive element in a circuit would be one means of detecting
micrometeors. The particle, upon striking the sheet, would produce a tiny puncture, giv-
ing rise to a small but observable pulse. Such a sheet could be used similarly as one plate of
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a condenser. These rocket techniques, when developed, could also be used in a satellite
observatory.
The foregoing experiments are of interest to the upper-air and solar physicist. It
seems clear that known techniques, such as those suggested, could be used to carry out the
various experiments. Familiar telemetering methods, such as those now used in rocket
studies, could be adapted. But, there will be, of course, peculiar experimental difficulties
to overcome. A number of these difficulties are already quite plain, although there may be
some that are not now apparent.
One of the foremost problems is that of power. It has already been pointed out that
a chief advantage of a satellite platform would be the possibility of making continuing
observations over long periods of time, such as throughout a given year. The longer the
period which could be covered the more satisfying would be the experiment. But to make
the various measurements would require energy, which, presumably, would be stored in
batteries. Associated with each 50 watt-hours of such stored energy would be something
like one pound of battery mass. Including the operation of transmitting measured data,
the satellite experiment would probably use energy at the rate of at least 20 watts. Assum-
ing that the mass limitations in an early satellite vehicle would be on the order of 100 lb.
this would preclude continuous operation over anything even approaching a year. To sur-
mount this obstacle one would probably resort to periodic operation, to low current com-
ponents like transistors, and to the use of the sun's light for the recharging of batteries. In
this last connection, one may note the recent announcement by the Bell Telephone Labo-
ratories of a solar device, consisting of thin silicon strips with an even thinner covering of
boron, which could produce about 50 watts per square yard of exposed surface, The equip-
ment could be turned on and off periodically by some low power timing device, or by
radio means from a ground recording station. The latter method might be the preferable
one, since it would permit turning on the equipment whenever ground-based observa-
tions showed the existence of unusual solar, ionospheric, or cosmic ray activity.
A second problem would be that of temperature. If the satellite were to present the
same side always toward the sun, that side would become intolerably hot. By having that
station rotate, however, enough of the energy absorbed at any spot on the satellite's sur-
face could be reradiated into outer space to keep the temperature of the station and its
equipment at an admissible level. This procedure would, however, introduce some diffi-
culties into the basic experiment. Some omnidirectional arrangement of sensing elements
would be required in order to make the experiment independent of the station's orienta-
tion. For the high energy cosmic ray [75] experiments, this could be done with crossed
counters. In the case of low energy particles and solar ultra-violet light and x-rays, requir-
ing counters with special windows, banks of counters might be the answer. A number of
counters connected in parallel could encircle the satellite so as to present a window on
every side.
The weightlessness of everything in the satellite might present some vexing prob-
lems. Thus, gassing of the batteries used is no cause for concern on the earth, where the
bubbles simply rise in the liquid and pass off harmlessly. But in a nonrotating satellite
stadon, the gas bubbles would not rise.
Remaining right where they form, they would cause the electrolyte to foam and fizz,
like a bottle of soda. In a rotating satellite the centrifugal force field due to the station's
rotation might provide the answer to such problems as this.
The satellite would be giving off gases continuously from the surfaces exposed to
space. Also, in the near-vacuum surrounding the station, the metal structure of the satel-
lite would evaporate slowly. Such effects would make it extremely difficult, if not impos-
sible, to measure the original material content of the space in the neighborhood of the
vehicle. Hence, although of great interest, such measurements are not suggested at the
present time for a satellite experiment.
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Appendix D
Comments Concerning Meteorological Interests in an Orbiting
Unmanned Space Vehicle
EUGENE BOLLAY
North American Weather Consultants
In view of the fact that unmanned, orbiting space vehicles appear to be feasible with
our present engineering knowledge, it would seem appropriate to comment briefly on
measurements one might desire to make of meteorological interest in space.
Our present concepts in meteorology revolve largely around the solar balance and
the resulting fluid dynamic consequences. Such consequences are produced by heating a
gaseous mixture, such as the earth's atmosphere, unevenly under various roughness con-
ditions. A large scientific effort has been made in connection with these hydrodynamic
considerations, in contrast to studying the initiating impulse--the solar radiation phe-
nomena.
It would seem that a space-observing platform would be ideally suited for collecting
direct solar measurements as well as indirect solar relationships such as magnetic storm
activity, etc.
Another item to analyze from a space station is a census of meteoric dust. The recent
correlation by Dr. Bowen in Australia ofrneteoric dust and rainfall deserves rather intense
and careful research.
The saying that one does not see the forest because of the trees may be rather appro-
priate to this problem. On earth we are engulfed in numerous meteorological details which
mask or have masked rather completely the initiating circumstances which may become
evident from observations in space. Connection of the theories of the General Circulation
of the Atmosphere to direct solar influences is still lacking. Information from space may
provide data for the solution of this challenging problem.
Appendix E
The Geodetic Significance of an Artificial Satellite
JOHN O'KEEFE
Army Map Service
I. Purpose and Scope
This report is intended to indicate the extent of the usefulness of a small artificial
satellite, weighing only a few pounds, in finding out more about the size and shape of the
earth, the intensity of its gravitational field, and certain other related constants.
II. Illumination
Most of the possible applications of the satellite would depend on detecting its pres-
ence either by visible light or by radar. The latter application falls outside the scope of the
present paper, which would be chiefly concerned with the application of visible light. The
first question is, then, how the satellite could be illuminated with sufficient brilliance to be
observed.
A. Sunlight
Assuming that the satellite were to consist of a hollow aluminum sphere, 8 ft in diam-
eter, such as could be produced by inflating a foil, it would have a surface brighmess some-
what greater than that of the moon. The ratio of the total brightness would then be the
ratio of the apparent surface area. At a distance of 250 miles, an 8-ft sphere would have a
surface area of 1.1 x 101_square radians. The moon has a surface area of 1.31 x 10_ square
radians or 1.2 x 107 times as great. The full moon is of-12 magnitude; the above ratio in
brightness corresponds to approximately 17.7 magnitudes. The higher reflectivity of
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aluminum as compared with lunar surface is compensated for by the fact that the moon
has been taken as full while the satellite will be in a pardal phase. Thus the object would
have a brilliance of a star of magnitude 5,7, barely visible to the naked eye at night in a
clear sky. It would not be visible by day even with a large telescope. Also, it would not be
visible even in a large telescope when in the shadow of the earth, since its surface bright-
ness would then be less than that of the fully eclipsed moon. It would be visible only be-
tween the end of twilight and the time when it passed into the earth's shadow. The end of
astronomical twilight would almost coincide with the entrance into the earth's shadow;
the interval might be as little as 15'. From the end of nautical twilight to the entrance into
the earth's shadow there would be an interval of about 2 _. The interval could be very
considerably increased by setdng up an orbit which would parallel the line between night
and day over the earth.
B. Intrinsic Illumination
1. Evidently the illumination could be somewhat prolonged by making use of a fluo-
rescent coating which could store up solar radiation, and so continue to shine for some
time after the sun's light was cut off. This process would not give any more light than direct
illumination; but it might produce a longer storage.
2. There is also the possibility of radiant paint. The order of brightness to be ex-
pected here is perhaps less than for a fluorescent coating, and considerably less than that
for direct illumination.
3. No method of installing a lamp appears to be promising, from the point of view of
fuel required to maintain the lamp for more than a few hours.
C. Illumination of a ReO_direaive Refleaor by a Searchlight
1. There exist some 60-in. searchlights, which yield 800,000,000 candles on the axis.
At 250 miles, or 400 kilometers, this corresponds to
8x10 B= 0.5 X 10 .2lumens/(meter) _
(4 x 10s) 2
2. During World War II, the army developed some glass trihedral reflectors. These
have the property of returning light over the same path as that along which the light came
to them, with a spread of about 12 in. The effective area of the [76] ordinary trihedral
reflectors is such that one would receive about 2.5 × 10 5 lumens, and throw it back in a
solid angle of approximately 1.16 × 10 * square radians, thus yielding 2.16 × 10 s candles on
the axis of the returning beam, or, on the ground:
2.16 x 10' = 1.35 x 10 _ lumens/sq meter
(4 x 105) _
According to the fundamental measurements of Fabry, a first-magnitude star yields
8.3 × 107 lumens/sq meter; hence we should require ten searchlights and six trihedral
reflectors to arrive at this amount. To take care of the various aspects of the missile, it
might be best to have 72 trihedral reflectors distributed six each on the faces of a regular
dodecahedron in order to have adequate returned light in all aspects. There would be a
loss of one to three magnitudes from atmospheric absorption in each direction, depend-
ing upon the altitude; thus the satellite would appear as an object between the third and
seventh magnitudes.
HI. Conclusions on Observability
Balancing the disadvantages of irregular motion against the advantages of approxi-
mately known position and speed, it appears likely that objects of the 14th magnitude
could be observed. On the other hand, we have seen that an object of the 4th magnitude
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couldbeproduced;thereisthusamarginof10magnitudes,orasafetyfactorof 10,000. If
the satellite is imagined to be at 1000 miles instead of 250 miles, the brighmess is reduced
by a factor of 4' or 256; there is still a safety factor of 40. However, since the searchlights will
cause the sky to appear very bright in the direction in which they are pointed, this margin
of safety may turn out to be insufficient. We conclude that at 250 miles the satellite should
be an easy object; at 1000 miles it may be a difficult object.
IV. Applications
In studying the applications to geodesy of such a satellite, it will undoubtedly be
necessary to proceed by successive approximations, since the geodetic data now available
are not adequate to permit the calculation of an accurate orbit. For example, it is believed
that the present values for the latitudes and longitudes of points in Europe may be incon-
sistent with the American system of latitudes and longitudes by several hundred feet. For
an object at a distance of 500 miles, this would imply discrepancies of the order of one
minute of arc between European and American observations, under certain circumstances.
Again, the International figure of the earth may be in error by as much as one part in
20,000; this would lead to a discrepancy of 10 sec per revolution between the position
calculated from observations of the linear speed and the actual position; for a 2-hr orbit
this would amount to 2 min per day. The problem is thus actually a problem of an over-
whelming flood of basic information. It follows that it would be difficult to solve for one
element at a time; it is necessary to solve simultaneously for several different elements.
The following attempt to sort out the results does not correspond, therefore, to the chro-
nological order in which results would be obtained, except roughly.
A. Determination of Relative Positions Between Continents
1. Simultaneous observations on a satellite missile from two independent triangula-
tion systems would seem to fix their relative positions by a modification of the method now
being employed for flare triangulation. A missile at a height of 1000 miles would be easily
visible from points 2000 miles away. If the missile were set to follow a track around the
earth's equator, the countries in which it would be easily visible would be chiefly those
between latitude 30 ° North and latitude 30 ° South. In the case of a missile fired at some
angle to the equator, this difficulty would disappear; on the other hand, there would be a
problem of keeping track of the missile.
2. Assuming an angular accuracy of 5 sec in position, and a precision of 0_.01 in the
timing, the accuracy of positioning between independent continental systems would be of
the order of 125 ft in each coordinate. Thus it is evident that a correction through a mis-
sile would be advantageous.
B. Calculation of g
From observations on the satellite made from a single country, it should be possible
to obtain the absolute value of the acceleration of gravity, averaged over a large extent of
terrain. Ordinary pendulum gravity measurements do not give absolute values of gravity;
instead, the pendulum or the gravity meter is brought to a standard point whose gravity is
assumed; and comparisons are made by differential methods. From a freely moving mis-
sile, on the other hand, the acceleration of gravity could be directly measured in absolute
terms. Best of all, the gravity so measured would represent the average value over a consid-
erable area. At present, such a value, which is required for large-scale geodetic studies, is
attainable only by laboriously measuring the values at many points, and then averaging;
even when this has been done, there is a danger that the mountainous areas are
underrepresented, so that systematic errors are created.
C. Calculation of the Earth's Semimajor Axis a
It appears to be possible to calculate the earth's semimajor axis from considerations
relating to the earth's linear surface velocity. It may at first sight seem surprising that it is
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notpossibletostatewithextremeaccuracythespeedwithwhichwemovearoundthe
earth'saxis.Theangularspeed is, of course, very well known. By definition, the earth
turns on its axis one full revolution in one sidereal day. The speed of the observer in
meters per second due to this rotation could be calculated with great precision if we knew
exacdy how far he is from the earth's axis. This quantity, however, depends on the earth's
semimajor axis a and its flattening f Of these, f if known with a precision which is ad-
equate for the purpose under discussion; the chief uncertainty arises from the value of a.
V. Conclusions
It appears that the setting up of a satellite capable of being observed by theodolites
and the like is an engineering possibility and that it would yield results of high geodetic
value. If it could be accurately observed, most of the principal problems of geodesy could
be attacked successfully.
Appendix F
Orbital Radio Relays
JOHN R. PIERCE
1. Introduction
Following the announcement last year that the American Telephone and Telegraph
Company and the British Post Office have joindy undertaken the construction of a
36-channel two-way submarine telephone cable across the Adantic at a cost of 35 million
dollars, it is natural, at least for a person who is a complete amateur in such matters, to
speculate about further developments in transoceanic communication, even into the far
future.
Would a channel 30 times as wide, which would accommodate 1080 phone conversa-
tions or one television signal, be worth 30 x 35 million dollars--that is, a billion dollars?
Will someone spend this much trying to make a broad-band channel to Europe? The idea
is of course absurd. At the present, there is no commercial demand which would justify
such a channel. By the dine there is, surely some technical solution to the problem will be
sought which does not involve multiplying the cost of the present cable in proportion to
the bandwidth.
It is conceivable that such a solution could come about [77] through further devel-
opment in the field of cables; but a very difficult step must be taken to multiply the chan-
nel capacity by 30 or more. In the meandme, other means for obtaining a broad-band
channel to Europe have been considered, including routes largely across land rather than
across water.
A route from Labrador or Baffin Island to Greenland, around the coast of Greenland,
thence to Iceland and via the Faroe Islands to ScoOand traverses much nasty country by
land and still leaves gaps of several hundred miles by sea. These gaps might conceivably be
spanned by radio, using very high power. Perhaps it may be possible to make undersea
television cables which would span gaps of a few hundred miles before such cables can be
made to span thousands of miles. Even granting the success of a difficult radio link or a
broad-band cable, both terrain and climate make this indirect route difficult and unap-
pealing.
A route from Alaska across the Bering Strait to Siberia, and thence overland to Eu-
rope is conceivable, but it is difficult and indirect and it has other disadvantages which
need not be mentioned.
Radio relay along a continual chain of planes crossing the Atlantic has been pro-
posed. While this is certainly technically feasible, in good weather at least, it seems strange
either as a long-range or a short-range solution.
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Another"solution"hasbeenproposedtotheproblemoftrans-oceaniccomnmnica-
tion;thatis,relayingbymeansof asatelliterevolvingaboutheearthabovetheatmo-
sphere.I donotbelievethatmanyengineersdoubthatitwilleventuallybepossibletoput
asatelliteupandintoplace,nortosupplyitwithsmallamountsofpowerforlongperiods
andtoexercisesomesortofradiocontroloverit.However,thereisnounclassifiedintor-
mationtotellushowlongit willbebeforewecouldputupasatelliteorwhatit mightcost
todoso,andtheremaynotevenbeclassified information on the subject. Thus, while I am
here considering some aspect of transoceanic communication via a satellite, I have noth-
ing at all to say about the over-all feasibility of such communication, which must depend
on the feasibility of the satellite itself.
Fortunately, there is a good deal else to be said about the matter. For instance, I have
spoken of trans-oceanic communication only, and I have a reason for this. We now have
transcontinental television circuits. The announced cost of the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company's trans-continental TD2 microwave system was 40 million dollars. This
is only 5 million dollars more than the 35 million for the 36-channel transatlantic cable;
and yet the TD2 system provides a number of television channels in both directions, as well
as many telephone channels. Perhaps even more important in an overland system, it pro-
vides facilities for dropping and adding channels along the route. Without such flexibility,
an overland system would be almost useless.
Some types of satellite relay systems would provide communication only between
selected points. These would lack the flexibility required for overland service. Further,
there is little reason to believe that a satellite relay could compete with present microwave
radio relay or coaxial cable in cost. Present facilities are very satisfactory, so that there is
litde incentive to replace them with some difficuh alternative system, even if it could do
the same job. Thus, satellite radio relay seems attractive only for spanning oceans.
Two different sorts of satellite radio repeaters suggest themselves. One consists of
enough spheres in relatively near orbits so that one of them is always in sight at the trans-
mitting and receiving locations. The sphere isotropically scatters the transmitted signal, so
one has merely to point the transmitter and receiver antennas at it to complete the path.
Another system uses a plane mirror or an active repeater with a 24-hr orbital period, lo-
cated directly above the equator at a radius of around 26,000 miles or an altitude of about
22,000 miles. Such a satellite would be visible to within 9 ° of the poles, that is, in all inhab-
ited latitudes. If it were not for the perturbations of the orbit by the moon and the sun, it
could stay fixed relative to the surface of the earth, and large fixed antennas could be used
on earth. However, it appears that perturbation of the orbit would be large enough to
necessitate steerable antennas on earth and orientation of the satellite antennas or the
reflector by remote control.
Even disregarding problems concerned with the making and placing of the satellites,
would such satellite relay systems or any satellite relay system be feasible in other respects?
To decide this we must consider two sorts of problems: problems of microwave communi-
cation, and problems lying in the field of celestial mechanics, concerned with the orbit
and orientation of a satellite.
(In his full paper, to appear in a future issue of Jet Propulsion, Dr. Pierce proceeds to
develop mathematically the power requirements for several types of relays, and he ana-
lyzes briefly a few of the orientation and orbit problems.)
2. Summary and Discussion
The best we can do is try to state some sort of conclusions concerning the sorts of
systems which have been described .... All of these are for a 5-mc video channel provided
by an 8-digit binary pulse code modulation system and a wave of 10 cm. The diameter of
the antennas on earth is assumed to be 250 ft.
The great advantages of the passive repeaters over active repeaters are potential chan-
nel capacity and flexibility. Once in place, passive repeaters could be used to provide an
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almost unlimited number of two-way channels between various points at various wave
lengths. They would also allow for modifications and improvements in the ground equip-
ment without changes in the repeater.
Spheres, which reflect isotropically, are the most flexible of passive repeaters, be-
cause they allow transmission between any two points in sight of them. Moreover, with
spheres there is no problem of the angular orientation of the repeaters.
For a 24-hour "fixed" repeater and a 1000-ft sphere, the power required is 10 mega-
watts, and this seems excessive. However, suppose 10 spheres, each 100 ft in diam, circled
the earth above the equator at a fairly low altitude. At low altitudes, one or more would
always be in sight. The path length would be only about a tenth that for the 24-hr orbit,
and the power required would be around 100 kw, which seems quite feasible.
A plane mirror returns much more power than does a sphere of the same diameter.
A 100-ft mirror at an altitude of 22,000 miles would call for a transmitter power of about 20
kw, which again is by no means unreasonable.
The great problem in connection with a plane mirror is that of position and orienta-
tion. If it were not for the perturbation caused by the moon and sun, the position and
orientation of the mirror could be preserved automatically by a proper [78] disposition of
masses attached to the mirror and by the use of damping.
However, as perturbations of position and orientation will be too large to be toler-
ated, the orientation of the mirror would have to be adjusted by moving masses through
radio control. The power required would be small, perhaps less than that required for an
active repeater. The advantage of channel capacity would be preserved.
The plane mirror suffers a considerable limitation compared with the sphere, how-
ever. If it really hung fixed in the sky, it would provide communication between any point
in sight of its face and another particular corresponding point. However, because pertur-
bation by the sun and moon will cause it to wander about in the sky so that the orientation
of the mirror must be adjusted to maintain a path between two particular points, a plane
mirror can actually be used only to provide channels (and a large number of channels on
different frequencies) between two particular points.
The chief disadvantage, then, of the passive repeater is that the power required on
the ground is large--though probably attainable.
The attractive feature of an active repeater is the small power required and the small
antennas needed at the repeater, as well as the small power required at the ground. The
small antennas would have a comparatively small directivity. This, coupled with the fact
that for a given angular or positional shift, the beam from a radiator shifts only half as far
as the beam from a reflector, makes the orientation problem considerably easier in the
case of an active repeater. However, there still is an orientation problem, in contrast to the
case of a sphere used as a passive repeater.
The chief disadvantage of the active repeater, aside from disadvantages of power
supply and life, is that it provides only the number and sort of channels that are built into
it. Once it is in place, its channel capacity cannot be substantially increased by anything
done on the ground, although some gain might be made by an increase in transmitter
power and receiver sensitivity and by a modificadon of the nature of the signal.
In conclusion, one can say that, disregarding the feasibility of constructing and plac-
ing satellites, it seems reasonably possible to achieve broad-band transoceanic communi-
cation using satellite repeaters with any one of three general types of repeater: spheres at
low altitudes, or a plane reflector or an active repeater in a 24-hr orbit (at an altitude of
around 22,000 miles).
At this point, some information from astronomers about orbits and from rocket men
about constructing and placing satellites would be decidedly welcome.
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Document 11-9
Document fl0e: U.S. National Committee for the International Geophysical Year 1957-58.
"Summary Minutes of the Eighth Meeting," Washington, D.C., May 18, 1955.
Source: Archives, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.
The idea for holding an International Geophysical Year (IGY) arose from an infor-
mal meeting of scientists at the Maryland home of physicist James Van Allen in 1950. The
intention was to coordinate high-altitude research conducted around the world. Support-
ers took the idea to the International Council of Scientific Unions, where it was supported
by sixty-seven nations. In October 1954, Lloyd Berkner, one of the scientists at the original
meeting, and ten of his associates discussed the problems and rewards of launching a
satellite as part of the IGY and agreed unanimously to recommend it to the Special Com-
mittee for the International Geophysical Year (CSAGI). On October 4, the CSAGI issued a
statement calling for governments to try to launch Earth satellites. The American Long
Playing Rocket Proposal followed from that recommendation. The U.S. National Commit-
tee for the International Geophysical Year gave formal approval to the project at its May
18, 1955, meeting. The minutes of that meeting have as attachments background on the
U.S. satellite proposal.
[ 1 ] 1. Attendance.
1.1 Members: Joseph Kaplan (Chairman), A. H. Shapley (Vice-Chairman), L. H.
Adams, Wallace W. Atwood,Jr., Lloyd V. Berkner, Earl G. Droessler, J. WallaceJoyce,John
P. Marble, E. B. Roberts, Walter M. Rudolph, Paul A. Siple, H. K. Stephenson, Merle A.
Tuve, E. H, Vestine (alternate).
1,2 USNC-IGYSecretariat: Hugh Odishaw, Executive Secretary, R. C. Peavey, Admin-
istrative Officer.
2. General Business.
2.1 Dr. Kaplan announced that Senate hearings on the IGY principal budget were
scheduled for 3:00 P.M., today.
2.2J. Wallace Joyce was introduced to the Committee as Head of the NSF Office for
the IGY. Earl G. Droessler was introduced as representing the Office of the Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense (R&D).
2.3 L. V. Berkner noted that Dr. Briggs was in the hospital with a broken leg. It was
agreed that a letter would be sent to Dr. Briggs in the name of the Committee expressing
hope for a rapid recovery.
3,Discussion on LPR Program.
3.1 Dr. Kaplan opened a discussion on the Long Playing Rocket Project (LPR). He
stated that this USNC Meeting had been called to review and consider formal approval of
the LPR policy, program, and budget, which had been outlined by the USNC Executive
Committee. He emphasized that the discussion on LPR must be considered private and
confidential within the Committee until high policy decisions had been reached and a
public announcement had been made by the Executive Branch of the Government.
3.2 Mr. Odishaw reviewed the history of events leading to the formulation of an LPR
Program and Budget as an extension of the conventional Rocket Program proposed for
the International Geophysical Year. He read the resolutions passed by the International
Union of Geodesy and Geophysics (IUGG) [2] on September 20, 1954; the International
Scientific Radio Union (URSI), on September 24, 1954; and the International Council of
Scientific Unions Special Committee for the International Geophysical Year (CSAGI) on
October 4, 1954 (Appendix I to these Minutes).
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Mr. Odishaw then discussed the formation of a special LPR Committee consisting of
members of the USNC Technical Panel on Rocketry and the USNC Executive Committee,
to consider the technical feasibility of the CSAGI proposal and to suggest experiments
which should be performed (Appendix II to these Minutes.) He noted that results of this
study (Appendix III to these Minutes) and the proposed program and policy position had
been approved unanimously by the USNC Executive Committee at its Meeting March 8-
10, 1955, which authorized the Chairman to transmit on March 14, 1955, a policy state-
ment on the LPR Project to the President of the National Academy of Sciences and the
Director of the National Science Foundation (Appendix IV to these Minutes).
3.3 Detailed discussion ensued on the technical and scientific objectives as well as
financial and political aspects of the LPR Project. It was noted that the vehicle, fuel, and
launching system would probably involve unavoidable security problems, but it was explic-
idy understood that the USNC intended for the bird to be freely available for inspection by
other nations participating in the LPR and to be tracked in flight by other nations.
3.4 Following this discussion, the USNC gave formal approval to the resolution adopted
by the USNC Executive Committee and the policy statement on the LPR Project transmit-
ted to the President, NAS-NRC and the Director, NSF on March 14, 1955, with one mem-
ber dissenting.
4. LPR Budget.
4.1 Mr. Odishaw reported that on May 5, 1955, the USNC Executive Committee had
given instructions for the preparation and transmission of a program and budget for the
LPR Project to the Director, NSF, for consideration by the National Science Board at its
forthcoming meeting on May 20, 1955. He then reviewed in detail estimated costs, totaling
$9,734,500, which includes the cost of ten rocket vehicle systems for instrumented birds.
4.2 After discussion, the USNC gave formal approval to the LPR PROGRAM AND
BUDGET DOCUMENT drawn up as of May 6, 1955, for transmittal to the Director of the
National Science Foundation, with one member abstaining from the vote (Appendix V to
these Minutes).
5. Other Business.
5.1 Mr. Odishaw reported that detailed program and budget estimates for scientific
projects had been received from the USNC Technical Panels and that copies of all project
forms would be mailed to the USNC for review and approval as to acceptance in the U. S.
Program for the IGY. The USNC was advised that the Supplemental Budget would be
presented to the National Science Board for its consideration on May 20, 1955.
5.2 After approval of these procedures discussed under item 5.1 above, the meeting
adjourned.
[s]
Appendix I
International Scientific Resolutions
On The Earth Circling Satellite Vehicles
1. International Union of Geodesy & Geophysics (IUGC),
September 20, 1954:
"In view of the great importance of observations over extended periods of dme of
extraterrestrial radiations and geophysical phenomena in the upper atmosphere and the
advanced state of present rocket techniques, it is recommended that consideration be
given to the launching of small satellite vehicles, their scientific instrumentation and the
new problems associated with satellite experiments such as power supply, telemetering,
and orientation of the vehicle."
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2. International Scientific Radio Union (URSI), September 24, 1954:
"URSI recognizes the extreme importance of continuous observations, from above
the E-region of extraterrestrial radiations, especially during the forthcoming AGI.
"URSI therefore draws attention to the fact that an extension of present isolated
rocket observations by means of instrumented earth satellite vehicles would allow the con-
tinuous monitoring of solar ultraviolet and X-radiation intensity and its effects on the
ionosphere, particularly during solar flares thereby gready enhancing our scientific knowl-
edge of the outer atmosphere."
3. International Council of Scientific Unions Special Committee for the International
Geophysical Year (CSAGI), October 4, 1954:
"In view of the great importance of observations during extended periods of time of
extraterrestrial radiations and geophysical phenomena in the upper atmosphere, and in
view of the advanced state of present rocket techniques, CSAGI recommends that thought
be given to the launching of small satellite vehicles, to their scientific instrumentation,
and to the new problems associated with satellite experiments, such as power supply,
telemetering, and orientation of the vehicle."
C4]
Appendix II
MINUTES
of the
First Meeting
Technical Panel on Rocketry
USNC for the IGY
10:00- 17:00,January 22, 1955, National Science Foundation
Washington, D. C.
2. Organization of Panel
2.1 Dr. Van Allen as convener called the meeting to order and Dr. Spilhaus of the
Executive Committee of the U. S. National Committee for the IGY introduced as first
order of business a resolution passed by the Executive Committee to be taken up by this
panel. A motion was introduced, seconded and carried to the effect that the following part
of the meeting on LPR be a closed session, be private, though unclassified, and its record
be available to the participants of this closed session only. A record of the Closed Session
will be found as Attachment A to these minutes.
[5]
January 22, 1955
Attachment A
REPORT
on the
Closed Session
of the
First Meeting
Technical Panel on Rocketry
U.S.N.C. for the I.G.Y.
1. Resolution
1.1 Dr. Spilhaus reported on a resolution passed by the Executive Committee of the
U.S. National Committee for the IGY requesting this Panel to perform a study and report
on the technical feasibility of the construction of an extended rocket, from here on called
LPR, to be launched in connection with scientific activities during the International Geo-
physical Year.
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1.2Thisreportpresents the resolved actions taken on account of the ensuing discus-
sion among the participants of the closed session,
1.3 Participants: N.C. Gerson, B. Haurwitz, J. Kaplan, H.E. Newell, Jr., H. Odishaw,
G.E Schilling, S.E Singer, A.E Spilhaus, J.A. Van Allen, EL. Whipple.
1.4 All contents of this report are classified as private, pending further determina-
tion of a suitable security classification, and discussions or communications would be lim-
ited to members of the Panel and only those others indicated in 2.2. A motion covering
this point was proposed by Dr. Kaplan, seconded, and unanimously passed. Copies of this
report, Attachment A to the Minutes of the First Meeting of the Technical Panel on Rock-
etry of the USNC for the IGY, will be available to participants of this closed session only.
2. Discussion
2.1 The ensuing discussion included, in addition to technical details, such topics as
the expected reaction of public opinion, the liaison with Government agencies, and the
availability of funds.
[6] 2.2 It was finally resolved that a study group to be called LPR Committee would
be set up under the chairmanship of Dr. Whipple, consisting of the members of this Panel
and the following added consultants: W. Pickering, California Institute of Technology;
M.W. Rosen, Naval Research Laboratory; J.W. Townsend, Jr., Naval Research Laboratory.
2.3 This LPR Committee will meet at Pasadena, California, on the evening of Febru-
ary 3, 1955, and possibly on subsequent days, the participants to be informed of exact time
and locality by Dr. Van Allen.
2.4 It was resolved that the LPR Committee draft a report on the following topics
and/or sub-topics concerning LPR: technical feasibility, budget, geophysical possibilities;
controls, motor, manpower, timing, cost estimates, desired orbit; and possibly other perti-
nent subjects.
2.5 It was resolved that the whole report would either be classified and an unclassi-
fied abstract be extracted, or the report would be in two parts, one part carrying a security
classification.
2.6 It was resolved that the LPR Committee would send the report to Dr. Spilhaus to
be presented to the members of the Executive Committee of the USNC for the IGY, or
directly to respective Government agencies such as the National Security Council, upon
the discretion of the Chairman of the USNC for the IGY
2.7 Dr. Haurwitz indicated that due to prior commitments he would be unable to
attend the planned meeting on February 3, 1955. He offered to write a letter to Dr. Whipple
prior to the planned meeting, containing his contribution for inclusion in the report.
[7]
Appendix HI
National Academy Of Sciences - National Research Council
United States National Committee
For The International Geophysical Year 1957-58
Unclassified Excerpts
Prepared by: G.F. Schilling, Program Officer, USNC-IGY
Verified by: H.E. Newell, Jr., Exec. Vice Chairman, USNC
Technical Panel on Rocketry
Approved by: Hugh Odishaw, Executive Secretary, USNC - IGY
Date: August 2, 1955
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of the Special Meeting
LPR Committee
Technical Panel on Rocketry
USNC for the IGY
09:00 - 13:00, 9 March 1955, IGY Conference Room
Washington, D. C.
N.C.
1. Attendance
1.1 Members Panel on Rocketry: F.L. Whipple (Chairman), W. Berning, W.G. Dow,
Gerson,J. Kaplan, H.E. Newell,Jr., S.E Singer, W. Stroud, EH. Wyckoff
Absent: B. Haurwitz, J.A. Van Allen
1.2 IGY Secretariat: H. Odishaw, G.E Schilling
1.3 LPR Technical Subcommittee: M.W. Rosen,J.W. Townsend
Absent: W.H, Pickering
1.4 Invited Participants: E.L. Eaton, A.E Spilhaus, T.B. Walker
3, Business Session
3.1 Dr. Whipple, Chairman of the Technical Panel on Rocketry of the USNC for the
IGY convened the meeting and called upon Mr. Rosen to present a Report of the LPR
Technical Subcommittee, prepared by W.H. Pickering, M.W. Rosen, andJ.W. Townsend.
[8] 3.2 Mr. Rosen read and submitted a written report (Attachment A to these Min-
utes), summarizing three conclusions resolved by the Subcommittee.
3.3 The report was accepted by the Chairman of the Panel and Mr. Rosen was called
upon to amplify and detail the content of the report,
4. Detailed Report by M. W. Rosen
4.1 Mr. Rosen discussed the following three possible approaches to placing a small
payload in an orbit around the earth. He emphasized that all three approaches are fea-
sible with present-day knowledge and facilities, and are presented in the order of difficulty
and amount of additional development required.
I. Technique Number One:
This technique suggests the use of a one-stage large rocket plus the release of a num-
ber of small rockets, launched at or near the top of the flight path of the large rocket.
Three existing large rockets are qualified to be used for the first stage. The guidance can
be made accurate to one degree of arc.
II. Technique Number Two:
This technique suggests the use of a two-stage rocket plus one or two more stages of
small rockets. The guidance problem of the second stage is more difficult here, than with
Technique Number One, but it is technically feasible. The technique gives the possibility
of greater payload, i.e., instrumented satellite.
III. Technique Number Three:
This technique may represent the most long-term approach, but offers the greatest
payload. The basic suggestion is to start out with the biggest power plant presently in de-
velopment and to build a test vehicle around it. This would involve a development pro-
gram for the first stage. Before evaluating this program, a preliminary study of two to three
months would be necessary.
5. Discussion on Size Categories
5.1 Dr. Whipple started a discussion on desirable size categories. It was apparent that
an object of the order of magnitude of one pound would not be useful. An object of the
order of magnitude of ten pounds would be observable from ground. Into any object of
30 pounds or more some sort of power could be put, thus making it an instrumented
satellite. It was agreed that at the present time the use of nuclear or solar power supplies
was doubtful and not technically feasible, therefore batteries would be needed.
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[9] 5.2 10 pds Observable Object: Dr. Whipple outlined technical and scientific as-
pects concerning a 10 pd object. He suggested that it should be about 20 inches in diam-
eter, painted white or have a reflecting surface. It could be observed visually from ground
at twilight or dawn, representing a star ofa 6th magnitude brighmess (60% reflection). Dr.
Whipple stated firmly that such an object could be found optically with binoculars and
telemeter cameras (Askania system), and discussed the technique applicable to find the
object once it was in an orbit.
Such an object would permit determination of atmospheric densities and would
preferably be placed in an equatorial orbit. An ideal orbit would have a perigee of about
250 miles and an apogee of about 500 miles. If the object were much bigger in diameter
than 20 inches, it would spiral back to earth too fast and make determinations of density
more difficult and inaccurate. [Paragraph omitted]
Among further scientific results obtainable, the following projects were mentioned:
determinations of inter-continental distances to an accuracy of probably 100 feet, if a time
accuracy of about 0.01 seconds (equivalent to approximately 200 feet moving path) can be
achieved. The mass and density distribution in the earth's crust, e.g., mountain ranges,
might be calculated. [Paragraph omitted]
[ 11 ] 5.6 Dr. Singer discussed geophysical and astrophysical applications of an instru-
mented rocket. He went into details concerning the desirability of measuring various geo-
physical parameters and a general discussion ensued.
5.7 Dr. Newell reported on an engineering study performed at NRL on a 30 to 50 pd
object. He presented a theoretical design of an instrumented 15 inch sphere in an equato-
rial orbit, fitted out with available instruments. He detailed as follows:
Optical tracking:
Solar batteries:
same as Dr. Whipple.
not practical for next 3 years.
Experiments for an active satellite (the following lists the actually designed
instrumentation).
(1) Interplanetary Hydrogen Density (Lyman-alpha)-I pd, 0.2 watts.
(2) Dual Micrometeor Detector-0.5 pds, 4 watts.
(3) Extraterrestrial and Ionospheric Electric Currents--8 pds,
5 watts, 0.1 watthour per measurement.
(4) Magnetic Aspect Indicator (for orientation)
-0.25 pds, 2 watts.
[Sentence omitted]
(6) Telemetering System-3.8 pds, 71 watts-batteries 20 pds.
(7) Structure-15 pds.
7. Final Discussion
7.1 It was generally agreed upon that instrumentation costs for any type of object
would be negligible in comparison with other costs. This means that a number of small
objects could be built relatively inexpensively and more types than one would be possible.
7.2 For technical reasons the majority of the Panel members seemed to favor Tech-
nique Number Two applied to a 30 pds observable object.
7.3 The Panel designated Dr. Whipple and Dr. Newell to present an unclassified sum-
mary of the findings of this meeting to the Executive Committee of the U.S, National
Committee for ICY.
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Appendix III
Attachment A
Report on LPR Subcommittee on Vehicle Capabilities
On Friday, February 11, a committee consisting of Dr. W.H. Pickering, Director, Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology; Mr. M.W. Rosen, Head, Rocket
Development Branch, Naval Research Laboratory; and Mr.J.W. Townsend, Assistant Head,
Rocket Sonde Branch, Naval Research Laboratory, met in Washington to consider the
feasibility of placing a small payload in an orbit around the earth. All three members of the
committee were familiar with several proposals for a small satellite, but not necessarily
with all such proposals that may exist. In view of the very brief time available for reaching
some conclusions, the committee decided that it could not underwrite any specific pro-
posal and that it could not formulate any specific proposal for a satellite.
The Committee reached the following three conclusions:
1. With regard to propulsive power required for reaching satellite velocity, it is fea-
sible to attain the required velocity for payloads up to 10 pounds using combinations of
existing rocket vehicles with a moderate amount of additional development work.
2. A more difficult problem is that of the control or guidance necessary to produce
an orbit. This problem can be solved using existing control and guidance components.
The precision required for producing an orbit is less stringent than that necessary to meet
the specifications for at least several existing guided missile projects. An appreciable amount
of development work would be required.
3. The creation of a satellite for payloads up to 10 pounds can be realized within two
to three years, provided that sufficient funds and manpower are applied ....
[13]
Appendix IV
National Academy Of Sciences
National Research Council of the United States Of America
United States National Committee
International Geophysical Year 1957-58
March 14, 1955
Identical Letter was addressed to:
Director, National Science Foundation
Dr. Detlev W. Bronk, President
National Academy of Sciences
2101 Constitution Avenue
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Dr. Bronk:
A small, approximately fifty-pound, earth-circling satellite which could be freely in-
spected before launching and tracked in flight by international agencies would be in ac-
cord with recommendations of the Comite Special Annee Geophysique Internationale
1957-58 (CSAGI) at its Rome meeting in 1954, and would _eld new geophysical data of
considerable interest. If such vehicles could be constructed and launched within the spirit
of the International Geophysical Year, the Executive Committees of the U.S. National Com-
mittee for the International Geophysical Year, on basis of studies and reports by its rocket
panel, recommends that the U.S. Government include such vehicles in its rocket program,
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andprovidetheU.S.NationalCommitteewithopportunityoinstalltheorbitingvehicles
forsuchflights,
A resolutionadoptedbytheExecutiveCommitteeof theUSNCispresentedhere-
with:
TheExecutive Committee of the U.S. National Committee for the International Geo-
physical Year notes that the following resolution was adopted by the CSAGI in Rome, Italy,
during 1954: "In view of the great importance of observations over extended periods of
time of extraterrestrial radiations and geophysical phenomena in the upper atmosphere,
and in view of the advanced state of present rocket techniques, it is recommended that
thought be given to the launching of small satellite vehicles, to their scientific instrumen-
tation, and to the new problems associated with satellite experiments, such as power sup-
ply, telemetering, and orientation of the vehicle." The Executive Committee of the U.S.
National Committee for the International Geophysical [ 14] Year, basing its opinion on the
study of its expert panel on rocketry, feels that a small artificial satellite for geophysical
purposes is feasible during the International Geophysical Year if action is initiated promptly
and that the realization of such a satellite would give promise of yielding original results of
geophysical interest.
I am also submitting the above information and resolution to the Director of the
National Science Foundation.
Sincerely yours,
Joseph Kaplan
Chairman
[16]
Appendix V
National Academy Of Sciences
National Research Council of the United States Of America
United States National Committee
International Geophysical Year 1957-58
May 6, 1955
The Honorable
Alan T. Waterman, Director
National Science Foundation
1520 - H Street, N.W.
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Dr. Waterman:
I am writing to present to you the budget and related recommendations of the USNC
Executive Committee on the proposed USNC-IGYProject LPR (Long Play Rocket), consti-
tuting also an amplification of my letter of March 14, 1955, to the President of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences and you on this subject. While this represents an official action
by the Executive Committee, final approval by the full USNC is also necessary: a special
meeting, as indicated below, will be called as soon as you have advised me on the existence
of a favorable Government policy.
The Executive Committee at its Seventh Meeting, May 5, 1955, acted favorably upon
the enclosed budget estimate totalling $9,734,500 (see Attachment A). This estimate in-
cludes not only provisions for (i) approximately ten "birds" and five observation stations,
including the necessary scientific instrumentation, related equipment, and minimum
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civilian scientific staff but also provisions for (ii) approximately ten vehicles and their asso-
ciated flight instrumentation. Cost estimates for (i) are $2,234,500; for (ii) $7,500,000;
and the total comes to $9,734,500.
Although in our earlier discussions, with which you are familiar, the Executive Com-
mittee had considered that the USNC-IGYprogram need only include item (i), the Execu-
tive Committee now believes that item (ii) ought also to be part of the ICY budget. There
are several reasons for this conclusion: first, it would be more fully in the spirit of the IGY
for the USNC-IGYto sponsor and provide support for the total equipment and instrument
needs (analogous to the present rocket program), clearly establishing the basic ci_ilian
character of the endeavor; second and somewhat related to the preceding clause, there
appears to be no fundamental classification problem involved in the vehicles: without ref-
erence to the history of rocketry (in particular, German V-2 developments), such rockets
as the Viking and Aerobee, combinations of which are capable of doing the job, [17] are
commercially available and involve no security classification considerations, an important
factor in terms not only of the philosophy of the ICY but, we believe, in terms of the
international relations of the United States; and, third, the inclusion of (i) and (ii) in the
USNC-IGY program provides a simplicity in the demarcation of USNC-IGY and DOD re-
sponsibilities, the latter, as in the rocket program, having to do with logistics and opera-
tional support.
These and related topics are the subject of the narrative accompanying the enclosed
budget (see Attachment A); the views of the Executive Committee on the budget itself can
be summarized briefly by quoting the Minutes of the Seventh Meeting: "With the under-
standing that the totals for vehicles for launching of approximately 10 birds at a cost not to
exceed $7.5 million for procurement, construction, and necessary system design and de-
velopment, and $2,234,500 for procurement, construction, and design relating to birds
and observing equipment, the USNC Executive Committee recommends to the National
Science Foundation that the entire LPR program be funded from IGY funds, pro_Sded
that procurement, loglsdcs and launching be coordinated by the appropriate DOD agency."
I should like at this time to dwell briefly on the urgency of this matter: namely, unless
funds are available within a very brief interval after July 1, 1955, it will be virtually impos-
sible to be sure that the LPR program can be conducted during the IGY. The critical short-
age of time can not be over-emphasized. You will recall that my letter of March 14, 1955,
contained the phrase "if action is initiated promptly." The enclosed copy of a newspaper
article (see Attachment C) may be of interest to you, showing as it does the interest of
other nations in such a program.
The Executive Committee assumes that a favorable Government position, emanat-
ing from the highest levels within the Executive Branch, will have been reached in the very
near future on this program so that the following steps can be taken: (i) approval by the
full U.S. National Committee, (ii) submission to the National Science Board at its May
meeting, and (iii) submission to the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress during the
present session in the hope that funds can be granted by July 1, 1955, or earlier if possible.
Aspects of the critical timetable confronting us are described in Attachment B.
I know that you have been pursuing this matter diligently, and the Executive Com-
mittee is appreciative of your interest and assistance. I hope to hear from you soon in
order to call a special meeting of the USNC, and I and my colleagues shall be pleased to
appear before the National Science Board, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Congress on
this subject as we have in the past in connection with other aspects of the IGYprogram.
Sincerely yours,
Joseph Kaplan
Chairman
Attachments
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AppendixV
Attachment A
USNC-IGYLPR (Long Play Rocket) Program
Program and Estimated Budget
1. International Background
The desirability of launching small instrumented vehicles for geophysical research
during the International Geophysical Year (1957-58) was the subject of discussion at three
international meetings last year:
(i) In August and September, 1954, the International Scientific Radio Union (URSI)
considered this matter and endorsed the following resolution:
"Study of Solar Radiation in the Upper Atmosphere.
URSI recognizes the extreme importance of continuous observations, from above
the E region of extraterrestrial radiations, especially during the forthcoming AGI.
URSI therefore draws attention to the fact that an extension of present isolated rocket
observations by means of instrumented earth satellite vehicles would allow the continuous
monitoring of solar ultraviolet and X radiation intensity and its effects on the ionosphere,
particularly during solar flares thereby greatly enhancing our scientific knowledge of the
outer atmosphere."
(ii) The International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics submitted to the Special
Committee for the International Geophysical Year (CSAGI) the following recommenda-
tion of its International Association of Terrestrial Magnetism and Electricity (September
20, 1954):
"In view of the great importance of observations over extended periods of time of
extraterrestrial radiations and geophysical phenomena in the upper atmosphere and the
advanced state of present rocket techniques, it is recommended that consideration be
given to the launching of small satellite vehicles, their scientific instrumentation and the
new problem associated with satellite experiments such as power supply, telemetering,
and orientation of the vehicle."
(iii) The CSAGI at its final plenary session on October 4, 1954, adopted the follow-
ing resolution:
"In view of the great importance of observations during the extended periods of
time of extraterrestrial radiations and geophysical phenomena in the upper atmosphere,
and in view of the advanced state of present [20] rocket techniques, CSAGI recommends
that thought be given to the launching of small satellite vehicles, to their scientific instru-
mentation, and to the new problems associated with satellite experiments, such as power
supply, telemetering, and orientation of the vehicle."
An indication of international interest is apparent in the news article enclosed here-
with as Attachment C.
2. National Background
In view of the above International recommendations and in view of the advanced
state of U.S. rocketry developments, the Executive Committee of the U.S. National Com-
mittee for the IG¥considered the possibility of constructing, launching, and observing an
instrumented satellite. A special group for this purpose was established within the USNC
Technical Panel on Rocketry.
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On the basis of studies made by the above group, the Executive Committee decided
that an instrumented satellite program was of scientific importance and was feasible. The
Executive Committee summarized its findings as follows (March 8 and 10, 1955):
"A small, approximately fifty-pound, earth-circling satellite which could be freely in-
spected before launching and tracked in flight by international agencies would be in ac-
cord with recommendations of the Comite Special Annee Geophysique Internationale
1957-58 (CSAGI) at its Rome meeting 1954, and would yield new geophysical data of con-
siderable interest. If such vehicles could be constructed and launched within the spirit of
the International Geophysical Year, the Executive Committee of the U.S. National Com-
mittee for the International Geophysical Year, on basis of studies and reports by its rocket
panel, recommends that the U.S. Government include such vehicles in its rocket program,
and provide the U.S. National Committee with opportunity to install the orbiting vehicles
for such flights."
The Executive Committee adopted the following resolution, March 8 and 10, 1955:
'q'he Executive Committee of the U.S. National Committee for the International
Geophysical Year notes that the following resolution was adopted by the CSAGI in Rome,
Italy during 1954: 'In view of the great importance of observations over extended periods
of time of extraterrestrial radiations and [21] geophysical phenomena in the upper
atmosphere, and in view of the advanced state of present rocket techniques, it is recom-
mended that thought be given to the launching of small satellite vehicles, to their scien-
tific instrumentation, and to the new problems associated with satellite experiments, such
as power supply, telemetering, and orientation of the vehicle.' The Executive Committee
of the U. S. National Committee for the International Geophysical Year, basing its opinion
on the study of its expert panel on rocketry, feels that a small artificial satellite for geo-
physical purposes is feasible during the International Geophysical Year if action is initiated
promptly [emphasis added] and that the realization of such a satellite would give promise
of yielding original results of geophysical interest."
The Executive Committee authorized the Chairman of the U.S. National Committee
to transmit the above findings and resolution to the President of the National Academy of
Sciences and the Director of the National Science Foundation. This was done on March
14, 1955.
3. USNC-IGY LPR Program
The Executive Committee of the USNC-IGY proposes a minimum satellite program
during the ICY consisting of approximately ten instrumented birds, with the expectation
that at least five of the birds will be successfully launched into their orbits, circulating
about the earth for a period of approximately two weeks, at a height of about 250 miles,
traveling about the equator. Five ground stations will be established for observations and
measurement purposes, one each in the Equatorial Pacific, South America, the Atlantic
Ocean, Africa, and the Philippines.
The instrumented satellites will permit the performance of a number of important
experiments. The simplest and most direct will be the use of the satellite for precise geo-
detic measurements and the determination of upper air densities. Instrumentation now
planned will permit the following investigations: Measurement of solar radiation, mea-
surement of particle radiation such as micrometeorites and those responsible for the au-
rora, and determination of current flows in the ionosphere associated with magnet storms
and radio black-outs. Such a vehicle would also permit the determination of hydrogen in
inter-planetary space.
To achieve the objectives of the program, the USNC Executive Committee recom-
mends the following definitions of responsibility:
(i) That the program be an integral part of the USNC-IGY program for both scien-
tific and international reasons and that the execution of the program be under the direc-
tion of the USNC and its appropriate Committees and Panels.
[22] (ii) That the USNC-IGY budget include the (a) procurement of instrumented
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birds, (b) the procurement of the rocket vehicle systems, (c) ground stations, their scien-
tific instrumentation, and immediately associated supplies, and (d) provisions for the
employment (and travel) of 25 scientists; and that the USNC-IGY LPR budget be pre-
sented to the Government and Congress under the auspices of the National Science Foun-
dation.
(iii) That the U.S. Government, through the Department of Defense and under the
scientific direction of the USNC, assume overall responsibility for the task, establish re-
sponsibility within the Department for the task, set up the appropriate working groups
and task forces, and provide (a) scientific and technical personnel for vehicles, launching,
and instrumentation of vehicles and birds, (b) all technical and field facilities, including
laboratories (domestic and field), related structures, and quarters for personnel (includ-
ing maintenance and subsistence equipment, supplies and services), (c) logistics support,
(d) operational support, including transportation and vehicles, domestic and field, and
(e) all other types of support, equipment and services essential for the success of the pro-
gram but not noted in items (a) through (d) and not included in the USNC-IGY LPR
budget.
(iv) That cooperation of scientists from other nations be invited with respect to (a)
the instrumented bird and (b) the observation program, including provisions for partici-
pation in observations at our field stadons as well as issuance of data permitting ease of
observation from other than our field stations.
4. Budget F-_ate and Time Schedule
The attached budget estimate sheet presents current estimates of that portion of the
proposed program that appropriately belongs in the ICY budget. If the program is to be
effected during the IGY, funds must be available early in Fiscal Year 1956; Attachment B
describes aspects of the timetable.
May 6, 1955
[24]
USNC-IGYLPR (Long Play Rocket) Program
Budget Estimates
(May 6, 1955)
Salaries .......................................................................................................... $ 215,000
Two professionals at each of 5 stations for one year at an average salary of
$9,500, ten man-years: $95,000; three professionals at each of 5 stations
for one year at an average salary of $8,000, fifteen man-years: $120,000.
Travel ............................................................................................................... 217,500
Round-trip travel for each of 5 men at each of 5 stations for an average of
five shoots, 125 round trips at an average cost of $1,400: $175,000. Per
diem for a period of 20 days for each of the 125 trips at an average daily
cost of $12: $30,000. Domestic travel, including per diem, $12,500.
Transportation of things .................................................................................. 222,000
Transportation of supplies and materials, $21,000; transportation of equipment
and facilities, $201,000.
Supplies and materials ..................................................................................... 140,000
Photographic supplies at $2,000 per station: $10,000; electronic parts and
components at $20,000 per station: $100,000; electrical supplies at $2,000
per station: $10,000; laboratory, office, and miscellaneous supplies at
$4,000 per station: $20,000.
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Equipment and facilities ............................................................................... 8,940,000
Design of instrumented bird, $100,000; construction of.approximately ten
instrumented birds, at approximately $25,000 each: $250,000; five
telemetering stations at $50,000 each: $250,000; three C-W triplet-
antenna Tracking Stations for each of three stations at $200,000 each:
$600,000; two theodolite optical tracking stations for each of two stations
at $100,000 each: $200,000; five sets of manual optical tracking gear for the
five stations at $8,000 per station: $40,000; approximately 10 rocket vehicle
systems, including procurement of rockets and associated control equipment and
related devices and the necessary design and development to synthesize the
vehicle system, at approximately $750,000 each: $7,500,000.
Total .............................................................................................................. 9,734,500
[25]
Attachment B
Factors Affecting USNC-IGY LPR Schedule
The resolution of the USNC Executive Committee, March 8-10, 1955 (see Section 2
of Attachment A) pointed out that the LPR program is feasible during the ICY "if action is
initiated promptly" [emphasis added], Funds must be available promptly--no later than early
in Fiscal Year 1957; preferably sooner--if the objectives of the program are to be achieved
during the IGY. There are important reasons for stressing time: the data provided by the
LPR program would have considerable added value primarily because this data could be
usefully correlated with large bodies of indirect data gathered during the IGY from all
parts of the world. It is of interest also to note that at least one other nation has announced
plans for a similar program (see Attachment C) under the direction of an extremely able
physicist.
It appears that at least the following steps are involved in the carrying of this pro-
posal to the funding stage:
1. Government Policy
1.1 Departments and Independent Agencies
1.2 National Security Council
2. U.S. National Committee Approval
3. National Science Board Approval
4. Bureau of the Budget Approval
5. Presentation to the Congress
In view of the limited time between now and the end of the current session of Con-
gress, it is evident that prompt action must characterize Governmental considerations. It is
understood that vigorous action with respect to step (1) has been undertaken by the Na-
tional Science Foundation, following the March 14, 1955, letter from the USNC Chair-
man: as of May 6, 1955, however a Government position had not been defined. Once this
position has been defined, involving basically three considerations [(i) general favorable
positions of such agencies as the Department of State, (ii) assumption of responsibility by
DOD as outlined in item (iii) of Section (3) of Attachment A but without requiring, at this
time, a decision as to how DOD will establish its task group, and (iii) approval by the NSC],
a special meeting of the USNC will be called for approval of the Executive Committee
recommendations. The next step will require prompt consideration by the National Sci-
ence Board in order to permit submission of the budget to the Bureau of the Budget and
Congress.
May 6, 1955
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Attachment C
Interplanetary Commission Created
Russians Planning Space Laboratory for Research Beyond Earth's Gravity
LONDON, April 16 (AP). --Russia announced tonight her top scientists are working
on a space laboratory which would revolve around the earth as a satellite.
"A permanent Interdepartmental Commission for Interplanetary Communications
has been created in the Astronomic Council of the USSR Academy of Sciences," said Mos-
cow Radio.
'q'his Commission is coordinating work on problems of mastering cosmic space."
Peter Kapitsa, 61, one of Russia's best known atomic scientists, was among those ap-
pointed to the Commission.
Anatoly Karpenko, secretary of the Commission, was quoted as saying:
"One of the first tasks of the Commission lies in organizing work for the creation of
an automatic laboratory of scientific research in cosmic space.
"With the ship of such a laboratory--which could, over a long period, revolve around
the earth as a satellite, beyond the limit of the atmosphere--it will be possible to carry out
observations of phenomena inaccessible under ordinary terrestrial conditions."
With this automatic equipment, Karpenko said, Soviet biologists will be able to ob-
tain information about conditions of life in the absence of gravity.
"Astrophysicists will be able to observe the ultraviolet and roentgen spectra of the
radiation of the sun and the stars and, with the help of these observations, to obtain addi-
tional data concerning the processes taking place on these bodies.
"Radio physicists will study more completely processes in the ionosphere and will
determine the most advantageous conditions for the establishment of radio communica-
tions with future space ships."
He said Russia's cosmic laboratory will enable her scientists to penetrate deeper into
the secrets of the universe and "will represent the first stage in the solution of the problem
of interplanetary communication."
--Washington Post
April 17, 1955
Document I1-10
Document title: National Security Council, NSC 5520, "Draft Statement of Poficy on U.S.
Scientific Satellite Program," May 20, 1955.
Source: Presidential Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
This is the first statement of national policy for outer space. There were three satel-
lite programs under consideration in early 1955. Two--Project Orbiter and WS 1171.,--
were aimed at military and intelligence goals. The other was the IGY satellite being advo-
cated by the National Academy of Sciences and the National Science Foundation. This
policy statement emphasizes the political benefits of having the first U.S. satellite launched
under international scientific auspices.
[1] 1. The U. S. is believed to have the technical capability to establish successfully a
small scientific satellite of the earth in the fairly near future. Recent studies by the Depart-
ment of Defense have indicated that a small scientific satellite weighing 5 to 10 pounds can
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be launched into an orbit about the earth using adaptations of existing rocket compo-
nents. Ira decision to embark on such a program is made promptly, the U. S. will probably
be able to establish and track such a satellite within the period 1957-58.
2. The report of the Technological Capabilities Panel of the President's Science Ad-
visory Committee recommended [phrase excised during declassification review] an im-
mediate program leading to a very small satellite in orbit around the earth, and that
re-examination should be made of the principles or practices of international law with
regard to "Freedom of Space" from the standpoint of recent advances in weapon technology.
3. On April 16, 1955, the Soviet Government announced that a permanent high-
level, interdepartmental commission for interplanetary communications has been created
in the [2] Astronomic Council of the USSR Academy of Sciences. A group of Russia's top
scientists is now believed to be working on a satellite program. In September 1954 the
Soviet Academy of Sciences announced the establishment of the Tsiolkovsky Gold Medal
which would be awarded every three years for outstanding work in the field of interplan-
etary communications.
4. Some substantial benefits may be derived from establishing small scientific satel-
lites. By careful observation and the analysis of actual orbital decay patterns, much infor-
mation will be gained about air drag at extreme altitudes and about the fine details of the
shape of and the gravitationai field of the earth. Such satellites promise to provide direct
and continuous determination of the total ion content of the ionosphere. These signifi-
cant findings will find ready application in defense communication and missile research.
When large instrumented satellites are established, a number of other kinds of scientific
data may be acquired. The attached Technical Annex (Annex A) contains a further enu-
meration of scientific benefits.
5. [Paragraph excised during declassification review]
[3] 6. Considerable prestige and psychological benefits will accrue to the nation which
first is successful in launching a satellite. The inference of such a demonstration of ad-
vanced technology and its unmistakable relationship to inter-continental ballistic missile
technology might have important repercussions on the political determination of free
world countries to resist Communist threats, especially if the USSR were to be the first to
establish a satellite. Furthermore, a small scientific satellite will provide a test of the prin-
ciple of "Freedom of Space." The implications of this principle are being studied within
the Executive Branch. However, preliminary studies indicate that there is no obstacle un-
der international law to the launching of such a satellite.
7. It should be emphasized that a satellite would constitute no active military offen-
sive threat to any country over which it might pass. Although a large satellite :night con-
ceivably serve to launch a guided missile at a ground target, it will always be a poor choice
for the purpose. A bomb could not be dropped from a satellite on a target below, because
anything dropped from a satellite would simply continue alongside in the orbit.
[4] 8. The U. S. is actively collaborating in many scientific programs for the Interna-
tional Geophysical Year (IGY),July 1957 through December 1958. The U. S. National Com-
mittee of the IGY has requested U. S. Government support for the establishment of a
scientific satellite during the Geophysical Year. The IGY affords an excellent opportunity
to mesh a scientific satellite program with the cooperative world-wide geophysical observa-
tional program. The U. S. can simultaneously exploit its probable technological capability
for launching a small scientific satellite to multiply and enhance the over-all benefits of the
International Geophysical Year, to gain scientific prestige, [phrase excised during
declassification review] The U. S. should emphasize the peaceful purposes of the launch-
ing of such a satellite, although care must be taken as the project advances not to prejudice
U. S. freedom of action (1) to proceed outside the IGYshould difficulties arise in the IGY
procedure, [sentence excised during declassification review]
9. The Department of Defense believes that, if preliminary design studies and initial
critical component development are initiated promptly, sufficient assurance of success in
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establishing a small scientific satellite during [5] the IGYwill be obtained before the end
of this calendar year to warrant a response, perhaps qualified, to an IGY request. The
satellite itself and much information as to its orbit would be public information. The means
of launching would be classified.
10. A program for a small scientific satellite could be developed from existing missile
programs already underway within the Department of Defense. Funds of the order of
$20 million are estimated to be required to give reasonable assurance that a small scien-
tific satellite can be established during 1957-58 (See Financial Appendix).
[6] Courses of Action
11. Initiate a program in the Department of Defense to develop the capability of
launching a small scientific satellite by 1958, with the understanding that this program will
not prejudice continued research [phrase excised during declassification review] or mate-
rially delay other major Defense programs.
12. Endeavor to launch a small scientific satellite under international auspices, such
as the International Geophysical Year, in order to emphasize its peaceful purposes, pro-
vided such international auspices are arranged in a manner which:
a. Preserves U.S. freedom of action in the field of satellites and related programs.
b. Does not delay or otherwise impede the U.S. satellite program and related re-
search and development programs.
c. Protects the security of U.S. classified information regarding such matters as the
means of launching a scientific satellite.
d. Does not involve actions which imply a requirement for prior consent by any
nation over which the satellite might pass in its orbit, and thereby does not jeopardize the
concept of "Freedom of Space."
[7] Financial Appendix
1. Funds of the order of $20 million are estimated to be required to assure a small
scientific satellite during the period of the IGY This figure allows for design and produc-
tion of adequate vehicles and for scientific instrumentation and observation costs. It also
includes preliminary back-up studies of an alternate system without vehicle procurement.
The ultimate cost of a scientific satellite program will be conditioned by (1) size and com-
plexity of the satellite, (2) longevity of each satellite, and (3) duration of the scientific
observation program. Experience has shown that preliminary budget estimates on new
major experimental and design programs may not anticipate many important develop-
mental difficulties, and may therefore be considerably less than final costs.
2. The estimate of funds required is based on:
satellite vehicle
instrumentation for tracking
logistics for launching and
tracking
$10-$15 million
$2.5 million
$2.5 million
TOTAL $15-$20 million
3. These estimates do not include funding for military research and development
already part of other missile programs. They include costs for observations that might
properly be undertaken by Department of Defense agencies as part of the Department of
Defense mission. They do not include costs of other observations that may be proposed by
other agencies. They will provide a minimum satellite for which two vehicle systems now
under study offer good promise, "Orbiter" and "Viking." They also include exploratory
studies for a back-up program based upon the "Atlas" missile and "Aerobee" research rocket
development.
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Annex A
Technical Annex
Scientific Values
1. The scientific information that may be expected from a satellite is dependent upon
the size of the vehicle and whether it can be instrumented.
2. From a small, inert, trackable satellite, it is reasonable to expect that the following
scientific values may be derived:
a. Analysis of currently available information on the upper atmosphere shows a need
for additional basic information to support the development of manned craft and mis-
siles for use at high altitudes. More accurate data on air density, pressure and temperature
are required. From the analysis of actual orbital "decay" patterns, the air drag at high
altitudes can be determined to a greater accuracy than by techniques now available.
b. Electronic tracking would probably permit direct and continuous determination
of the total ion content of the ionosphere by comparison of simultaneous electronic and
visual observations.
c. Anti-missile missile research will be aided by the experience gained in finding and
tracking artificial satellites. It is expected that the satellite will approximate the speed and
altitude of an intercontinental ballistic missile.
d. It is probable that a small scientific satellite would yield measurements of high
geodetic value. More precise determinations of relative position between continents, the
value of the gravitational constant averaged over long distances and the earth's semimajor
axis can probably be made by observations of a small scientific satellite.
e. The observation of an uninstrumented satellite in an orbital plane inclined to the
equator can permit the determination of the rotation of the orbital plane in space about
the earth's polar axis, commonly called the "regression of the nodes." This perturbation is
caused by the oblateness of the earth. Its evaluation will have considerable significance in
precisely forecasting satellite orbits.
[9] Military Values
3. In addition to the scientific values listed above, some of which are clearly relevant
to missile and anti-missile research and development programs of the Department of De-
fense, it may be noted that military communications programs will be enhanced by im-
provements in knowledge of the ionosphere and by improved knowledge of the rate of
earth rotation. To this list must also be added the direct values of experience in organiza-
tion, operation and logistics accruing to military missile forces detailed to execute a scien-
tific satellite firing program. It is expected that the satellite will approximate the speed
and altitude of an intercontinental ballistic missile.
Orbit and Tracking Considerations
4. Ifa perigee approximating 200 miles and an apogee approximately 1,000 miles are
used to fix the desired orbit, the satellite will pass completely around the earth in approxi-
mately 90 minutes. If an orbit over the earth's poles or an orbit inclined to the equator is
selected, the satellite will pass successively farther west of the launching point on each
revolution around the earth. This means that an individual tracking station set up for
inclined orbits will not be in an observing position for every revolution. The optimum
location for tracking polar orbits is at or near the poles. On the other hand, an equatorial
orbit will place each observing station in position to observe every circuit of the satellite.
Artificial satellites in a low roughly circular orbit will appear optically similar to a 5.6 mag-
nitude star moving at a high angular rate. Optical observations in broad daylight will be
impracticable and observations when the satellite is in the earth's shadow will also be im-
practicable unless the satellite is illuminated. This means that experiments depending on
passive optical tracking of a satellite cannot be conducted except during 50 minutes at
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dawnand50minutesatdusk.Aninclinedorbitwouldthusmateriallyreducetheusable
dataperstationforexperimentsbasedonpassiveopticalobservations.Theusefulnessof
thesatelliteandtheselectionof thedesirableorbitis,therefore,closelyrelatedtothe
degreetowhichthesatellitecanbeacquiredandtrackedbyelectronictechniquesa well
asoptical.
5.AninclinedorbitutilizingPatrickAirForceBaseatCocoa,Florida,asalaunching
pointhasthefollowingadvantagesoveranequatorialorbit:
a.Eliminatednecessitytomountropicalexpeditiontoestablishlaunchingandtrack-
ingsites.[10]b.PermitsobservationfromNavyAirMissileTestCenter,PointMugu,Califor-
nia;NavalOrdnanceTestStation,Inyokern,California;WhiteSandsProvingGround,New
Mexico;British-AustralianGuidedMissileRange,Woomera,Australia;ndalargenumber
ofthefreeworld'sastronomicalobservatories.
c.Utilizesthefulllength(5000miles)ofLongRangeProvingGroundforobserva-
tionsofthecriticalfirstpartofthefirstorbit.
d.Permitsanaccumulationfgeophysicaldataoveralargerareaoftheearth'sur-face.
6.Disadvantagesofaninclinedorbitwhencomparedtoanequatorialorbitare:
a.Inclinedorbitprovidesfeweropportunitiestoobservefromasinglebase.Thisis
especiallycriticalforsmalluninstrumentedsatellitesnotobservablebyordinaryradar,
b.InclinedorbitfromPatrickAirForceBasereachingamaximumlatitudeof 35°
wouldresultin thesatellitepassingondifferentcircuitsovervirtuallyallof theworld
between35°Nlatitudeand35°S latitude. This might increase substantially the amount of
diplomatic negotiations necessary to implement the program.
Hazards to Human Life
7. The launching of a scientific satellite does not appear to threaten in any serious
way the safety of air transportation at normal altitudes, nor the safety of personnel and
property on the ground. All of the scientific satellites discussed above would be launched
from locations where the initial flight of the booster system would be over water. At the
end of this stage the booster rocket, which is the largest and potentially most lethal part of
the satellite, would separate and fall into the water. Normal precautions taken in launch-
ing ordinary guided missiles would suffice to assure adequate safety of the launch and
booster phases. The orbiting vehicle in all cases of both instrumented and uninstrumented
satellites would be designed with the objective in mind that the entire device would disin-
tegrate and to a large extent vaporize under the heat of re-entry into the earth's atmo-
sphere. This vehicle would, therefore, create negligible hazards after re-entering the at-
mosphere.
[11]
Annex B
The White House
Washington
Copy May 17, 1955
Memorandum For Mr. James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
Subject: U. S. Scientific Satellite Program
1. I should like to register my enthusiastic support of the proposal of the Department
of Defense (RD-CGS 202/4) which you sent to me under cover of your memorandum of
May 13, 1955.
2. I am impressed by the psychological as well as by the [phrase excised during
declassificadon review] advantages of having the first successful endeavor in this field re-
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suit from the initiative of the United States, and by the costly consequences of allowing the
Russian initiative to outrun ours through an achievement that will symbolize scientific and
technological advancement to peoples everywhere. The stake of prestige that is involved
makes this a race that we cannot afford to lose.
3. Because of the basically new questions of ionosphere jurisdiction that are involved,
and because the announced Soviet program in interplanetary communications makes it
certain that a vigorous propaganda will be employed to exploit all possible derogatory
implications of any American success that may be achieved, it is highly important that the
U. S. effort be initiated under auspices that are least vulnerable to effective criticism. The
extraordinary opportunities for exploitation of superstitions on the one hand and of im-
puted military hazards on the other that are inherent in a scientific "breakthrough" of
such novelty make it imperative to enlist many voices speaking for numbers of nations to
allay the potentially boundless fears that may be stirred up, even though they are quite
unwarranted.
[12] I agree, therefore, with the suggested procedure of having our Government
announce that it is ready to support the project through the U.S. National Committee of
the International Geophysical Year. It is important for the following reasons that the U.S.
proposal be made public at the time when it is submitted to the IGY:
A. The International Geophysical Year was established by the International Union of
Scientific Societies which in turn is affiliated with UNESCO--part of the United Nations
structure.
B. I am informed that the IGYin its Rome meeting last year endorsed the launching
of a satellite as a desirable scientific step.
C. Since Russia is represented in this organization it would be in a position to know
immediately of any U.S. offer made by the Government through the U.S. National Com-
mittee to launch a satellite.
D. If the U.S. offer was not made public the Soviets might take immediate action and
do one of two things:
1) Announce it has already launched a satellite.
2) Make an offer to launch one themselves.
thus reducing the psychological significance and prestige values of the U.S. proposal.
4. The announcement of the U.S. offer might be made by Ambassador Lodge to the
United Nations. Although the IGYis affiliated with the United Nations, for public reassur-
ance the Ambassador might state that the United States would welcome some form of
direct U.N. sponsorship for the project since its intent was to contribute to the world body
of scientific knowledge through study of the satellite in flight. Needless to say, the offer of
sharing knowledge would not be extended to the method of launching.
5. The fact that Russia was represented upon the International Geophysical Year
which endorsed a satellite launching project can be used to good effect by us in the event
that there should be a concerted Communist effort to brand the project as evil or threat-
ening. We should, alternatively, be ready to meet a Soviet statement that it, too, is prepar-
ing to launch a satellite upon a shorter time-table or even, at some date, an announce-
ment, true or false, that it has launched one.
[13] 6. Since a U.S. success in being the first to launch a small uninstrumented satel-
lite could be quickly discounted if the Soviets were to follow it with an initial success in the
launching of a satellite of more sophisticated type, I believe that the exploratory work on
the latter type recommended in paragraph 11 C of the Department of Defense memoran-
dum should be pursued vigorously in the United States concurrently with the program
recommended for immediate implementation.
Nelson A. Rockefeller
Special Assistant
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Document I1-11
Document tide: S.E Singer, "Studies of a Minimum Orbital Unmanned Satellite of the
Earth (MOUSE)," Astronaut/ca Acta, 1 (1955): 171-84.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA Headquar-
ters, Washington, D.C.
S. Fred Singer, a physicist at the University of Maryland, proposed a Minimum Or-
bital Unmanned Satellite of the Earth (MOUSE) at the fourth Congress of the Interna-
tional Astronautics Federation in Zurich, Switzerland, in the summer of 1953. Singer's
paper was based on a study prepared two years earlier by members of the British Interplan-
etary Society who had based their proposal on the use of a V-2 rocket. The Upper Atmo-
sphere Rocket Research Panel at White Sands discussed Singer's plan in April 1954. In
May, Singer presented his MOUSE proposal at the Hayden Planetarium's fourth Space
Travel Symposium.
Singer had been present at the spring 1950 meeting at James Van Allen's home where
the prospect of an International Geophysical Year was discussed, and he became a vocal
proponent of building a satellite for the IGY. MOUSE was the first satellite proposal widely
discussed in non-governmental engineering and scientific circles.
[171]
Studies of a Minimum Orbital Unmanned Satellite of
the Earth (MOUSE) x
Part I. Geophysical and Astrophysical Applications _
by S.E Singer, College Park/Md.', ARS
(Received August 29, 1955)
Editor's Note. The announcement by President Eisenhower on July 29, 1955 about
the launching of minimum satellites by the United States during the International Geo-
physical Year 1957-58 has made the present article quite topical.
While it is too early to speculate about the details of the U.S. satellite program, the
announced dimensions, payloads and applications resemble very much those of a MOUSE
satellite. It will be remembered that in 1954 the International Sciendfic Radio Union (URSI)
in the Hague and the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics (UGGI) in Rome
both endorsed resolutions proposed by Professor Singer to apply artificial satellites to geo-
physical and astrophysical research.
Abstract. A MOUSE would provide a far-reaching extension of present high altitude
rockets in the study of the upper atmosphere and extraterrestrial radiations. Lifetimes of
even a few days and payloads as low as 50 pounds would be adequate to allow continuous
observations of the solar ultraviolet and X-radiations which have a profound influence on
the ionosphere and therefore on radio communications. The cause of magnetic storms and
1. Presented in this form at the 25th Anniversary Spring Meeting of the American Rocket Society, Bait'-
more, Maryland, April 20, 1955. The substance of this paper was first presented at the Fourth Congress of the
I.A.E, Zurich, 1953.
2. Part lI "Orbits and Lifetimes of Minimum Satellites" was presented as a paper at the New York meeting
of the American Rocket Society, Dec. 1954.
3. Associate Professor, Department of Physics, College Park, Maryland, U.S.A.
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aurorae could be established with more certainty. Observations of cosmic rays would help
clear up the question of their origin. Various other astrophysical phenomena, such as mz-
crometeorites, could be brought under direct observation. Measurement of the earth's albedo
(reflected sunlight) would give a measure of total world cloud coverage which could be
used to predict long term climatic changes. Radio transmissions from MOUSE would send
back all data and allow at the same time a study of the ionosphere. The change in the orbit
and the lifetime would give information on drag and therefore upper atmosphere densities,
while observation of a luminous trail of sodium emitted from the satellite would allow
studies of winds, temperature, and turbutence in the outermost layers of the earth's atmo-
sphere.
[172] The technical problems connected with the launching, control and instru-
mentation of the MOUSE satellite are well within the range of present techniques. It is
likely that even smaller satellites will be constructed first to carry out portions of the re-
search program described above ....
In_oducfion
It is the purpose of the present paper to present a strong justification for the estab-
lishment of a minimum artificial satellite of the earth in terms of the advances it would
lead to in our knowledge of the earth's outer atmosphere, of extraterrestrial radiations
and their influences on the earth. It is my belief that only after a justification has been
clearly stated and the problems delineated which the [173] satellite would solve for us,
does it become possible to deal with the technical problems in an intelligent manner; for
example, the questions of optimum altitude of the satellite or of the precision of the orbit
or of the necessary lifetime for a satellite cannot really be answered unless the purpose of
the satellite is kept clearly in mind.
We will discuss here only the geophysical and astrophysical applications of a mtmmum
satellite; i.e., a satellite weighing no more than perhaps fifty pounds, containing a radio
transmitter and simple instruments to measure properties of the earth's atmosphere and
of the extraterrestrial radiations. This does not mean that a larger satellite carr_ng more
elaborate equipment, such as television cameras, spectrographs, or telescopes with point-
ing controls, would not be more useful. However, the larger satellite vehicle seems far
removed from the standpoint of feasibility. To talk about its obvious usefulness would not
add to the very real task of defining the usefulness of a satellite small enough so that it can
be constructed and launched within the framework of available techniques. Hence we
shall resist the temptation to discuss more elaborate instrumentations and consider only
the very simplest types of observations which could be performed by instruments placed
in a minimum vehicle above the earth's atmosphere.
Instruments vs. Propulsion
The main tasks would seem to be to decide on what is important to measure, to
choose the fields in which crude observations could add appreciable knowledge to our
store of information about outer space, and finally to design instruments which can with-
out great refinement yield worthwhile and important data.
One can then investigate how the requirements of such a satellite research program
affect the propulsion and guidance necessary to place the vehicle in its orbit. It is obvious
that in order to be practical, this cannot be a one-way channel, but rather the propulsion
engineer may say to the astrophysicist: "This is as much as we can do, so many pounds of
payload, now see what you can do with that." It is necessary, therefore, to place oneself
somewhere in the middle, keeping both ears open, one towards propulsion and the other
towards the scientific instrumentation and to allow continuously for modifications on both
sides in order to produce an end product which will be both useful and feasible.
This indeed is the heart of the compromise. It is relatively easy to produce a satellite
which may be nothing more than a tiny metal slug, but it is hard to justi_ it on the basis of
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geophysicalusefulnessif it cannotbeeasilyobserved.Ontheotherhand,anambitious
satellitewithelaborateinstrumentsmayexceedthelimitationsetdownbytherocket
engineer.So,inordertobepractical,andthispaperwillbeconcernedwithapractical
approach,asatelliteproposalhastobebothfeasible and worthwhile.
We will arrange this paper into two parts: The first part will deal with a detailed
discussion of the most useful investigations, and their scientific and economic implica-
tions. The second part will deal with some of the technical questions pertaining to a satel-
lite, discussed in the light of the above investigations. These technical questions relate
primarily to the weight of the satellite, to its physical dimensions, to the structural materi-
als (in particular the skin), to the method of data recovery, to the choice of orbit, to the
optimum launching altitude, to the necessary launching accuracy in speed and angle and
the resulting precision of the orbit, and to the "lifetime" of the satellite?
[ 174] Basic Reasons for Upper Atmosphere Investigations
In order to study the largest part of extraterrestrial radiations, either electromag-
netic or corpuscular, it is necessary to be above the appreciable _ atmosphere since the
radiation on encountering the atmosphere is modified or absorbed. Certain of the radia-
tions, e.g., ultraviolet from the sun, are of great importance for the behavior of the atmo-
sphere, but in every case a study of the incoming radiations reveals much about processes
in outer space which could not be determined from sea level or even balloon observations.
If we examine the transmission of the atmosphere to electromagnetic radiations [ 1], we
find only two major 'hsindows", one in the visible region from 2900 A to about 7000 A, the
other in the radio region. Beyond 7000 A in the infrared there are many absorption bands
due to the presence of water vapor, carbon dioxide, and ozone. Occasionally there are
"windows" in the atmosphere through which one can see small portions of the infrared
spectrum of the sun [2]. A particular prominent window is in the neighborhood of ten
microns. It is only when one reaches wave lengths of the order of millimeters, in the micro-
wave region, that the atmosphere again becomes transparent. But when the wave length
increases up to a few meters the waves are again prevented from coming to sea level, this
time not by absorption, but by reflection from the ionized layers in the upper atmosphere
[ 1]. Going from the optical window towards shorter wave lengths one finds ozone and
oxygen to be effective absorbers of ultraviolet radiation. It is only recently that rocket
flights above 70 miles have given direct evidence of solar radiation in the far ultraviolet
and in the X-ray region.
The situation is even worse with regard to corpuscular radiation. Even the highly
energetic (> 10 _ ev) cosmic ray primary particles (made up of protons and nuclei of heavier
atoms) cannot penetrate far into the atmosphere without undergoing collisions with air
nuclei. Only the cosmic ray secondaries produced in these collisions can reach the lower
atmosphere [3]. Auroral particles, [175] which are responsible for the northern lights,
may contain protons of energy 100 times lower than the lowest cosmic ray energies; they
are easily stopped in the upper atmosphere as they give up their energy to excite the
auroral glow [4]; strangely enough particles of energy intermediate to cosmic rays and
auroral particles are often absent [5], Particles of even lower velocity (about 3000 km/sec)
are extremely difficult to detect if they arrive singly. If they are charged, they will be turned
away by the earth's magnetic field, long before they come close to the atmosphere. If,
however, they arrive in sufficiently large numbers, in the form of corpuscular streams,
instead of singly, then their reaction on the magnetic field is noticeable and may even lead
to measurable variations of the earth's field [6].
A third category includes material bodies: interplanetary dust particles, micromete-
orites, meteors and meteorites. The last two categories can, of course, be detected from
4. This novel concept relates to the duration of the satellite orbit and is discussed in Part If. Astronautics,
Acta, Vol. I, Fasc. 4.
5. Where _appreciable" denotes an altitude appropriate to the type of radiation under study, e.g., - 2.5
miles for cosmic rays, ~ 65 miles for solar ultraviolet.
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theground,themeteorsbytheirluminousandionizationtrails.If theyareextremely
small(oftheorderof afewmicrons),theymaynotproducethesetrails.Theycould,
however,beobservedinimpactswithdetectorsplacedabovetheatmosphere[7].
SatelliteObservations
Since1946upperatmosphereexperimentshavebeencarriedoninV-2,Aerobee,
andVikinghighaltitudesoundingrocketsandhavefurnishedagreatdealof scientific
knowledgeabouthehighatmosphereandsolarandcosmicradiations[8]. In acritical
studyof therocketprogramoneisleftwiththefeelingthatmuchcouldbegainedin
certainfieldsbymorefrequentorevencontinuousobservationsasagainstoccasionalrocket
measurementsatonelocationoftheearth.Outofsuchastudyemergesaconsistentre-
searchprogramforasatellite,consistenti thesensethatit willsupplementtheinforma-
tionwhichhasbeen[176]derivedfromhighaltituderocketexperimentsbyexpanding
thetimeandgeographicalscaleof certainobservations.Rocketexperiments,becauseof
their greaterpayloads,candelvemorecloselyintodetailedinvestigationsof uppel
atmospherephenomenaandradiationsfromouterspace.
Electromagnetic Radiations
Probably the most important subject for study from a platform above the atmosphere
is the ultraviolet radiation from the sun. The interesting radiations extend all the way into
the soft X-ray region with wave lengths of only a few Angstrom units. The portion of the
radiation extending from 2900 A to 2200 A is stopped by the ozone (0_) of the middle
atmosphere (about 30 miles). Wavelengths shorter than 2200 A must be observed at alti-
tudes of over 65 miles since the absorption of the residual oxygen in the atmosphere is
strong enough to eliminate all traces of this radiation at lower altitudes [1].
A characteristic feature of the solar radiation in the UV region is its great variability;
although the sun appears to be emitting steadily in the visible, in the ultraviolet it behaves
very much as a variable star. Since the ultraviolet radiation has such profound effects on
the earth's upper atmosphere (it produces the radio reflecting layers of the ionosphere
and the ozone layer) and since it initiates many photochemical reactions in the upper
atmosphere, it is of the utmost importance to keep track of the ultraviolet radiation. Of
particular interest in the Lyman-alpha line of hydrogen at 1216 A where a large part of the
ultraviolet energy of the sun is concentrated. It is suspected that the intensity of the line
can vary considerably depending on the amount of solar activity [9]. During periods of
solar activity large amounts of energy seem to be released in the solar atmosphere and can
be observed as sudden brightenings ("flares") on the solar surface in the vicinity of sun
spots. These brightenings cover only a minute fraction of the solar disc and are detectable
only in light filtered in the red line of atomic hydrogen (Ha line 6563 A). During these
solar flares gaseous material is ejected from the sun into interplanetary space and large
amounts of electromagnetic radiation are also emitted. We cannot observe at sea level
anything but the visible. There is good evidence, however, for the increased emission of
LW through observations of the ionosphere. Large solar flares can produce so-called radio
fadeouts which are indicated by the disappearance of reflected radio signals. The fadeouts
are caused by excess ionization in the lower D layer of the ionosphere, this excess ioniza-
tion being produced by a large increase in the UV emission from various levels of the sun's
atmosphere. The outermost level, the tenuous corona, emits X-radiations which are simi-
larly enhanced during solar flares. The exact amounts are not known and their variability
is quite unknown. Probably, therefore, the most important application of a satellite would
be to the study of the Lyman-alpha radiation and the X-radiation of the sun, and of their
intensity variation with time during different periods of solar activity. A study of the rela-
tionship, during solar flares, of the large increases among the different regions of the solar
spectrum may give us valuable information about the manner in which the energy is
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transferred from the surface of the sun into the sun's outer atmosphere 10,000 miles up. It
is suspected that the corona is heated either by magneto-hydrodynamic shock waves or by
particle streams, thus causing the high temperatures which are deduced from coronal
emission lines observed in the visible. From the travel time of the disturbance we may be
able to learn more about the actual mechanism by which the energy is transported in the
solar atmosphere,
[177] The economic implications of these studies are quite considerable, particu-
larly if correlated directly with ionospheric observations. The study of the ionosphere has
become a vast undertaking carried on by the laboratories of many governments on an
international basis in order to derive fundamental information about the radio reflecting
layers. The knowledge derived can be applied in a practical way to give predictions neces-
sary for effective radio communication. At the present time this study is handicapped by
our very imperfect knowledge about the solar radiations which produce these layers. Al-
though there can be a wide range of argument about which types of satellite observations
would be the most useful, it is safe to say that the studies of the solar radiation described
above would rank very high.
The instruments for observing solar ultraviolet and X-radiation can be photon geiger-
counters or photo sensitive surfaces with appropriate filters, similar to techniques which
are now being used in high altitude rockets [8]. It is essential, however, to be able to point
the instruments roughly towards the sun, to have them reasonably omnidirectional in case
of misorientation, and to be able to observe the sun over as large a fraction of the orbit as
possible.
Aside from the UV region, measurements of electromagnetic radiation can also be
carried on in the infrared. Here the techniques become more difficult, also the results
become less important from the fundamental point of view of solar physics and from the
applied point of view of atmospheric effects. Furthermore, the variability in the infrared
should be low; therefore, occasional rather than continuous observation may provide the
necessary answers. Finally, it is possible to get a great deal of information on the solar
infrared from balloon observations above the appreciable water-vapor and carbon dioxide
of the lower atmosphere.
Up to now no hard X-rays or gamma rays coming from the sun have been measured.
The problem may be one of low intensity, but it is certainly advisable to explore this region
in conventional high altitude rockets before discussing applications for a satellite instru-
mentation. Of particular interest would be the measurement of the 2.2 Mev gamma ray
which arises from the radiative nuclear capture of neutrons by protons and would indicate
the presence of high energy neutrons on the sun. This is an experiment which could
probably be done in a balloon because high energy gamma rays are quite penetrating;
thus it is no longer necessary to observe at extremely high altitudes.
Corpuscular Radiation
During periods of great solar activity, one can observe with chronographs promi-
nences of luminous gas being shot out from the solar surface. These observations indicate
the great violence of solar processes. Recent radio observations of the sun have shown the
existence of streams of charged particles which are shot out through the solar atmosphere
during solar flares [9]. But for a half century now it has been hypothesized that the sun
can emit clouds of ionized gas with velocities high enough to leave its surface and travel
through interplanetary space past the earth. While it has not been possible to observe
these gas clouds directly in their travel from the sun, their effects upon the earth are
unmistakable. About a day following a strong solar flare (as manifested by visual observa-
tions on the solar disk and by ultraviolet enhancements leading to radio fadeouts), one
observes a sudden increase of the earth's magnetic field, the so-called "sudden commence-
ment." This is followed a few hours later by a slow decrease of the field which may last for
several days. These "magnetic storms" are world-wide and are believed to be produced by
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theelectromagneticeffects[178]ofthesestreamsofchargedparticlesastheyenterthe
earth'smagneticfield.Duringtheseperiodsonealsoobservesalarge nhancementof he
aurorain thenorthernandsouthernhemispheres.Theseauroraldisplaysin theupper
atmospherearethoughttobeduetohighspeedcorpuscles,possiblyprotons,whichcome
fromthesunduringtheseperiodsofgreatactivity.Theregionsofthesunwhicharere-
sponsibleforthemagneticstorms,theso-calledM-regions, show great persistence; twenty-
seven days later, one synodic rotation period of the sun, one may again observe a magnetic
storm, an enhancement of the aurora, and associated cosmic ray effects. It is thought,
therefore, that the active regions of the sun continue to emit a stream of particles which
sweeps interplanetary space, very much like a stream of water from a rotating garden hose
[1].
The nature of the solar streams, and the exact mechanism by which they cause mag-
netic storms, aurorae, and cosmic ray effects, are not well understood. A satellite could
contribute to this study in two ways: (1) By intercepting the particles which cause the
aurora, we would determine their nature and their intensity, their time variations and
their geographical distribution. A satellite traversing an orbit over both poles would also
contain the world-wide distribution of auroral particles in the northern and southern hemi-
spheres. This would give an important clue to their origin. (2) By studying the magnetic
field above the conducting layers of the ionosphere one would obtain a better picture of
the primary effects of the magnetic-storm producing beam since the magnetic effect
observed at sea level is distorted by the ionosphere [7]. The instrumentation for these
measurements is again well proven from high altitude rocket experiments. The auroral
particle measurements could be done with thin-walled geiger-counters whereas the mag-
netic storm measurements could be done by means of total field magnetometers such as
have been used in Aerohee rockets.
The study of magnetic storms and aurorae is of considerable practical importance
again from the point of view of radio communication. Magnetic storms have sometimes
profound and very violent effects also on long distance telephone communication; the
electric fields induced by the strong variations in the earth's magnetic field can easily burn
out long distance cables and raise havoc with wire communication.
Cosmic Rays
Cosmic rays are corpuscular radiations of extremely high energies. The primary cos-
mic rays consist mainly of protons but also of helium nuclei and to a smaller extent of the
nuclei of heavier elements. They arrive at the top of the atmosphere with almost the speed
of light and with energies ranging from a few billion electron volts (Bey) up to a billion
times as much. They constitute the highest energy phenomenon known in nature; but
because of the small number of cosmic rays which are received here, the energy they bring
in is about equal to the energy of starlight. The effects of cosmic rays on the earth and the
earth's atmosphere are, therefore, probably negligible but they constitute one of the most
important fields of study in modern physics and provide a challenging problem to the
astrophysicist as well as to the nuclear physicist. The nuclear physicist studies cosmic rays
because they represent nuclear particles of energy vastly greater than can be produced by
even the largest accelerators. The cosmic rays in colliding with the atoms of the upper air
produce nuclear reactions which cannot be duplicated in laboratory studies. The nuclear
physicist, therefore, views cosmic rays essentially as a tool which nature has provided to
help him in the study of high energy physics and with which he hopes to solve the prob-
lems of [179] the ultimate constitution of the nucleus and the ultimate nature of the
"elementary" particles. Already the study of cosmic rays from that point-of-view has led to
the discovery of many new types of elementary particles, the so-called mesons, There is
reason to believe that their systematic study will lead eventually to a better understanding
of the nature of nuclear forces [3].
320 ORIGINS OF U.S. SPACE POLICY
The astrophysicist treats cosmic rays essentially as a phenomenon and as an indicator
of processes which go on in the galaxy and in the solar system. He is mainly concerned
about the origin of the cosmic radiation and about the manner in which they acquire the
high energies; he asks about the processes which exist in the universe which can produce
such tremendous energies. There is little doubt that these processes are electromagnetic
in nature and that, therefore, a study of the origin of cosmic rays will lead to a better
understanding of the electromagnetic conditions not only in the vicinity of the earth and
in the solar system but also in our galaxy. This knowledge of magnetic fields in the galaxy
can have a very profound influence on theories of the origin of galactic systems and on
cosmology in general.
One of the most fruitful ways of studying the cosmic radiation is to investigate the
distribution-in-energy of the primary rays. This has been accomplished in rocket experi-
ments by observing the cosmic ray flux at different latitudes. The method makes use of the
earth's magnetic field, which varies with latitude, and uses this field as an energy analyzer
for cosmic radiations. It has led to the rather surprising finding that in the cosmic radia-
tion there is at dmes an absence of low energy cosmic rays; i.e., below about 0.5 Bey there
are very few cosmic rays compared to the number above this energy [5]. The mechanism
which either keeps low energy cosmic rays from coming to the earth, or perhaps prevents
their ever being produced, is not understood, and if cleared up will probably shed a great
deal of light on the origin of cosmic rays themselves. Experimentally this absence of low
energy cosmic rays manifests itself as follows: While the cosmic ray flux increases by a
factor of ten in going from the equator to geomagnetic latitude 56 ° , there is no further
increase observed between 56 ° and 90 ° . If the low energy cosmic radiation were present,
the increase between 56 ° and 90 ° might be almost another factor of ten.
The most promising method, therefore, for using a satellite for cosmic ray studies
would be to investigate the energy spectrum on a continuous basis by allowing the satellite
to travel between 0 ° and 90 ° ladtude to measure the intensity variation of cosmic rays as a
function of latitude. We would like to discover, for example, whether the "knee" at 56 ° is
fixed with time or whether its position changes as a function of the solar cycle, whether
there are increases in intensity above 56 ° possibly correlated with phenomena on the sun,
and so on.
From cosmic ray studies of the last few years we know that the cosmic ray intensity is
not constant. Among the more pronounced effects there are two which seem to be espe-
cially suited to satellite observations, because of their large size. They are the cosmic ray
increases which sometimes accompany certain bright solar flares, and the cosmic ray de-
creases which often occur in connection with magnetic storms [3].
The cosmic ray increases associated occasionally with solar flares manifest themselves
in a rapid rise of the cosmic ray intensity about ten to thirty minutes after the solar flare. It
seems fairly certain that the increases are due to cosmic ray particles, accelerated either on
the sun or in the immediate vicinity of the sun, which travel towards the earth and are then
deflected by the earth's magnetic field. This deflection causes the particles to be incident
at certain locations, the so-called impact zones, with relation to the sun-earth line [ 10].
From our present [ 180] sea level observations it seems fairly certain that these cosmic ray
increases are due to additional particles of low energy, i.e., not exceeding about 10 Bey.
What is quite unknown, however, is the reason why only a few solar flares cause these large
increases, four in the last 15 years. Satellite observations could establish whether increases
occurred in the primary cosmic rays but were confined to such low energies that no effects
could be detected at sea level.
The decreases of the cosmic ray intensity lasting a day or more and associated with
magnetic storms are among the most puzzling phenomena. Recent observations that these
decreases occur even at the pole establish that we are dealing here with a real decrease in
the cosmic ray intensity in the vicinity of the earth, rather than a deflection away from the
earth by the ring current which is thought to encircle the earth during periods of mag-
netic storms [4]. The question as to what produces this decrease in cosmic ray intensity is
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not at all settled. It is thought likely that the cosmic storms are produced by the corpuscu-
lar streams from the sun which are also responsible for magnetic storms. The cosmic ray
decreases show the same 27-day recurrence, clearly associated with the 27-day s_lodic ro-
tation period of the sun. One of the missing links for an interpretation of the phenom-
enon is again an observation of the primary spectrum during periods of cosmic ray storm
decreases [7].
Techniques for observing the cosmic radiation are well developed from work in con-
ventional rockets. Gcigercounters of conventional and special design could be used to
measure the flux and even the composition of the primary radiation.
Micrometeorites
We cannot study atomic particles of extremely low velocities; i.e., below the velocities
of auroral particles, unless they occur in large streams and produce electromagnetic ef-
fects as is the case with the corpuscular streams from the sun. We can, however, study low
velocity particles of higher mass, i.e., micrometeorites or interplanetary dust particles (di-
mension of the order of 1 micron). Depending on their orbits with respect to the eal th
they may enter the atmosphere with velocities up to about seventy kilometers per second.
The larger ones produce, of course, the bright flashes and ionization trails associated with
meteors but very small ones may escape detection entirely. No direct observations have
been made of micrometeorites except for some exploratory rocket experiments in which
their impacts have been observed either by condenser microphones or by the pitting of
polished plates [7].
Observations of the zodiacal light and of the F-corona, the outer dust corona of the
sun, have given some ideas of the density of interplanetary dust between the sun and the
earth. Micrometeorites would perhaps have the same dimensions as dust particles but travel
with rather high speeds into the atmosphere. The number of observations of the inter-
planetary dust are not sufficient as yet to establish any significant density variations with
the solar cycle or even variations of a shorter time period. A particularly interesting point
to investigate would be the effect of solar corpuscular beams on the dust density; it will be
possible thereby to evaluate the "sweeping out" effect of a corpuscular beam. This study of
the fluctuations in their intensity could be performed in a satellite by counting particle
impacts; it would have considerable value in clearing up the origin of the interplanetary
dust particles. The measurement of an intensity variation vs. latitude would give informa-
tion on their momenta and electric charges.
[181] Observations of the Earth's Upper Atmosphere
Earth's Albedo
One of the main questions which concerns meteorologists is the heat input to the
earth from the sun. The heat balance of the earth can be described roughly as follows: The
earth intercepts from the sun an amount of energy equal to the solar constant at the earth's
orbit times the cross-sectional area of the earth. The solar constant has the value of
2 calories/cm:/min; it is believed that variations in the solar ultraviolet emission do not
affect its value appreciably although UV radiation does have profound effects on the up-
per atmosphere. Of the total amount of energy intercepted a certain fraction is reflected
in the visible. This reflection is of the order of 35%; it is mainly due to clouds, which have
a very high albedo. The albedo of the land surface is of the order of 15% although snow
and ice on the land surface will greatly increase the albedo. The largest portion of the
earth's surface, the oceans, have an albedo of only 4% in the visible. The net energy, i.e.
incident minus reflected, is used to heat the earth's surface and atmosphere. This energy
influx is balanced by the heat loss from the earth's surface and the atmosphere; they radi-
ate according to the classical radiauon laws. Since thetr temperature is very low, of the
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order of 300 ° K, the radiation occurs mainly in the far infrared, around ten microns. The
energy is radiated isotropically into interplanetary space and is lost from the earth. The
infrared loss tends to vary slowly because of the large heat capacity of the earth. The great
unknown in the heat balance considerations is represented by the amount of reflected
sunlight which depends so critically in the day-to-day cloud coverage of the earth. The
satellite furnishes a very direct method for measuring the visual albedo of the earth and
supplying thereby the vital missing link in the heat balance computations. It should, there-
fore, be possible to plot more detailed heat flux data for the earth, which in turn could
lead to the possibility of predicting long range climate for various latitude belts of the
earth and for various seasons. The practical importance of this possibility can hardly be
overestimated.
The actual measurement of the earth's albedo is technically a very simple matter. A
photocell which views the earth continuously would provide us with the necessary infor-
mation.
Ionosphere
The radio signal from a satellite which is used to transmit the data from the various
instruments can itself be used to yield important information about the ionosphere. As
the satellite moves with respect to a fixed station, the total number of electrons between it
and the receiving station decreases to a minimum and then increases. This change in
index of refraction introduces an easily measured frequency shift. While this ionosphere
frequency shift is always superimposed upon a Doppler shift, they can be separated and
evaluated independendy. The satellite transmitter, therefore, gives us a valuable tool for
investigating the ionosphere in a manner which supplements the usual ionospheric inves-
tigations with reflected radio signals.
Upper Atmosphere Densities
The measurement of drag deceleration seems to be the only promising method for
determining the densities in the very high atmosphere where the molecular mean free
path is very much larger than any instrument or any vehicle which can be sent up. Clearly
a vertically falling body of any appreciable mass will [182] not experience a measurable
deceleration. It is only when the body travels in an orbit in which it can spend a long time
in the upper atmosphere, that the product, deceleration X time, leads to an appreciable
change in velocity; even though the deceleration is very small, the time interval is long
enough to allow the velocity change to be measured.
In the case of a satellite the velocity change will lead to a change in the elements of
the orbit; it is, therefore, possible by measuring the change in the elements of the orbit to
deduce upper atmosphere densities. A detailed study of the effects of upper atmosphere
drag leads to the following results: An initially elliptical orbit which has a perigee suffi-
ciently low in the atmosphere to experience drag, will after a certain number of orbits
gradually approach a circular orbit. The rate at which the eccentricity decreases depends
not only on the elements of the orbit but critically on the area and mass of the satellite. 6
6. In the elliptical orbit the energy lossoccursmainly at the perigee, the point of closest approach to the
earth's surface. It is therefore possible to apply an approximation method in which the energy lossand velocity
loss is concentrated at the perigee. This method can be used to predict with good accuracy the lifetime of a
satellite after its initial orbit isdetermined and if its area and mass are known. After the orbit has become more
or less circular, the energy loss will occur continuously and the circle will shrink in altitude until finally the
energy lossper orbit becomes an appreciable fraction of the total energy. The perturbation method which has
been used is then no longer applicable; the satellite rapidly loses altitude and intercepts the earth's surface.
(For further details cf. Part II.)
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Sodium Trail
It has been remarked earlier that the solar radiation produces reactions in the up-
per atmosphere which lead to the emission of light. Among the prominent emission lines
of the night air glow are those of the "forbidden" oxygen transitions (5577 A and 6300 A)
and also the yellow D-lines of sodium (5893 A). During twilight, while the lower atmo-
sphere is dark, the sun illuminates the upper atmosphere. Under these conditions the few
sodium atoms of the upper atmosphere, because of resonance radiation, exhibit the char-
acteristic yellow sodium line very strongly, the so-called "twilight flash" [1 ]. Since the so-
dium atoms are not localized, the emission is observed as a diffuse yellow glow. It has been
suggested that if the concentration of sodium were enhanced, the sodium light emission
would be similarly increased. Therefore, a novel application of a satellite would be to ex-
haust sodium vapor into the upper atmosphere so as to produce a defined trail of sodium
atoms which would in turn exhibit a defined trail of the sodium emission light. This would
lead to rather spectacular results since it should be possible to observe this sodium trail
visually from the ground during twilight conditions. From the research point of view the
sodium trail offers great advantages. Since the sodium atoms are subject to collisions with
other gas atoms, they will soon cool down and share their temperature. From the spread-
ing of the trail, therefore, we would be able to learn about the temperature and turbu-
lence in the outermost layers of the earth's atmosphere and from the distortion of the trail
we would be able to deduce the existence of winds in these rarefied regions. The sodium
trail certainly promises to be one of the most exciting applications of satellite geophysical
research.
Technical Questions
We may now turn our attention to the characteristics of the satellite and its orbit,
which are required to make possible the investigations which we have [183] outlined. With
the simple instrumentation which these investigations demand, the weight of the satellite
can be kept well below fifty pounds. The scientific data would be telemetered to the ground
by a radio transmitter which carries superimposed on it a number of telemetering chan-
nels; each is assigned to a definite instrument which detects and transmits information
about the phenomenon it is sensitive to. The largest portion of the weight will be the
power supply and transmitter. Once a radio frequency channel has been established, each
additional telemetering channel does not consume very much extra power or weight. The
individual instrumentations probably weigh only on the order of ounces. The physical
dimensions of the satellite can be similarly small, probably within a cylinder of about one
foot diameter and one foot height. With proper precautions the temperature problems in
the satellite are not critical; it is only necessary to establish good heat conductivity to pre-
vent hot spots. The average temperature would be of the order of room temperature.
The various experiments outlined earlier strongly suggest an orbit [ 11 ] which will go
over the poles of the earth rather than an equatorial orbit. Since, however, an equatorial
orbit is easier to establish from the propulsion point of view, one probably should not insist
too strongly on a polar orbit, at least to begin with, except to point out that it would allow
the continuous observation of the sun and, therefore, the continuous production of elec-
tric power by means of silicon solar batteries. A polar orbit will also allow a study of the
energy spectrum of the cosmic rays and the investigation of auroral particles in the auroral
zone. It would further allow scanning of the complete earth's surface in order to obtain
the cloud albedo. There are, therefore, many advantages in the choice of a polar orbit
rather than an equatorial one; it is hoped that the additional propulsion which a polar
orbit demands will not be too difficult to procure. In a polar orbit it would be most eco-
nomical to store the telemetered information and release it only over the poles, either one
or both, since this would demand a minimum of telemetering receiving stations. It is to be
kept in mind that the orbit will stay more or less fixed in space as the earth turns
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underneathit.Anorbit,therefore,[184]whichisperpendiculartotheearth-sunline,will
offerthegreatestadvantagefromthepointofviewofsolarobservation.
A questionequallyimportantasthepropulsionproblemisthedegreeofguidance
necessarytoachieveadesiredorbit.Theoptimumlaunchingaltitudeandtheerrorsal-
lowableinlaunchingspeedandangleareintimatelytiedupwitheachotherandwiththe
physicalpropertiesofthesatellite.Togethertheydeterminethelifetimeofthesatellite.Thisisamatterof detailedconsiderationsandisdiscussedin PartII. It is tobenoted
finallythatopticalvisibilityandprecisionoftheorbitareofminorimportanceforasatel-
litewhosemainapplicationisgeophysicalorastrophysicalresearch.It ismerelynecessary
tohaveit abovetheatmosphereforasufficiendylongperiodof time,whichmaymean
onlyafewdays.Astronomicalperturbationscanbeneglectedforsuchshortlifetimes.It is
seen,therefore,thattheguidanceandcontrolproblem,aswellasthepropulsionproblem
forthistypeof satelliteisextremelysimple[11]incomparisonto satelliteswhichare
meanttofulfillmoreambitiousfunctions.It isthisfeaturemainlywhichgiveshopeforthe
earlyaccomplishmentofaminimuminstrumentedsatellite.
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Document 11-12
Document title: "Memorandum of Discussion at the 322d Meeting of the National
Security Council, Washington, D.C., May 10, 1957," United Nations and General Interna-
tional Matters, Vol. XI. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957 (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 748-54. The original document is located in
the Whitman File, NSC Series, Eisenhower Library. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by S.
Everett Gleason on May 11, 1957.
The National Security Council (NSC) had originally approved $20 million for the
IGY satellite program, Project Vanguard. But the cost estimate for the program began
rising almost immediately until it reached $110 million in April 1957. On May 3, 1957, a
four-page "Memorandum for the President" from Percival Brundage, Director of the Bu-
reau of the Budget, had raised the issue of Project Vanguard's cost overruns. This problem
prompted President Eisenhower to ask that the scientific satellite program be discussed at
the May 10, 1957, meeting of the NSC, including Soviet progress toward developing a
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space vehicle. At this meeting, the president decided that, despite the cost increases, the
United States had no choice but to go ahead with the program.
[748] In the course of his briefing [on the scientific satellite program], Mr. [Robert]
Cutler [special assistant to the president for national security affairs] explained that an-
other hike in the costs of this program had induced the President to schedule the matter
for discussion by the National Security Council. Mr. Cutler said that there would be a
presentation by Assistant Secretary of Defense [William M. ] Holaday and other officials of
the Research and Engineering Division of the Department of Defense. Dr. Detlev Bronk,
President of the National Academy of Sciences, and Dr. Alan Waterman, Director of the
National Science Foundation, were likewise present, and would comment on the report by
the Department of Defense ....
After Mr. Cutler had finished his briefing and had noted that the costs of- the pro-
gram had increased from the original estimate (May 1955) of $15-20 million to the esti-
mate of April 1957, of $110 million, he turned to call upon Secretary Holaday to present
the Defense Department report. The President, however, interrupted with a _4gorous com-
plaint to Mr. Curler that before he slid over some very important facts it would be well to
recall that the original [749] program, calling for six satellites, was primarily a satety pro-
gram designed to assure that at least one of these six satellites could be successfully or-
bited. There was no intention necessarily to launch six satellites. Another problem which
disturbed the President was the very costly instrumentation currently being pro_Sded for
the six satellites. Such costly instrumentation had not been envisaged when NSC 5520 had
originally been approved by the President. The President therefore stressed that the ele-
ment of national prestige, so strongly emphasized in NSC 5520, depended on getting a
satellite into its orbit, and not on the instrumentation of the scientific satellite.
Mr. Cutler explained that he had not intentionally passed over these problems, and
that they would be dealt with in the presentations by the Defense Department which were
now to follow. Mr. Cutler then called on Secretary Holaday, who in turn stated that Dr.
[John E] Hagen [director of the Vanguard program] would make the first report on the
nature and performance of the earth satellite program and the schedule of test
launchings ....
Dr. Hagen was followed by Assistant Secretary Holaday, who confined himself to an
analysis of the cost aspects of the program to launch an earth satellite, with particular
emphasis on the reasons which had led to the marked increases in the estimated costs of
completing the program. He concluded his remarks with certain recommendations as to
ways and means of funding the remainder of the program.
At the conclusion of Secretary Holaday's remarks, Mr. Cutler called on Dr. Bronk for
a statement of the scientific aspects and importance of the earth satellite program. Dr.
Bronk said that he would divide his brief report into three main parts. He dealt first with
what he described as the immediate practical values to be derived from the successful
orbiting of a scientific satellite. Among these, he stressed...information on the determi-
nants of weather; and lastly, the influence of outer space on communications. He com-
mented on the intense anticipation with which scientists were waiting for the receipt of
this kind of scientific information.
Dr. Bronk stated that the second aspect of his analysis would be concerned with what
might be described as the spiritual aspects of the program. If a satellite were successfully
orbited, it would constitute the movement of man into an entirely new area of the universe
into which he had never moved before. This was, accordingly, a challenging adventure,
and if it were successfully concluded would mark a whole new chapter--indeed, a new
epoch--in science and history.
[750] Finally, Dr. Bronk said he would touch on the international aspects of the
earth satellite program. These aspects, he said, were of very great concern to our scientists.
The fact that our earth satellite program was being carried out in connection with the
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International Geophysical Year and in association with scientific groups from many for-
eign countries, would bring our scientists into a relationship with the scientists of other
countries which could be very significant. We are taking the lead, but we are associated
with a variety of other nations.
Mr. Curler then called on Dr. Waterman, who said he would confine himself to dis-
cussing the matter of responsibility for funding the earth satellite program, as between the
National Science Foundation and the Department of Defense. The gist of Dr. Waterman's
remarks was that if it proved necessary to go to the Congress for a supplemental appropria-
tion in order to complete the program set forth in NSC 5520, the Department of Defense
was in a much better position, and had a much clearer obligation, to do so than did the
National Science Foundation. On the other hand, Dr. Waterman expressed the earnest
hope that some way might be found to provide for the costs of completing this program
without going up to the Congress with a request for supplemental appropriations.
The President said that two thoughts had come to his mind at once as he had lis-
tened to this series of reports and comments. In the first place, there was no particular
reason to assume that the latest estimate of the costs of completing the program
($110 million) would prove firmer than the earlier estimates. Indeed, it was quite possible
that the costs of completing the program would go to $150 million, or even higher. His
second impression, said the President, was that everybody wanted to duck responsibility
for finding the money to fund the program.
Mr. Curler then requested the Director of Central Intelligence to report on what we
knew about the Soviet program to launch an earth satellite, and on the world-wide effects
of a U.S. decision to abandon its own earth satellite program at this time.
Mr. Dulles indicated that the Soviets had not followed through on their promise to
provide the organizers of the International Geophysical Year with the appropriate details
of their program .... With respect to the effect of a U.S. abandonment of our program, Mr.
Dulles pointed out that the program had been widely advertised and warmly welcomed
throughout the world of science. If the Soviets succeeded in orbiting a scientific satellite
and the United States did not even try to, the USSR would have achieved a propaganda
weapon which they could use to boast about the superiority of Soviet scientists. In the
premises, the Soviets would also emphasize the propaganda theme that our abandonment
[751] of this peaceful scientific program meant that we were devoting the resources of our
scientists to warlike preparations instead of peaceful programs.
Mr. Curler then invited comments from Secretary [of Defense Charles E.] Wilson.
Secretary Wilson replied that when the earth satellite program was first broached in the
spring of 1955, it had been clearly and publicly stated that any of the scientific information
resulting from the successful launching of an earth satellite would be made available freely
to the whole world. Accordingly, our earth satellite program partook of the character of a
pure research product rather than of the character of directed research which the Depart-
ment of Defense could appropriately describe as vital to U.S. national security. Of course,
continued Secretary Wilson, we in the Defense Department do have some defense interest
in the satellite program. Nevertheless, itwas not the kind of program which Defense could
properly underwrite and for which it could properly provide money, as it had done lately,
out of the DOD emergency funds for research and development. Indeed, Congress had
already criticized the Defense Department for allocating money out of its emergency funds
to tide over the earth satellite program, and Secretary Wilson said he could not really
blame Congressional critics for their attitude. He complained that he was already having
enough trouble in providing money out of his emergency funds for research projects which
were truly vital to national defense.
The Director of the Budget pointed out to Secretary Wilson that the Department of
Defense Emergency Fund ran out each year and had to be renewed each year.
When Mr. Cutler inquired of Secretary [Christian A.] Herter the views of the Depart-
ment of State, Secretary Herter replied that he felt much as did Mr. Allen Dulles. The State
Department favored completing the earth satellite program because of the prestige it would
confer on the United States. He could not speak authoritatively of the problem of funding
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the program, which he said did present a rather frightening picture. Asked for his opin-
ion, Admiral [Lewis L.] Strauss, [Chair of the Atomic Energy Commission], replied that
he concurred in the views of Secretary Herter.
The President then commented that there was one lesson to be learned from the
experience with the earth satellite program: In the future let us avoid any bragging until
we know we have succeeded in accomplishing our objectives. The President then said that
he would like to be informed as to how much the increased costs of the earth satellite
program derived from increased costs of more elaborate instrumentation. Secondly, he
wished to inquire whether the [752] launching of an earth satellite could be rendered
easier if the satellite did not contain so much instrumentation as currently planned.
In replying to the President, Secretary Holaday pointed out that the diameter of the
earth satellite had been reduced from thirty inches to twenty inches, although he admit-
ted that the instrumentation had become a little "gold-plated', or at least "chromium-
plated", as it had developed. Secretary Holaday also admitted that at the start of the earth
satellite program we had not realized fully the requirements of the velocity. Likeu_se, more
observation stations were now going to be established than had originally been thought
necessary. Such items as these helped to explain the increasing costs of the program.
The President responded by pointing out that although Secretary Holaday had said
that the 30-inch sphere had now been reduced to a 20-inch sphere, this was still larger than
the "size of the basketball" which had been mentioned when NSC 5520 had first been
considered by the Council. The President confessed that he was much annoyed by this
tendency to "gold-plate" the satellite in terms of instrumentation before we had proved
the basic feasibility of orbiting any kind of earth satellite. Secretary Wilson added the com-
ment that irrespective of the merit of the earth satellite program, this program had too
many promoters and no bankers.
Mr. Cutler alluded to a suggestion that if we succeeded in orbiting one of the test
vehicles which would have no scientific instrumentation, it might be possible to abandon
the rest of the program for launching the fully-instrumented scientific satellite. The trouble
with this reasoning, according to Mr. Curler, was that the six instrumented satellites were
already in the pipeline. Accordingly, if we abandoned the attempt to launch these satel-
lites, we wouldn't save very much money and we would miss achieving our objectives.
Secretary Humphrey inquired what was expected to happen if and when we suc-
ceeded in orbiting an earth satellite. Would we not then initiate another tremendous pro-
gram to launch additional satellites and secure additional information about outer space.
Secretary Wilson commented that this was the likely eventuality, and that this was the
American way of doing everything--bigger and better.
The President observed that it was quite conceivable that the information we achieved
from the successful launching of an earth satellite would be so great as to merit a continu-
ing program thereafter. The trouble was that our original "basketball" satellite program
had grown bigger, better, and more cosily, at the same time that everybody wished to duck
financial responsibility for its completion.
Secretary Wilson said that there was another significant factor to account for the
increasing costs of programs such as this, Whenever you put a time limit on a new and
large scientific program, you [753] immediately encountered financial troubles. The costs
were bound to rise if the objective had to be achieved when a specific and relatively short
time interval was set.
The President observed that in any event he did not see how the United States could
back out of the earth satellite program at this time. We should, however, keep it on no
more elaborate a basis than at the present time. Beyond this there was the problem of how
to finance the completion of the program. In this respect the President suggested that in
view of the fact that we have run out of money, there was no other recourse than for
Defense and the National Science Foundationjoinily to appear before the Congressional
committees, tell them the story, and ask for supplemental funds. Secretary Wilson agreed
with the President that we could not now abandon the program, and the President
informed Secretary Wilson, Mr. Brundage and Dr. Waterman that they should make
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arrangementstogobeforetheCongressionalcommitteeswitharequestforfundstofi-
nancetheprogramonitspresentbasis.Beforedoingso,however,thePresidentsaidhe
wishedthescientistswhohadbeenconcernedwiththisprogramto takeanotherhard
lookatit toseeif therewereanywaysbywhichthecostscouldbecutorminimized.The
Presidentsaidhewasnothopefulinthisrespect,butthatitwasworthatry.Thereafterthe
wholetruthshouldbepresentedtothecommitteesofCongress.Mr.CutlersaidheassumedthatthePresidentwishedDefenseandNSFtomaketheir
joint presentationtothesamecommitteesofCongresswhichhadbeendealingwiththe
earthsatelliteprograminthepast.Mr.CutleralsosuggestedthatthePresidentwouldwish
animmediater portotheNationalSecurityCouncilassoonastheDefenseDepartment
hassucceededinorbitingatestvehicle.
Mr.BrundagepointedoutthatthePresident'sdecisionswouldalsoinvolvetheuse
of$5.8millionmoreoftheemergencyfundsoftheDepartmentofDefense.ThePresident
agreed,andagaincalledforareportbytheDefenseDepartmentscientistswerealittle
morerestrictedin theirhopesandambitionsfor theearthsatelliteprogram.Secretary
Wilsoncommentedthatatleastsuchareviewbythescientistsmighthelptopreventa
furtherelaborationof theearthsatelliteprogram.
The National Security Council?
a. Discussed the subject, in the light of a presentation by the Department of Defense
and comments by the Director, National Science Foundation, the President, National Acad-
emy of Sciences, and the Director of Central Intelligence.
b. Noted the President's directive that the U.S. scientific satellite program under
NSC 5520 should be continued on no more elaborate basis than at present and under the
following conditions:
(1) The necessary arrangements should be made with the Congressional committees
which previously dealt with this program, for joint presentations by the Department of
Defense and the National Science Foundation, as to:
(a) The additional funds to be made available from the Defense Department Emer-
gency Fund to continue the program through August 1, 1957; and
(b) The additional funds which must be appropriated in Fiscal Year 1958 to the
Department of Defense in order to complete the program at a total cost not to exceed
$110 million.
(2) Prior to the joint presentations under b-(1)-(b) above, the scientists working on
this program should again scrutinize it carefully to determine whether the estimated addi-
tional funds required can be reduced by restricting the program in ways which will not
jeopardize the current objectives under NSC 5520.
(3) In addition to the report required under NSC Action No. 1656-b, the Depart-
ment of Defense should submit a report to the Council immediately if one of the test
vehicles is successfully orbited as a satellite.
Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted
to the Secretary of Defense, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Director, National
Science Foundation, for implementation ....
S. Everett Gleason
1. Paragraphs a-b and Note constitute NSC Action No. 1713. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscella-
neous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)
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Document 11-13
Document tide: Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, to The Honorable Donald
Quarles, Deputy Secretary of Defense, July 5, 1957.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA Headquar-
ters, Washington, D.C.
By 1957, the Central Intelligence Agency was aware that the Soviet Union had an
active ballistic missile program and was preparing to launch a satellite. But the exact date
of the launch was still uncertain. This memorandum from Director of Central Intelligence
Allen Dulles to Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles indicates that American intel-
ligence knew a Soviet space launch was imminent, but, as of early July 1957, was still unsure
of the exact date of the launch.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
Thank you for your memorandum of 20 June 1957, transmitting the letter to you
from Mr. V. A. Nekrassoff.
Information concerning the timing of the launching of the Soviet's first earth-
orbiting satellite is sketchy, and our people here do not believe that the evidence is suffi-
cient as yet for a probability statement on when the Soviets may launch their first satellite.
However, data has been recently received that Alexander Nesmsyanov, President of
the Soviet Academy of Sciences, stated that, "soon, literally in the next few months, the
earth will get its second satellite." Other information, not so precise, indicates that the
USSR probably is capable of launching a satellite in 1957, and may be making prepara-
tions to do so on IGY World Days or Special World Days. The U.S. community estimates
that for prestige and psychological factors, the USSR would endeavor to be first in launch-
ing an earth satellite.
Mr. Nekrassoff's postulation of 17 September 1957, presents an interesting consider-
ation when we note that the public releases on Vanguard project set the first launching of
the U.S. satellite in 1958, and the date 17 September 1957, would permit the Russians to
attain the objective of a first launching. Further, the Russians like to be dramatic and could
well choose the birthday of Tsiolkovsky to accomplish such an operation, especially since
this is the one hundredth anniversary of his birth. On the other hand, no IGYWorld Day
has been established in September 1957.
Sincerely,
Allen W. Dulles
Director
Document 11-14
Document title: "Announcement of the First Satellite," from Pravda, October 5, 1957, F.J.
Krieger, Behind the Sputniks (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1958), pp. 311-12.
On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched the first Earth-orbiting satellite to
support the scientific research effort undertaken by several nations during the 1957-1958
International Geophysical Year. The Soviets called the satellite "Sputnik" or "fellow trav-
eler" and reported the achievement in a tersely worded press release issued by the official
news agency, Tass, printed in the October 5, 1957, issue of Pravda. The United States had
also been working on a scientific satellite program, Project Vanguard, but it had not yet
launched a satellite.
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[311] For several years scientific research and experimental design work have been
conducted in the Soviet Union on the creation of artificial satellites of the earth.
As already reported in the press, the first launching of the satellites in the USSR were
planned for realization in accordance with the scientific research program of the Interna-
tional Geophysical Year.
As a result of very intensive work by scientific research institutes and design bureaus
the first artificial satellite in the world has been created. On October 4, 1957, this first
satellite was successfully launched in the USSR. According to preliminary data, the carrier
rocket has imparted to the satellite the required orbital velocity of about 8000 meters per
second. At the present time the satellite is describing elliptical trajectories around the
earth, and its flight can be observed in the rays of the rising and setting sun with the aid of
very simple optical instruments (binoculars, telescopes, etc.).
According to calculations which now are being supplemented by direct observations,
the satellite will travel at altitudes up to 900 kilometers above the surface of the earth; the
time for a complete revolution of the satellite will be one hour and thirty-five minutes; the
angle of inclination of its orbit to the equatorial plane is 65 degrees. On October 5 the
satellite will pass over the Moscow area twice--at 1:46 a.m. and at 6:42 a.m. Moscow time.
Reports about the subsequent movement of the first artificial satellite launched in the
USSR on October 4 will be issued regularly by broadcasting stations.
The satellite has a spherical shape 58 centimeters in diameter and weighs 83.6 kilo-
grams. It is equipped with two radio transmitters continuously emitting signals at frequen-
cies of 20.005 and 40.002 megacycles per second (wave lengths of about 15 and 7.5 meters,
respectively). The power of the transmitters ensures reliable reception of the signals by a
broad range of radio amateurs. The signals have the form of telegraph pulses of about
0.3 second's duration with a [312] pause of the same duration. The signal of one fre-
quency is sent during the pause in the signal of the other frequency.
Scientific stations located at various points in the Soviet Union are tracking the satel-
lite and determining the elements of its trajectory. Since the density of the rarefied upper
layers of the atmosphere is not accurately known, there are no data at present for the
precise determination of the satellite's lifetime and of the point of its entry into the dense
layers of the atmosphere. Calculations have shown that owing to the tremendous velocity
of the satellite, at the end of its existence it will burn up on reaching the dense layers of the
atmosphere at an altitude of several tens of kilometers.
As early as the end of the nineteenth century the possibility of realizing cosmic flights
by means of rockets was first scientifically substantiated in Russia by the works of the out-
standing Russian scientist K[onstantin] E. Tsiolkovskii [Tsiolkovskiy].
The successful launching of the first man-made earth satellite makes a most impor-
tant contribution to the treasure-house of world science and culture. The scientific experi-
ment accomplished at such a great height is of tremendous importance for learning the
properties of cosmic space and for studying the earth as a planet of our solar system.
During the International Geophysical Year the Soviet Union proposes launching sev-
eral more artificial earth satellites. These subsequent satellites will be larger and heavier
and they will be used to carry out programs of scientific research.
Artificial earth satellites will pave the way to interplanetary travel and, apparently,
our contemporaries will witness how the freed and conscientious labor of the people of
the new socialist society makes the most daring dreams of mankind a reality.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 331
Document 11-15
Document title: John Foster Dulles to James C. Hagerty, October 8, 1957, with attached:
"Draft Statements on the Soviet Satellite," October 5, 1957.
Source: John Foster Dulles Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
The Eisenhower administration had anticipated the imminent launch of the first
Soviet satellite, and had given some thought to potential public reaction to such an event.
But when the launch occurred on October 4, 1957, the administration was surprised by
the amount of public concern. Four days after the event, Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles sent White House Press Secretary James Hagerty his suggestions for the text of a
press release that would place the Sputnik launch in its proper context and reassure the
public. Although Dulles' comments did not result in a press release, they did form the
basis for much of the administration's "official" comment about the Soviet achievement as
well as the core of President Eisenhower's comments at a press conference on October
9th. This document does not contain the draft statement prepared by Allen Dulles, Direc-
tor of the Central Intelligence Agency and brother of the Secretary of State, which is men-
tioned in the cover letter.
[1] Draft byJFD
10/8/57
The launching by the Soviet Union of the first earth satellite is an event of consider-
able technical and scientific importance. However, that importance should not be exag-
gerated. What has happened involves no basic discovery and the value of a satellite to
mankind will for a long time be highly problematical.
That the Soviet Union was first in this project is due to the high priority which the
Soviet Union gives to scientific training and to the fact that since 1945 the Soviet Union
has particularly emphasized developments in the fields of missiles and of outer space. The
Germans had made a major advance in this field and the results of their effort were largely
taken over by the Russians when they took over the German assets, human and material, at
Peenemfinde, the principal German base for research and experiment in the use of outer
space. This encouraged the Soviets to concentrate upon developments in this field with a
use of [2] resources and effort not possible in time of peace to societies where the people
are free to engage in pursuits of their own choosing and where public monies are limited
by representatives of the people. Despotic societies which can command the activities and
resources of all their people can often produce spectacular accomplishments. These, how-
ever, do not prove that freedom is not the best way.
While the United States has not given the same priority to outer space developments
as has the Soviet Union, it has not neglected this field. It already has a capability to utilize
outer space for missiles and it is expected to launch an earth satellite during the present
geophysical year in accordance with a program which has been under orderly develop-
ment over the past two years.
The United States welcomes the peaceful achievement of the Soviet scientists. It hopes
that the acclaim which has resulted from [3] their effort will encourage the Soviet Union
to seek development along peaceful lines and seek to enrich the spiritual and material
welfare of their people.
What is happening with reference to outer space makes more than ever important
the proposal made by the United States and the other free world members of the Disarma-
ment Subcommittee, I recall my White House statement of August 28 which emphasized
the proposal of the Western Powers at London to establish a study group to the end that
"outer space shall be used only for peaceful, not military, purposes."
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Document 11-16
Document rifle: President's Science Advisory Committee, "Introduction to Outer Space,"
March 26, 1958, pp. 1-2, 6, 13-15.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA Headquar-
ters, Washington, D.C.
An initial assignment for the President's Science Advisory Committee, which was
formed in the aftermath of the launches of Sputnik I and II, was to assess the appropriate
direction and pace for the U.S. space program. The committee focused heavily on the
scientific aspects of the space program. With the president's endorsement, on March 26,
1958, it released a report outlining the importance of space activities, but recommended a
cautiously measured pace,
Statement by the President
In connection with a study of space science and technology made at my request, the
President's Science Advisory Committee, of which Dr. James R. Killian is Chairman, has
prepared a brief "Introduction to Outer Space" for the nontechnical reader.
This is not science fiction. This is a sober, realistic presentation prepared by leading
scientists. I have found this statement so informative and interesting that I wish to share it
with all the people of America, and indeed with all the people of the earth. I hope that it
can be widely disseminated by all news media for it clarifies many aspects of space and
space technology in a way which can be helpful to all people as the United States proceeds
with its peaceful program in space science and exploration. Every person has the opportu-
nity to share through understanding in the adventures which lie ahead.
This statement of the Science Advisory Committee makes clear the opportunities
which a developing space technology can provide to extend man's knowledge of the earth,
the solar system, and the universe. These opportunities reinforce my conviction that we
and other nations have a great responsibility to promote the peaceful use of space and to
utilize the new knowledge obtainable from space science and technology for the benefit of
all mankind.
Dwight D. Eisenhower
[1] Introduction to Outer Space
What are the principal reasons for undertaking a national space program? What can
we expect to gain from space science and exploration? What are the scientific laws and
facts and the technological means which it would be helpful to know and understand in
reaching sound policy decisions for a United States space program and its management by
the Federal Government? This statement seeks to provide brief and introductory answers
to these questions.
It is useful to distinguish among four factors which give importance, urgency, and
inevitability to the advancement of space technology. The first of these factors is the com-
pelling urge of man to explore and to discover, the thrust of curiosity that leads men to try
to go where no one has gone before. Most of the surface of the earth has now been ex-
plored and men now turn to the exploration of outer space as their next objective.
Second, there is the defense objective for the development of space technology. We
wish to be sure that space is not used to endanger our security. If space is to be used for
military purposes, we must be prepared to use space to defend ourselves.
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Third, there is the factor of national prestige. To be strong and bold in space tech-
nology will enhance the prestige of the United States among the peoples of the world and
create added confidence in our scientific, technological, industrial, and military strength.
Fourth, space technology affords new opportunities for scientific observation and
experiment [2] which will add to our knowledge and understanding of the earth, the solar
system, and the universe.
The determination of what our space program should be must take into consider-
ation all four of these objectives. While this statement deals mainly with the use of space
for scientific inquiry, we fully recognize the importance of the other three objectives.
In fact it has been the military quest for ultra long-range rockets that has provided
man with new machinery so powerful that it can readily put satellites in orbit and, before
long, send instruments out to explore the moon and nearby planets. In this way, what was
at first a purely military enterprise has opened up an exciting era of exploration that few
men, even a decade ago, dreamed would come in this century ....
[6] Will the Results Justify the Costs?
Since the rocket power plants for space exploration are already in existence or being
developed for military need, the cost of additional scientific research, using these rockets,
need not be exorbitant. StiU, the cost will not be small, either. This raises an important
question that scientists and the general public (who will pay the bill) both must face: Since
there are still so many unanswered scientific questions and problems all around us on
earth, why should we start asking new questions and seeking out new problems in space?
How can the results possibly justify the cost?
Scientific research, of course, has never been amenable to rigorous cost accounting in
advance. Nor, for that matter, has exploration of any sort. But if we have learned one lesson,
it is that research and exploration have a remarkable way of paying off--quite apart from
the fact that they demonstrate that man is alive and insatiably curious. And we all feel richer
for knowing what explorers and scientists have learned about the universe in which we live.
It is in these terms that we must measure the value of launching satellites and send-
ing rockets into space ....
[ 13] the scientific opportunities are so numerous and so inviting that scientists from
many countries will certainly want to participate. Perhaps the International Geophysical
Year will suggest a model for the international exploration of space in the years and de-
cades to come.
The timetable...suggests the approximate order in which some of the scientific and
technical objectives mentioned in this review may be attained.
The timetable is not broken down into years, since there is yet too much uncertainty
about the scale of the effort that will be made. The timetable simply lists various types of
space investigations and goals under three broad headings: Early, Later, Still Later ....
[14] EARLY
1. Physics
2. Geophysics
3. Meteorology
4. Minimal Moon Contact
5. Experimental Communications
6. Space Physiology
LATER
1. Astronomy
2. Extensive Communications
3. Biology
4. Scientific Lunar Investigation
5. Minimal Planetary Contact
6. Human Flight in Orbit
334 ORIGINSOFU.S,SPACEPOLICY
STILLLATER
1.AutomatedLunarExploration
2. Automated Planetary Exploration
3. Human Lunar Exploration and Return
AND MUCH LATER STILL
Human Planetary Exploration
[15] In conclusion, we venture two observations. Research in outer space affords
new opportunities in science, but it does not diminish the importance of science on earth.
Many of the secrets of the universe will be fathomed in laboratories on earth, and the
progress of our science and technology and the welfare of the Nation require that our
regular scientific programs go forward without loss of pace, in fact at an increased pace. It
would not be in the national interest to exploit space science at the cost of weakening our
efforts in other scientific endeavors. This need not happen if we plan our national pro-
gram for space science and technology as part of a balanced national effort in all science
and technology.
Our second observation is prompted by technical considerations. For the present,
the rocketry and other equipment used in space technology must usually be employed at
the very limit of its capacity. This means that failures of equipment and uncertainties of
schedule are to be expected. It therefore appears wise to be cautious and modest in our
predictions and pronouncements about future space activities---and quiedy bold in our
execution ....
Document 11-17
Document tide: "National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958," Public Law 85-568, 72 Stat.,
426. Signed by the president on July 29, 1958.
Source: Record Group 255, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington,
D.C.
After the launch of Sputnik and the publicity surrounding it, the Eisenhower admin-
istration moved quickly to create an American civilian space agency. The National Advi-
sory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) was too small for the task, however; the White
House decided that a new agency, with NACA as its core, but also including rocket and
space engineers involved in various defense programs, was needed. On March 5, 1958,
President Eisenhower approved a final memorandum ordering the Bureau of Budget to
draft a space bill immediately. It was ready three weeks later and sent to Congress on April
9. Senator Lyndon Johnson had a great deal of influence on the form of the final bill,
which was passed after lengthy congressional deliberations. In particular, Congress added
to the administration bill a requirement for a National Aeronautics and Space Council as
a presidential-level policy coordinating board.
[1] ANACT
To provide for research into problems of flight within and outside the earth's atmo-
sphere, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
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Title I--Short Title, Declaration of Policy, and Definitions
Short Title
Sec. 101. This act may be cited as the "National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958."
Declaration of Policy and Purpose
Sec. 102. (a) The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of the United States
that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all man-
kind.
(b) The Congress declares that the general welfare and security of the United States
require that adequate provision be made for aeronautical and space activities. The Con-
gress further declares that such activities shall be the responsibility of, and shall be di-
rected by, a civilian agency exercising control over aeronautical and space activities spon-
sored by the United States, except that activities peculiar to or primarily associated with
the development of weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the United
States (including the research and development necessary to make effective provision for
the defense of the United States) shall be the responsibility of, and shall be directed by, the
Department of Defense; and that determination as to which such agency has responsibility
for and direction of any such activity shall be made by the President in conformity with
section 201 (e).
(c) The aeronautical and space activities of the United States shall be conducted so
as to contribute materially to one or more of the following objectives:
(1) The expansion of human knowledge of phenomena in the atmosphere and
space;
(2) The improvement of the usefulness, performance, speed, safety, and efficiency
of aeronautical and space vehicles;
(3) The development and operation of vehicles capable of carrying instruments,
equipment, supplies and living organisms through space;
(4) The establishment of long-range studies of the potential benefits to be gained
from, the opportunities for, and the problems involved in the utilization of aeronautical
and space activities for peaceful and scientific purposes.
(5) The preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical
and space science and technology and in the application thereof to the conduct of peace-
ful activities within and outside the atmosphere.
(6) The making available to agencies directly concerned with national defenses of
discoveries that have military value or significance, and the furnishing by such agencies, to
the civilian agency established to direct and control nonmilitary aeronautical and space
activities, of information as to discoveries which have value or significance to that agency;
[2] (7) Cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of nations in
work done pursuant to this Act and in the peaceful application of the results, thereof; and
(8) The most effective utilization of the scientific and engineering resources of
the United States, with close cooperation among all interested agencies of the United
States in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, facilities, and equipment.
(d) It is the purpose of this Act to carry out and effectuate the policies declared in
subsections (a), (b), and (c).
Definitions
Sec. 103. As used in this Act-
(l) the term "aeronautical and space activities" means (A) research into, and the
solution of, problems of flight within and outside the earth's atmosphere, (B) the develop-
ment, construction, testing, and operation for research purposes of aeronautical and space
vehicles, and (C) such other activities as may be required for the exploration of space; and
(2) the term "aeronautical and space vehicles" means aircraft, missiles, satellites, and
other space vehicles, manned and unmanned, together with related equipment, devices,
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components,andparts.
Title II--Coordination of Aeronautical and Space Activities
National Aeronautics and Space Council
Sec. 201. (a) There is hereby established the National Aeronautics and Space Coun-
cil (hereinafter called the "Council") which shall be composed of-
(l) the President (who shall preside over meetings of the Council);
(2) the Secretary of State;
(3) the Secretary of Defense
(4) the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration;
(5) the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission;
(6) not more than one additional member appointed by the President from the
departments and agencies of the Federal Government; and
(7) not more than three other members appointed by the President, solely on the
basis of established records of distinguished achievement from among individuals in pri-
vate life who are eminent in science, engineering, technology, education, administration,
or public affairs.
(b) Each member of the Council from a department or agency of the Federal Gov-
ernment may designate another officer of his department or agency to serve on the Coun-
cil as his alternate in his unavoidable absence.
(c) Each member of the Council appointed or designated under paragraphs (6) and
(7) of subsection (a), and each alternate member designated under subsection (b), shall
be appointed or designated to serve as such by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, unless at the time of such appointment or designation he holds an office in the
Federal Government to which he was appointed by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.
[3] (d) It shall be the function of the Council to advise the President with respect to the
performance of the duties prescribed in subsection (e) of this section.
(e) In conformity with the provisions of section 102 of this Act, it shall be the duty of
the President to--
(l) survey all significant aeronautical and space activities, including the policies,
plans, programs, and accomplishments of all agencies of the United States engaged in
such activities;
(2) develop a comprehensive program of aeronautical and space activities to be
conducted by agencies of the United States;
(3) designate and fix responsibility for the direction of major aeronautical and
space activities;
(4) provide for effective cooperation between the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration and the Department of Defense in all such activities, and specify which of
such activities may be carried on concurrently by both such agencies notwithstanding the
assignment of primary responsibility therefor to one or the other of such agencies; and
(5) resolve differences arising among departments and agencies of the United
States with respect to aeronautical and space activities under this Act, including differ-
ences as to whether a particular project is an aeronautical and space activity.
(f) The Council may employ a staff to be headed by a civilian executive secretary who
shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and the consent of the Senate
and shall receive compensation at the rate of $20,000 a year. The executive secretary, sub-
ject to the direction of the Council, is authorized to appoint and fix the compensation of
such personnel, including not more than three persons who may be appointed without
regard to the civil service laws or the Classification Act of 1949 and compensated at the
rate of not more that $19,000 a year, as may be necessary to perform such duties as may be
prescribed by the Council in connection with the performance of its functions. Each ap-
pointment under this subsection shall be subject to the same security requirements as
those established for personnel of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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appointed under section 203 (b) (2) of this Act.
(g) Members of the Council appointed from private life under subsection (a) (7)
may be compensated at a rate not to exceed $100 per diem, and may be paid travel ex-
penses and per diem in lieu of subsistence in accordance with the provisions of section 5 of
the Administrative Expenses Act of 1946 (5 U.S.C. 73b-2) relating to persons serving with-
out compensation.
National Aeronautics And Space Administration
Sec. 202. (a) There is hereby established the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration (hereinafter called the "Administration"). The Administration shall be headed
by an Administrator, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at the rate of $22,500
per annum. Under the supervision and direction of the President, the Administrator shall
be responsible for the exercise of all powers and the discharge of all duties of the Admin-
istration, and shall have authority and control over all personnel and activities, thereof.
(b) There shall be in the Administration a Deputy Administrator, who shall be ap-
pointed from civilian life by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate, shall receive compensation of $21,500 per annum, and shall perform such duties and
exercise such powers as the Administrator may prescribe. The Deputy Administrator shall
act for, and exercise [4] the powers of, the Administrator during his absence or disability.
(c) The Administrator and the Deputy Administrator shall not engage in any other
business, vocation, or employment while serving as such.
Functions of the Administration
Sec. 203. (a) The Administration, in order to carry out the purpose of this Act, shall--
(1) plan, direct, and conduct aeronautical and space activities;
(2) arrange for participation by the scientific community in planning scientific mea-
surements and observations to be made through use of aeronautical and space vehicles, and
conduct or arrange for the conduct of such measurements and observations; and
(3) provide for the widest practicable and appropriate dissemination of informa-
tion concerning its activities and the results thereof.
(b) In the performance of its functions the Administration is authorized-
(I) to make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend rules and regulations govern-
ing the manner of its operations and the exercise of the powers vested in it by law;
(2) to appoint and fix the compensation of such officers and employees as may be
necessary to carry out such functions. Such officers and employees shall be appointed in
accordance with the civil-service laws and their compensation fixed in accordance with the
Classification Act of 1949, except that (A) to the extent the Administrator deems such
action necessary to the discharge of his responsibilities, he may appoint and fix the com-
pensation (up to a limit of $19,000 a year, or up to a limit of $21,000 a year for a maximum
of ten positions) of not more than two hundred and sixty of the scientific, engineering and
administrative personnel of the Administration without regard to such laws, and (B) to the
extent the Administrator deems such action necessary to recruit specially qualified scien-
tific and engineering talent, he may establish the entrance grade for scientific and engi-
neering personnel without previous service in the Federal Government at a level up to two
grades higher than the grade provided for such personnel under the General Schedule
established by the Classification Act of 1949, and fix their compensation accordingly;
(3) to acquire (by purchase, lease, condemnation, or otherwise), construct, improve,
repair, operate, and maintain laboratories, research and testing sites and facilities, aero-
nautical and space vehicles, quarters and related accommodations for employees and de-
pendents of employees of the Administration, and such other real and personal property
(including patents), or any interest therein, as the Administration deems necessary within
and outside the continental United States; to lease to others such real and personal prop-
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erty; to sell and otherwise dispose of real and personal property (including patents and
rights thereunder) in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Property and Admin-
istrative Service Act of 1949, as amended (40 U.S.C. 471 et seq.); and to provide by con-
tract or otherwise for cafeterias and other necessary facilities for the welfare of employees
of the Administration at its installations and purchase and maintain equipment therefor;
[5] (4) to accept unconditional gifts or donations of services, money, or property,
real, personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible;
(5) without regard to section 3648 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (31 U.S.C.
529), to enter into and perform such contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, or other
transactions as may be necessary in the conduct of its work and on such terms as it may
deem appropriate, with any agency or instrumentality of the United States, or with any
State, Territory, or possession, or with any political subdivision thereof, or with any person,
firm, association, corporation, educational institution. To the maximum extent practicable
and consistent with the accomplishment of the purpose of this Act, such contracts, leases,
agreements, and other transactions shall be allocated by the Administrator in a manner
which will enable small-business concerns to participate equitably and proportionately in
the conduct of the work of the Administration;
(6) to use, with their consent, the services, equipment, personnel, and facilities of
Federal and other agencies with or without reimbursement, and on a similar basis to coop-
erate with other public and private agencies and instrumentalities in the use of services,
equipment and facilities. Each department and agency of the Federal Government shall
cooperate fully with the Administration in making its services, equipment, personnel, and
facilities available to the Administration, and any such department or agency is autho-
rized, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to transfer or to receive from the Admin-
istration, without reimbursement, aeronautical and space vehicles, and supplies and
equipment other than administrative supplies and equipment;
(7) to appoint such advisory committees as may be appropriate for purposes of
consultation and advice to the Administration in the performance of its functions;
(8) to establish within the Administration such offices and procedures as may be
appropriate to provide for the greatest possible coordination of its activities under this Act
with related scientific and other activities being carried on by other public and private
agencies and organizations;
(9) to obtain services as authorized by section 15 of the Act of August 2, 1946
(5 U.S.C. 55a), at rates not to exceed $100 per diem for individuals;
(10) when determined by the Administrator to be necessary, and subject to such
security investigations as he may determine to be appropriate, to employ aliens without
regard to statutory provisions prohibiting payment of compensation to aliens;
(11) to employ retired commissioned officers of the armed forces of the United
States and compensate them at the rate established for the positions occupied by them
within the Administration, subject only to the limitations in pay set forth in section 212 of
the Act of June 30, 1932 as amended (5 U.S.C. 59a);
(12) with the approval of the President, to enter into cooperative agreements un-
der which members or the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps may be detailed by
the appropriate Secretary for services in the performance of functions under this Act to
the same extent as that to which they might by lawfully assigned in the Department of
Defense; and
(13) (A) to consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, settle, and pay, on behalf of the
United States, in full satisfaction thereof, any claim for $5,000 or less against the United
States for bodily injury, death, or damage to or loss of real or personal property [6] result-
ing from the conduct of the Administration's functions as specified in subsection (a) of
this section, where such claim is presented to the Administration in writing within two
years after the accident or incident out of which the claim arises; and
(B) if the Administration considers that a claim in excess of $5,000 is meritorious
and would otherwise be covered by this paragraph, to report the facts and circumstances
thereof to the Congress for its consideration.
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Civilian-Military Liaison Committee
Sec. 204 (a) There shall be a Civilian-Military Liaison Committee consisting of___
(1) a Chairman, who shall be the head thereof and who shall be appointed by the
President, shall serve at the pleasure of the President, and shall receive compensation (in
the manner provided in subsection (d)) at the rate of $20,000 per annum;
(2) one or more representatives from the Department of Defense, and one or
more representatives from each of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, to
be assigned by the Secretary of Defense to serve on the Committee without additional
compensation; and
(3) representatives from the Administration, to be assigned by the Administrator
to serve on the Committee without additional compensation, equal in number to the num-
ber of representatives assigned to serve on the Committee under paragraph (2).
(b) The Administration and the Department of Defense, through the Liaison Com-
mittee, shall advise and consult with each other on all matters within their respective juris-
dictions relating to aeronautical and space activities and shall keep each other fully and
currently informed with respect to such activities.
(c) If the Secretary of Defense concludes that any request, action, proposed action,
or failure to act on the part of the Administrator is adverse to the responsibilities of the
Department of Defense, or the Administrator concludes that any request, action, or pro-
posed action, or failure to act on the part of the Department of Defense is adverse to the
responsibilities of the Administration, and the Administrator and the Secretary of Defense
are unable to reach an agreement with respect thereto, either the Administrator or the
Secretary of Defense may refer the matter to the President for his decision (which shall be
final) as provided in section 201 (e).
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, any active or retired officer of
the Army, Navy, or Air Force may serve as Chairman of the Liaison Committee without
prejudice to his active or retired status as such officer. The compensation received by any
such officer for his service as Chairman of the Liaison Committee shall be equal to the
amount (if any) by which the compensation fixed by subsection (a) (1) for such Chairman
exceeds his pay and allowances (including special and incentive pays) as an active officer,
or his retired pay.
International Cooperation
Sec. 205. The Administration, under the foreign policy guidance of the President,
may engage in a program of international cooperation in work done pursuant to the Act,
and in the peaceful application of the results thereof, pursuant to agreements made by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
[71 Reports to the Congress
Sec. 206. (a) The Administration shall submit to the President for transmittal to the
Congress, semiannually and at such other times as it deems desirable, a report of its activi-
ties and accomplishments.
(b) The President shall transmit to the Congress in January of each year a report,
which shall include (1) a comprehensive description of the programmed activities and the
accomplishments of all agencies of the United States in the field of aeronautics and space
activities during the preceding calendar year, and (2) an evaluation of such activities and
accomplishments in terms of the attainment of, or the failure to attain, the objectives
described in section 102 (c) of this Act.
(c) Any report made under this section shall contain such recommendations for
additional legislation as the Administrator of the President may consider necessary or de-
sirable for the attainment of the objectives described in section 102 (c) of this Act.
(d) No information which has been classified for reasons of national security shall be
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included in any report made under this section, unless such information has been declas-
sified by, or pursuant to authorization given by, the President.
Title HI--Miscellaneous
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
Sec. 301. (a) The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, on the effective
date of this section, shall cease to exist. On such date all functions, powers, duties, and
obligations, and all real and personal property, personnel (other than members of the
Committee), funds, and records of that organization, shall be transferred to the Adminis-
tration.
(b) Section 2302 of title 10 of the United States Code is amended by striking out "or
the Executive Secretary of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics." and insert-
ing in lieu thereof "or the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration."; and section 2303 of such title 10 is amended by striking out "National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics" and inserting in lieu thereof "The National Aeronautics and
Space Administration."
(c) The first section of the Act of August 26, 1950 (5 U.S.C. 22-1), is amended by
striking out "the Director, National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics" and inserting in
lieu thereof "the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
and by striking out "or National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics" and inserting in
lieu thereof "or National Aeronautics and Space Administration."
(d) The Unitary Wind Tunnel Plan Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 511-515) is amended (1)
by striking out 'q'he National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (hereinafter referred
to as the "Committee')" and inserting in lieu thereof 'q'he Administrator of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (hereinafter referred to as the "Administrator')";
(2) by striking out "Committee" or "Committee's" wherever they appear and inserting in
lieu thereof "Administrator" and "Administrator's", respectively; and (3) by striking out
"its" wherever it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "his."
(e) This section shall take effect ninety days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, or on any earlier date on which the Administrator shall determine, and announce by
proclamation published in the Federal Register, that the Administration has been orga-
nized and is prepared to discharge the duties and exercise the powers conferred upon it
by this Act.
[s] Transfer of Related Functions
Sec. 302. (a) Subject to the provisions of this section, the President, for a period of
four years after the date of enactment of this Act, may transfer to the Administration any
functions (including powers, duties, activities, facilities, and parts of functions) of any other
department or agency of the United States, or of any officer or organizational entity thereof,
which relate primarily to the functions, powers, and duties of the Administration as pre-
scribed by section 203 of this Act. In connection with any such transfer, the President may,
under this section or other applicable authority, provide for appropriate transfers of records,
property, civilian personnel, and funds.
(b) Whenever any such transfer is made beforeJanuary 1, 1959, the President shall
transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of
the Senate a full and complete report concerning the nature and effect of such transfer.
(c) After December 31, 1958, no transfer shall be made under this section until (1) a
full and complete report concerning the nature and effect of such proposed transfer has
been transmitted by the President to the Congress, and (2) the first period of sixty calen-
dar days of regular session of the Congress following the date of receipt of such report by
the Congress has expired without the adoption by the Congress of a concurrent resolution
stating that the Congress does not favor such transfer.
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Access to Information
Sec. 303. Information obtained or developed by the Administrator in the pertor-
mance of his functions under the Act shall be made available for public inspection, except
(A) information authorized or required by Federal statute to be withheld, and (B) intbr-
mation classified to protect the national security: Provided, That nothing in this Act shall
authorize the withholding of information by the Administrator from the duly authorized
committees of the Congress.
Security
Sec. 304. (a) The Administrator shall establish such security requirements, restric-
tions, and safeguards as he deems necessary in the interest of the national security'. The
Administrator may arrange with the Civil Service Commission for the conduct of such
security or other personnel investigations of the Administration's officers, employees, and
consultants, and its contractors and subcontractors and their officers and employees, ac-
tual or prospective, as he deems appropriate; and if any such investigation develops any
data reflecting that the individual who is the subject thereof is of questionable loyalty the
matter shall be referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the conduct of a full
field investigation, the results of which shall be furnished to the Administrator.
(b) The Atomic Energy Commission may authorize any of its employees, or employ-
ees of any contractor, prospective contractor, licensee, or prospective licensee of the Atomic
Energy Commission or any other person authorized to have access to Restricted Data by
the Atomic Energy Commission under subsection 145 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(42 U.S.C. 2165 (b)), to permit any member, officer, or employee of the Council, or the
Administrator, or any officer, employee, member of an advisory committee, contractor,
subcontractor, or officer or employee of a contractor or subcontractor of the Administra-
tion, to have access to Restricted Data relating to aeronautical and space activities which is
required in the performance of his duties and so certified by the Council or the Adminis-
trator, as the case may be, [O] but only if (1) the Council or Administrator or designee
thereof has determined, in accordance with the established personnel security procedures
and standards of the Council or Administration, that permitting such individual to have
access to such Restricted Data will not endanger the common defense and security, and
(2) the Council or Administrator or designee thereof finds that the established personnel
and other security procedures and standards of the Council or Administration are ad-
equate and in reasonable conformity to the standards established by the Atomic Energy
Commission under section 145 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2165). Any
individual granted access to such Restricted Data pursuant to this subsection may exchange
such Data with any individual who (A) is an officer or employee of the Department of
Defense, or any department or agency thereof, or a member of the armed forces, or a
contractor or subcontractor, and (B) has been authorized to have access to Restricted
Data under the provisions of section 143 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
2163).
(c) Chapter 37 of title 18 of the United States Code (entitled Espionage and Censor-
ship) is amended bym
(1) adding at the end thereof the following new section:
"799. Violation of regulations of National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Whoever willfully shall violate, attempt to violate, or conspire to violate any regula-
tion or order promulgated by the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration for the protection or security of any laboratory, station, base or other facil-
ity, or part thereof, or any aircraft, missile, spacecraft, or similar vehicle, or part thereof, or
other property or equipment in the custody of the Administration, or any real or personal
property or equipment in the custody of any contractor under any contract with the Ad-
ministration or any subcontractor of any such contractor, shall be fined not more than
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$5,000,orimprisonednotmorethatoneyear,orboth."(2)addingattheendofthesectionalnalysisthereofthefollowingnewitem:
"799.ViolationofregulationsofNationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration."(d) Section1114of tide18of theUnitedStatesCodeisamendedbyinserting
immediatelybefore'Xvhilengagedin theperformanceofhisofficialdudes"the follow-
ing: "or any officer or employee of the Nadonal Aeronautics and Space Administration
directed to guard and protect property of the United States under the administration and
control of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration."
(e) The Administrator may direct such of the officers and employees of the Adminis-
tration as he deems necessary in the public interest to carry firearms while in the conduct
of their official duties. The Administrator may also authorize such of those employees of
the contractors and subcontractors of the Administration engaged in the protection of
property owned by the United States and located at facilities owned by or contracted to the
United States as he deems necessary in the public interest, to carry firearms while in the
conduct of their official duties.
Property Rights In Inventions
Sec. 305. (a) Whenever any invention is made in the performance of any work under
any contract of the Administration, and the Administrator determines that--
(1) the person who made the invention was employed or assigned to perform
research, development, or exploration work and the invention is related to the work be
was employed or [10] assigned to perform, or that it was within the scope of his employ-
ment duties, whether or not it was made during working hours, or with a contribution by
the Government of the use of Government facilities, equipment, materials, allocated funds,
information proprietary to the Government, or services of Government employees during
working hours; or
(2) the person who made the invention was not employed or assigned to perform
research, development, or exploration work, but the invention is nevertheless related to
the contract, or to the work or dudes he was employed or assigned to perform, and was
made during working hours, or with a contribution from the Government of the sort re-
ferred to in clause (1), such invention shall be the exclusive property of the United States,
and if such invention is patentable a patent therefor shall be issued to the United States
upon application made by the Administrator, unless the Administrator waives all or any
part of the rights of the United States to such invention in conformity with the provisions
of subsection (0 of this section.
(b) Each contract entered into by the Administrator with any party for the perfor-
mance of any work shall contain effective provisions under which such party shall furnish
prompdy to the Administrator a written report containing full and complete technical
information concerning any invention, discovery, improvement, or innovation which may
be made in the performance of any such work.
(c) No patent may be issued to any applicant other than the Administrator for any
invention which appears to the Commissioner of Patents to have significant utility in the
conduct of aeronautical and space activities unless the applicant files with the Commis-
sioner, with the application or within thirty days after request therefor by the Commis-
sioner, a written statement executed under oath setting forth the full facts concerning the
circumstances under which such invention was made and stating the relationship (if any)
of such invention to the performance of any work under any contract of the Administra-
tion. Copies of each such statement and the application to which it relates shall be trans-
mitted forthwith by the Commissioner to the Administrator.
(d) Upon any application as to which any such statement has been transmitted to the
Administrator, the Commissioner may, if the invention is patentable, issue a patent to the
applicant unless the Administrator, within ninety days after receipt of such application and
statement, requests that such patent be issued to him on behalf of the United States. If,
within such time, the Administrator files such a request with the Commissioner, the Corn-
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missionershalltransmitnoticethereoftotheapplicant,andshallissuesuchpatentothe
Administratorunlesstheapplicantwithinthirtydaysaftereceiptofsuchnoticerequestsa
hearingbeforeaBoardofPatentInterferencesonthequestionwhethertheAdministra-
torisentitledunderthissectiontoreceivesuchpatent.TheBoardmayhearanddeter-
mine,inaccordancewithrulesandprocedurestablishedforinterferenceases,theques-
tionsopresented,anditsdeterminationshallbesubjecttoappealbytheapplicantorby
theAdministratortotheCourtofCustomsandPatentAppealsinaccordancewithproce-
duresgoverningappealsfromdecisionsoftheBoardof PatentInterferencesin other
proceedings.(e)Wheneveranypatenthasbeenissuedtoanyapplicantinconformitywithsubsec-
tion(d),andtheAdministratorthereafterhasreasontobelievethatthestatementfiledby
theapplicantinconnectiontherewithcontainedanyfalserepresentationfanymaterial
fact,theAdministratorwithinfiveyearsafterthedateofissuanceofsuchpatentmayfile
withtheCommissionerarequestforthe[11]transfertotheAdministratorftitletosuch
patentontherecordsoftheCommissioner.Noticeofanysuchrequestshallbetransmit-
tedbytheCommissionertotheownerofrecordofsuchpatent,andtitletosuchpatent
shallbesotransferredtotheAdministratorunlesswithinthirtydaysafterreceiptofsuch
noticesuchownerofrecordrequestsahearingbeforeaBoardofPatentInterferenceson
thequestionwhetheranysuchfalserepresentationwascontainedinsuchstatement.Such
questionshallbeheardanddetermined,anddeterminationthereofshallbesubjectto
review,in themannerprescribedbysubsection(d)forquestionsarisingthereunder.No
requestmadebytheAdministratorunderthissubsectionforthetransferoftitleto any
patent,andnoprosecutionfortheviolationofanycriminalstatute,shallbebarredbyany
failureoftheAdministratorto makearequestundersubsection(d)for theissuanceof
suchpatentohim,orbyanynoticepreviouslygivenbytheAdministratorstatingthathe
hadnoobjectiontotheissuanceofsuchpatenttotheapplicanttherefor.(f) UndersuchregulationsinconformitywiththissubsectionastheAdministrator
shallprescribe,hemaywaivealloranypartoftherightsof theUnitedStatesunderthis
sectionwithrespecttoanyinventionorclassofinventionsmadeorwhichmaybemadeby
anypersonorclassofpersonsin theperformanceofanyworkrequiredbyanycontractoftheAdministrationif theAdministratordeterminesthattheinterestsoftheUnitedStates
willbeservedthereby.Anysuchwaivermaybemadeuponsuchtermsandundersuch
conditionsastheAdministratorshalldeterminetoberequiredfortheprotectionof the
interestsoftheUnitedStates.Eachsuchwaivermadewithrespecttoanyinventionshallbe
subjecttothereservationbytheAdministratorfanirrevocable,nonexclusive,nontrans-
ferable,royalty-freelicenseforthepracticeofsuchinventionthroughouttheworldbyor
onbehalfoftheUnitedStatesoranyforeigngovernmentpursuanttoanytreatyoragree-
mentwiththeUnitedStates.Eachproposalforanywaiverunderthissubsectionshallbe
referredtoanInventionsandContributionsBoardwhichshallbeestablishedbytheAd-
ministratorwithintheAdministration.SuchBoardshallaccordtoeachinterestedpartyan
opportunityfor hearing,andshalltransmittotheAdministratoritsfindingsoffactwith
respectto suchproposalanditsrecommendationsforactionto betakenwithrespectthereto.
(g)TheAdministratorshalldetermine,andpromulgater gulationsspecifying,the
termsandconditionsuponwhichlicenseswillbegrantedbytheAdministratorfor the
practicebyanyperson(otherthananagencyoftheUnitedStates)ofanyinventionfor
whichtheAdministratorholdsapatentonbehalfoftheUnitedStates.(h)TheAdministratorisauthorizedtotakeallsuitableandnecessarystepstopro-
tectanyinventionor discoverytowhichhehastitle,andtorequirethatcontractorsor
personswhoretaintitletoinventionsordiscoveriesunderthissectionprotecttheinven-
tionsordiscoveriestowhichtheAdministrationhasormayacquirealicenseoruse.(i)TheAdministrationshallbeconsidereda efenseagencyoftheUnitedStatesfor
thepurposeofchapter17oftitle35oftheUnitedStatesCode.(j)Asusedin thissection-(l) term"person"meansanyindividual,partnership,corporation,association,
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institution,orotherentity;(2)theterm"contract"meansanyactualorproposedcontract,agreement,under-
standing,orotherarrangement,andincludesanyassignment,substitutionofparties,or
subcontractexecutedorenteredintothereunder;and[12] (3)theterm"made",whenusedin relationtoanyinvention,meanstheconception
orfirstactualreductiontopracticeofsuchinvention.
Contributions Awards
Sec. 306. (a) Subject to the provisions of this section, the Administrator is autho-
rized, upon his own initiative or upon application of any person, to make a monetary
award, in such amount and upon such terms as he shall determine to be warranted, to any
person (as defined by section 305) for any scientific or technical contribution to the Ad-
ministration which is determined by the Administrator to have significant value in the
conduct of aeronautical and space activities. Each application made for any such award
shall be referred to the Inventions and Contributions Board established under section 305
of this Act. Such Board shall accord to each such applicant an opportunity for hearing
upon such application, and shall transmit to the Administrator its recommendation as to
the terms of the award, if any, to be made to such applicant for such contribution. In
determining the terms and conditions of any award the Administrator shall take into ac-
count-
(1) the value of the contribution to the United States;
(2) the aggregate amount of any such sums which have been expended by the
applicant for the development of such contribution;
(3) the amount of any compensation (other than salary received for services ren-
dered as an officer of employee of the Government) previously received by the applicant
for or on account of the use of such contribution by the United States; and
(4) such other factors as the Administrator shall determine to be material.
(b) If more than one applicant under subsection (a) claims an interest in the same
contribution, the Administrator shall ascertain and determine the respective interests of
such applicants, and shall apportion any award to be made with respect to such contribu-
tion among such applicants in such proportions as he shall determine to be equitable. No
award may be made under subsection (a) with respect to any contribution-
(I) unless the applicant surrenders, by such means as the Administrator shall de-
termine to be effective, all claims which such applicant may have to receive any compensa-
tion (other than the award made under this section) for the use of such contribution or
any element thereof at any time by or on behalf of the United States, or by or on behalf of
any foreign government pursuant to any treaty or agreement with the United States, within
the United States or at any other place;
(2) in any amount exceeding $100,000, unless the Administrator has transmitted
to the appropriate committees of the Congress a full and complete report concerning the
amount and terms of, and the basis for, such proposed award, and thirty calendar days of
regular session of the Congress have expired after receipt of such report by such commit-
tees.
[ 13] Appropriations
Sec. 307. (a) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be
necessary to carry out this Act except that nothing in this Act shall authorize the appro-
priation of any amount for (1) the acquisition or condemnation of any real property, or
(2) any other item of a capital nature (such as plant or facility acquisition, construction, or
expansion) which exceeds $250,000. Sums appropriated pursuant to this subsectioll for
the construction of facilities, or for research and development activities, shall remain avail-
able until expended.
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(b) Any funds appropriated for the construction of facilities may be used for emer-
gency repairs of existing facilities when such existing facilities are made inoperative by
major breakdown, accident, or other circumstances and such repairs are deemed by the
Administrator to be of greater urgency than the construction of new facilities.
(Sam Rayburn)
Speaker of the House of Representatives
(Richard Nixon)
Vice President of the United States and
President of the Senate.
Document 11-18
Document rifle: National Security Council, NSC 5814, "U.S. Policy on Outer Space,"
June 20, 1958.
Source: Presidential Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
Even before a new civilian space agency began operation, the Eisenhower adminis-
tration developed an initial post-Sputnik statement of national space policy. This docu-
ment was prepared under National Security Council auspices; the discussions included
the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, which had been chosen by the White
House as the core of a new civilian space agency. (The National Aeronautics and Space
Council established by the 1958 Space Act had not yet begun to function.) As the docu-
ment was sent to the National Security Council for discussion on June 20, 1958, disagree-
ments remained on some aspects of the statement of U.S. objectives in space (paragraph
43) and of the policy guidance for U.S. space activities (paragraphs 50 and 56.f).
[ 1] Introductory Note
This statement of U.S. Policy on Outer Space is designated Preliminary because man's
understanding of the full implications of outer space is only in its preliminary stages. As
man develops a fuller understanding of the new dimension of outer space, it is probable
that the long-term results of exploration and exploitation will basically affect international
and national political and social institutions.
Perhaps the starkest facts which confront the United States in the immediate and
foreseeable future are (1) the USSR has surpassed the United States and the Free World in
scientific and technological accomplishments in outer space, which have captured the
imagination and admiration of the world; (2) the USSR, if it maintains its present superi-
ority in the exploitation of outer space, will be able to use that superiority as a means of
undermining the prestige and leadership of the United States; and (3) the USSR, if it
should be the first to achieve a significantly superior military capability in outer space,
could create an imbalance of power in favor of the Sine_Soviet Bloc and pose a direct
military threat to U.S. security.
The security of the United States requires that we meet these challenges with re-
sourcefulness and vigor.
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[2] General Considerations
Introduction
Significance of Outer Space to U.S. Security
1. More than by any other imaginative concept, the mind of man is aroused by the
thought of exploring the mysteries of outer space.
9. Through such exploration, man hopes to broaden his horizons, add to his knowl-
edge, improve his way of living on earth. Already, man is sure that through further explo-
ration he can obtain certain scientific and military values. It is reasonable for man to
believe that there must be, beyond these areas, different and great values still to be
discovered.
3. The technical ability to explore outer space has deep psychological implications
over and above the stimulation provided by the opportunity to explore the unknown. With
its hint of the possibility of the discovery of fundamental truths concerning man, the earth,
the solar system, and the universe, space exploration has an appeal to deep insights within
man which transcend his earthbound concerns. The manner in which outer space is ex-
plored and the uses to which it is put thus take on an unusual and peculiar significance.
4. The beginning stages of man's conquest of space have been focused on technol-
ogy and have been characterized by national competition. The result has been a tendency
to equate achievement in outer space with leadership in science, military capability, indus-
trial technology, and with leadership in general.
5. The initial and subsequent successes by the USSR in launching large earth satel-
lites have profoundly affected the belief of peoples, both in the United States and abroad,
in the superiority of U.S. leadership in science and military capability. This psychological
reaction of sophisticated and unsophisticated peoples everywhere affects U.S. relations
with its allies, with the Communist Bloc, and with neutral and uncommitted nations.
[3] 6. In this situation of national competition and initial successes by the USSR,
further demonstrations by the USSR of continuing leadership in outer space capabilities
might, in the absence of comparable U.S. achievements in this field, 5s*dangerously impair
the confidence of these peoples in U.S. over-all leadership. To be strong and bold in space
technology will enhance the prestige of the United States among the peoples of the world
and create added confidence in U.S. scientific, technological, industrial and military
strength.
7. The novel nature of space exploitation offers opportunities for international co-
operation in its peaceful aspects. It is likely that certain nations may be willing to enter into
cooperative arrangements with the United States. The willingness of the Soviets to cooper-
ate remains to be determined. The fact that the results of cooperation in certain fields,
even though entered into for peaceful purposes, could have military application, may con-
dition the extent of such cooperation is those fields.
Problem of Def'ming Space
8. Many names for the various regions of the earth's atmosphere and the divisions of
space have developed over the years. The boundaries of these regions and divisions cannot
be precisely defined in physical terms, and authorities differ widely on terminology and
meaning.
9. The term "air space" has been used to denote the layer of atmosphere surround-
ing the earth in which military and civilian air vehicles operate. Although national policies
and international agreements have dealt extensively with air space and expressly assert the
sovereignty of each nation over its air space, the upper limit of air space has not been
defined.
554. Communist China has announced, furthermore, an intention of proceeding to launch its own earth
satellite in the near future. Such a development, which could only result from USSR assistance, would tend to
enhance the prestige of the Chinese Communist regime throughout Asia and among the less-developed coun-
tries, and could further undermine the reputation of the West for technological leadership unless the accom-
plishment were matched by a Free World ally.
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[4] [Entire page omitted due to classification]
[5] 12. Because the question of rights in "outer space" will undoubtedly arise at the
UN General Assembly in September 1958, perhaps in international discussions on post-
IGY activities, and perhaps in other international negotiations, it would appear desirable
for the United States to develop a common understanding of the term "outer space" as
related to particular objects and activities therein.
13. For the purposes of this policy statement, space is divided into to two regions: "air
space" and "outer space." "Outer space" is considered as contiguous to "air space", with
the lower limit of "outer space" being the upper limit of "air space."
Use of Outer Space
General
14. Outer space can be used:
a. By vehicles or other objects that achieve their primary purpose in outer space;
such as
(1) Vehicles or objects that remain in an area directly over a nation's own territory,
such as sounding rockets;
(2) Vehicles or objects that orbit the earth;
(3) Vehicles that traverse outer space enroute to the moon, other planets or the sun;
b. For the transmission of electromagnetic energy for such purposes as communi-
cations, radar measurement and electronic countermeasures;
c. By [phrase omitted during declassification review] vehicles which traverse outer
space, but which achieve their primary purpose upon their return to air space or earth.
15. There are many uses of outer space for peaceful purposes, such as exploration,
pure adventure, increase of scientific knowledge, and development and applications of
technology. Any use of outer space, however, whatever the purpose it is intended to serve,
may have some degree of military or other non-peaceful application. Therefore, U.S. poli-
cies relating to international arrangements on uses of outer space for peaceful purposes
will have to take into account possible non-peaceful applications in determining the net
advantage to U.S. security.
Science and Technology
16. Outer space technology affords new and unique opportunities for scientific ob-
servations and experiments which will add greatly to our knowledge and understanding of
the earth, the solar system and the universe. These opportunities exist in many fields,
including among others:
a. Geophysics: Three-dimensional mapping of the earth's gravity and magnetic
field.
b. Physics: Cosmic ray measurements above the earth's dense atmosphere and
experiments in the theory of relativity.
c. Meteorology: World-wide cloud-cover mapping for improved forecasting of
weather and measurements of incoming and outgoing heat energy which will allow a bet-
ter understanding of weather.
d. Biology: Possible living organisms in space and the effects on man of prolonged
exposure to radiation and weightlessness.
e. Psychological response of man to a space environment.
f. Astronomy: The universe as seen from beyond the earth's atmosphere and mea-
surement of stellar radiation.
g. Lunar investigations including the moon's gravity, mass, magnetic field, atmo-
sphere, surface, core, and original state.
h. Nature of the Planets.
The foregoing studies would be conducted by means of sounding rockets, earth satellites,
lunar vehicles, and interplanetary vehicles.
348 ORIGINS OF U.S. SPACE POLICY
17. Outer space activity and scientific research would have both military and non-
military applications. Examples are satellites as navigational aids; and satellites as relay
stations to receive and relay television or radio signals and improve world-wide communi-
cations.
18. It is not possible to foresee all applications of outer space activity which may be
developed, but our ability to achieve and maintain leadership in such applications will
largely depend on the breadth of the scientific research which is undertaken and sup-
ported.
[7] Military
19. The effective use of outer space by the United States and the Free World will
enhance their military capability. Military uses of outer space (some of which may have
peaceful applications) may be divided into the following three general categories:
a. Now Planned or in Immediate Prospect
(1) Ballistic Missiles. A family of IRBM's and ICBM's is now in the latter stages of
development. Components of these missiles can be used to develop other space vehicles,
for both military and scientific use.
(2) Anti-ICBM's which are now being developed.
(3) Military Reconnaissance. (See "Reconnaissance Satellites" section, paragraphs
20-23)
b. Feasible in the Near Future
( 1 ) Satellites of Weather Observation.
(2) Military Communications Satellites.
(3) Satellites for Electronic Countermeasures (Jamming).
(4) Satellites as Aids for Navigation, tracked from the earth's surface visually or by
radio.
c. Future Possibilities
(1) Manned Maintenance and Resupply Outer Space Vehicles,
(2) Manned Defensive Outer Space Vehicles, which might capture, destroy or neu-
tralize an enemy outer space vehicle.
(3) Bombardment Satellites (Manned or Unmanned). It is conceivable that, in the
future, satellites carrying weapons ready for firing on signal might be used for attacking
targets on the earth.
(4) Manned Lunar Stations, such as military communications relay sites or recon-
naissance stations. Conceivably, launching of missiles to the earth from lunar sites would
be possible.
[8] Reconnaissance Satellites
20. Reconnaissance satellites are of critical importance to U.S. national security. Those
now planned are designed:
(a) [major section omitted during declassification review] Reconnaissance satel-
lites would also have a high potential use as a means of implementing the "open skies"
proposal or policing a system of international armaments control.
21. As envisaged in U.S. plans, the instrumentation of reconnaissance satellites would
consist primarily of [remainder of page omitted during declassification review] . .
[9] 23. Some political implications of the use of reconnaissance satellites may be
adverse. Therefore, studies must be urgently undertaken in order to determine the most
favorable political framework in which such satellites would operate.
Manned Exploration of Outer Space
24. In addition to satisfying man's urge to explore new regions, manned exploration
of outer space is of importance to our national security because:
(a) Although present studies in outer space can be carried on satisfactorily by
using only unmanned vehicles, the time will undoubtedly come when man's judgment
and resourcefulness will be required fully to exploit the potentialities of outer space.
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(b)Tothelayman,mannedexplorationwillrepresentthetrue conquest of outer
space. No unmanned experiment can substitute for manned exploration in its psychologi-
cal effect on the peoples of the world.
(c) Discovery and exploration may be required to establish a foundation for the
rejection of USSR claims to exclusive sovereignty of other planets which may be visited by
nationals of the USSR.
25. The first step in manned outer space travel could be undertaken using rockets
and components now under study and development. Travel by man to the moon and be-
yond will probably require the development of new basic vehicles and equipment.
[10] Other Implications of Outer Space Activities
International Cooperation and Control
General
26. International cooperation in certain outer space activities appears highly desir-
able from a scientific, political and psychological standpoint and may appear desirable in
selected instances with U.S. allies from the military standpoint. International cooperation
agreements in which the United States participates could have the effect of (a) enhancing
the position of the United States as a leader in advocating the uses of outer space for
peaceful purposes and international cooperation in science, (b) conserving U.S. resources,
(c) speeding up outer space achievements by the pooling of talents, (d) "opening up" the
Soviet Bloc, and (e) introducing a degree of order and authority in the necessary interna-
tional regulations governing certain outer space activities.
27. Various types of international cooperation may be possible through existing in-
ternational scientific organizations, the United Nations, multilateral and bilateral arrange-
ments with the Free World nations and NATO, and U.S.-Soviet bilateral arrangements.
International cooperation by the United States in outer space activities might, as consis-
tent with U.S. security interests, include (a) the collection and exchange of information
on outer space; (b) the exchange of scientific instrumentation; (c) contacts among scien-
fists; (d) participation of foreign scientists in U.S. space projects; (e) planning and coordi-
nation of certain programs or specific projects to be carried out on a fully international
basis (some of which might be: a large instrumented scientific satellite, communication
satellites, and meteorological satellites); (f) establishment of regulations governing cer-
tain outer space activities; (g) provision and launching of scientific satellites in support of
international planning of a program of satellite observations.
28. Under present conditions, the extent of international cooperation, particularly
in fields having important military applications such as propulsion and guidance
mechanisms, will have to take into account security considerations (see paragraphs 7 and 15).
[11] U.S. Position
29. In January 1957 the United States initiated international discussion of the con-
trol of outer space by proposing in the UN General Assembly that the testing of outer
space vehicles should be carried out and inspected under international auspices. This
proposal was based on a policy decision _55to seek to assure that the sending of objects into
outer space should be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes and that, under
effective control, the production of such objects designed for military purposes should be
555, With reference to the relation of the use of outer space to an armaments control system, the Annex
to NSC Action No. 1553 (November 21, 1956), which remains in effect, pro_4des: "5. It is the purpose of the
United States, as part of an armaments control system, to seek to assure that the sending of objects into oute_
space shall be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes and that under effective control the production
of objects designed for travel in or projection through outer space for military purposes shall be prohibited.
Therefore, the United States to propose that, contingent upon the establishment of effective inspection
to verify the fulfillment of the commitment, all states agree to provide for international inspection of and
participation in tests of outer space objects."
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prohibited as part of an armaments control system. It was thought, at the then state of the
art, that a control of testing would have precluded development until more comprehen-
sive controls could be agreed upon. The U.S. proposal was altered with the passage of time
and, as presented on August 29, 1957 as the Four Power Proposal in London, calls for
technical studies of the "design of an inspection system which would make it possible to
assure that the sending of objects through outer space will be exclusively for peaceful and
scientific purposes." In his letter of January 13, 1958 to Bulganin, the President proposed,
as part of a five-point program relating to control of armaments and armed forces, that
"we agree that outer space be used only for peaceful purposes" and inquired "can we not
stop the productions of such weapons which would use or more accurately misuse, outer
space...?" In his later letter to Bulganin, dated February 15, 1958, the President proposed
''wholly eliminating the newest types of weapons which use outer space for human destruc-
tion."
[12] 30. a. The most recent statement of basic policy relating to the regulation and reduc-
tion of armed forces and armaments appears in paragraph 40 of NSC 5810/1 (May 5,
1958).
b. Further consideration of U.S. policy concerning the scope of control and inspec-
tion required to assure that outer space could be used only for peaceful purposes, as well
as the relationship of any such control arrangement to other aspects of an arms agree-
ment, is deferred pending the recommendation of the Special NSC Committee established
to make preparations for a possible Summit Meeting (NSC Action No. 1893). It is under-
stood that the Special NSC Committee will also consider possible interim and more lim-
ited arrangements, and take into account the technical feasibility of assuring that outer
space can be used only for peaceful purposes.
USSR Position
31. The USSR has proposed an agenda item for the next UN General Assembly meet-
ing calling for the banning of the use of "cosmic space" for military purposes, the elimina-
tion of foreign bases on the territories of other countries, and international cooperation
in the study of "cosmic space." The Soviets envisage an international agency with the
following functions: development and supervision of an international program for launch-
ing intercontinental and space rockets to study "cosmic space"; continuation on a perma-
nent basis of the IGY "cosmic space" research; world-wide collection, exchange and
dissemination of "cosmic" research information; and coordination of and assistance to
national research programs.
United Nations Role
32. The Soviet position makes certain that outer space questions, probably including
peaceful uses, control, and organization, will be discussed in the UN General Assembly in
September, 1958. The rapid pace of outer space achievements in past months has aroused
great interest among all UN members concerning the role of the United Nations in the
various aspects of outer space. The maintenance of our posture as the leading exponen t of
the use of outer space for peaceful purposes requires that the United States take in the
General Assembly an imaginative and positive position.
[13] Legal Problems of Air Space and Outer Space
33. Numerous legal problems will be posed by the development of activities in space.
Many of these cannot be settled until we gain more experience and basic information,
because the only foundation for a sound rule of law is a body of ascertained fact. It is
altogether likely that some issues in the field of space law which will be practical questions
in the future are not even identified today. This is not to say that there is an entire lack of
international law applicable to activities in space at the present time. For example, Article
51 of the Charter of the United Nations recognizes the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense against armed attack. Clearly this right is available against any space
activities employed in such an attack.
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34. International Geophysical Year. From the arrangements and announcements made
in connection with the International Geophysical Year, there may be a general implied
consent that scientific satellites be launched and orbited during the IGY. Such implied
consent does not necessarily mean, however, that assent has been given to the launching
and orbiting or other types of satellites and missiles, or that assent with respect to scientific
satellites extends beyond the IGY. It remains to be determined what rules will apply to
subsequent satellites; what limitations will govern the types and purposes of satellites in
the future, The United States, as well as other countries, has not yet taken positions on
these questions and, here again, the answer will depend not only upon what others are
likely to do but also upon what activities the United States wishes to be free to engage in.
35. A problem of jurisdiction in space on which the United States reserves its posi-
tion at present is whether celestial bodies in space beyond the earth are susceptible to
appropriation by national control or sovereignty.
36. The problem of legal definitions is unsolved. As indicated above, there is as yet
insufficient basis for legally deciding that air space extends so far and no farther; that
outer space begins at a given point above the earth. Because, for some time to come, at
least, activities in outer space will be closely connected with activities on the earth and in
air space, many legal problems with respect to space activities may well be resolved without
the necessity of determining or agreeing upon a line of demarcation between air space
and outer space. If, by analogy to the Antarctic proposal of the United States, interna-
tional agreement can be reached upon permissible activities in space and the rules and
regulations to be followed with respect thereto, problems of sovereignty may be avoided or
at least deferred.
[14] 37. Problems of liability for injury or damage caused by activities in space or by re-
entry will also arise. No nations has as yet taken a position as to whether due care against
negligence should be the standard or whether liability should be absolute. Here again
future experience, and the development of agreement among the nations, will be neces-
sary. Absolute liability as respects objects lauding on United States will have to be weighed
against absolute liability for U.S. objects landing on other nations.
38. Problems of national and international regulation over activities in space will also
arise. There is already the need to assign telecommunication wavelengths to communica-
tions with satellites and space objects. Other types of regulations having serious security'
implications will have to be worked out for the identification of space objects and for some
type of traffic control to prevent congestion and interference.
39. Generally speaking, rules will have to be evolved gradually and pragmatically
from experience. While the nations engaging in space activities will play an important role
in this field, it will have to be recognized from the nature of the subject that all nations
have a legitimate interest in it. The field is not suitable for abstract a pr/or/codification.
[15] Comparison of USSR and U.S.
Capabilities in Outer Space Activities
40. Conclusive evidence shows that the Soviets are conducting a well-planned outer
space program at high priority. The table below attempts to estimate the U.S. and USSR
timetable for accomplishment of specific outer space flight activities.
a. Soviet space flight capabilities estimated in the table reflect the earliest possible
time periods in which each specific event could be successfully accomplished.
(1) The space flight program is in competition with many other programs, particu-
larly the missile program. The USSR probably cannot successfully accomplish all of the
estimated space flight activities within the time periods specified. The USSR will not per-
mit its space flight program to interfere with achieving an early operational capability for
ICBM's (which enjoy the highest priority).
(2) The USSR is believed to have the intention to pursue both an active space flight
program designed to put man into outer space for military and/or scientific purposes,
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and further scientific research utilizing earth satellites, lunar rockets, and probes of Mars
and Venus; but it cannot be determined, at this time, whether the basic scientific program
or the "man in space" program enjoys the higher priority and will, therefore, be pursued
first.
b. U.S. space flight capabilities indicated in the table reflect the earliest possible
time periods in which each specific event could be successfully accomplished. Not all of
the indicated activities could be successfully accomplished with the time period specified.
It must also be recognized that the accomplishment of some of the activities listed would
impinge upon space activities already programmed, or upon other military programs.
41. If the USSR high-priority outer space program continues, the USSR will maintain
its lead at least for the next few years, as shown in the following table.
[16] Earliest Possible Time Periods of Various
Soviet and U.S. Accomplishments in Outer Space
(NOTE: Generally, Soviet vehicles will be of substantially greater orbital payloads than
U.S. vehicles. It should be noted, however, that the comparative capabilities of the United
States and the USSR should not be measured by orbital payloads alone.
The United States is estimated to be considerably ahead of the USSR in miniaturiza-
tion of missile and satellite components, and therefore the effectiveness of U.S. satellites
on a "per pound in orbit" basis is estimated to be greater than that of the USSR.)
So_et" US. k
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
1957-58 1958Scientific Earth Satellites
(IGYCommitment)
Reconnaissance Satellites'
Recoverable Aeromedical Satellites
Exploratory Lunar Probes
or Lunar Satellites
"Soft" Lunar Landing
Communications Satellites
Manned Recoverable Satellites
a. Capsule-type Satellites 1959-60 d 1960-63
b. Glide-type Vehicles 1960-61 1960-63
8. Mars Probe Aug. 1958" Oct. 1960
9. Venus Probe June 1959' Jan. 1961
10. 25,000-pound Satellite -- manned 1961-62 After 1965
11. Manned Circumlunar Flight 1961-62 1969-64
12. Manned Lunar Landing After 1965 1968
1958-59 1959-61
1958-59 1959
1958-59 1958-59
1959-60 Early 1960
1959-60
" Estimate by the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (GMIC) of the IAC as if
June 3, 1958.
b Some: Department of Defense, June 4, 1958.
' Defense Comment: (See Annex B for test reconnaissance satellites.) The United
States plans to launch a reconnaissance satellite of approximately 3,000 pounds in late
1959. During the same time period the USSR is estimated to be capable of launching a
45,000 pound reconnaissance satellite.
The Joint Staff member of GMIC reserves his position on the date 1959.
The Soviets most likely would attempt probes when Venus and Mars are in their
most favorable conjunction with the earth for such an undertaking.
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Level of Effort
42. a. Because of the highly speculative nature of future activities in outer space,
decisions as to the priority and extent of U.S. outer space programs will obviously be a
judgment based on limited knowledge. Some activities in outer space would be expedited
by the allocation of additional financial resources; others would not, being dependent on
research progress. The potentially great importance to U.S. national interests of outer
space activities, however, requires taking risks in allocating resources to research and de-
velopment activities, the success or ultimate utility of which cannot be definitely fore-
seen.
b. The level of material and scientific effort to be expended on outer space activities
must nevertheless be related to other national security programs to ensure that a proper
balance is maintained between anticipated scientific, military and psychological gains from
outer space programs and the possible loss resulting from reductions in resources allo-
cated to other programs.
Objectives 5_6
43. The fullest 557development and exploitation of U.S. outer space capabilities as
needed to achieve U.S. scientific, military and political purposes as follows:
a. A technological capability to meet the requirements of b, c and d below.
b. A degree of competence and a level of achievement in outer space basic and
applied research and exploration which is at least on a par with that of any other nation.
c. Applications of outer space technology, research and exploration to achieve a
military capability in outer space sufficient to assure the over-all superiority of U.S. [outer
space] _" offensive and defensive systems relative to those of the USSR,
d. Applications of outer space technology, research, and exploration for non-
military purposes, which are at least on a par with any other nation.
e. World recognition of the United States as, at least, the equal of any other nation
in over-all outer space activity and as the leading advocate of the peaceful exploitation of
outer space.
[43. The establishment of the United States as the recognized leader in the over-all
development and exploitation of outer space for scientific, military and political pur-
poses.J559
44. As consistent with U.S. security, achievement of international cooperation in the
uses of and activities related to outer space: for peaceful purposes, and with selected allies
for military purposes.
[19] 45. As consistent with U.S. security, the achievement of suitable international agree-
ments relating to the uses of outer space for peaceful purposes that will assure orderly
outer space programs.
46. Utilization of the potentials of outer space to assist in "opening up" the Soviet
Bloc through improved intelligence and programs of scientific cooperation.
Policy Guidance 56°
Priority and Scope of Outer Space Effort
47. With a priority and scope sufficient to enable the United States at the earliest
practicable time to achieve its scientific, military and political objectives as stated in para-
556. See paragraphs 29 and 30 for statement of the status of policy on the regulation and reduction of
armed forces and armaments in relation to outer space.
557. Budget proposes to delete "the fullest" and all of the paragraph after "purposes".
558. Defense-JCS proposal.
559. ODM-NACA-USIA alternative paragraph 43.
560. See paragraphs 29 and 30 for statement of the status of policy on the regulation and reduction of
armed forces and armaments in relation to outer space.
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graph 43, develop and expand selected U.S. activities related to outer space in:
a. Research and technology required to exploit the military and non-military po-
tentials of outer space.
b. Outer space exploration required to determine such military and non-military
potentials.
c. Applications of outer space research, technology, and exploration to develop
outer space capabilities (in addition to those capabilities which now have the highest na-
tional priority _l) required to achieve such objectives.
48. In addition to undertaking necessary immediate and short-range activities re-
lated to outer space, develop plans for outer space activities or the longer range (through
at least a ten-year period).
49. Study on a continuing basis the implications which U.S. and foreign exploitation
of outer space may hold for international and national political and social institutions.
Critically examine such exploitation for possible consequences on activities and on life on
earth (e.g., outer space activities which affect weather, health for other factors relating to
activities and life on earth).
[50. In the absence of a safeguarded international agreement for the control of ar-
maments and armed forces, place primary emphasis on activities related to outer space
necessary to maintain the over-all deterrent capability of the United States and the Free
World.] 5°I
[21 ] Paychological Exploitation
51. In the near future, while the USSR has a superior capability in space technology,
judiciously select (without prejudicing activities under paragraph 47) projects for imple-
mentation which, while having scientific or military value, are designed to achieve a favor-
able world-wide psychological impact.
52. Identify, to the greatest extent possible, the interests and aspirations of other
Free World nations in outer space with U.S.-sponsored activities and accomplishments.
53. Develop information and other programs that will exploit fully U.S. outer space
activities on a continuing basis; especially, during the period while the USSR has superior
over-all outer space capabilities, those designed to counter the psychological impact of
Soviet outer space activities and to present U.S. outer space progress in the most favorable
comparative light.
Reconnmce Satellites 5_s
54. In anticipation of the availability of reconnaissance satellites, seek urgently a po-
litical framework which will place the uses of U.S. reconnaissance satellites in a political
and psychological context most favorable to the United States.
55. At the earliest technologically practicable date, use reconnaissance satellites to
enhance to the maximum extent the U.S. intelligence effort.
International Cooperation in Outer Space Activities
56. Consistent with the objectives in paragraphs 43 and 44, and as a means of main-
raining the U.S. position as the leading advocate of the use of outer space for peaceful
purposes, be prepared to propose that the United States join with other nations, including
the USSR, in cooperative efforts relating to outer space. Specifically:
a. Encourage a continuation and expansion of the type of cooperation which exists
in the IGY programs, through nongovernmental international scientific [22] organiza-
tions such as the International Council of Scientific Unions; including cooperation in the
design of experiments and instrumentation, exchange of information on instrumenta-
561. See NSC Acdon No. 1846.
562. State-Defense-Treasury-JCS proposal, Other Planning Board representatives believe the subject is
adequately covered in paragraphs 43 and 47, and would therefore delete paragraph 50.
563. The priority and scope of operational capabilities of reconnaissance satellites are established in NSC
Action No. 1846,Janua.ry 2_, 1958.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 355
tion, scientific data and telemetry, exchange of instruments, and in the use of scientific
satellites and other scientific vehicles in support of international planning for exploration
of outer space.
b. Recognize UN interests in outer space cooperation, but do not encourage pre-
cipitous UN action to establish permanent organizational arrangements. To this end
consider: (1) establishment of an ad hoc UN planning committee to formulate recom-
mendations to facilitate international cooperation and appropriate UN organizational ar-
rangements; and (2) in the interim, participation in those joint projects for cooperation
and exchange of information for which UN auspices are desirable.
c. Invite scientists of foreign countries, including the Soviet Bloc in general on a
reciprocal basis, to participate in selected U.S. programs for the scientific exploration of
space.
d. Propose scientific bilateral arrangements with other nations (including the
USSR) for cooperative ventures related to outer space, provided that the combined exist-
ing competence might achieve meaningful scientific and technical advance.
e. Propose to groups of nations and international organizations independent outer
space projects which would be appropriate for multilateral participation.
f. Assist selected Free World nations willing and able to undertake useful activities
related to outer space, [as necessary to assure that the over-all Free World position in outer
space developments is at least on a par with that of the Sino-Soviet Bloc] ._
Limited International Arrangements to Regulate Outer Space Activities
57. Propose international agreements concerning appropriate means for maintain-
ing a full and current public record of satellite orbits and emission frequencies.
[23] International Outer Space Law
58. [Paragraph excised during declassification review]
59. Reserve the U.S. position on legal issues of outer space, but undertake on an
urgent basis a study of the legal issues that will arise from national and international outer
space activities in the near future.
Interim Position in International Negotiations
60. In negotiations with other nations or organizations dealing with outer space (pend-
ing the results of the study referred to in paragraph 58), seek to achieve common agree-
ment to relate such negotiations to the traversing or operating of man-made objects in
outer space, rather than to defined regions in outer space.
Security Classification
61. In considering whether U.S. outer space information and material requires clas-
sification under Executive Order No. 10501,5_ take special account of the lead achieved by
the USSR in outer space activities and the advantages, including more rapid progress,
which could accrue to the United States through liberalizing the general availability and
use of such information and material.
Administration of Outer Space Programs
62. Provide through appropriate legislation for the conduct of U.S. outer space ac-
tivities under the direction of a civilian agency, except in so far as such activities may be
peculiar to or primarily associated with weapons systems or military operations, in the case
of which activities the Department of Defense shall be responsible.
564. Budget proposes deletion.
565. Executive Order No. 10501 ("Safeguarding Official Information in the Interests of the Defense of
the United States"), Section 3 provides in part that: "Unnecessary classification and over-classification [of infor-
mation or material] shall be scrupulously avoided."
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[24] Annex A
The Soviet Space Program
1. Objectives and Scope of Program. Conclusive evidence shows that the Soviets are
conducting a well-planned space flight program at high priority. This program is appar-
ently aimed at placing both instrumented and manned vehicles into space. Certain suc-
cesses have been exhibited already in the instrumented vehicles category (including the
orbiting of three earth satellites, one containing a dog) and we believe they are fully ca-
pable of achieving manned space flight within the next few years.
2. General. Evidence of Soviet interest in space flight dates back to a publication in
1903 of a paper, "Investigation of Universal Space by Means of Rocket Flight," by the emi-
nent Russian scientist Tsiolkovsky. This highly scientific treatise for the first time math-
ematically established the fundamentals of rocket dynamics and included a proposal
for an artificial earth satellite. Reactive motion (rockets) was seriously engaged again in
the latter '20s and in the '30s. In April 1955, the Interagency Commission for Interplan-
etary Communications was formed under the Academy of Sciences to establish an
automatic laboratory for scientific research in cosmic space as a first step in solving the
problems of interplanetary travel. Since early 1955 several hundred articles on space re-
search, earth satellites and space flight have been published in the USSR Many of the
articles have been written by high-caliber Soviet scientists and most deal with the theoreti-
cal principles of space flight.
3. Capabilities. The Soviet Union dramatically demonstrated its interest and current
capability in space flight with the launching of two earth satellites in October and Novem-
ber 1957, and a third in mid-May 1958. The complex facilities and skills needed to operate
the large rocket vehicles required for the launching of a satellite or space vehicle are ap-
parently available within the Soviet military. Thus, although the first space flights were
doubtless undertaken for the furtherance of scientific knowledge and for whatever psy-
chological and political advantage would accrue, the Soviet military department, by
intimate participation of its hardware and personnel, is in a posidon to utilize immediately
such knowledge for the enhancement of the Soviet military position and objectives. The
realization of even more advanced space projects particularly those involving manned flight,
must be preceded by a vast amount of systematic [25] and well-coordinated scientific and
technological work directed toward the development of practical space vehicles, the deter-
mination of basic operational requirements and limitations, and the creation of an envi-
ronment and equipment capable of sustaining human life in outer space. Such a program
embraces virtually all fields of science and engineering and the following fields were par-
ticularly examined for evidence of Soviet technical capability: guided missiles, re-entry
vehicles, propulsion, electronics, space medicine, astrobiology, internal power supplies,
and celestial mechanics. While firm association of these areas with a space program varied
considerably, it is noted that the state of Soviet art in all sciences required in a space pro-
gram was such that no scientific barriers of magnitude were detected. Four areas critical to
a space program have apparently received considerable attention by the USSR, e.g., devel-
opment of large rocket-engine propulsion systems, space medicine, cosmic biology and
celestial mechanics. We believe the depth and advancement of their research and develop-
ment makes them world leaders in these areas. In particular their work in space medicine
and cosmic biology are strong indicators of their serious intent to put man in space at an
early date.
4. Time Scales.
a. The following milestones are considered at least partially affiliated with a space
program and indicate historically the long-term interest of Soviet Union in this endeavor:
1903 Inidal treatise on space flight
1923 Soviet Institute on Theoretical Astronomy founded
1929 First significant rocket studies conducted, "Group for the
Investigation of Reactive Motion" founded
1934 Government-sponsored rocket research program established
EXPLORINGTHE UNKNOWN 357
1940
1946-47
1953-55
1955
(Apr.)
1955-58
1957
(Oct.-Nov.)
Flight of first Soviet rocket-powered aircraft
Rocket-propelled intercontinental bomber program organized
Systematic investigation of moon flight problems undertaken
Interagency Commission for Interplanetary
Communications established
Over 500 Soviet articles published dealing with space research,
earth satellites and manned space flight.
First artificial earth satellites orbited.
b. Future Capabilities. Soviet space flight capabilities estimated in this section are
the earliest possible time periods in which each specific event could be successfully accom-
plished. It is recognized that the space flight program is in competition with many other
programs, particularly the missile program, and that the USSR probably cannot success-
fully accomplish all of the estimated space flight activities within the time periods speci-
fied. We believe the USSR has the intention to pursue an active flight program designed to
put man into space for military and/or scientific purposes. We also believe they have a
definite intention to pursue further scientific research utilizing earth satellites, lunar rock-
ets, and probes of Mars and Venus. We cannot, at this time, determine whether the basic
scientific program or the "man in space" program enjoys the higher priority and will, there-
fore, be pursued first. Whichever approach is adopted will probably result in some slip-
page in the capability dates indicated for the other program. We believe the Soviet ICBM
program s011 enjoys the highest priority and that the USSR will not permit its space flight
program to interfere with achieving an early operational ICBM capability.
( 1 ) Unmanned Earth Satellites.
(a) Based on current estimates of Soviet ICBM capabilities, it is estimated that the
USSR could orbit scientific satellites weighing on the order of 5,000 pounds within the
next several months. The USSR could probably continue to place into orbit more and
perhaps larger satellites throughout the period of this estimate. As additional scientific
data is obtained, the USSR could refine or develop new scientific instrumentation to be
placed into satellites.
(b) It is believed that the USSR could place into orbit and recover aeromedical
specimens from satellites early in the period of this estimate. Early recovery of a biological
specimen from orbiting satellites is essential and could advance Soviet knowledge of recov-
ery techniques and provide indications of adverse effects of a space environment for man.
(c) The USSR could probably orbit surveillance satellites capable of low resolu-
tion (approximately 100-200 feet) at any time within the next year to obtain weather data
and perhaps [27] some additional data of military intelligence value such as fleet move-
ments. More sophisticated surveillance satellites, involving improved photographic or TV
reconnaissance, infrared photography and/or ELINT, could be developed within a year or
two following an initial success. These latter satellites containing this more advanced in-
strumentation could be capable of providing more diverse scientific and military informa-
tion. Should they elect to do so, the USSR could also develop a communications relay
satellite within the period of this estimate.
(2) Lunar Rockets. The USSR has had the capability of launching a lunar probe
toward the vicinity of the moon since the fall of 1957 as far as propulsion and guidance
requirements are concerned. A Soviet program of lunar probes could commence with
experimental rockets followed by rocket landings on the moon with increasingly hea_ 7
loads containing scientific and telemetering equipment. Placing a satellite into orbit around
the moon requires the use of a retro-rocket and more accurate guidance. It is believed that
the USSR could achieve a lunar satellite in late 1958-1959 and have a lunar soft landing
about six months thereafter.
(3) Manned Earth Satellites. Sufficient scientific data could probably be attained and
recovery techniques perfected to permit the USSR to launch a manned satellite into or-
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bital flight and recovery by about 1959-19607 _ A manned capsule-type satellite as well as a
manned glide-type vehicle appear to be feasible techniques and within Soviet capabilities.
However, it is believed that the first Soviet orbital recovery attempt will probably be with
the manned capsule.
(4) Planetary Probes. Planetary probe vehicles could utilize existing Soviet ICBM
propulsion units for the first stage and presently available guidance components. It is be-
lieved that the USSR could launch probes towards Mars and Venus with a good chance of
success. The first launchings toward Mars could occur in August 1958, when Mars will be
in the most favorable [28] position relative to the earth. More sophisticated probes could
occur in October 1960, when Mars will again be in a favorable position relative to the
earth. Probes toward Venus could probably occur in June 1959, and more sophisticated
probe vehicles could be launched in January 1961.
(5) Manned Curcumlunar Flights. Contingent upon their success with manned earth
satellites and the development of a new, large booster engine, and concurrent advances in
scientific experimentations with lunar rockets, the USSR could achieve a capability for
manned circumlunar flight with reasonable chance for success in about 1961-1962.
(6) Manned Lunar Landings. It is not believed that the USSR will have a capability for
manned lunar landings until some time after 1965.
(7) Space Platforms. There is insufficient information on the problems as well as the
utility of constructing a platform in space to determine the Soviet capability. It is believed,
however, that they are capable of placing a very large satellite (about 25,000 pounds) into
orbit in 1961-1962 and that this vehicle could serve some of the scientific functions of a
large space platform without the difficulties of joining and constructing such a platform in
space.
Annex B
Tentative Schedule of U.S. Vehicle Launchings 567
(as of June 30, 1958)
1. IGY (Five Vanguard vehicles)
Firing rate about one per month ending late in 1958 (or early 1959).
Payload 22 lbs.
2. Lunar Probes (Three Thor-Vanguard vehicles)
First launching - September 1958 - Payload 25 lbs. plus retro-rockets.
Second launching- October 1958 - Payload 26 lbs. plus retro-rockets.
Third launching - November 1958 - Payload 26 lbs. plus retro-rockets.
3. Satellites and Lunar Probes (Three Juno II, One Juno I)
(Inflatable Sphere) - Fall 1958 - Payload 12-foot reflecting sphere.
(Lunar Probe) - November 1958 - Payload 15 lbs.
(Lunar Probe) -January 1959 - Payload 15 lbs.
(Cosmic ray satellite) - February 1959 - Payload 60 lbs.
4. a. ARGUS Project (Two Juno I)
Both units to be launched as earth satellites in August 1958 - Payload 26 lbs.
b. ARGUS Project (Six NOTS fly-up satellites)
Satellites are air-launched, have approximately 3-pound payload of instruments de-
signed to detect Argus effect. Satellites are to be launched into polar orbits. Three flights
in July 1958 are planned for purpose of testing system. If these first three are successful,
three more will be launched in August as part of Argus Project.
[30] 5. Advanced Reconnaissance Satellite Development Program, W/S 117L
566. The Joint Staff member reserves his position on the date 1959.
567. Launchings shown are those needed to implement presently-planned programs. These programs
are under review and are not to be regarded as final.
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a.Tests
(1)Thor-boostedprogram- Up to nineteen vehicles - Test firings for second stage
and instrumentation capability.
First launching about November 1958 - Firing rate nearly one per month until comple-
tion. Payload 400 lbs. to 135-mile orbit.
(2) Atlas-boosted program - five vehicles - Visual Reconnaissance Components Test.
First launching about July 1959, with firing rate of about one every other month to
completion of program. Payload 2600 lbs. to 300-mile orbit. Launchings from Cape
Canaveral. Satellites would not pass over the USSR.
(3) Atlas-boosted program - one vehicle - Visual Reconnaissance Components Test.
Launching about March 1960 (the earliest date an Atlas 117L launching stand would be
available at Cooke). Payload 2600 lbs. to 300-mile orbit.
(4) Atlas-boosted program - four vehicles - Visual Reconnaissance Test.
First launching about May 1960, with firing rate of one every other month to comple-
tion November 1960. Payload 2600 lbs. to 300-mile orbit. Launchings from Cooke.
(5) Atlas-boosted program - Three vehicles - Ferret Reconnaissance Test.
First launching about August 1960, with firing rate of one every other month to
completion December 1960. Payload 2600 lbs. to 300-mile orbit. Launchings from Cooke.
[Section omitted during declassification review]
(6) X-15 Manned Research Aircraft-Three aircraft- (USAF, NACA, USN). First flight
scheduled in first half of CY 1959. Maximum altitude capability, 100-125 miles. Maximum
speed about 4500 miles per hour. 5_
Document 11-19
Document title: Nathan E Twining, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for
the Secretary of Defense, "U.S. Policy on Outer Space (NSC 5814)," August 11, 1958.
Source: Presidential Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
While the draft of NSC 5814 was being discussed, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
Nathan E Twining was asked to review the document, and he recommended changes. His
August 11, 1958, memorandum on the subject argued that primary emphasis in U.S. space
policy should be given to military activities related to U.S. security.
[1] Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense
Subject: U.S. Policy on Outer Space (NSC 5814).
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the subject draft revision of NSC 5814
prepared by the NSC Planning Board in accordance with NSC Action 1940-c for consider-
ation by the National Security Council at its meeting on 14 August 1958. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff consider that while the draft revision is in literal consonance with NSC Action
1940-c, it does not wholly reflect the substance of the recommendation made to the Na-
tional Security Council by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. As a result, the draft statement
of policy does not reflect a proper balance between military and non-military interests in
outer space. Paragraph 43 of the draft revision states the following as a U.S. objective:
"Development and exploitation of U.S. outer space capabilities as needed to achieve U.S.
568. This aircraft was not planned as an orbital vehicle and approved programs do not include modifica-
tion of system to allow orbiting. Various problems related to re-entry of orbiting or space vehicles can be effec-
tively studied with this aircraft.
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scientific, military, and political purposes, and to establish the United States as a recog-
nized leader in this field." The primary product of leadership in the non-military aspect of
outer space is world-wide prestige, whereas that of the military aspect is a factor of survival
of the United States. Since U.S. resources that can be devoted to outer space activities over-
all are limited, it is appropriate to indicate the relative priority between military and non-
military activities.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to emphasize the "preliminary" nature of the draft
statement of policy and the need for flexibility in the execution of its provisions.
3. Specific comments on the diverse views contained in the draft revisions follow:
a. Paragraph 50, page 12. (Changes to read as follows, indicated in the usual man-
ner) :
[50. In the absence of a safeguarded international agreement for the control of ar-
maments and armed forces, place priraary emphasis on activities related to outer space necessa D, to
maintain the over-all deterrent capability of the United States and the Free World.]
[2] REASON: In the absence of a safeguarded international agreement for the
control of armaments and armed forces, policy guidance, particularly as it affects future
military research and development programs is needed. Such guidance does not appear
elsewhere in this paper nor in other U.S. policy papers.
4. Subject to the foregoing,
a. The majority view of the draft revision of policy is acceptable from a military
point of view, and
b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you concur in the adoption of the
draft revision of NSC 5814, "U.S. Policy on Outer Space."
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
N.E TWINING,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Document 11-20
Document tide: National Security Council, NSC 5814/1, "Preliminary U.S. Policy on Outer
Space," August 18, 1958, pp. 17-19.
Source: Presidential Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
This statement of U.S. policy, a revision of NSC 5814, was adopted by the National
Security Council at its August 14, 1958, meeting and approved by President Eisenhower on
August 18, 1958. Coordinating the implementation of the policy was the Operations Coor-
dinating Board, a unit within the Executive Office of the President closely linked to the
National Security Council; this was the president's means of making sure that various ex-
ecutive agencies were being responsive to administration policy. At the time this policy
statement was approved, the new National Aeronautics and Space Administration had been
created, but had not begun operations.
There are a number of language changes between this document and the draft NSC
5814 [II-18 ], which are relatively insignificant. However, paragraph 44 is a revision of para-
graph 43 in the draft document that takes a less expansive view of U.S. purposes in space.
Also, paragraph 50 of the earlier document was deleted on the basis of objections from the
military community. The major changes are reprinted here.
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[17] Level of Effort
43. a. Because of the highly speculative nature of future activities in outer space,
decisions as to the priority and extent of U,S. outer space programs will obviously be a
judgment based on limited knowledge. Some activities in outer space would be expedited
by the allocation of additional financial resources; others would not, being dependent on
research progress. The potentially great importance to U.S. national interests of outer
space activities, however, requires taking risks in allocating resources to research and de-
velopment activities, the success or ultimate utility of which cannot be definitely foreseen.
b. The level of material and scientific effort to be expended on outer space activi-
ties must nevertheless be related to other national security programs to ensure that a proper
balance is maintained between anticipated scientific, military and psychological gains from
outer space programs and the possible loss resulting from reductions in resources allo-
cated to other programs.
[ 18] Objectives _'
44. Development and exploitation of U.S. outer space capabilities as needed to achieve
U.S. scientific, military, and political purposes, and to establish the U.S. as a recognized
leader in this field.
45. As consistent with U.S. security, achievement of international cooperation in the
uses of and activities related to outer space; for peaceful purposes, and with selected allies
for military purposes.
46, As consistent with U.S. security, the achievement of suitable international agree-
ments relating to the uses of outer space for peaceful purposes that will assure orderly
development and regulation of national and international outer space programs.
47. Utilization of the potentials of outer space to assist in "opening up" the Soviet
Bloc through improved intelligence and programs of scientific cooperation.
Policy Guidance 5_
Priority and Scope of Outer Space Effort 5_6
48. With a priority and scope sufficient to enable the U.S. at the earliest practicable
time to achieve its scientific, military and political objectives as stated in paragraph 44,
develop and expand selected U.S. activities related to outer space in:
[19] a. Basic and applied research, and exploration required to determine the mili-
tary and non-military potentials of outer space.
b. Research and technology required to exploit such military and non-military
potentials.
c. Application of such outer space research, technology, and exploration to
develop outer space capabilities required to achieve such objectives.
49. In addition to undertaking necessary immediate and short-range activities re-
lated to outer space, develop plans for outer space activities for the longer range (through
at least a ten-year period).
50. Study on a continuing basis the implications which U.S. and foreign exploitation
of outer space may hold for international and national political and social institutions.
Critically examine such exploitation for possible consequences on activities and life on
earth (e.g., outer space activities which affect weather, health, or other factors relating to
activities and life on earth) ....
'_' See paragraphs 30 and 31 for statement of the status of policy on the regulation and reduction of
armed forces and armaments in relation to outer space.
_'_See paragraphs 30 and 31 for statement of the status of policy on the regulation and reduction of
armed forces and armaments in relation to outer space.
_"Nothing in this paper shall be construed as affecting priorities established under NSC Action No. 1846
or future priorities approved by the President.
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Document 11-21
Document rifle: National Aeronautics and Space Council, "U.S. Policy on Outer Space,"
January 26, 1960.
Source: Presidential Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
This final Eisenhower administration statement on U.S. space policy was adopted at
what was considered ajoint meeting of the National Aeronautics and Space Council and
the National Security Council on January 12, 1960, and approved by the president on
January 26, 1960. It replaced the policy statements contained in National Security Council
documents NSC 5520 [II-10] and NSC 5814/1 [II-18, II-20]. Although the draft of this
policy statement had been circulated bearing a National Security Council designation (NSC
5918), the approved statement was issued as a National Aeronautics and Space Council
document. Because of changes from the draft policy statement that had been circulated in
December, this final policy document did not contain a page 14,
[13 General Considerations
Scope of Policy
1. This policy is concerned with U.S. interests in scientific, civil, military, and political
activities related to outer space. It deals with sounding rockets, earth satellites, and outer
space vehicles, their relationship to the exploration and use of outer space, and their po-
litica] and psychological significance. Although the relation between outer space technol-
ogy and ballistic missile technology is recognized, U.S. policy on ballistic missiles is not
covered in this policy. And-missile defense systems also are not covered except to the ex-
tent that space vehicles may be used in connection with such systems.
Significance of Outer Space to U.S. Security
2. Outer space presents a new and imposing challenge. Although the full potentiali-
ties and significance of outer space remain largely to be explored, it is already clear that
there are important scientific, civil, military, and political implications for the national
security, including the psychological impact of outer space activities which is of broad
significance to national prestige.
3. Outer space generally has been viewed as an area of intense competition which has
been characterized to date by comparison of Soviet and U.S. activities. The successes of
the Soviet Union in placing the first earth satellite in orbit, in launching the first space
probe to reach escape velocity, in achieving the first "hard" landing on the moon and in
obtaining the first pictures of the back side of the moon have resulted in substantial and
enduring gains in Soviet prestige. The U.S. has launched a greater number of earth satel-
lites and has also launched a space probe which has achieved escape velocity. These U.S.
activities have resulted in a number of scientifically significant "firsts." However, the space
vehicles launched by the Soviet Union have been substantially heavier than those in the
U.S., and weight has been a major point of comparison internationally. In addition, the
Soviets have benefited from their ability to conceal any failures from public scrutiny.
4. From the political and psychological standpoint the most significant factor of
Soviet space accomplishments is that they have produced new credibility for Soviet state-
ments and claims. Where once the Soviet Union was not generally believed, even its bold-
est propaganda claims are now apt to be accepted at face value, not only abroad but in the
United States. The Soviets have used this credibility for the following purposes:
a. To claim general superiority for the Soviet system on the grounds that the Sput-
niks and Luniks demonstrate the ability [2] of the system to produce great results in an
extremely short period of time.
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b. To claim that the world balance has shifted in favor of Communism.
c. To claim that Communism is the wave of the future.
d. To create a new image of the Soviet Union as a technologically powerful, scien-
tifically sophisticated nation that is equal to the U.S. in most respects, superior in others,
and with a far more brilliant future.
e. To create a new military image of the vast manpower of the Communist nations
now backed by weaponry that is as scientifically advanced as that of the West, superior in
the missile field, and superior in quantity in all fields.
5. Soviet efforts already have achieved a considerable degree of success, and may be
expected to show further gains with each notable space accomplishment, and particularly
each major "first."
6. Significant advances have been made in restoring U.S. prestige overseas, and in
increasing awareness of the scope and magnitude of the U.S. outer space effort. Although
most opinion still considers the U.S. as probably leading in general scientific and technical
accomplishments, the USSR is viewed in most quarters as leading in space science and
technology. There is evidence that a considerable portion of world leadership and the
world public expects the United States to "catch up" with the Soviet Union, and further
expects this to be demonstrated by U.S. ability to equal Soviet space payloads and to match
or surpass Soviet accomplishments. Failure to satisfy such expectations may give rise to the
belief that the United States is "second best," thus transferring to the Soviets additional
increments of prestige and credibility now enjoyed by the United States.
7. To the layman, manned space flight and exploration will represent the true con-
quest of outer space and hence the ultimate goal of space activities. No unmanned experi-
ment can substitute for manned space exploration in its psychological effect on the peoples
of the world. There is no reason to believe that the Soviets, after getting an earlier start, are
placing as much emphasis on their manned space flight program as is the U.S,
[3] 8. The scientific value of space exploration and the prestige accruing therefrom
have been demonstrated. The scientific uses of space are a potent factor in the derivation
of fundamental information of use in most fields of knowledge. Further, the greater the
breadth and precision of the knowledge of the space environment, the greater the ability
to exploit its potentials.
9. Among several foreseeable civil applications of earth satellites, two at present offer
unique capabilities which are promising in fields of significance to the national economy:
communications and meteorology. Other civil potentials are also likely to be identified.
10. [Paragraph excised during declassification review]
11. [Paragraph excised during declassification review]
12. Outer space activities present new opportunities and problems in the conduct of
the relations of the U.S. with its allies, neutral states, and the Soviet Bloc; and the establish-
ment of sound international relationships in this new field is of fundamental significance
to the national security. Of importance in seeking such relationships is the fact that all
nations have an interest in the purposes for which outer space is explored and used and in
the achievement of an orderly basis for the conduct of space activities. Moreover, many
nations are capable of participating directly in various aspects of outer space activities, and
international participation in such applications of space vehicles as those involved in sci-
entific research, weather forecasting, and communications may [4] be essential to full
realization of the potentialities of such activities. In addition, an improvement of the inter-
national position of the U.S. may be effected through U.S. leadership in extending inter-
nationally the benefits of the peaceful purposes of outer space. The fact that the results of
the arrangements in certain fields, even though entered into for peaceful purposes, could
have military implications, may condition the extent of such arrangements in those fields.
Use of Outer Space
General
13. As further knowledge of outer space is obtained, the advantages to be accrued
will become more apparent. At the present time, space activities are directed toward tech-
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nological development and scientific exploration; however, it is anticipated that systems
will be put into operation, beginning in the near future, that will more directly contribute
to national security and well-being and be of international benefit.
14. Present and planned outer space activities will require the use of the following
classes of vehicles:
a. Sounding Rockets _- Vehicles that are launched vertically or in a ballistic trajec-
tory to heights well outside the earth's atmosphere and return to earth.
b. Earth Satellites - Manned and unmanned vehicles that orbit the earth.
c. Space Probes mad Interplanetary Space Vehicles -Manned and unmanned ve-
hicles that escape the earth environment to traverse interplanetary space.
15. It is not possible to foresee all the uses of outer space, but the ability to identi_
and develop such uses will be significantly influenced by the breadth of the exploratory
scientific research which is undertaken.
Scientific Research and Exploration
16. Space technology affords new and unique opportunities for immediate and long-
range scientific observation, experimentation, and [5] exploration which will add to our
knowledge and understanding of the earth, the solar system, and the universe. Immediate
opportunities exist in many areas, including among others:
a. Atmosphere - Study of the structure and composition of the earth's outer
atmosphere.
b. Ionosphere - Measurement of the electron density of the earth's outer
ionosphere and its temporal and spatial variations.
c. Energetic Particles - Measurement of cosmic ray intensity, radiation belts, and
auroral particles and their variations with time and space in the vicinity of the earth and
moon.
d. Electric and Magnetic Fields - Measurement of the magnitude and variations of
the earth's magnetic field and the associated ionospheric electric currents.
e. Gravitational Fields - Study of the detailed motion of existing and special satel-
lites with the object of determining a more detailed picture of the earth's and moon's
gravitational field.
f. Astronomy - Preliminary investigation of the moon; and measurement of spec-
tra, especially in the ultraviolet and X-ray regions, including the brighmess and positions
of interesting regions of the sky.
g. Bit Sciences - Investigation of the effects of outer space on living organisms,
especially those which have most application to the manned exploration of space.
h. Geodesy- Measurement of the size and shape of the earth, and location of land
masses and water.
17, Future possibilities for scientific research and exploration include: continuation
on a more sophisticated basis of the measurements of atmospheres, ionospheres, electric
and magnetic fields, and expansion of such measurements to Mars and Venus and ulti-
mately throughout the solar system; astronomical observations from points beyond the
earth's atmosphere; manned and unmanned exploration of the moon and the planets;
advance experiments designed to test certain predictions of the theory of relativity and
other theories relating to the fundamental nature of the universe; investigation of the
occurrence of biological phenomena in outer space.
[6] Operational Applications of Space Technology
18. AU applications of the technology of outer space that now show promise of early
operational utility for military or civilian purposes are based on the earth satellite. These
applications ultimately will have to meet one of several criteria if they are to survive in
either the defense program or the civilian economy. They will have to make possible the
1. Sounding rockets have also been defined as those vertically launched rockets that do not penetrate
outer space beyond one earth radius, approximately 4000 statute miles.
EXPLORINGTHEUNKNOWN 365
moreefficientoperationofanexistingactivityorcreateanew and desirable activity. It is
expected that benefits will be gained from these applications, but the full extent of their
military, economic, political and social implications has yet to be determined. Military'
applications are designed to enhance military capabilities by fulfilling stated requirements
of the Military Services and are currently being developed for use as operational systems.
The applications that are expected to be available earliest are as follows: 2
a. Meteorology- Satellite systems to provide weather data on a global scale, mak-
ing use of such techniques as television, optics, infrared detectors and radar. Information
on cloud cover, storm locations, precipitation, wind direction, heat balance and water
vapor would permit improved weather forecasting, including storm warnings, useful in a
variety of civil activities such as agricultural, industrial and transportation activities, and
would provide weather information to meet military operational needs.
b. Communications - Satellite systems to improve and extend existing world-wide
communications. For the Military Services, such systems would provide more effective
global military communications for purposes of command, control, and support of mili-
tary forces. Civil applications will benefit through more prompt service, increased mes-
sage capacity, and greater reliability. Direct world-wide transmission of voice and video
signals is envisaged.
c. Navigation - Satellite systems to provide global all-weather capability, for land,
sea and air vehicles, which will permit accurate determination of position; in the case of
the military, secure operations would be possible.
[Paragraph excised during declassification review]
[7] Manned Space Flight and Exploration
20. It is expected that manned space flight will add significantly to the effectiveness
of many of the scientific, military and civil applications indicated in the foregoing para-
graphs. There are a number of important reasons why manned space activities, including
the initial step of placing a man in orbit, are being carried out. Primary among these are:
a. To the layman, manned space flight and exploration will represent the true
conquest of outer space. No unmanned experiment can substitute for manned explora-
tion in its psychological effect on the peoples of the world.
b. Man's judgment, decision-making capability, and resourcefulness will ultimately
be needed in many instances to ensure the full exploitation of space technology.
Moreover, manned space flight is required for scientific studies in which man him-
self is the principal subject of the experiment, because there is no substitute for the con-
duct in outer space of essential psychological and biological studies of man.
[Foomote excised during declassification review]
[8] International Principles, Procedures and Arrangements
21. National policies and international agreements have dealt extensively with "air
space" and expressly assert national sovereignty over this region; however, the upper limit
of air space has not been defined. The term "outer space" also has no accepted definition,
and the consequences of adopting a definition cannot now be fully anticipated. Although
an avowedly arbitrary definition might prove useful for specific purposes, most of the cur-
rently foreseeable legal problems of outer space may be resolved without a precise line of
demarcation between air space and outer space.
22. The U.S. has advanced and a number of states have accepted the view that outer
space is not wholly without law inasmuch as the United Nations Charter and the Statute of
the International Court of Justice are not spatially limited. Furthermore, the principles
and procedures developed in the past to govern the use of air space and also the sea may
provide useful analogies. However, many problems of outer space will be unique in charac-
ter.
2. Order of listing does not indicate anticipated order of availability.
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23. An initial problem, in which all states have an interest, involves the permissibility
of various activities in outer space. With respect to this problem, the report of the United
Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space expresses the following
view which the U.S. has supported:
"During the International Geophysical Year 1957-58 and subsequently, countries
through the world proceeded on the premise of the permissibility of the launching and
flight of the space vehicles which were launched, regardless of what territory they passed
over during the course of their flight through outer space. The Committee, bearing in
mind that its terms of reference refer exclusively to the peaceful uses of outer space,
believes that, with this practice, there may have been initiated the recognition or establish-
ment of a generally accepted rule to the effect that, in principle, outer space is, on condi-
tions of equality, freely available for exploration and use by all in accordance with existing
or future international law or agreements."
In this connection, it should be noted that definitions of "peaceful" or "non-interfer-
ing" uses of outer space have not been advanced by the United States or other states.
24. Although the U.S. has not to date recognized any upper limit to it sovereignty, a
principle of freedom of outer space, such as that expressed by the United Nations Ad Hoc
Committee, suggests [9] that at least insofar as peaceful exploration and use of outer space
are concerned, the right of states to exclude persons and objects may not obtain. However,
the full implications of a principle of freedom of outer space, in contrast with a principle
of national sovereignty over outer space, remain to be assessed fully.
25. It is possible that certain military applications of space vehicles may be accepted
as peaceful or acquiesced in as not-interfering. On the other hand, it may be anticipated
that states will not willingly acquiesce in unrestricted use of outer space for activities which
may jeopardize or interfere with their national interests.
26. There is frequent and sharpening concern on the part of world opinion over the
military implications of unchecked competition in outer space between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union, and there is an accompanying interest in international agreements, controls
or restrictions to limit the dangers felt to stem from such competition. With regard to the
armaments control aspects of outer space, the United States first proposed in 1957, in
connection with international consideration of an armaments control system, that a mul-
tilateral technical committee be set up to attempt to design an inspection system to ensure
that the sending of objects through outer space will be exclusively for peaceful purposes.
Furthermore, the United States has offered, if there is a general agreement to proceed
with this study without awaiting the conclusion of negotiations on other substantive disar-
mament proposals. There has not, to date, been multilateral agreement to proceed with
such a study, and U.S. policy has not been determined concerning either the scope of
control and inspection required to ensure that outer space could be used only for peaceful
purposes or the relationship of any such control arrangement to other aspects of an arms
agreement?
27. Exploration and use of celestial bodies require separate consideration. Neither
the U.S. nor any other state has yet taken a position regarding the questions of whether a
celestial body is capable of appropriation to national sovereignty and if so what acts would
suffice to found a claim thereto. It is clear that serious problems would arise if a state
claimed, on one ground or another, exclusive rights over all or part of a celestial body. At
an appropriate time some form of international arrangement may prove useful.
28. Other problems in which all states have an interest arise from the operation of
space vehicles. The following problems appear [10] amenable to early treatment with a
view to seeking internationally a basis for orderly accomplishment of space vehicle opera-
tions: (a) identification and registration of space vehicles; (b) liability for injury or aam-
age caused by space vehicles; (c) reservation of radio frequencies for space vehicles and
the related problem of termination of transmission; (d) avoidance of interference be-
tween space vehicles and aircraft; and (e) the re-entry and landing of space vehicles, through
5. Basic nadonal security policy with respect to disarmament is stated in paragraph 59 of NSC 5906/1.
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accident or design, on the territory of other states.
29. Although only a few states may be capable of mounting comprehensive outer
space efforts, many states are capable of participating in the conduct of outer space activi-
ties, and active international cooperation in selected activities offers scientific, economic,
and political opportunities. Continuation and extension of such cooperation in the peace-
ful uses of outer space through a variety of governmental and non-governmental arrange-
merits should further enhance the position of the United States as the leading advocate of
the exploration and use of outer space for the benefit of all. Where space vehicles are
employed for military applications, some degree of international cooperation may also
prove useful. Any international arrangements for cooperation in outer space activities
may require determination of the net advantage to U.S. security.
30. The role most appropriately undertaken by the United Nations with respect to
the foregoing matters appears to lie in performing two principal functions: (a) facilitating
international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space, and (b) providing a
forum for consultation and agreement respecting international problems arising from
outer space activities. Future developments may make it desirable for additional functions
to be performed by or under the auspices of the United Nations.
Objectives
31. Carry out energetically a program for the exploration and use of outer space by
the U.S., based upon sound scientific and technological progress, designed: (a) to achieve
that enhancement of scientific knowledge, military strength, economic capabilities, and
political position which may be derived through the advantageous application of space
technology and through appropriate international cooperation in related matters, and
(b) to obtain the advantages which come from successful achievements in space.
[ 11 ] Policy Guidance
Priority, Scope and Level of Effort
32. While relating the resources and effort to be expended on outer space activities
to other programs to ensure that the anticipated gains from such activities are properly
related to possible gains from other programs which may be competitive for manpower,
facilities, funds or other resources, commit and effectively apply adequate resources with a
priority sufficient to enable the U.S. as soon as reasonably practicable to achieve the objec-
tives stated in paragraph 31.
33. In addition to undertaking necessary immediate and short-range activities re-
lated to outer space, develop goals and supporting plans for outer space activities for the
longer range, through at least a ten-year period.
34. Study on a continuing basis the implications and possible consequences which
United States and foreign exploitation of outer space may hold for international and na-
tional political and social institutions. Critically examine such exploitation for possible
consequences on activities and on life on earth (e.g,, the use of nuclear energy for auxil-
iary or main power sources or for other applications in outer space which may affect health,
or other outer space activities which may affect weather or other factors relating to activi-
ties and life on earth).
35. Periodically evaluate and compare the space activities of the U.S. and USSR with
a view to determining, insofar as possible, the goals and relative rate of progress of each
country's program.
Psychological Exploitation
36. To minimize the psychological advantages which the USSR has acquired as a
result of space accomplishments, select from among those current or projected U.S. space
activities of intrinsic military, scientific or technological value, one or more projects which
offer promise of obtaining a demonstrably effective advantage over the Soviets and, so far
as is consistent with solid achievements in the overall space program, stress these projects
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in present and future programming.
37. Identify, to the greatest extent possible, the interests and aspirations of other
Free World nations in outer space with U.S.-sponsored activities and accomplishments.
[ 12] 38. Develop information programs that will exploit fully U.S. outer space activi-
ties on a continuing basis; especially develop programs to counter overseas the psychologi-
cal impact of Soviet outer space activities and to present U.S. outer space progress in the
most favorable light.
[Paragraphs 39 and 40 excised during declassification review]
Manned Space Flight
41. Starting with the recovery from orbit of a manned satellite, proceed as soon as
reasonably practicable with manned space flight and exploration.
International Principles, Procedures and Arrangements
42. Continue to support the principle that, insofar as peaceful exploration and use of
outer space are concerned, outer space is freely available for exploration and use by all,
and in this connection: (a) consider as a possible U.S. position the right of transit through
outer space of orbital space vehicles or objects not equipped to inflict injury or damage;
(b) where the U.S. contemplates military applications of space vehicles and significant
adverse international reaction in anticipated, seek to develop measures designed to mini-
mize or counteract such reaction; and (c) consider the usefulness of international arrange-
ments respecting celestial bodies.
43. Taking into account, among other factors, the relationship of outer space capa-
bilities to the present and future security position of the United States:
a. Study the scope of control and character of safeguards required in an interna-
tional system designed to assure that outer space be used for peaceful purposes only; in-
clude in this study an assessment of the technical feasibility of a positive enforcement
system and an examination of the possibility of multilateral or international control of all
outer space activities.
b. Study the relationship between any international [ 13] arrangement to assure
that outer space be used for peaceful purposes only and other aspects of the regulation
and reduction of armed forces and armaments.
c. In connection with the prosecution of studies enumerated in 43 (a) and (b),
give full consideration to the requirements of U.S. security interests.
44. In the interest of establishing an international basis for orderly accomplishment
of space flight operations, explore the desirability of and, where so indicated, seek interna-
tional agreement on such problems as: (a) Some form of identification and registration of
space vehicles which is to the net advantage to national security; (b) liability for injury or
damage caused by space vehicles; (c) reservation of radio frequencies for space vehicles
and the related problem of termination of transmission; (d) avoidance of interference
between space vehicles and aircraft; and (e) the re-entry and landing of space vehicles,
through accident or design, on the territory of other nations.
45. Seek to increase international cooperation in selected activities relating to the
peaceful exploration and use of outer space by such means as: (a) Arrangements within
the framework of the international scientific community including the Committee on Space
Research (COSPAR) of the International Council of Scientific Unions, and (b) bilateral
and multilateral arrangements between the U.S. and other countries including the Soviet
Union. International arrangements for cooperation in outer space activities should con-
sider the net advantage to U.S. security.
46. Support the United Nations in facilitating international cooperation in the ex-
ploration and use of outer space and in serving as a forum for consultation and agreement
respecting international problems arising from outer space activities.
47. Develop means and take appropriate measures to ensure that the U.S. leads the
USSR in making the scientific and technological information from its outer space pro-
gram available to the world at large.
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SecurityClassification
48. In implementing security classification regulations, take special account of the
lead achieved by the USSR in outer space activities and the advantages to the U.S. which
result from the maximum availability and use of scientific and technological information
and material.
[15] ANNEX A
The Soviet Space Program
1. Soviet Objectives: The USSR has announced that the objective of its space pro-
gram is the attainment of manned interplanetary travel. At present, the program appears
to be directed toward the acquisition of scientific and technological data which would be
applicable to Soviet space activities, their ICBM program, and basic scientific research.
While the space program was undoubtedly initiated to serve scientific purposes, one of the
primary underlying motivations which continues to give it impetus is the promise of sub-
stantial world-wide political and psychological gains for the USSR. Military considerations
may have little bearing on the decision to develop certain types of space vehicles, although
the successful development of these vehicles may result in military applications. Thus, it
can be concluded that the Soviet space program has four major objectives. These objec-
tives will have varying priorities as the program itself progresses and as new political and
military requirements develop:
a. Manned space travel
b. Scientific research
c. Propaganda
d. Military applications
Of the above, it appears now that flight test priority has been on the scientific and
propaganda objectives rather that on man-in-space or military applications.
2. Background: Russian interest in space flight dates back to 1903 when a scientific
paper was published entitled: "Investigation of Universal Space by Means of Rocket Flight,"
by eminent Russian scientist Tsiolkovsky. Several other Russian actions took place during
the succeeding years to the present which have been identified as at least partially associ-
ated with a space program. These have included the founding of the Soviet Institute of
Theoretical Astronomy in 1923, establishment in 1934 of a government-sponsored rocket
research program, flights of animals in vertical rockets since the early 1950's, and system-
atic investigations of moon flight problems starting in 1953. The establishment in early
1955 of the Interagency Commission for Interplanetary Communications was indicative of
the Soviet realization that theory and capability for space flight were both feasible and that
accomplishment of a long cherished ambition was within sight.
[16] 3. Priority: The Soviets have demonstrated that they are conducting a well-
planned space flight program. The importance attached to this program is illustrated by
the high quality of the scientists assigned to its direction, by the broad range of facilities
and specialists engaged in its implementation, and by the wealth of theoretical and ap-
plied research being conducted in its support. However, the numbers of space vehicles
actually launched over the past few years have not been as numerous as had been expected
and it is apparent that their actual flight program is proceeding at a fairly deliberate pace.
While there is no direct evidence on the priority of the overall Soviet space program vis-a-
vis the military missile program, it is believed that any interference between the two would
be resolved in favor of the missile program. To date, however, there is no indication that
the space program has interfered with the missile program.
4. Capabilities: The Soviet Union dramatically demonstrated its in terest and capabil-
ity in space flight with the orbiting of two earth satellites in the fall of 1957, and a third in
1958. These were followed by the launching of three lunar associated vehicles in 1959.
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Evidence indicates that the Soviet space program has been built on the foundation of
military rocketry and guidance systems, with military and other facilities probably engaged
dually in supporting tests of military ballistic missiles and space experiments. Thus, al-
though these first space flights were doubdessly undertaken for the furtherance of scien-
tific knowledge and for whatever psychological and political advantage would accrue, the
Soviet military, by intimate paxdcipadon of its hardware, personnel, and facilities, has been
in a position to utilize immediately such knowledge for the enhancement of the Soviet
military position and objectives. The realization of more advanced space projects, particu-
laxly those involving manned flight, must be preceded by a vast amount of scientific and
technological work directed towards the development of useable space vehicles, the deter-
mination of basic operational requirements and limitations, and the creation of an envi-
ronment and equipment capable of sustaining human life in outer space. Since such a
program embraces virtually all fields of science and engineering, the following areas were
particularly examined for evidence of Soviet technical capability: guided missiles (includ-
ing vertical rocket launchings), re-entry vehicles and techniques, propulsion, guidance,
communications, space medicine, internal power supplies, and celestial mechanics. While
firm association of these fields with a space program varied considerably, it is noted that
the state of Soviet art in all the sciences required in a space program is such that no scien-
tific or technical barriers of magnitude have been noted. Four areas deemed critical to a
space program have apparently received considerable attention by the USSR; e.g., devel-
opment of laxge rocket-engine propulsion systems, vertical rocket flights with animals (in-
cluding recovery devices), space medicine, and celestial mechanics. There are indications
that Soviet advanced thinking and study [ 16] in astro-biology have been de-emphasized in
favor of providing an artificial environment within a vehicle suitable for manned space
flight.
5. Future Capabilities:
a. There is no firm evidence of Soviet future plans for the exploration of outer
space with either unmanned or manned vehicles. It is believed they will continue and
expand their scientific research with further unmanned earth satellites, lunar probes (in-
cluding satellites and soft landings), solar and planetary probes. Manned experiments will
probably be conducted in earth satellites, circumlunar flights and soft landings on the
moon. It is expected that all manned flights into outer space will be preceded by similar
tests with animals, unless for political purposes the Soviets attempt a high risk program.
Man-in-space programs axe confronted by many problems or hazards, the most immediate
of which are recovery and life support over extended periods. While data which might
lead to solutions or better understandings of both can be obtained from instrumented
packages which are orbited and recovered, accomplishment of the same test animals would
provide data of more direct application to subsequent attempts with man.
b. The dates estimated for specific Soviet accomplishments in space represent the
earliest possible time periods in which each specific event could be accomplished. It is
recognized that the various facets of the space flight program are in competition not only
among themselves, but with other priority programs, and that the USSR probably cannot
undertake all the space flight activities described below at the priority required to meet
the time periods specified. At this time it cannot be determined which specific space flight
activities enjoy the higher priorities and will be pursued first.
c. No attempt has been made to estimate manned space missions beyond the earth-
moon realm. The time periods in which the successful development of subsystems essen-
tial to planetary flight activities can be brought to fruidon and integrated into a complete
space flight system cannot be foreseen.
d. Similarly, considerations of military applications have been limited to earth
orbiting types of space vehicles. Missions beyond this realm are considered only in the
scientific or exploratory sense because we believe they cannot be successfully accomplished
in the time period considered.
6. An estimate of a possible Soviet space development program is as follows:
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[18] Possible Soviet Space Development Program
Space Program Objectives First Possible
Capability Rate
These dates represent the earliest possible time period in which each specific event
could be accomplished. However, competition between the space program and the mili-
tary missile program as well as within the space program itself makes it unlikely that all of
these objectives will be achieved within the specified time periods.
Unmanned Earth Satellites
5000-10,000 pounds, low orbit satellites .......................................................................... 1959
Recoverable (including biological) satellites .................................................................. 1959
Military Satellites: The dates shown are the earliest in which feasibility demonstrations
could begin. Generally, militarily useful vehicles would be available 2-3 years after the fea-
sibility demonstration.
[Remainder of paragraph excised during declassification review]
Unmanned Lunar Rockets
Biological Probe ................................................................................................................ 1959
Satellite of the Moon ......................................................................................................... 1959
Soft Landings ..................................................................................................................... 1960
Lunar Landing, Return and Earth Recovery ......................................................... 1963-1964
Planetary Probes
Mars ................................................................................................................. about Oct. 1960
Venus ................................................................................................................ about Jan. 1961
Manned Vertical or Short Down-Range Flight ................................................................ 1959
Manned Earth Satellites - The specified time periods for manned .... accomplishments are
predicated on the Soviets having previously successfully accomplished a number of similar
unmanned ventures.
Capsule-type Vehicles 4.............................................................................. Mid-1960-mid-1961
Glide-type Vehicles ................................................................................................. 1 to 2 years
after above
Maneuverable (minimum: conventional propulsion) ................................................... 1963
Maneuverable (nuclear propulsion) .................................................................... about 1970
Space Platform (minimum, non-ecological, feasibility demonstration) ...................... 1965
Space Platform (long-lived) .................................................................................. about 1970
Manned Lunar Flights
Circumlunar ............................................................................................................. 1964-1965
Satellites (temporary) .............................................................................................. 1955-1955
Landings ................................................................................................................. about 1970
4. Recovery would probably be attempted after the first few orbits but life could probably be sustained for
about a week.
372 ORIGINSOFU.S.SPACEPOLICY
[19]
Estimated Funding* Requirements
Summary
ANNEX B
Fiscal Year
1960 1961 1962 _
NASA 524.0 802.0 1031.0 1171.0 1350.0
AEC 46.7 41.5 66.0 60.6 55.2
DEFENSE 438.8 480.7 747.5 750.0 728.0
1054.5 1324.2 1844.5 1981.6 2133.2
*Figures are in millions of dollars.
More detailed agency estimates given on following pages.
[20]
Estimated Funding* Requirements
of
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Fiscal Year
1960 1961 1962
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
Launching Vehicle Dev. 57 140 163
Space Propulsion Technol. 39 51 118
Vehicle Systems Technol. 13 30 47
Manned Space Flight 87 108 120
Scientific Investig. in Space 82 95 140
Satellite Applications 11 27 36
Aeronautical and Space Res. 28 61 70
Space Flight Operations 16 33 42
SUB TOTAL - Research & Dev. 333 545 736
230 375
120 90
49 50
135 180
145 150
60 75
70 70
5O 55
859 1045
CONSTRUCTION & EQUIPMENT 100 89 120
SALARIES & EXPENSES 91 168 175
137 130
175 175
TOTAL FUNDS REQUIRED 524 802 1031 1171 1350
*Figures are in millions of dollars.
These figures represent a level of effort which corresponds to an efficient and steadily growing capability. The
rate of progress could be improved by an increased funding level, primarily by improving the certainty of the
timely completion of the many essential engineering developments.
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[21] Estimated Funding* Requirements
of
Atomic Energy Commission
Fiscal Year
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
PROJECT
ROVER - Nuclear rocket 31.5 24.9 33 32.6 26.2
SNAP - Nuclear auxiliary
power system 15.2 16.6 33 28 29
Total 46.7 41.5 66.0 60.6 55.2
*Figures are in millions of dollars
Document 11-22
Document tide: Cyrus Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Di-
rective Number TS 5105.23, "National Reconnaissance Office," March 27, 1964.
Source: Space Poficy Institute, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
In February 1958, President Eisenhower directed the CIA to develop a reconnais-
sance satellite. He did so because the Air Force's WS 117L was unlikely to be available soon
because it relied on the still-untested Atlas rocket. The CIA began the development of a
reconnaissance satellite for launch atop Thor IRBMs. The result was that the United States
had two reconnaissance satellites in simultaneous development. In August 1960, the Na-
tional Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was created to manage the development and opera-
tion of reconnaissance satellites. The existence of this office was highly classified and was
formally established in DoD Directive Number TS 5105.23. The existence of the NRO was
not officially acknowledged until September 1992. This document, dated March 27, 1964,
is the earliest declassified charter for the NRO. Neither the earlier version of DoD Direc-
tive 5105.23 mentioned in this document nor the presidential directive--possibly a Na-
tional Security Council memorandum--has been publicly released.
[ 1] I. General
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense and the provisions of the
National Security Act of 1947, as amended, including the Department of Defense Reorga-
nization Act of 1958, a National Reconnaissance Office is hereby established as an operat-
ing agency of the Department of Defense, under the direction and supervision of the
Secretary of Defense.
II. Organization and Responsibility
The National Reconnaissance Office will be organized separately within the Depart-
ment of Defense under a Director, National Reconnaissance Office, appointed by the Sec-
retary of Defense. The Director will be responsible for consolidation of all Department of
Defense satellite and air vehicle overflight projects for intelligence into a single program,
defined as the National Reconnaissance Program, and for the complete management and
conduct of this Program in accordance with policy guidance and decisions of the Secre-
tary of Defense.
374 ORIGINS OF U.S. SPACE POLICY
HI. Relationships
A. In carrying out his responsibilities for the National Reconnaissance Program, the
Director, Nadonal Reconnaissance Office shall:
[2] 1. Keep the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense (Comptroller) personally informed on a regular basis on the status of
projects of the National Reconnaissance Program.
2. Similarly inform other Department of Defense personnel as he may determine
necessary in the course of carrying out specific project matters.
3. Establish appropriate interfaces between the National Reconnaissance Office and
the United States Intelligence Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the National Security Agency.
4. Where appropriate, make use of qualified personnel of services and agencies of
the Department of Defense as full dme members of the National Reconnaissance Office.
B. Officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, military departments, and other
DoD agencies shall provide support within their respective fields of responsibility, to the
Director, National Reconnaissance Office as may be necessary for the Director to carry out
his assigned responsibilities and functions. The Director, National Reconnaissance Office
will be given support as required from normal staff elements of the military departments
and agencies concerned, although these staff elements will not participate in these project
matters except as he specifically requests.
IV. Authorities
A. The Director, National Reconnaissance Office, in connection with his assigned
responsibilities for the [3] National Reconnaissance Office and the National Reconnais-
sance Program, is hereby specifically delegated authority to:
1. Organize, staff, and supervise the National Reconnaissance Office.
2. Establish, manage and conduct the National Reconnaissance Program.
3. Assist the Secretary of Defense in the supervision of aircraft and satellite recon-
naissance photographic projects, and be his direct representative on these matters both
within and outside the Department of Defense.
4. Review all Department of Defense budget requests and expenditures for any items
falling within the definition of the National Reconnaissance Program, including studies
and preliminary research and development of components and techniques to support
such existing or future projects.
B. Other authorities specifically delegated to the Director, National Reconnaissance
Office by the Secretary of Defense will be referenced in numbered enclosures to this direc-
tive.
V. Project Assignments
All projects falling within the definition of the National Reconnaissance Program are
assigned to that program and will be managed as oudined herein unless specific exception
is made by the Director, National Reconnaissance Office. Announcements of any such
exceptions will be made by numbered enclosures to this directive.
[4] VI. Security
A. The Director, National Reconnaissance Office will establish the security proce-
dures to be followed for all matters of the National Reconnaissance Program, to protect all
elements of the National Reconnaissance Office.
B. All communications pertaining to matters under the National Reconnaissance
Program will be subject to special systems of security control under the cognizance of the
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Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, except in those instances specifically exempted by
either Director, National Reconnaissance Office or the Secretary of Defense.
C. With the single exception of this directive, no mention will be made of the follow-
ing titles or their abbreviations in any document which is not controlled under the special
security control system(s) referred to in B. above: National Reconnaissance Program;
National Reconnaissance Office. Where absolutely necessary to refer to the National Re-
connaissance Program in communications not controlled under the prescribed special
security systems, such reference will be made by use of the terminology: "Matters under
the purview of DoD TS-5105.23."
VII. Effective Date
This Directive is effective upon publication.
VIII. Cancellation
Reference (a) is hereby cancelled.
Cyrus Vance
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Chapter Three
The Evolution of
U.S. Space Policy and Plans
by John M. Logsdon
The July 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act [II-17] and the statement of "Pre-
liminary U.S. Policy for Outer Space" adopted by the Eisenhower administration in Au-
gust 1958 [II-20] provided the framework within which the new space agency, the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), planned an initial set of programs and
projects. In the subsequent thirty years, the interactions among formal statements of na-
tional space policy, various presidential decisions on specific space undertakings, and project
proposals emanating from internal NASA planning have resulted in an evolving U.S. civil-
ian space program that has been able to meet the Space Act mandate of making the United
States "a leader" in space. This essay provides an overview of those interactions as they are
manifested in key policy documents included in this work?
The Early Years: Space Policy and Planning, 1959-1960
NASA's initial plan of activity was based on preexisting programs inherited from the
Department of Defense and NASA's predecessor organization, the National Advisory Com-
mittee for Aeronautics (NACA). [III-1] Within a few months after it began operations, the
agency had shaped this inheritance into a short-term program, and its new leaders, Ad-
ministrator T. Keith Glennan, who had come to NASA from his position as president of the
Case Institute of Technology in Cleveland, and Deputy Administrator Hugh L. Dryden,
who had been the NACA Director, set about the task of developing their own plans for the
new space agency. 2
By the end of 1959, just over a year after NASA began operations, the space agency
had prepared a formal long-range plan. [III-2] The plan noted that NASA's activities dur-
ing the 1960s "should make feasible the manned exploration of the moon and nearby
planets, and this exploration may thus be taken as a long-term goal of NASA activities."
The plan called for the "first launching in a program leading to manned circumlunar
flight and to a permanent near-earth space station" in the 1965-1967 period. It also called
for the first human flight to the Moon sometime "beyond 1970. ''_ Although the first NASA
long-range plan featured a balanced program of science, applications, and human space-
flight, from the start proposals for the future of the piloted portion of its activities excited
the public, and NASA, therefore, became the focal point of future thinking.
1 . This brief essay cannot purport to be a comprehensive history of the evolution of U.S. space policy;
that would require at least book-length treatment. (Such a book does not now exist.) Rather, this essay attempts
to put the documents selected for this section of the work in their historical context, so that they can be under-
stood in terms of where they fit in the overall development of U.S. space policy and plans.
2. On Glennan's career, see J.D. Hunley, ed., The Birth of NASA: TheDiary oft Keith Glennan (Washing-
ton, DC: NASA SP-4105, 1993).
3. Office of Program Planning and Evaluation, 1"he Long Range Plan of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration," December 16, 1959, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, DC.
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MakinghumanflightstotheMoonandplanetsthestatedlong-rangegoalof the
NASAprogramwas,tosaytheleast,controversialwithintheEisenhoweradministration.
NASAplannerssincearly1959hadbeeninvestigatingtheappropriatefocusforNASA's
humanspaceflightprogram,oncetheinitialProjectMercuryhaddemonstratedtheabil-
it)'ofthehumanbodytowithstandtherigorsoflaunch,weightlessness,andthenreentry.
Inparticular,agroupchairedbyHarryJ.Goett,DirectorofthenewGoddardSpaceFlight
CenterinGreenbelt,Maryland,concludedbymid-1959thatheappropriategoalforNASA's
post-MercuryhumanspaceflightprogramwastosendhumanstotheMoon,notjustfor
extendedstaysin Earthorbit?Evenafterthelunarlanding oalhadbeenincludedin
NASA'slong-rangeplan,it continuedtobedebatedwithinthetopcouncilsofNASA,but
byearly1960adecisionwasmadetoproceedwithalunarexpeditionasamajorelement
inNASA'sfutureplanning.
ThefactthatNASAwascontemplatingsendingpeopletotheMoondidnotescape
thenoticeofthoseadvisingPresidentDwightD.Eisenhoweronoverallscienceandtech-
nologyissues.Bytheendof 1960,anAdHocPanelonMan-in-SpaceofthePresident's
ScienceAdvisoryCommittee(PSAC),chairedbychemistDonaldF.HornigofBrownUni-
versity,hadcompleteditsowninvestigationfNASA'spost-Mercuryplanning.[III-3]The
panelconcludedthat"atthepresenttime...man-in-spacecannotbejustifiedonpurely
scientificgrounds .... On the other hand, it may be argued that much of the motivation
and drive for the scientific exploration of space is derived from the dream of man's getting
into space himself." The group also estimated that landing humans on the Moon would
cost $26-38 billion above the $8-9 billion cost of Earth-orbiting and circumlunar flights,
and could not be accomplished until after 1975. 5 The report of the PSAC panel was pre-
sented to President Eisenhower at a December 20, 1960, meedng of the National Security
Council; Eisenhower's reaction was that "he couldn't care less whether a man ever reached
the moon."
At the end of the Eisenhower administration, then, NASA had in place a long-range
plan that anticipated a budget gradually increasing during the 1960s to a $2.5 billion level
in 1960 dollars, but without White House approval for its centerpiece activities---a post-
Mercury program of human spaceflight aimed at an eventual lunar landing and the devel-
opment of the large boosters required for such a program. Dwight Eisenhower recognized
that the United States was in a space race with the Soviet Union, but be was not interested
in winning that race at any cost. His attitude is best captured by the policy guidance pro-
vided in a January 1960 comprehensive statement of U.S. space policy. [II-21 ] That state-
ment directed planners to, in orde
To minimize the psychological advantages which the USSR has acquired as a result of space accom-
plishments, select from among those current or projected U.S. space activities of intrinsic military,
scientific or technological value, one or more projects which offer promise of obtaining a demonstrably
effective advantage over the Soviets and, so far as is consistent with solid achievements in the over-all
space program, stress these projects in present and future programming.7
To President Eisenhower, a race to be first on the Moon did not meet the require-
ment of "intrinsic value," and he was unwilling to approve future human spaceflight
efforts that were steps in the direction of such an undertaking. This left NASA in a state of
high uncertainty about its future prospectsmuncertainty that was resolved within a few
months by the new president, John F. Kennedy.
4. The work of the Goett Committee is discussed in John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon:
Projea Apollo and the National Interest (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970), pp. 56-57.
5. The President's Science Advisory Committee, "Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Man-in-Space," Decem-
ber 16, 1960, pp. 6, 9, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
6. Hunley, ed., The Birth of NASA, pp. 292-93.
7. National Aeronautics and Space Council, "U.S. Policy on Outer Space,"January 26, 1960, p. 11, para-
graph 36, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
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The Decision to Go to the Moon s
However, this uncertainty was not reduced by the first indication of the posture the
new administration might take with respect to the civilian space program. [III-4] After his
narrow victory over Richard M. Nixon in November 1960, Kennedy had formed a "transi-
tion team" to assess the national space effort. That team was headed by Jerome B. Wiesner,
a Massachusetts Institute of Technology physicist who was slated to become Kennedy's
science adviser. The "Wiesner Report" [III-5], released on January 10, 1961, was very criti-
cal of the quality and technical competence of NASA management and of the emphasis
that had been placed on human spaceflight. It called the Mercury program "marginal"
because of the limited power of its Atlas booster and criticized the priority given to the
Mercury program for strengthening "the popular belief that man in space is the most
important aim of our non-military space effort. '_ As the new president took office on Janu-
ary 20, the future course for NASA remained unclear.
Events of the next few months, however, made most of the recommendations of the
Wiesner Report moot. President Kennedy announced on January 31 that James E. Webb,
a politically skilled and aggressive lawyer-administrator, would become NASA Administra-
tor, and that other senior members of NASA management would remain. Webb took office
on February 14, and within six weeks met with the president with a request for a significant
acceleration of the NASA program, with an emphasis on larger boosters and a new space-
craft for human spaceflight. Kennedy deferred a decision on Webb's request until the fall
of 1961 deliberations on his next budget.
Then, on April 12, the Soviet Union launched the first human, Yuri Gagarin, into
orbit. World and domestic reaction to the achievement was universally positive, and within
a few days President Kennedy decided that the United States bad to not only accept the
challenge to a space race put forth by the Soviet Union, but also to enter the race with an
intent to win. On April 20, he asked Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson to conduct an
"overall survey of where we stand in space." [III-6] In particular, Kennedy asked: "Do we
have a chance of beating the Soviets by putting a laboratory in space, or by a trip around
the moon, or by a rocket to go to the moon and back with a man? Is there any other space
program that promises dramatic results in which we could win?" The president asked for a
report on Johnson's findings "at the earliest possible moment. ''_°
The review was carried out under the auspices of the National Aeronautics and Space
Council, which Kennedy had decided the vice president should chair. Even before the
review began, in reaction to presidential guidance at an April 14 White House meeting,
NASA had been examining the feasibility and costs of an accelerated civilian space effort.
The Department of Defense provided its initial input on April 21. [III-7] Vice President
Johnson asked a number of individuals inside and outside government for their views,
including rocket engineer and space exploration visionary Wernher von Braun. [III-9] By
April 28 the vice president could report to Kennedy [III-8] that "dramatic accomplish-
ments in space are being increasingly identified as a major indicator of world leadership."
He added that "if we do not make a strong effort now, the time will soon be reached when
the margin of control over space and over men's minds through space accomplishments
will have swung so far on the Russian side that we will not be able to catch up, let alone
assume leadership," and that "manned exploration of the moon...is not only an achieve-
ment with great propaganda value, but it is essential as an objective whether or not we are
first in its accomplishment--and we may be able to be first. ''_1
8. In addition to the specific sources cited below, this account is based on Logsdon, Decision to Go to the
Moon.
9. "Report to the President-Elect of the Ad Hoc Committee on Space,"January 10, 1961, NASA Historical
Reference Collection. Quotes are from p. 9 and p. 16.
10.John F. Kennedy, Memorandum for Vice President, April 20, 1961, Presidential Files,John E Kennedy
Presidential Library, Boston, MA.
11. Lyndon B.Johnson, Vice President, Memorandum for the President, "Evaluation of Space Program,"
April 28, 1961, p. 2, Presidential Papers, Kennedy Presidential Library.
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In ameetingonMay3,thevicepresidentbroughtogetheradiversegroupthat
includedRobertKerr(D-OK),Chairmanof the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and
Space Sciences, and the ranking minority member on the committee, Styles Bridges
(R-NH), together with others who had been involved in the space review. The primary
purpose of the meeting was to ensure that the Senate would support an accelerated space
program, but the minutes of the proceedings capture well the state of the debate at that
point. [III-10] Of all the participants, NASA Administrator Webb seemed most hesitant to
move quickly ahead with a set of ambitious recommendations to the president. Webb ap-
parendywanted to make sure that the White House and Congress would commit the multi-
year support needed to carry out those recommendations before he would advocate them
to the president.
Webb's hesitation was quickly overcome. On Friday, May 5, the United States launched
its first human, Navy Lt. Cdr. Alan B. Shepard, on a suborbital flight, to great acclaim. On
the same day, Vice President Johnson learned that he would be leaving the next week for
an inspection tour of U.S. military capabilities in Southeast Asia, and requested NASA and
the Department of Defense to put together a recommendation to the president before he
left. After an intense weekend of work, a report, delivered with a cover letter from James
Webb and Secretary of Defense Robert S, McNamara, was ready by Monday morning, May
8. [III-11] The Vice President approved the report without change and transmitted it to
the president; he in turn accepted the report's recommendations at a May 10 White House
meeting.
The report called for a fundamental reversal of a space policy principle that had
been established under President Eisenhower--that competition with the Soviet Union
would be based only on projects that had other elements of "intrinsic merit." Rather, it
argued that
Major successes, such as orbiting a man as the Soviets have just done, lend national prestige even
though the scientific, commercial or military value of the undertaking may by ordinary standards be
marginal or economically unjustified.
This nation needs to make a positive decision to pursue space projects aimed at enhancing national
prestige. Our attainments are a major element in the international competition between the Soviet
system and our own. The non-military, non-commercial, non-scientific but "civilian "projects such as
lunar and planetary exploration are, in this sense, part of the battle along the fluid front of the cold
war) 2
The report called for an across-the-board acceleration of U.S. efforts in space and
strong central planning for an integrated national space program. It noted that 'Me are
uncertain of Soviet intentions, plans or status" with respect to sending humans to the
Moon, but, because "it is man, not merely machines, in space that captures the imagina-
tion of the world," the United States should commit itself to a lunar landing program, even
though it was not sure it could beat the Soviets to the Moon, because "it is better for us to
get there second than not at all."ls
President John E Kennedy announced his decision to go to the Moon in what was
billed as an unprecedented second "State of the Union" address to a joint session of
Congress on May 95, 1961. [III-12] His speech had gone through a number of drafts, with
one issue being whether the president should announce 1967, the fiftieth anniversary of
the Russian Revolution and a date widely thought to be timely for a Soviet spectacular in
space, as the intended date for the first lunar landing. His advisers convinced him that he
12. James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, and Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, to the Vice
President, May 8, 1961, with attached: *Recommendations for Our National Space Program: Changes, Policies,
Goals," p. 8, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
13. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 381
should allow some margin for unexpected delays, and so he called for the lunar landing
"before this decade is out." He told Congress and the nation that "now it is time to take
longer strides--time for a great new American enterprise--time for this nation to take a
clearly leading role in space achievement." Kennedy added in his own hand to the pre-
pared text the words--"which in many ways may hold the key to our future on earth."'*
Congress quickly accepted the president's call for a more than half-billion dollar
supplement to NASA's budget, and with that acceptance gave initial support to the policy
of seeking across-the-board leadership--preeminence--in space. Project Apollo, NASA's
lunar landing program, became the dominant feature of the U.S. quest for space leader-
ship. Its impacts on the evolution of the U.S. space program were to be pervasive in the
decades to come.
Reviewing the Apollo Commitment
President John Kennedy chose to go to the Moon as a response to the political situa-
tion in early 1961, not primarily in terms of a long-range vision for the U.S. space program.
While Kennedy personally may have come to see space as a particularly important sphere
of future-oriented activities, almost from the day that the president announced his intent
to set the lunar landing goal, others inside and outside government questioned the wis-
dom of this commitment. This questioning became more vocal in 1962 and 1963, as the
United States forced the Soviet Union to withdraw nuclear missiles from Cuba in October
1962 and as the two nuclear superpowers agreed on a limited test ban treaty and appeared
headed toward less tension in their geopolitical rivalry. By September 1963, President
Kennedy was ready to go before the United Nations and suggest an end to the space race
and the conversion of Apollo into a cooperative U.S.-Russian program."
These public manifestations of possible instability in the U.S. commitment to Apollo
and to a preeminent space program were accompanied by major White House reviews in
1962 and 1963. The 1962 review [III-13] was precipitated by the very rapid buildup of the
NASA budget, increases in the estimated cost for Apollo, and pressure to accelerate the
planned date for the initial lunar landing by the individual NASA had chosen to head the
Apollo program, D. Brainard Holmes. The controversy over whether Apollo should be
carried out on an all-out, "crash" basis or in relative balance with other elements of a
program aimed at U.S. space superiority went to President Kennedy for resolution in No-
vember 1962. In a follow-up letter summarizing the arguments he had made during his
meeting with the president on the question [III-14], NASA Administrator Webb argued
that "the objective of our national space program is to become pre-eminent in all impor-
tant aspects of this endeavor and to conduct the program in such a manner that our emerg-
ing scientific, technological, and operational competence is clearly evident." He told the
president that "the manned lunar landing program, although of highest national priority,
will not by itself create the pre-eminent position we seek. "_6
Based on this reasoning, Webb recommended against providing additional funds for
Apollo and moving up the planned date for the first lunar landing. Kennedy accepted
Webb's perspective, and soon after Brainard Holmes left NASA. Perhaps more fundamen-
tal, the president's acceptance seemed to indicate that across-the-board preeminence was
indeed his guiding policy objective for the United States in space.
The 1963 space program review, by contrast, appears to have been stimulated by
increasing external criticism of the priority being given to the space program rather than
other areas of science and technology, and was focused on those aspects of the program
14. President John F. Kennedy, Excerpts from "Urgent National Needs," Speech to a Joint Session of
Congress, May 25, 1961, Presidential Files, Kennedy Presidential Library.
15. Representative Thomas Pelly, a Seattle Republican, stood up in the well of the House of Representa-
tives three weeks later and offered an amendment to prohibit the use of government funds to finance a joint
expedition. In spite of Kennedy's insistence that his U.N. proposal merely carried out the mandate for interna-
tional cooperation in NASA's enabling legislation, the amendment passed. See "Major Legislation---Appropria-
tions," CongTessional Quarterly Almanac 1963 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1964), p. 170.
16.James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, to the President. November 30, 1962, NASA Historical RefeJ-
ence Collection.
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not linked to Apollo. In April President Kennedy asked the vice president and the Space
Council to conduct a comprehensive review so that he could "obtain a clearer understand-
ing of a number of factual and policy issues relating to the National Space Program which
seem to rise repeatedly in public and other contexts. ''' [III-15]
Leading the criticisms of the space program (including Apoilo) were many in the
scientific and educational communities. 's For example, Vannevar Bush, who had been a
primary architect of the relationship between government and science since World War II,
wrote to James Webb in April 1963 with a comprehensive critique of the space effort. Bush
argued "that the [space] program, as it has been built up, is not sound," that it was "more
expensive than the country can now afford," and that "its results, while interesting, are
secondary to our national welfare."lg
The vice president transmitted the results of the space program review to President
Kennedy on May 13, 1963. [III-16] He noted that the central difference between the
Eisenhower and Kennedy administration's space programs was that "the plan of the previ-
ous Administration represented an effort for a second place runner and the program of
the present Administration is designed to make this country the assured leader before the
end of the decade." He argued that "our space progr[a]m has an overriding urgency that
cannot be calculated solely in terms of industrial, scientific, or military development. The
future of society is at stake. "Johnson also told the president that all members of the Space
Council concurred with the views contained in his report? ° The president apparendy agreed,
for the speech he had prepared for delivery in Dallas on November 22, 1963, reaffirmed
the administration's strong support for the leadership-oriented space effort he had initi-
ated 2 1/_ years earlier.
Post-Apollo Planning During the Johnson Presidency
There was no comprehensive, presidentially approved statement of national space
policy while John Kenned}, or Lyndon Johnson were president, as there had been under
Dwight Eisenhower; although the staff of the National Aeronautics and Space Council
drafted such a document, it never received presidential sanction. _ After the 1962 and
1963 reviews and the assassination of President Kennedy, any chance of a policy reversal
that would downgrade the objective of making the United States first to the Moon disap-
peared, and the planning focus shifted to what objectives the country should pursue in
space after Apollo. On January 30, 1964, President Johnson asked NASA for "a statement
of possible objectives beyond those already approved."2_
James Webb was very skeptical of having NASA come forward with a proposal for its
future and then seeking political support for it; rather, he preferred that NASA wait for a
"consensus" (which he defined as agreement among politically powerful actors) to form
on future objectives for space. Then NASA could develop programs to achieve those objec-
tives. _sThus the NASA response to Lyndon Johnson's 1964 request, which was transmitted
to the president in February 1965, was not a long-range plan. [III-17] Rather, it described
17.John E Kennedy, Memorandum for the Vice President, April 9, 1963, Presidential Papers, Kennedy
Presidential Library.
18. For a sample of the criticisms of Apollo that emerged in the 1962-1964 period, see Amitai Etzioni, The
Moondoggle:Domestic and International Implications of the Space Race (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1964).
19. Vannevar Bush to James E. Wehb, Administrator, NASA, April 11, 1963, p. 2, Presidential Papers,
Kennedy Library.
20. Lyndon B.Johnson, Vice President, to the President, May 13, 1963, with attached report, Presidential
Papers, Kennedy Library.
21. For a discussion of attempts to develop such a policy statement, see TheNat_onalAeronaut_cs and Space
Council During the Tenure of Lyndon B.Johnson as VtcePresident and During His Administration as President (January
1961-January 1969), a history prepared by the National Aeronautics and Space Council staff. Copy in Lyndon
Baines Johnson Library.
22. LyndonJohnson to James E. Webb, January 30, 1964, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
23. For Webb's views on long-range planning, see Arnold S. Levine, Managing NASA m the Apollo Era
(Washington, DC: NASA SP-4102, 1982), particularly chapter 9 and Webb's foreword.
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"a number of long-range missions that deserve serious attention."_' The report was in many
ways a catalogue of the ways that the capabilities developed during the Apollo buildup
could be employed and a '_rish list" of future mission possibilities, with no priority indi-
cated among them.
James Webb's hoped-for consensus on future space objectives did not emerge before
Webb left NASA in November 1968 near the end of the Johnson administration. While the
White House and the majority of Congress seemed willing to sustain the commitment to
Apollo, no major ne_, programs were approved, and the NASA budget began to decline
after peaking at $5.25 billion in fiscal year 1965. This situation was deeply troubling to
Webb. In an August 1966 letter to President Johnson, he pointed out that NASA was al-
ready in the process of "liquidation of some of the capabilities we have built up." [III-18]
Webb had received Bureau of the Budget guidelines for the next fiscal year that he be-
lieved meant that "important options which we have been holding open will be foreclosed."
Recognizing the international and domestic pressures of the president, Webb said he had
struggled "to try to put myseff in your place and to see this from your point of view" but
could not "avoid a strong feeling that this is not in the best interests of the country." Webb
told the president of his problems with Congress; in order to avoid a $1 billion cut in the
NASA budget proposed by Senator William Proxmire (D-WI), Webb had to seek the sup-
port of the Republican leader in the Senate, Everett Dirksen (R-IL). Senior Democrats,
including Richard Russell (D-GA), chair of the Senate Space Committee, had voted for the
cut, which Webb believed would have led to "catastrophic emasculation" of the NASA pro-
gram) _
Through the remaining years of the Johnson presidency, Webb was not able to con-
vince the president to articulate future objectives for the post-Apollo civilian space pro-
gram; other issues occupied LyndonJohnson's attention. Meanwhile, as he had said would
be necessary, Webb began the process of dismantling the capabilities developed to send
Americans to the Moon; in August 1968, he ordered the first steps in shutting down the
production line for the giant Saturn booster developed for the lunar mission. [III-19]
Decisions on the character of the post-Apollo space program would have to be made by
Lyndon Johnson's successor, Richard M. Nixon. [III-20]
Post-Apollo Planning During the Nixon Presidency
When he was sworn in as president on January 20, 1969, Richard Nixon had avail-
able--as had John Kennedy--a report from a high-level transition task force on space.
[III-21] That task force was chaired by Nobel Prize-winning physicist Charles Townes of
the University of California. It recommended proceeding with lunar exploration after
Apollo, a program to utilize Apollo hardware and capabilities, an increase in automated
solar system exploration and in general better balance between the human spaceflight
and automated elements of the NASA program, and more attention to the applications of
space and space technologies to useful purposes. The report recommended against com-
mitments to a large space station, low-cost boosters, or human trips to the planets. The
task group felt that the program it recommended could be carried out for an annual
NASA budget of approximately $4 billion.
President Nixon and his advisers, however, recognized a need for early decisions on
the post-Apollo space program. On February 13, 1969, Nixon asked his vice president,
Spiro T. Agnew, to chair a Space Task Group (STG) to provide "definitive recommenda-
tion on the direction which the U.S. space program should take in the post-Apollo
24. NASA, Summary Report: Future Programs Task Group, January 1965, p. ii, NASA Historical Reference
Collection.
25. James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, to the President, August 96, 1966. with attached: James E.
Webb, Administrator, NASA, to Honorable Everett Dirksen, U.S. Senate, August 9, 1966, NASA Historical Refer-
ence Collection.
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period."[111-22]RatherthanusetheNationalAeronauticsandSpaceCouncil,whichwas
chairedbyAgnew,asthebasisforthereview,thepresidentamedastheonlyothermem-
bersoftheSTGtheactingadministratorfNASA,thesecretaryofdefense,andthesci-
enceadviser.Healsoaskedthescienceadviserto actas"staffofficer"for thegroup's
review._
NASAwasnotcomfortableentrustingitsfuturetothedeliberationsoftheSTG.The
NixonadministrationhadnotyetselectedaNASAadministrator,andthemanwhohad
beendeputytoJamesWebbandhadbecomeactingadministratoruponWebb'sretire-
mentinNovember1968,ThomasO.Paine,wasmanagingtheagency.(Painewaselected
astheNixonchoice to remain as administrator in March 1969.) Paine was a much differ-
ent sort of individual than James Webb. He was optimistic, bullish in word and action, and
a newcomer to Washington's political ways. Unlike Webb, Paine preferred that NASA have
the initiative in outlining future space goals.
Paine decided to try to preempt the work of the STG and attempt to get an early
commitment to what NASA saw as its major post-Apollo program, a large space station.
The need for an orbital outpost had been part of NASA's planning from the earliest years,
but the decision to go to the Moon, particularly using a lunar rendezvous approach, had
bypassed this step in space development. As NASA began during 1967 and 1968 to focus
attention on its priorities for the next large new program after Apollo, a space station rose
to the top of its list. On February 26, Paine sent a lengthy memorandum on "Problems and
Opportunities in Manned Space Flight" to the president. [III-23] He suggested that "the
case that a space station should be a major future U.S. goal is now strong enough to justify
at least a general statement on your part" to this effect? 7
The White House did not accept Paine's arguments, and he was told that all deci-
sions related to future programs would await the recommendations of the STG. Those
recommendations took shape over the summer of 1969, with the U.S. space program at
the peak of its prestige and accomplishment as Apollo I 1 returned from humanity's first
foray on another celestial surface.
Thomas Paine found in Vice President Agnew an ally in calling for a fast-paced, am-
bilious post-Apollo program. At an eaHy STG meeting, Agnew had asked for an "Apollo
for the seventies." In interviews at the Kennedy Space Center following theJuly 16 launch
of the Apollo 11 mission, Agnew said that it was his "individual feeling that we should
articulate a simple, ambitious, optimistic goal of a manned flight to Mars by the end of the
century."_8
NASA was prepared to give Agnew what he asked for. The agency's planning for its
input to the STG had been built on an "integrated plan" for future human spaceflight that
had been developed by George Mueller, the NASA Associate Administrator for Manned
Space Flight. That plan focused on activities in the space between the Earth and the Moon.
After Agnew's statements, Paine asked Wernher yon Braun (who had been thinking about
Mars exploration for many years) to add an early Mars expedition to the NASA plan as
developed by Mueller. The revised NASA plan was briefed to the STG on August 4, 1969. It
included an initial twelve-person expedition to Mars leaving Earth in November 1981, with
six members of the expedition spending thirty to sixty days on the Martian surface in late
1982.
The possibility that the STG might actually recommend the program that NASA was
proposing was worrisome to Secretary of the Air Force Robert C. Seamans, who repre-
sented Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird during the group's deliberations. Seamans had
been a senior official in NASA from 1960 to 1967, and he was concerned that the STG
would put forward a program that was not politically acceptable. Seamans made his views
known to the vice president at the August 4 STG meeting and in a letter dated the same
26. Richard Nixon, Memorandum for the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, the Acting Adminis-
trator, NASA, and the Science Adviser, February 13, 1969, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
27. Thomas O. Paine, Acting Administrator, NASA, Memorandum for the President, "Problems and
Opportunities in Manned Space Flight," February 26, 1969, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
28. New YorkTimes, July 17, 1969, p. 1.
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day.[III-24]SeamansrecommendedthattheNASAprogramforthe1970sconcentrateon
usingitscapabilitiesfor"solutionoftheproblemsdirectlyaffectingmenhereonearth"
andthatthedevelopmentofaspacestationoranew,reusablespacetransportationsvstem(whichhademergeduringSTGdeliberationsa anattractiveoptionfor thefuture).
muchlesshumanmissionstoMars,notbeapproveduntiltheirfeasibilityanddesirability
weremorefirmlyestablished._
Facedwithdifferingviews(Directorof theBureauof theBudgetRobertE Mayo
participatedonlyasanobserverin theSTG,buthadmadeit clearthatfromabudgetary
perspectiveh wasopposedtoanambitiouspost-Apollospaceprogram),theSTGdecided
onAugust4 topresentseveralfutureprogramoptionstoPresidentNixon,ratherthan
attempttoreachconsensusonaprogramthatallcouldsupport.Overthenextmonth,a
reportwaspreparedthatoutlinedthreeoptions,eachincorporatingaspacestationanda
Marsmission,butondifferentschedulesandbudgetprofiles.Anotheroption,ata low
budgetlevel,involvedterminatingthehumanspaceflightprogram.Asthetimecametbv
submissionfthereportothepresident,seniorWhiteHouseaides,particularly'Assistant
tothePresidentJohnErlichman,demandedthatit bemodifiedsothatthepresidentot
receiverecommendationsthathecouldnotpossiblyaccept,suchasa1982Marslanding
orendingthehumanspaceflightprogramsosoonafterApollo11:" Changes were hur-
riedly made, and the report was presented to President Nixon on September 15, 1969.
The STG report [III-25] recommended a "basic goal of a balanced manned and un-
manned space program conducted for the benefit of all mankind," with, "as a focus for the
development of new capability...the long-range option or goal of manned planetary ex-
ploration with a manned Mars mission before the end of this century as the first target."
Beyond such general statements, however, the report recommended no commitment to
any specific project or schedule of accomplishments. It left to President Richard Nixon
the job of setting the future course in space for the United States.
The Nixon Space Policy
Almost six months passed before Nixon issued a formal statement of his views on
space in response to the STG report. In that statement, issued on March 7, 1970, the pres_-
dent signaled a significant downgrading in the priority of post-Apollo space efforts; in
effect, he rejected even the least ambitious of the options that the STG had recommended.
In his statement, Nixon noted the need "to define new goals which make sense for the
Seventies." He argued that
many critical problems here on this planet make high priority demands on our attention and our
resources. By no means should we allow our space program to stagnate. But--with the entire future
and the entire universe before us--we should not try to do everything at once. Our approach to space
must be bold--but it must also be balanced.
The president rejected another Apollo-like undertaking, saying that "space activities
will be part of our lives for the rest of time," and thus there was no need to plan them "as
a series of separate leaps, each requiring a massive concentration of energy and will and
accomplished on a crash timetable." Instead, "space expenditures must take their place
within a rigorous system of national priorities."sl
The six-month delay in a presidential response to the STG report was caused by a
vigorous battle between NASA and White House political, budgetary, and technical advis-
ers over the content of that response and over the level of the NASA budget for fiscal year
1971--the first post-Apollo 11, post-STG budget. While NASA believed it had in the STG
29. Robert C. Seamans Jr., Secretary of the Air Force. to Honorable Spiro T. Agnew, Vice President,
August 4, 1969, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
30. For Erlichman's account of this intervention, see Witness to Power: The Nzxon Year._(New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1982), pp. 144-45.
31. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1971), pp. 250-53.
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report a mandate for a continuing program of capability development and high visibility
achievement, the White House viewed the space program as a place for lowered priority
and budget cuts. Nixon's advisers saw few political benefits for the president in continuing
to fund a large civilian space program. [III-26, III-27] By the time final budget decisions
were announced in January 1970, the NASA budget had been reduced by $402 million
from its level of the preceding year, production of the Saturn V heavy lift booster was
terminated, and no commitment was made to develop either a space station or a reusable
space transportation system, the space shuttle. Clearly, NASA was once again facing an
uncertain future.
The Decision to Develop the Space Shutde
Frustrated by the unwillingness of the Nixon administration to support the kind of
space program he thought was in the country's interest and attracted by a lucrative private
sector job offer, Thomas Paine announced in July 1970 that he was resigning as of Septem-
ber 15. Paine's deputy, George Low, became acting administrator. Low was a highly re-
spected career NASA engineer who had taken over the Apollo spacecraft program after
the 1967 Apollo capsule fire and had come to Washington to be deputy administrator in
September 1969. It took until April 1971 for Paine's permanent successor to be named; he
was James C. Fletcher, president of the University of Utah. Low stayed on as Fletcher's
deputy, and it was the Fletcher-Low team that guided NASA through the critical 1971 deci-
sions that shaped the agency for years to come.
NASA had hoped, as it fought its losing budget batdes in the fall of 1969 and the
early months of 1970, to come back to the White House at the end of 1970 and get ap-
proval for developing both a space station and a space shuttle. But in the months leading
up to discussions over NASA's fiscal year 1972 budget, it became clear that there was no
enthusiasm in the White House for going ahead with a space station, and that only the
proposed reusable transportation system had any chance of approval. But that approval
did not come in the fiscal year 1972 decisions, and Fletcher and Low believed that NASA
had to get a go-ahead for the shuttle in 1971 if NASA were to maintain its identity as a large
development organization with human spaceflight as its central activity. The choice of
whether or not to approve the space shuttle thus became a de facto policy decision on the
kind of civilian space policy and program the United States would pursue during the 1970s
and beyond) 2
At the White House, one individual decided that cuts in the NASA budget were go-
ing too far. He was Caspar (Cap) Weinberger, deputy director of the renamed Bureau of
the Budget, now the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). In an August 12, 1971,
memorandum to the president, Weinberger argued that "there is real merit to the future
of NASA, and to its proposed programs." [III-28] OMB was considering, as a means of
further cutting the NASA budget, not approving the start of space shuttle development
and cancelling the last two Apollo missions, Apollo 16 and 17. Weinberger suggested that
such cuts
would be confirming in some respects, a belief that Ifear is gaining credence at home and abroad: That
our best years are behind us, that we are turning inward, reducing our defense commitments, and
voluntarily starting to give up our super-power status, and our desire to maintain world superiority.
America should be able to afford something besides increased welfare, programs to repair our cities, or
Appalachian relief and the like.
32. For a more detailed discussion of the space shutde decision, see John M. Logsdon, "The Space Shuttle
Decision: Technology and Political Choice,"JournalofContemporary Business 7 (1978): 13-30;John M. Logsdon,
"The Decision to Develop the Space Shuttle," Space Policy 2 (May 1986): 103-19;John M. Logsdon, "The Space
Shutde Program: A Policy Failure," Science 232 (May 30, 1986): 1099-1105.
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WhenWeinbergerarguedthatprogramssuchasthespaceshuttleshouldbefunded,
hisviewsfoundaresponsiveear.InahandwrittennoteonWeinberger'smemo,President
RichardNixonindicated"IagreewithCap.'sOMBDirectorGeorgeShultzwasinformed
that"thepresidentapprovedMr.Weinberger'splantofindenoughreductionsinother
programstopayforcontinuingNASAatgenerallythe3.3-3.4billiondollarlevel,orabout
400to500milliondollarsmorethanthepresentplanningtarget."4
NeitherNASAnortheOMBstaffknewof thisexchange.Anoftenheatedstruggle
overtheagency'sbudgetoutlookandapprovalofshuttledevelopmentcontinuedthrough
thesummerandfallof 1971,[III-29]In May1971OMBhadtoldNASAthatitsbudget
wouldbefurthereducedandthenstaylevelatapproximately$3.0billion/yearfor the
restoftheNixonpresidency.ThiswasthefinalblowtoNASA'shopeofgettingapproval
fortheapproximately$10billionneededtodevelopafullyreusableshuttle;betweenJune
andDecember1971theagencyanditscontractorsexaminedmanyalternativesforaless
ambitiousdevelopmentprogram.TheOMBstaff,fundamentallyconvincedthattheshutde
wasnotadesirableprogram,nomatterhowcheaplyit couldbedeveloped,resistedthe
variousconceptsNASAputforward.
OnelineofargumentthatNASAdevelopedduringtheshuttledebatewasthatthe
programwouldbecost-effective--i.e.,thatthesavingsovertheuseofexistingexpendable
launchvehiclesin launchcosts,payloadesign,andtheabilitytorepairsatelliteswould
morethanpayforthecostsof developingashuttle.ThiswasthefirsttimeNASAhad
attemptedaneconomicjustificationforamajorprogram;theapproachadbeenforced
onthespaceagencybyOMB.Asthedecisionprocessregardingtheshuttlereachedits
conclusioni thelastmonthsof 1971,NASA'scontractorforthecost-effectivenessanaly-
sis,Mathematica,Inc.,widelycirculatedamemorandum[III-30]thatarguedthat"Areus-
able space transportation system is economically feasible .... ,,s5
While an economic argument was one part of NASA's case for shuttle approval, other
factors were more important to the agency's arguments. James Fletcher summarized them
in a November 1971 memorandum to the White House: [III-31]
I. The U.S. cannot forego manned spaceflight.
2. The space shuttle is the only meaningful new manned space flight program that can be
accomplished on a modest budget.
3. The space shuttle is a necessary next step for the practical use of space ....
4. The cost and complexity of today's shuttle is one-half of what it was six months ago.
5. Starting the shuttle now will have a significant positive effect on aerospace employment. Not
starting would be a serious blow to both the morale and health of the Aerospace Industry. _
After intense debate between NASA and OMB during December, a decision to ap-
prove the shuttle program was made over the New Year weekend. The perspective that
Weinberger had put forward in August, NASA's arguments in the November memoran-
dum, and the desire to start a new aerospace program that would avoid unemployment in
critical states in the 1972 election year were ultimately decisive. NASA was informed of the
decision on January 3, 1972. Fletcher and Low, surprised at the go-ahead, made hasty
33. Ca.spar W. Weinberger, Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, _aa George P. Schultz,
Memorandum for the President, "Future of NASA," August 12, 1971, Richard M. Nixon Project, National Ar-
chives and Records Administration, Washington, DC
34. Jon M. Huntsman, The White House, Memorandum for George P, Shultz, "The Future of NASA,"
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35. Klaus P. Heiss and Oskar Morgenstern, Memorandum for Dr.James C. Fletcher, Administrator, NASA,
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preparations to fly to California for a January 5 meeting with President Nixon, who was at
his western White House in San Clemente, after which shuttle approval would be made
public. At that meeting, the president asked NASA to stress the view that the shuttle made
economic sense, but "even if it were not a good investment, we would have to do it anyway,
because space flight is here to stay. ,,,7 [111-32]
Although itwas not specifically part of the set of decisions reached at this time, NASA
had justified the costs of developing the shuttle on its use to replace existing expendable
space launch vehicles, particularly the Delta, Atlas, and Titan. NASA had also modified the
shuttle design during 1970 and 1971 to meet the requirements of the Department of De-
fense, and the anticipation was that the shuttle would launch all DoD payloads as well as
those of the civilian sector. [111-29, Ill-30, Ili-31, III-32] The decision to proceed with the
space shuttle under these assumptions was the central space choice of the 1970s. It was
not, except by default, a policy decision regarding U.S. objectives in space, however. For
the rest of the 1970s, the United States would carry out those space missions that could be
afforded within a fixed NASA budget after shuttle development costs had been paid. Once
the shuttle entered operations, U.S. space objectives would be largely defined in terms of
those missions enabled by shuttle capabilities. This was certainly a different approach to
space policy than that of the preceding decade.
Space Policy Under President Jimmy Carter
During the brief presidency of Gerald Ford, no major space policy decisions or initia-
tives were taken, although Ford was generally sympathetic toward the program and as he
left the White House approved the start of two major missions. They became the Galileo
probe to Jupiter and the Hubble Space Telescope.
President-elect Jimmy Carter did not create a blue-ribbon transition group for space,
as had John Kennedy and Richard Nixon. The Carter space transition document was the
product of a single individual, who took a generally skeptical tone toward NASA and its
programs. [III-33] The document noted:
1 .... NASA directs ourR&D resources towards centralized big technology, maintaining the defense
R&D orientation of the aerospace industry.
2. The Shuttle has become the end, rather than the means, because NASA space policy has been shaped
by the Office of (Manned) Space Flight. The Offices of Space Science, Applications, and Aeronautics
Technology get the funds that are left over. _
The Carter administration returned to a practice last followed under President
Eisenhower: the development, through an inter-agency process coordinated at the White
House level, of formal statements of national space policy. The first of these statements
[III-34] was issued on May 11, 1978; it dealt with both national security and civilian uses of
space, and large portions of the statement remain classified. A June 20, 1978, White House
press release announcing the results of the initial Carter policy review noted that "the
major concerns that prompted this review arose from growing interaction among our vari-
ous space activities" and that the May policy statement resulting from the review did not
"deal in detail with the long-term objectives of our defense, commercial, and civil pro-
grams." The White House release indicated that its next step would be a comprehensive
review of civilian space policy."
37. George M. Low, DeputyAdministrator, NASA, Memorandum for the Record, "Meeting with the Presi-
dent on January 5, 1972,"January 12, 1972, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
38. Nick MacNeil, Carter-Mondale Transition Planning Group, to Stuart Eizenstat, Al Stern, David
Rubenstein, Barry Blechman, and Dick Steadman, "NASA Recommendations,"January 31, 1977, Jimmy Carter
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39. "United States Space Activities," Announcement of Administration Review, June 20, 1978, in Public
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Theresultsof thatpolicyreviewwereincorporatedinPresidentialDirective/NSC-
42,"CivilandFurtherNationalSpacePolicy,"datedOctober10,1978.[III-35]Thisdirec-
tivetookameasuredapproachtofutureU.S.goalsinspace:
First: Space activities will be pursued because they can be uniquely' or more efficiently accomplished in
space. Our space policy will become more evolutionary rather than centering around a single, massive
engineering feat. Pluralistic objectives and needs of our society will set the course for future space
objectives.
Second: Our space policy will reflect a balanced strategy of applications, science and technology devel-
opment ....
Third: It is neither feasible nor necessary at this point to commit the US to a high-challenge, highly,
visible space engineering initiative comparable to ApoUo. '°
With this set of guidelines, it was clear that the space program during the Carter
administration would be one seeking efficiencies and payoffs from existing capabilities.
After considering cancellation of the shutde program and being dissuaded because of the
need for the shuttle to launch satellites critical to his arms control initiatives, Jimmy Carter
gave highest priority to completing shuttle development. 4_
Space Policy Under President Ronald Reagan
Unlike his predecessor, Ronald Reagan did assemble a prestigious panel, largely com-
posed of veterans in the space field, as part of his transition effort. The group was headed
by George M. Low, who had left NASA in 1976 to become president of Rensselaer Poly-
technic Institute. Not surprisingly, the team's report [III-36] was bullish on the space pro-
gram. It noted:
The year 1980finds NASA in an untenable position .... This unhealthy state of affairs can only be
rectified by a conscious decision. Continuation of the prior administration's low level of interest and
lack of clear direction would result in an unconscionable waste of human and financial resources.
"NASA and the space program are without a clear purpose and direction," said the
transition team. In his cover letter transmitting the report, Low said that the transition
team members had asked him to "emphasize our view that NASA and its civil space pro-
gram represent an opportunity for positive accomplishment by the Reagan
administration...NASA can be many things in the futureqthe best in American accom-
plishment and inspiration for all citizens. '_
The Reagan administration selected experienced individuals as the new leaders of
NASA. Chosen as administrator was James E. Beggs, an aerospace industry executive who
had worked under James Webb in the late 1960s; the designee as deputy administrator was
Hans Mark, who had been director of NASA's Ames Research Center before coming to
Washington as under secretary and then secretary of the Air Force during the Carter ad-
ministration. The approach to the space agency that the new pair of NASA managers would
take was foreshadowed in a paper prepared by Mark and a senior engineering associate,
Milton Silveira, that was widely circulated among the top people in NASA soon after the
new leaders assumed control; Beggs accepted the paper as a framework for NASA
40. Presidential Directive/NSC-37, "National Space Policy," May 11, 1978, N._SA Historical Reference
Collection.
41. See Hans Mark, The Space Shuttle: A PersonalJourru'y (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, t987).
chapter IX, for an account of the Carter administration decisions on the space shuttle.
42. George M. Low, Team Leader, NASA Transition Team, to Richard Fairbanks, Director, Transiuon
Resources and Development Group, December 19, 1980, with attached: "Report of the Transition Team, Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration," George M. Low Papers, Archives and Special Collections,
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY.
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planning." That approach gave top priority to making the space shuttle operational and
then utilizing it frequently while getting approval for a major new development project,
the space station. [III-37]
Like the Carter administration before it, the Reagan White House carried out an
early, comprehensive review of national space policy. The results of that review were incor-
porated in a classified national security decision directive issued July 4, 1982. [III-38] The
directive provided "the broad framework and the basis for the commitments necessary for
the conduct of U.S. space programs." It gave particular emphasis to the role of the space
shuttle, which was to be "a major factor in the future evolution of United States space
programs. '_ The directive also transferred White House responsibility for reviewing space
policy from the Office of Science and Technology Policy, where it had been vested during
the Carter administration, to the National Security Council, and created a Senior Inter-
agency Group (SIG) for Space, chaired by the president's assistant for national security, to
oversee the Reagan-era space policy process.
During the following six years, SIG (Space) was the focal point for a series of debates,
policy statements, and directives on various aspects of U.S. space efforts. Issues that stimu-
lated these debates included a desire to foster the commercial uses of space, the decision
to begin a space station program, controversy over the pricing policy for the space shuttle,
and actions required to recover from the January 1986 ChallenKeraccident. In 1988, Presi-
dent Reagan approved a revised statement of national space policy that incorporated the
results of these individual decisions and directives. [III-42] Reflecting a theme that had
been present in U.S. space policy since the beginning, the directive noted that "a funda-
mental objective guiding United States space activities has been, and continues to be, space
leadership.'_
The Space Station Decision `°
At his Senate confirmation hearing in June 1981,James Beggs was asked his view on
what should be the next major U.S. undertaking in space. He replied that "it seems to me
that the next step is a space station. ''47 Between the second half of 1981 and the end of
1983, NASA carried out an intense, and ultimately successful, campaign to gain presiden-
tial approval to develop a large, permanendy occupied space station as the "next logical
step" in space development. Like the space shutde before it, developing and operating a
space station promised to influence the U.S. space program for years to come.
NASA spent most of 1982 laying the foundation for station approval by conducting
internal and contractor studies, with a particular focus on identifying the missions that a
station might perform. Beggs and Mark pursued a two-pronged strategy for gaining
station approval. One path was to work with other government agencies and external
constituencies to build a broad coalition in support of the station; the other was to con-
vince President Ronald Reagan that it was in the U.S. interest to go ahead with the pro-
gram. _
The forum for developing an interagency consensus on the station was the National
Security Council's SIG (Space). At a March 30, 1983, meeting, SIG (Space) approved terms
of reference for a study that would provide the basis for a presiden dal decision on whether
to proceed with the program. To give added weight to the study, a national security
43. Mark, Space Station, p. 128.
44. National Security Decision Directive Number 42, "National Space Policy," July 4, 1982 (partially de-
classified June 14, 1990).
45. Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet: Presidential Directive on National Space Policy," February
11, 1988, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
46. For more details on the space station decision, see Howard E. McCurdy, The Space Statzon Dects*on:
Incremental Politics and Technologtcal Choice (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990); Mark, Space
Station.
47. McCurdy, The Space Station Decision, p. 40,
48. See Mark, Space Statior_ chapter XIV, for a discussion of this strategy.
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decisiondirectivesignedbythepresidentandincorporatingthesetermsofreferencewas
drafted. After being briefed on the station program, Reagan approved the directive on
April 11. [III-39] The directive identified five policy issues to be studied:
How will a manned Space Station contribute to the maintenance of U.S. space leadership and to the
other goals contained in our National Space Policy ?... How will a manned Space Station best fulfill
national and international requirements versus other means of satisfying them?... What are the na-
tional security implications of a manned Space Station ?... What are the foreign policy implications of
a manned Space Station ?... What is the overall economic and social impact of a manned Space
Station ?
These questions were to be answered with respect to four possible future scenarios:
- Space Shuttle and Unmanned Satellites
- Space Shuttle and Unmanned Platforms
- Space Shuttle and an Evolutionary/Incrementally Developed Space Station
- Space Shuttle and a Fully Functional Space Station
The directive called for study results to be available "not later than September 1983. ''_9
In the course of the next several months, NASA discovered that getting a positive
recommendation on the station from SIG (Space) was not going to be possible. First of all,
the effort got bogged down as the NASA-led team considered the multiple options of the
study directive. The process of developing a shorter policy paper containing recommenda-
tions to which nil SIG (Space) members could agree became stalemated in August; there
was significant opposition from the national security members of the group to going ahead
with the station. In particular, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger argued against the
station project. [III-41] Without SIG (Space) agreement, it seemed, there would be no
recommendation to Ronald Reagan to approve the space station.
Over the next few months, however, NASA was able to find an alternative path to get
the issue of whether or not to go ahead with the station before the president. It had been
James Beggs' position nil along that President Reagan would approve the station program,
given the opportunity; this had been the second prong of the NASA strategy. NASA's allies
in the White House succeeded in getting the station question on the agenda of a Decem-
ber 1, 1983, meeting of the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade, one of the organi-
zations that the Reagan administration had created for policy development; the national
security community did not have a controlling position among the council's membership.
The NASA presentation to the meeting, which was attended by the president, asked
for a decision to proceed with the space station program. [III-40] Primary emphasis in the
presentation was given to the station's contribution to U.S. leadership around the world, a
theme that Beggs knew was close to Ronald Reagan's heart. The presentation also empha-
sized the commercial potential of station-based activities, and underlined the fact that the
Soviet Union already had a small space station and was expected to develop a larger facil-
ity. In concluding the presentation,James Beggs told the president and others in the Cabi-
net Room that "the time to start a space station is now, "5°
President Reagan approved the station program in an Oval Office meeting a few days
later. On January 25, 1984, in his annual State of the Union message, Reagan told Con-
gress and the nations that
America has always been greatest when we dared to be great. We can reach for greatness again. We can
follow our dreams to distant stars, living and working in space for peaceful, economic, and scientific
49. National Security Decision Directive 5-83. "Space Station," April 11. 1983. National Security Archive,
Washington, DC.
50. "Revised Talking Points for the Space Station Presentation to the President and the Cabinet Coun-
cil," November 30, 1983, with attached: "Presentation on Space Station," December 1, 1983, NASA Historical
Reference Collection.
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gain. Tonight I am directing NASA to develop a permanently manned space station and to do it
within a decade. 51
Looking Toward the Future
The space station was frequently justified by James Beggs and others in NASA as "the
next logical step." When asked "step toward what" NASA most often pointed out the many
missions that had been proposed for a permanently occupied orbiting laboratory. During
the 1982-1983 debate over station approval, the agency resisted pressure from Presidential
Science Adviser George A. Keyworth II to identify the station with the ambitious goal of
preparing for human journeys to Mars. The memory of the negative response to the 1969
Space Task Group recommendation for Mars exploration was still strongly in the minds of
many at NASA, and Beggsjudged that the time was not propitious for linking station ap-
proval to such a visionary objective.
Pressure also came from Congress for NASA to articulate its long-term vision of the
future in space. In 1984, Congress passed a bill requiring the president to name a National
Commission on Space to develop a future space agenda for the United States. The White
House in March 1985 chose Thomas Paine as chairman of the commission, who, since
leaving NASA fifteen years earlier, had been a tireless spokesman for an expansive view of
what should be done in space. The fourteen other commissioners were a diverse group,
ranging from Apollo 11 astronaut Nell Armstrong and test pilot Chuck Yeager to the U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeanne Kirkpatrick.
The commission took most of a year to prepare its report; in addition to its own
deliberations, the group solicited public input in hearings throughout the United States.
The commission report, Pioneering the Space Frontier, was published in a lavishly illustrated,
glossy format in May 1986; a summary videotape was also prepared.
The National Commission on Space recommended "a pioneering mission for 21st-
century America"m"to lead the exploration and development of the space frontier, ad-
vancing science, technology, and enterprise, and building institutions and systems that
make accessible vast new resources and support human settlements beyond Earth orbit,
from the highlands of the Moon to the plains of Mars."
The report also contained a "Declaration for Space" that included a rationale for
exploring and settling the solar system and outlined a long-range space program for the
United States? _
The United States in 1986 was not in a particularly receptive mood for such bold
proposals; the tragic Challenger accident in January 1986 had focused attention on the
problems with the U.S. space program, not its prospects. But as the year ended, NASA
once again began to focus on its long-range objectives.James Fletcher, who had returned
for a second tour of duty as NASA administrator in the wake of the shuttle tragedy, asked
former astronaut Sally K. Ride to chair a task force to develop options for NASA's future.
The group's report, Leadership and America's Future in Space, was presented to Fletcher in
August 1987.
The Ride report identified four "leadership initiatives" that NASA might choose to
pursue, individually or in combination:
1. Mission to Planet Earth: a program that would use the perspective afforded from space to
study and characterize our home planet on a global scale.
2. Exploration of the Solar System: a program to retain U.S. leadership in exploration of the
outer solar system, and regain U.S. leadership in the exploration of comets, asteroids, and Mars.
51. Quoted in McCurdy, Space Station Deasion. p. 190.
52. The Report of the National Commission on Space, Pioneering the Space Frontter (New York: Bantam
Books, 1986), excerpts.
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3. Outpost on the Moon: a program that would build on and extend the lega O, of the Apollo
program, returning Americans to the Moon to continue exploration, to establish a permanent scien-
tific outpost, and to begin prospecting the Moon's resources.
4. Humans to Mars: a program to send astronauts on a series of round trips to land on the
surface of Mars, leading to eventual establishment of a permanent base.
In its conclusion, the report referred to the central vision statement of the National Com-
mission on Space, quoted above, and recommended that "the United States needs to
define a course of action to make this vision a reality. ''_
Conclusion
Many influences shaped U.S. space policy and the U.S. space program in the three
decades between 1958 and 1988. Throughout, leadership in space has been a consistent
policy objective, and human exploration of space a constant theme. As a response to the
needs of the time, the United States sent twelve people to the surface of the Moon between
1969 and 1972, but this first instance of human exploration of another celestial body did
not lead to a sustained program of human exploration. That still lay in the future in 1988;
the final Reagan administration statement of space policy set as a long-range goal "to ex-
pand human presence and activity beyond Earth orbit into the solar system.'54 While much
happened in the early years of the space program, much remains.
53. Dr. Sally K. Ride, Leadership and America %Future in Space:,4 Report to theAdmzmstrator (Washington, DC:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, August 1987), pp. 21, 58.
54. Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet: Presidential Directive on National Space Policy," February
11, 1988, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
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Document II1-1
Document title: Special Committee on Space Technology, "Recommendations to the NASA
Regarding A National Civil Space Program," October 28, 1958.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
By the end of 1957 the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) was
heavily involved in space-related research, which constituted forty to fifty percent of its
total effort. Sensing that NACA might be the obvious choice for taking the lead in the
American space effort after Sputnik, on January 12, 1958, General James Doolittle, chair-
man of NACA, created a Special Committee on Space Technology. While NACA Director
Hugh Dryden addressed the institutional issues involved in transforming NACA into NASA,
the Committee on Space Technology was charged with addressing specific areas of space
technology deserving early attention. NASA was formally established on October 1, 1958,
and the committee issued its final report at the end of that month. The following docu-
ment reprints the recommendations to NASA on "A National Civil Space Program" of-
fered by the Special Committee on Space Technology on October 28, 1958.
[ 1 ] Summary
The major objectives of a civil space research program are scientific research in the
physical and life sciences, advancement of space flight technology, development of manned
space flight capability, and exploitation of space flight for human benefit. Inherent in the
achievement of these objectives is the development and unification of new scientific con-
cepts of unforeseeably broad import.
Space Research - Instruments mounted in space vehicles can observe and measure
"geophysical" and environmental phenomena in the solar system, the results of cosmic
processes in outer space, and atmospheric phenomena, as well as the influence of space
environment on materials and living organisms. A vigorous, coordinated attack upon the
problems of maintaining the performance capabilities of man in the space environment is
prerequisite to sophisticated space exploration.
Development - Flight vehicles and simulators should be used for space research and
also for developmental testing and evaluation aimed at improved space flight and observa-
tional capabilities. Major developmental recommendations include sustained support of a
comprehensive instrumentation development program, establishment of versatile dynamic
flight simulators, and provision of a coordinated series of vehicles for testing components
and sub-systems.
Ground Facilities - Properly diversified space flight operations are impossible with-
out adequate ground facilities. To this end serious study aimed toward providing an equa-
torial launching capability is recommended. A complete ground instrumentation system
consisting of computing centers, communication network, and facilities for tracking and
control of and communication (including telemetry) with space vehicles is required. At
least part of the system must be capable of real time computation and communication. A
competent satellite communications relay system would be most valuable in this regard,
and it is recommended that NASA take the lead in determining the specifications of such
a system. A coordinated national attack upon the problems of recovery is recommended.
Flight Program - The first recovery vehicles will probably be ballistic, but the control
and safety advantages of lifting re-entry vehicles warrant their development. [2] A
million-pound-plus booster can be achieved about three years sooner by clustering en-
gines than by developing a new single-barrel engine, but the cluster would not have the
growth potential of the larger engine. Further growth potential requires the development
of the single-barrel engine. Both developments are needed.
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Strongresearcheffortonnovelpropulsionsystemsforvacuumoperationsisurged,
anddevelopmentofhigh-energy-propellantsystemsforupperstagesshouldreceivefull
support.
Threegenerationsofspacevehiclesareimmediatelyavailable.Thefirstisbasedon
Vanguard-JupiterC,theSecondonIRBMboosters,andthethirdonICBMboosters.The
performancecapabilitiesofvariouscombinationsofexistingboostersandupperstages
shouldbeevaluated,andintensivedevelopmentconcentratedonthosepromisingreat-
estusefulnessindifferentgeneralcategoriesofpayload.
Introduction
Scientifically, we are at the beginning of a new era. More than two centuries between
Newton and Einstein were occupied by the observations, experiments and thought that
produced the background necessary for modern science. New scientific knowledge indi-
cates that we are already working in a similar period preceding another long step forward
in scientific theory. The information obtained from direct observation, in space, of envi-
ronment and of cosmological processes will probably be essential to, and will certainly
assist in, the formulation of new unifying theories. We can no more predict the results of
this work than Galileo could have predicted the industrial revolution that resulted from
Newtonian mechanics.
The observation of the nature and effects of the space environment are necessarily
paced by the development of space flight capabilities. This report presents suggestions
regarding research policies and procedures that should aid in the establishment and im-
provement of capabilities for space flight and space research.
In preparing this report, the Special Committee on Space Technology has been as-
sisted by the Technical committees of the NACA and the ad hoc Working Groups of the
Special Committee. The membership of the Working Groups is listed in an appendix to
this report.
The reports of the Working Groups are primarily program-oriented, and while they
are not referenced specifically, they have furnished the basis for the preparation of this
report. These will be presented to the NASA as separate Working Group reports, indepen-
dent of this report.
[3] Objectives
A national civil space research program to explore, study, and conquer the newly
accessible realm beyond the atmosphere will have the following general objectives:
1.Scientific research and exploration in the physical and the life sciences.
Submerged as he always has been beneath the "dirty window" of the atmosphere,
man has necessarily inferred the nature of the physical universe from local observations
and glimpses of what lies beyond his essentially two-dimensional earth-bound habitat. Little
of the radiation and few of the solid particles from outer space reach the earth's surface,
yet practically all aspects of man's earthly environment are determined ultimately by extra-
terrestrial factors. The radiation that does reach the surface is so distorted by passage
through the atmosphere that only incomplete observations can be made on the nature of
other celestial bodies and the contents of interstellar space.
With the information derived from experiments and directed observations in the
actual space environment, man will achieve a better understanding of the universe and of
nature phenomena and life on the earth.
An excellent start toward determination of the near-space environment has already
been made in connection with the IGY, and the pattern of international cooperation that
has developed with this program indicates that mutual understanding and respect among
the nations of the earth may be generated by concerted attack upon scientific problems.
Inasmuch as national scientific excellence is, to a great extent, now evaluated by the people
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oftheearthin termsofsuccessin theexplorationofspace,it behoovestheUnitedStates
toachieveandmaintainanunselfishleadershipin thisfield.
2.Advancementof hetechnologyofspaceflight.[4]Propulsionsystemshavebeendevelopedhavingthedemonstratedcapabilityof
puttingsmallinstrumentedpackagesintoorbitaboutheearth.However,thereliabilityof
thetotalvehicleandcontrolsystemneedsimprovementi ordertoconductmuchofthe
desiredspaceprogram.Largerpowerplants,andnewhigher-energyfuelsandtheequip-
mentoproducethemmustbedeveloped.If orbitsaboutheeartharetobeexpanded
intopracticalinterplanetarytrajectories,newpropulsionsystemshavingverylowfuelcon-
sumptionandmodestthrustwillberequiredinorderthatthetrajectorycanbecontrolled
toperformthemission.
Agoodstarthasbeenmadeonthedevelopmentofinstrumentationforobserving
theenvironmenti space.Instrumentationforcontrollingandnavigatingthevehicleand
forcommunicatingwiththeearthwillrequirextensived velopment.Becauseoftheserver
weightrestrictions,allinstrumentationmustbeseverelyminiaturized.Ground-basedcom-
municationssystemsmustbeexpandedto providefor thecontrolof andcommunica-
tionwithvehiclesonlunarorplanetarymissions,andforproperlycontrolledre-entryand
recovery.
Novelstructuralproblemsareposedbyspacevehicles.Heavyloadsof steadyaccel-
eration,shockandvibrationoccurduringboost,whileweightlessnessduringunpowered
spaceflightmakespossibletheuseofnonconventionalmechanicaldesignprinciples.For
vehicleswhichmustre-entertheearth'satmosphere,problemsofstructuralintegrityun-
derhighre-entryheatingrates,largerthermalgradients,andthermalshockareveryim-
portant.All of theserequirementsmustbemetwithanabsoluteminimumofstructural
weight.
Extensivehumanengineeringdevelopmentsarerequiredinorderformannedspace
flighttobesuccessful.Becauseof therigorousbutlargelyunknownspacenvironment,
thesedevelopmentswilldependcriticallyupontheinformationobtainedintheearlyprob-
ingflights.
A successfulNationalSpaceProgram,thereforequirescontinuingimprovement
anddevelopmenti thepertinentfieldsoftechnology.
3.Mannedspaceflight.
Instrumentsforthecollectionandtransmissionfdataonthespacenvironment
havebeendesignedandputintoorbitaboutheearth.However,manhasthecapabilityof
correlatingunlikeeventsandunexpectedobservations,acapacityforoverallevaluationof
situations,andthebackgroundknowledgeandexperiencetoapplyjudgmentthatcannot
beprovidedbyinstruments;andinmanyotherwaystheintellectualfunctionsofmanare
anecessarycomplementtotheobservingandrecordingfunctionsofcomplicatedinstru-
mentsystems.Furthermore,maniscapableofvoicecommunicationf rsendingdetailed
descriptionsandreceivinginformationwherebytheconcertedjudgmentofothersmaybe
broughttobearonunforeseenproblemsthatmayariseduringflight.[5]Althoughit isbelievedthatamannedsatelliteisnotnecessaryforthecollection
of environmentaldatain thevicinityof theearth,explorationof thesolarsystemin a
sophisticatedwaywillrequireahumancrew.
4.Explorationofspaceforhumanbenefit.
Thepracticalexploitationofsatellitesandspacevehiclesforcivilpurposesandfor
humanbenefitmaybeasimportantas-orevenmoreimportantthan-theimmediatemili-
taryusesforspaceflight.Perhapsthemostimportantexampleistheuseofsatelliteve-
hiclesfor activeorpassivecommunicationsrelay.Thiscouldextendwhatareeffectively
line-of-sightcommunicationli ksforthousandsofmilesbetweenpointsontheground,
withverygreatbandwidthsandnoneofthecapriciousnessnowcharacterizinglong-rangeHFcommunications.
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Many indirect benefits will also be derived from the technological developments that
will make space flight practical. The necessarily high technological standards required tier
space flight will certainly accelerate improvement in transportation, communications and
other contributions to human welfare.
The unpredictable long-term benefits of space-accelerated scientific and technologi-
cal advancement will almost certainly far exceed the foreseeable benefits.
Aside from the intentional omission of military and political objectives, the forego-
ing objectives appear to be in consonance with those mentioned in "Introduction to Outer
Space," by the President's Science Advisory Committee (Killian Committee), and with the
objectives stated in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, which is the enabling
legislation for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Basic Scientific Research
Space Research
Geophysical observations from satellites and non-orbiting space probes enable the
gravitational and magnetic fields in the vicinity of the earth to be mapped to altitudes
limited only by the capabilities of the flight vehicle. The interactions among these fields
and the particles and radiations approaching the earth from the sun and other [6] space
can be studied, and related to the composition and behavior of the gaseous envelope of
the earth from troposphere to exosphere. Satellite observations of large-scale cloud move-
ments and other atmospheric phenomena can do much to put meteorology on a more
sound scientific basis. As propulsion and guidance systems are improved, "geodetic" and
"geophysical" studies can be extended to the moon and other planets.
Telescopes and spectroscopes mounted on earth satellites can utilize the complete
radiation spectrum from vacuum ultraviolet to radio frequencies to observe the sun, the
planets, stars, and interstellar space. Direct measurements of the space environment should
include the nature, direction and intensity of electromagnetic and corpuscular radiation,
and the nature and distribution of meteorites. The mass density in space can be measured,
and large-scale magneto-hydrodynamic phenomena in and beyond the ionosphere can be
studied. These observations and direct measurements will offer tremendous improvements
in understanding of cosmic processes.
In addition to scientific observations and environmental measurements, satellite ex-
periments will enable evaluation of the effect of the space environment on all types of
material and biological specimens and hardware components. Re-entry phenomena can
be studied, and here for the first time, it is possible to investigate the effects of extended
periods of weightlessness on instrumentation and living subjects.
Experiments with man and other living organisms, both plant and animal, during
extended periods in the space environment may offer new insight to human physiology
and psychology and into life processes generally.
Upper Atmosphere Research
Upper atmosphere experiments, utilizing both rocket-propelled and
balloon-supported vehicles, can, at reasonable cost, give direct information on both the
vertical and time-wise variations of various atmospheric parameters and cosmic radiations.
Heat-transfer, ablation, vehicle-control dynamics, and pilot-vehicle interactions can be stud-
ied under approximately re-entry conditions. Limited-time biological studies and human
physiological and psychological studies under almost space conditions, and with limited
periods of weightlessness, can also be investigated.
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Ground-Based Supporting Research
In addition to direct study of the space environment, much ground-based research
must be conducted as a basis for the space flight program. This will include such factors as
radiation effects [7] on materials, instruments, and living organisms, and means of radia-
tion protection. Other physical phenomena pertinent to space flight and re-entry include
radio propagation; and behavior, in a space-type environment, of materials, transducers
power supplies, and so forth for instrument components; hypersonic gasdynamics, both
continuum and noncontinuum; and magnetogasdynamics.
Human factors pertinent to space flight present a real challenge. Those amenable to
ground-based study include, among others, acceleration and vibration tolerance and
protection, and the influence of new physiological and psychological factors (other than
weighdessness) on the performance capabilities of the crew members. A major coopera-
tive effort between the NASA, and the Department of Defense, and other groups con-
cerned with aeromedical and space flight problems is necessary.
Research Techniques and Equipment Development
Vehicle Instrumentation
Vehicle instrumentation presents formidable development problems because of the
conflicting requirements of minimum weight, adequate resistance to the accelerations
and vibrations of launching and ability to operate correcdy for extended periods of time
under the conditions of space flight. For scientific observations, a complete range of in-
strumentation will be required for observing the external environment and recording or
telemetering the data. Other special instrumentation will be required to observe experi-
ments conducted within the vehicle.
Navigation and guidance equipment, and instruments for attitude sensing and
control for the communication, are required for operation of the vehicle, particularly on
extended flights into space. An integrated display of information on the internal environ-
ment and the vehicle operation will be required for manned flights. Improved auxiliary
power sources will be needed for all types of vehicle-borne instruments.
It is recommended that the NASA organize and give consistent support to a compre-
hensive program of instrumentation development, comprising not only instruments
useful in the development, flight testing, and operation of space vehicles, but also the
instruments needed for a broad program of environmental and other experimental re-
search. Special attention should be paid to the novel design possibilities offered by operat-
ing such instruments in free fall and in vacuo.
[8] Ground Simulation of Environment and Operational Problems
The development and testing of a space vehicle, its components and, for a manned
vehicle, its crew require ground simulation of the environment operating problems that
will be encountered. The completeness of the simulation may well determine the success
or failure of the mission. This will be a continuously changing problem as new information
is obtained on the environment and as the operational ranges and durations increase.
Wind tunnels and jets of various types, ballistic rangers and structural test facilities,
can simulate, to a reasonable extent aerodynamic effects encountered during launching
and re-entry. Vacuum chambers with assorted loading devices and radiation sources will
be useful for both instrumental structural tests.
The capacity of a human crew to participate in the operation of a space vehicle is still
an unknown quantity. As fast as such capabilities are demonstrated they should be utilized
to the extent profitable in operation of the vehicle. Therefore, flight simulators should be
designed and built in which the flight dynamics and internal environment of space
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vehicles can simulated as closely as possible. Such facilities would be used for pilot evalua-
tion and training and for evaluation of the dynamic characteristics of the vehicle-pilot
combination.
Flight Testing Techniques
To aid in the advanced development of space vehicles and sub-systems, and to comple-
ment the ground-based simulators, it is recommended that the NASA use reliable
high-performance rocket-propelled test vehicles which would be standardized for as many
tests as possible. In order to minimize the development cost of such vehicles, they should
presumably be based on military developments in the missile field.
Two other techniques are recommended for larger-scale tests and for systems devel-
opment and testing. One of these is a large, high-altitude, balloon-supported laboratory in
which most conditions of space environment could be simulated. This balloon-supported
laboratory would not only allow a substantial amount of research on the equipment needed
by the space crew and on the effects of space environment needed by the space crew and
on the effect of space environment on the capsule and its inhabitants, but could also be
valuable for basic environmental studies.
[9] The other is a nonorbiting rocket-propelled research vehicle capable of carrying
at least two men, or an actual man-carrying satellite capsule. This vehicle should be ca-
pable of a number of minutes of free coast well above significant atmospheric influences.
Such a vehicle should be used for development and final flight-testing of actual space
flight controls and operational instrumentation. In addition, flight crew could be trained
and evaluated under longer periods of weightlessness than are possible within the atmo-
sphere.
With the establishment of artificial earth satellites, space flight has become a reality,
albeit on only a very limited scale. For more extended space missions, the long-time effects
of the space environment on the vehicle and its contents must be known and designed for.
This can best be studied in earth satellite vehicles. Strong technological support should be
provided for all phases of vehicular development. Specifically, a substantial fraction of
space flight missions should be allocated to such technological projects as components
tests, materials tests, engine-restart tests, solar power supply systems, et cetera.
Ground Facilities for Space Flight Operations
Range Capabilities and Requirements
In view of the plans to expand the NASA Wallops Island facility for technique devel-
opment and relatively small probe and satellite launchings, and with the Atlantic and
Pacific Missile Ranges capable of substantial further development, there is no present need
for another major nonequatoral launching complex. It may be desirable, however, for the
NASA to establish permanent field stations at both the Atlantic and Pacific Missile Ranges.
On the other hand, the unique properties of an equatorial orbit lead to a distinct
need for an equatorial launching site. These are:
1. Narrow track over the earth's surface.
2. Best departure point for interplanetary operations.
3. Capability for all other orbits.
4. Minimum requirement for ground stations and communication system.
These considerations bringing the Committee to the conclusion that the NASA should
establish a study, survey and planning group [10] aimed toward early provision of an equa-
torial launching capability, including necessary logistic support, for the United States.
Fixed-base and ship-based launchings should be considered by the group before reaching
a final decision.
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Ground-Based Instrumentation Systems
The ground-based instrumentation needs of the civilian space program encompass
such things as:
1. Communication with and transmission of commands to vehicles both near the
earth and in interplanetary space.
2. Active and passive tracking of space vehicles.
3. Reception of telemetry signals from space.
4. Calculation of real-time search ephemeris data.
5. Calculation of final orbits for scientific analysis.
The instrumentation necessary can thus be listed as:
1. A network of stations suitably located for tracking of a communication with ve-
hicles in interplanetary space. These stations must be tied together with reasonably rapid
communication links. The stations will consist of very large antennas, sensitive receiving
equipment, and high-power transmitting equipment.
2. A network of radio receiving stations to obtain orbital information from active
satellites. These stations may be, in part at least, the same as those in the preceding para-
graph.
3. A network of optical stations to make very precise optical observations on some
satellites, and a supplementary set of optical observing stations, probably similar to the
present Moonwatch teams, for rough orbital data.
4. A set of telemetry receiving stations which will be in part, but not necessarily com-
pletely, at the other radio sites.
5. A special network of stations for re-entry experiments.
6. Computing facilities to calculate and publish search ephemeris data.
7. Computing facilities to generate orbital data of sufficient accuracy to satisfy scien-
tific needs.
[11] This complete instrumentation network should be coordinated with similar
activities of the Department of Defense, but the special requirements of the civilian space
program are such as to require the NASA to establish and operate some of the stations.
The technical requirements of the space communication channels, telemetry, et cetera,
should likewise be coordinated with the Department of Defense.
In view of the radio frequency requirements of the space program for communica-
tion with space vehicles, it is recommended that NASA take the necessary steps to insure
that frequency assignments for this purpose are available.
Overseas stations of the NASA could be operated by local technical groups, universi-
ties, et cetera, and this phase of the problem should be actively pursued by NASA, for
reasons both of efficient and economical operation and of international cooperation.
It is not recommended that the NASA offer to support the continued operation of
the present IGY tracking system for an interim period after the expiration of the present
ICY support. It is recommended, however, that a study be made of possible radio tracking
systems to replace or supplement the present Minitrack stations. It is believed that a per-
manent radio tracking system should be capable of receiving signals at higher frequencies
and from larger numbers of satellites, should probably offer greater angular coverage, and
may require a different geographical plan. Special attention needs to be given to the re-
ception of signals of broader bandwidth to take care of future satellites which may have a
relatively large quantity of information to transmit back to earth.
Real-Time Communication
Certain projects will require real-time computation of orbits and communication of
the data to other ground stations at large earth distances. A capability for communication
with the satellite essentially all the time may also be desirable, particularly for manned
flights. It appears, however, that such a situation may not be completely feasible, either
technically or economically, in the near future, and therefor the communication system
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whichcanbeprovidedmayproveto beoneof thelimitingfactorsin thedesignof the
experiment.Hardwire,whichisconsideredtobetheonlycurrentlyavailablecommunica-
tionsystemwhosereliabilityapproaches100percent,extendsonlyfromHawaiitoItalyby
commercialcable.All radiosystemsof substantialrangearelessreliable,exceptfor
line-of-sightoperationssuchascommunicationsatellitesmightprovide.Sincemanyagen-
ciesareconcernedwiththismatter,andmanyimportantdesigndecisionsmustbetaken
toyieldthemost[12]generallyusefulsatellitecommunicationsrelaysystem,NASAshould
taketheinitiativein coordinatingthevariousrequirementsandsettlingonapreferred
systemattheearliestpossibledate.Furthermore,projectsrequiringreal-timecommunica-
tionshouldformulatearathercompletecommunicationsplanearlyintheproject-planning
stage.
Recovery
The requirements of recovery of instrumented and manned satellites from orbital
flight pose problems involving equipment, communication, and operation which are of
very great magnitude. The escape maneuver during both the launch and recovery phases
will require recovery capability over large areas of the Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific Ocean,
and possibly the United States Zone of the Interior.
It appears that a coordinated national effort is required to cope with this problem.
It is recommended, therefor, that NASA establish a working group on recovery sys-
tems which will summarize the experience obtained to date, will define the problems to be
solved, and propose operational techniques and equipment which should be developed.
One possible solution would be for the Atlantic, Pacific, and White Sands Missile
Ranges to establish coordinated operational groups for these three areas, making maxi-
mum use of existing organization and facilities, for all national space programs requiring
recovery techniques.
Space Surveillance
It is not considered necessary for NASA to set up the ground equipment and to
maintain current ephemerides of all passive satellites, although, of course, ephemerides
will be required for all satellites during the course for their experiments and for all satel-
lites intended for recovery.
It is considered important that some kind of control be applied to limit th e life of any
satellite radio transmitter to a reasonable duration of experiment, in order to prevent
cluttering up useful parts of the radio spectrum. However, no non-military need is antici-
pated, at this time, for a "vacuum cleaner" to remove from orbit the satellites that have
outlived their usefulness.
[13] Flight Program
Re-entry Vehicles
Types of and uses for non-satellite probes and instrumented satellites have already
been commented upon. Manned satellites, however, must be capable of safely re-entering
the earth's atmosphere and being recovered. As a result of study of a number of suggested
satellite vehicles for manned flight, it is concluded that:
1. The ballistic (pure drag) type vehicle can probably be put in operation soonest
because:
a. The booster problem is simplest by virtue of the low weight of this satellite ve-
hicle.
b. The aerodynamic heating problem is well understood.
c. The development of the vehicle appears to be straight-forward.
2. The high-drag, high-lift vehicle study should be carried on concurrently because:
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a. The ability to steer during re-entry eases the recovery problem, since it reduces
the accuracy required of the retrograde rocket timing and impulse, and allows the vehicle
to be flown to or near the ground or sea recovery stations.
b. The danger of excessive accidental decelerations due to malfunction in either
the boost phase or re-entry phase of flight is greatly diminished.
3. The low-drag, high-lift vehicle looks less attractive for application to manned space
flight for the near future. The advantages of better range control and greater maneuver-
ability after re-entry may eventually make this vehicle more desirable.
t¥opu/s/on
There has been much discussion of the relative merits of developing a large booster
engine or of clustering small ones. Both of these developments are required.
[ 14] Schedule studies clearly indicate that a booster of one million pounds thrust or
more could be available about three years earlier of it were based on the clustering of
existing rocket engines. This would lead to a fourth generation of space vehicles (with
Vanguard Jupiter C being the first; IRBM-boosted space vehicles being the second;
ICBM-boosted vehicles the third generation.) Progress in the rocket engine field offers a
high degree of confidence that multiple-barrel boosters of one to one and a half million
pounds total thrust could be ready for flight test in two to three years. Fifth-generation
boosters based on the one million pounds-plus thrust, single-barrel engine (whether using
one such engine or several) would offer orbital payloads up to 100,000 pounds, and would
be available three years later.
It is strongly recommended that a study be made to assess the advisability of develop-
ing recoverable first-stage boosters. Recovery techniques should be optimistic from a sys-
tem point of view.
Strong research effort on novel propulsion systems for vacuum operations is urged,
and development of high-energy-propellant systems for upper stages should receive full
support.
Vehicles for Early Experiments
In the preceding section several generations of space vehicle boosters are identified
in general terms. The first generation, already in being, is capable of putting into orbit
payloads of approximately 30 pounds. Such a vehicle enables the observation of a rela-
tively small number of space environmental factors, or the conduct of simple experiments
in the space environmental factors, or the conduct of simple experiments in the space
environment. The second generation, with payload capabilities up to roughly 300 pounds,
enables more sophisticated or larger numbers of experiments and environmental observa-
tions. The third-generation vehicles should make possible payloads of 3,000 pounds or
more. Heavy or bulky observing instruments with provision for long-time attitude control
and data transmission can be carried, and minimal manned space flights should be pos-
sible.
In each of these generations a number of boosters and upper stages are either avail-
able or under development. Proper combinations of these should make possible a wide
spectrum of payloads and performances. Furthermore, it is likely that early generation
vehicles will continue to be used even after later generation vehicles are available. There-
for the NASA should make a thorough study of the capabilities of existing stages to
determine whether there are any serious gaps in the spectrum, and to select particular
combinations of further development and use in these early experiments. [ 15] With prop-
erly selective effort going into the early generations, a more vigorous development pro-
gram for later generations of boosters and vehicles should be possible.
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Conclusion
Scientific advances of the broadest import can result from substantially improved
understanding of cosmic processes and their influence upon the environment, and there-
for the inhabitants, of the earth. The acquisition of such understanding depends critically
upon the establishment of observational vantage points outside the insulation of the earth's
atmosphere. The discussions and suggestions regarding research policies, procedures and
programs presented in this report are intended to further the rapid and efficient develop-
ment of the requisite space flight capabilities. All of these suggestions include recommen-
dations, either stated or implicit, for cooperation or close coordination within related
work by other civil and military agencies. More detailed discussions and program recom-
mendations in particular fields are treated by Working Group reports ....
Document 111-2
Document title: Office of Program Planning and Evaluation, "The Long Range Plan of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration," December 16, 1959, pp 1-3, 9-11, 17-18,
26, 44.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
This initial ten-year plan for NASA was developed during the agency's first year of
operation. Because it contained both target dates for various accomplishments and bud-
get estimates for the decade, it received a "Secret" security classification, and was later
declassified.
[ 1 ] Introduction
The long-term national objectives of the United States in aeronautical and space
activities are stated in general terms in the enabling legislation establishing NASA. It is the
responsibility of NASA to interpret the legislative language in more specific terms and to
assure that the program so generated provides an efficient means of achieving the follow-
ing objectives expressed in PL 85-568, Sec. 102(c) as:
"The aeronautical and space activities of the United States shall be conducted so as
to contribute materially to one or more of the following objectives:
(1) The expansion of human knowledge of phenomena in the atmosphere and space;
(2) The improvement of the usefulness, performance, speed, safety, and efficiency
of aeronautical and space vehicles;
(3) The development and operation of vehicles capable of carrying instruments,
equipment, supplies, and living organisms through space;
(4) The establishment of long-range studies of the potential benefits to be gained
from, the opportunities for, and the problems involved in the utilization of aeronautical
and space activities for peaceful and scientific purposes;
(5) The preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and
space science and technology and in the application thereof to the conduct of peaceful
activities within and outside the atmosphere;
(6) The making available to agencies directly concerned with national defense of
discoveries that have military value or significance, and the furnishing by such agencies, to
the civilian [2] agency established to direct and control non-military aeronautical and
space activities, of information as to discoveries which have value or significance to that
agency;
(7) Cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of nations in
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work done pursuant to this Act and in the peaceful application of the results thereof; and
(8) The most effective utilization of the scientific and engineering resources of the
United States, with close cooperation among all interested agencies of the United States,
in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, facilities, and equipment."
In operational terms, these objectives are instructions to explore and to utilize both
the atmosphere and the regions outside the earth's atmosphere for peaceful and scientific
purposes, while at the same time providing research support to the Department of De-
fense. These objectives can be attained only by means of a broad and soundly conceived
program of research, development and operations in space. In the long run, such activi-
ties should make feasible the manned exploration of the moon and the nearby planets,
and this exploration may thus be taken as a long-term goal of NASA activities. To assure
steady and rapid progress toward these objectives, a NASA Long Range Plan has been
developed and it is presented in this document.
In interpreting the Plan, it must be remembered that the implications for the na-
tional economy reach far beyond the specific program goals. For example, the space sci-
ence activities cover the frontiers of almost all the major areas of the physical sciences, and
these activities thus provide support of the physical sciences in specific applications in the
fields of electronics, materials, propulsion, etc., will contribute, directly or indirectly, to all
subsequent military weapons developments and to many unforeseen civilian applications.
Reciprocally, the NASA program is provided with [3] support, direct or indirect, from all
the related research and development activities outside NASA.
The Plan is presented at a level of effort which corresponds to an efficient and steadily
growing capability. The rate of progress could be improved by an increased funding level,
primarily by improving the certainty of the timely completion of the many essential engi-
neering developments. On the other hand, a significantly lower scale of funding could be
accommodated only by arbitrarily limiting the activities to a narrow line and by greatly
reducing the rate of approach to the long-term goals.
[9] Table I
NASA Mission Target Dates
Calendar
Year
1960
1961
1961-1962
1962
1963
1963-1964
1964
1965-1967
Beyond 1970
First launching
First launching
First launching
First launching
First launching
First suborbital
First launching
of a Meteorological Satellite.
of a Passive Reflector Communications Satellite.
of a Scout vehicle.
of a Thor-Delta vehicle.
of an Atlas-Agena-B vehicle (by the Department of Defense).
flight of an astronaut.
of a lunar impact vehicle.
First launching of an Atlas-Centaur vehicle.
Attainment of manned space flight, Project Mercury.
First launchingto the vicinityof Venus and/or Mars.
First launchingof two stage Saturn vehicle.
First launching of unmanned vehicle for controlled landing on the moon.
First launching Orbiting Astronomicaland Radio Astronomy Observatory.
First launching of unmanned lunar circumnavigation and return to earth vehicle.
First reconnaissance of Mars and/or Venus by an unmanned vehicle.
First launching in a program leading to manned circumlunar flight and to permanent
near-earth space station.
Manned flight to the moon.
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[lO] Table It
Current Funds & Anticipated Funding Requirements
Fiscal Year
Research & Development
Launching vehicle Development
Space Propulsion Technology
Vehicle Systems Technology
Manned Space Flight
Scientific Investig, in Space
Satellite Applications
Aeronautical & Space Research
Space Flight Operations
Total Research & Development
Construction & Equipment
Salaries & Expenses
Advanced Projects
Total Funds Required
57 140 163 230
39 51 118 120
13 30 47 49
87 108 120 135
82 95 140 145
1t 27 36 60
28 61 70 70
16 33 42 50
333 545 736 859
100 90 113 137
91 168 175 175
375 325
90 75
50 50
180 260
150 165
75 80
70 70
55 60
1045 1085 1120
130 125 110
175 175 175
70 100 120
19881196711968
Extrapolated
50 50 50 50
260 340 360 360
70 70 70 70
60 60 60 60
1150 1210 1210
105 95 95
175 175 175
120 120
"Includes 19598upplementatand 1960SupplementalRequest
[ll] Figure I
Current & Anticipated Funding Requirements
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[17] Table IV
Performance of NASA Launching Vehicles
Vehicle
In Use:
1st Stage Thrust
1,000 Lbs. Mission
Low Earth Orbit ] Moon Probe I Planet Probe
Project Mercury Capsule
Spacecraft Wt. Lbs.
Redstone 80 Used in Project Mercury Develop.
Atlas 360
Juno II 150 100 20
Thor-Able 150 200 80
Atlas-Able 360 370
Under Development
Scout 100 200-240
Thor-Delta 150 400-500 60
150 1,200-1,500 350 (_ 200 (21Thor-A_}ena B(t)
Attas-Agena Bo; 360 4,500-5,500 750-1,000 350-500
Atlas-Centaur 360 8,000-9,000 2,300-2,700 1,500-1,900
Saturn (initially) 1,500 28,500 9,000 7,000
1. DaD DevelcJ:)ment
2. Withadditional stage
[18] Table V
Launching Vehicle Development
Fiscal Year 60 61
Scout
Flights
Funds, $M
Thor-Delta
Flights
Funds, $M
Atlas-Vega
Funds, $M
Atlas Centaur
Decision Points
Flights
Funds, $M
Saturn
Configuration Analysis
Decision Points
Flights
Funds, $M
Nova
Feasibility Studies
Decision Points
Flights
Funds, $M
57.1 140.5
(a) Beginningin 1962Thor-DeltareplacedbyThor-AgenaB
(b_ Fundedby Departmentof Defense
(¢) TotalFY t961 fundingforSaturn$140M--Includes$46M forS&E
and 13MforC&E notshown
(d) VehicleProcurementbeyonddevelopmentphaseshown
onthistable isfundedby the usingproject.
69
2
210
210
1. Decidetimeof replacementof Atlas-AgenawithAtlas-Cenlaur
2. Selectupperstagesforthe Saturnveh=c_e
3. Determineconfigurationof the Nova vehicle
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[26] Table VII
Vehicle Systems Technology
Fiscal Year 60 61
Guidance & Control
AgenaJCentaur
Injection Develop & Test
Improve
Mid Course--Develop & tesP )
Terminal--Develop & TesP _
Saturn/Nova
Study
Develop & Test
Attitude Control
Develop & test
Refine (0,01 ")
R&D Funds, $M
Power Generation
Nuclear
Snap VIII Develop
Upper Stage Study
Possible Develop
R&D Funds, $M
Solar
Sunflower Develop
R&D Funds, $M
Chemical
R&D Funds, $M
Miscellaneous L$M
Total R&D Funds, $M 12.7 30.4
(a) Initialflight useIn M_d-1961,refinedand improvedby 1963.
69
15
28
6
1
50
(b) Initialflight usein 1963, refinedand improvedby 1965.
[44] Figure II
Distribution of Aeronautical & Space Research Effort
by Problem Area
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Document 111-3
Document title: President's Science Advisory Committee, "Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on
Man-in-Space," December 16, 1960.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
When NASA submitted its 1962 fiscal budget request to the Bureau of the Budget in
May 1960, President Eisenhower learned for the first time of the agency's plans for a lunar
landing program. He asked Presidential Science Advisor George Kistiatowsky to study "the
goals, the missions and the costs" of the manned spaceflight program that NASA had in
mind. The studywas chaired by Brown University chemistry professor Donald Hornig and
was presented to the president at a December 20, 1960, meeting. Eisenhower has been
quoted as saying at this time that he was not willing to "hock his jewels" (referring to the
decision by Spanish monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella to finance the initial expedition of
Christopher Columbus) to send people to the Moon. The handwritten figures included in
this report have been omitted.
E1j Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Man-in-Space
1. Introduction
We have been plunged into a race for the conquest of outer space. As a reason for
this undertaking some look to the new and exciting scientific discoveries which are certain
to be made. Others feel the challenge to transport man beyond frontiers he scarcely dared
dream about until now. But at present the most impelling reason for our effort has been
the international political situation which demands that we demonstrate our technologi-
cal capabilities if we are to maintain our position of leadership. For all of these reasons we
have embarked on a complex and costly adventure. It is the purpose of this report to
clarify the goals, the missions and the costs of this effort in the foreseeable future, particu-
larly with regard to the man-in-space program.*
This report has been made possible by the complete cooperation of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration. Officials of the NASA presented a very impressive
description of their detailed plans for development, utilization and costs of the Saturn
vehicle. They also provided technical information on possible follow-on vehicles, advanced
propulsion techniques, and possible development and funding schedules, As far as we can
tell, the NASA program is well thought through, and we believe that the mission, sched-
ules and costs are as realistic as possible at this time. We had to project their plans beyond
1970, and such projections must be seen as only crude estimates.
[2] 2. The Man-in-Space Program
The initial American attempt to launch a manned capsule into orbital flight, Project
Mercury, is already well advanced. It is a somewhat marginal effort, limited by the thrust of
the Atlas booster. It has as its goal the launching of a one man capsule into orbit around
the earth and its successful return to earth. The fact that the thrust of any available Ameri-
can booster is barely sufficient for the purpose means that it is difficult to achieve a high
probability of a successful flight while also providing adequate safety for the Astronaut.
Achieving reliability on both accounts will strain our capabilities. A difficult decision will
soon be necessary as to when or whether a manned flight should be launched. The chief
justification for pushing Project Mercury on the present time scale lies in the political
desire either to be the first nation to send a man into orbit, or at least to be a close second.
*No attempt has been made to include manned space programs initiates, or to be initiated, by the DOD.
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Themarginalcapabilitycannotbechangedsubstantiallyuntil theSaturnbooster
becomesavailable.TheNASAprogramforutilizingSaturninvolvesthedevelopmentof
theso-calledApollospacecraft.TheSaturnrocketwhichisbeingdevelopednow(C-l)
shouldbecapableoflaunchingaspacecrafto about19,000lbsintoalowearthorbit.The
proposedApollospacecraftweightof 15,000lbsiswellwithinthislimitandwouldenable
orbitalqualificationflightsoftheApollospacecraft(somemanned)about1966-1968.Such
amannedflightwouldoccurafterabout25SaturnC-l'shavebeentestedandmuchde-
pendsonwhetherademonstratedreliabilitycanbeattainedin thisrathersmallnumber
oftests.TheApollospacecraft,aspresentlyenvisioned,wouldcarrythreemenwhowould
exercisecontrolfromwithinthespacecraftndbeabletoreturntoearthwithinafairly
welldefinedarea.ThechiefpurposeoftheearlyApollomissionswouldbetogainexperi-
enceinmannedflight,tolearnmoreoftheproblemsencounteredbycrewsundersuch
newconditionsandtoaidin thedevelopmentofaspacecraftformoreambitiousmissions.
Thefull capabilitiesof the Saturn booster cannot be utilized until a large
hydrogen-oxygen second stage has been developed. The C-2 Saturn, utilizing the new
high-performance stage, is expected to enter the test phase about 1965 and may he avail-
able for manned flight (No. 17) in 1968 or 1969. There is again a question as to whether 16
flights will be enough to demonstrate sufficient reliability for its use in manned missions.
The Saturn C-2 is expected to lift about 40,000 lbs into low earth orbit and it is planned
to utilize this capability to send up an "orbiting laboratory" capable of staying aloft for two
weeks or more. It is our opinion that an [3] orbiting laboratory of this size could produce
considerably more scientific information if it were wholly instrumented rather than manned.
Alternatively, we believe that the valid scientific missions to be performed by a manned
laboratory of this size could be accomplished using a much smaller unmanned instru-
mented spacecraft which would in turn require a smaller booster system. The large manned
orbiting laboratory might be of value as a life sciences laboratory to acquire physiological
and psychological data on humans, to study life support mechanisms, to perform biologi-
cal studies, and to carry out engineering tests under gravity free conditions. In short, its
major mission appears to be the preparation for further steps in the manned exploration
of space.
To take such steps, the Apollo spacecraft may be launched into successively more
elliptical orbits which carry it further and further from the earth, culminating about 1970
in a manned flight around the moon and back to the earth. The Apollo program in itself
does not reach what might be considered to be the next major goal in manned space
flight, i.e. manned landing on the moon. It does, however, appear to represent a logical
approach to that goal in that it will develop space craft and crews for space flight and will
enable us to gain experience in navigation and successful return from increasingly diffi-
cult trips. In the meantime it should be possible to obtain far more detailed information
about the moon by unmanned spacecraft and lunar landing craft than the crew of the
circumlunar flight could gain.
None of the boosters now planned for development are capable of landing on the
moon with sufficient auxiliary equipment to return the crew safely to earth. To achieve
this goal, a new program much larger than Saturn will be needed. It is likely to take one of
three forms:
1. An all-chemical liquid-fueled rocket, the Nova, might be developed to take the trip
directly. It would require a booster with about 6 times the thrust of the Saturn and utilyzing
either kerosene or hydrogen-oxygen. The upper stage of the Nova would require hydro-
gen-oxygen and at least one stage would probably be an existing stage from the Saturn
development program.
2. Ifa suitable nuclear upper stage could be developed, the Nova vehicle could cot,-
ceivably become a combination chemical-nuclear system. This system would still require
the development of a first stage chemical booster with thrust of the same order of magni-
tude as that described for the all chemical system. If the nuclear development should be as
successful as its proponents hope, it might open the way for future developments beyond
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the [4] possibilities envisioned for chemical rockets. However, a sound decision on the
promise of nuclear rockets cannot be made until about 1963.
3. Rendezvous techniques, utilizing either Saturn C-2 vehicles or some type of ad-
vanced Saturn vehicles, could be employed to lift into an earth orbit the hardware and fuel
necessary to perform the manned lunar landing mission. In this system, a series of vehicles
would be launched into a temporary earth orbit where they would rendezvous to enable
fueling of the spacecraft and, if necessary, assembly of the component parts of the space-
craft. This spacecraft would then be used to transport the manned payload to the moon
and thence back to Earth. These techniques will require considerable development, and
are at present only in a preliminary study phase.
It is clear that any of the routes to land a man on the moon require a development
much more ambitious than the present Saturn program. Not only must much bigger boost-
ers probably be developed, but rockets and guidance mechanisms for the safe landing and
then for return from moon to earth by means of additional rockets must be developed and
tested. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that this new, major step is implicit in under-
taking the proposed manned Saturn program, for the first really big achievement of the
man-in-space program would be the lunar landing.
The succeeding step, manned flight to the vicinity of Venus or Mars represents a
problem an order of magnitude greater than that involved in the manned lunar landing.
Not only does it appear to be insoluble in terms of chemical rockets, thus requiring the
development of suitable nuclear rockets or nuclear-powered electric propulsion devices,
but it also poses serious problems in terms of life support and radiation shielding for
journeys requiring times ranging from many months to years.
3. Unmanned Programs Related to Man-in-Space
A great part of the unmanned program for the scientific exploration of space is a
necessary prerequisite to manned flight. The programs which are now planned fall in the
following general categories:
1. The general scientific exploration of space. This will take place in a continuing
series of flights. This program has been moving along well and has been marked by solid
scientific achievement; it could probably be carried on to a high state of advancement
using launch vehicles no larger than Centaur (an Adas with hydrogen-oxygen upper stage).
[5] 2. A rough landing on the moon, with television recording of the impact and
with a surviving seismometer to make measurements on the lunar surface, may be made in
1962 or 1963 using an Adas-Agena-B vehicle.
3. The Centaur rocket, which should make its first flight in 1961, will make it possible
to fly instruments past Venus and Mars, making close-up scientific observations for a short
time, in 1962 or 1964. It may even be possible to land a 10 lbs instrument capsule through
their atmospheres.
4. The Centaur should also make it possible to soft land 190 lbs of scientific gear on
the surface of the moon (1964-1966) and to make surface observations from a very close
orbit about the moon, including photography comparable to satellite photography of the
earth (Samos).
5. The Saturn C-2 will be the first vehicle which can carry an adequately instrumented
spacecraft, weighing perhaps 325 lbs, into an orbit about Venus or Mars, and to land a
225 lbs capsule through their atmosphere, giving us direct atmospheric and surface mea-
surements for the first time in about 1967 or 1968. It may then be possible to obtain defi-
nite evidence regarding life on Mars. Although such studies can be started with the Saturn
C-1 in 1965 or 1966, they really require the C-2 to give reasonable instrument weights.
6. A roving automatic vehicle equipped with television and other sensing instruments
to make observations on the surface of the moon can first be landed with the C-2 in about
1967, and is included in present NASA plans.
7. It should also be possible to soft land so object on the moon which is large enough
to send a capsule back to earth with a few pound sample of the surface of the moon. This
also requires the C-2 and could be tried beginning in about 1968.
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8. No booster smaller than the C-2 can carry scientific instruments to the vicinity of
Mercury or Jupiter. This, too, should be possible around 1968 to 1970.
9. For unmanned scientific investigations with roving vehicles on the planets, or for
more ambitious instrumented missions out of the plane of the ecliptic, even the Saturn
C-2 does not provide sufficient payload-carrying capability.
[6] 4. Relation between Manned and Unmanned Space Exploration
Certainly among the major reasons for attending the manned exploration of space
are emotional compulsions and national aspirations. These are not subjects which can be
discussed on technical grounds. However, it can be asked whether the presence of a man
adds to the variety or quality of the observations which can be made from unmanned
vehicles, in short whether there is a scientific justification to include man in space vehicles.
It is said that an astronaut's judgment, decision-making capability and resourceful-
ness can increase the probability of successful accomplishment of a space mission and
expand the variety and quality of observations performed. On the other hand, man's senses
can be satisfactorily duplicated at remote locations by the use of available instrumentation
and advances in the state of the art are continually increasing the ability to transmit infor-
mation back to a central receiving point. With such an instrumented system, the decisions
requiring man's mental capabilities can be performed by many men in a normal environ-
ment and with the aid of elaborate computational aids, where necessary.
The following considerations seem pertinent:
1. Information from unmanned flights is a necessary prerequisite to manned flight.
2. The degree of reliability that can be accepted in the entire mechanism is very
much less for unmanned than for manned vehicles. As the systems become more complex
this may make a decisive difference in what one dares to undertake at any given time.
3. From a purely scientific point of view it should be noted that unmanned flights to
a given objective can be undertaken much earlier. Hence repeated observations, changes
of objectives and the learning by experience are more feasible,
It seems, therefore, to us at the present time that man-in-space cannot be justified on
purely scientific grounds, although more thought may show that there are situations for
which this is not true. On the other hand, it may be argued that much of the motivation
and drive for the scientific exploration of space is derived from the dream of man's getting
into space himself.
[7] 5. Cost of the NASA Man-in-Space Program
The NASA man-in-space program, exclusive of the Mercury Project, revolves around
the use of the Saturn and Nova vehicles. Development of the Saturn is far enough along
that its characteristics are fairly well known, and the costs of its development and use can
be predicted with reasonable accuracy. The Nova, required for direct manned operations
on the moon, is based on the use of the 1.5 million lbs thrust engine, six of which would
probably power the first stage. The character of the vehicle as a whole cannot be clearly
determined until the characteristics of this engine are understood. However, the present
tentative designs of the Nova configuration are probably adequate to support the very
rough cost analysis presented here.
This analysis is based on the rule-of-thumb principle, generally supported by past
experience, that the cost of a program of this nature, inclading development, flight test
and use, should be approximately proportional to the dry weight of the booster vehicle
and payload on which the program is based. The dry weight of the Nova vehicle is about
six times that of the Saturn vehicle, and accordingly a factor of six should be applied to the
costs of the two programs. It is pointed out, however, by the NASA that there is some
reason to believe that a somewhat smaller factor might be appropriate. There is a good
deal of basic engineering that will carry over from Saturn to Nova, and certain of the Nova
stages may already have been developed for Saturn. Such considerations are doubtless
valid, but they could not justify the use of a factor smaller than four. In the analysis that
follows two values of the multiplicative factor are used: four, representing the lower bound
on what might be achieved, and six, representing a reasonably conservative estimate.
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It is further assumed that the time span required for the development and exploita-
tion of the capabilities of the Nova are the same as that for Saturn. It is assumed, however,
that the Nova development follows that of Saturn by seven years, Thus, by 1968 Nova is in
a state of development corresponding to that of Saturn in 1961.
With these assumptions in mind, the method of arriving at the yearly costs given in
the figure can be stated.
1. The known and estimated costs for the development and use of Saturn are plotted
on the curve so labeled in Figure 1. The costs following 1970 are not NASA estimates, but
are predicated on the likelihood of some continuing use for this vehicle.
[8] 2. The "Saturn" curve is now displaced to the right by seven years, and the ordi-
nate multiplied by the factors four and six. This produces the solid sections of the curves
labeled "Nova" in Figure 1. The dashed left-hand tails of the Nova curves represent pure
estimate and have only reasonableness to recommend them.
3. The "Saturn" and "Nova" curves have been added year by year to produce the
composite curves of Figure 2. These are taken to represent rough bounds on the cost of
the NASA man-in-space program.
4. The integrated areas under the curves represent the total expenditures for the
period 1961 through 1975. As indicated on the figures, the total Saturn program costs
8 billion (1961) dollars up to 1975. The Nova program over the same time period comes to
25.5 billion on the lower estimate and 38 billion on the higher estimate. (It will be noted
that these totals are not four and six times, respectively, the total Saturn cost. This is be-
cause the Nova costs were integrated only out to 1975, when the first manned lunar land-
ing might be achieved. The Saturn costs, on the other hand, were integrated over the
entire estimated program.) Figure 2 gives the total composite expenditure to 1975 as
33.5 billion for the lower estimate and 46 billion for the higher.
The cut-off at 1975 is arbitrary and might be misleading. During the five or ten year
period preceding this date new developments will be under way to implement new pro-
grams for the post 1975 era. It does not seem possible at this time to estimate the incre-
mental costs associated with these programs.
Present indications suggest that alternative methods, described elsewhere in this re-
port, of accomplishing the manned lunar landing mission, could not be expected to alter
substantially the over-all cost of mission as analyzed here on the basis of Nova.
In the event that additional flight testing is required to achieve adequate reliability in
these programs, it seems likely that the program would be stretched out in time. Thus
probably the annual expenditures would not change appreciably, although the integrated
expenditure would increase accordingly.
6. Conclusions
1. The first major goal of the man-in-space program is to orbit a man about the earth.
It will cost about 350 million dollars.
[9] 2. The next goal, of an intermediate nature, is the manned circum-navigation of
the moon. It will cost about 8 billion dollars.
3. The second major goal, landing on the moon, can only be achieved about 1975
after an additional national expenditure in the vicinity of 26 to 38 billion dollars.
4. The Saturn program is a necessary intermediate step toward manned lunar land-
ing but must be followed by a much bigger development before manned lunar landing is
possible.
5. The unmanned program is a necessary prerequisite to a manned program. Even if
there were no manned program, the unmanned program might yield as much scientific
knowledge and on this basis would be justified in its own right.
6. Even if there were no man-in-space program, Saturn C-2 is still a minimum vehicle
for close-up instrumented study of Venus and Mars, for unmanned trips to more distant
planets, and for putdng roving vehicles on the surface of the moon.
7. Manned trips to the vicinity of Venus or Mars are not yet foreseeable ....
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Document 111-4
Document title: Richard E. Neustadt, "Problems of Space Programs," December 20, 1960,
attached to Memorandum for Senator Kennedy, "Memo on Space Problems for you to use
with Lyndon Johnson," December 23, 1960.
Source: Pre-Presidential Papers, John E Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachu-
setts.
Eisenhower made several recommendations concerning space betore leaving office.
Some of these, such as the elimination of the Civilian-Military Liaison Committee, were
followed by the Kennedy administration. Others, such as the elimination of the National
Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC), were not. Eisenhower recommended that the
council be abolished, but Richard E. Neustadt, who had worked on the Democratic Party
Platform Committee and was serving as consultant to the president-elect, recommended
that the vice president be named chairman of the NASC in a memo to Kennedy on Decem-
ber 20, 1960. Neustadt also was the first to bring the Saturn rocket program to Kennedy's
attention and to note that it was needed only if the United States intended "to put a man
on the moon and get him back before or soon after the Russians do."
[1] December 20, 1960
Problems of Space Programs
The "space" programs both civil and military, raise problems of great difficulty. Su-
perficially these are problems of budget and organization. Essentially they are problems of
policy direction.
The following approximate figures include the growth and projected magnitude of
the space programs:
NASA
AEC (nuclear
power for
space use)
Defense (identifi-
able space
programs)
Total
New Obligational Authority in millions
1957 1961 1962 1965
& prior 1958 1959 1960 Approx Approx Projected
-- 117 305 524 965 1,110 2,000
20 33 52 45 53 100
95 92 53J_ 543 740 825 2.OOO
95 229 849 1,119 1,750 1,988 4,100
Organizationally, there are two Government space programs: (1) a civilian space pro-
gram which is the responsibility of NASA (and of AEC with respect to reactor develop-
ment), and (2) a military space program consisting of activities considered by the
Pentagon to be specifically required for defense; these are the responsibility of the Depart-
ment of Defense.
The existence of two programs has resulted in a certain amount of actual duplication
on communications satellites, manned space flight programs, and supporting research
and development. The tendency toward duplication has to be watched carefully; there is
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always danger that it will get out of hand. The Civilian-Military Liaison Committee, estab-
lished by law, has become inoperative, as a result of experience which showed it to [2] be
ineffective in coordination operations. At present there is an administrative established
"Aeronautics and Space Coordinating Board" consisting of representatives of NASA and
Defense through which operational coordination is being sought.
The Problem of "National Prestige"
Since Sputnik we have been in a race to be "first" in physical achievements of a dra-
matic sort-the sort which has high visibility and thus makes an impression on mass opin-
ion, especially abroad. This has got us into the business of pressing achievements for the
sake of their psychological effect, regardless of concrete scientific or military utility. The
dollar costs are high and are bound to grow much higher. The big booster program (see
below) is a classic case and demonstrates NASA's expenditures into the future. The dollar
costs represent diversion of resources-money, manpower, facilities, scientific skills-from
other parts of our nadonal effort.
This is the heart of the problem.
The problem is that we need more funds for research and development of new weapon
systems, more funds for science generally, more funds for economic development abroad,
more funds for welfare purposes at home. Money spent to serve no concrete purpose save
the psychological effect of being "first" is money we could well use for these other needs.
The problem is made sharper by the fact that on the kind of "firsts" which have had
most dramatic mass appeal, the Russians may be well ahead of us. We have reason to think
that, taken as a whole, our scientific programs of inquiry and exploration in space are
more advanced [3] than Moscow's and have yielded more real scientific returns. But we
have not yet found means of making our progress drastically apparent to the
man-in-the-street around the world.
Two questions arise:
1. If we are behind and are likely to stay behind in the race for "Spumik-type firsts"
should we get out of the race and divert the resources now tied up in it to other uses which
have tangible military, scientific or welfare value?
2. By what means, if any, can we make our underlying scientific "firsts" dramatic and
appealing, especially aboard? How can we render visible a different sort of "race" which we
are more likely to "win"?
Virtually every aspect of the NASA budget now and in the next several fiscal years will
be affected by answers to these questions. Admittedly they are very hard questions to an-
swer with anything like a simple yes or no, but reasonably clear answers are needed for the
sake of budgetary guidelines in fiscal 1962 and after.
The Big Booster Program
Close to half the NASA budget for 1962 is bound up, in one way or another with this
program.
The program has two parts:
First is the so-called Saturn, which, with luck, might become operational in about
two years. This is a "bailing wire" devise intended to give us big booster capability for the
short-run by combining and adapting devices designed for other purposes. The Saturn is
a forced draft operation and an expensive one. Booster capability is needed in this form
only in order to put a man on the moon and get him back before or soon after the Rus-
sians do. [4] Saturn, in short, is a prestige item. It will not affect and is distinct from getting
a man in space, per se.
Second is the single-engine big booster which is under development for eventual use
in a space vehicle designed to transport men and heavy equipment. This is the progenitor
of the engines which eventually will be necessary for the "space ship" of the future. Re-
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gardlessoftheRussians,theUnitedStatesmayhavereasontogoforwardwiththisdevel-
opment.It isadevelopmentwhichstimulatestheimaginationofyoungAmericanswho
willbevotingbeforetoolong.It isadevelopmentwhichmay, in time, have military and
economic uses not foreseeable. Finally, it is part of the whole forward push in technolo_,.
We have certainly learned from earlier experience that these forward steps cannot be
stopped. But we have also learned that under present circumstances only Government
support will get them taken.
The single-engine development is proceeding slowly, in second place for funds and
other resources behind the Saturn project. It is necessary to consider: (1) "Prestige" apart,
can Government afford, in the nextyears, the diversion of resources needed to bring either
or both these boosters to fruition? (2) In the longer run, what proportion of Government
resources, for what span of years, should go into developing the technology, of space travel?
Civil, Military Duplications of Effort
The decision was made in 1958 to organize governmental space efforts as a civilian
enterprise except for programs integrally related to the missions of the military services.
The exception, of course, is very significant. Both NASA and the Defense Department will,
inevitably, conduct research, development and operations in the space field. The [5] two
sets of programs are not always easy to distinguish. For reasons of practicality and economy,
NASA uses military facilities for much of its experimentation and testing. Defense, in turn,
relies on NASA for some research and development.
The operating relationships between NASA and Defense are bound to be complex,
but it does not necessarily follow that they need be inefficient. Nor does it follow that the
two programs should be duplicative except where duplication serves a constructive put--
pose.
Unfortunately, there are many signs of inefficiency in the relationship and many
indications of duplicative effort which may not meet the test of useful duplication. There
are dual programs in communications, in manned space flight, in vehicles development
and in applied research. The relative utility and need for these programs, both on the side
of NASA and on the side of Defense, calls not so much for technical as for policy evalua-
tion.
The National Aeronautical and Space Council was originally envisaged as a
Cabinet-type advisory committee to help the President with policy evaluation, and to help
him also in securing effective coordination of operative relationships. But the Council has
not functioned in the past year. Meanwhile, a NASA-Defense committee has been estab-
lished. Experience to date suggests that this may be a promising development in securing
coordination at the working level. It is unlikely to resolve the problems of securing policy
advice.
An opportunity now exists to revitalize the National Aeronautical and Space Council
under the Chairmanship of the Vice President. Legislation will be required to put him in
the chair. It might be timely to simplify the Council's title and to reconsider its statutory
membership. If the council is to function effectively in the future, as it has not done in the
past, it might be well to keep its membership relatively small and to have it operate selec-
tively on high priority policy issues of the sort mentioned above.
R.E.N.
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Document 111-5
Document title: "Report to the President-Elect of the Ad Hoc Committee on Space,"Janu-
ary 10, 1961.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
John E Kennedy was the first president-elect to set up high-level "transition teams" to
advise him on issues that he would face upon assuming the presidency. His transition team
on space was chaired by Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Jerome B. Wiesner,
a member of President Eisenhower's President's Science Advisory Committee (and thus
familiar with discussions inside the Eisenhower administration on space policy and pro-
grams). Wiesner had advised Kennedy on science and technology issues during the Presi-
dential campaign and would become the new president's science adviser. The report re-
flected the widespread skepticism within the scientific elite of the country over the value,
and even the feasibility, of human spaceflight.
[ 1] I, Introduction
Activities in space now comprise six major categories:
1. Ballistic missiles.
2. Scientific observations from satellites.
3. The exploration of the solar system with instruments carried in deep space probes.
4. Military space systems.
5. Man in orbit and in space.
6. Non-military applications of space technology.
We rely on the first member of the list, ballistic missiles, for a large part of the retal-
iatory response to the Russian missile threat.
It is generally assumed by the American citizen that our vast expenditures of money
and technical talent in the national space program are primarily designed to meet the
overriding needs of our military security. The fact is, however, that the sense of excitement
and creativity has moved away from the missile field to the other components of the list,
and that missiles, long before they are in condition for us to depend upon them, are slowly
being delegated to the category of routine management. Before we proceed in this report
to discuss and support the important activities in the other five categories we wish to em-
phasize the hazard of failing to complete and deploy on dme our intercontinental deter-
rent missiles.
[2] In addition to the need to develop ballistic missiles to provide for our military
security, there are five principal motivations for desiring a vital, effective space program. It
is important to distinguish among them when attempting to evaluate our national space
effort.
First, there is the factor of national prestige. Space exploration and exploits have
captured the imagination of the peoples of the world. During the next few years the pres-
tige of the United States will in part be determined by the leadership we demonstrate in
space activities. It is within this context that we must consider man in space. Given time, a
desire, considerable innovation, and sufficient effort and money, man can eventually ex-
plore our solar system. Given his enormous curiosity about the universe in which he lives
and his compelling urge to go where no one has ever been before, this will be done
Second, we believe that some space developments, in addition to missiles, can con-
tribute much to our national securitymboth in terms of military systems and of arms-
limitation inspection and control systems.
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Third, the development of space vehicles affords new opportunities for scientific
observation and experiment--adding to our knowledge and understanding of the earth,
the solar system, and the universe. In the three years since serious space exploration was
initiated the United States has been the outstanding contributor to space science. We should
make every effort to continue and to improve this position.
Fourth, there are a number of important practical non-military applications for space
technology--among them, satellite communications and broadcasting; satellite navigation
and geodesy; meteorological reconnaissance; and satellite mapping--which can make
important contributions to our civilian efforts and to our economy.
Finally, space activities, particularly in the fields of communications and in the explo-
ration of our solar system, offer exciting possibilities for international cooperation with all
the nations of the world. The very ambitious [3] and long-range space projects would
prosper if they could be carried out in an atmosphere of cooperation as projects of all
mankind instead of in the present atmosphere of national competition.
The ad hoc panel has made a hasty review of the national space program, keeping in
mind the objective--to provide a survey of the program and to identify personnel, techni-
cal, or administrative problems which require the prompt attention of the Kennedy ad-
ministration. We have identified a number of major problems in each of these categories,
and they will be discussed in this report. It is obvious that there has been inadequate time
to examine all facets of the program or to permit full consideration of the possible answers
to many of the questions raised.
Because of the overriding necessity to provide more efficient and effective leader-
ship for the program, the group has devoted a major portion of its time to this aspect of
the space program. We will, however, indicate important scientific and technical problems
which should be thoroughly examined as soon as possible. We have concluded that it is
important to reassess thoroughly national objectives in the space effort--particularly in
regard to man in space; space, science and exploration; and the non-military applications
of space, in order to assure a proper division of effort among these activities. Space activi-
ties are so unbelievably expensive and people working in this field are so imaginative that
the space program could easily grow to cost many more billions of dollars per year
While we are now compelled to criticize our space program and its management, we
must first give adequate recognition to the dedication and talent which brought about
very real progress in space during the last few years. Our scientific accomplishments to
date are impressive, but unfortunately, against the background of Soviet accomplishments
with large boosters, they have not been impressive enough.
Our review of the United States' space program has disclosed a number of organiza-
tional and management deficiencies as well as problems of staffing and direction which
should receive prompt attention from the new administration. These include serious prob-
lems within NASA, within the military establishment, and at the [4] executive and other
policy-making levels of government. These matters are discussed in the sections which
follow.
II. The Ballistic Missile Program
The nation's ballistic missile program is lagging. The development of the missiles
and of the associated control systems, the base construction, and missile procurement
must all be accelerated if we are to have the secure missile deterrent force soon that the
country has been led to expect.
While additional funds will undoubtedly be required to accomplish this, we believe
that re-establishing an effective, efficient, technically competent arrangement for the pro-
gram is the overriding necessity.
Though the missile program is not ordinarily regarded as part of the space progrant.
it is important to recognize that for the near future the achievement of an adequate deter-
rent force is much more important for the nation's security than are most of the space
objectives, and that at least part of the difficulty in the management and execution of the
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program stems from the distraction within the Defense Department and in industry caused
by vast new space projects. However, we have no alternative but to press forward, with
space developments.
HI. Organization and Management
There is an urgent need to establish more effective management and coordination
of the United States space effort. The new administration has promised to move our coun-
try into a position of preeminence in the broad range of military, cultural, scientific and
civilian applications of satellite and other space vehicles. This cannot be done without
major improvements in the planning and direction of the program. Neither NASA as pres-
endy operated nor the fractionated military space program nor the long-dormant space
council have been adequate to meet the challenge that the Soviet thrust into space has
posed to our military security and to our position of leadership in the world.
[5] In addition to the difficulties and delays which the program has endured because
of the lack of sufficient planning and direction, it has also been handicapped because too
few of the country's outstanding scientists and engineers have been deeply committed to
the development and research programs in the space field. In changing the management
structure and in selecting the administrators for the effort, the need to make space activi-
ties attractive to a larger group of competent scientists and engineers should be a guiding
principle.
The new administration has announced that it plans to use the National Aeronautics
and Space Council for coordinating government space activities, or advising the President
on policy on plans and on the implementation of programs. We believe that the space
council can fulfill this role only if it is technically well-informed and, moreover, seriously
accepts the responsibility for directing the conduct of a coherent national space effort.
Particular care should be taken to insure the selection of a very competent and experi-
enced staff to assist the Council
Not only must we provide more vigor, competence and integration in the space field,
but we must also relate our space requirements to other vital programs which support our
national policy. We refer particularly to the missile needs, already mentioned, and to the
continuing need for development and research in the field of aeronautics.
Each of the military services has begun to create its own independent space pro-
gram. This presents the problem of overlapping programs and duplication of the work of
NASA. If the responsibility of all military space developments were to be assigned to one
agency or military service within the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense
would then be able to maintain control of the scope and direction of the program and the
Space Council would have the responsibility for settling conflicts of interest between NASA
and the Department of Defense.
With its present organizational structure and with the lack of strong technical and
scientific personalities in the top echelons, it is highly unlikely [6] that NASA space activi-
ties can be greatly improved by vitalization of the Space Council.
We are also concerned by the NASA preoccupation with the development of an in-
house research establishment. We feel that too large a fraction of the NASA program,
particularly in the scientific fields, is being channeled into NASA-operated facilities. NASA's
staff has had to expand much too rapidly and without adequate selectivity, so that many
inexperienced people have been placed in positions of major responsibility. This has, in
turn, made NASA less willing than would a more mature and competent organization to
solicit and accept the advice of competent non-government scientists. This situation ap-
pears to be improving at the present time.
One important responsibility of NASA given little attention now in the organization,
is that of providing for basic research and advanced development in the field of aeronau-
tics. There is a general belief in the aviation industry that the national preoccupation with
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space developments has all but halted any advance in the theory and technology of aero-
dynamic flight. There is ample evidence to support the contention that the Russians and
possibly the British, are surpassing us in this field and consequently in the development of
supersonic commercial aircraft. We should make a substantial effi)rt to correct this situa-
tion, possibly by getting some of NASA's aeronautical and aerodynamic experts back into
the field of advanced aircraft research and development. Possibly, after careful investiga-
tion, the Space Council would prefer to stimulate this work by non-governmental arrange-
merits, or by placing it entirely in another agency.
We believe that the work of NASAwould be facilitated and the task of recruiting staff
made possible if an outstanding expert was placed in charge of the direction and manage-
ment of each of the following important areas of work:
a. Propulsion and vehicle design and development
b. The space sciences
[7] c. Non-military exploitation of space technology
d. Aeronautical sciences and aircraft development
IV. The Booster Program
The inability of our rockets to lift large payloads into space is the key to the serious
limitations of our space program. It is the reason for the current Russian advantage in
undertaking manned space flight and a variety of ambitious unmanned missions. As a
consequence, the rapid development of boosters with a greater weight-lifting capacity is a
matter of national urgency.
Payload weight is currently limited by our dependence on modified military rockets
as the primary boosters (THOR, JUPITER, ATLAS). Current plans call for the first sub-
stantial increase in payload with the addition of the CENTAUR upper stage to the ATLAS
in 1962, followed by a second big step with the SATURN booster in 1965.
It is likely that a variety of new booster programs will be proposed in the near future,
particularly for military projects. There are no fundamental differences in civilian and
military requirements which are foreseeable now. If the national effort is to be focused
and the very large expenditures are not to be distributed among an excessive number of
booster programs, it is important that we maintain and strengthen the concept of a Na-
tional Booster Program.
A number of problems may well arise in the National Booster Program. The present
MERCURYprogram, based on the ATLAS, is marginal and if the ATLAS proves inadequate
for the job it may be necessary to push alternatives vigorously. The first possibility appears
to be the TITAN, although it has not yet demonstrated the reliability which is required. We
should study the desirability of carrying out a TITAN-boosted MERCURYprogram in the
event ATLAS should prove to be inadequate.
The CENTAUR rocket involves an entirely new technology and is still untested. If
difficulties develop in this program within the next three or four months we must act
promptly to initiate an alternate.
[8] Development of the SATURN-booster--a cluster of eight ATLAS engines---should
continue to be prosecuted vigorously. However, it would be dangerous to rely on SATURN
alone for the solution to our problems, either in the long or short term, for two reasons:
(a) It is intrinsically so complex that there is a real question whether it can be made
to function reliably.
(b) It represents a maximum elaboration of present technology and provides no
route to further development.
Therefore, the development of a very large single engine should proceed as fast as
possible so that it may be a back-up for the SATURN cluster and a base for future larger
vehicle development. The present F-1 (1.5 million lb. thrust) engine development should
be studied to be sure it is progressing fast enough and has enough promise of success to fill
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this role. If the technological step in going from the present 180,000 lb. thrust engines to
1.5 million lbs. is so big as to make success marginal, a parallel development of a somewhat
smaller engine should be started.
The nuclear rocket program (ROVER) presents an area in which some major deci-
sions will have to be taken by the new administration. In principle the nuclear rocket can
eventually carry heavier payloads much farther than any chemical rocket. Nevertheless,
the technology is so new and the extrapolation from reactors developed now to sizes which
would be useful in large rockets is so great that it is not clear how soon they will make an
important contribution to the space program. The use of nuclear rockets will raise serious
international political problems since the possibility that a reactor could reenter and fall
on foreign territory cannot be ignored. A major technical and management review of the
ROVER program seems urgent.
Above all we must encourage entirely new ideas which might lead to real break-
throughs. One such idea is the ORION proposal to utilize a large number of small nuclear
bombs for rocket propulsion. This proposal should receive careful [9] study with a realiza-
tion of the international problems associated with such a venture.
[Most of page 9, all of pages 10 and 11, and 1/3 of page 12 excised during
declassification review]
[12] VI. Science in Space and Space Exploration
In the three years since space exploration began, experiments with satellites and
deep space probes have provided a wealth of new scientific results of great significance. In
spite of the limitations in our capability of lifting heavy payloads, we now hold a position of
leadership in space science. American scientists have discovered the great belt of radia-
tion, trapped within the earth's magnetic field. American scientists have revealed the exist-
ence of a system of electric currents that circle our planet, Our space vehicles have probed
the interplanetary space to distances of tens of millions of miles from the earth. They have
shown that the earth is not moving through an empty space but through an exceedingly
thin magnetized plasma. They have intercepted streams of fast-moving plasma ejected from
the sun which, upon reaching our planet, produce magnetic storms, trigger off auroral
displays and disrupt radio communications.
From these and other experiments, there is gradually emerging an entirely novel
picture of the conditions of space around our planet and of the sun-earth relations. One
of the importan t tasks of space science in the next few years will be a full exploration of the
new field revealed by the early experiments. There is litde doubt that such exploration will
lead to further important discoveries.
[13] Another scientific field, where space science promises an early and major break-
through is that of astronomy. Until a few years ago, visible light from celestial objects,
reaching our telescopes through the atmospheric planet, had been the only source of
astronomical information available to man. The only other portion of the spectrum
capable of penetrating the atmosphere and the ionosphere is that corresponding to short-
wave radio signals. In recent years, the development of radio telescopes has made it pos-
sible to detect these signals. Radio astronomy has enormously advanced our knowledge of
the universe. By means of radio telescopes we can now "see" not only the stars, but also the
great masses of gas between the stars; we can detect the high-energy electrons produced by
cosmic accelerators located thousands of millions of light years away from the earth.
We are entitled to expect a similar and even perhaps a more spectacular advance the
day that we shall have telescopes installed aboard satellites circling the earth above the
atmosphere and the ionosphere. These instruments will be capable of detecting the whole
of the electro-magnetic spectrum--from long-wave radio signals to gamma-rays.
A third major task of space science in the years to come will be the exploration of the
moon and the planets. Scientists are planning to fly instruments to the vicinity of these
celestial objects, and eventually to land them upon their surface. From the data supplied
by these instruments they expect to obtain information of decisive importance concern-
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ing the origin and the evolution of the solar system. Moreover, there is the distinct possibil-
ity that planetary exploration may lead to the discovery of extra-terrestrial forms of life.
This clearly would be one of the greatest human achievements of all times.
Our present leadership in space science is due to a large extent to the early participa-
tion of some of our ablest scientists in our space program--primarily as part of the Inter-
national Geophysical Year--and to the fact that these scientists were in a position to influ-
ence this program. Another important [14] factor was our initial advantage in instrumen-
tation, which helped to offset our disadvantage in propulsion.
We must not delude ourselves into thinking that it will be easy for the U.S.A. to main-
tain in the future a prominent position in space science. The USSR has a number of com-
petent scientists. It will be easier for them to catch up with us in instrument development
than for our engineers to catch up with the Russians in the technique of propulsion. Thus
we must push forward in space science as effectively and as forcefully as we can.
Our scientific program in space appears to be basically sound. However, to insure its
success, the following requirements must be met.
1. In the planning of our space activities, scientific objectives must be assigned a
prominent place.
2. Our space agency must insure a wide participation in its program by scientists
from universities and industrial laboratories, where our greatest scientific strength lies.
3. It must provide adequate financial support for the development and construction
of scientific payloads.
4. It must exert the greatest wisdom and foresight in the selection of the scientific
missions and of the scientists assigned to carry them out.
5. It must initiate immediately a research program in advanced instrumentation, so
that we may be ready to exploit fully the capability of flying heavier and more complex
payloads that we shall possess several years from now. Problems of automation, processing
and transmission of information must be tackled by competent and imaginative research
teams.
NASA has not fulfilled all of the above requirements satisfactorily. We believe, as
previously stated, that the main obstacle here has been the lack of a strong scientific per-
sonality in the top echelons of its organization.
[15] VII. Man in Space
We are rapidly approaching the time when the state of technology will make it pos-
sible for man to go out into space. It is sure that, as soon as this possibility exists, man will
be compelled to make use of it, by the same motives that have compelled him to travel to
the poles and to climb the highest mountains of the earth. There are also dimly perceived
military and scientific missions in space which may prove to be very important.
Thus, manned exploration of space will certainly come to pass and we believe that
the United States must play a vigorous role in this venture. However, in order to achieve an
effective and sound program in this field, a number of facts must be clearly understood.
1. Because of our lag in the development of large boosters, it is very unlikely that we
shall be first in placing a man into orbit around the earth.
2. While the successful orbiting of a man about the earth is not an end unto itself, it
will provide a necessary stepping stone toward the establishment of a space station and for
the eventual manned exploration of the moon and the planets. The ultimate goal of this
kind of endeavor would, of course, be an actual landing of man on the moon or a planet,
followed by his return to the earth. It is not possible to accomplish such a mission with any
vehicles that are presently under development.
3. Some day, it may be possible for men in space to accomplish important scientific
or technical tasks. For the time being, however, it appears that space exploration must rely
on unmanned vehicles. Therefore, a crash program aimed at placing a man into an orbit
at the earliest possible time cannot be justified solely on scientific or technical grounds.
Indeed, it may hinder the development of our scientific and technical program, even the
422 THEEVOLUTIONFU.S.SPACEPOLICYANDPLANS
[16]futuremannedspaceprogrambydivertingmanpower,vehiclesandfunds.
4.Theacquisitionof newknowledgeandtheenrichmentof humanlife through
technologicaladvancesaresolid,durable,andworthwhilegoalsof space activities. There
is general lack of appreciation of this simple truism, both at home and abroad. Indeed, by
having placed highest national priority on the MERCURY program we have strengthened
the popular belief that man in space is the most important aim of our non-military space
effort. The manner in which this program has been publicized in our press has further
crystallized such belief. It exaggerates the value of that aspect of space activity where we
are less likely to achieve success, and discounts those aspects in which we have already
achieved great success and will probably reap further successes in the future.
5. A failure in our first attempt to place a man into orbit, resulting in the death of an
astronaut, would create a situation of serious national embarrassment. An even more seri-
ous situation would result if we fall to safely recover a man from orbit.
On the basis of these facts we would like to submit the following recommendations:
1. By allowing the present MERCURY program to continue unchanged for more
than a very few months, the new Administration would effectively endorse this program
and take the blame for its possible failures. A thorough and impartial appraisal of the
MERCURYprogram should be urgently made. The objectives of the various phases of this
program (including the proposed physiological tests) should be critically examined. The
margins of safety should be realistically estimated. If our present man-in-space program
[17] appears unsound, we must be prepared to modify it drastically or even to cancel it. It
is important that a decision on these matters be reached at the earliest possible date.
2. Whatever we decide to actually do about the man-in-space program, we should
stop advertising MERCURY as our major objective in space activities. Indeed, we should
make an effort to diminish the significance of this program to its proper proportion be-
fore the public, both at home and abroad. We should find effective means to make people
appreciate the cultural, public service and military importance of space activities other
than space travel.
VIII. Non-military Applications of Space Technology--
An Industry-Government Space Program
As the technical feasibility and reliability of man-made satellites was demonstrated,
many possible civilian uses for satellites emerged. With no government support, various
groups in private industry have examined the field for areas of study and development and
a few substantial projects are already under way.
Industrial and governmental communications satellites appear practical and economi-
cally sound. Communication satellites will provide high quality and inexpensive telephone
and general communication service between most parts of the earth. A by-product of a
communication satellite will almost surely be an international television relay system link-
ing all the nations of the world. On a longer time scale it should be feasible to provide
radio and television broadcasting service via satellite-mounted transmitters. Such systems
would give the quality broadcast reception now only available in and near urban areas to
most of the inhabitants of the earth.
Satellites containing reliable beacons can be used to provide improved means of
navigation for aircraft and ships at sea and can greatly advance the field of geodetics.
[18] Proper use of the information gathered by meteorological satellites should greatly
increase our understanding of meteorology. With more knowledge of meteorology and
with world-wide data frequently available from the satellites, longer-range and more reli-
able weather predictions should be possible. These projects, dreams a decade ago, bridge
areas of technical specialty in which this nation is unexcelled. The United States has the
most advanced communication system in the world, with a vast scientific and technologi-
cal base supporting the communications industry. We are preeminent in the development
of our electronic skills in radio, television, telephone and telegraphy. This entire indus-
trial-scientific base is available to apply its art through satellite systems to the civilian needs
of the world.
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The exploitation of a new area of industrial opportunity for civilian use is normally
left by our government to private enterprise. However, in the case of these important space
systems, the development investment required is so large that it is beyond the financial
resources of even our largest private industry. Furthermore, the use of commercial space
satellites will require physical support of government installations as well as financial
support.
All of the civilian satellite projects listed here will have direct or indirect military
usefulness as well. Furthermore, communication and navigation systems of the type envis-
aged would be extremely useful in implementing an inspection system which might ac-
company a disarmament agreement. For these reasons projects of the type proposed might
well be undertaken in cooperation with the military services.
We recommend that a vigorous program to exploit the potentialities of practical
space systems. The government, through NASA or the Department of Defense, should
make available the required physical facilities as well as any extraordinary financial sup-
port required to make the undertakings successful.
Organizational machinery is needed within the executive branch of the government
to carry out this civilian space program.
[19] Summary of Recommendations
1. Make the Space Council an effective agency for managing the national space pro-
gram.
2. Establish a single responsibility within the military establishments for managing
the military portion of the space program.
3. Provide a vigorous, imaginative, and technically competent top management for
NASA, including:
(a) Administrator and deputy administrator
(b)
i. A technical director for propulsion and vehicles
ii. A technical director for the scientific program
iii. A technical director for the non-military space applications
iv. A technical director for aerodynamic and aircraft programs.
4. Review the national space program and redefine the objectives in view of the expe-
rmnce gained during the past two years. Particular attention should be given the booster
program, manned space technology,, military uses of space to the civilian activities of the
country.
5. Establish the organizational machinery within the government to administer an
industry-government civilian space program.
Document 111-6
Document tide: John F. Kennedy, Memorandum for Vice President, April 20, 1961.
Source: Presidential Files, John E Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.
This memorandum led directly to the Apollo program. By posing the question "Is
there any...space program which promises dramatic results in which we could win?," Presi-
dent Kennedy set in motion a review that concluded that only an effort to send Americans
to the Moon met the criteria Kennedy had laid out. This memorandum followed a week of
discussion within the White House on how best to respond to the challenge to U.S. inter-
ests posed by the April 12, 1961, orbital flight of Yuri Gagarin.
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[1] April20,1961
MEMORANDUMFOR
VICE PRESIDENT
In accordance with our conversation I would like for you as Chairman of the Space
Council to be in charge of making an overall survey of where we stand in space.
1. Do we have a chance of beating the Soviets by putting a laboratory in space, or by
a trip around the moon, or by a rocket to land on the moon, or by a rocket to go to the
moon and back with a man. Is there any other space program which promises dramatic
results in which we could win?
2. How much additional would it cost?
3. Are we working 24 hours a day on existing programs. If not, why not? If not, will
you make recommendations to me as to how work can be speeded up.
4. In building large boosters should we put our emphasis on nuclear, chemical or
liquid fuel, or a combination of these three?
5. Are we making maximum effort? Are we achieving necessary results?
I have asked Jim Webb, Dr. Weisner, Secretary McNamara and other responsible offi-
cials to cooperate with you fully. I would appreciate a report on this at the earliest possible
moment.
John E Kennedy
Document 111-7
Document tide: Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Vice
President, "Brief Analysis of Department of Defense Space Program Efforts," April 21,
1961, without attachment, "Resume of Existing Programs."
Source: Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.
This document was the initial Department of Defense response to the review requested
by President Kennedy in his April 20 memorandum. Some of the language in this response
also appeared in the May 8 recommendations that formed the basis for Apollo and other
elements of an accelerated space effort.
[1 ] It is the purpose of the memorandum to outline views with respect to major space
programs. This document cannot be adequately supported by detailed analysis at this time.
A more complete review is currently under way which will result in a first report on 28
April. That report will include an appraisal in considerable detail of our posture with re-
spect to the Soviets. It will also comment on the Gardner Report and views expressed
elsewhere concerning the conduct of our space programs and their proper objectives.
A. General:
1. Programs in space must be undertaken for a variety of reasons. They may be aimed
at gaining scientific knowledge. Some, in the future, will be of commercial value. Several
current programs are of potential military value for functions such as early warning.
2. All large scale space programs require the mobilization of resources on a national
scale. They require the development and successful application of the most advanced tech-
nologies. Dramatic achievements in space, therefore, symbolize the technological power
and organizing capacity of a nation.
3. It is for reasons such as these that major achievements in space contribute to na-
tional prestige. This is true even though the scientific, commercial or military value of the
undertaking may, by ordinary standards, be marginal or economically unjustified.
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4.WhatheSovietsdoandwhatheyarelikelytodoarethereforemattersofgreat
importancefromtheviewpointof nationalprestige.Ourattainmentsconstituteamajor
elementin theinternationalcompetitionbetweentheSovietsystemandourown.While
thefuturemilitaryvalueofadvancedspacecapabilitiescannotbepredictedverywell,it,
nevertheless,[2] isimportanttoinsurethatthebasictechnologicalbuildingblocksare
createdinanorderlyandtimelymanner.Thesebuildingblocks,moreover,mustgiveus
capabilitieswhichmatchtheSovietsinallareasof international competition.
5. Because of their national importance and their national scope, it is essential that
our space efforts be well planned. It is essential that they be well managed. It is particularly
undesirable in this connection to undertake crash programs needed to compensate for
inadequate planning. It is likewise undesirable to spread our engineering resources to()
thinly. It is doubtless necessary to sponsor parallel efforts in the design stage, but it is
essential to avoid duplication in the advanced development, procurement and deploy-
ment of operational equipment.
The comments in the following paragraphs are based upon these and similar as-
sumptions. They deal with two major areas: launch vehicles and payload recovery."
B. Launch Vehicles:
It is important from a national standpoint that the launch vehicle "gap" presently
separating Soviet and U.S. capabilities be closed in an orderly but timely way. It is also
important that our capabilities in the 1965-1970 period continue to grow so that similar
important gaps are avoided. There will come a point, of course, at which a superior capa-
bility on the part of the Soviets or ourselves will be of little importance since either capabil-
ity will suffice, but that point will not be reached for many years.
1. The Current "Gap":
1.1 The ATLAS-CENTAUR development should continue. If it is successful, it will
enable us to boost 8,500 lbs. into a 300-mile orbit which still does not match the Soviet's
capability of placing 10,000-14,000 lbs. into a 300-mile orbit.
1.2 CENTAUR like other developments is not assured of success. A substantial
delay or major development shortcomings would be serious.
[3] 1.3 It is important, however, that our national launch vehicle program focus
on a very small number of devices. A major element in the success of the Soviet program is
the orderly, focussed way in which they have placed continued emphasis on the repetitive
use of a single booster and a very small family of upper stages.
1.4 It would seem desirable, however, to inaugurate one or two back up programs
for ATLAS-CENTAUR. An example would be an advanced upper stage for use with TITAN-II.
Another might be a high boost segmented solid rocket booster for use with existing AGENA
stages or possibly with an advanced AGENT. There is even the possibility of developing an
upper stage using different propellants. It is not possible to decide at this time, but the
results of current studies will make it possible to recommend action which fits into an
improved over-all plan.
2. Follow-on Efforts:
2.1 The SATURN C-1 consisting of a cluster of eight chambers will give a total
thrust of about 1.5 million pounds. It is unlikely to become operationally useful for mis-
sions such as manned orbital flight until after 1966. Should it prove inadequate or subject
to excessive delays, a serious gap in boost capability would develop even if the early under-
takings listed above were wholly successful.
2.2 The SATURN, depending as it does upon the clustering of very complex en-
gines, may present very serious reliability problems. It seems almost certain that it will not
"Attachment A summarizes the Department of Defense space projects and shows the budgetary changes
that were made as a result of the detailed review of F'Y-62budget estimates. No further changes in funding
levels for FY-62are recommended for these programs.
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be fully usable in its present form for the DYNASOAR mission. For such reasons it appears
likely that a suitable parallel effort should be undertaken to insure that present planning
and programming provides adequate insurance against the development of a launch ve-
hicle gap in the 1965-1970 period.
2.3 The F-1 engine capable of developing 1.5 million pounds thrust in a single
chamber should be more vigorously pushed. Detailed design studies for a suitable first
stage utilizing this engine should be undertaken at once. After assessment and analysis,
long lead time procurement and development efforts should be begun which give us the
opportunity to accelerate and back this route to a 1 _/_ million pound booster if SATUI_N's
progress warrants such a decision.
2.4 Other possibilities also present themselves. Upon further investigation it may
be desirable to augment the development of large segmented [4] solid rocket boosters
capable of 50-70 million pounds/second thrust. Other proposals such as the development
of a high pressure hydrogen-oxygen cluster booster should also be investigated.
2.5 It is important to make sure that the number of such programs is adequate but
not excessive. It is essential that engineering resources be focused and not spread too thin.
It is vital that hard decisions be made at the critical decision points. Such decisions will
include the total termination of unprofitable ventures and the deployment of fiscal and
human resources on the highest priority and most promising undertakings.
2.6 It is difficult to estimate at this point the magnitude of the efforts which might
be initiated to supplement the SATURN development. It is not unlikely, however, that as
much as 50-100 million dollars of additional funds might be utilized in FY-62. These funds
represent people and facilities. It is mandatory that policies be followed which utilize and
strengthen existing organizations. Our national posture may be worsened rather than im-
proved if added expenditures result in the still greater dispersal of scientific engineering
and managerial talent among a variety of organizations too small or too over-loaded to do
a fully adequate job.
C. Payload Recovery:
The Soviets have developed a recovery system which enable them to recover large
payloads with a comparatively high degree of landing accuracy. This capability is essential
to the success of manned experiments in space and is important to the success of many
other space missions.
The U.S., however, has developed only the DISCOVERER type of recovery system. It
is complex and has not proved to be very reliable.
The MERCURY system using parachutes is not very accurate and requires search
operations of an enormous sea area.
The DYNASOAR system will not be testable for many years. Hundreds of millions of
dollars will be required before maneuverable entry from orbit can be demonstrated.
It seems most desirable, therefore, to undertake the development of a controlled
reentry and recovery system emphasizing simplicity, modest accuracy and high reliability.
It is not likely that a recovery system per se will prove desirable. Rather, the development
of a standardized space vehicle equipped with such a recovery system and incorporating
standardized propulsion [5] and control components is likely to be most attractive. If it is
large enough, such a vehicle can be used to carry a great variety of payloads with compara-
tively minor and largely internal modifications. This aspect of our planning for the future
has not been addressed in much detail. It is difficult, therefore, to estimate the amount of
additional funds which may be required to begin developments in this direction. It would
appear, however, that the amounts involved in FY-62 could be comparatively modest.
Robert S. McNamara
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Document 111-8
Document floe: Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice President, Memorandum for the President,
"Evaluation of Space Program," April 28, 1961.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
This memorandum, prepared by Edward C. Welsh, the new executive secretary of
the National Aeronautics and Space Council, and signed by Vice President Johnson, was
the first report to President Kennedy on the results of the review he had ordered on April
20. The report identified a lunar landing by 1966 or 1967 as the first dramatic space project
in which the United States could beat the Soviet Union. The vice president identified
"leadership" as the appropriate goal of U.S. efforts in space.
[1] Memorandum for the President
April 28, 1961
Subject: Evaluation of Space Program.
Reference is to your April 20 memorandum asking certain questions regarding this
country's space program.
A detailed survey has not been completed in this time period, The examination will
continue. However, what we have obtained so far from knowledgeable and responsible
persons makes this summary reply possible.
Among those who have participated in our deliberations have been the Secretary
and Deputy Secretary of Defense; General Schriever (AF); Admiral Hayward (Navy); Dr.
von Braun (NASA); the Administrator, Deputy Administrator, and other top officials of
NASA; the Special Assistant to the President on Science and Technology; representatives
of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget; and three outstanding non-Government citi-
zens of the general public: Mr. George Brown (Brown & Root, Houston, Texas); Mr. Donald
Cook (American Electric Power Service, New York, N.Y.); and Mr. Frank Stanton (Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, New York, N.Y.).
The following general conclusions can be reported:
a. Largely due to their concentrated efforts and their earlier emphasis upon the
development of large rocket engines, the Soviets are ahead of the United States in world
prestige attained through impressive technological accomplishments in space.
b. The U.S. has greater resources than the USSR for attaining space leadership but
has failed to make the necessary hard decisions and to marshal those resources to achieve
such leadership.
[2] c. This country should he realistic and recognize that other nations, regardless of
their appreciation of our idealistic values, will tend to align themselves with the country
which they believe will be the world leader-the winner in the long run. Dramatic accom-
plishments in space are being increasingly identified as a major indicator of world leader-
ship.
d. The U.S. can, if it will, firm up its objectives and employ its resources with a reason-
able chance of attaining world leadership in space during this decade. This will be difficult
but can be made probable even recognizing the head start of the Soviets and the likeli-
hood that they will continue to move forward with impressive successes. In certain areas,
such as communications, navigation, weather, and mapping, the U.S. can and should ex-
ploit its existing advance position.
e. If we do not make the strong effort now, the time will soon be reached when the
margin of control over space and over men's minds through space accomplishments will
428 THEEVOLUTION OF U.S. SPACE POLICYAND PLANS
have swung so far on the Russian side that we will not be able to catch up, let alone assume
leadership.
f. Even in those areas in which the Soviets already have the capability to be first and
are likely to improve upon such capability, the United States should make aggressive ef-
forts as the technological gains as well as the international rewards are essential steps in
eventually gaining leadership. The danger of long lags or outright omissions by this coun-
try is substantial in view of the possibility of great technological breakthroughs obtained
from space exploration.
g. Manned exploration of the moon, for example, is not only an achievement with
great propaganda value, but it is essential as an objective whether or not we are first in its
accomplishment-and we may be able to be first. We cannot leapfrog such accomplish-
ments, as they are essential sources of knowledge and experience for even greater suc-
cesses in space. We cannot expect the Russians to transfer the benefits of their experiences
or the advantages of their capabilities to us. We must do these things ourselves.
[3] h. The American public should be given the facts as to bow we stand in the space
race, told of our determination to lead in that race, and advised of the importance of such
leadership to our future.
i. More resources and more effort need to be put into our space program as soon as
possible. We should move forward with a bold program, while at the same time taking
every practical precaution for the safety of the persons actively participating in space flights.
As for the specific questions posed in your memorandum, the following brief an-
swers develop from the studies made during the past few days. These conclusions are sub-
ject to expansion and more detailed examination as our survey continues.
Q. 1- Do we have a chance of beating the Soviets by putting a laboratory in space, or
by a trip around the moon, or by a rocket to land on the moon, or by a rocket to go to the
moon and back with a man. Is there any other space program which promises dramatic
results in which we could win?
A.1- The Soviets now have a rocket capability for putting a multi-manned laboratory
into space and have already crash-landed a rocket on the moon. They also have the booster
capability of making a soft landing on the moon with a payload of instruments, although
we do not know how much preparation they have made for such a project. As for a manned
trip around the moon or a safe landing and return by a man to the moon, neither the U.S.
nor the USSR has such capability at this time, so far as we know. The Russians have had
more experience with large boosters and with flights of dogs and man. Hence they might
be conceded a time advantage in circumnavigation of the moon and also in a manned trip
to the moon. However, with a strong effort, the United States could conceivably be first in
those two accomplishments by 1966 or 1967.
[4] There are a number of programs which the United States could pursue immedi-
ately and which promise significant world-wide advantage over the Soviets. Among these
are communications satellites, and navigation and mapping satellites. These are all areas
in which we have already developed some competence. We have such programs and
believe that the Soviets do not. Moreover, they are programs which could be made opera-
tional and effective within reasonably short periods of time and could, if properly pro-
grammed with the interests of other nations, make useful strides toward world leadership.
Q.2- How much additional would it cost?
A.9- To start upon an accelerated program with the aforementioned objectives clearly
in mind, NASA has submitted an analysis indicating that about $500 million would be
needed for FY 1962 over and above the amount currently requested of the Congress. A
program based upon NASA's analysis would, over a ten-year period, average approximately
$1 billion a year above the current estimates of the existing NASA program.
While the Department of Defense plans to make a more detailed submission to me
within a few days, the Secretary has taken the position that there is a need for a strong
effort to develop a large solid-propellant booster and that his Department is interested in
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undertakingsuchaproject.Itwasunderstoodthatthiswouldbeprogrammedinaccord
withtheexistingarrangementforclosecooperationwithNASA,whichAgencyisunder-
takingsomeresearchinthisfield.Heestimatedtheywouldneedtoemployapproximately$50millionduringFY1962forthisworkbutthatthiscouldbefinancedthroughmanage-
mentoffundsalreadyrequestedin theFY1962budget.Futuredefensebudgetswould
includerequestsforadditionalfundingforthispurpose;apreliminaryestimateindicatesthatabout$500millionwouldbeneededintotal.
[5]Q.3-Areweworking24hoursadayonexistingprograms?Ifnot,whynot?Ifnot,
willyoumakerecommendationstomeastohowworkcanbespeededup?
A.3-Thereisnota24-hour-a-dayworkscheduleonexistingNASAspaceprograms
exceptforselectedareasinProjectMercury,theSaturnC-1booster,theCentaurengines
andthefinallaunchingphasesofmostflightmissions.Theyadvisethattheirschedules
havebeengearedto theavailabilityoffacilitiesandfinancialresources,andthathence
theirovertimeand3-shiftarrangementsexistonlyin thoseactivitiesinwhichthereare
particularbottlenecksorwhichareholdingupoperationsinotherpartsoftheprograms.
Forexample,theyhavea3-shift7-day-weekoperationincertainworkatCapeCanaveral;
thecontractorforProjectMercuryhasaverageda54-hourweekandemploystwoor three
shiftsinsomeareas;SaturnC-1atHuntsvilleisworkingaroundtheclockduring critical
test periods while the remaining work on this project averages a 47-hour week; the Cen-
taur hydrogen engine is on a 3-shift basis in some portions of the contractor's plants.
This work can be speeded up through firm decisions to go ahead faster if accompa-
nied by additional funds needed for the acceleration.
Q.4- In building large boosters should we put our emphasis on nuclear, chemical or
liquid fuel, or a combination of these three?
A.4- It was the consensus that liquid, solid and nuclear boosters should all be acceler-
ated. This conclusion is based not only upon the necessity for back-up methods, but also
because of the advantages of the different types of boosters for different missions. A pro-
gram of such emphasis would meet both so-called civilian needs and defense requirements.
[6] Q.5- Are we making maximum effort? Are we achieving necessary results?
A.5- We are neither making maximum effort nor achieving results necessary if this
country is to reach a position of leadership.
Lyndon B. Johnson
Document 111-9
Document title: Wernher von Braun to the Vice President of the United States, April 29,
1961, no pagination.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
Of all those consulted during the presidentially mandated space review, no one had
been thinking longer about the future in space than Wernher yon Braun. Even when he
had led the development of the V-2 rocket for Germany during World War II, yon Braun
and his associates had been planning future space journeys. After coming to the United
States after World War II, von Braun was a major contributor to popularizing the idea of
human spaceflight. As he stressed in his letter, von Braun had been asked to participate in
the review as an individual, not as the director of NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center.
Von Braun told the vice president in his letter that the United States had "an excellent
chance" of beating the Russians to a lunar landing.
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This is an attempt to answer some of the questions about our national space program
raised by The President in his memorandum to you dated April 20, 1961. I should like to
emphasize that the following comments are stricdy my own and do not necessarily reflect
the official position of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in which I have
the honor to serve.
Question 1. Do we have a chance of beating the Soviets by putting a laboratory in
space, or by a trip around the moon, or by a rocket to land on the moon, or by a rocket to
go to the moon and back with a man? Is there any other space program which promises
dramatic results in which we could win?
Answer: With their recent Venus shot, the Soviets demonstrated that they have a
rocket at their disposal which can place 14,000 pounds of payload in orbit. When one
considers that our own one-man Mercury space capsule weighs only 3900 pounds, it be-
comes readily apparent that the Soviet carrier rocket should be capable of
- launching several astronauts into orbit simultaneously. (Such an enlarged multi-
man capsule could be considered and could serve as a small "laboratory in space".)
- soft-landing a substantial payload on the moon. My estimate of the maximum soft-
landed net payload weight the Soviet rocket is capable of is about 1400 pounds (one-tenth
of its low orbit payload). This weight capability is not sufficient to include a rocket for the
return flight to earth of a man landed on the moon. But it is entirely adequate for a power-
ful radio transmitter which would relay lunar data back to earth and which would be aban-
doned on the lunar surface after completion of this mission. A similar mission is planned
for our "Ranger" project, which uses an Adas-Agena B boost rocket. The "semi-hard" landed
portion of the Ranger package weighs 293 pounds. Launching is scheduled for January
1962.
The existing Soviet rocket could furthermore hurl a 4000 to 5000 pound capsule
around the moon with ensuing re-entry into the earth atmosphere. This weight allowance
must be considered marginal for a one-man round-the-moon voyage. Specifically, it would
not suffice to provide the capsule and its occupant with a "safe abort and return" capabil-
ity, a feature which under NASA ground rules for pilot safety is considered mandatory for
all manned space flight missions. One should not overlook the possibility, however, that
the Soviets may substantially facilitate their task by simply waiving this requirement.
A rocket about ten times aspowerful as the Soviet Venus launch rocket is required to land a man
on the moon and bring him back to earth. Development of such a super rocket can be circum-
vented by orbital rendezvous and refueling of smaller rockets, but the development of this
technique by the Soviets would not be hidden from our eyes and would undoubtedly re-
quire several years (possibly as long or even longer than the development of a large direct-
flight super rocket).
Summing up, it is my belief that
a) we do not have a good chance of beating the Soviets to a manned "laboratory in
space." The Russians could place it in orbit this year while we could establish a (somewhat
heavier) laboratory only after the availability of a reliable Saturn C-1 which is in 1964.
b) we havea sporting chance of beating the Soviets to a soft-landing of a radio trans-
mitter station on the moon. It is hard to say whether this objective is on their program, but as
far as the launch rocket is concerned, they could do it at any time. We plan to do it with the
Atlas-Agena B-boosted Ranger #3 in early 1962.
[3] c) we have a sporting chance of sending a 3-man crew around the moon ahead of
the Soviets (1965/66). However, the Soviets could conduct a round-the-moon voyage ear-
lier if they are ready to waive certain emergency safety features and limit the voyage to one
man. My estimate is that they could perform this simplified task in 1962 or 1963.
d) we have an excellent chance of beating the Soviets to the first landing of a crew on
the moon (including return capability, of course). The reason is that a performance jump
by a factor 10 over their present rockets is necessary to accomplish this feat. While today
we do not have such a rocket, it is unlikely that the Soviets have it. Therefore, we would not
have to enter the race toward this obvious next goal in space exploration against hopeless
odds favoring the Soviets. With an all-out crash program I think we could accomplish this
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objective in 1967/68.
Question 2. How much additional would it cost?
Answer: I think I should not attempt to answer this question before the exact objec-
tives and the time plan for an accelerated United States space program have been deter-
mined. However, I can say with some degree of certainty that the necessary funding
increase to meet objective d) above would be well over $1 Billion for FY 62, and that the
required increases for subsequent fiscal years may run twice as high or more.
Question 3. Are we working 24 hours a day on existing programs? If not, why not? If
not, will you make recommendations to me as to how work can be speeded up.
Answer: We are notworldng 24 hours a day on existing programs. At present, work on
NASA's Saturn project proceeds on a basic one-shift basis, with overtime and multiple shift
operations approved in critical "bottleneck" areas.
During the months of January, February and March 1961, NASA's George C. Marshall
Space Flight Center, which has systems management for the entire Saturn vehicle and
develops the large first stage as an in-house project, has worked an average of 46 hours a
week. This includes all administrative and clerical activities. In the areas critical for the
Saturn project (design activities, assembly, inspecting, testing), average working time tor
the same period was 47.7 hours a week, with individual peaks up to 54 hours per week.
Experience indicates that in Research & Development work longer hours are not
conducive to progress because of hazards introduced by fatigue. In the aforementioned
critical areas, a second shift would greatly alleviate the tight scheduling situation. How-
ever, additional funds and personnel spaces are required to hire a second shift, and nei-
ther are available at this time. In this area, help would be most effective.
Introduction of a third shift cannot be recommended for Research & Development
work. Industry-wide experience indicates that a two-shift operation with moderate but not
excessive overtime produces the best results.
In industrial plants engaged in the Saturn program the situation is approximately
the same. Moderately increased funding to permit greater use of premium paid overtime,
prudently applied to real "bottleneck" areas, can definitely speed up the program.
Question 4. In building large boosters should we put our emphasis on nuclear, chemi-
cal or liquid fuel, or a combination of these three?
Answer: It is the consensus of opinion among most rocket men and reactor experts
that the future of the nuclear rocket lies in deep-space operations (upper stages of chemi-
cally-boosted rockets or nuclear space vehicles departing from an orbit around the earth)
rather than in launchings (under nuclear power) from the ground. In addition, there can
be little doubt that the basic technology of nuclear rockets is still in its early infancy. The
nuclear rocket should therefore be looked upon as a promising means to extend and
expand the scope of our space operations in the years beyond 1967 or 1968. It should not
be considered as a serious contender in the big booster problem of 1961.
The foregoing comment refers to the simplest and most straightforward type of
nuclear rocket, viz. the "heat transfer" or "blow-down" type, whereby liquid hydrogen is
evaporated and superheated in a very hot nuclear reactor and subsequently expanded
through a nozzle.
There is also a fundamentally different type of nuclear rocket propulsion system in
the works which is usually referred to as "ion rocket" or "ion propulsion." Here, the nuclear
energy is first converted into electrical power which is then used to expel "ionized" (i.e.,
electrically charged) particles into the vacuum of outer space at extremely high speeds.
The resulting reaction force is the ion rocket's "thrust." It is in the very nature of nuclear
ion propulsion systems that they cannot be used in the atmosphere. While very efficient in
propellant economy, they are capable only of very small thrust forces. Therefore they do
not qualify as "boosters" at all. The future of nuclear ion propulsion lies in its application
for low-thrust, high-economy cruise power for interplanetary voyages.
As to "chemical or liquid fuel" The President's question undoubtedly refers to a com-
parison between "solid" and "liquid" rocket fuels, both of which involve chemical reactions.
At the present time, our most powerful rocket boosters (Atlas, first stage of Titan,
first stage of Saturn) are all liquid fuel rockets and all available evidence indicates that the
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Soviets are also using liquid fuels for their ICBM's and space launchings. The largest solid
fuel rockets in existence today (Nike Zeus booster, first stage Minuteman, first stage
Polaris) are substantially smaller and less powerful. There is no question in my mind that,
when it comes to building very powerful booster rocket systems, the body of experience
available today with liquid fuel systems greatly exceeds that with solid fuel rockets.
There can be no question that larger and more powerful solid fuel rockets can be
built and I do not believe that major breakthroughs are required to do so. On the other
hand it should not be overlooked that a casing filled with solid propellant and a nozzle
attached to it, while entirely capable of producing thrust, is not yet a rocket ship. And
although the reliability record of solid fuel rocket propulsion units, thanks to their simplic-
ity, is impressive and better than that of liquid propulsion units, this does not apply to
complete rocket systems, including guidance systems, control elements, stage separation, etc.
Another important point is that booster performance should not be measured in
terms of thrust force alone, but in terms of total impulse; i.e., the product of thrust force
and operating time. For a number of reasons it is advantageous not to extend the burning
time of solid fuel rockets beyond about 60 seconds, whereas most liquid fuel boosters have
burning time of 120 seconds and more. Thus, a 3-million pound thrust solid rocket of 60
seconds burning time is actually not more powerful than a 1'/_-million pound thrust liquid
booster of 120 seconds burning time.
[Paragraph excised during declassification review]
My recommendation is to substantially increase the level of effort and funding in the
field of solid fuel rockets (by 30 or 50 million dollars for FY62) with the immediate objec-
tives of
- demonstration of the feasibility of very large segmented solid fuel rockets. (Han-
dling and shipping of multi-million pound solid fuel rockets become unmanageable un-
less the rockets consist of smaller individual segments which can be assembled in building
block fashion at the launching site.)
- development of simple inspection methods to make certain that such huge solid
fuel rockets are free of dangerous cracks or voids
- determination of the most suitable operational methods to ship, handle, assemble,
check and launch very large solid fuel rockets. This would involve a series of paper studies
to answer questions such as
a. Are clusters of smaller solid rockets, or huge, single poured-in-launch-site solid
fuel rockets, possibly superior to segmented rockets? This question must be analyzed not
just from the propulsion angle, but from the operational point of view for the total space
transportation system and its attendant ground support equipment.
b. Launch pad safety and range safety criteria (How is the total operation at Cape
Canaveral affected by the presence of loaded multi-million pound solid fuel boosters?)
c. Land vs. off-shore vs, sea launchings of large solid fuel rockets.
d. Requirements for manned launchings (How to shut the booster off in case of
trouble to permit safe mission abort and crew capsule recovery? If this is difficult, what
other safety procedures should be provided?)
Question _i. Are we making maximum effort? Are we achieving necessary results?
Answer: No, I do not think we are making maximum effort.
In my opinion, the most effective steps to improve our national stature in the space
field, and to speed things up would be to
- identify a few (the fewer the better) goals in our space program as objectives of
highest national priority, (For example: Let's land a man on the moon in 1967 or 1968.)
- identify those elements of our present space program that would qualify as immedi-
ate contributions to this objective. (For example, soft landings of suitable instrumentation
on the moon to determine the environmental conditions man will find there.)
- put all other elements of our national space program on the "back burner."
- add another more powerful liquid fuel booster to our national launch vehicle pro-
gram. The design parameters of this booster should allow a certain flexibility for desired
program reorientation as more experience is gathered.
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Example:Developin additiontowhatisbeingdonetoday,afirst-stageliquidfuel
boosteroftwicethetotalimpulseofSaturn'sfirststage,designedtobeusedinclustersif
needed.Withthisboosterwecould
a.doubleSaturn'spresentlyenvisionedpayload.Thisadditionalpayloadcapability
wouldbeveryhelpfulforsoftinstrumentlandingsonthemoon,forcircumlunarflights
andforthefinalobjectiveofamannedlandingonthemoon(ifafewyearsfromnowthe
routeviaorbitalre-fuelingshouldturnouttobethemorepromisingone.)
b.assembleamuchlargerunitbystrappingthreeor fourboosterstogetherintoa
cluster.Thisapproachwouldbetakenshould,afewyearshence,orbitalrendezvousand
refuelingrunintodifficultiesandthe"directroute"forthemannedlunarlandingthus
appearsmorepromising.[Paragraphexciseduringdeclassification review]
Summing up, I should like to say that in the space race we are competing with a
determined opponent whose peacetime economy is on a wartime footing. Most of our
procedures are designed for orderly, peacetime conditions. I do not believe that we can
win this race unless we take at least some measures which thus far have been considered
acceptable only in times of a national emergency.
Yours respectfully,
Wernher von Braun
Document II1-10
Document title: "Vice President's Ad Hoc Meeting," May 3, 1961.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
As the space review progressed in early May, Vice President Lyndon Johnson called
together many of those participating in the review to meet with Senator Robert Kerr
(D-OK), who was the new chairman of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Science, and Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH), the committee's ranking minority member.
The point of the meeting was to let these key senators know what was being discussed
within the executive branch and to solicit their support for an acceleration of the space
program. Evident in the notes of the meeting is some tension between Vice President
Johnson, who was pushing for a strong recommendation to the president, and NASA Ad-
ministrator James Webb, who was not yet sure that a program of the magnitude that the
vice president wanted was technically or politically feasible.
[1] Vice President's Ad Hoc Meeting
May 3 - Room 210 - With Senators
Vice President: This meeting is to get the benefit of remarks and ideas from the
Senators and others for Mr. Webb, the Department of Defense, the President, and the
Space Council members. We haven't gone far enough or fast enough. We need a new look,
and to know how much it will cost. Mr. Webb has a comprehensive program. It would add
$500 million more or less to the current budget. The Department of Defense also has
need for about $100 million more. Everyone is requested to give suggestions and recom-
mendations. We are grateful for the participation of the senior Senators. This is not a
partisan matter. We are all Americans doing the best job we can for America. In taking a
new look, we will call first on Senator Kerr.
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SenatorKerr:Afterall thathasgoneon,andconsideringparticularlythingsthat
havehappenedrecently,wecansee that the budget of the outgoing Administration was
not adequate to do what the President and others have in mind. The establishment of the
Space Council is the most progressive thing that has yet been done. One of the first things
they must do is to look at requirements, costs, and come up with a budget, either on an
annual or project basis, that will fix the agency of responsibility. We have some [2] great
men leading the program.
We need to agree on objectives, the timing of those matters, get a decision from the
President on what he needs in the budget, and after these preliminary steps, the matter
comes to us in the Congress. We need some cold-blooded decisions, but the Senate can be
counted on in the end to face up to whatever is required. Senator Bridges is an indispens-
able man in the matter of getting started and getting the right answer from the Senate.
Senator Bridges: Concurred with the remarks of Senator Kerr. The Vice President
will remember the trials and frustrations of 1958 that came with the development of the
Space Act. Now we face a new situation. What are our short and long range objectives? We
have been attempting to maintain a balance between the military necessity and the scien-
tific desires. A coordination between them has been maintained. It certainly is necessary
to attain the highest possible scientific use and to maintain the glory of the United States
and its prestige, but basic to the whole matter is the security of the United States. These
things have to be in tune. It is a tremendous challenge. The Space Committee of the
Senate will cooperate, but it wants to be informed, it wants the truth, and it will carry its
share of the load and more.
[3] Vice President: I am asking Mr. Webb to review the high points of his short and
long range objectives and his budget needs. He has a paper covering ten or eleven points,
and this seems to be a good way to cover the ground.
Mr. Webb: When the amendment to the Space Act was recently passed, the Vice Presi-
dent asked for our views on the subject just announced. These were put together very fast.
They start from a basic estimate that we can arrange for a manned lunar landing in 1967 or
1968. Before that can be done, science must have found plenty of new answers or ideas,
and much more must be found and understood before we can either put three men in an
orbit round the moon or make a soft landing. Before we get to that objective, we have
some other things we can do along that path. Some new shots will advance meteorology.
We will have communications satellites and a system set up which will serve both military
and commercial needs.
In order to answer the first question asked by the President, "Do we have a chance of
beating the Soviets?", I have assigned the best 25 scientists on each one of the five projects
the task of analyzing the possibilities and probabilities to cover each part of [4] the ques-
tion. There is a great deal that must be done before the Vice President will be in a position
to make recommendations and the President be ready to go to the Congress and ask for
the large sums which will be necessary, so we've got to be very careful now. The magni-
tudes are something like this-S1,7 billion for next year, $3 billion one year later, and $4.4
billion the following year.
The Vice President: Do you feel that you will not be prepared to give me answers for
a month? You should be making your recommendations as early as you can. You were
desperate for $308 million two weeks ago. You didn't get all of that. Is it going to take you
a month to make the decisions necessary to arrive at good targets? I am not trying to rush
you. But you must not wait a month or Congress will have gone home.
Webb: There are some overall policy guidances with which we ought to be provided
to make a proper start in our estimates.
In the last two weeks we have actually had a new invention. It amounts to a combina-
tion of solid and liquid propellants in boosters. If this process is feasible, we can make a
national decision -
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Vice President: I thought you said you would have your answers in a month. What
you are now talking about will take longer than a month, won't it?
[5] Webb: If our top men decide the psychological and military necessities, and that
these things require a lunar shot in 1967, then the budget for the first year would be $1.7
billion for NASA in 1962.
Senator Kerr: Does this mean that you will want to adjust your figures and your justi-
fication for the recent appropriation increases requested?
Webb: Although there would not be a big change in spending, there would be a
considerable problem having to do with long range commitments. There is a real question
as to whether a request for $33 billion for these objectives is proper at this time.
Vice President: We want to keep clear here our need for recommendations on next
year and on a ten-year total. It seems that your best "horseback" guess was a need for $509
million. (The Vice President then read from paper tided "Major Items in Accelerated
Program Requiring Additional Funds for Fiscal 1962." The amount needed for each of the
eleven points was read. Total $509 million.)
[6] Now my question is, do you want to change that $509 million figure?
Webb: Our new idea on boosters will force us to change some of these figures, just
how much I do not know, because DOD has now decided that they need big boosters and
they may take over some or all of this one project cost.
Dryden: Speaking as a technician, I would recommend that we try for the moon as
soon as possible, but national policy has other significant guidance factors and we're fish-
ing for some of that guidance in order to know what kind of support we would get for some
of our ideas.
Vice President: I don't want anyone here to feel that we are putting him on the spot.
We'll wait a month if necessary for people to get guts enough to make solid recommenda-
tions. Our purpose today is to have these important Senators get the benefit of consulta-
tion and for us to have the benefit of consulting them and we want to consult everyone
who can make a contribution.
Dryden: In terms of the overall national interest and objectives, we find ourselves in
a pretty narrow part of that, i.e., the space program.
[7] When it comes to its relationship to the USSR, someone else has to tell us how we
fit into the overall scheme of things and what we should do to carry our part of the burden.
Webb: We can only do our share -we can't carry the burden of all of those who have
responsibility.
Vice President: What we want to know is what would you do if you were President?
Webb: Since we don't know enough about his other problems, we can't judge what
we would do if we were President. I think I would be for a moon shot in 1967.
Vice President: In other words, you take the same position that you recommended
two weeks ago [4/19/61]. Will your figures be way off?.
Dryden: It will take a month to work out our program and its justification to a point
which will satisfy the Bureau of the Budget, and until then we can't really tell the Senators
much about figures.
Senator Kerr: If the objectives discussed here have the President's backing, NASA
and Senator Kerr will share the burden of that load. If the President [8] has not been
convinced, Kerr backs out.
Vice President: The President will stand behind the recommendations from the Space
Council which will be based on recommendations from Webb and the other members.
Webb: We need a national commitment to defined objectives. If Congress would give
us a commitment for big increments to our program in future years, we could do a better
job of planning. It would be a national disgrace if we were to start now a big program and
then have to stop because of lack of appropriation in future years.
Vice President: You can't get any more than a one-year appropriation but Congress
will give you annual appropriations as they do in the case of a big dam. Let's not try to do
the impossible. On the other hand, let's hope that you can go on year after ),ear persuad-
ing reasonable men and explain the changes as they take place. We got $126 million when
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we asked for $308 million, but the President explained his reasons and he is ready to listen
to new recommendations with an open mind.
Webb: The President did give us our needs for a big booster and he paved the way for
more. We need more experience on life in space with men and [9] with animals. We will
have to reschedule the use of our $509 million plan. The $182 million we have asked for
would actually level out lower if our big booster hopes work out, but we will need more
now as we see greatly increased costs coming up later. There are four major booster devel-
opments in our program which were not in the budget which went to the President. We
need $509 million now, instead of the $182 million we asked the President for. If our new
idea of the marriage of the types of boosters is feasible, we will have some new costs and
one of those will be $105 million for launching pads. We need new types of space crafts for
meteorological work and for communications work.
Senator Bridges: Based on intelligence resources, how does your program compare
with the achievements which are to be expected from the USSR?
Webb: They will be ahead until 1967 or 1968.
Senator Bridges: Should we be planning to do less than we know they are doing?
Webb: We can't help it. We can't do more during that period. They have been using
an 800,000 lb. thrust and are ready to make the next jump in size, which may be double or
more. On the other hand, we are about to jump our size ten times, and there are lots of
unsolved problems involved. [ 10]
Senator Bridges: Who decided on the publicity which has been given this shot that
was cancelled the other day? [Shepard]
Webb: The plan for this shot was in existence when we took over. One of the first
things we did was to cancel out some arrangements which had been made between the
astronauts and commercial publicists. Although there was a half million dollars involved,
we came to some pretty firm conclusions and in spite of the important commercial inter-
ests, we fixed some limitations. Although there are reports of 500 newsmen down at Cape
Canaveral, they are not in the way. They have been eased out of the blockhouse and any
other area where they have in the past interfered. This whole problem needs more atten-
tion, but with things like a House Committee investigating me and others pressing me
every minute, I haven't had time.
Dryden: It's true that the basic decisions were made by the last Administration and
these are some of the reasons Cape Canaveral can't be cut off from public view. Photo-
graphs can be taken with long lenses and misleading information provided, based on those
photographs, so it was decided to brief the press on scheduled events weeks in advance
and cut down the scuttlebutt. There are all kind of activities at the base which will give
intelligent people benchmarks and ways to judge what is going on.
[11] The recent shot is a case in point. NASA has never announced a date but the
press watches Navy ships go to stations and astronauts' wives shifting to other quarters, and
they come to conclusions which we are forced to agree to by maintaining silence.
Senator Bridges: Did we ever think of moving?
Dryden: Cape Canaveral belongs to Defense. We have test operations at Wallops Is-
land for small shots. We have considered other locations, but moving in remote areas
multiplies the costs, and they are prohibitive.
Senator Bridges: If we fail in this coming shot with publicity as tremendous as it has
been, the results will be tragic.
Rubel: (Defense) Defense is working very closely with NASA. The plans which are
being developed are the best which can be expected from several points of view. There are
many elements in the Department of Defense which are involved, such as the R&D in
DOD, Aerospace Corporation (AF), Englewood, California, and the military staff of the
Air Force. They all have notions. We all have to put our heads together, and we're almost
sure of our position now. [12]
Vice President: In your last report you promised more complete iniormation by April
28th. I hope we can have that soon, and that it will tell us what the Department of Defense
will need and will do.
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Rubel:It shouldbereadybyMonday,andverylitdewillbeomittedfromthethings
wehopedtoprovide.About$100millionwillbeneededfor 1962.Thisisthesameaswe
estimatedonApril20thbutwenowhavetheproblemofjustifyingit fortheBOB.
VicePresident: (He gave a summary of previous executive meetings for the benefit
of the Senators.) Boiled down, it appears that the President should be asked to expand the
total program from an estimated $22 billion to be spent in ten years to $33 billion in ten
years. As a part of this, $509 million would be added for FY 1962. The Eisenhower budget
provided for $2.015 billion for all purposes. The Kennedy add-ons amount to $308 mil-
lion, a total of $2.323 billion, with a new request for about $600 million, The new total for
FY 1962 will be about $3 billion. Now quickly we must get our figures necessary on the
recommendations we wish to make on a national effort and then let the BOB decide what
part of it is justifiable in the light of overall national needs. [13]
Brown (AEC): He was in total agreement with NASA, and hoped that the $509 mil-
lion estimate would include the AEC tie-in agreements on their targets with NASA, but he
learned that this pordon of the $182 million requested of the President had been turned
down without prejudice to reconsideration later. He considered it most important to get
target dates fixed for these major efforts. The present budget does not provide AEC with
what it needs for any new targets. For that purpose we would have to put back in what AEC
needed in the $308 million request. Their needs are not reflected in the $509 million
request.
Webb: The figures we have show the principal use by AEC of funds after F3( 1970. The
AEC budget would need to be reconsidered only if we want to go ahead all across the
board. Frankly, in order to get some of the other things done on new schedules, perhaps
we can't handle the AEC request.
Vice President: We may have to come to that but let's come to that later. This meeting
is not for the purpose of making such decisions. The last decision by the President in-
volved a bite which he could take, chew, and swallow at that time. He might now be ready
for the next bite, and it's up to us to be prepared with the facts and the estimate. [14]
Webb: It doesn't appear that we can do everything at the same time and to the extent
that we find a conflict of objectives, these must be resolved in the national interest.
Vice President: We won't be able to set national objectives until you are sure and you
make recommendations. The President won't be able to act for more than a month if
that's when you will be ready to advise him. If the program that is ultimately devised is
astronomical in cost, we can be sure that it will have to be tailored.
Hansen (BOB) : If we all work together in the development of space plans and projects,
we can approach them with confidence. The BOB can be depended upon to stay with you
and accept and approve budget plans that are justified, in the overall national interest.
Senator Bridges: While the things you are talking about may all be true, if we were to
have a war, things would just have to be different. We can start on the basis that we are here
to discuss them, but we must realize that war would mean a complete reorganization of the
national plans and space programs. [15]
Cook: The agencies here represented know what they are doing and they know that
they have to have the right people doing the proper jobs. And like all good soldiers, having
made recommendations, we have to take the decision and work with it all together. First a
program should be laid out in terms of objectives, then the policy determination should
be made, the funds provided and schedules fixed and adhered to.
Vice President: In order to catch up on what has been going on recently, it is sug-
gested that everyone here obtain copies of the testimony which Dr. Welsh in hearings
before the Space Committees of the House and the Senate on the amendment to the
NASA Act. In reading this testimony along with the changes, one can get a good under-
standing of the new responsibilities of the new Space Council and also obtain an insight on
Dr. Welsh's plans for the Space Council staff and staff activities.
Stanton (CBS): Setting aside for a moment comments on publicity about the immi-
nent space shot and the public image -
With ignorance as to policy needs and further need for briefing on scientific and
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military requirements, it's difficult for a businessman to [16] set aside his desire to go
ahead and get things done. There are times, however, when the scientists want to go deeper
into the problem before they start concrete action, and it creates the need for critical
examination of the whole problem in the national interest.
Vice President: Do the NASA scientists want to go into this matter to a point that
would increase the $509 million estimate?
Dryden: Yes. This, however, is principally in field centers where they usually want
more than we in the national office consider reasonable in the interest of program direc-
tion.
Stanton: Our interest in the future depends upon being first in science. If a moon
shot is judged to be expedient, we should press on. We don't have to be concerned about
national support if wise men have decided upon the action necessary in the national inter-
est.
Dryden: To do a moon shot will tax everyone involved to the limit and all along the
way there will have to be trial, error, and correction.
Stanton: To get national support, we must give now consideration to this matter of
the "goldfish bowl." This was the highlight of the President's [17] talk to the American
Newspaper Publishers Association. We can't go on doing as we have in the past. We must
be particularly careful about publicizing failures that have the effect of dropping national
support. Every good laboratory has its failures, but this isn't generally understood by the
public, and there are times when it is far better that we keep quiet.
Hansen: We know now that the USSR is going to be ahead of us for a time. Therefore
anything that we do they will attempt to ridicule. We must give our people the best infor-
mation we have because the absence of complete information is worse when you have
some failures and your people are not prepared for them. It is far better to be frank if you
want to get full support. We need some aggressive leadership to sell the people that we are
going about this in the right way.
Webb: This is really a new frontier. We are up against some hostile voices in the
unknown. We really need 50 shots to try things out in an orderly way, but we have to boil
this all clown to a lot fewer and if we announce each of them, a lot will be riding on every
test. Mr. Stanton can help by keeping the focus on our accomplishments, but we certainly
ought to avoid broadcasting our objectives. [18]
Stanton: It would be most desirable to put all of the information in the right frame in
order properly to get public support and keep public opinion moving in the direction you
want it to follow.
(Senators and members of the Committee staffs left at this point.)...
[19] Webb: This whole issue is made complicated by a great many different factors.
We mustn't forget that there are many foreign people involved. We have networks of sta-
tions all over the free world and they all have to know what we're doing and when we're
doing it. Then there are the scientists. It's hard to control the minds of such men. As a
matter of fact, we have to remember that we are fighting for men's minds.
Farley: (State) State is somewhat concerned both about the public reaction at home,
and foreign reaction. There must be some way that we could cut down publicity and make
it all look like a bleacher stunt. There are many things we can do to build up our dignity.
We're developing a program to meet the USSR all around the world. By 1967 or 1968 we
must get out of second place. If in the meantime we can do some thing that is concrete like
the establishment of a communications network by means of satellites and show the free
world a program from which they will benefit, we will advance U.S. interests all along the
line. We ought to set our goals as soon as possible for the communications network and
the supply of weather information from our satellites just as soon as possible. It appears
that the communications network is the best short range target.
George Brown: Experience proves that when one pinpoints a long range program,
you get things done all along the way. The products that come out at short [20] range are
automatic. We shouldn't forecast each of our steps for the USSR. When we do, we can be
sure that they will find some way to cover or blank out our desired publicity.
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Webb: The previous Administration asked for bids on the communications satellite.
Seven were received and we are taking two weeks to evaluate them. We understand that
Bell is going ahead with its plans whether or not it gets the award. FCC has a big part of the
control in this project. It started its hearings on the 1st of May and promised to give a
ruling within 4 to 6 weeks. There are certain military requirements and therefore some
reservations about the use of these communications satellites. The expense of this project
is somewhat in doubt and the House is calling for hearings before we are ready to talk.
Nevertheless we ought to be ready to run an experiment across the Atlantic by mid-1962.
We have the Tiros now and the Nimbus to come in 1962. If the AT&T is successful, they
have stated that they would have an operational prototype ready by Christmas and be
ready to shoot early next year.
Cook: Isn't it better for the public to know what it has to face? Isn't it possible that
spoon-feeding and disclosures of something less than full frankness will result in casting
doubts on the leadership of the program? [21]
Vice President: Serious consideration is being given to having the President in a
message put this whole matter right out on the table and explain it, but before he does this
we will see that all of the pros and cons are taken into account.
Each of the men at this conference is requested to prepare a page or a page and a
half paper on what our nation space effort should be. Let's define the goals. Your judg-
ment and what you will have to say will not be charged against you. If you will each use your
brains [and others theirs] we will add the ideas all together and get a good product. In
other words, let's have a short paper by Monday to tell me what you think. Our objectives
should be, what we should do [I don't need it from Webb. I have his.]
I assume that Webb will be burning the midnight oil to firm up the outlines of two
weeks ago and get the BOB to agree. The President has read the interim memo and asked
questions about it. He is keeping in very close touch with changing events. Everyone in-
volved should get details to the BOB and get their justifications confirmed because June
30th is coming and we've got to have it all done. We have to try all sorts of things and in
doing that, we'll get something like we want on each of them.
Should we give some thought to having the President enlist peoples' support in our
program honesdy explaining that there will [22] be limited information? Can we put em-
phasis on the announcements of our success and in doing so, call it "running gear" and
then say that we need $500 million more to use that "gear?" No one is going to be pinned
down when he expresses his best judgment. We must hope for the best, but be ready to
accept the inevitable. So far NASA has gotten everything it has asked for. I want them to
plan and dream big enough to get us out ahead. (Story of electricity for rural Texas). I
want to know what the national effort should be in your judgment. By working together,
we will achieve the national goal.
Document II1-11
Document tide: James E. Webb, NASA Administrator, and Robert S. McNamara, Secre-
tary of Defense, to the Vice President, May 8, 1961, with attached: "Recommendations for
Our National Space Program: Changes, Policies, Goals."
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
This memorandum is the charter for Project Apollo and for an across-the-board ac-
celeration of U.S. space efforts. It was the hurried product of a weekend of work following
the successful suborbital flight of the first U.S. astronaut on Friday, May 5, 1961. The ur-
gency was caused by the vice president's desire to get recommendations to the president
before he left on a rapidly arranged inspection tour to Southeast Asia. NASA, the Depart-
ment of Defense, and the Bureau of the Budget staffs and senior officials met on Saturday
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and Sunday at the Pentagon to put together the memorandum, which the vice president
approved without change and delivered to the president on Monday, May 8. On that same
day, Alan Shepard came to Washington for a parade down Pennsylvania Avenue and a
White House ceremony with President Kennedy.
8 May i961
Dear Mr. Vice President:
Attached to this letter is a report entitled "Recommendations for Our National Space
Program: Changes, Policies, Goals", dated 8 May 1961. This document represents our joint
thinking. We recommend that, if you concur with its contents and recommendations, it be
transmitted to the President for his information revised and expended objectives which it
contains.
Very respectfully,
James E. Webb
Administrator
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense...
[1 ] Introduction
It is the purpose of this report (1) to describe changes to our national space efforts
requiring additional appropriations for FY 1962; (2) to outline the thinking of the Secre-
tary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA concerning U.S. status, prospects, and
policies for space; and (3) to depict the chief goals which in our opinion should become
part of Integrated National Space Plan. These matters are covered in Sections I, I1, III,
respectively.
Three appendices (Tabs A through C) support these sections. Tab A highlights the
Soviet space program. The bulk of this Tab (Attachment A) is separated from this report
since it bears a special security classification. Tab B includes a description of major U.S.
space projects and elements. Tab C provides financial summaries of the present programs,
the proposed add-ons, and future costs of the program.
The first joint report contains the results of extensive studies and reappraisals. It is a
first and not our last report and does not, of course, represent a complete or final word
about our space undertakings.
[2] I. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FY-1962 ADD-ONS
Our recommendations for additional FY 1962 NOA for our space efforts are listed
below. They total $626 Million of which all but $77 million is for NASA. Certain of these
additions will accelerate projects which need to be accomplished more quickly if national
space goals are to be reached on time. Other additions augment projects or programs to
afford greater likelihood of success or to acquire concurrently data needed to implement
long range goals for which we would otherwise have had to wait. Some of the additions,
especially those for rocket engine, booster, and upper stage developments, support paral-
lel programs to insure that the failure or delay in a single launch vehicle development will
not place our long range goals in jeopardy. It is our belief that it is feasible to accomplish
those objectives of acceleration, augmentauon and greater certainty of success through
the application of the funds specified. The general objectives of acceleration, augmenta-
tion and greater certainty of success through the application of the funds specified. The
general objectives and their implementation in each particular case are amply supported
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bytheinvestigationsandassessmentsofqualifiedscientific and technical people intimately
familiar with our space undertakings in detail and in the large.
These FY 1962 additions represent a vital first stage funding toward implementing
longer range goals, including the objective of manned lunar exploration in the latter part
of this decade, specified in Section III. They will, we believe, prove to be consistent with
the objectives and policies set forth in Section II.
a. Spacecraft for Manned Lunar Landing and Return
To achieve the goal of landing a man on the moon and returning him to earth in the
latter part of the current decade requires immediate initiation of an accelerated program
of spacecraft development.
The program designated Project Apollo includes initial flights of a multi-manned
orbiting laboratory to qualify the [3] spacecraft, and manned flights around the moon
before attempting the difficult lunar landing.
The additional funds required will be used to extend tests with the Mercury space-
craft to learn more about the behavior of man during longer duration flights in space, to
study the biomedical problems encountered in outer space, to investigate the problems of
reentering the earth's atmosphere from lunar return speeds, to initiate the development
of the multi-manned spacecraft for the mission, and for ground tracking and other facili-
ties.
APPROVED RECOMM.
BUDGET BVD(_ET ADD'AL
FUNDS: 29.5M 240.0M 210.5M
b. Launch Vehicle Development
1. For the manned lunar landing
The advanced goal of manned landing on the moon requires the development of a
launch vehicle (Nova) with a thrust of about six times greater then that of the largest
vehicle now under development (Saturn). The funds requested are to accelerate the de-
velopment of 1 '/2 million pounds thrust liquid fueled rocket engine now under develop-
ment; for design, engineering, and component development of the Nova vehicle; and to
initiate the construction of necessary facilities required in support of the vehicle develop-
ment and test.
APPROVED RECOMM.
BUDGET BUDGET ADD'AL
FUNDS: 42.7M 155.2M 112.5M
2. Solid propellant parallel approach
To assure a high degree of success in achieving the manned lunar landing goal a
parallel approach to the development of a first stage for the large launch vehicle (NOVA)
must be undertaken. In addition to the use of liquid fuels for this purpose we must also
undertake the immediate development of large solid rocket launch vehicles. When devel-
opments in both liquid fueled and solid fueled rockets have [4] progressed to a stage
where one or the other can be shown to be the superior approach, it will be pursued as the
principal launch vehicle development. Certain elements of the solid rocket development
are also believed to have future military importance. The DoD will be responsible for this
development, being fully responsive to NASA requirements.
APPROVED RECOMM.
BUDGET BUDGET
FUNDS(DoD):-0- 62M
ADD'AL
62M
c, Development of An Upper Stage for Titan II
The Adas-Agena combination is the most powerful launch vehicle available to the
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U.S. until the Atlas-Centaur becomes operational in 1963. The Adas-Agena cannot place
more then 5,000 pounds in the 300-miles orbit. The Arias-Centaur, if successful, will be
capable of launching as much as 8,500 pounds.
Because of an urgent need by both DoD and NASA of a vehicle with the perfor-
mance of AdavCentaur, a back-up for this launch vehicle is considered essential. There-
fore it is proposed to initiate development of an upper stage for Titan II which will then
provide a strong back-up for the Adas-Centaur. The Titan II upper stage development will
be terminated if the timely success of Atlas-Centaur becomes apparent.
APPROVED RECOMM.
BUDGET BUDGET AOD'AL
FUNDS (DoD): -0- 15M 15M
d. Unmanned Lunar Exploration
Before attempting a manned lunar landing, it is essential to learn more about the
phenomena that exist in space near the moon and about the nature of the characteristics
of the moon's surface. The programs now underway, designated Ranger and Surveyor, are
designed to provide this information. With additional funds, the number of fights in these
programs will be increased and the program will be accelerated to provide timely informa-
tion and greater assurance.
[5] APPROVED RECOMM.
BUDGET BUDGET ADD'AL
FUNDS: 71.67M 134.67M 63.0M
e. Scientific Experiments on Space Environment
Knowledge of the space environment through which man must travel to the moon is
now still very meager. The nature and characteristics of the radiation emanating from the
sun and from outer space must be thoroughly studied and understood. Man's ability to
survive in outer space and on the surface of the moon depends on this knowledge. The
additional funds will augment and expedite current programs that will provide this infor-
mation.
APPROVED RECOMM.
BUDGET BUDGET ADD'AL
FUNDS: 72.2M 87.2M 15.0M
f. Satellite Communications Systems
With the launching of the Echo and Courier communications satellites, the United
States achieved a position of leadership in the use of satellites for worldwide communica-
tions. Studies by many qualified organizations have shown the potential economic, politi-
cal and military value of these systems. The funding requested will accelerate the develop-
ments, lead to a much earlier availability of an operational system, and maintain the United
States position of leadership
APPROVED RECOMM.
BUDGET BUDGET ADD'AL
FUNDS: 44.6M 94.6M 50.0M
g. Meteorological Satellites for Worldwide Weather Prediction"
The outstanding success demonstrated by the U.S. Tiros weather satellite in world-
wide weather prediction will enable the U.S. to exploit this technology for the benefit of
*The Department of Commerce is considering the request of an additional 53.5M in FY62 to initiate an
operational meteorological satellite system.
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all mankind. [6] Developments are now under way which will lead to operational systems
To assure success of an operational system at the earliest time it is necessary to augment
the funding of this program by the amount shown below.
APPROVED RECOMM.
BUDGET BVDGET ADD'AL
FUNDS: 282M 50,2M 22.0M
h. Nuclear Rocket Development"
Nuclear rocket development (Rover) must be carried out on an accelerated basis
because of its great potential for even more difficult missions than landing a man on the
moon. This program faces many difficult technological problems which will require sub-
stantial support over a number of years for their solution. The funding will provide for
augmented research and development and essential facilities for the conduct of the pro-
gram.
APPROVED RECOMM.
BUDGET BUDGET ADD'AL
FUNDS: 17.5M 40.5M 23.0M
i. Supporting Research and Technology
The successful accomplishment of the accelerated program goals requires immedi-
ate expansion of basic researches and advances in technology in many fields. For the con-
duct and management of this major effort some additional increase in the NASA staff will
also be required. Requirements for the additional research, advancement of technology
and support of personnel and plant are shown below.
APPROVED RECOMM.
BUDGET B_D(_ET A__DD'AL
FUNDS: 393.5M 446.5M 53.0M
[7] II. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY
The recommendations made in the preceding Section imply the existence of na-
tional space goals and objectives toward which these and other projects are aimed. Major
goals are summarized in Section III. Such goals must be formulated in the context of a
national policy with respect to undertakings in space. It is the purpose of this Section to
highlight our thinking concerning the direction that such national policy needs to take
and to present a backdrop against which more specific goals, objectives and detailed poli-
cies should, in our opinion, be formulated.
a. Categories of Space Projects
Projects in space may be undertaken for any one of four principal reasons. They may
be aimed at gaining scientific knowledge. Some, in the future, will be of commercial or
chiefly civilian value. Several current programs are of potential military value for functions
such as reconnaissance and early warning. Finally, some space projects may be undertaken
chiefly for reasons of national prestige.
The U.S. is not behind in the first three categories. Scientifically and militarily we are
ahead. We consider our potential in the commercial/civilian area to be superior. The
Soviets lead in space spectaculars which bestow great prestige. They lead in launch ve-
hicles needed for such missions. These bestow a lead in capabilities which may some day
become important from a military point of view. For these reasons it is important that we
take steps to insure that the current and future disparity between U.S. Soviet launch
*The Atomic Energy Commission has requested an additional 7M in FY62 to support the reactor portion
of the Nuclear Rocket Development Program.
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capabilitiesberemovedinanorderlybuttimelyway.Manyotherfactorshowever,areof
equalimportance.
b.SpaceProjectsforPrestige
All large scale space projects require the mobilization of resources on a national
scale. They require the development and successful application of the most advanced
technologies. They call for skillful management, centralized control and unflagging pur-
suit of long range [8] goals. Dramatic achievements in space, therefore, symbolize the
technological power and organizing capacity of a nation.
It is for reasons such as these that major achievements in space contribute to na-
tional prestige. Major successes, such as orbiting a man as the Soviets have just done, lend
national presdge even though the scientific, commercial or military value of the undertak-
ing may by ordinary standards be marginal or economically unjustified.
This nation needs to make a positive decision to pursue space projects aimed at enhancing
national prestige. Our attainments are a major element in the international competition
between the Soviet system and our own. The non-military, non-commercial, non-scientific
but "civilian" projects such as lunar and planetary exploration are, in this sense, part of the
batde along the fluid front of the cold war. Such undertakings may affect our military
strength only indirectly if at all, but they have an increasing effect upon our national pos-
ture.
c. Planning
It is vital to establish specific missions aimed mainly at national prestige. Such plan-
ning must be aimed at both the near-term and at the long range future. Near-term objec-
tive alone will not suffice. The management mechanisms established to implement long
range plans must be capable of sustained centralized direction and control. An immediate
task is to specify long-range goals, to describe the missions to be accomplished, to define
improved management mechanisms, to select the launch vehicles, the spacecraft, and the
essential building blocks needed to meet mission goals. The long-term task is to manage
national resources from the national level to make sure our goals are met.
It is absolutely vital that national planning be sufficiendy detailed to define the build-
ing blocks in an orderly and integrated way. It is absolutely vital that national management
be equal to the task of focusing resources, particularly scientific and engineering man-
power [9] resources, on the essential building blocks. It is particularly vital that we do not
continue to make the error of spreading ourselves too thin and expect to solve our prob-
lems through the mere appropriation and expenditure of additional funds.
d. Feasibility
It is technically feasible to match and surpass the Soviets in all areas of national space
competition whether scientific, commercial, military or in the area of national prestige.
Certain steps need to be undertaken right away. Those requiring additional appropria-
tions in FY 1962 were described in Section I.
Additional important actions have also been defined. They include the necessity to
specify standardized "work horse" building block combinations to support our space ef-
forts for the long pull. It is particularly important to define building block combinations
of boosters and upper stages for each major class of payload and mission. Conversely, it is
important to avoid wherever possible the creation of complex and costly launch vehicles
and other equipments optimized for and largely limited in application to a single project
or mission. This principle has been recognized and applied to portions of our launch-
vehicle developments. It has not been applied to all. It must govern all our efforts in the
future. Major sub-elements including guidance systems, control systems, power supplies,
telemetry, recovery and other basic system elements must also be standardized and used
repetitively to the maximum possible degree.
After fully adequate study we must specify the minimum family of launch vehicle
systems that will enable us to accomplish both near term (such as communication satel-
lites) and long range missions (such as lunar or planetary exploration) which will com-
prise our national space goals.
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If properly conceived and designed the vehicles will be used for many years in dozens
and perhaps hundreds of costly missions. Their development and procurement will in-
volve the expenditure of billions of [10] dollars over a period of a decade or more. It is
essential that we set out [our] foot on the correct path kneading to the future. The deci-
sions made in the beginning will define that path. Once embarked upon it, we cannot turn
back or turn aside without losing time which can never be regained.
e. Background Information Bearing on the Problem
These words would not be written and this report would not be called for if we were
satisfied with our status and our prospects for the future in space. We are not satisfied. We
are behind in important ways and it is not clear that we are catching up. In reading the
balance of this report, it is important to have in mind some of the highlights of space
history, of our posture today, and of our prospects for the future, It is important to realize
that more money is not the only answer. While considerable additional effort will be called
for, a principal problem is how better to harness, not merely how further to expand, the
human and physical resources already at hand.
It is important to note that the recent Soviet attainments are the result of a program
planned and executed at the national level over a long period of time. The decisions which
led to the current successes were, for the most part, made many years ago. Many of them,
in fact, must have been made in the early part of the 1950-1960 decade.
That decade has witnessed a great expansion in U.S. government-sponsored research
and development, especially for large-scale defense programs. Enormous strides have been
made, particularly in our space efforts and in the development of related ballistic missile
technology on a "crash" basis. We have, however, incurred certain liabilities in the process.
We have over-encouraged the development of entrepreneurs and the proliferation of new
enterprises. As a result, key personnel have been thinly spread. The turnover rate in U.S.
defense and space industry has had the effect of removing many key scientific engineering
personnel from their jobs before the completion of the projects for which they were em-
ployed. Strong concentrations of technical talent needed for the best [ 11 ] work on diffi-
cult tasks have been seriously weakened. Engineering costs have doubled in the past ten
years.
These and other trends have a strong adverse effect on our capacity to do a good job
in space. The inflation of costs has an obvious impact and they are still rising at the rate of
about seven per cent per year. This fact alone affects forward planning. It has often led to
project stretch-outs, and may again in future years. The spreading out of technological
personnel among a great many organizations has greatly slowed down the evolution of
design and development skills at the working level throughout the country. Precisely the
opposite is true in the USSR, where the turnover rate is very low and where skilled cadres
of development personnel remain in existence for a great many years.
It is not suggested that we apply Soviet type restrictions and controls upon the exer-
cise of personal liberty and freedom of choice. It is suggested, however, that our American
system can be and must be better utilized in the future than in the past.
Our space efforts, like many of our military weapons developments, have suffered
because of our tendency to "improve" and to embellish our designs. We have allowed
ourselves to strive for the optimum solution to nearly every problem project-by-project. We
have often tried to "integrate" very complex system elements at minimum weight and with
very little margin for safety or for error. Many have come to think that such techniques are
the natural and obvious way to get jobs done. They are not, they will not succeed and they
must be changed.
We must address ourselves to these problems more effectively in the future than in
the past. We must create mechanisms to lay out and to insist upon achievement, not mere
improvement. We must stress performance, not embellishment. We must insist from the
top down, that, as the Russians say, "the better is the enemy of the good."
[12] f. Summary
Clearly, then, the future of our efforts in space is going to depend on much more
than this year's appropriations or tomorrow's new idea. It is going to depend in large
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measure upon the extent to which this country is able to establish and to direct an "Inte-
grated Nadonal Space Program."
True, it will be necessary to support our space efforts at a higher funding level than
recommended before. Such support will have to be backed by the Administration, by the
Congress, and by the American people. If, however, the application of more money leads
to still further cost increases and still further thinning out of technical manpower and
technical supervision, it is likely that the Russians will be ahead of us ten years from now
just as they are today.
It will be necessary, therefore, to find a way to formulate and apply plans and policies
aimed at insuring the success of an Integrated National Space Program. Top level scien-
tific and policy direction must be forthcoming from the top management echelon. The
mere statement of broad objectives will not be good enough. Periodic budget reviews and
their intensification in the spring of each year will not suffice. It will be necessary to im-
pose policy and management actions which will alter many of the trends of the past ten
years, particularly in the management of research and engineering resources on a na-
tional scale. It will be necessary to impose actions which may involve painful cancellations
and redirections.
These and other policies, too, must be supported by the Administration, by the Con-
gress, and by the American people to insure success for the long pull ahead.
Our joint efforts are addressed to the creation of management tools to deal with
these and other problems we will face in the years ahead.
[13] III. MAJOR NATIONAL SPACE GOALS
It is the purpose of this section to outline some of the principal goals, both long
range and short range, toward which our national space efforts should, in our opinion, be
directed. It is not the intent to specify all of the goals or even all of the major goals of
importance to a National Space Plan. We wish to stress five principal objectives which in
our opinion have not been adequately formulated or accepted in the past and which we
believe should be accepted as a basis for specific project undertakings in the years ahead.
a. Manned Lunar Exploration
We recommend that our National Space Plan include the objective of manned lunar
exploration before the end of this decade. It is our belief that manned exploration to the
vicinity of and on the surface of the moon represents a major area in which international
competition for achievement in space will be conducted. The orbiting of machines is not
the same as the orbiting or landing of man. It is man, not merely machines, in space that
captures the imagination of the world.
The establishment of this major objective has many implications. It will cost a great
deal of money. It will require large efforts for a long time. It requires parallel and support-
ing undertakings which are also costly and complex. Thus, for example, the RANGER and
SURVEYOR Projects and the technology associated with them must be undertaken and
must succeed to provide the data, the techniques and the experience without which manned
lunar exploration cannot be undertaken.
The Soviets have announced lunar landing as a major objective of their program.
They may have begun to plan for such an effort years ago. They may have undertaken
important first steps which we have not begun.
It may be argued, therefore, that we undertake such an objective with several strikes
against us. We cannot avoid announcing not only our general goals but many of our spe-
cific plans, and our successes [ 14] and our failures along the way. Our cards are and will be
face up--their's are face down.
Despite these considerations we recommend proceeding toward this objective. We
are uncertain of Soviet intentions, plans or status. Their plans, whatever they may be, are
not more certain of success than ours. Just as we accelerated our ICBM program we have
accelerated and are passing the Soviets in important areas in space technology. If we set
our sights on this difficult objective we may surpass them here as well. Accepting the goal
gives us a chance. Finally, even if the Soviets get there first, as they may, and as some think
they will, it is better for us to get there second than not at all. In any event we will have
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masteredthetechnology.Ifwefailtoacceptthischallengeit may be interpreted as a lack
of national vigor and capacity to respond.
b. Worldwide Operational Satellite Communication Capability
It is our belief that advances in technology will make it possible to set up an opera-
tional satellite-based telecommunications capability within a few years. It is too early to be
sure what kind of capability we should create.
We are certain, however, that at least one of several current possibilities is very likely
to prove successful aild practical. We are also confident that an operational communica-
tion satellite capability can have far reaching applications and implications for the U.S.
Many commercial enterprises in this country have displayed great interest in this
subject. It is virtually certain that communication satellites will have commercial udlity in
future years. The Department of Defense is keenly interested in view of its large use of
commercial capacity and is also undertaking the development (Project ADVENT) of a
satellite aimed principally at fulfilling military requirements.
Finally and perhaps most important of all, communication satellites uniquely pro-
vide a way of relaying information from one point [15] to another over great distances. A
successful global satellite-based communication system may be looked upon somewhat as
an overhead cable thousands of miles in the air to which users all over the world may make
connections by means of invisible radio beams.
Accordingly, we have recommended that the NASA Communication Satellite effort
be expanded in FY 1962. Within the next few years this country which is already the world's
leader in communications of all kinds will be able to deploy a worldwide satellite-based
communication capability.
c. Worldwide Operational Satellite Weather Prediction System
The TIROS I meteorological satellite operated for several months, transmitting pic-
tures of cloud cover around the world. TIROS II, launched last November, is sdll transmit-
ting cloud pictures and infra-red data. The Weather Bureau, the NASA, and other
interested governmental agencies are closely coordinating their interests with respect to
TIROS and follow-on meteorological satellites. A worldwide system of such satellites will
be of great value to people in every country, to public and private interests in the U.S., and
to our military forces, particularly those at sea and in the air. The addition of $22 million
in FY 1962 will accelerate the early attainment of preliminary operational capability.
d. Scientific Investigation
Fundamental to and underlying all progress in the exploration and application of
space is the knowledge to be gained from the space sciences. It is essential that the na-
tional space sciences program be broad and comprehensive both in content and in partici-
pation by the scientific community of the world.
Before man can explore in the vast and hostile regions of space more knowledge is
required on the effects of hard vacuum, weightlessness, and radiation.
The broad program that is recommended includes the following objectives:
[16] --To understand the nature of the sun and its influence on the earth.
To investigate the solar system, its nature, and its history.
To search for life in the solar system.
To study cosmology, the history and nature of the universe.
Researchers in government laboratories, universities, industry, and other scientific
organizations must participate in the space sciences effort and the space science program
should support not only the existing talent but also the development of new talent. This
requires support of universities in the education of the young scientists who are inspired
by the challenge of space and who will strengthen the program with their vitality and new
ideas.
For the fiscal year 1962 we recommend adding fifteen million dollars to the program
to assure success of these objectives.
e. Large Scale Boosters for Potential Military Use
Space technology is in its infancy. The first U.S. satellite was launched only 3-1/2 years
ago. Vast resources are presently devoted to this field in the Communist world and in our
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own. The future potentialities and capabilities that space technology will afford cannot be
foreseen. Their military potential and implications are largely unknown. It is certain, how-
ever, that without the capacity to place large payloads reliably into orbit, our nation will
not be able to exploit whatever military potential unfolds in space.
We believe it is important, therefore, to insure that large scale boosters are made
available. They should, of course, form part of a family of launch vehicles applicable to
many missions and thoroughly integrated with NASA developments and with characteris-
tics suitable for NASA needs.
We have agreedjoindy in recommending the addition of $62 million for the DoD in
FY 1962 to undertake the development of large scale solid propellant rocket motors.
[ 17] TAB A: THE SOVIET PROGRAM AND CAPABILITIES
Attachment A depicts the Soviet space program in considerable detail. It is separated
from this report for security reasons, but it should be read by the key policy makers con-
cerned with the U.S. space program. It should be read not only because of what it tells
about the Soviet program in space, but for what it reveals concerning the caliber of the
competition we are up against in this important arena of the cold war.
Attachment A reveals a set of Soviet undertakings and achievements of enviable sim-
plicity and unmatched success. With the possible exception of the first two launchings, a
single ICBM booster has been used on all Soviet space shots. A small family of intermedi-
ate and final stages has been combined to form a total of only three different configura-
tions. The Soviets have placed only 14 space craft into orbit around the earth, the moon,
or elsewhere in the planetary system.
The Soviets have employed a single launch complex for all ICBM and space launchings.
All shots have been made in the same direction whether for ICBM tesdng, earth-orbit
missions (including man in space), or lunar and deep space missions. These features of
the Soviet program evidence long-range planning which in all probability began early in
the 1950-1960 decade.
The U.S. did not undertake a corresponding planning effort at the national level
until much later. Space was not recognized as an area of importance to be planned for and
pursued until after Sputnik I. Great efforts were then made to utilize the tools at hand to
enter the space arena. Early projects were undertaken on a crash basis. New governmental
and industrial organizations were formed and expanded under pressure and in haste. For
several years it was necessary to "make do" with too-small boosters and launch vehicles
employing devices developed and deployed with unusual urgency. However dedicated or
effective such efforts were, they were not the product of a deliberate effort adhering to
preplanning schedules and objectives.
[18]The U.S. space program in the past three years reflects this situation in many
ways. We have been forced to design with inadequate margins for error or deficiencies in
thrust. We have been forced to develop elaborate and often unreliabie new ways to cram
complex equipments in a very small space. Our results have, despite many excellent achieve-
ments, been disappointing in many important ways. Nearly half of our attempted launchings
failed to achieve orbit. Certain programs achieved success, real success, on fewer than a
third of all attempts. To a large degree, though not entirely, of course, these disappoint-
ments are symptoms of the lack of adequate national planning and guidance for the long
pull.
It is possible, of course, that the Soviet program is not actually the result of careful
planning toward long range goals. It may only appear that way in retrospect. It is possible,
too, that Soviet management and decision making is not as excellent as it appears to date.
Perhaps the poverty of their resources forced concentration on a brute force approach
which paid off not as the result of initiative and forethought but through the force of
circumstances which left no other choice. Perhaps luck played an important part at an
early stage and the Soviets were wise enough and swift enough to exploit it far beyond any
initial long range plan.
These are conjectures. The evidence points dramatically to the existence of long
range planning and competent and flexible technical decision making and managerial
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direction. It is prudent to suppose that the next decade will be marked with Soviet achieve-
ments in space which will be well planned, well directed, and executed with deliberateness
and skill.
Attachment A indicates the manner in which we can estimate key milestones of the
future of the Soviet program by extrapolating our present knowledge. Doubtless, the
Soviet plan is not irrevocably fixed and includes options and decision points which will
enable them to pace their achievements in relation to ours and to Soviet national objec-
fives ....
[27]
Tab C
SPACE ACTIVITIES OFTHE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
New ObUgational Authority/Program Basismin millions
Historical Summary and Proposed 1962 Add-ons
_t_' _ _._Q' NSF' WB_ T_
1955 ........ $ 56.9 $ 3.0
1956 ........ 72.7 30.3 $ 7.0 $7.3
1957 ........ 78.2 71.0 21.3 8.4
1958 ........ 117.3 205.6 21,3 3.3
1959 ........ 338.9 489.5 34.3
1960 ........ 523.6 560.9 43.3 .1
1961 ........ 964.0 751.7 62.7 .6
1962 Budget.. 1,109.6 846,9 55,1 1.6
Budget amendments _ 1590 _ _-
Total present
1962 Budget 1,235.3
Proposed 62 Add-ons __
Total 1962 Proposals $1,784.3
$2,2
$ 59.9
117.3
178.9
3475
862.7
1,127.9
1,779.0
$2,015.4
3O8.2
1,005.9 78,6 1.6 2.2 2,323.6
$1,082,9 $85,6 $1.6 $55.2 $3,009.6
1. National Aeronautics and Space Administration amounts are totals for all activities of NASA and
include totals for NACA prior to establishment of NASA.
2. Department of Defense amounts are based on identifiable Defense funding for space and space-
related effort and do not include substantial amounts for (1) construction and operation of the national missile
ranges with regard to space programs, (2) the cost of developing missiles such as Thor and Atlas which are
also used in space programs, or (3) supporting research and development (such as bio-medicaI research)
which is more or less mutually applicable to programs other than "space"
3. Atomic Energy Commission amounts are those identifiable with ROVER nuclear rocket and SNAP
atomic power source projects.
4. National Science Foundation amounts are those identifiable with VANGUARD and with the NSF
space telescope project.
5. Weather Bureau amounts are those identifiable with the meteorological satellite program.
6. AEC add-on for ROVER corresponding to the $23 million included in proposed NASA add-ons.
7. Add-on for initiation of operational NIMBUS system under consideration by Department of Com-
merce.
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[28] NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
FY 1962 BUDGET AND PROPOSED ADD-ONS
(In Millions)
Original 1962 Present Proposed Total
1962 Budget 1962 1962 1962
Amendment _ Add-one
I. Major Vehicle & Propulsion
Day. Projects
A. Centaur ......................... $ 49.8 $ 25.6 $ 75.4
B. Saturn ............................ 212.8 73.0' 285.8
C. Rover (NASA only) ....... 13.5 4.0 17.5
D. F-1 Engine and Nova
Vehicle ........................... 33.4 9.3 42.7
E. Large Solid Boosters .... 2.0 2.0
F. Other Projects ............... 6.6 6.6
$ 23.0"
112.5
II. Major Space Flight Programs
A. Mercury ......................... 74.2
B. Other Manned
Space Flight .................. 29.5
C. Meteorology .................. 28.2
D. Communications ........... 34.6
E. Scientific Satellites &
Sounding Rockets ......... 72.2
F. Unmanned Lunar
Exploration .................... 71.7
O. Unmanned Planetary
Exploration .................... 32.2
10.0
$ 75.4
285.8
40.5
155.2
2.0
6.6
74.2 74.2
29.5 210.5 240.0
28.2 22.0 50.2
44.6 50.0 94.6
72,2 15.0 87.2
III. Supporting Development and
Operations
A. NASA Development Centers
& Launch Operations .... 164.0
B. Tracking and Data
Acquisition ..................... 60.2
C. Other Supporting
Development ................. 57.7
71.7 63,0 134.7
32.2 32.2
3.0 = 167.0 28.0 = 195.0
-1.0 59.2 59.2
57.7 25.0 82.7
IV. Aeronautical and Space
Research ....................... 142.7 1.3' 144.0 144.0
V. Program Direction ......... 24.3 .5 24.8 24.8
Total NASA ......................... $1,109.6 $125.7 $1,235.3 $549.0 $1,784.3
' Total of $78 million identified with Saturn C-2 includes $5 million of supporting costs on line III-A.
' Consists of $5 million for support identified with Saturn C-2 less $2 million adjustment in other support-
ing costs.
' Consists of $2 million identified with the supersonic transport less $.7 million adjustment on a vivarium
construction project.
• Would require corresponding add-on of $7 million for AEC.
6 Part of this amount may be applied to IV and V.
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[29] DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
SPACE AND RELATED PROGRAMS 1
FY 1962 BUDGET AND PROPOSED ADD-ONS
Original 1962 Present
1962 Budget 1962
Amendment
DISCOVERER .................... $ 24.9 $ 30.0 $ 54.9
SAMOS ............................... 282.2 282.2
MIDAS ................................. 147.6 60.0 207.6
TRANSIT ............................ 22.4 22.4
ADVENT ............................. 57,0 15.0 72.0
SAINT ................................. 12,0 14.0 26.0
SPACETRACK .................... 34.0 34.0
SPASUR ............................. 4.3 4.3
BLUE SCOUT .................... 5.0 10.0 15.0
WESTFORD ....................... 4.3 4.3
X-15 .................................... 7.0 7.0
DYNASOAR (Step I) ........... 76.5 30.0 106.5
Component development/
Applied Research/Other., 169.7 169.7
Large Solid Booster ...........
CENTAUR BACKUP ...........
TOTAL DOD Space and
Related Programs ............
Proposed
1962
Total
1962
Prooosed
$ 54.9
282.2
207.6
22.4
72.0
26.0
34.0
4.3
15.0
4.3
7.0
106.5
169.7
62.0 62.0
15.0 15.0
$846.9 $159.0 $1,005.9 $77.0 $1,082.9
1. Covers identifiable DOD funding for space and space-related effort; does not include substantial
amounts for (1) construction and operation of the national missile ranges with regard to space programs. (2)
supporting research and development (such as bio-medical research) which is more or less mutually appli-
cable to programs other than "space," and (3) the cost of developing missiles such as ATLAS and THOR which
are also used in space programs.
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[30] ESTIMATED PROJECTIONS OF N.A.S.A. end DEFENSE SPACE PROGRAMS
(Excludes A.E.C., Weather Bureau, and N.S.F.)
New Obligational Authority/Program Basis--In Millions
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
BASE PROJECTIONS (Includes only (1) conti-
nuing programs end (2) major projects
currently underway or approved for
initiation in the amended 1962 Budget):
N .A.S.A ..................
Defense .................
Total .......................
OTHER CURRENT PLANS (Projects which would
be initiated in 1963 or later Budgets
under current agency plans):
N.A.S.A ..................
Defense .................
Total .......................
TOTAL PROJECTIONS OF CURRENT AGENCY
PROGRAMS:
N .A.S.A ..................
Defense .................
Total .......................
INCREASED FUNDING REQUIREMENTS RESULTING
FROM PROPOSED ADD-ONS:
N.A.S.A ..................
Defense .................
Total .......................
TOTAL PROJECTIONS OF PROPOSED PROGRAMS:
N.A.S.A ..................
Defense .................
Total .......................
1235 1390 1275 1215 1070
1006 1300 1360 1475 1675
2241 2690 2635 2690 2745
-- 799 1051 1520 1595
.............. NOT AVAILABLE ..............
-- 799 1051 1520 1595
1235 2189 2326 2735 2665
1006 1300 1360 1475 1675
2241 3489 3688 4210 4340
549 785 1917 1917 1959
77 150 160 125 100
626 935 2077 2042 2059
1784 2974 4243 4652 4624
1083 1450 1520 1600 1775
2867 4424 5763 6252 6399
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Document 111-12
Document tide: John E Kennedy, Excerpts from "Urgent National Needs," Speech to a
Joint Session of Congress, May 25, 1961.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
This is the section of President Kennedy's "reading text" of his address to a Joint
Session of Congress in which he called for sending Americans to the Moon "before this
decade is out." President Kennedy in his own hand modified the prepared text of his
remarks. The text as written, modified, and ultimately delivered varies considerably. Kennedy
ad-libbed three additional paragraphs near the end of his speech.
Handwritten additions to the text are contained in brackets, Portions of the text that
Kennedy crossed out are contained in parentheses.
[63] IX. Space
Finally, if we are to win the battle for men's minds, [64] the dramatic achievements in
space which occurred in recent weeks should have made clear to us all [as did the Sputnik
in 1957] the impact of this new frontier of human adventure. Since early in my term, our
efforts in space have been under review. With the advice of the Vice President [who is
Chairman of the National Space Council] we have examined where we are strong and
where we are not, where we may succeed and where we may not. Now it is time to take
longer strides -- time for a great new American enterprise -- time for this nation to take a
clearly leading role in space achievement [which in many ways may hold the key to our
future on earth].
[65] I believe we possess all the resources and all the talents necessary. But the facts
of the matter are that we have never made the national decisions or marshalled the na-
tional resources required for such leadership. We have never specified long range goals on
an urgent time schedule, or managed our resources and our time so as to insure their
fulfillment.
Recognizing the head start obtained by the Soviets with their large rocket engines,
which gives them many months of lead-time, [66] and recognizing the likelihood that they
will exploit this lead for some time to come in still more impressive successes, we neverthe-
less are required to make new efforts. For while we cannot guarantee that we shall one day
be first, we can guarantee that any failure to make this effort will find us last. We take an
additional risk by making it in full view of the world -- but as shown by the feat of astronaut
Shepard, this very risk enhances our stature when we are successful. But this is not merely
a race. [67] Space is open to us now; and our eagerness to share its meaning is not gov-
erned by the efforts of others. We go into space because whatever mankind must under-
take, free men must fully share.
I therefore ask the Congress, above and beyond the increases I have earlier requested
for space activities, to provide the funds which are needed to meet the following national
goals:
First, I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this
decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to earth. [68] No
single space project in this period will be more (exciting or) impressive [to mankind as it
makes its judgement of whether the world is free] or more important for the long-range
exploration of space; and none will be so difficult or expensive to accomplish. (Including
necessary supporting research, this objective will require an additional $531 million this
year and still higher sums in the future.) We propose to accelerate development of the
appropriate lunar space craft. We propose to develop alternate liquid and solid fuel boost-
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ers much larger than any now being developed, until certain which is superior. [69] We
propose additional funds for other engine development and for unmanned explorations
---explorations which are particularly important for one purpose which this nation will
never overlook: the survival of the man who first makes this daring flight. But in a very real
sense, it will not be one man going to the moon -- it will be an entire nation. For all of us
must work to put him there.
Second, an additional $23 million, together with $7 million already available, will ac-
celerate development of the ROVER nuclear rocket. [70] This (is a technological enter-
prise in which we are well on the way to striking progress, and which) gives promise of
some day providing a means for even more exciting and ambitious exploration of space,
perhaps beyond the moon, perhaps to the very ends of the solar system itself.
Third, an additional $50 million will make the most of our present leadership by
accelerating the use of space satellites for world-wide communications. When we have put
into space a system that will enable people in remote areas of the earth to exchange mes-
sages, hold conversations, [71] and eventually see television programs, we will have achieved
a success as beneficial as it will be striking.
Fourth, an additional $75 million -- of which $53 million is for the Weather Bureau
--will help give us at the earliest possible time a satellite system for world-wide weather
observation. (Such a system will be of inestimable commercial and scientific value; and the
information it provides will be made freely available to all the nations of the world.)
Let it be clear that I am asking the Congress and the country to accept a firm com-
mitment to a new course of action -- [72] a course which will last for many years and carry
very heavy costs [531 million dollars this year] -- an estimated $7-9 billion additional over
the next five years. If we were to go only halfway, or reduce our sights in the face of diffi-
cult),, it would be better not to go at all. [this is the choice and finally you and the American
public must decide for itself.]
Let me stress also that more money alone will not do the job. This decision demands
a major national commitment of scientific and technical manpower, material and facili-
ties, and the possibility of their diversion from other important activities where they are
already thinly spread. It means a degree of dedication, [73] organization and discipline
which have not always characterized our research and development efforts. It means we
cannot afford undue work stoppages, inflated costs of material or talent, wasteful inter-
agency rivalries, or a high turnover of key personnel.
New objectives and new money cannot solve these problems. They could, in fact,
aggravate them furthermunless every scientist, every engineer, every serviceman, every
technician, contractor, and civil servant involved gives his personal pledge that this nation
will move forward, with the full speed of freedom, in the exciting adventure of space.
Document 111-13
Document fl0e: Director, Bureau of the Budget, Memorandum for the President, Draft,
November 13, 1962, with attached: "Space Activities of the U.S. Government."
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
This memorandum summarized the results of a special review of the space program
carried out by the Bureau of the Budget, NASA, and the Department of Defense in the
second half of 1962. The assessment was in response to President's Kennedy's request for
"an especially critical review" of the total national space efforts. Other factors justifying the
review included NASA's decision to adopt the lunar orbital rendezvous approach to the
lunar mission and a subsequent upward revision in the budget estimates for Apollo; a
suggestion by Brainard Holmes, the individual in charge of the Apollo program, that the
target date for the first landing attempt be moved up from late 1967 to late 1966; and the
lack of evidence that the Soviet Union was itself carrying out a lunar landing program.
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[1] Memorandum for the President
This memorandum is to report the status and results to date of the special review of
space programs which we have been conducting with the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration and the Department of Defense, and to present two policy questions on
which your guidance is needed at this time:
1. The pace at which the manned lunar landing program should proceed, in view of
the budgetary implications and other considerations; and
2. The approach that should be taken to other space programs in the 1964 budget,
i.e., should they as a matter of policy be exempted from or subjected to the restrictive
budgetary ground rules applicable in 1964 to other programs of the Government.
Decisions on specific programs, and the final amounts to be included in the 1964
budget can wait. However, advance decisions on the above two policy questions are essen-
tial to guide the preparation of refined estimates and specific recommendations, espe-
cially in the case of NASA.
The special space review
A special space review was begun last summer in response to your request that the
space programs of all agencies be given an especially critical review and be presented to
you as a whole. As a part of the 1964 budget preview process we arranged to have the
tentative 5-year space programs of NASA, Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and
the Weather Bureau, as they stood last August, laid out on a comparable basis in consider-
able detail for consideration and [2] review. Subsequently the agencies have made some
significant revisions in the programs and cost estimates--notably an upward revision in
the cost estimates for the NASA manned lunar landing program--and the agencies and
the Bureau of the Budget have developed a variety of higher and lower alternative pro-
grams, have reviewed the more important individual programs, and have given special
consideration to areas where the programs and interests of the agencies overlap.
The 1964 budget estimates of the agencies now under consideration reflect many of
the results of the special review, and serve as a useful basis for the consideration of the
various policy alternatives outlined below. A more detailed table is attached as an appendix.
Current Agency Estimates
Newobligationalauthority- in billions
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Mannedlunar
landingprogram $1.3 $2.7 $4,6 $3,4 $2.6 $1.8
AllotherNASA ,5 1.0 1,6 2.6 3.4 4.2
Total,NASA 1,8 3.7 6,2 6.0 6.0 6.0
Departmentof
Defense 1.1 1.6 1.6 1.6" 1.6" 1.6"
AECand
WeatherBureau .2 .3 .4 .4 .5 .5
TotalNOA,
allspaceprograms 3.1 5.6 8.2 8.0 8.1 8.1
Totalexpenditures,
all spaceprograms 2.3 3.9 6.5 8.0 8.1
*Illustrativeamounts;currentestimatesnotyet projectedby DOD
8.1
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Manned lunar landing program
The question of the pace and budget level of the manned lunar landing program
revolves around (1) the acceptability of both the schedule and funding [3] requirements
of the program currently proposed by NASA; (2) the desirability, cost, and practical feasi-
bility of measures that might be taken to accelerate the program, which have been set
forth in a letter by Mr. Webb in reply to your question on the possibility of acceleration;
and (3) the merits of lower alternatives which would delay the program to some degree
but would ease the burden on the 1964 budget. There are three recent significant devel-
opments relating to the manned lunar landing program. One is that a firm decision has
been reached to proceed with the "lunar orbit rendezvous" approach. As you know, Dr.
Wiesner and his advisory committees have had strong reservations with respect to this
approach and advocated further studies and reconsideration of other alternatives. After
the latest round of studies and discussions, however, Dr. Wiesner has now agreed that
while it might have been better to have concentrated on the earth orbit rendezvous or a
2-man direct ascent approach from the start, in the present circumstances the NASA deci-
sion to proceed with the LOR approach is appropriate and offers the best possibility for
accomplishing the mission at the earliest practicable date. It is, however, desirable to con-
tinue the studies of the 2-man direct mode.
A second development is that NASA's latest estimates, based on the details of the
LOR approach as they have now been worked out, indicate that substantially higher amounts
would be required in 1963 and 1964 to keep the entire program on an optimum
schedule-over $400 million in 1963 above the amounts now appropriated and about $550
million in 1964 above the initial LOR estimates last August. These revised estimates, re-
flected in the [4] alternatives below, accentuate the budgetary problem, and illustrate
once again the tendency for repeated increases in estimated costs of large and complex
development projects, while there are reasons to believe that the present estimates are
much firmer than previous ones, we cannot with any confidence say that there will not be
still further increases in this, without doubt, the largest and most complex single develop-
ment project the nation has ever undertaken. Third, our understanding of the latest intel-
ligence estimates is that there is no evidence yet that the Russians are actually developing
either a larger booster of the size required for a manned lunar landing attempt or rendez-
vous techniques of the sort that would be required to assemble a manned lunar landing
vehicle in earth orbit using their available boosters. While not conclusive, this suggests
that extreme measures to advance somewhat our own target dates may not be necessary to
preserve a good possibility that we will be first.
The range of possible alternatives is as follows. As indicated in the explanations, all
of the alternatives are not equally feasible and have not been worked out in the same
detail. In all of the alternatives the "schedule" is to be understood as the target date estab-
lished for program planning and estimating purposes, not as a forecast of when the first
manned lunar landing attempts would actually be made. Experience has shown that on a
realistic basis slippage of as much as a year must be anticipated.
[5] Manned Lunar Landing Program
MLLtarget
date
NOAin billions
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
AlternativeI late 1967 $2.7 $4.6 $3.4 $2.6 $1.8
Alternative2 mid-1967 3.1 4.6 3.2 2,4 t .8
Alternative3 late 1966 3.6 5.4 3.9 3,0 1.0
Alternative4 late 1968 2.7 3.7 3.5 2,7 2.1
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Alternative 1. Assumes no 1963 supplemental and a late 1967 target date, which is
regarded as the earliest feasible without a 1963 supplemental. It is included in NASA's
current 1964 budget estimates as the alternative preferred by NASA on the basis of cur-
rent policy guidance, recognizing the practical problems involved in getting timely ap-
proval of a 1963 supplemental authorization and appropriation. This alternative involves a
sharp peaking of fund requirements in 1964, because the normal funding curves for all of
the principal subprojects Gemini, Apollo, Advanced Saturn, etc.--have to peak in the same
year--in order to meet the assumed schedule. (There is some doubt whether the require-
ments in 1965 will drop as much as present estimates indicate.)
Alternative 2. Assumes a 1963 supplemental of about $425 million with approval to
proceed immediately on a deficiency basis in anticipation of the supplemental, and a
mid-1967 target date. This is the "optimum" schedule referred to above. This alternative,
which might accelerate the schedule by about 6 months, would require a strong presiden-
tial endorsement and the concurrence of congressional leaders and the appropriations
committees with the decision to proceed on a deficiency basis. Because of the practical
problems, it is not strongly advocated by Mr. Webb as the appropriate course for the ad-
ministration to take.
[6] Alternative 3. Assumes a 1963 supplemental of $900 million, approval to proceed
on a deficiency basis in 1963, and a decision to proceed on an all-out "crash" basis. NASA
estimates that these measures of maximum acceleration might advance the date of a first
attempt by as much as one year. This alternative would also require strong Presidential
endorsement and congressional concurrence. It would create enormous additional man-
agement problems, and in NASA's view and ours would not appear to offer enough assur-
ance of actually advancing the date of a successful attempt to be worth the cost and other
problems involved.
Alternative 4. This is an estimate of the minimum amount ($3.7 billion) that could
be provided in 1964 and still accommodate a program based on a target date about one
year later than alternative 1. A new detailed program would have to be worked out under
these dollar and schedule assumptions, and there would be considerable dislocations in
activities now underway in 1963. This alternative is significant as indicating probably about
the lowest 1964 estimate under which the first actual manned lunar landing might still be
expected to occur during this decade, after a realistic allowance for slippage. As such it
could be regarded as being in accord with the announced administration policy of achiev-
ing a manned lunar landing before the end of this decade. It would also represent an
approach to the manned lunar landing program more closely corresponding to the re-
strictive approach we are taking with respect to other parts of the 1964 budget.
I agree with Mr. Webb that alternative 1, the NASA recommendation, is probably the
most appropriate choice at this time to press forward to achieve a manned lunar landing
ahead of the Russians. While it will be criticized [7] in some quarters as representing
slightly less than a maximum effort, I believe that practical as well as budgetory consider-
ations make a more accelerated program, like alternatives 2 or 3, inadvisable ....
Other NASA programs
The special attention give to the manned lunar landing program has sometimes ob-
scured the other program objectives being pursued by NASA. Perhaps the most important
are the programs for scientific investigations in space, in which the United States has from
the start been the recognized world leader, which have important intrinsic value, which
have been the focus of significant programs of international cooperation, and which in
some cases, for example if the Mariner spacecraft succeeds in its voyage to Venus, can
provide spectacular achievements with some of the same popular appeal as manned space
flights. Less costly, but most important, are the programs directed at developing practical
applications of space technology, chiefly in the meteorological and communications fields.
Finally, there is the continuing research and development effort required to lay the techni-
cal foundation for and begin the development of engines and other components, space
vehicles, and techniques for future manned and unmanned space flight.
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There is no disagreement that work in all of these areas should continue and move
forward on a progressive basis, with appropriate decisions and coordination of the specific
projects and areas of effort. The policy issue relates to the scale of effort and relative prior-
ity of the work.
There are essentially two alternatives, indicated by the following figures:
Other NASA Programs
(Exclusive of amounts supportingmanned lunar landing program)
1964 NOA - in billions
Scientific investigations in space
Applications (communications
& meteorology)
Future capabilities & supporting research
& development
Total
NASA Illustrative
proposal alternate
$.6 $.4
.2 .2
.8 .7
1.6 1.3
NASA takes the view that the importance of maintaining the proposed general level
of effort in the "other" areas is so great that if any reduction were to be made in the $6.2
billion budget request, it should be applied at least in part to the manned lunar landing
program, in order to maintain a "balanced" total program. The Administrator and his
principal assistants are fearful that the appeal and priority of the manned lunar landing
program may turn NASA in to a "one program agency" with loss of leadership and standing
in the scientific community at home and abroad, and with inadequate provision [9] for
moving ahead with developments required for future capabilities in apace. They point to
the fact that to some extent the MLL and other programs are mutually supporting in a
technical sense, although all scientific investigations and supporting research direcdy re-
quired for the manned lunar program have been identified and provided for in that pro-
gram.
While recognizing the force of these arguments, it seems to me that (1) as in other
research and development programs, the level of effort to be carried forward is, within
limits, essentially a matter of degree, and (2) the decision to proceed with the manned
lunar landing program as a matter of high urgency has been a unique sort of national
decision which does not automatically endow other space objectives and programs with a
special degree of urgency. Rather, it seems to me the appropriate national policy is to
attempt to maintain a reasonable degree of balance between the very costly space pro-
grams, and research and development programs in other fields. Under the policies being
applied to the 1964 budget, this would mean that the estimates for NASA programs other
than the manned lunar landing should be treated on their merits in the same restrictive
fashion as other programs. I feel that a restrictive approach is especially appropriate in
1964 in view of the tremendous peaking in 1964 fund requirements that will occur if alter-
native 1 is approved for the manned lunar landing program.
The practical effect on the 1964 budget of this policy difference is about $300 mil-
lion in NOA and about $150 million in expenditures. While these amounts seem small
compared to the totals for the space program, they are large compared to most of the
other possibilities of adjustment in the 1964 [10] budget. The difference is not greater
because NASA's proposals had already deferred to 1965 or later years initiation of most of
the major new development projects under consideration, largely for reasons of technical
feasibility, pardy in recognition of the major effort required in 1964 on the manned lunar
landing program. Our recommendation should not be equated with a "no new starts"
policy, since even under the restrictive approach we feel would be appropriate, the pro-
gram would include initiation of additional satellites of types currently available, new types
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of experiments, and some new development projects, as well as continuation of work al-
ready underway.
Defense and other space programs
The space programs of Defense, AEC, and the Weather Bureau do not present policy
issues requiring resolution in advance of the final 1964 budget decisions. In the case of
Defense, the Secretary and his assistants have taken a restrictive approach in their reviews,
based on the conclusion that there are no valid new military requirements which justify at
this time a major expansion in the military space programs. Special attention is being
given in the budget reviews to the necessity for proceeding with the Titan III and Dynasoar
projects, and to the approach that should be taken in the development of communica-
tions satellite systems. The communications satellite problem is complex, involving NASA,
Defense, and prospectively the new corporation authorized at the last session of Congress.
The alternatives and our recommendations on this matter will be presented to you at a
later date.
[11 ] Financial summary
The financial effect on the 1964 budget of the policy alternadves that appear most
pertinent on the basis of the foregoing discussion are summarized below. It should be
recognized that all estimates shown are subject to further adjustment when the regular
budget review is completed.
New Obllgatlonsl Authority
Fiscal Year 1964 - in billions
Current Current
agency BOB
estimates estimates
Manned lunar landing $4.6 $4.6
Other NASA 1.6 1.3
Total NASA
Defense space programs 1.6 1.6
AEC and Weather Bureau .4 .4
Total NOA 8.2 7.9
Expenditures
Manned lunar banding 3.4 3.4
Other NASA 1.2 1.0
Total NASA 4.6 4.4
Total Defense and other 1.9 1.9
Total expenditures 6.5 6.3
In closing, I should point out that under any alternative we will be faced with a large
built-in further increase in expenditures in 1965 which we now tentatively estimate at about
$1.3 billion.
Director
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Attachment
[12] SPACE ACTIVITIES OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT
Based on agency estimates as of November 9, 1962 - Subject
to change as budget reviews proceed
National Aeronautics
and Space Administration
New Obliaational Authority - in million_
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Manned Lunar Landing Program
Spacecraft Development and
Operations (Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, etc.) $703 $1,536 $1,101 $978 $666
Launch Vehicle and Engine Development (Saturn,
Advanced Saturn, and their engines) 660 1,028 796 579 361
Engineering Support (Systems engineering, integration,
and checkout; aerospace medicine; launch operations) 72 244 207 173 165
Supporting Scientific Investigations in Space (Unmanned
lunar exploration, orbiting solar observatories, radiation
and bioscience satellites, etc.) 291 411 356 299 216
Other Support (Supporting research and development;
tracking networks; NASA personnel and operation of
installations) 397 609 569 517 316
Construction (Launch, ground test, laboratory,
and support fac.) 586 785 343 91 51
Total, MLL Program 2,709 4,613 3,372 2,637 1,775
Other NASA Programs
Other space sciences programs (Geophysical and
astronomical satellites and unmanned exploration of
Venus and Mars) 353 590 629 655 522
Applications programs
(Development of meteorological and communications
satellites) 129 186 144 108 102
Developments required for advanced manned space flight
(Advanced engine development, nuclear rocket project,
and studies of advanced manned space vehicles) 299 485 685 913 982
Other supporting research
(General space technology, aeronautical research, and
research grants and facilities for universities) 203 343 359 394 430
Provision for unspecified new programs 811 1,293 2,189
Total, Other NASA Programs 984 1,604 2,628 3,363 4,225
3 693 6,217 6,000 6,000 6,000Total, NASA
Department of Defense
Navigation satellite development and operation 45 35 * *
Communications satellite development 95 76 * *
Dynasoar manned space flight experiments 130 125 *
Dynasoar support at Vela nuclear weapons test
detection experiments 26 26
Discoverer program 130 79 *
Titan Itl launch vehicle development 261 330 153 29 3
Large solid rocket development 40 34 * *
Atlantic Missile Range (portion estimated as
applicable to space activities) 80 88
Space tracking & detection systems 33 57
Minor projects, supporting research & development,
laboratory operations, and miscellaneous 651 706 *
Total, Defense space activities 1,631 1,646 1,600 1,600 1,600
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Atomic Energy Commission
Nuclear rocket developmant (Rover) 105 170 172 180 170
Space nuclear power development 95 128 187 214 204
Supporting activities 12 2 t 24 29 29
Total, AEC apace activities 212 319 383 423 403
Weather Bureau
Operational meteorological satellite system & related
meteorological research 43 41 60 60
TOTAL, all space activities 5,579 8,223 8,043 8,083
* Current estimates not yet projected for all items by Defense; total shown is illustrative only.
60
8,063
Document 111-14
Document tide: James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, to the President, November 30, 1962.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
In November 1962, a controversy had arisen between NASA Administrator James
Webb and the man he had selected to manage the Apollo program, Associate Administra-
tor for Manned Space Flight R. Brainard Holmes, over the priority to be assigned to the
Apollo program. Holmes argued that Apollo should be carried out on a crash basis and, if
necessary, should be funded at the expense of other NASA programs. Webb, in contrast,
believed that Apollo was just a part, albeit a very important part, of a balanced space effort
aimed at across-the-board preeminence in space. In a November 21 meeting with Presi-
dent Kennedy and in this follow-up letter, Webb forcefully argued his position. Kennedy
accepted the argument, and soon after Holmes left NASA. This letter presents a compre-
hensive overview of James Webb's concept of the space program that he was attempting to
execute.
[ 1] At the close of our meeting on November 21, concerning possible acceleration of
the manned lunar landing program, you requested that I describe for you the priority of
this program in our overall civilian space effort. This letter has been prepared by Dr. Dryden,
Dr. Seamans, and myself to express our views on this vital question.
The objective of our national space program is to become preeminent in all impor-
tant aspects of this endeavor and to conduct the program in such a manner that our emerg-
ing scientific, technological, and operational competence in space is clearly evident.
To be preeminent in space, we must conduct scientific investigations on a broad
front. We must concurrently investigate geophysical phenomena about the earth, analyze
the sun's radiation and its effect on earth, explore the moon and the planets, make mea-
surements in interplanetary space, and conduct astronomical measurements.
To be preeminent in space, we must also have an advancing technology that permits
increasingly large payloads to orbit the earth and to travel to the moon and the planets.
We must substantially improve our propulsion capabilities, must provide methods for de-
livering large amounts of internal power, must develop instruments and life support sys-
tems that operate for extended periods, and must learn to transmit large quantifies of data
over long distances.
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To be preeminent in operations in space, we must be able to launch our vehicles at
prescribed times. We must develop the capability to place payloads in exact orbits. We
must maneuver in space and rendezvous with cooperative spacecraft and, for knowledge
of the military potential with uncooperative spacecraft. We must develop techniques for
landing on the moon and the planets, and for re-entry into the earth's atmosphere at
increasingly high velocities. Finally, we must learn the process of fabrication, inspection,
assembly, and check-out that will provide vehicles with life expectancies in space measured
in years rather than months. Improved reliability is required for astronaut safety, long
duration scientific measurements, and for economical meteorological and communica-
tions systems.
[2] In order to carry out this program, we must continually up-rate the competence
of Government research and flight centers, industry, and universities, to implement their
special assignments and to work together effectively toward common goals. We also must
have effective working relationships with many foreign countries in order to track and
acquire data from our space vehicles and to carry out research projects of mutual interest
and to utilize satellites for weather forecasting and world-wide communications.
Manned Lunar Landing Program
NASA has many flight missions, each directed toward an important aspect of our
national objective. The manned lunar landing program requires for its successful comple-
tion many, though not all, of these flight missions. Consequently, the manned lunar land-
ing program provides currently a natural focus for the development of national capability
in space and, in addition, will provide a clear demonstration to the world of our accom-
plishments in space. The program is the largest single effort within NASA, constituting
three-fourths of our budget, and is being executed with the utmost urgency. All major
activities of NASA, both in headquarters and in the field, are involved in this effort, either
partially or full time.
In order to reach the moon, we are developing a launch vehicle with a payload capa-
bility 85 times that of the present Atlas booster. We are developing flexible manned space-
craft capable of sustaining a crew of three for periods up to 14 days. Technology is being
advanced in the areas of guidance and navigation, re-entry, life support, and structures---
in short, almost all elements of booster and spacecraft technology.
The lunar program is an extrapolation of our Mercury experience. The Gemini space-
craft will provide the answers to many important technological problems before the first
Apollo flights. The Apollo program will commence with earth orbital maneuvers and cul-
minate with the one-week trip to and from the lunar surface. For the next five to six years
there will be many significant events by which the world will judge the competence of the
United States in space.
The many diverse elements of the program are now being scheduled in the proper
sequence to achieve this objective and to emphasize the major milestones as we pass them.
For the years ahead, each of these tasks must be carried out on a priority basis.
[3] Although the manned lunar landing requires major scientific and technological
effort, it does not encompass all space science and technology, nor does it provide funds to
support direct applications in meteorological and communications systems. Also, univer-
sity research and many of our international projects are not phased with the manned
lunar program, although they are extremely important to our future competence and
posture in the world community.
Space Science
As already indicated, space science includes the following distinct areas: geophysical,
solar physics, lunar and planetary science, interplanetary science, astronomy, and space
biosciences.
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Atpresent,bycomparisonwiththepublishedinformationfromtheSovietUnion,
theUnitedStatesclearlyleadsin geophysics,solarphysics,andinterplanetaryscience.
Evenhere,however,it mustberecognizedthattheRussianshavewithinthepastyear
launchedamajorseriesofgeophysicals tellites,theresultsofwhichcouldmateriallyalter
thebalance.Inastronomy,weareinaperiodofpreparationforsignificantadvances,us-
ingtheOrbitingAstronomicalObservatorywhichisnowunderdevelopment.It isnot
knownhowfartheRussianplanshaveprogressedin thisimportantarea.In spacebio-
sciencesandlunarandplanetaryscience,theRussiansenjoyadefiniteleadatthepresent
time.It isthereforessentialthatwepushforwardwithourownprogramsineachofthese
importantscientificareasin ordertoretrieveormaintainourlead,andto beableto
identifythoseareas,unknownatthistime,whereanaddedpushcanmakeasignificant
breakthrough.
Abroad-basedspacescienceprogramprovidesnecessarysupporttotheachievement
ofmannedspaceflightleadingtolunarlanding.Thesuccessfullaunchandrecoveryof
mannedorbitingspacecraftinProjectMercurydependedonknowledgeof thepressure,
temperature,density,andcompositionfthehighatmosphereobtainedfromthenation's
previousscientificrocketandsatelliteprogram.Considerablymorespacesciencedataare
requiredfortheGeminiandApolloprojects.AthigheraltitudesthanMercury,thespace-
craftwillapproacht eradiationbeltthroughwhichmanwill traveltoreachthemoon.
Intenseradiationin thisbeltisamajorhazardtothecrew.Informationontheradiation
beltwilldeterminetheshieldingrequirementsandtheparkingorbitthatmustbeusedon
thewaytothemoon.[4]Onceoutsidetheradiationbelt,onaflighttothesoon,amannedspacecraftwill
beexposedtoburstsofhighspeedprotonsreleasedfromtimetotimefromflaresonthe
sun.Theseburstsdonotpenetratebelowtheradiationbeltbecausetheyaredeflectedby
theearth'smagneticfield,buttheyarehighlydangeroustomanin interplanetaryspace.
Theapproachandsafelandingofmannedspacecraftonthemoonwilldependon
morepreciseinformationonlunargravityandtopography.In addition,knowledgeofthe
bearingstrengthandroughnessofthelandingsiteisofcrucialimportance,l stheland-
ingmoduletoppleorsinkintothelunarsurface.
Manyof thedatarequiredforsupportofthemannedlunarlandingefforthaveal-
readybeenobtained,butasindicatedabovetherearemanycrucialpiecesofinformation
stillunknown.It isunfortunatethatthescientificprogramof thepastdecadewasnot
sufficientlybroadandvigoroustohaveprovideduswithmostofthesedata.Wecanlearn
alessonfromthissituation,however,andproceednowwithavigorousandbroadscientific
programnotonlytoprovidevitalsupporttothemannedlunarlanding,butalsotocover
ourfuturerequirementsforthecontinuedevelopmentofmannedflightinspace,forthe
furtherexplorationofspace,andforfutureapplicationsofspaceknowledgeandtechnol-
ogytopracticaluses.
Advanced Research and Technology
The history of modern technology has clearly shown that preeminence in a given
field of endeavor requires a balance between major projects which apply the technology,
on the one hand, and research which sustains it on the other. The major projects owe their
support and continuing progress to the intellectual activities of the sustaining research.
These intellectual activities in turn derive fresh vigor and motivation from the projects.
The philosophy of providing for an intellectual activity of research and an interlocking
cycle of application must be a cornerstone of our National Space Program.
The research and technology information which was established by the NASA and its
predecessor, the NACA, has formed the foundation for this nation's preeminence in
aeronautics, as exemplified by our military weapons systems, our world market in civil jet
airliners, and the unmatched manned flight within the atmosphere represented by the
X-15.
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[5] More recently, research effort of this type has brought the TFX concept to frui-
tion and similar work will lead to a supersonic transport which will enter a highly comped-
tive world market. The concept and design of these vehicles and their related propulsion,
controls, and structures were based on basic and applied research accomplished years
ahead. Government research laboratories, universities, and industrial research organiza-
tions were necessarily brought to bear over a period of many years prior to the appearance
before the public of actual devices or equipment.
These same research and technological manpower and laboratory resources of the
nation have formed a basis for the U.S. thrust toward pre-eminence in space during the
last four years. The launch vehicles, spacecraft, and associated systems including rocket
engines, reacdon control systems, onboard power generation, instrumentation and equip-
ment for communications, television and the measurement of the space environment it-
self have been possible in this time period only because of past research and technological
effort. Project Mercury could not have moved as rapidly or as successfully without the
information provided by years of NACA and later NASA research in providing a base of
technology for sage re-entry heat shields, practical control mechanisms, and life support
systems.
It is clear that a preeminence in space in the future is dependent upon an advanced
research and technology program which harnesses the nation's intellectual and inventive
genius and directs it along selective paths. It is clear that we cannot afford to develop
hardware for every approach but rather that we must select approaches that show the
greatest promise of payoff toward the objectives of our nation's space goals. Our research
on environmental effects is strongly focused on the meteoroid problem in order to pro-
vide information for the design of structures that will insure their integrity through space
missions. Our research program on materials must concentrate on those materials that
not only provide meteoroid protection but also may withstand the extremely high tem-
peratures which exist during re-entry as well as the extremely low temperatures of cryo-
genic fuels within the vehicle structure. Our research program in propulsion must explore
the concepts of nuclear propulsion for early 1970 applications and the even more ad-
vanced electrical propulsion systems that may become operational in the mid 1970's. A
high degree of selectivity must be and is exercised in all areas of research and advanced
technology to ensure that we are working on the major items that contribute to the nation's
goals that make up an over-all preeminence in space exploration. Research and technol-
ogy must precede and pace these established goals or a stagnation of progress in space will
inevitably result.
[6] Space Applications
The manned lunar landing program does not include our satellite applications ac-
tivities. There are two such program areas under way and supported separately: meteoro-
logical satellites and communications satellites. The meteorological satellite program has
developed the TIROS system, which has already successfully orbited six spacecraft and
which has provided the foundation for the joint NASA-Weather Bureau planning for the
national operational meteorological satellite system. This system will center on the use of
the Nimbus satellite which is presently under development, with an initial research and
development flight expected at the end of 1963. The meteorological satellite develop-
ments have formed an important position for this nadon in international discussions of
peaceful uses of space technology for world benefits.
NASA has under way a research and development effort directed toward the early
realization of a practical communication satellite system. In this area, NASA is working
with the Department of Defense on the Syncom (stationary, 24-hour orbit, communica-
tions satellite) project in which the Department of Defense is providing ground station
support for NASA's spacecraft development; and with commercial interests, for example,
AT&T on the Telstar project. The recent "Communications Satellite Act of 1962" makes
NASA responsible for advice to and cooperation with the new Communications Satellite
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Corporation,aswellasforlaunchingoperationsfortheresearchend/oroperationalneeds
oftheCorporation.Thedetailsofsuchprocedureswillhavetobedefinedaftertheestab-
lishmentoftheCorporation.It isclear,however,thatthistremendouslyimportantapplica-
tionofspacet chnologywillbedependentonNASA'ssupportforearlydevelopmentand
implementation.
University Participation
In our space program, the university is the principal institution devoted to and de-
signed for the production, extension, and communication of new scientific and technical
knowledge. In doing its job, the university intimately relates the training of people to the
knowledge acquisition process of research. Further, they are the only institutions which
produce more trained people. Thus, not only do they yield fundamental knowledge, but
they are the sources of the scientific and technical manpower needed generally for NASA
to meet its program objectives.
In addition to the direct support of the space program and the training of new tech-
nical and scientific personnel, the university is uniquely qualified to bring to bear the
thinking of multidisciplinary [7] groups on the present-day problems of economic, politi-
cal, and social growth. In this regard, NASA is encouraging the universities to work with
local industrial, labor, and governmental leaders to develop ways and means through which
the tools developed in the space program can also be utilized by the local leaders in work-
ing on their own growth problems. This program is in its infancy, but offers great promise
in the working out of new ways through which economic growth can be generated by the
spin-off from our space and related research and technology.
International Activity
The National Space Program also serves as the base for international projects of
significant technical and political value. The peaceful purposes of these projects have been
of importance in opening the way for overseas tracking and data acquisition sites neces-
sary for manned flight and other programs which, in many cases, would otherwise have
been unobtainable. Geographic areas of special scientific significance have been opened
to cooperative sounding rocket ventures of immediate technical value. These programs
have opened channels for the introduction of new instrumentation and experiments re-
flecting the special competence and talent of foreign scientists. The cooperation of other
countries - indispensable to the ultimate achievement of communication satellite systems
and the allocation of needed radio frequencies--has been obtained in the form of over-
seas ground terminals contributed by those countries. International exploitation and en-
hancement of the meteorological experiments through the synchronized participation of
some 35 foreign nations represent another by-product of the applications program and
one of particular interest to the less developed nations, including the neutrals, and even
certain of the Soviet bloc satellite nations.
These international activities do not in most cases require special funding; indeed,
they have brought participation resulting in modest savings. Nevertheless, this program of
technical and political value can be maintained only as an extension of the underlying
on-going programs, many of which are not considered part of the manned lunar landing
program, but of importance to space science and direct applications.
Summary and Conclusion
In summarizing the views which are held by Dr. Dryden, Dr. Seamans, and myselt,
and which have guided our joint efforts to develop the National Space Program, I would
emphasize that the manned lunar landing [8] program, although of highest national pri-
ority, will not by itself create the preeminent position we seek. The present interest of the
United States in terms of our scientific posture and increasing prestige, and our future
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interest in terms of having an adequate scientific and technological base for space activi-
ties beyond the manned lunar landing, demand that we pursue an adequate, well-balanced
space program in all areas, including those not direcdy related to the manned lunar land-
ing. We strongly believe that the United States will gain tangible benefits from such a total
accumulation of basic scientific and technological data as well as from the greatly increased
strength of our educational institutions. For these reasons, we believe it would not be in
the nation's long-range interest to cancel or drastically curtail on-going space science and
technology development programs in order to increase the funding of the manned lunar
landing program in fiscal year 1963.
The fiscal year 1963 budget for major hardware development and flight missions not
part of the manned lunar landing program, as well as the university program, totals $400
million. This is the amount which the manned space flight program is short. Cancellation
of this effort would eliminate all nuclear developments, our international sounding rocket
projects, the joint U.S.-Italian San Marcos project recendy signed by Vice President Johnson,
all of our planetary and astronomical flights, and the communication and meteorological
satellites. It should be realized that savings to the Government from this cancellation would
be a small fraction of this total since considerable effort has already been expended in
fiscal year 1963. However, even if the full amount could be realized, we would strongly
recommend against this action.
In aeronautical and space research, we now have a program under way that will in-
sure that we are covering the essential areas of the "unknown." Perhaps of one thing only
can we be certain; that the ability to go into space and return at will increases the likeli-
hood of new basic knowledge on the order of the theory that led to nuclear fission.
Finally, we believe that a supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 1963 is not nearly
so important as to obtain for fiscal year 1964 the funds needed for the continued vigorous
prosecution of the manned lunar landing program $4.6 billion) and for the continuing
development of our program in space science ($670 million), advanced research and tech-
nology ($263 million), space application ($185 million), and advanced manned flight in-
cluding nuclear propulsion ($485 million).
[9] The funds already appropriated permit us to maintain a driving, vigorous pro-
gram in the manned space flight area aimed at a target date of late 1967 for the lunar
landing. We are concerned that the efforts required to pass a supplemental bill through
the Congress, coupled with Congressional reaction to the practice of deficiency spending,
could adversely affect our appropriations for fiscal year 1964 and subsequent years, and
permit critics to focus on such items as charges that "overruns stem from poor manage-
ment instead of on the tremendous progress we have made and are making.
As you know, we have supplied the Bureau of the Budget complete information on
the work that can be accomplished at various budgetary levels running from $5.2 billion to
$6.6 billion for fiscal year 1964. We have also supplied the Bureau of the Budget with
carefully worked out schedules showing that approval by you and the Congress of a 1964
level of funding of $6.2 billion together with careful husbanding and management of the
$3.7 billion appropriated for 1963 would permit maintenance of the target dates neces-
sary for the various milestones required for a final target date for the lunar landing of late
1967. The jump from $3.7 billion for 1963 to $6.2 billion for 1964 is undoubtedly going to
raise more questions than the previous year jump from $1.8 billion to $3.7 billion.
If your budget for 1964 supports our request for $6.2 billion for NASA, we feel rea-
sonably confident we can work with the committees and leaders of Congress in such a way
as to secure their endorsement of your recommendation and the incident appropriations.
To have moved in two years from President Eisenhower's appropriation request for 1962
of$1.1 billion to the approval of your own request for $1.8 billion, then for $3.7 billion for
1963 and on to $6.2 billion for 1964 would represent a great accomplishment for your
administration. We see a risk that this will be lost sight of in charges that the costs are
skyrocketing, the program is not under control, and so forth, if we request a supplemental
in fiscal year 1963.
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However, if it is your feeling that additional funds should be provided through a
supplemental appropriation request for 1963 rather than to make the main fight for the
level of support of the program on the basis of the $6.2 billion request for 1964, we will
give our best effort to an effective presentation and effective use of any funds provided to
speed up the manned lunar program.
With much respect, believe me
Sincerely yours,
James E. Webb
Administrator
Document111-15
Document title: John E Kennedy, Memorandum for the Vice President, April 9, 1963.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
Criticism of the priority assigned to the space program, and particularly Project Apollo,
increased in 1963. As he had the previous year, President Kennedy asked for a careful
review of the program. This time, however, unlike in 1962, Kennedy asked the vice presi-
dent and the Space Council, rather than the Bureau of the Budget, to carry out the review.
This increased the likelihood of an assessment generally favorable to the program as it
then stood.
[ 1] In view of recent discussions, I feel the need to obtain a clearer understanding of
a number of factual and policy issues relating to the National Space Program which seem
to arise repeatedly in public and other contexts. With this objective in mind, I would ap-
preciate having the Space Council give consideration, and replies, to the following ques-
tions:
1. What are the salient differences, as to planned technical and scientific accomplish-
ments, between the NASA program as projected on January 1, 1961 for the years 1962
through 1970, and the NASA programs as redefined by the present Administration? What
are the differences in the intended levels of funding, year by year, for the two projections?
The costs of which new major projects, or what reestimates in the costs of projects appear-
ing in both projections, are responsible for the year-by year differences in funding
between them? What would be the differences in accomplishments assuming the two pro-
grams were successful?
2. What specifically are the principal benefits to the national economy we can expect
to accrue from the present, greatly augmented program in the following areas: scientific
knowledge; industrial productivity; education, at the various levels beginning with high
school; and military technology? Please estimate in dollar terms the portion of the annual
expenditure that will result in contributions in each of these areas, from the present NASA
program, and from its predecessor.
[2] 3. What are some of the major problems likely to result from continuation of the
national space program as now projected in the fields of industry, government and educa-
tion? In particular, will research and development in the industrial and consumer prod-
ucts segments of the national economy suffer because of diversion of technical manpower
away from it, and/or from increasing costs of such research and development?
4. To what extent could the program be reduced, beginning with FY 1964, in areas
not directly affecting the Apollo program (and therefore not compromising the timetable
for the first manned lunar landing)? What are these areas, and the dollar amounts
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involved? Specifically, what would be the consequences in science, industrial productivity,
education and in other areas, if such reductions were imposed? Conversely, where would
you judge that the present projection merits expansion and, specifically, what kind of ben-
efits, in what areas, would ensue from such increases?
5. Are we taking sufficient measures to insure the maximum degree of coordination
and cooperation between NASA and the Defense Department in the areas of space ve-
hicles development and facility utilization?
I would appreciate receiving your report concerning the above by May 15, 1963.
I have sent a copy of this memorandum to Mr. Webb, with the request that he assist in
preparing the material needed for this review.
John F. Kennedy
Document 111-16
Document title: Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice President, to the President, May 13, 1963, with
attached report.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
The vice president transmitted with this letter the results of the review requested by
President Kennedy on April 9. The review compared NASA's 1962 plans with the 1960
NASA Long Range Plan. The report noted that the program accelerations that President
Kennedy had announced in his May 1961 speech would require a budget over $30 billion
greater during the 1960s than had been anticipated at the end of the Eisenhower adminis-
t_ration.
[1] Dear Mr. President:
Your memorandum of April 9 to me asked that the Space Council give consideration
and responses to five groups of questions regarding the National Space Program. Since
most of the questions were directed toward NASA's participation in that program, major
attention of the responses is also pointed in that direction.
In the process of preparing the attached reply, consultations were held with and
inputs received from all agencies whose executive heads are members of the Council. Be-
cause of the detail involved, the written contributions from NASA and Defense accompany
this report as reference Appendices A and B, respectively. Staff papers from State and AEC
appear in Appendix C.
To assist in orderly and brief response, the five groups of questions in your memoran-
dum were identified and numbered as follows: (1) Comparisons of current NASA pro-
gram with that of previous Administration; (2) Benefits to national economy from NASA
program; (3) Problems resulting from Space Program; (4) Reductions and expansions in
NASA program, without affecting lunar project; (5) Coordination and cooperation be-
tween NASA and Defense.
All members of the Council, as well as the Executive Secretary, have concurred in
this report.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson...
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[ 1 of Report]
I. Comparison of NASA Program with That of Previous Administration
Current and Projected NASA Budgets
(millions of dollars)
FY 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Long-range Plan
of Previous
Administration
(Tentative) 922 1159 1577 1674 1825
Long-range Plan
(1962) as
Suggested by NASA 964 1822 3688 5712 5900
1931
600O
Total for
FY 1967 1968 1969 1970 Decade
Long-range Plan
of Previous
Administration
(Tentative) 2056 2258 2239 2276 17,917
Long-range Plan
(1952) as suggested
by NASA 6000 6000 6000 6000 48,086
1. The major distinctions between the present NASA program and that of the previ-
ous Administration involve:
a. The lunar project.
b. Breadth of scientific endeavor.
c. Expansion of space applications.
d. Sense of urgency.
2. The operational plan of the previous Administration terminated with the 3-orbit
MERCURY flight, and there was no continuation beyond that with the exception of stud-
ies, unsupported by any commitment to the necessary hardware and facilities, pointing to
a landing on the Moon at an unspecified time after 1970, The plan of the present Admin-
istration is marshalling resources required for a round trip to the Moon in the 1967-68
period.
3. The previous plan proposed, but did not have Presidential approval, to commit
$4.76 billion to manned space flight. The current plan would add $15.88 billion to this,
bringing the cost of the manned and unmanned aspects of the lunar project to approxi-
mately $20 billion.
4. The extra money would buy major capital investments in facilities at Houston;
Michoud, Mississippi Test Center; Cape Canaveral; and the [2] worldwide tracking net-
work in direct support of the lunar project. In addition, the money is:
a. Buying a strengthened support program in unmanned survey of the Moon, study
of bioscience, and investigation of solar phenomena and space radiation.
b. Giving us more support in advance technology as backup for APOLLO and a lead
time for future missions to keep this country in front, such as the nuclear rockets.
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c.Aidingtheuniversitiestoaddatleastas many scientists and engineers to the na-
tional supply as the space program will draw from the pool.
5. The long-range plan of the previous Administration covering all NASA programs,
amounted to $17.9 billion for the period 1961-70. It soon had to be re-estimated at $22.2
billion. The long-range plan of the present Administration came to $42.5 billion. NASA
judgments, coupled with a projection of no annual budget in excess of $6 billion, would
bring the total to $48 billion for the decade.
6. Over the 10-year period, the NASA program as now conceived:
a. Will run fairly consistently at 2-1/_ times that of the 1961 tentative long-range plan.
b. Would run about 4 times more in manned space flight costs.
c. Would run about double in applications and tracking costs.
d. Would run more than 1-1/2 times greater in space sciences and research and tech-
nology.
7. In over-all terms, the basic difference between the two programs is that the plan of
the previous Administration represented an effort for a second place runner and the pro-
gram of the present Administration is designed to make this country the assured leader
before the end of the decade. This is not taking the narrow view that the project isjust a
race to reach the Moon first. Instead, it is an over-all coordinated program designed to
return benefits to the economy and to the national security on a broad front. [3]
II. Benefits to National Economy from NASA Space Programs
1. It cannot be questioned that billions of dollars directed into research and develop-
ment in an orderly and thoughtful manner will have a significant effect upon our national
economy. No formula has been found which attributes specific dollar values to each of the
areas of anticipated developments, However, the "multiplier" of space research and devel-
opment will augment our economic strength, our peaceful posture, and our standard of
living.
2. Even though specific dollar values cannot be set for these benefits, a mere listing
of the fields which will be affected is convincing evidence that the benefits will be substan-
tial. The benefits include:
a. Additional knowledge about the earth and the Sun's influence on the earth, the
nature of interplanetary space environment, and the origin of the solar system as well as of
life itself.
b. Increased ability and experience in managing major research and development
efforts, expansion of capital facilities, encouragement of higher standards of quality pro-
duction.
c. Accelerated use of liquid oxygen in steelmaking, coatings for temperature control
of housing, efficient transfer of chemical energy into electrical energy, and wide-range
advances in electronics.
d. Development of effective filters against detergents; increased accuracy (and there-
fore reduced costs) in measuring hot steel rods; improved medical equipment in human
care; stimulation of the use of fiberglass refractory welding tape, high energy metal form-
ing processes; development of new coatings for plywood and furniture; use of frangible
tube energy absorption systems that can be adapted to absorbing shocks of failing eleva-
tors and emergency aircraft landings.
e. Improved communications, improved weather forecasting, improved forest fire
detection, and improved navigation.
f. Development of high temperature gas-cooled graphite moderated reactors and
liquid metal cooled reactors; development of radio-isotope power sources for both mili-
tary and civilian uses; development of [4] instruments for monitoring degrees of
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radiation; and application of thermoelectric and thermionic conversion of heat to electric
energy.
g. Improvements in metals, alloys, and ceramics.
h. An augmentation of the supply of highly trained technical manpower.
i. Greater strength for the educational system both through direct grants, facilities
and scholarships and through setting goals that will encourage young people.
j. An expansion of the base for peaceful cooperation among nations.
k. Military competence. (It is estimated that between $600 and $675 million of NASA's
FY 1964 budget would be needed for military space projects and would be budgeted by the
Defense Department, if they were not already provided for in the NASA budget.)
HI. Problems Resulting from the Space Program
1. The introduction of a vital new element into an economy always creates new prob-
lems but, otherwise, the nation's space program creates no major complications. The pro-
gram has, to a lesser magnitude, the same problems which Defense budgets and programs
have been creating for several years.
2. Despite claims to the contrary, there is no solid evidence that research and devel-
opment in industry is suffering significantly from a diversion of technical manpower to the
space program. NASA estimates that:
a. The nation's pool of scientists and engineers was 1,400,000 as of January 1, 1963.
b. NASA programs employed 42,000 of these scientists and engineers--only 9,000
directly on NASA payrolls.
c. On this basis, the NASA space program currently draws upon only 3% of the na-
tional pool of scientists and engineers. [5]
d. Taking into account anticipated expansion, NASA programs are not expected to
absorb more than 7% of our country's total supply of scientists and engineers.
3. The majority of the technical people working for NASA fall in the category of
engineering. However, NASA's education programs are designed to help the universities
train additions to the nation's technical manpower needs.
4. NASA has undertaken to support the annual graduate training of 1000 Ph.D.'s
_/4 of the estimated overall shortage of 4,000 per year. This program would more than
replace those drawn upon by the agency.
5. In overall terms, NASA finds that diversion of manpower and resources is not a
major problem arising from the space program. A major problem, however, is the need to
minimize waste and inefficiency. To help meet this challenge, turnover of top level Gov-
ernment talent should be reduced and compensation more in line with responsibilities
would contribute to this objective.
IV. Reductions and Expansions in the NASA Program
Without Affecting the Lunar Project
1. The fiscal 1964 NASA budget is divided between $4.4 billion for the manned lunar
landing program and $1.3 billion for a multi-project scientific, research, and technology
development and applications effort. Therefore, only 23% of the total budget is unrelated
to the manned lunar landing program.
2. There are approximately 60 programs, projects and activities within this 23% of
the budget. Examples include geodesy, orbiting observatories, planetary and interplan-
etary probes, international satellites, university program, advanced propulsion, and com-
munications and meteorological developments.
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B. It is pertinent under this heading to recall that the NASA budget requests for fiscal
1964 were reduced from $6.2 billion to $5.7 billion before the presentation to Congress.
Further reductions would:
a. Lessen the quantity and quality of benefits to the economy.
b. Give additional ammunition to those who criticize the major funding weight given
to the lunar program on the grounds that it diverts money from other programs. [6]
c. Disrupt manpower teams, delay the realization of goals, and ultimately lead to
increased costs to the stretchout process.
4. Growth of the present favorable international attitude toward our space programs
would be inhibited if the lunar program were favored through a reduction or elimination
of projects which promote international cooperation or promise actual or potential ben-
efits to foreign governments.
5. In light of current conditions, it is not considered practicable to increase the size
of the program. However, in considering future budgets, attention should be directed
toward such developments as:
a. NASA/DOD space station competence.
b. Nuclear rocket propulsion and auxiliary power.
c. Interplanetary exploration.
V. Coordination and Cooperation Between NASA and Defense
1. The difficulties of assuring a single National space program have been recognized
from the beginning, NASA and the Department of Defense carry the major burdens, but
the program touches widely divergent agencies of government. In order to assist in coordi-
nation and in avoiding duplication, the following steps have been taken:
a. The National Aeronautics and Space Council has been authorized and activated to
advise and assist the President in coordinating the entire program.
b. The Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board (and its six panels) has
been organized for high-level managerial coordination to integrate major Space projects
in the early stages of their development.
c. Within the agencies, a number of coordinating arrangements operate at various
levels.
d. More than 50joint written agreements have been worked out between NASA and
DOD spelling out lines of action in such fields as development of launch vehicles and
spacecraft, administration of range facilities, and planning for communication satellites.
[7] 2. However, it is inevitable that controversies will continue to arise in any field as
new, as wide ranging, and as technically complicated as space. Areas in which cooperation
could be further improved are:
a. Coordination in joint planning of advanced projects to insure that divergent views
are not prematurely curtailed and that unwarranted duplication between NASA and DOD
is avoided in the initial development of these projects.
b. Further strengthening of cross-fertilization in the areas of research and technol-
ogy to insure that NASA research is available for the solution of critical military problems
and that military research is available for the solution of NASA problems.
3. It must be kept in mind that no mechanical application of a formula will insure
maximum cooperation and coordination and a minimum of duplication and waste. Con-
tinuous monitoring at a high level is essential at every stage of the development of the
space program. The Space Council will continue to function on the premise that no relax-
ation of its efforts is possible.
EXPLORINGTHEUNKNOWN 473
Conclusion
Thereisonefurtherpointtobeborneinmind.Thespaceprogramisnotsolelya
questionofprestige,ofadvancingscientificknowledge,ofeconomicbenefitorofmilitary
development,althoughallofthesefactorsareinvolved.Basically,amuchmorefundamen-
talissueisatstake--whetheradimensionthatcanwelldominatehistoryforthenextfew
centurieswillbedevotedtothesocialsystemoffreedomorcontrolledbythesocialsystem
ofcommunism.
TheUnitedStateshasmadeclearthatit doesnotseekto"dominate"spaceand,in
fact,hasledthewayin securinginternationalcooperationi thisfield.Butwecannot
closeoureyesastowhatwouldhappenif wepermittedtotalitariansystemstodominate
theenvironmentoftheearthitself.Forthisreasonourspaceprogramhasanoverriding
urgencythatcannotbecalculatedsolelyintermsofindustrial,scientific,ormilitarydevel-
opment.Thefutureofsocietyisatstake.
Document 111-17
Document tide: NASA, Summary Report: Future Programs Task Group, January 1965.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
In the last year of the Kennedy administration, the Bureau of the Budget and the
White House Office of Science and Technology shifted focus from whether or not to go
forward with Apollo to what programs NASA was likely to propose to follow the lunar
landing program. After Kennedy's assassination, President Johnson asked NASA Adminis-
trator Webb on January 30, 1964, to identify future objectives for the civilian space pro-
gram. Webb was quite reluctant to identify NASA's goals and priorities in advance of any
expression of political support, a position he had taken even during the debates preceding
the decision to go to the Moon; he preferred that NASA identify a variety of paths it could
take, and then have top policyrnakers choose the option they wished to pursue.
This is the approach NASA took in response to the president's request, Webb ap-
pointed a Future Programs Task Group, headed by Frank Smith of the Langley Research
Center, to prepare an overview of the capabilities that NASA was developing during the
1960s and the uses to which they might be applied. The group's summary report, com-
pleted in January 1965 (several months late) and not released publicly until April, set no
priorities and made no recommendation, except to continue a "balanced" program in all
areas of space activity. Some figures have been omitted from the excerpt printed here.
[ii] Foreword
This summary report of the Future Programs Task Group, directed by Francis B.
Smith of Langley Research Center, presents the results of studies made during 1964 to
answer inquiries made by President Johnson as to criteria and priorities for space missions
to follow those now approved for the decade of the 1960's.
The President's request was for a review of space objectives in relation both to what
we have learned from our space efforts and to the most important emerging concepts of
missions needed for scientific purposes and for advances in technology. The President
requested that our evaluation be made in relation to estimates of time and funds required
to complete programs already approved and under way.
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The Future Programs Task Group was established to develop materials to meet the
President's request. It has studied: (1) the capability being created in the present aeronau-
tical and space effort; (2) next-step or intermediate space missions that could use or
extend this capability; and (3) a number of long-range missions which deserve serious
attention. This summary report, resulting from these studies, provides a source of infor-
mation on accomplishments to date and indicates the general time periods within which
we can assume or forecast the availability of further scientific and technical knowledge, It
is, in addition to providing a review for the President, a timely and valuable working docu-
ment for use within NASA and other agencies as a foundation for further analysis and
discussion looking toward decisions that can be based on a broad consensus as to values
and timing.
A major concern of the Task Group has been to identify the areas and levels of tech-
nology required to accomplish the most likely future missions and to provide a basis for
informed decisions relating to the allocation of resources and timing for those which may
be approved. Considerable attention has been given to steps we need to take to insure that
these areas and levels or technology are available as needed.
The long range developments section of this report contains a discussion of the tech-
nology development programs which are under way in NASA and a number which should
be given careful consideration in making future plans. Many of these programs are broadly
based, but are also essential to provide optional means to accomplish the minimum under
study and also provide a strong basis for judgments bearing on the value, time and cost
elements.
James E. Webb
Administrator...
[1] Summary Report: Future Programs Task Group
I. Introduction
The successful flight of Sputr_k I, in its most fundamental aspect, meant that man
had taken the first step toward the exploration of a new environment by means of a new
technology. It also meant that in the USSR, which accomplished this first step, new hori-
zons were opened and there was a surge of national pride and accomplishment. An inter-
nal drive was created that changed the posture of Soviet society and lifted it above many of
the frictions and tensions of the existing status. Horizons were widened. Internationally,
the leadership and image of the Soviet Union were vasdy enhanced. The flights of Gagarin
and other Soviet Cosmonauts added impetus to a marked degree.
In the United States and in the Free World, as we all know, the immediate effects
were quite the opposite. However, since then, we have made tremendous progress under a
broad based and balanced program aimed at achieving preeminence in aeronautics and
space.
Down through the course of history, the mastery of a new environment, or of a major
new technology, or of the combination of the two as we now see in space, has had pro-
found effects on the future of nations; on their relative strength and security; on the rela-
tions with one another; on their internal economic, social and political affairs; and on the
concepts of reality held by their people. From the elements of each such new situation
which history records, all or most of the developments listed in Figure 1 have materialized.
The long-range effect, of man's entry into space, in person and by instruments and
machines, can be best forecast in terms of these considerations. As a new environment,
space may well become as important to national security and national development as the
land, the oceans and the atmosphere; rocket, and spacecraft as important as automobiles,
trucks, trains, ships, submarines and aircraft. The foreseeable returns from scientific ad-
vances, technical advances, and practical uses compare favorably with the returns yielded
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Fig. 1
Developments Which Generally Follow a Nation's
Mastery of a New Environment and Technology
I. An increase in power and position through:
A. The prestige of being first in new accomplishments; of being in control or sharing control of the new
environment; and of possessing new knowledge and technology.
B. The establishment of strategic international positions for traffic, communications, and trade.
C. Wide use of new resources.
D. Military capability through use of the new environment and technology.
E. An increase in initiative, pride and drive toward accomplishment in all walks of life.
II. The appearance of new developments in the relations among nations: by negotiation, by cooperation,
or by conflict.
II1. Changes within national societies as a result of the forces listed above; of actions taken to compete
in the new environment and to develop and use the new technology; and of the interplay of new
knowledge, new thought, increased resources, and changed social relations.
Fig, 2
Basic NASA Aeronautical and Space Objectives
i. The scientific measurement and understanding of the space environment.
II. The development of a broad-based national capability for manned and unmanned operations in space
and close cooperation with the Department of Defense and other agencies having current or potential
needs related to such capabilities.
II1. The development of the practical uses of space.
IV. Continued advancement in all areas of aeronautics in order to maintain world leadership in this field.
V. An adequate level of research and development to support other government agencies with needs or
interests in aeronautics and space.
VI. The bringing together of government, industry, and university capabilities into an effective national
system for meeting the needs of space exploration and use.
VII. The maintenance of a technological base in aeronautics and space adequate to meet all non-military
needs.
VIII. The strengthening and efficient utilization of the nation's aeronautical and space-related resources in
science, engineering and technology.
IX. The maximum utilization of the scientific and technical results of the space effort for non-space
purposes.
X. The use of space for further international cooperation and understanding and for the good o4 all
mankind.
by the most vigorous past periods of exploration of newly opened segments of man's ex-
panding frontier.
[2] If these larger considerations of the space effort are to be adequately dealt with
in terms of national policy, they must be translated into brood objectives in order that
particular programs and missions can be defined and evaluated. For the United States,
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these objectives relate aeronautics to space and are contained in the Space Act of 1958.
They are oudined in Figure 2.
Under the Space Act, NASA bears the general responsibility for continuously provid-
ing an adequate underlying aeronautical and space capability and cooperating with the
military services and other agencies which have, or anticipate, specific missions and uses.
In 1958, and again in 1961, two major periods of wide debate and assessment brought
decisions to undertake missions and programs which accelerated our progress toward the
achievement of these objectives. The capability which has been created through the work
thus begun and now under way will be the basis for this analysis.
First, however, we need to understand that we face certain conditions and constraints ....
[7] Ill. Major Capabilities Existing and Under Development
The broad categories of capabilities which have been developed during the past 6
years, or are to be developed in current programs, are shown in Figure 4. The major cat-
egories are Aeronautics, Satellite Applications, Unmanned Exploration, Manned Opera-
tions, Launch Vehicles, and Technology.
Fig. 4
Major Capabilities Existing or Under Development
Aeronautics
R&D hypersonic airplanes
Operational supersonic military airplanes
Commercial supersonic airplanes
Improved subsonic aircraft including V/STOL
Satellite Applications
Satellite pictures of Earth weather
Intercontinental communications
(including "IV)
Unmanned Exploration
Near-Earth exploration
Solar effects
Planetary and interplanetary probes
Lunar probes and landers
Biosatellites
Manned Operations
Man in Earth orbit (1 to 2 weeks)
Maneuver & rendezvous
Lunar orbiting, landing and return
Launch Vehicles
Up to 125 tons in Earth orbit
Up to 47.5 tons to escape
Technology
Power supplies of increased power and life-
time and decreased weight
More accurate guidance and control
Increased communications capability
More accurate stabilization
Life support for long periods
Improved landing control systems
Increased reliability
Fig. 5
FY 1965 In-House Aeronautical Research Effort
505 Professional Man Years
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Aelrolrl_t u t'/¢_
The aeronautical program of NASA represents a continuation of a pattern of re-
search activity developed by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA)
over a period of more than 40 years. The in-house effort of this program is primarily basic
and applied research activity at four NACA centers which were in existence in 1958 (the
Langley Research Center, the Lewis Research Center, the Ames Research Center, and the
Flight Research Center), This consists of in house and contracted-out work aimed at prac-
tical solutions of advanced problems of flight, but excludes the development of complete
aircraft. Over many years the latter has been the responsibility of industry and other
branches of the government with whom the NACA and now the NASA has developed
effective working relations of collaboration and support.
For a number of years, the major portion of the NASA aeronautics effort has been in
two areas. First, a basic research program in atmospheric flight. Three significant areas
have received increasing attention--major increases in maximum flight speed, major de-
creases in minimum flight speed, and major increases in operational flexibility. Second, a
continuing research and technology program in support of military and other govern-
ment agencies and industry has pointed to continued evolutionary improvement of exist-
ing aircraft types.
Figure 5 shows the aeronautical research effort of NASA classified by broad areas and
gives an idea of the size and distribution of the effort for Fiscal Year 1965. In-house effort
is carried on by about 500 research professionals supported by 1500 additional in-house
personnel. In addition to the costs of these personnel, $35.2 million of R&D funding for
contracted-out research and development supports this effort ....
Satellite Applications
[9] Significant successes have been achieved in NASA's applications satellite pro-
gram during the past 6 years and the results are now being used to establish operational
systems.
In the area of meteorology, nine TIROS satellites, launched since 1960, and one
Nimbus satellite, launched in August 1964, have demonstrated the feasibility and value of
Earth weather research and observation from satellites in orbit. One of the primary uses of
the pictures returned by the TIROS satellite has been the identification and tracking of
weather storms, including some 70 hurricanes and typhoons.
Based on NASA research and development success with TIROS, the United States
Weather Bureau has adopted a modified TIROS system for its operational satellite system.
This is expected to be ready during the winter of 1965-1966.
In the meantime, while we work toward operational systems, data from NASA's ex-
perimental TIROS weather satellites are used routinely by the Weather Bureau in the prepa-
ration of daily forecasts as well as for analysis in the area of climatology. The DOD also uses
these data in the preparation of local forecasts in remote areas.
The Nimbus research and development weather (meteorological) satellite shown in
Figure 9 is a significant advance over TIROS. Through three-axis stabilization and Earth
orientation, continuous data on the Earth's weather is provided throughout its orbit. Its
solar cells provide over 400 watts of power (10 times that of TIROS), and it can carry
numerous types of meteorological experiments now emerging from our research program.
In addition to its television transmission system, the first Nimbus carried an Auto-
matic Picture Transmission (APT) system and a High Resolution Infra-Red (HRIR) sys-
tem. The APT system permits read-out of local cloud cover pictures by inexpensive ground
stations, as shown by Figure 10, and will provide weather information to Department of
Defense installations and the numerous foreign countries that have purchased or built, or
plan to build, ground stations.
[ 10] A most significant achievement of Nimbus was demonstration of the capability
and value of the HRIR system, illustrated in Figure 11. This system enables us to obtain for
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thefirsttime,in pictorialformatandonarealtime basis, cloud cover information from
the dark side of the Earth. Cloud cover pictures such as these are reconstructed from
measurements taken at night, and give an indication of cloud height as well as area cover-
age.
As illustrated in Figure 12, in the field of communications, the Echo passive satellite,
and the Telstar, Relay and Syncom active satellites have experimentally proved out the
technology for reliable, long-range point-to-point transmission of radio, television, tele-
phone, teletype and facsimile via satellite. As a result, the Communications Satellite
Corporation is now undertaking an international communications satellite system whose
initial "Early Bird" satellite is based on NASA's Syncom.
Recently Syncom III, shown in Figure 13, transmitted real-time television of the Olym-
pic Games from Japan to the United States. The precision achieved in the Syncom launch
and positioning operations is indicated by the fact that Syncom Ill's period is almost syn-
chronous and the inclination of the orbit is less than one-tenth of a degree from equato-
rial. This means that it moves north and south with respect to the Earth's equator less than
6 miles a day.
In addidon to its primary communications function, Syncom has proved useful for
scientific measurements used in better defining the shape of the Earth at the equator.
Fig. 13
SYNCOM Spacecraft
Actlve Synchronous Communication Satellite
C t)I.1LIlIHIC AI IDN_%
Ar._I_r_N_ • Launch Weight 146 Ibs.
(including Apogee motor)
Control Systems Gas jets
Propellant Solid
Stabilization Spin
Status
SYNCOM I launched Feb. 14, 1963
Achieved near synchronous orbit
SYNCOM II launched July 26, 1963
On station Aug. 16, 1963, at 55=W
Communications "on" time
over 4500 hours.
SYNGOM III launched Aug. 19, 1964,
into synchronous equatorial orbit
over the Pacific Ocean•
Unmanned Exploration
The basic objective of this NASA program is to acquire fundamental knowledge of
the space environment and of those phenomena which can be studied best from space-
craft, for both scientific and practical purposes ....
[11] The unmanned space exploration program was initiated in 1958 when instru-
ments carried by the first of the Explorer series of satellites revealed the existence of the
Van Allen Belts encircling the Earth. Since that date, 26 Explorer and Monitor satellites...
have been launched. These relatively small satellites, which have been placed in orbit by
Jupiter C, Scout and Delta launch vehicles, are usually designed to make measurements of
specific phenomena in space such as the distribution and energies of the particles trapped
in the Earth's magnetic field (as with Explorers XlV and XV), ionospheric measurements
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todeterminelectrondensitiesandtheirvariationbathdiurnallyandwithchangesin
solaractivity(asweremadebyExplorerVIIIandtheUnitedKingdom'sAriell),orother
phenomenasuchasmicrometeoroidfluxandatmosphericstructure.
AsanexampleofsomeofthefindingsofoneofthenewerExplorers(ExplorerXVI,
launchedNovember27,1963)....Atransitionregionwasfoundbetweenthesteadysolar
windofinterplanetaryspaceandthemagnetosphere,wherethesolarwindwasturbulent
andthemagneticfieldunsteady.Ofextremeinterest,also,wasthediscovery,onthefifth
orbit,thattheMoonasit movesthroughthesolarwindapparentlygeneratesawakethat
extendsforadistanceofatleast120,000milesonthesideawayfromtheSun.
ThisprogramoflaunchingrelativelyinexpensiveExplorerclassatellitestomake
measurementsof pecificphenomenawillbecontinued.AnewseriesofExplorersatellites
willcarrypayloadsdevelopedbyuniversitiesandwillalsobeusedto continueinterna-
tionalcooperationprojectssuchastheU.K.ArielII, theCanadianAlouette,andtheItal-ianSanMarco.
[12]Thesoundingrocketprogramisanimportantelementofnear-Earthexplora-
tion.It openstoinvestigationthatvastregionoftheEarth'satmospherethatistoohigh
forballoonstoreachandtoolowforsatellites.It alsoprovidesin-flightdevelopmenttest-
ingofinstrumentsandotherequipmentintendedforlateruseinsatellites.Further,new
expefimentersfromuniversities,industryandforeignorganizationsareprovidedalogical
andinexpensivewayofgainingexperienceinspacesciencetechniques.
Showni Figure17isthesecondgenerationofscientificsatellites,theorbitingob-
servatories.Theselargersatellitesoredesignedtomakemareprecise,morecomplexand
bettercoordinatedmeasurementsof tellar,solarandgeophysicalphenomena.
ThefirstOrbitingSolarObservatory,(OSO),waslaunchedinMarch1962,andsuc-
cessfullyreportedataonsolarphenomenaforwelloverayear.ThesecondOSO,launched
inFebruary1965,willcontinuemakingsolarmeasurementsduringthepresentquietpe-
riodofthesolarcycle.
ThefirstoftheOrbitingGeophysicalObservatories(OGO)waslaunchedinSeptem-
ber1964intoahighlyellipticalorbit.Although2ofthelongboomshowndidnotdeploy
properlyandthesatellitewasnotstabilizedasintended,18of the20experimentsare
operatingandmanyoftheobjectiveswillbeaccomplished.TheOGOsaredesignedto
carry20to50experimentsandwillallowcorrelatedmeasurementsofEarth-relatedphe-
nomenatasinglepointinspace.
ThefirstOrbitingAstronomicalObservatory(OAO)willbelaunchedin late1965or
early1966andwillallowthefirstextendedobservationsof tarsandplanetsfromabove
theEarth'satmosphere.Aneventualgoalinthisseriesofsatellitestoproducethecapabil-
ityofpointinga36-inchtelescopeatastartowithinplusorminusone-tenthofasecondof
arc,andoneofitsearlyexperimentswillbethemappingoftheheavensinultravioletcave
lengths.
Capabilitiesforinterplanetaryandplanetaryexplorationweresuccessfullydemon-
stratedbyPioneerV,launchedin 1960,andbytheVenusprobe,MarinerII, shownin
Figure18,whichwaslaunchedinAugust1962.PioneerV setarecordfor thattimeby
communicatingtoEarthfromadistanceof22,000,000miles,andreturnednewdataon
theinterplanetaryenvironment.MarinerII, 109claysafteritwaslaunched,passedcloseto
thesurfaceofVenusand[13]transmittedtoEarthman'sfirstclose-upinformationabout
anotherplanet.Althoughthedatatransmissioncapacitywaslimited,MarinerII gaveus
informationonthesurfacet mperature,magneticfields,dustenvironmentandradiationbeltsofVenus.
MarinerII alsodemonstratedthevalueof themid-coursemaneuvercapabilityon
whichwehavestandardizedforguidingaspacecrafttoadesiredestination-inthiscase
towithinapproximately20,000milesofVenuswhenitwas35,000,000milesfromtheEarth.
TheMarsprobe,MarinerIV,waslauncheduringtheNovember1964opportunity.
Duringits8-monthtriptotheplanet,this575-poundspacecraftismakinginterplanetary
measurementsof themagneticfieldsandsolarwinds.Onarrivingatthevicinityof the
planet,thespacecraft,i operatingproperly,willmakemeasurementsof theMartian
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magnetic fields and radiation belts, collect some data on the Martian atmosphere, and will
transmit to Forth about 20 television pictures of the planet's surface.
The Moon probe, Ranger VII, illustrated in Figure 19, gave man his first close-up
look at the surface of Earth's nearest neighbor in space by transmitting approximately
4,300 television pictures to Earth in the last 15 minutes before it impacted on the lunar
surface. Ranger also demonstrated our increased competence in mid-course maneuver
capability, in this case to carry television cameras to within 10 miles of a preselected spot
on the Moon's surface. It also demonstrated a communications capability for transmitting
wide-band information over the quarter-million-mile Earth-Moon distance.
As illustrated in Figure 20, NASA is also developing the Lunar Orbiter and the
Surveyor spacecraft for unmanned exploration of the Moon. Initial Lunar Orbiters, sched-
uled for launch in 1966, are designed to obtain topographic information by photograph-
ing an area of about 15,000 square miles with a resolution of 25 feet and of about 3,000
square miles with a resolution of 3 feet. Furthermore, the mass distribution and shape of
the Moon can be determined from perturbations in the spacecraft's orbit. Later Lunar
Orbiters will carry scientific instruments, as Well, that Will increase our knowledge of the
lunar environment and of the surface and subsurface characteristics. The Surveyor space-
craft is designed to land on the Moon and make measurements of the bearing strength
and composition of the lunar surface, to take close-up panoramic TV pictures of the lunar
surface, to measure seismic activity, and to determine the flux of primary [14] and second-
ary particles impinging on the surface. The Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter will serve as a
team to survey and select suitable sites for manned landings. The biosatellite program
consists of orbital flights up to 30 days of recoverable capsules, which contain various bio-
logical experiments, illustrated conceptually in Figure 21. The experiments carried will
range from studies of the effects of weightlessness and radiation on elemental cell func-
tions to investigations of heart and nerve functions in primates immobilized for prolonged
periods in a weightless condition. This program will use thrust-augmented Delta launch
vehicles and take advantage of the recovery techniques developed by the Air Force in the
Discoverer program.
Manned Operations
As illustrated in Figure 22, the current manned operations program provides an or-
derly progression of operational capabilities from the 2,900 pound Mercury spacecraft to
the 7,000-pound Gemini, to the 95,000-pound Apolio-LEM system.
Figure 23 illustrates the progression of manned launch vehicles from the 368,000
pound thrust Atlas which launched the Mercury spacecraft to the 7 72 million-pound
thrust Saturn V which will launch the Apollo.
The Mercury spacecraft, launched by the Atlas, provided this country's first capabil-
ity for manned Earth-orbital flight and was used in the 3-orbit mission by John Glenn in
1962. The Mercury-Arias system capability was later extended to accomplish Gordon
Cooper's 22-orbit, 34-hour flight in 1963.
The Gemini two-man spacecraft, with its Titan II launch vehicle, will make possible
missions of up to 14 clays in Earth orbit, beginning in 1965. New equipment will permit
orbit change, rendezvous and docking, and will enable the astronauts to venture out- [ 15]
side the spacecraft into free space. Dual launches of the Gemini by Titan and the Agena by
Atlas will place an unmanned Agena target into orbit and enable the Gemini astronauts to
perfect the rendezvous and docking systems. These missions will verify the operations and
techniques to be used later in the more ambitious Apollo missions.
In Project Gemini, NASA is providing a flexible, experimental space tool with which
to flight test equipment, conduct scientific experiments, and develop techniques and pro-
vide training for Project Apollo. The Department of Defense Manned Orbital Laboratory
will also make use of Gemini for the launch and return to Earth of the astronauts who will
work in the laboratory.
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AsillustratedinFigure 24, the Gemini spacecraft consists of two major elements, the
reentry module and the adapter, with a combined weight of 7,000 pounds. The reentry
module provides life support and control equipment for the two crewmen, contains most
of the experiments and also contains the rendezvous and recovery systems. The adapter
element provides the link between the Titan II launch vehicle and the reentry module,
and is composed of two sections, an equipment section to provide augmented life support,
stabilization equipment and expendables for flight durations of up to 14 days, and a retro-
grade section to slow down the spacecraft from its orbital velocity.
Several of the Gemini missions are designated primarily as rendezvous missions to
explore the feasibility of various modes of accomplishing rendezvous utilizing different
levels of automation in the sensing and control equipment.
In a typical mission, an Agena engine will first be launched into a 160-nautical-mile
circular orbit. The manned Gemini spacecraft will then be placed into a lower circular
orbit at 130 nautical miles. The different periods of the two spacecraft in these concentric
orbits will cause a continuing change in the relative position of the Gemini with respect to
the Agena. When the relative positions are proper, the Gemini spacecraft will be acceler-
ated in a transfer ellipse to the higher orbit where the rendezvous and docking will be
accomplished. These missions will be short-lived because of the weight requirement for
fuel which reduces the expendables that can be carried for life support, power supply, and
stabilization.
[16] On the Gemini long-duration missions, primary emphasis will be placed an
biomedical and behavioral aspects of man in a weightless condition; however, scientific
and technical experiments are being planned for all missions. Specific experiments range
all the way from visual definition experiments requiring no equipment and astronomical
observations made with a 2-pound ultra-violet camera to radiometric or astronaut maneu-
vering experiments using equipment weighing as much as 200 pounds. The experiment
program is tailored to the available weight, volume, and power in the spacecraft on each
mission, as well as to the participation and accessibility which can be provided for the
astronauts. Mthough the volume available for experiments within the pressurized cabin is
limited, extra-vehicular operations are planned for the astronauts to permit free-space
experiments, maneuvering, and other external operations such as the testing of manual
dexterity and the use of specialized tools for spacecraft repair functions.
The Gemini spacecraft is already undergoing flight test. The successful launch of the
first and second unmanned Gemini's in April 1964 and January 1965 will be followed soon
by the first manned orbital flight. The easy access to the crew compartment is emphasized
in Figure 25, which shows the Gemini spacecraft mockup.
The larger goals of the presently planned manned space flight program will be at-
tained by the three-man ApolIo-LEM system to be launched by the Saturn IB beginning in
1966 and by the Saturn V beginning in 1967. The Apollo Command and Service Modules,
with fuel partially removed, will be launched first by the Saturn IB for Earth-orbital mis-
sions of up to 10 days duration. A number of such flights will be made in which rendez-
vous, docking, maneuvering, and other operations will be conducted.
Later, the total 47.5-ton Apollo-LEM spacecraft will be qualified in Earth orbit and
eventually propelled to the Moon by the Saturn V, thus extending the area of space in
which man can operate from near-Earth orbit to as far out as the Moon, and including the
lunar surface.
The size of the Apollo-LEM spacecraft, shown previously in Figure 22, as compared
with either the Mercury or Gemini spacecraft, is in part due to the longer duration of the
Apollo missions, the larger heat-shield, and the increased crew; however, the major in-
crease is due to the requirements for a large propulsion capability for maneuvering in
space. The Service Module provides a propulsion capability for mid-course correction,
lunar-orbit braking, and lunar-orbit escape, while the Lunar Excursion Module provides
the capability for lunar landing and lunar takeoff.
The very large capability of the Apollo space exploration system (illustrated in Fig-
ure 26) will open a new era to manned space flight. Earth-orbital missions reaching out to
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synchronous orbit distances and of 14 days duration can be conducted, and lunar and
other missions out to lunar distances will be possible, including one-day stays on the lunar
surface for two men, or [17] 4 days stay in lunar orbit for three men.
On Earth-orbital, lunar-orbital, and lunar surface missions, provision is being made
for the conduct of an extensive experimental program. Because of the increased size and
the presence of man, these experiments will, in general, be more complex and extensive
than those performed in unmanned vehicles. In the Command Module, volume has been
provided for about 3 cubic feet of experimental equipment and with a return-to-Earth
capability of about 80 pounds of instruments or lunar samples. In the Service Module, a
complete empty bay provides an available volume of 250 cubic feet for the mounting of
instruments; the weight available would depend upon the particular mission and the amount
of fuel or other expendables required.
In the Lunar Excursion Module, 2 cubic feet of experimental equipment, weighing
up to 80 pounds, can be installed within the existing ascent stage, and 15 cubic feet of
instruments, weighing up to 250 pounds, an the descent stage in an area accessible to the
astronauts while standing on the lunar surface. On all missions, however, the permissible
weight of experiments must be evaluated against the comparable weight of expendables
for fuel and life support, in order to extend the maneuver capability or duration of the
mission.
A better impression of the room provided for experiments, as well as the progress
that is being made in finalizing the design concept of the Apollo-LEM system, can be
gained from the mockups of the major spacecraft elements shown in Figure 27. The area
in the exposed bay in the Service Module could be utilized for installation of instruments
that do not need direct monitoring by the astronauts. This space might also be used for
carrying complete unmanned spacecraft in a piggy-back fashion for later deployment on
unmanned space missions or for lunar surface probes.
Launch Vehicles
Figure 28 shows the boosters now included in the National Launch Vehicle Program
which range from the Scout vehicle, capable of placing about 325 pounds in a 100-mile
Earth orbit, to the Saturn Vwhich will place about 250,000 pounds in the same orbit. The
Thor/Delta vehicle, which will place about 930 pounds in a 100-nautical-mile Earth orbit
or propel a 105 pound payload to escape velocity, has been the most successful of U. S.
launch [18] vehicles, placing 26 payloads in Earth orbit out of 29 attempts. The capacity of
the Thor/Delta has been improved recendy by the addition of three 33-inch diameter
strap-on solid rocket motors, giving about 25 per cent increase in Earth orbital payload
capability. The thrust-augmented Thor/Agena will be capable of placing about 1,800 pounds
in Earth orbit, when launched from the Western Test Range.
The two Arias-based vehicles are the Adas Agena and the Arias/Centaur. The Adas
Agena can place up to 6,300 pounds in Earth orbit. It has been used successfully to launch
the 750- to 800-pound Ranger probes to the Moon; and, on November 28, launched the
575-pound Mariner IV to Mars. The Arias/Centaur, nearing completion of development,
will accelerate 2,300 pounds to escape velocity or 9,700 pounds to Earth orbital velocity. It
will be used as the launch vehicle for the Surveyor spacecraft designed to achieve a soft
landing on the Moon.
The Centaur was the first rocket stage to use hydrogen and oxygen as fuel, a combi-
nation which gives an increase in specific impulse from about 300 seconds, available with
standard fuels, to more than 400 seconds. This is an improvement of particular impor-
tance to missions requiring velocities equal to, or higher than, that far Earth escape.
The Titan series of launch vehicles is under development by the Department of De-
fense. The Titan II is used by NASA to launch the 7,000-pound, 10-foot diameter Gemini
spacecraft. The Titan IIIA (not illustrated) consists of the Titan II to which an additional
stage, called the tranvstage, has been added. The addition of two 120-inch solids to the
IIIA produces the IIIC (illustrated in Figure 28), which will place about 25,000 pounds in
low Earth orbit or propel about 5,000 pounds to escape velocities.
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IntheSaturnfamilyofvehicles,theSaturnIBiscapableofplacing35,000poundsin
Earthorbit;andtheSaturnV,250,000pounds.TheSaturnVwillalsoaccelerate95,000
poundstoEarthescapevelocity.
TheSaturnprogramindicatestheuseofstandardizedrocketengines.Thefirststage
oftheSaturnIBismadeupofeightLOX-RP-1fueledH-Iengines- anup-ratedversionof
theS-3enginesthatweredevelopedfortheAtlasbooster.TheupperstageoftheSaturnIB
usesonehydrogen-oxygenS-2enginewhichwillalsobeusedinaclusteroffivetopower
thesecondstageoftheSaturnV.
In theSaturnV,five1,500,000-poundthrustF-Ienginespowerthefirststage.The
secondstagewillusefiveJ-2engines.ThethirdstageusesoneJ-2engineandisalmost
identicaltothesecondstageoftheSaturnIB.
Thesevehiclesthusprovideawiderangeoflaunchcapabilitiesbasedonaminimum
numberof [19]enginetypes.However,it isimportanttonotethattherearewidegapsin
escapepayloadcapabilitybetweenthe950poundsoftheAtlas/Agena,the2,300pounds
oftheAtlas/Centaur,the5,100poundsoftheTitanIIIC,the13,000poundsoftheSaturn
IB/Centaur,andthe95,000poundsof theSaturnV.
Technology
The technological base which supports the development of the mission capabilities
described has been made possible by the experience gained by our military services in the
ballistic missile program and the broad research and technology development programs
carried on by industry and by NASA. When the space age began in 1957, the reserve of
technology which could be tapped to meet the immediate needs of the United States proved
insufficient. The reliability and thrust of the launch vehicles, for example, were far short
of that required to meet the challenge of the Soviet space program. However, due to the
foresight exercised at that time in undertaking, without specific end uses in sight, the
development of the 1-1/2 million-pound thrust F-1 engine, and other important projects,
this country was able to make sound technical decisions when it became necessary to ex-
pand its space program in 1961. This expanded program is designed to assure United
States leadership in space and to be ready to respond when national needs or objectives
require new aeronautical or space systems. With respect to such a large, complex, and
unknown environment as space, and the still not precisely defined characteristics of the
Earth's atmosphere, this Nation would be oblivious to the lessons of history if it required
that all its exploratory research and development efforts be matched to completely de-
fined missions. It is clear from the 1958 Aeronautics and Space Act that NASA was estab-
lished to make sure we would develop the capability which was clearly lacking at that time,
and to develop the kind of policies and priorities that would do the job needed. Where
there is reasonable promise of success in the development of such things as new materials,
propulsion systems, or techniques, it is NASA policy to pursue these directions even though
a specific use is not clearly defined. We have found that we can organize these efforts so as
to point at broad classes of possible uses, giving the necessary technical base for options as
to missions and the best ways to accomplish them. In his testimony before the Committee
on Science and Astronautics on February 4, 1964, Dr. Hugh Dryden recalled how the
United States, despite initial positions of advantage, failed to carry forward work of which
it was capable in aeronautics, in jet propulsion, in ballistic missiles, and in the launch
vehicles and spacecraft necessary for space exploration. The result in each case was that
other nations moved ahead, placing the United States at a disadvantage and requiring an
enormous effort to catch up. Our present relative position in space leaves no room for
complacency. As Dr. Dryden said, "We must not delude ourselves or the nation with any
thought that leadership in this fast moving age can be maintained with anything less than
determined, whole-hearted, sustained effort."
It is on this basis that NASA is continuing to carry out a broad, long-range program
in research and technology development. This program is aimed at the establishment of
future mission capability, and it can be expected that new advances in technology will be
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madeandwillprovideabetterbasisofjudgmentthanwehavehadbeforeastothevalueof
missionsandprojectsandastowhentheycanbeundertakenatreasonablecostsandrisks.
In the next two sections of this report, dealing with intermediate and long-range
missions, we shall attempt to identify, when possible, the technological advances that are
required for their accomplishment. These research and technology development programs
will be discussed in [20] detail following the section on long-range missions.
Same examples of the capabilities which have been, or are being, developed to date
are"
a. Solar cell power supplies capable of producing 650 watts.
b. Guidance and control capabilities for placing a spacecraft within a few thousand
miles of a distant planet, or within a few miles of a given point on the Moon.
c. Communications technologies which provide almost continuous communications
with manned spacecraft in Earth orbit, the transmission of about five television pictures
per second from the Moon, or radio reception from a spacecraft over a 100 million miles
in space.
d. Spacecraft stabilization technology which will enable precision instruments to be
pointed, in some instances, to within 1/10 second of arc.
e. Life support systems which will enable three men to remain in space for as long as
14 days and to venture as far as 250,000 miles from the Earth.
f. The reliability of both spacecraft and launch vehicles. Spacecraft reliability has
been improved to the paint where many unmanned spacecraft now have lifetimes of well
over one year, and manned spacecraft will be capable of dependable operation for 14 days
or longer. Reliability of launch vehicles has been improved to such an extent that the per
cent of successful vehicle launches has risen from about 60 per cent in 1960-61 to over 90
per cent at the present time.
g. A world-wide tracking, data acquisition, and communications system to support
manned flight, scientific and application satellites, injection, monitoring, and deep space
probes, as illustrated in Figure 29.
Along with the missions which are being undertaken and the capabilities which are
being developed, the first years of the Nation's effort in space have produced a broad
scientific and industrial base, and the facilities and management systems needed far carry-
ing out an effective program of space exploration.
A major part of our present space capability is found in the expansion of NASA since
1961. About 2-1/3 billion dollars have been invested in strengthening the industrial facili-
ties and government laboratories associated with aeronautical and space research and in
adding new installations. These include the Goddard Space Flight Center in Maryland,
the Michoud Plant at New Orleans, the Mississippi Test Facility in southern Mississippi, the
Manned Spacecraft Center at Houston, Texas, and the New Merritt Island Launch Facility
at Cape Kennedy, of which the Saturn/Apollo Vehicle [21] Assembly Building is shown in
a cutaway view in Figure 30. The exacting demands of space systems in the electronics
Field have also required a new Electronics Research Center which will conduct and super-
vise research in this vital field from its location in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
NASA has contracted out more than 90 per cent of its research and development
work. Over 1,600 manufacturing firms have held prime contracts of over $25,000 and about
20,000 firms have worked under prime or sub-contracts. Surveys made by 12 more prime
contractors disclosed 3,000 subcontracts of over $10,000 to sub-contractors located in all
50 states. During slighdy over 6 years of operation, NASA contracts have totaled more than
$13 billion, adding great strength to the country's industrial base.
The conduct of space research and development, involving the design and manufac-
ture of the most complex systems ever attempted, is demanding major improvements in
methods of conducting large-scale organized effort. Included are new methods of produc-
tion control, systems integration and checkout, and reliability and quality control.
The substantial expense involved in launching space vehicles, and the intricacy of
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thedevicesinvolved,haveimposedunusualrequirementsofprecisionmanufactureand
qualityassurance.Asaconsequence,increasingrelianceisbeingplaceduponincentive
contracts,andnewwaysofencouragingimprovedgovernmentpersonnelandcontractor
performancearebeingdeveloped.
Thespaceprogramisindeedalargeandvariedresearchanddevelopmenteffort.
Theharshenvironmentof spacerequiresmajoradvancesin allareasof technology,in
materials,inelectronics,inpropulsion,inguidanceandcontrol,inpowersources,inlu-
bricantsandcoolants,in communications,i theintegrationofsystemsandtheestablish-
mentof highlevelsof reliability,andin themaintenanceof humanlife inspace.It is
alreadyclearthatourbalancedandbroadly-basedspaceffortisproducingimportant
scientificandtechnologicaladvancesthatarenotlimitedtospaceuse.
Experimentsorpilotmodelefforts,throughwhichtheseadvancesconstitutingma-jorNationalresourcesforbothsecurityandeconomicgrowthcanbemadeavailablequickly
andefficientlyfornon-spaceuse,arebeingcarriedout.NASAhasestablishedaprogram
intechnologyutilization,withheadquartersinWashingtona dwithofficesineachofthe
NASAcenters.Innovationsarebeingidentifiedanddescribedinappropriatepublications;
thesearedisseminatedwidely.Regionaldisseminationcentershavebeenestablishedona
trialbasisatanumberofuniversities.Ateachofthese,NASAmaterialisputoncomputer
tapesandaccessprovidedtoindustrialconcernswhosupportthesecentersthroughuser
feesandcontributions.Thissystemakesthismaterialavailablewithinabout6weeksof
it'sreportingdatetoHeadquartersfrombothNASAcentersandcontractors,andmakesit
availableonaselectivebasisconformingto theinterestsof theusers.Thesystemalso
providesamethodbywhichtheusercansecure[22]complete,in-depthinformationon
anyadvanceinanareaofparticularinterest.Theobjectiveofthisprogramistospreadthe
advancedtechnicalindustrialcapabilitiesdevelopingin thespaceprogramwithinand
beyondthegovernmentcontractorpopulationtothemaximumextentpracticable,and
particularlytobringaboutheidentificationandpracticalutilizationbyAmericani dus-
tryofnewprocessesandproductsdevelopingin thespaceprogram.
Scholarsin theNation'suniversitiesconductmuchofthebasicresearch,andpre-
paremanyoftheexperimentsrequiredforadvancesinspacescience.Thebreadthofthe
programhasproduced,atmanyuniversities,newrequirementsforinterdisciplinarycoop-
erationandparticipationamongthescientificspecialties,andbetweenscienceandengi-
neering.
NAsA-supportedr searcheffortinuniversitiesinvolvesbothproject-relatedr search,
asillustratedinFigure31,andaSustainingUniversityProgramcomprisedof training,
researchandfacilitiesgrants.Underthetrainingprogram,142universitieshavereceived
grantsto supporta totalof 3,132candidatesfor predoctoraltrainingfellowshipsin
space-relatedfields.ResearchgrantsundertheSustainingUniversityProgramhavebeen
madeto53educationalinstitutions,mostoftheminvolvinginterdisciplinaryeffort,and
manyof them"seedgrants" aimed at strengthening research activity at universities ca-
pable of expanding their research programs. A total of 27 facilities grants is shown in
Figure 32) have been made to universities to provide additional laboratory space required
in the performance of space-related research.
A significant element in the overall NASA university effort, particularly in the case of
those universities receiving facility grants, is the encouragement of a closer working rela-
tionship between the university research activities and those businesses and industries with
which the university already has close relations. This aims to facilitate the transfer of space
research results to practical, industrial application. Memoranda of understanding accom-
pan)ring the facility grants provide that the university will, in an organized and interdisci-
plinary manner, seek ways in which such transfers can be achieved, and strive for closer
relationships with the business community.
[23] Participation in the U. S. space program has not been limited to this country.
Individuals or agencies in 69 nations throughout the world have joined the United States
in space projects, including the establishment of tracking and data acquisition stations, as
illustrated in Figure 33. In all of these projects, cooperation has been literal and substan-
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five,requiringsignificantcontributionsfrombothsides,withoutfinancialexchange,and
meetingthe test of scientific value.
NASA has launched four satellites in cooperation with Great Britain, Canada, and
Italy and has existing agreements to launch others with all of these coun tries as well as with
France and the European Space Research Organization. The present practice in these
projects is that the cooperating country conceives and engineers the complete satellite,
using its own resources.
Individual experiments proposed by foreign scientists, sponsored by their govern-
ments and selected on their merits, are also accommodated in NASA satellites. One British
experiment flew on Explorer 1, and 19 other British, Dutch, and French experiments are
scheduled for inclusion on NASA satellites which will be launched over the next few years.
NASA has participated in cooperative sounding rocket projects with 14 countries,
involving more than 100 cooperative launchings, and currendy has agreements for launch-
ing nearly 50 more in such projects. The multitude of foreign sites established for this
program and the extent of capability stimulated by it vasdy increase the possibilities for
synopdc research, while reducing its cost.
A wide variety of ground-based cooperative projects involving foreign scientists has
been organized to produce observations or measurements enhancing, and sometimes even
necessary to, NASA's orbiting experiments. Thus, 42 countries have collected local meteo-
rological information for correlation with TIROS observations, and 11 countries have al-
ready built, or will soon complete, ground terminals necessary for test transmissions in
connection with our communications satellite programs.
Under international scientific and technical personnel exchanges, 103 gifted for-
eign Research Associates have contributed their talents to work in NASA centers, 84 Inter-
national Graduate Fellows have trained in U. S. universities, and 180 foreign technicians
have trained at NASA centers in support of cooperative projects and ground facility opera-
tions.
This completes the review of the capabilities which have been developed during the
first 6 years of space exploration, or which will be developed within this decade ....
[61 ] VI. Summary
Our study of future programs has covered three major categories as illustrated ear-
lier in Figures 4, 34, and 54, repeated here for ease of reference. These have covered:
a. A review of the capabilities being developed by current programs;
b. Intermediate missions which would support National objectives in space and af-
ford steady progress toward longer-range goals, and at the some dme make most effective
use of capabilities developed thus far; and
c. Long-range missions which may comprise the Nation's space exploration goals in
the decades ahead.
In the areas of aeronautics, satellite applications, unmanned and manned space ex-
ploration, launch vehicles, and research and technology development, it is possible to
trace horizontally the development path from 1958 to a decade or further into the future.
It is obvious that there is increased uncertainty as the plans are projected into the future.
The details of these new missions, such as specific spacecraft designs and exact mis-
sion plans will, of course, be the subject of continued study by Headquarters and Field
Centers of NASA, by interested government agencies, by universities, and by industry. Con-
tinued [62] space exploration will be an evolutionary process in which the next step is
based largely on what was learned from the experience of preceding research and flight
missions. The pace at which these new programs will be carried out will necessarily de-
pend upon many other factors, such as the allocation of budgetary and manpower re-
sources and the changing National needs of the future.
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This study has not revealed any single area of space development which appears to
require an overriding emphasis or a crash effort. Rather, it appears that a continued bal-
anced program, steadily pursuing continued advancement in aeronautics, space sciences,
manned space flight, and lunar and planetary exploration, adequately supported by a
broad basic research and technology development program, still represents the wisest
course. Further, it is believed that such a balanced program will not impose unreasonably
large demands upon the Nation's resources and that such a program will lead to a preemi-
nent role in aeronautics and space.
Fig.34
Intermediate Missions--Extensions of Present Capabilities
Aeronautics
Supersonic transport
Hypersonic engine development
V/STOL
Satellite Applications
Applications technology satellites
Direct broadcast FM
Communications/navigation satellites
Meteorological observation technology
Unmanned Exploration
Observatories, Pioneers and Explorers
continued
Planetary fly by, orbiters, and landers
Manned Operations
Earth orbit application (1 to 2 months)
Equatorial orbits
Polar orbits
Synchronous orbits
Rendezvous, inspection, repair, and rescue
Lunar mapping
Extended stay in Lunar space (3 to 14 days)
Launch Vehicles
Saturn 1B Centaur
7000 lb. high energy stage
Technology
Isotope power supplies (1 to 2 kW)
Guidance and control (within miles of point on
Mars)
Communications (3000 bits/second from Mars)
Stabilization
Propellant storage
Life support (3 men, 1 to 2 months)
Sterilization
Reliability
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Fig.50
Extended Apollo Mission Capabilities
Mission Configuration Orbit
N M Incl
Earth Orbit Sat IB/XCSM/LEM AS 200/30"
Earth Orbit Sat V/XCSM/LEM ASP 200/30"
Initial
Earth Orbit Sat V/XCSM/LEM AS 200/Polar
Earth Orbit Sat V/XCSM/LEM AS 200/Polar
Earth Orbit Sat V/XCSM/LEM AS Synchr/0 °
Earth Orbit Sat V/XCSM/LEM AS Synchr/28"
Lunar Mapping SatV/XCSM/LEM ASP 80q/Polar
Lunar Surface Sat V/XCSM/LEM Lunar
Exploration Dual Launch Surface
Equivalent
Duration Payload _,V fps Plane Change
Days Lbs deg
30 5,000 0 --
0 2,000 4
30 210,000 0 --
0 26,000 60
90 200,000 0 --
30 17,500 0 --
0 4,000 9
60 12,500 0 --
2,000 2,000 4
30 9,500 0 --
0 1,500 9
60 10,000 -- --
28 9,500 -- --
14 2,500 -- --
Notes XCSM--ApolIo command and service module with additional subsystems and expendables
LEM AS--LEM ascent stage without subsystems, dependent on XCMS
LEM ASP--LEM AS plus LEM descent stage propulsion
III
Fig 51
Manned Earth Orbit Experiments
I Space Sciences
Blosciences
Physical Sciences
Astronomy/Astrophysics
Earth Oriented Applications
Atmospheric Science and Technology
Earth Resources Survey and Inventory
Communications
Support for Space Operations
Advanced Technology and Subsystems
Operations Techniques/Subsystems
Biomedical/Behavioral
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Aeronautics
Hypersonic transports
Recoverable orbital transport
Commercial V/STOL aircraft
Satellite Applications
Direct TV broadcast
Navigation & traffic control
Continuous global weather observation
Unmanned Exploration
Probes & landers to distant planets
Solar probes
Galactic probes
Fig. 54
Long-Term Development
Manned Space Exploration
Conventional take off and landing
of space vehicles
Flexible Earth orbital operations
Large permanent space laboratory
Roving Lunar vehicles and Lunar bases
Planetary exploration
Launch Vehicles and Propulsion
1 million pounds in Earth orbit
Recoverable boosters
Nuclear engines
Electric propulsion
Technology
Nuclear & isotope power supplies (megawatt)
Guidance & control (controlled landings
at desired locations on other planets)
Communications (wide band communications
with planetary vehicles)
Stabilization
Permanent life support systems
Reliability
Fig. 68
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Fig 69
Interplanetary Mission Summary
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Document III-18
Document tide: James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, to the President, August 26, 1966,
with attached: James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, to Honorable Everett Dirksen, U.S.
Senate, August 9, 1966.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
By 1966, the NASA budget had peaked, and the agency's future, once Apollo had
been completed, was unclear. NASA Administrator Webb was becoming increasingly flus-
trated by the unwillingness of the White House and the Democratic-led Congress to sup-
port the budget for the space program that he thought was needed to continue a produc-
five effort. The Bureau of the Budget had reduced NASA's fiscal year 1967 budget request
by $712 million, and in August Senator William Proxmire (D-WI) proposed that the Con-
gress reduce the budget by another $1 billion. To counter the Proxmire proposal, Webb
had to seek the support of the Republican leader in the Senate, Everett Dirksen (R-IL).
Webb attached the letter he had sent to Dirksen, which sought his help in defeating
the Proxmire amendment, in this August 26 letter to PresidentJohnson in which he ex-
pressed his growing unhappiness with NASA's outlook. In particular he protested the guide-
lines for the fiscal year 1968 budget that had been given to the agency by the Bureau of the
Budget, which to Webb's thinking were inconsistent with a plan for the president to give a
speech setting out "a ringing challenge for the next half century in space."
[ 1] Dear Mr. President:
Almost six years ago when you urged me to accept the responsibilities which devolve
upon the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, I asked if
my task would be to carry out a preconceived program or to figure out what needed to be
done and do it. You said, "the latter," and, of course, this was on the basis that President
Kennedy would have to approve whatever you and I worked out. You will remember that in
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the sessions you had in 1961 with your advisers and Congressional leaders, I was quite
reluctant to undertake the responsibility of building a transportation system to the moon
and that you had to almost drive me to make the recommendation which you sent on to
President Kennedy.
As to my discharge of this responsibility after the decision was made, and of the other
responsibilities inherent in the aeronautical and space science activities of NASA, you are
in position to judge. I believe the record justifies your continued support. There are few, if
any, enterprises of such size and inherent difficulty that have yielded more total value in
proportion to resources invested.
In presenting your 1967 budget to the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations, I
used this language and furnished you a marked copy:
'q'his budget has been carefully drawn by the President to reflect total national re-
quirements. For NASA this is a particularly stringent budget. We are midway through a
ten-year effort to achieve preeminence in all fields of aeronautics and space. This budget
is less than we need to carry out this effort with greatest efficiency and minimum risk.
Every expenditure that can be deferred until 1968 without causing gaps in our activity has
been deferred. This budget provides for continuation of our ongoing efforts and a [2] few
long lead-time items for the post-Apollo period. It provides no alternate or backup ve-
hicles."
'q'he program we began presenting to you in 1961, and have elaborated in each
succeeding year, was intended to meet fierce competition and end up ahead. It was also
intended to give us a number of options in space from which we could choose those offer-
ing the greatest advantages at the least cost. The competition is still fierce, and we are not
yet able to feel assurance that we will end up ahead in the option areas where the Russians
are developing their strongest potential. A $5 billion budget level in the years ahead will
not be adequate to develop and utilize the options we are now in the final stages of devel-
oping. Many of these show clear indications of usefulness far beyond their cost.
"In my view the main question which this committee must consider as it takes up the
1967 budget is whether we can or will continue to meet the challenges and pursue the
opportunities opening up in space."
"Along with austerity, the NASA authorization request reflects the President's deter-
mination to provide sufficient resources to hold open for another year and not to fore-
close the major decisions on future programs where failure to apply resources this year
would make it impossible to act effectively next year. Most of these relate to whether to
make use in 1970 and beyond of the space operational systems, space know-bow, and facili-
ties we have worked so hard to build up, or to begin their liquidation."
The combined effect of the action taken by the Senate and House Conferees on our
appropriation, which puts us below the above-mentioned $5 billion figure for FY 1967,
and the guidelines furnished us by the Bureau of the Budget for the 1968 submission leave
no choice but to accelerate the rate at which we are carrying on the liquidation of some of
the capabilities which we have built up. Important options which we have been holding
open will be foreclosed. Further, the actions we must take will bring into play [3] forces of
doubt and uncertainty in the minds of many whose competence, skill and courage have
kept us above that thin line that divides success from failure.
There has not been a single important new space project started since you became
President. Under the 1968 guidelines very little looking to the future can be done next
year.
Struggle as I have to try to put myself in your place and see this from your point of
view, I cannot avoid a strong feeling that this is not in the best interests of the country.
I know the heavy total responsibility which you bear, Mr. President, and believe firmly
in the actions you are taking to make clear to the Communists that you have on call a large
measure of power based on the kind of technology NASA is developing and that you are
prepared to employ it to make sure they sustain a loss instead of a profit when they under-
take excursions such as that in Vietnam. I have no desire to add to your burdens and have
had serious doubts that I should involve you in a protest of your 1968 guidelines. However,
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when Mr. Moyers telephoned that you wanted to make a speech on space that would chart
a course that would constitute a ringing challenge for the next half century, and include
where we have come, where we have to go, and the benefits from the program, I decided I
should let you know my feelings. They are set forth in the enclosed letter which I sent
Senator Dirksen the day we had to collect up the votes to beat Senator Proxmire. I hope
you can find time to read it. It is never an easy thing to decide the time has come to ask for
help from the minority leader. The senior member of our committee, Senator Russell,
voted to support Proxmire, as did Senator Robert Kennedy. Without the effective work of
Senators Anderson, Magnuson, and Smith, with considerable help from Allott, we would
now be facing a catastrophic emasculation of what we have labored so hard to build up.
If it is your purpose to enunciate a ringing challenge for the next half century in
space, Bob Seamans and I will be right with you, but we cannot deliver the kind of suc-
cesses we have had with the thin budgetary margins of the past three years.
With warm and affectionate personal regards, highest respect, and deep apprecia-
tion of your many acts of friendship and support, believe me
Sincerely yours,
James E. Webb
Administrator
[1] August 9, 1966
Honorable Everett Dirksen
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Senator Dirksen:
In accordance with your request for information on the effect of the Proxmire pro-
posals to cut up to $1 billion from the space budget for Fiscal 1967, the best I can do in the
short dme between now and your deadline of noon is to state the following:
1. Through NASA, the nation is in the process of investing approximately $40 billion
in the scientific measurement, development of engines, machines and the know-how to
operate them, and in the use of this scientific knowledge, technical capability, know-how
and machines to make use of both the air and the space region around the earth for
practical, economic, and international purposes. Another factor is to make sure we do not
wake up some day and find others in possession of the power to deny us the use of space.
Beginning in 1958, the various non-military agencies of government were brought together
to retrieve the position of leadership in space which we had lost to the Russians. A pro-
gram looking toward the expenditure of from $22 to $25 billion over a period up to 1975
was initiated by President Eisenhower. With the dramatic capability demonstrated by the
Gagarin flight in 1961, this was augmented and speeded up under the leadership of Presi-
dent Kennedy and Vice President Johnson with strong bi-partisan support. Over the past
five years, the Congress has appropriated about $22 billion to carry out this effort and a
dramatic build-up has taken place as demonstrated recently by the successful Gemini flights
and the Surveyor landing on the moon. Right behind these tremendous efforts and these
clear demonstrations of the correctness of our engineering approach, our knowledge of
the environmental conditions to be met, and the validity of our system of management
which allocates over 90 percent of the doing of this job to American industry, we now find
ourselves facing an even greater requirement. The end result of an investment involving
between $15 and $16 billion in advanced equipment that can far exceed anything we have
seen demonstrated yet is now flowing toward our installations for test and on to Cape
Kennedy for launch.
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[2]2.Whiletheabovefive-yearrecordhasbeenachievedwithintheestimatesof cost
provided to the Congress at the beginning, we find that reductions made by the Congress
in Presidential requests have been largely responsible for slowing up the program by two
years and adding more than twice the amount of these reductions to the cost for doing the
same amount of work. The reductions made by Congress over five years have amounted to
$1,100,000,000 and the increase in cost will amount to $2.7 billion. The enclosed sum-
mary of this situation supplied to the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sci-
ences at the request of Senator Margaret Chase Smith further explains what has happened.
3. For Fiscal Year 1967, the President reduced our request for funds by $712 million,
with the result that under the most favorable circumstances the work force in the factories
and laboratories of some 20,000 industrial companies, financed by NASA, will be reduced
by from 60 to 80 thousand workers. This drastic reduction will have to be made at a time
when the Civil Service personnel in NASA centers must take the responsibility for the final
test and launch of the end results of the large investments referred to above. The Proxmire
proposals would require a further cut of about 100,000 workers and the momentum and
effectiveness of the program would, in my opinion, be utterly destroyed. These proposals
can only be based on a complete lack of understanding of what it takes to build up a work
force of over 450,000 people, proceed rapidly but without the waste of a crash program to
develop advanced equipment that can operate with men out to the moon and with auto-
mated equipment out to Mars and Venus and then utilize this capability to increase the
power of our nation to have on effective voice at the time the largest decisions as to the
future of the development of the human race on this planet will be made. Those of us who
have had to take the responsibility for what I am describing have little doubt that the
balance of technological power among nations is rapidly becoming one of the most impor-
tant determinants of national economic, social, and political viability as well as leadership
in international affairs.
4. Over the past five years, NASA has invested about $22 billion in facilities to permit
us, for from 25 to 50 years, to keep a constant challenge before the Russians or an)' other
nation in the utilization of advanced aeronautical and space systems. American [3] indus-
try has invested another $630 to $650 million in capital items, such as test stands, vacuum
chambers, etc. The 1967 NASA budget includes $95 million to round out and complete
this very large investment and make all of it worth more to the country.
5. We have already sent men into space 22 times before the eyes of the world and
brought them back. One failure would have hurt our nation. Within the next three months,
we should complete the 12 flights of the Gemini program and move on to the Apollo
flights. This will involve the use of the very large Saturn boosters which concentrate in one
machine the rough equivalent power of a small atomic bomb. Because of the danger, we
must fuel and launch these machines automatically with no human being within miles of
the launch pad except the three astronauts on the nose of the rocket. This has never been
done before. The burden of doing the final perfection, correcting faults, proving reliabil-
ity and launching these very large systems with the entire rocket and payload in place on
every launch, even the first one, takes high competence, the availability at the launch site
of every item required for success, and a good deal of self-confidence and guts. We have
built the organization to see this job through, but we cannot hold it together on an
up-and-down basis,
6. As to the period beyond 1970, the production lines for our nation's only really big
boosters are going to grind to a halt unless we can buy the long lead-time items required to
support them. Even if production is continued, these boosters are going to have nothing
like the value they could have for our future if we cannot use the scientific and technical
knowledge we are now buying at such great cost to do the necessary planning and testing
of the payloads, earth sensing equipment, and requirements for operating over long peri-
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ods in space which these boosters now open up to us. Senator Proxmire's proposals will, in
my view, shortly put us back to the kind of frustration and inability to meet the USSR space
challenge that we felt in 1958 with Sputnik and in 1961 with the Gagarin flight.
7. The capability to use our very large rocket engines, advanced electronics, and
ability to marry these capabilities with those of the human being, as shown in our Gemini
flights, has significance far beyond landing on the moon. What we have done [4] in space
shows a can-do nation building strength in science, technology, engineering and manage-
ment, teaming up its scientific, industrial and governmental institutions to meet the re-
quirements for operating in the new and unlimited environment of space and developing
the kind of national capability that will ensure that we are present when the big decisions
affecting our future and that of hundreds of millions of people are made.
8. There is no doubt in my mind that cuts made in this program now will have to be
restored and multiplied within the next year or two as the Russians begin to use the capa-
bility they are in process of developing for flying very large payloads. Beginning in the
1950's we saw them step over what we could do with our Adas and Titan boosters with the
Vostok and Voskhod systems. They clearly have the capability with the booster that has
flown the Proton series to step over the capability of the Saturn 1B and get up to some
50,000 pounds in orbit. I believe they are now rapidly building the capability to leap-frog
over the kind of payloads the Saturn V can boost into space.
9. In the years since 1958 NASA has shown the ability to get a great deal for every
dollar of the investments made in aeronautics and space. We urgently need your support
in order that some of the most important matters affecting the future of this nation are
not put in jeopardy by on ill-considered action. The committees of Congress charged with
the responsibility have officially approved the President's budget, and I would hope their
judgment could be confirmed. Many of the statements being made in support of large cuts
in the NASA budget simply will not stand up on close examination.
I appreciate your desire to understand this situation, and hope I have differentiated
the NASA program from some of those you have characterized as "non-essential spend-
ing."
Sincerely yours,
James E. Webb
Administrator
Document 111-19
Document rifle: James E. Webb, Administrator, Memorandum to Associate Administrator
for Manned Space Flight, "Termination of the Contract for Procurement of Long Lead
Time Items for Vehicles 516 and 517," August 1, 1968.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash.
ington, D.C.
To ensure that there were enough heavy-lift boosters to complete the Apollo pro-
gram, NASA bad contracted for the elements of fifteen Saturn V vehicles. George Mueller,
Associate Administrator for Manned Spaceflight, hoped to keep open the various produc-
tion lines involved in the Saturn V program, anticipating that there would be other uses
for the giant vehicle--extended lunar exploration and launching a space station, for ex-
ample-that would require a heavy-lift capability during the 1970s. The first step in ensur-
ing that this could be done was to contract for those components of the vehicle's S-1C first
stage that required the longest time to manufacture. In mid-1968, Mueller requested
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authorization from James Webb to enter into such contracts.
Webb's answer was negative--no uses for Saturn Vs beyond the original fifteen had
been approved, and the budget outlook for such approval was gloomy. This memorandum
was thus the first step in a process that led to a 1970 decision to terminate the Saturn V
program.
Memorandum to Associate Administrator for
Manned Space Flight
SUBJECT: Termination of the Contract for Procurement of Long lead Time Items for
Vehicles 516 and 517
REFERENCE: N memorandum to the Administrator, dated June 2, 1968, same subject
D memorandum to the Administrator, dated July 31, 1968
AD memorandum to M dated July 13, 1967
After reviewing the referenced documentation and in consideration of the FY 1969
budget situation, your request to expend additional funds for the procurement of long
lead time items for the S-IC stages of the 516 and 517 vehicles is disapproved. This deci-
sion, in effect, limits at this time the production effort on Saturn through vehicle 515. No
further work should be authorized for the development and fabrication of vehicles 516
and 517.
James E. Webb
Administrator
Document 111-20
Document fide: Bureau of the Budget, "National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
Highlight Summary," October 30, 1968.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
The career staff of the Bureau of the Budget (renamed the Office of Management
and Budget in 1970) remains in position as administrations change, and it is an important
contributor to continuity in government policies and programs. This summary, prepared
during the last months of the Johnson administration but intended for whomever would
enter the White House the following January, identifies the significant space policy issues
that would have to be addressed by the new president. While Lyndon Johnson had re-
mained committed to completing the Apollo program, the twin crises of the conflict in
Southeast Asia and urban unrest in the United States had not allowed him to allocate
resources to any major post-Apollo space objectives. As the first lunar landing approached,
the space program was clearly at a crossroads.
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[1] National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Highlight Summary
I. Program and Policy Issues
This paper discusses the major aspects of National Aeronautics and Space operations
which warrant attention at an early point in 1969.
A. Space l_gram Among Other National Priorities
The resource requirements of the Viet Nam war and of pressing domestic needs,
coupled with an apparent acceptance of the Soviet presence in space, have tended to push
the civil space program down the scale of national priorities. As funding requirements for
ongoing programs have declined, it has been very difficult to obtain funds for new starts.
Major space activities require large sums of money, and the development of equipment
requires 3 to 8 years from go-ahead to flight. Therefore planning for space programs, and
even annual budget decision, is very uncertain unless some general levels of funding com-
mitment in future years can be assumed. In a period in which space enjoyed high priority,
total programs were planned and budgeted around the expectation that $5-6 billion would
be available in future years. Now future planning estimates range between $3 and $4B, and
at the lower end of this scale our ability to undertake significant manned flight becomes
marginal.
It appears that a two-fold major policy study should be undertaken to identify ( 1) the
national needs served by space flight, and (2) the priority to be accorded the space pro-
gram over the next several years in relation to other national priorities.
B. Post Apollo Manned Space Flight
Major decisions must be made in the 1970 and 1971 budgets. Funding variations of
+ $2 billion from the present $2 billion per year base are involved. The Manned Lunar
Landing is very likely to occur in late CY 1969, thereby ending what is generally considered
the major cause of urgency in the progress of manned space flight.
As many as eight Saturn V launch vehicles with Apollo spacecraft will remain unused,
as will 7 to 9 Saturn IB's. Budget decisions were made in 1969 to close down all these
production lines on completion of Apollo program production. A short term Apollo Ap-
plications program has been defined to use the Saturn IB's in low earth orbit, but that
program will pass its funding peak in FY 1970 and end in CY 1972. [2]
In the circumstances, pressure is mounting to budget significant sums for follow-on
manned space flight activities, which forces the question of whether there should be a
program of manned space flight after Apollo.
Termination, or even lengthy postponement, poses problems of abandoning expen-
sive inventories, of local economic disorientation, and allegations of leaving all of outer
space, including the Moon, to the U.S.S.R.
Continuation poses problems of funding, program rationale, program definition,
and assignment of principal roles between NASA and Defense (see IV-A, below).
By landing a man on the Moon in 1969 we will have proven that we possess an engi-
neering and technological capability to master the basic problems of very large scale manned
space flight operations for periods of several days. The Gemini program proved our ability
to keep men in orbit for periods of two weeks, and the Department of Defense MOL
program is based on the assumption that man can function effectively in orbit for 30 days.
It is difficult to conceive of any use short of a manned planetary expedition that
would require men to operate in orbit for more than 30 days. Most scientific endeavors
that require the collection of data by means of space flight can be accomplished by un-
manned systems at considerably less expense than the manned space flight systems.
The U.S.S.R. is continuing to develop a large rocket that can place payloads in orbit
equivalent in size to those lifted by our Saturn V (285,000 pounds.) Only the Saturn V is in
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thisweightliftingclass,andnoothercombinationofrocketstagescurrentlyexistingin
theU.S.cancompete.
Ourmannedflightprogramwasestablished,andexpandedtoincludeamanned
lunarlanding,bypolicydecisionsinresponseto"technologicalhallenge"fromtheU.S.S.R.
AnalternativetothepolicyofcompetitionwouldbeapolicyofcooperationwithU.S.S.R.
in largemannedflightendeavors.
Reasonsforproceedingotherthancompetitioni cludenhancingthenationalpres-
tige,advancingthegeneraltechnology,orsimplyfaiththatmannedspaceflightwillulti-
matelyreturnbenefitstomankindinwaysnowunknownandunforeseen.None of these
secondary arguments can be quantified and most are difficult to support.
The case for continuation of a manned space flight effort after Apollo is one of con-
tinuing to advance our capability to operate in space on a larger scale, for longer dura-
tions, for ultimate purposes that are unclear.
[3] C. Unmanned Planetary Programs
Pressures are strong from the scientific community to increase our pace of unmanned
exploration of the planets. The National Academy of Sciences in its report, "Planetary
Exploration; 1968-1975" urged NASA to begin an ambitious program of unmanned inter-
planetary flights, and recommended that a substantially increased fraction of the total
NASA budget be devoted to unmanned planetary exploration. "This is an area in which
the U.S.S.R. is competing strongly and one of those in which accomplishments have scien-
tific as well as technological significance. Planetary investigations are basic research, how-
ever, and as such have no return in an economic sense. Even as a field of basic research
planetary studies may have less long term social benefit than biosciences. Planetary pro-
grams require long lead time and firm commitment due to the limited planetary flight
opportunities. Funding increases of $100M or more per year above the present $85M base
are involved in these programs.
D. Aeronautical R&D
The growth of air transportation, the decline of emphasis on military aircraft, and
the creation of the Department of Transportation have made commercial applications of
key importance in determining the course of aeronautics research. NASA's aeronautics
program should be considered within the context of overall government goals and objec-
tives. See separate memorandum on this subject.
E. Economic Applications
Clientele groups, both within the Government and outside, are pressing NASA to
increase its level of activity in development of satellites for communications, meteorology,
navigation, and surveys of earth resources. Funding in this area runs about $100M per
year and could easily double in the next two years. Though this is one of the few programs
in NASA that shows promise of generating clear near-term benefits, in several areas, nota-
bly meteorology and earth resources, the basic cost/benefit ratio questions remain to be
critically analyzed. Major management questions, possible reassignments of activities be-
tween agencies, and large increases in modest ongoing budgets are raised by the technical
possibility, of using satellites to serve the needs of several agencies. Interior, Agriculture,
ESSA, DOT and Navy are among the clientele agencies in this area, as is the ComSat Cor-
poration and other communications users.
[4] E Nuclear Rocket
This joint AEC/NASA project, started in 1956, has established feasibility of a nuclear
reactor-powered rocket engine. Over $1B has been spent to date and an additional $1.5-
$2B would be required to develop a useable nuclear rocket stage. However, the advantages
of nuclear propulsion do not begin to approximate the costs for missions short of a manned
Mars landing. No national commitment has been made to undertake this mission which
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would cost $40-$100B. (see "B" above) Nevertheless, pressures are strong in NASA, indus-
try and Congress to undertake the development of the nuclear rocket. See separate memo-
randum on this subject.
H. Budgetary Trends and Issues
NASA's funding level has declined from a high of $5.3B in appropriations in 1965 to
the current 1969 appropriation of $4.0B. The 1969 operating level is $3.85B. The manned
space flight activities account for over $2.0B in the current year.
The budget issues are those associated with each of the above items, plus the need to
reassess the need to support the elaborate ground complex of Government, industry, and
universities if the rate of space development activity should continue to decline. The cost
of this ground complex is more than $1.5B per year (see IV-B, below).
HI. Organization and Management Issues
A. Use of support service contracts at NASA fidd centers
NASA currently employs about 25,000 contractor personnel located in their labora-
toiles in direct support of their 32,000 civil service employees. This is a problem from
political, cost, and management standpoints. NASA is faced with a CSC ruling that several
of those contracts are illegal. Others may not be administered within the Civil Service laws.
At the same time, the agency is operating under the federal personnel ceiling constraints
which make conversion to Civil Service difficult, and a future program level uncertainty
which threatens the justification for keeping such large numbers of personnel.
B. Scope of capability ba_eforfu_re spaceactivities
NASA currently spends between $1.5 and $2.0B per year to maintain a Government/
University/Industry basic capability to engage in space flight activity. This capability con-
fists of the technical and management talent in the NASA laboratories, the world-wide
satellite tracking and control networks, scientists and their research teams in universities,
research and engineering teams in industry, and specialized ground test and launch facili-
ties scattered around the U.S.
This basic capability complex was established on the assumption that the NASA bud-
get would be about $5.5 B to $6 B per year. As the budget has declined to $3.85B, the flight
program development activity has borne the brunt of the reductions and the support com-
plex has been only slightly reduced. The question is whether to assume the possibility of
increased funding levels and preserve the base, or to phase down on a long term basis on
the assumption that lower funding levels will remain for the foreseeable future. [3]
C. NASA advanced research and technology centers
NASA has not yet developed a means to focus their in-house research on long range
mission goals. The research program, costing in total around $400M in contract funds for
space technology and aircraft technology, and in-house laboratory effort, is therefore dif-
fused and general. It is difficult to judge how varying levels of funding in these areas relate
to advancing the nation's ability to meet long-term space goals.
The laboratories do contain high calibre engineering and technical talent which
could be used to serve other national needs besides aeronautical and space flight. Re-
search and technology advancement in surface mass transportation, ocean engineering
and other complex technological areas could well be done by NASA laboratories. [5]
IV. Inter-agency Relations
A. NASA rdatiomhip to DOD space programs
The NASA operates a space program for non-military purposes which consists of
flight programs for collection of science data and for test and demonstration of new space-
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related technology, and of ground-based applied research and technology. The DOD op-
erates a space program consisting of satellite flights contributing to defense operations
and of ground based applied research and technology applicable to Defense oriented
space flight. There are joint agency studies under way to review the two agency programs.
Certain economies may be achieved by reassigning and consolidating activities in
such areas as standardization of equipment, ground based tracking networks, and technol-
ogy programs.
A major policy problem concerns the future of earth orbital manned space flight in
which DOD now has the Manned Orbiting Laboratory and NASA has the Apollo Applica-
tions program. In future, should we plan on two manned programs, a single program
jointly run, or should a single agency be assigned responsibility for all manned space flight
activities? [6]
B. As mentioned earlier in the areas of aeronautics and economic applications, there
is a need to relate NASA's effort to these programs to the requirements established by the
Departments of Transportation, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and others. The Gov-
ernment-wide goals, objectives and programs in the area of transportation and applica-
tions need to be established, and agency missions and roles delineated.
C. Total space program funding
Attached is a table showing the funding for space programs of all agencies 1958-
1969.
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Summary Budget Trends
(In Millions)
Budget Total,excl.
Outlays _ SummerYouth
1963 actual............... 3,673 2,552 27,904 29,934
1968 actual............... 4,587 4,721 32,469 33,968
1969 currentBOB
estimate(tentative).. 3,879 4,250 31,186 32,706
Document111-21
Document tide: Charles Townes, et al., "Report of the Task Force on Space," January 8,
1969.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
Richard M. Nixon was elected president in November 1968. Like the incoming
Kennedy administration in 1960, Nixon appointed a number of blue-ribbon transition
teams to advise the new government. Nixon's thirteen-person transition Task Force on
Space was chaired by Nobelist Charles Townes of the University of California at Berkeley.
Unlike the "Wiesner Report" prepared for the Kennedy transition, this report was not
released to the public or the press.
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[1] Report of the Task Force on Space
January 8, 1969
Preamble
Development of space sciences and technology, exploitation of their uses, and explo-
ration of the solar system inspire and attract human endeavor for many reasons. Since
much effort and expense are involved, and plans for major moves in these fields must be
made years in advance, it is prudent for any nation to consider carefully what, in the course
of years and decades, is the likely importance and cost of such efforts to the nation and to
humanity. Yet no one can assess with precision or surety the ultimate human value of our
space program, and indeed we can expect that some of the more striking values are not yet
visualized. However, what can now be foreseen, and historical experience in development
of other areas of science and technology, make a convincing case that space exploration
and utilization will have a tremendous impact on human thought, activity, and welfare.
The space program has many facets, and the values of each cannot always be measured on
the same scale. The more important aspects, not in order of priority, are:
1. Exp/oraaon and D/seovery. Man's escape from the earth's surface, his exploration of
the moon and planets and further penetration, at least by instruments, of space beyond
the solar system represent one of the most exciting and appealing frontiers for human
exploration of all time. Linked so closely with exploration as to not be really separable is a
second aspect-
2. Sdonce. The space program has provided new tools and unique capabilities for
examination of some of the most challenging and basic scientific questions. For example,
space observatories will have an important influence on our understanding of the history
of the universe and yield enormous advances in astronomy, newly possible lunar and plan-
etary [2] investigations should answer questions on the formation of the solar system and
greatly increase our knowledge of geophysics, and exobiology may revolutionize our view
of life.
3. Use of Spacecraft and Associated Techniques for Civil or Cora_l Benefit Some ap-
plications of space operations, such as communications satellites, already seem to be eco-
nomical in terms of direct benefits to civilian life. Others, like weather-observing satellites,
coupled with new sensing systems, offer realistic prospects of great advances in weather
research and its applications. In such diverse areas as mineral and water resource develop-
ment, forest and agricultural surveillance, and ocean monitoring, for example, substantial
advances seem imminent and warrant vigorous research and development. In all of these
cases, space technologies open up entirely new opportunities for achieving the global per-
spectives that are essential to the effective use of world resources and to the preservation
or improvement of the quality of the human environment.
4. World Cooperation and Stability. Many aspects of space work stimulate and offer new
opportunities to promote world unity and cooperation. Important among these are the
fulfillment of common human aspirations in extending man's purview beyond the earth
itself, the physical and logical impossibility of dividing space or satellite orbits along na-
tional lines, and the naturalness of global utilization of space operations. While capitaliza-
tion on these aspects in the interest of world unity and stability will require care and subdety,
they do present new and potent opportunities for progress in this direction.
5. National Security. If one omits consideration of ballistic missiles, as we shall, there
are still a large number of important direct applications [3] of space technology to mili-
tary effectiveness. The DOD budget of about $2 billion for space work is an indication,
and we think a reasonable reflection, of the present importance of military applications of
space. Furthermore, the probability of additional unappreciated effects of space technol-
ogy on military affairs and the rapidity of change in military technology give considerable
importance to a high level of U.S. competence in all major areas of space technology and
operations. Closely related to some aspects of national security is the question of---
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6. Prestige. Prestige comprises a variety of real and sensible effects on the attitudes
and responses of the U.S. citizenry, as well as other peoples. They are important to the
confidence and well-being of our own citizens as well as to our international actions and
national security. Prestige associated with space must in the long run be based, of course,
on real values rather than on the appearance of accomplishment, and its effects need to
be carefully judged by those versed in politics and social psychology, who at the same time
are well informed about the technical and operational possibilities of the space program.
7. Technelogiml DevelcYl_nent A successful space program gives not only the appear-
ance of technological and organizational leadership, its stringent requirements demand
and develop them. There are other conceivable technological programs, mostly less highly
visible, which can give similar benefits for the general development of technology. How-
ever, the existence of a vigorous space program does provide an important stimulus to
technology, and helps give U.S. industry a favorable competitive position in world mar-
kets.
[4] Summary of Issues and Conclusions
Major issues and considerations in the present direction of the nation's space pro-
gram are as follows:
1. Should the U.S. compete with the U$SR in space act/v/ty ?We believe it should not do so
in detail, but that the U.S. effort must be as strong over-all as that of the Soviet Union. A
decision to compete on this broad scale plays an important role in the budgetary level of
space work, fixing it at something like the present level.
2. Is any significant change required in thrust or content of the present space program? A
new look is required at the balance between the manned and unmanned segments of
NASA space program, in order to ensure that the purposes and relative usefulness of each
is properly assessed and fully exploited. Expanded research and development in use of
unmanned devices for scientific investigation, and in a wide variety of useful applications,
including communications, weather and earth resources surveys, seems strongly indicated.
3. What should be the objectives and scope of the manned program? While this issue is
complex, and the function of man in space not yet clear, a considerable majority of the
task force believes there is a substantial role for man in the long term, and that a contin-
ued manned flight program, including lunar exploration, is justified at present.
4. What are the program items and their urgency for the iramediate future? Various items
needing special consideration are
a. A manned space station. We are against any present commitment to the construc-
tion of a large space station, but believe study of the possible purposes and design of such
a station should be continued.
[5] b. Apollo Applications Program. This program should proceed as a way of testing
man's role in space, of allowing a healthy continuing manned space program, and for the
biomedical and scientific information it will yield.
c. Lunar exploration. Lunar exploration after the first Apollo landing will be excit-
ing and valuable. But additional work needs to be initiated this year to provide for its full
exploitation by means of an adequate mobility and extended stay on the lunar surface.
d. Planetary exploration. The U.S. program for planetary exploration by instrumented
probes needs to be strengthened and funds for such probes increased appreciably. How-
ever, the great majority of the task force is not in favor of a commitment at present to a
manned planetary lander or orbiter.
e. Astronomy and other sciences. The space program is important to a number of
sciences, and can be of enormous benefit to astronomy. This potential should be continu-
ously developed through sound and stable programs.
f. Applications of spacecraft and associated techniques for civil and commercial ben-
efit. We believe research and development of such applications should be supported strongly
and increased in pace. Furthermore, the new administration should give considerable
attention to their use in promoting international cooperation.
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5. 1_ _n_ of space work to national security. The space program is of great
importance to national security, not only because of present direct military applications,
and its effect on our posture, but also [6] to have available the necessary technology and
skill to make or counter new military uses of space. Recommendations are discussed in a
classified appendix.
6. Cos*reduction, and _loweost"boostm_. The unit costs of boosting payloads into space
can be substantially reduced, but this requires an increased number of flights, or such an
increase coupled with an expensive development program. We do not recommend initia-
tion of such a development, but study of the technical possibilities and rewards. Some cost
reductions in the space program can probably be made simply through experience and
stabilization of the level of effort, and through coordination of future NASA and DOD
programs.
7. InUrnationa/affa/r,. Space operations put in a new light many international ques-
tions and also lead naturally towards some areas on international cooperation. We believe
these offer opportunities for initiatives and some progress towards world cooperation and
stability, and the U.S. should exploit these opportunities with both care and vigor.
8. Arc organizational arrangements approWiate for the future space effort?We believe the
separation of nonmilitary from military space work which has been effectively produced
by the creation of NASA, and the continuance of a strong, largely unclassified, space pro-
gram without any direct military aspects is very important.
Organizational programs which need action or study include:
a. The DOD/NASA interface, where it is recommended that the new heads of the
two organizations develop a plan for optimizing coordination.
b. The NASA organizational structure. Sometime after the first lunar landing, NASA
should be reorganized on a more [7] functional basis rather than on a basis of use of
manned or unmanned techniques, and in addition an out-standing scientist should be
brought into its top administrative ranks.
c. The Space Council has not been very effective. We recommend changes.
The appropriate over-all budgetary level and rate of the space effort cannot be made
precise without detailed examination. However, three considerations dominate in the gen-
eral budgetary level required for the space program. One is the needed development and
application of space technology directly for military problems. We have not examined the
DOD budget of $2 billion for these purposes, but such a figure seems appropriate. A sec-
ond is the need we see for a continued manned space flight program. For a successful,
safe, and continuing manned program in NASA an annual budget of about $2 billion
directly for this purpose is needed for fiscal 1970. Additional funds are of course necessary
for many other parts of the NASA program, including some expansion on unmanned
exploratory work. The third large and very pervasive factor affecting the budget is the
need to maintain a generally competitive position with respect to the Soviet Union. We
believe that approximately the present level of expenditure, $6 billion for the total space
program, and about $4 billion for NASA, is needed for this purpose. This total amount,
about 3/4 of one per cent of the GNP, does not seem excessive in view of importance of the
space developments to the nation.
A $4 billion budget represents a rather frugal amount to carry out NASA's many
important tasks. But we believe it is adequate for the programs recommended here. In
subsequent years some changes may be appropriate, [8] but we do not expect that any
large fractional change will be desirable soon without a concomitant substantial change in
the role of NASA or in the international situation.
The most reasonable way of effecting a large budget reduction in the future would
be to postpone any development of new manned systems. Since most of the development
and hardware purchases for Apollo have now been made and considerable number of
boosters and space vehicles will remain after the first lunar landing, it is possible to have an
active and successful manned program for several years while at the same time steadily
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decreasing the level of funding for manned space flight to perhaps $1.25 billion by fiscal
1972. This would be based on use of hardware already procured, which would permit
continued manned space operation until 1975. An option representing a severely con-
strained manned program would be continuation of manned flight following 1975 with
Saturn V equipment. Procurement lead time would require a decision about 1972, and
annual acquisition and operational cost for a minimal program of two launches per year
would level out at about $1.2 billion. Such a program would be based on extended use of
present technology and not allow any new development of equipment for manned flight
during this time. Such a plan is not recommended, since we believe a continued vigorous
manned program beyond this period will be important.
Competition with the USSR
The Apollo commitment had its origin in a crisis of confidence in the technological
superiority of the U.S., with implications concerning our national security. While this situ-
ation has changed radically and we believe that the nation can plan its space program with
considerable confidence and [9] detachment, our plans must reflect the concurrent So-
viet activity.
The USSR continues to expand its investments in nonmilitary and military space
operations. It seems to be actively preparing for a long-term program of manned space
flight activity, including both manned lunar flights and extended manned flights in earth
orbit. In addition, the Russians are in a particularly strong position to compete in un-
manned planetary exploration--for which they have a well-tested rocket more suitable
than ours---and they are steadily strengthening their nonmilitary applications programs.
Our response to Soviet space activity must insure that we do not abdicate unilateral
capabilities to the USSR whose potential impact on our security cannot be readily assessed.
Nor should we permit ourselves to be completely dependent on Soviet sources for major
areas of important scientific information. In applications areas the U.S. should insure the
strength of its commercial and national security positions and take the initiative in inter-
national space cooperation.
The task force also believes that continuation of a vigorous program of space explo-
ration, involving man's participation, is desirable in order that the U.S. shall remain com-
petitive in this most visible area of space activity, although we recognize this as more a
political than a technical question.
These views have the following consequence in policy:
1. We should remain competitive in each of the following areas under the principles
given above:
a. Manned and automated exploration of the solar system
b. Military and civilian space applications
c. Space science
d. Technology relevant to the above
[ 10] 2. There is no need for our space goals to mirror those of the USSR in detail; we
can and should design a program to meet our needs.
3. Continued efforts should be devoted to the ultimate goal of cooperation with the
Soviet Union in manned exploration of the solar system, in the order that this area of
prestige competition might be reduced in cost and become a force for political accommo-
dation.
4. Current NASA budget levels are sufficient to support an adequately competitive
space effort.
Objectives and Scope of the Manned Space Program
The remarkable success of the Apollo 8 mission has provided renewed insight to the
dramatic public appeal of manned space flight and bolsters our confidence that the manned
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lunar landing may be accomplished as early as July 1969. With this convincing demonstra-
tion of our strength and capability in space technology we must examine and redefine the
future role and objectives of manned space activity in our national space program. A deci-
sion regarding this role may be the most critical choice facing the new administration in
regard to the space program.
The broad objectives of the space program, and particularly of its manned compo-
nent, must be viewed realistically and objectively in two parts. The first part relates to the
satisfaction of man's aspirations to explore his universe and extend his purview, coupled
with the continued exercising of our national scientific, technological and industrial skill
in a way that is dramatically appealing to the world public--a "show of constructive force,"
as it were. We will be measured, and we will measure ourselves against the Soviet Union by
the quality and value of our space [11] activities, and thereby contribute to the over-all
assessment of our relative strength and influence in the community of nations. Our ac-
complishments may further serve to provide an important domestic focus of national pur-
pose and pride, a unifying and inspirational force of some consequence in the midst of
difficult and divisive social problems.
The second class of objectives relates to man in space as a useful part of a scientific
activity or a space applications operation. There are substantial differences of view among
technically well-informed people about the future evolution of space technology, the role
that man-in-space will play in it and how soon extensive practical use of man-in-space might
come. Given a shirt-sleeve environment in which to work, men can probably work in the
weighdess state with an effectiveness nearly equivalent to their performance on the earth's
surface. Doubts about the role of man in space arise in part from the rapid evolution of
technology on earth toward the removal of man's intimate involvement in complex equip-
ment and substitution of computer and other remote control systems. In part these doubts
result from concern about risks to life that can never be reduced to zero. But primarily
such doubts come from the great cost of placing man in orbit and sustaining him there
with the necessary tools, propulsion, and other capabilities to be truly useful in a control
or engineering role.
Whether these costs will be justified by the reductions in capital cost of space systems
that manned operation, or manned repair and modernization in space might bring, and
the value of man's dexterity in assisting with the assembly of complex systems in orbit will
be to a large extent dependent on the total scale of space operations in the future and the
reduction in costs of transport to orbit that new launch systems might bring. By this crite-
rion [12] man cannot be said to "pay his way" in space today. There is a good reason to
hope that in the long run man in earth orbit will be valuable in providing operational and
engineering support to large-scale space operations and scientific experiments. There-
fore, plans for future manned programs must recognize the fact that we do not know
precisely what may be the proper or most useful functions of man in space, but it should
be precisely our objective to find out.
It would be undesirable to define at this time a new goal that is both very ambitious
in scope and highly restrictive in schedule, for example a manned landing on Mars before
1985, even though such a goal might be achievable. Such a commitment, adopted now,
might inhabit our ability to establish a proper balance between the manned space pro-
gram and the scientific and applications programs. On the other hand, there is probably
some threshold budgetary level required to maintain a manned space flight capability in
being, which may be between $1.2 and $2.0 billion per year. Some part of this manned
space flight activity can be directed to the continued exploration of man's possible useful-
ness in space. The proposed Apollo Application Program, including the workshop experi-
ments, will contribute to this end in the 1971-1972 period. Other than this program, the
major focus of manned space flight during the coming half decade should be manned
lunar exploration. It is inconceivable that we should terminate human exploration of the
moon after one or two landings, with no activity beyond simply standing on the surface.
However, continued manned exploration should be a thoughtfully integrated part of a
total program of lunar exploration, utilizing unmanned landings and remotely controlled
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exploratory devices when they are advantageous. The manned landing should be infre-
quent, but planned to extend progressively man's roll in the exploration.
[13] It should also be noted that achievement of prestige through space achieve-
ments may require some shift of emphasis from manned to unmanned activity. With our
apparent momentary lead in manned flight, it is likely that Soviet programs will emphasize
strongly a massive commanded and automated exploration of the planets. These two as-
pects of space prestige must be considered carefully.
In the continued investigation of man's proper roll in either space science or space
applications, it is desirable to avoid undue polarization along manned versus unmanned
flight and instead to focus on the search for the most appropriate roles for the human
being in the entire system, on the ground as well as in space. The objective should be to
devise the most efficient means of conducting the entire activity, with the human intelli-
gence operating in the most effective location. The focus should be on the mission itself,
and the mission-oriented plan should include, where appropriate, the determination of
an optimum combination of manned and unmanned flights. The present organization of
NASA is not at all adapted to this approach.
Programs and Priorities--Space Stations and Apollo Applications Program
The Apollo Applications Program should contribute to our understanding of man's
utility in space, but needs a much closer connection than has been achieved so far with the
space science and the space applications programs and a sounder foundation in biomedi-
cal research. For this, management must put strong emphasis on the missions to be accom-
plished. The "manned space station" concept, proposed as a program for the later 1970's,
is on much more doubtful ground. It is much too ambitious to be consistent with the
present clear needs for continued exploration of man's usefulness in space. [14] On the
other hand, it is not obviously an effective way of continuing to demonstrate for prestige
purposes our manned space capability. Perhaps the most unique function of a space sta-
tion would be to test man's ability for an extended space flight over times of a year or
more, so that the practicality of a manned planetary mission could be examined. Such a
test would be needed by the mid-70's if a manned Mars mission by the early 80's were
planned. However, the desirability of such a mission is not yet clear, and the Apollo Appli-
cations Program may be able to give useful partial answers to the possibility of very
long-durations space flights. It therefore seems premature to make any firm program deci-
sion regarding the proposed manned space station.
Programs and Priorities---Lunar Exploration
The primary goal of manned space flight in the 1970's which should be planned now
is the scientific exploration of the moon, by both equipment and occasional manned land-
ings using upgraded versions of the present Apollo system. Alternatives for this choice are:
a. A commitment next year to a manned landing on Mars, which some of us believe
could be carried out in the early or middle 1980's, if sufficient effort were made;
b. An earth orbital space station to house perhaps six to nine men who would make
occasional trips to and from earth.
A great majority of the task force opposes a commitment to a manned Mars landing
at this time, It believes that the space program in this second decade should not be built
around a single monolithic goal on a fixed timetable. The task force also recognizes that a
Mars landing in the early or middle [15] 1980's would require a substantial expansion of
the NASA budget in the next few years, It proposes that the space station receive further
study without a binding commitment until its design and purposes are more clearly delin-
eated and the possibilities of a radical reduction in the future of costs of transportation to
orbit are more firmly established. It appears that the AAP program for manned flight, also
scheduled for the 70's, might serve many of the purposes of a space station.
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Mixed manned and unmanned lunar exploration has the following advantages as a
primary goal of manned spaceflight in the next 5-8 years:
1. Exploration of the moon may reveal surprises which our studies of the earth did
not lead us to suspect. The resulting new concepts about the evolution of planetary sys-
tems may have far-reaching impact on our understanding of earth resources, earthquakes,
and other matters of great importance to mankind.
2. Building on the capability provided by Apollo, it provides the best opportunity in
the next ten years for utilizing man's unique capabilities in space exploration, having a
high potential for sustained scientific and public interest.
8. Lunar exploration makes best use of the already contracted inventory of Apollo
Saturn V launch vehicles, of which there are sufficient to carry such a program from about
1973 through 1976.
4. It exploits our current "lead" over the Russians, although we can expect manned
landing on the moon by the USSR before we can prepare the needed lunar exploration
capability, about 1973.
5. A combined manned and unmanned approach is not only one of minimum cost
for the maximum return in scientific knowledge, it examines [ 16] both the competition
and the synergism between systems in which the man is either at hand or in a remote
location. In that sense we suspect it may be the forerunner of the space technology of the
distant future.
This program will require adding vehicles for mobility on the lunar surface and also
provision of longer stay time.
Programs and Priorities--
Use of Spacecraft and Associated Techniques for Civil or Commercial Benefit
Satellites give new and uniquely valuable capabilities. These capabilities can be ex-
ploited for the benefit of all society and for specific practical applications. For such exploi-
tation an expanded program of research and development, using both ground-based and
space techniques is needed.
Because of the high level of technical development and diversification in booster
launch use, guidance and control, and durability of electronic equipment in space, recent
technological developments have so increased the long life potential of satellites that their
operational cost is gready reduced and leverage for future great cost reduction is large. All
this has laid the ground work for application of satellites in the fields of
1. Communications as a radio relay or repeater with high information capacity. Spe-
cific applications include public and commercial communications, for example, telephon-
ing, T.V., data collection and transmission and navigation aids. These have only begun,
with greater expansion expected when questions of national and international policy and
of public and private interests are resolved.
[17] 2. Observation using the electromagnetic spectrum of reading the earth's re-
sources and environment. Users, present and possible, include those in the fields of me-
teorology, agriculture, forestry, water resources, navigation and traffic control, geodesy
and cartography and oceanography.
The opportunities for application in communication and observation are of such
social impact on man and have such unrealized economic benefits that their support by
NASA should be an immediate major program. NASA with the support of other govern-
ment agencies should have a strong satellite applications program within government and
which also encourages the private sector for development and investment.
Programs and Priorities--Planetary Exploration
We consider that unmanned planetary exploration should be a major component of
the future space program of the Unites States.
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There are nine major planets and an uncountable number of smaller, planet-like
objects in the solar system, each of whose motion is dominated by the gravitational attrac-
tion of the sun. Each of the planets is a "new world." Each has its own special properties
and no two are alike. The origin of the entire system and the separate histories of each
planet form one of the most engaging puzzles of astronomical science. Much has been
learned and much more can be learned by the use of ground-based optical and radar
telescopes. But truly definitive study of the planets must await on-the-spot observations by
fly-by, orbiting, and landed spacecraft. The pioneering Venus and Mars missions, Mariners
II, IV and V of the United States and mission Venus IV of the USSR, have demonstrated the
effectiveness of automated equipment for detailed investigations of the planets and have
already yielded substantial advances in knowledge.
[18] The United States now possesses the technological capability and the scientific
sophistication to send powerful automated spacecraft to Mars, Venus, Mercury, and the
giant outer planet Jupiter within the next five years and to the most distant outer planets
Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, and Pluto within the following decade. The first objectives will
be to learn the physical properties of the planets--the composition, structure and tem-
perature of their atmospheres; and nature and temperature of their surfaces; their precise
shapes, masses and magnetic characteristics; and their internal structures as inferred from
such evidence.
Following rapidly behind such physical investigations will be attempts to establish
the existence or absence of extraterrestrial life. The discovery of any form of life on an-
other planet would be an event of outstanding scientific importance and of profound
cultural and philosophical significance.
It is our opinion that a vigorous program of direct planetary exploration by auto-
mated spacecraft is readily encompassed by our national resources and will greatly in-
crease the scope and depth of human knowledge and perceptive.
Programs and Priorities--Astronomy and Other Sciences
Curiosity as to the origin, the fundamental nature, and the form of our physical
universe is a subject of profound interest to all civilized man. The present prospects of
carrying out experiments and making observations from the environment of space pro-
vides an opportunity for studying the nature of the universe in ways heretofore impossible.
Until the advent of flight above the earth's atmosphere we were able to view the
physical universe with blurred vision and in only two narrow wavelengths regions out of
broad system of radiation by which the [19] processes of the stars and galaxies manifest
themselves. A satisfactory start in exploiting the clear seeing beyond the earth's atmo-
sphere has been made; we can point with pride to the success of the Solar Observatories,
the Astronomical Observatory, and a host of cosmic and X-ray experiments, where these
early observations have revolutionized our picture of processes occurring in our Galaxy.
These experiments are only the pioneer steps in space science and there are clear-cut,
long-range goals in several areas which must be borne in mind in planning the continued
science program from space.
In the area of galactic and extragalactic astronomy, it is important to provide means
to see the universe in all available wavelengths and with the highest possible angular reso-
lution. This requires the ultimate construction of high sensitivity, high directivity X-ray
and gamma-ray facilities, radio telescope arrays of diameters of miles and a sophisticated
optical telescope of diffraction limited performance comparable in size and versatility to
the largest now existing on the earth. All of these goals are within the capabilities of our
program and can be achieved within the next decade by a vigorous program of progres-
sively more refined experiments, each scientifically justified in itself.
The closest star, our sun, reveals new phenomena and interactions with interplan-
etary medium as it is studied with increasing spatial and energy resolution and we must
work toward more sophisticated observations of this object. The interaction of this source
of energy with the material between the planets and the earth, and the manner in which
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the cosmic rays are modulated as they enter the solar system is a subject of particular
relevance to the astronomical and planetary programs of NASA.
[20] Furthermore, rather than looking at the moon and planets from a distance, we
now have opportunities to view them at close range, and conduct experiments on their
surfaces. The possibilities of studying the moon and planetary objects at first hand will
vasdy increase our understanding of geophysics and of the history of the earth and solar
system.
Significance of the National Space Program to National Security
The national space program, taken as a whole, has been and will continue to be vital
to national security. Certain parts of the program contribute very directly and with ex-
tremely high leverage to national security, while other parts make only an indirect and
smaller contribution.
(The primary part of this section, which considers High Leverage Direct Contributions,
is in a special classified appendix.)
Indirect Contributions of the Space Program to National Security
Indirect contributions of the space program to national security are important, but
their naturally rather diffuse character makes it impractical to give more than a brief list of
them here.
1. The national security, including in particular its diplomatic aspects, is substantially
influenced by our apparent posture resulting from performance in the highly conspicu-
ous areas of space science and technology, and space operations. Prestige factors are com-
mented on in other sections of this report.
[21] 2. The space program and space-borne platforms have some unique potentials
to help in a general way break down restrictions on free communications across borders
and also to build healthy connections with other governments.
3. The space program provides challenging goals and severe tests of advanced
technology and management techniques with are important to the nation's military effec-
tiveness and economic success. Direct military programs and also some other civilian pro-
grams can provide a similar stimulus. However, the considerable human interest and the
variety of new problems connected with the space program are notably effective in
developing knowledge and trained personnel of importance to high technology and an
adaptive military capability.
Reduction of Unit Costs of Space Operations
Much attention has been directed, particularly during the past six months, to the
problem of achieving significantly lower costs in large boosters, without decrease in the
reliability of the launching and boosting operations. It now seems clear that several differ-
ent ways of achieving significandy lower launching and booster costs can be devised by
taking full advantage of experience to date, and by applying current technology specifi-
caUy to the purpose of reducing costs. The launching and booster costs per pound in low
altitude orbit could be reduced by about a factor of 10--from $700-$1000 per pound to
less then $100 per pound, (Enthusiasts suggest a reduction by a factor of 50.) This differ-
ence in cost could total many billions of dollars over a ten-year period. The exact savings
depends, of course, on the number of launches one assumes. Each of the different [ ways]
[22] (recover both states, greatly simplified liquid propellant stages, and solid propellant
stages) of accomplishing this reduction has its own vigorous proponents.
It does not appear necessary or desirable to initiate a major new program to achieve
this cost reduction by any of the alternate approaches at this time. However, it is clear that
continued priority should be given to the studies that are already under way, and that these
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studiesshouldbeaugmentedtoprovideamorecompleteunderstandingofthetechnical
alternatives,andtomakemorecompleteconomiccomparisonsforseveraldifferentfu-
turelevelsoflaunchingactivity,projectedoverthenextfifteenyears,Thisworkshouldbe
focussedandcoordinatedbyDODandNASAsoastoprovidebyabout1November1969
informationuponwhichajointDOD-NASAprogramdecisioncouldbemade.
International Cooperation
The space program provides many opportunities, a variety of stimuli, and some ne-
cessity for new initiatives in international cooperation. Space beyond the earth's atmo-
sphere, including the heavenly bodies, has generally been recognized as common to the
human race. Satellites must of necessity cross national boundaries and the tracking or
retrieving of them is likely to extend past national frontiers. Furthermore, they are gener-
ally much more efficient when used on a global scale. And the exploration of space, like
human knowledge, is naturally an inspiration and an enterprise best shared by all men.
We believe that the present technological position and national interest in the U.S.
make it desirable to take vigorous initiatives towards international cooperation in space
work, and to continually make clear our earnest desire [23] for such cooperation.
In general our policy and programs for international space cooperation has so far
been important but modest. Much broader cooperation with selected nations or groups of
nations would be valuable and is strongly recommended. Cooperation in scientific experi-
ments with Italy, Canada, France, West Germany, Great Britain, and several other coun-
tries has been so successful that it seems profitable to increase these types of projects with
the hope that the cooperating countries would gain in competence and play a larger role.
We do have agreements with the Soviet Union for exchanging meteorological and mag-
netic data. Satellite communications are rapidly moving into the area of international
agreement (Intelsat).
Active study should be begun to seek and to analyze initiatives and policies for the
U.S. which would further international cooperation in peace work. The first lunar landing
may offer a particular occasion for useful and arresting moves.
Consideration should be given to the merits of an international laboratory financed
and staffed by all participating nations in proportion to their interest and devoted to in-
tensive study of world-wide systems such as global weather prediction, or an earth resources
satellite system, or both. The U.S. would participate in, but not finance, this laboratory.
The relationship of such laboratories to ESRO, WMO, and to the U.N. would require
careful study. One could also consider regional laboratories such as in Latin America or
Africa where the individual countries cooperating in the program could read out data
from earth applications satellites and work up these data for their own areas.
[24] It is suggested that space cooperation with the Soviet Union in the near future
take the form of planning and scientific collaboration rather than join conduct of space
activities. The most promising area might be in unmanned planetary exploration--one in
which Soviet competence matches our own, and with obvious savings to both countries. In
the future this might be extended to lunar exploration.
Organizational Issues--Importance of a Civilian Organization
Separation of the space program into a part directed towards military applications in
the DOD and a largely unclassified part without strong military coloring in NASA has, we
believe, been an eminently wise policy. It is especially important to easy cooperation of
foreign nationals and governments with NASA, and to the very friendly attitude towards
NASA, its bases and operations, which characteristically occurs abroad. We recommend
careful efforts to see that this part of the space program continues to be clearly separated
from military applications.
510 THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. SPACE POLICYAND PLANS
Organizational Issues--DOD/NASA Interface
In considering the relationship between military and nonmilitary space programs,
the first question which arises is: are the roles and missions of NASA and DOD in the
national space program correctly established. We believe the answer to this question is
generally '_/es." That is, the DOD should continue its responsibility for all space programs
direcdy supporting military missions and NASA should continue its responsibility for more
general space and aeronautical science and technology, for applications of space technol-
ogy to nonmilitary purposes (such as [25] civil communications, civil navigation and
traffic control, weather prediction, earth resources surveys), and for general exploratory
programs in the near earth, lunar, and planetary regimes. Whether programs are "manned"
or "unmanned" it is not really fundamental to the division of missions between these agen-
cies, and both NASA and DOD should employ men or not employ men in space as suited
to their basic missions, and as influenced by the projects involved.
The next question which must be considered are: Are improvements necessary in
coordination and mutual support between NASA and DOD programs, and are there sig-
nificant opportunities for cost-savings in stronger central management of supporting
capabilities, such as booster vehicles, launching vehicles, rangers, tracking and communi-
cations networks, recovery forces and operational centers? We believe the answer to both
of these questions is also '_/es." That is, significant steps should be taken to provide stronger
policies on coordination and mutual support between NASA and DOD programs, stron-
ger central management and control of major new program planning and initiation, and
stronger and more cost-sensitive management of supporting capabilities. These improve-
ments are particularly needed relative to potential new manned space flight programs
with potentially large budgetary impact.
This problem is complicated and requires mature, thorough, and objective study.
Certainly no major changes in responsibilities or organizational reporting relationships
should be introduced in the Apollo program prior to the lunar landing. In general, trans-
fers of major organizational units and facilities between agencies may not be needed, if
strong machinery or central coordination and management on a national basis can be
effected, with suitable directed mutual support.
[26] We suggest that the new Secretary of Defense and the new Administrator of
NASA be directed by the President to present specific recommendations aimed at these
objectives.
Organizational Issues-Internal Organization of NASA
The present internal organization of NASA is oriented toward the achievement of a
manned lunar landing by 1970, with manned and unmanned operations administratively
divided. The organization is complex, often with no clear distinction between line and
staff functions, and is considered inappropriate for the problems of the post-Apollo space
program. While the present structure should not be seriously disturbed before the first
lunar landing to avoid any possibility of interfering with this operation, after Apollo the
administrative organization of NASA should be changed to correspond to program objec-
fives rather than means of accomplishing them.
In the area of applications, NASA should be encouraged to continue its technical
and scientific program leadership. This should continue beyond the initial research and
engineering development stages into pilot operations. NASA should continue responsibil-
ity for total space flight experimental systems---that is, satellites, sensors, ground stations,
test sites, and data processing. User agencies should participate acdvely in planning and in
evaluating results, and in the establishment of budgetary controls. NASA should be orga-
nized to work in close cooperation with potential users, especially at the administrative
and middle management level. Only thus, through shared responsibility, can the potential
benefit of future operations be understood by those concerned, and programs designed
for maximum efficiency and benefit.
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[27] We believe that future scientific and applications returns from NASA invest-
ments can be substantially improved by strengthened policy and managerial direction.
There are a number of ways this might be achieved, but one possibility is the return to a
feature of the management structure under President Eisenhower: policy leadership is
provided by an Administrator and his Deputy, one of whom should be an experienced
executive with the primary political responsibility, the other a distinguished and interna-
tionally recognized scientist. Policy would be executed by a General Manager.
Legislation
New legislation relating to the space program may be required or appropriate dur-
ing the next session of Congress in the following areas:
1. National Aeronautics and Space Council
The National Aeronautics and Space Council was established by the organic Act of
Congress which created NASA (the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 19B8), as a
permanent mechanism for resolving policy differences and coordinating operations, pri-
marily between the civilian and military space programs. The original Act provided for the
President to be Chairman of the Council. This provision was later amended so as to substi-
tute the Vice President (then LyndonJohnson) as Chairman.
Although the new President will have the option of asking Congress to abolish the
Council, or of not calling any meetings, we believe that as long as the Council exists and is
used it should be made effective. For that purpose, there should be a strong staff and the
President should be the Chairman. The later will require new legislation.
[28] 2. Communications
The capabilities and current use of satellites for communications purposes point to
major imminent changes requiring legislation. For example, satellites can be used for
communications within the United States. A proposal has been made to the Johnson
Administration, by a task force on communications, to consolidate all U.S. international
telecommunications into a single organization. We recommend early study of what legisla-
tion is needed in this area.
3. Rights to Inventions
The patent provisions of the National Aeronautics and Space Act are modeled on
those of the Atomic Energy Act, and therefore differ radically from other laws governing
rights to inventions made under similar circumstances. As the Act is now administered,
tide to inventions made under defined circumstances is vested in the Government unless
the Administrator affirmatively determines that it should be vested in the inventor. We
recommend that this emphasis be reversed.
Spencer M. Beresford
Lewis M. Branscomb
Francis H. Clauser
Harry H. Hess
Norman H. Horowitz
Samuel Lenher
Ruben E Mettler
Charles R. O'Dell
Allen E. Puckett
Walter O. Roberts
Robert Seamans
Charles H. Townes (Chairman)
James A. Van Allen
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January 10, 1969
Dr. Charles Townes, Chairman
Task Force on Space
Dear Charles:
In this letter I should like to present a view about the future of the U.S. space pro-
gram that is somewhat divergent from the report of our task force. The space program is
now rising to the climax of placing men on the moon. The world is acclaiming this an
event which may herald a dawn of an age of exploration.
Mr. Nixon faces the task of planning the nation's future in space. He needs from us
an assessment of the technological development that is possible. In our report I believe we
have painted a picture which underestimates the potentialities of the future. In predicting
progress today's problems loom large and tend to overshadow the inevitability of future
development. My experience would indicate that the ingenuity of mankind can be relied
upon to overcome today's obstacles and to carry us upward at an ever-accelerating rate.
Instinctively I feel if Mr. Nixon were to chart a bold program for us to explore the
solar system and to push ahead with space science and applications, U.S. technology would
be able to meet such a challenge. I think our rate of development can be considerably
more rapid than presented in the task force report. For example, I believe we can place
men on Mars before 1980. At the same time we can develop economical space transporta-
tion which will permit extensive exploration of the moon and in an even shorter time we
can place large telescopes in orbit.
Whether we embark on such a space program is a decision that Mr. Nixon and the
American people must make, balancing cost against historical perspective. I simply take
this opportunity to record my views that as a nation we are capable of carrying through on
such a challenge.
Cordially yours,
Francis H. Clauser
Professor Clauser has asked that the above view be submitted with the Task Force
Report.
I associate myself with this minority view in believing the tone of the report does not
reflect very well the real technical potentials of the longer range, nor the imperatives of
that peculiar species, man. However, I endorse the report's conclusions and recommended
present actions.
Charles H. Townes
Document i11-22
Document tide: Richard Nixon, Memorandum for the Vice President, the Secretary of
Defense, the Acting Administrator, NASA, and the Science Adviser, February 13, 1969.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
As the Nixon administration took office on January 20, 1969, it was clear to all that
decisions with respect to the goals and pace of the space program after the first lunar
landing needed to be made, and that some sort of review would be the first step toward
such decisions. The new science adviser, Lee DuBridge, at first attempted to have the re-
view carried out under his direction. DuBridge, who as president of the California Insti-
tute of Technology during the 1960s had clashed with NASA Administrator Webb, was
thought to share the scientific community's skepticism regarding the value of human space-
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 513
flight. Thus NASA let it be known to the White House that it was opposed to DuBridge as
the chair of the proposed space review.
By this memorandum, President Nixon established a Space Task Group, chaired by
Vice President Spirt T. Agnew, to conduct the review. Agnew was chosen because he was by
law the chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council. That council had fallen
into disuse during the latter years of the Johnson administration, and the White House
chose to assign the responsibility of staff support for the review to DuBridge and his staffin
the Office of Science and Technology.
Memorandum for
The Vice President
The Secretary of Defense
The Acting Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Science Adviser
It is necessary for me to have in the near future definitive recommendation on the
direction which the U. S. space program should take in the post Apollo period. I, there-
fore, ask the Secretary of Defense, the Acting Administrator of NASA, and the Science
Adviser each to develop proposed plans and to meet together as a task group, with the Vice
President in the chair, to prepare for me a coordinated program and budget proposal. In
developing your proposed plans, you may wish to seek advice from the scientific, engineer-
ing, and industrial communities, from The Congress and the public. You will wish also to
consult the Department of State (on international implications and cooperation) and other
interested agencies, as appropriate, such as the Departments of Interior, Commerce, and
Agriculture; the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Science Foundation. I am
asking the Science Adviser also to serve as staff officer for this task group and as coordina-
tor of the staff studies.
I would like to receive the coordinated proposal by September 1, 1969.
Richard Nixon
Document 111-23
Document floe: T.O. Paine, Acting Administrator, NASA, Memorandum for the President,
"Problems and Opportunifles in Manned Space Flight," February 26, 1969.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
The creation of a Space Task Group external to NASA as the means for reaching
post-Apollo decisions was not totally welcomed by NASA. Unlike his predecessor James
Webb, NASA Acting Administrator Thomas Paine preferred that the space agency decide
internally what its priorities were and then seek support for them from the White House
and Congress. NASA Headquarters had begun a long-range planning process in early 1968,
and the various NASA field centers, particularly the Manned Spacecraft Center in Hous-
ton, had also been thinking about future programs as they worked on current programs.
By early 1969, NASA had identified a large, permanently occupied space station as its
top-priority post-Apollo objective. Hoping to bypass the deliberations of the Space Task
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Group and to get an early endorsement of such an undertaking, Thomas Paine went di-
recdy to the president with a carefully crafted case for such an action. The White House
quickly rebuffed Paine's initiative, telling NASA that any decisions on future programs
would await the recommendations of the Space Task Group.
[1] This memorandum is the first of several that I am preparing in response to your
request of February 17, 1969, that I give you my views on the principal policy problems in
space and aeronautics which now face your Administration, point out some of the oppor-
tunities for leadership initiatives now open to you, and give you my recommendations on
the new directions which your Administration should set for the nation in space and aero-
nautics. These memoranda will also serve to indicate the alternative approaches NASA is
examining in developing plans and proposals for the post-Apollo period as requested in
your memorandum of February 13, 1969, and the basis for my recent recommendations to
the Direc tot of the Budget on amendments to the NASA FY 1970 Budget. Copies are being
sent to the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, and your Science Advisor as you re-
quested, with additional copies to the Director of the Budget and Mr. Robert Ellsworth.
This memorandum outlines the problems, opportunities, and principal factors to be
considered in Manned Space Flight, the area in our space program where NASA and your
Administration are faced with the most urgent need for high-level decisions.
1. Introduction-- NASA now has no approved plans or programs for manned space
flight programs beyond the first Apollo manned lunar landings and the limited Apollo
Applications earth orbital program now approved and underway. Sharply reduced space
budgets over the past three years and the failure of the previous Administradon to make
the required decisions and provide the necessary resources for future programs have built
in a period of low accomplishment which will become apparent during your Administra-
tion, and have left the program without a clear sense of future direction for the post-
Apollo period. Positive and dmely action must be taken by your Administration now to
prevent the nation's programs in manned space flight from slowing to a halt in 1972.
The Apollo program served the nation well in providing a clear focus for the initial
development and demonstration of manned space flight capabilities and technology. What
is needed now, however, is a more balanced program for the next decade which will focus
not on a single event but on sustained development and use of manned space [2] flight
over a period of years. As discussed below, there are two principal program opportunities:
one is a long-term carefully-planned program of manned exploration of the moon, the
other is a wide range of activities involved in the progressive development and operation
of a permanent manned station in earth orbit. I believe that (a) manned lunar explora-
tion should be continued at an economical rate to the point where a sound decision on
the future course the nation should follow with respect to the moon can be made on the
basis of knowledge and experience gained from a series of manned missions, and (b) the
nation should, in any case, focus our manned space flight program for the next decade on
the development and operation of a permanent space station--a Nadonal Research Cen-
ter in earth orbit--accessible at reasonable cost to experts in many disciplines who can
conduct investigations and operations in space which cannot be effectively carried out on
earth.
2. Status of U.S. Programs and Plans -- If our Apollo flights continue to be success-
ful we will achieve the first manned lunar landing later this year, possibly as early as this
summer. We will then carry out three additional landings at different locations on the
moon, but the improved equipment required for moving beyond this with a scientifically
significant lunar exploration plan is restricted to the study stage. We will have a number of
Saturn V boosters and Apollo spacecraft for future lunar missions left over from the Apollo
program.
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In earth orbit, the next major U.S. milestone is manned space flight is the Saturn I
Workshop, which is now scheduled for launch in late 1971. This first step toward a space
station will use existing Saturn IB rockets left over from the Apollo Program. Flight opera-
tions, including revisit and experimental Apollo telescope operations, will be completed
in 1972. The military missions of the Air Force's smaller and more specialized Manned
Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) are expected to take place about the same time.
There are no approved plans and no provision in the FY 1970 Budget for continued
U.S. development or utilization of manned space flight beyond the Apollo moon flights,
the single set of Saturn I Workshop and Apollo telescope missions, and the Air Force MOL
program as currently planned. For the future of manned space flight beyond 1972 the
present FY 1970 NASA Budget provides only small sums limited to studies of advanced
manned lunar exploration and earth orbital space stations.
3. USSR Prospects m Recent USSR manned space flight activities substantiate previ-
ous indications that they are continuing strong programs pointed both at manned opera-
tions to the moon and at space station operations in earth orbit. Beyond this, they talk
openly of future manned trips to the planets. While we now expect to land American
astronauts on the moon before the Russians get there, the prospects are that during the
period of our lunar flights in 1969-1970 the Soviets will, in addition to their manned lunar
program, follow up their Soyuz 4-5 [3] success by pushing toward a dominant position in
large-scale long-duration space station operations in earth orbit. They will have the re-
quired heavy-lift launch capability. A multi-man, multi-purpose USSR space station operat-
ing in orbit before the U.S. could match it would give the USSR a strong advantage in
space research and operations. Their moving clearly ahead of the U.S. in this field would
have a continuing impact on the rest of the world, particularly if the U.S. program did not
include a strong program in the earth orbital space station area.
4. Opportunity for Leadership m The fact that the previous Administration deferred
to you the setting of the nation's goals in manned space flight creates a problem, but it also
gives you a unique opportunity for leadership that will clearly identify your Administration
with the establishment of the nation's major goals in manned space flight for the next
decade. The impact and positive image of your leadership would be seriously downgraded
in the eyes of the nation, the Congress, and the public, in my view, if the U.S. were once
again placed in the position of reacting to Soviet initiatives in space. For this reason, I
believe that you should consider the advisability of initiating a general directive to define
the future goals of manned space flight in the next few months, prior to your final deci-
sions on the plans that will be recommended to you on September 1 by the members of
the Task Group you have established. For example, a major thrust this summer by the
USSR in the earth orbital space station field is a distinct possibility that would take the
edge off your announcement of a similar U.S. objective in the fall. For the reasons given
below, I believe that the case that a space station should be a major future U.S. goal is now
strong enough to justify at least a general statement on your part that this will be one of
our goals, with the understanding (which could be reaffirmed in your statement) that the
scope, pace, specific uses, and detailed plans of the space station will be determined on
the basis of the planning studies you have requested.
5. Basic National Policy _ There is, I believe, almost unanimous agreement on the
part of responsible leaders in your Administration, the Congress, industry, the scientific
community, and the general public that the U.S. must continue manned space flight activi-
ties. The concerns and criticisms that have been expressed do not question the continua-
tion of a manned space flight program but relate principally to (a) the cost of the
program, (b) the value of specific goals, and (c) questions of priorities, within the space
program or between the space program and other scientific fields or other national needs.
However, virtually no responsible and thoughtful person, to my knowledge, advocates or is
prepared to accept the prospect of the United States abandoning manned space flight to
the Soviets to develop and exploit as they see fit.
It is very important that all concerned with planning the [4] future of our space
programs recognize this basic question of national policy. Acceptance of the fact that as a
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matter of policy the nation must and will continue in manned space flight leads to the
following four points which should be considered in our planning:
a. Studies of our alternatives in future space programs should focus on pace, objec-
tives, and content of the manned space flight program, not on whether the U.S. should have
a manned program. Alternatives which have the effect of not supporting a continuing
effective U.S. manned flight program are not acceptable. A balanced total space program
must include a significant continuing manned space flight program as one of its key ele-
ments.
b. The U.S. must he prepared to pay the annual cost of an advancing, effective
manned space flight program, high though it may seem. An important early objective,
however, must be to reduce the cost of manned space flight, without sacrificing safety,
reliability, or accomplishment.
c. An advancing, effective manned space flight program cannot at this stage be
limited to repetitive flights of missions already flown but must provide for the continuous
evolutionary development of new capabilities, new missions, new experiments, and new
applications.
d. Decisions and selections of future programs must be made on a continuing
timely basis several years _fore current objectives are achieved; otherwise the long lead-
times inherent in the space program will force dangerous and expensive breaks in conti-
nuity that will undermine the success of the program.
5. Effects of Decisions in the Previous Administration _ The failure, during the
past three years, to make timely decisions and to take necessary future-oriented actions
has placed our manned space flight program in a serious and difficult position for the
early 1970's. The production of both Saturn IB and V launch vehicles has been termi-
nated. The Saturn V vehicles now on order must either be launched on schedules stretched
out to clearly uneconomical rates, rates which may be below the minimum acceptable for
reliability and safety, or flown with experimental payloads that repeat previous missions
without significant advances. The failure to develop and approve future goals and objec-
tives has forced the program into expensive and unproductive "holding" operations in
some areas and made it more difficult to focus sharply on the planning and preliminary
development efforts which must precede future programs. The watchwords of budgetary
actions for the past several years have [5] been "delay," "stretch-out," "defer," and "hold
the options open." The results are that for the next several years the nation will be getting
a smaller return on its great investment in manned space flight capability, and that the
long-deferred decisions on future goals must be taken now at an earlier time than your
Administration would otherwise prefer.
6. Recommended Approach -- I believe that your Administration should now speak
out boldly about the nation's future in space. Instead of continuing to stretch out and
minimize the manned space flight program at the risk of reducing it beyond the point
where it can be effective, your Administration should (a) point out the fact that the nation
must continue to move forward in manned space flight, (b) while seeking every economy,
accept the costs that this entails, and (c) plan, announce, and support a new ten-year space
program--including a strong program of manned space flight--of which this nation and
the world will be proud. Your Administration's decisions in the next few months will deter-
mine the nation's direction and progress in space for many years.
7. Study of Future Directions -- The process established in your memorandum of
February 13, 1969, provides a useful framework for the development of specific goals and
plans for the future of our space program. It will, among other things, enable NASA to
communicate to the other agencies involved the thinking and planning that we have had
underway for some time, and help assure NASA that its planning is properly coordinated
with future aerospace planning in DOD, DOT, and other departments.
However, unless adequate provision is made in the FY 1970 Budget in time for Con-
gressional action in the FY 1970 authorization and appropriation cycle, the implementa-
tion of plans decided upon next fall as a result of the Task Group recommendations will
have to await the FY 1971 cycle. This would mean the loss of an entire year and the
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foreclosure of your option to move ahead promptly with a strong manned space flight
program if that should be your decision.
For this reason, I believe that it is essential that the FY 1970 Budget be amended now
to include the manned space flight fundsJspecifically deleted by the previous Adminis-
trationmrequired to support moving ahead in lunar exploration and space station devel-
opment. I can appreciate that you may be reluctant to decide now to amend the FY 1970
Budget, thus appearing to prejudge the recommendations to be made in September, but
postponement will foreclose what may well be your most attractive option and will per-
petuate and aggravate an already unsatisfactory situation.
8. Future Directions and Goals -- As stated above, two major directions have been
identified for the manned space flight [6] program in the next decade. One is the further
exploration of the moon, with possibly the eventual goal of establishing a U.S. Lunar base;
the other is the further development of manned flight in earth orbit, with the goal of
establishing a permanent manned space station in earth orbit that will be accessible and
useful for a wide range of scientific, engineering, and application purposes. An important
part of the space station goal is the development of a low cost logistics system for shuttling
people and equipment to and from the space station.
These goals have in common the fact that they are not focused on a single dramatic
achievement to be accomplished by a certain date, as was the case in the Apollo program.
However, they can provide in the second decade of space, as Apollo did in the first, the
focus for continuing advances in U.S. space capabilities and technologywhich will be avail-
able to support future defense and civilian requirements and to sustain our long-term
national technical and economic vitality.
9. Lunar Exploration -- In lunar exploration, our immediate problem is to assure
that we have adequate scientific and operational equipment to allow us to follow up the
first few lunar landings with an effective initial program of exploration that will permit
sound judgments on the potential value of more advanced future missions and the even-
tual establishment of a lunar base. If, as we now expect, we have early success in achieving
the first manned landing on the moon, we will have Apollo hardwaremlaunch vehicles
and spacecraft_for as many as nine additional lunar missions, but we lack scientific and
improved operational equipment for more than three of these. In order to proceed with
these missions at an economical rate, we are preparing a budget amendment that will
permit prompt initiation of procurement of additional scientific and operational equip-
ment early in FY 1970. Your approval of this budget amendment now will not constitute a
commitment to lunar exploration beyond that possible with the Saturn-Apollo hardware
procured for the Apollo program. Decisions on an advanced program of lunar explora-
tion requiring major redesign of the Apollo Lunar Module, the development of shelters
and vehicles for use on the lunar surface, and the question of the ultimate goal of estab-
lishing a lunar base can and should be made in your review of the plans and proposals to
be submitted next September.
10. Space Station -- With respect to future manned earth orbital flight, the immedi-
ate problem is to assure that sufficient funds are available in FY 1970 to permit detailed
planning and design studies to proceed, and to develop critical long lead-time subsystems
that will be required in any future manned space flight program. Funds for these purposes
were specifically excluded from the present FY 1970 Budget, except for a small amount for
studies, and we are therefore preparing an appropriate amendment to the FY 1970 Bud-
get. This budget [7] amendment can be approved now without a commitment on your
part to a permanent space station as a major national goal. However, as stated in para-
graph 4 above, we believe that it is in the national interest for you to endorse this as a
general U.S. objective at this time. One possibility would be for you to give NASA and the
Task Group a specific instruction at the time you approve the budget amendment that
their recommendations to you in September should include proposals on the optimum
program for establishing and utilizing a permanent U.S. space station.
11. Space Station Concept _ The space station discussed here should become a
central point for many activities in space and would be designed to carry on these activities
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in an effective and economic manner. It would be located in the most advantageous posi-
Lion to conduct investigations and operations in the space environment, many important
aspects of which cannot be duplicated in an earth-based environment. The best place to
study space is in space. We have in mind a system consisting of general and special-purpose
modules with a low-cost logistic support system that will permit ready access and return by
many users and their equipment and supplies. The space station would not be launched as
a single unit, but would evolve over a period of years by adding to a core new modules as
they are required and developed. One of the key objectives is to develop the system in
cooperation with the Department of Defense so that it can be adaptable for future military
research as well as for a variety of non-military scientific, engineering, and other applica-
tion purposes.
There are many potential valuable uses of such a space station, and new ones will be
found as experts in many fields become familiar with the possibilities and are able to visit
and actually use it. However, we believe strongly that the justification for proceeding now
with this major project as a national goal does not, and should not be made to depend on
the specific contributions that can be foreseen today in particular scientific fields like as-
tronomy or high energy physics, in particular economic applications, such as earth re-
sources surveys, or in specific defense needs. Rather, the justification for the space station
is that it is clearly the next major evolutionary step in man's experimentation, conquest,
and use of space. The development of man's capability to live and work economically and
effectively in space for long periods of time is an essential prerequisite not only for opera-
dons in earth orbit, but for long stay times on the moon and in the distant future, manned
travel to the planets. It is for these reasons that I believe that space station development
should become one of your Administration's principal working goals for the action over
the next decade.
12. Saturn V Production -- Under NASA's reduced 1969 operating plan and its present
FY 1970 Budget, the production of [8] Saturn V, the nation's largest launch vehicle, has
been discontinued. The long-term future of the manned space flight program, as oudined
above, will clearly require additional Saturn V launch vehicles, and we are therefore pro-
posing a FY 1970 Budget amendment which will permit production to be resumed, at a
very low rate, before "start up" costs become excessive. This amendment will not preclude
other future decisions on large launch vehicles that might be made next fall, but it will
assure that funds are available to provide the launch vehicles that will be needed. It will
also get the U.S. out of what I believe to be a current untenable posidon of having discon-
tinued production of our largest space booster at a time when the Soviets are expected to
unveil a booster of this class or larger. For the reasons stated in paragraph 4 above, I rec-
ommend that you now take the initiative and announce this decision before the Russians
launch their first booster in this class, so that your announcement will not be viewed as a
reaction to the Soviet development.
13. Cost -- In planning the space program careful consideration must, of course, be
given each year, and especially at the time new major programs are undertaken, to the
future budget levels required. Our nadonal budget system wisely and necessarily provides
for a review at least annually of both on-going and new programs, but long-term enter-
prises like major space programs require a policy commitment to follow through with the
resources required over a period of many years. For these reasons, it is important that your
Administration be prepared to accept the total budget levels required by the programs you
determine to be in the national interest. NASA on its part has the obligation continually to
search out the least costly ways of carrying out the approved programs and to make every
effort to use the possibilities of new technology to reduce future costs. But most important
of all, neither NASA nor the Administration should, in the name of economy, underesti-
mate the resources that can realistically be expected to be required, We must meet our
commitments.
Our present projections indicate that a balanced total NASA program that includes
the recommended strong manned space flight program can be carried out with annual
budgets over the next five years which will not rise above the $4.5 to $5.5 billion range.
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Morepreciseprojectionswilldependonthenatureofthefuturelunarexplorationand
spacestationprogramsdecideduponandonfuturedecisionsinareasotherthanmanned
spaceflight.BythetimewesubmittheplanningproposalstoyouinSeptemberwewillbe
abletostatewithconsiderableconfidencetheprojectedfutureestimatedcostsofalterna-
tivetotalprograms.
Atotalannualprogramlevelof$4.5-$5.5billioncomparestoprogramandexpendi-
turelevelsin the$5.0-$6.0billionrangereachedin the1964-1967period,whichin the
pastwoyearshasbeenreducedto$3.9billioninourFY1969operating[9]planandthe
presentFY1970Budget.AswehaveinformedtheDirectorof theBudget,theFY1970
NASABudgetamendmentsweareproposinginmannedspaceflightamountto about$200millionandwouldbringourtotal1970Budget(includingauthoritycarriedforward
fromFY1969)toslightlyunder$4.1billion.Evenwiththisproposedamendment,how-
ever,NASA'soutlays(expenditures)in FY1970willstilldecline$200millionfromthe$4.25estimatedforFY1969.
Thismemorandumhasgivenyoumy_'ecommendationonthepositionyourAdmin-
istrationshouldtakewithrespectto thecriticalandurgentsituationin mannedspace
flight;otherNASAproblemsandopportunitiescanbetreatedappropriatelyin theTask
GroupframeworkforyourconsiderationinSeptember.Forthereasonsstatedabove,and
withthepossibilityofaninitiallunarlandinginJuly,I believeyoushouldnotdeferinitial
considerationf themannedspaceflightproblem.I thereforespecificallyrecommend
thatyouaskthemembersoftheTaskGroupestablishedinyourmemorandumofFebru-
ary13,1969,tomeetwithinthenextmonthandtoconsiderastheirfirstorderofbusiness
themattersidentifiedinthismemorandumasrequiringyourearlydecision.Theyshould
thenpresenttheirrecommendationstoyoubytheendofMarch.Inanticipationofsucha
meeting,NASAwillprepareandmakeavailabletotheothermembersoftheTaskGroup(a)detailedmaterialsonthealternativesavailable,and(b)suggestionsonhowtherecom-
mendedearlydecisionscanberelatedtoaneffectiveprocessfordevelopingoverallspace
plansandalternativesforyourconsiderationinSeptember.I hopethatthisproposalwill
meetwithyourapproval,andwould,ofcourse,behappytodiscussthismatterfurtherwith
youatyourconvenience.
T.O.Paine
ActingAdministrator
Document 111-24
Document title: Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Secretary of the Air Force, to Honorable Spiro T.
Agnew, Vice President, August 4, 1969.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
Robert Seamans had been NASA Associate Administrator and then Deputy Adminis-
trator during most of the 1960s, and returned to Washington to become Richard Nixon's
Secretary of the Air Force. Given his background and the central role of the Air Force in
military space, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird asked Seamans to serve in his stead as
the Department of Defense representative on the Space Task Group.
In the days following the July 20 landing of the Apollo 11 mission on the Moon,
NASA decided to propose to the Space Task Group an ambitious program for the future,
oriented to early human missions to Mars. Vice President Agnew supported such an initia-
tive, and NASA scheduled an elaborate presentafon of its proposals for August 4. Troubled
by the direction that the Space Task Group deliberations were taking, Seamans came to
the August 4 meeting with this letter, expressing a much more measured outlook for the
next steps in space.
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[l]
Dear Mr. Vice President:
The Department of Defense has carried out a comprehensive study of the various
opportunities for using space technology to enhance national security. Options for in-
creased space activity have been carefully reviewed by the Services, the Joint Chiefs, and
the offices of the Secretary of Defense, and are the basis for a report that is being transmit-
ted to you by Secretary Laird. As a member of your Space Task Group, I am writing this
letter to give you certain of my own personal views.
Rocketry and advanced electronics have permitted us to accomplish unique missions
in this decade. The landing of the Apollo 11 astronauts on the moon and their safe return
to earth is the crowning achievement. However, NASA and DoD have accomplished many
other highly significant missions that are important for scientific, technical and opera-
tional reasons. As a result of unmanned and manned space flight we know a great deal
more about the sun, the moon, the earth, and our sister planets. We are developing a
better understanding of meteorology, and are using satellites for communications, naviga-
tion, weather forecasting, mapping and surveillance. With this as background, let me out-
line a space program that I believe is relevant to our national needs. This program can
provide focus in the next decade similar to that of Apollo in this decade, but with several
rather than a single objective.
1. Direct Service to Mankind
We should capitalize on NASA's great scientific and technical capability to the maxi-
mum extent possible. By this I mean that NASA should wherever possible carry out work
of direct relevance to man here on earth. ESSA of the Department of Commerce needs
assistance to understand and predict the weather more accurately for longer periods of
time. The Department of Commerce, Interior, and Agriculture need support that can be
supplied by satellites if they are to carry out their responsibilities in such fields as oceanog-
raphy, hydrology, [2] agriculture, ecology, etc. However, I am not only thinking of further
satellite developments, but also the use of NASA's capability wherever pertinent to current
national problems.
NASA should put increased emphasis in aeronautics. We, in the Department of De-
fense, have need for greater effort by NASA to support us in the development of military
aircraft. The Department of Transportation needs major support if they are to implement
a new air traffic control system.
The extent to which NASA can support HUD and HEW has not been determined,
but it should be noted that advances in space are dependent upon extensive data process-
ing. Data processing is required in cities for a wide variety of purposes, including traffic
control, crime detection, communications and administration. Space exploration also
requires in-depth investigation of waste management, fire prevention, materials develop-
ment, construction of highly reliable equipment, all of vital importance to municipalities.
The medical and biological investigations of man in space have led to improved bio-
logical instrumentation, and a better understanding of physiology.
The applications of the NASA program are far reaching and considerably more effort should be
expended to make the results available for the benefit of mankind. To accomplish this objective,
program priorities will have to be revised and organizational changes will have to be made
both internal to NASA and between NASA and other agencies.
2. National Security
As stressed in the Department of Defense report, space is an environment that pro-
vides many opportunities to improve and support military operations. These opportuni-
ties include improvements in communications, weather forecasting, navigation, surveil-
lance, mapping and many others areas, all of which are discussed at length in the DoD
report. However, from the standi, oint of the Department of Defense, space exploration
and the development of space technology are not ends in themselves, but rather provide
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meansforaccomplishingfunctionsin support[3] ofexistingforces.Each military space
mzssion must be approved on a case-_'-case basis and weighed carefully against other means for doing
the same job. In the DoD report, a program is defined that maintains the annual outlay at
about its present level. However, options exist that would require an increase in annual
outlay by about 50%. In any event major effort is required to improve DoD space capabili-
ties by development of advanced systems with greater sensitivity, invulnerability, and longer
on-orbit life time,
3, Extended Lunar Exploration Using Apollo
The objective of Apollo was to provide a manned transportation system from earth to
the moon and return. From Apollo 11 we will derive significant scientific information,
particularly by analysis of the lunar samples. Now that the lunar transportation system
exists, we should use it for a continuing series of missions with the principal objective
being to derive maximum scientific data from the moon. This will entail landing on differ-
ent areas of the moon in order to bring back different materials and in order to implant a
wide variety of instruments. To do this effectively, some additional mobility will be re-
quired for the astronauts on the lunar surface. In a continuing manned lunar landingprogvam
it is important to proceed on a careful step-by-step basis reviewing scientific information from one
flight before going to the next and using unmanned spacecraft where appropriate.
4. Applications of Apollo to Earth Orbital Missions
The Apollo hardware can also be used for further exploration in earth orbit. The
objectives here include the involvement of man for extended periods in earth orbit both
to better understand man's performance in extended flight, and also to use man to make
a wide variety of measurements both of the earth, of the immediate space environment,
and of the sun and the stars. The present Apollo Applications Program including relatively few
missions should be expanded to include longer duration .flights and wider variety of orbits.
5. Space Transportation
The extent to which space is used either for exploration or national security depends
upon the cost per pound in [4] orbit. Today's flights are expensive because most of the
hardware is lost and even that which is returned cannot be readily and inexpensively re-
paired for additional missions, hecommend that we embark on a program to study by experimental
means induding orbital tests the possibility of a Space Transportation System that would permit the
cost per pound in orbit to be reduced by a substantial factor (ten times or more). Although prelimi-
nary studies have been conducted by both the Department of Defense and NASA on new
types of space transportation, it is not yet clear that we have the technology to make such a
major improvement. Consequently, I believe we should not put a rigid time constraint on
this objective, but rather embark on a flexible program where various alternatives are in-
vestigated. Then at a later date, if the decision is made to proceed with an operational
system, it can be made with technical, funding, and schedule confidence.
6. Manned Space Station
Multi-manned space stations have been studied and evaluated for many years. The
specific objectives for a space station are still not clear even though a large number of
interesting possibilities have been suggested. I believe that ultimately a space station will
be needed where man can live and work for long periods of time (a year or more), and
where no special astronaut type training is required prior to a mission. This will permit
scientific personnel to concentrate entirely on their specialties and to carry out projects
where a space environment is required.
Even though the development of a large manned space station appears to be a logical step
leading to further use and understanding of the space environment, I do not believe we should commit
ourselves to the development of such a space station at this time. I believe that we should wait until
we have had further experience with the Apollo Applications Program and a Space Trans-
portation System before we embark on this mission. Knowledge derived from Apollo
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Applications will give us a much greater understanding of the role that man can perform
in space and only after a thorough investigation of a Space Transportation System can we
predict with reasonable accuracy our ability to resupply such a station economically and to
ferry astronauts, scientists, and engineers back and forth from earth to the space platform.
[5] 7. Planetary Missions
We are rapidly acquiring knowledge of Mars and Venus, the two closest planets, using
unmanned spacecraft. The unmanned planetary program should be expanded to include more
thorough investigation of Mars and Venus, as well as exploration of the more distant planets.
I don't believe we skould commit this Nation to a manned planetary mission, at least until the
feasibility and need are morefirmly established. Experience must be gained in an orbiting space
station before manned planetary missions can be planned. At this time we do not know the
effect of placing a man in space for the one to two years required for a planetary trip.
There may be serious physiological and psychological effects that must be understood and
dealt with before such a trip can be considered a possibility.
A decision to travel to Mars, the only accessible planet, would require new launch
vehicle stages and spacecraft modules and a greatly increased annual ouday that would
compete with the resources needed to provide immediate benefits from NASA's capability.
In summary, the Department of Defense must use space to enhance its capability as
appropriate to its various responsibilities. The NASA program, on the other hand, should
continue to explore space with both unmanned and manned spacecraft, but with the solu-
tion of problems directly affecting man here on earth as its immediate objective. In the
past, there has been much discussion as to whether NASA had the right balance between
unmanned and manned flights and between science and technology. I believe that in the
future the balance of NASA's activities should be shifted not from considerations of manned
vs. unmanned flights nor from considerations of science vs. technology, but from consider-
ations of how this highly trained, highly motivated agency can make this country and the
world a more hopeful, and healthier place. Let us take the initiative and use the good will,
the momentum and the skills demonstrated in Apollo to help solve many of our problems
at home and abroad. But let us not give up exploration, rather let us also continue our
exploration while validating its benefit to all mankind.
Respectfully,
Robert C. Seamans,Jr.
Document 111-25
Document tide: Space Task Group, The Post-Apollo Space Program: Directiom for the Future,
September 1969.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
The report of the Space Task Group was presented to President Nixon on September
15, 1969. The report largely endorsed the hardware elements of the program that NASA
had developed in the weeks following Apollo 11, including the development of a space
station and a reusable transportation system. The Space Task Group as a whole did not
recommend any particular opdon, though both the vice president and NASA Administra-
tor Paine within a few days urged the president to approve Option II, which called for
station and shuttle development by 1977 and an inidal Mars expedition by 1986. In the
days immediately preceding delivery of the report to the president, senior White House
staff had demanded that the language of the report be changed so that the president not
be put in the position of having only ambitious opdons from which to choose; thus the
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tone of the "Conclusions and Recommendations" section of the report is not consistent
with the content of most of the rest of the document,
[i] Conclusions and Recommendations
The Space Task Group in its study of future directions in space, with recognition of
the many achievements culminating in the successful flight of Apollo 11, views these achieve-
ments as only a beginning to the long-term exploration and use of space by man. We see a
major role for this Nation in proceeding from the initial opening of this frontier to its
exploitation for the benefit of mankind, and ultimately to the opening of new regions of
space to access by man.
[ii] We have found increasing interest in the exploitation of our demonstrated space
expertise and technology for the direct benefit of mankind in such areas as earth resources,
communications, navigation, national security, science and technology, and international
participation. We have concluded that the space program for the future must include
increased emphasis upon space applications.
We have also found strong and wide-spread personal identification with the manned
flight program, and with the outstanding men who have participated as astronauts in this
program. We have concluded that a forward-looking space program for the future for this
Nation should include continuation of manned space flight activity. Space will continue to
provide new challenges to satisfy the innate desire of man to explore the limits of his
reach.
We have surveyed the important national resource of skilled program managers, sci-
entists, engineers, and workmen who have contributed so much to the success the space
program has enjoyed. This resource together with industrial capabilities, government, and
private facilities and growing expertise in space operations are the foundation upon which
we can build.
We have found that this broad foundation has provided us with a wide variety of new
and challenging opportunities from which to select our future directions. We have con-
cluded that the Nation should seize these new opportunities, particularly to advance sci-
ence and engineering, international relations, and enhance the prospects for peace.
We have found questions about national priorities, about the expense of manned
flight operations, about new goals in space which could be interpreted as a "crash pro-
gram." Principal concern in this area relates to decisions about a manned mission to Mars.
We conclude that NASA has the demonstrated organizational competence and technol-
ogy base, by virtue of the Apollo success and other achievements, to carry out a successful
program to land man on Mars within 15 years. There are a number of precursor activities
necessary before such a mission can be attempted. These activities can proceed without
developments specific to a Manned Mars Mission--but for optimum benefit should be
carried out with the Mars mission in mind. We conclude that a manned Mars mission
should be accepted as a long-range goal for the space program. Acceptance of this goal
would not give the manned Mars mission overriding priority relative to other program
objectives, since options for decision on its specific date are inherent in a balanced pro-
gram. Continuity of other unmanned exploration and applications efforts during periods
of unusual budget constraints should be supported in all future plans.
We believe the Nation's future space program possesses potential for the following
significant returns:
• new operational space applications to improve the quality of life on Earth
• non-provocative enhancement of our national security
• scientific and technological returns from space investments of the past decade
and expansion of our understanding of the universe
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• low-cost, flexible, long-lived, highly reliable, operational space systems with a high
degree of commonality and reusability
• international involvement and participation on a broad basis
[iii] Therefore, we recommend----
That this Nation accept the basic goal of a balanced manned and unmanned space
program conducted for the benefit of all mankind.
To achieve this goal, the United States should emphasize the following program objec-
tives:
• increase utilization of space capabilities for services to man, through an expanded
space applications program
• enhance the defense posture of the United States and thereby support the broader
objective of peace and security for the world through a program which exploits space
techniques for accomplishment of military missions
• increase man's knowledge of the universe by conduct of a continuing strong pro-
gram of lunar and planetary exploration, astronomy, physics, the earth and life sciences
• develop new systems and technology for space operations with emphasis upon the
critical factors of: (1) commonality, (2) reusability, and (3) economy, through a program
directed initially toward development of a new space transportation capability and space
station modules which utilize this new capability
• promote a sense of world community through a program which provides opportu-
nity for broad international participation and cooperation
As a focus for the development of new capability, we recommend the United States
accept the long-range option or goal of manned planetary exploration with a manned
Mars mission before the end of this century as the first target.
[iv] In proceeding towards this goal, three phases of activities can be identified:
• initially, activity should concentrate upon the dual theme of exploitation of exist-
ing capability and development of new capability, maintaining program balance within
available resources.
• second, an operational phase in which new capability and new systems would be
utilized in earth-moon space with groups of men living and working in this environment
for extended periods of time. Continued exploitation of science and applications would
be emphasized, making greater use of man or man-attendance as a result of anticipated
lowered costs for these operations.
• finally, manned exploration missions out of earth-moon space, building upon the
experience of the earlier two phases.
Schedule and budgetary implications associated with these three phases are subject
to Presidential choice and decision at this time with detailed program elements to be de-
termined in a normal annual budget and program review process. Should it be decided to
develop concurrently the space transportation system and the modular space station, a
rise of annual expenditures to approximately $6 billion in 1976 is required. A lower level
of approximately $4-5 billion could be met if the space station and the transportation
system were developed in series rather than in parallel.
For the Department of Defense, the space activities should be subject to continuing
review relative to the Nation's needs for national security. Such review and decision pro-
cesses are well established. However, the planned expansion of the DoD space technology
effort and its documented interest in the Space Transportation System demands contin-
ued authoritative coordination through the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating
Board to assure that the national interests are met.
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[V] The Space Task Group has had the opportunity to review the national space pro-
gram at a particularly significant point in its evolution. We believe that the new directions
we have identified can be both exciting and rewarding for this Nation. The environment
in which the space program is viewed is a vibrant, changing one and the new opportunities
that tomorrow will bring cannot be predicted with certainty. Our planning for the future
should recognize this rapidly changing nature of opportunities in space.
We recommend that the National Aeronautics and Space Council be utilized as a mecha-
nism for continuing reassessment of the character and pace of the space program.
[1] The Post-Apollo Space Program:
Directions for the Future
I. INTRODUCTION
With the successful flight of Apollo 11, man took his first step on a heavenly body
beyond his own planet. As we look into the distant future it seems clear that this is a mile-
stone--a beginning--and not an end to the exploration and use of space,
Success of the Apollo program has been the capstone to a series of significant accom-
plishments for the United States in space in a broad spectrum of manned and unmanned
exploration missions and in the application of space techniques for the benefit of man. In
the short span of twelve years man has suddenly opened an entirely new dimension for his
activity.
In addition, the national space program has made significant contributions to our
national security, has been a political instrument of international value, has produced new
science and technology, and has given us not only a national pride of accomplishment, but
has offered a challenge and example for other national endeavors.
The Nation now Las the demonstrated capability, to move on to new goals and new
achievements in space in all of the areas pioneered during the decade of the sixties. In
each area of space exploration what seemed impossible yesterday has become today's ac-
complishment. Our horizons and our competence have expanded to the point that we can
consider unmanned missions to any region in our solar system; manned bases in earth
orbit, lunar orbit or on the surface of the Moon; manned missions to Mars; space transpor-
tation systems that carry their payloads into orbit and then return and land as a conven-
tional jet aircraft; reusable nuclear-powered rockets for space operations; remotely
controlled roving science vehicles on the Moon or on Mars; and application of space
capability to a variety of services of benefit to man here on earth.
Our opportunities are great and we have a broad spectrum of choices available to us.
It remains only to chart the course and to set the pace of progress in this new dimension
for man.
The Space Task Group, established under the chairmanship and direction of the
Vice President (Appendices A and B), has examined the spectrum of new opportunities
available in space, values and benefits from space activities, casts and resource implications
of future options, and international aspects of the space program. A great wealth of data
has been made available to the Task Group, including reports from the National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration and the Department of Defense reflecting very extensive
planning and review activities, a detailed report from the President's Science Advisory
Committee, views from [2] members of Congress, the National Academy of Sciences Space
Science Board, and the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. In addition, a
series of individual reports from a special group of distinguished citizens who were asked
for their personal recommendations on the future course of the space program were of
considerable value to the Task Group. This broad range of material was considered and
evaluated as part of the Task Group deliberations This report presents in summary form
the views of the Space Task Group on the Nation's fiature directions in space
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[3] H. BACKGROUND
Twelve years ago, when the first artificial Earth satellite was placed into orbit, most of
the world's population was surprised and stunned by an achievement so new and foreign
to human experience. Today people of all nations are familiar with satellites, orbits, the
concept of zero 'g', manned operations in space, and a host of other aspects characteristic
of this new age--the age of space exploration.
The United States has carried out a diversified program during these early years in
space, requiring innovation in many fields of science, technology, and the human and
social sciences. The Nation's effort has been interdisciplinary, drawing successfully upon a
synergistic combination of human knowledge, management experience, and production
know-how to bring this Nation to a position of leadership in space.
Space activities have become a part of our national agenda.
We now have the benefit of twelve years of space acdvity and our leadership position
as background for our examination of future directions in space.
National Priorities
By its very nature, the exploration and exploitation of space is a costly undertaking
and must compete for funds with other national or individual enterprises. Now that the
national goal of manned lunar landing has been achieved, discussion of future space goals
has produced increasing pressures for reexamination of, and possible changes in, our
national priorities.
Many believe that funds spent for the space program contribute less to our national
economic growth and social well-being than funds allocated for other programs such as
health, education, urban affairs, or revenue sharing. Others believe that funds spent for
space exploration will ultimately return great economic and social benefits not now fore-
seen. These divergent views will persist and must be recognized in making decisions on
future space activities.
The Space Task Group has not attempted to reconcile these differences. Neither
have we attempted to classify the space program in a hierarchy of nadonal priorities. The
Space Task Group has identified major technical and scientific challenges in space in the
belief that returns will accrue to the society that takes up those challenges.
Values and Benefits
The magnitude of predicted great economic and social benefits from space activities
cannot be precisely determined. Nevertheless, there should be a recognition that signifi-
cant direct benefits have been realized as a result of space investments, particularly from
applications programs, as a long-term result of space science activities, DOD space activi-
ties, and advancing technology. These direct benefits are only part of the total set of ben-
efits from the space program, many of which are very difficult to quantify and therefore
are not often given adequate consideration when costs and benefits from space activities
are weighed or assessed in relation to other national programs.
[4] Benefits accrue in each of the following areas:
economic--direcdy through applications of space systems to services for man, and
indirectly through potential for increased productivity resulting from advancing technol-
ogy; improvements in reliability, quality control techniques, application of solid state elec-
tronics, and computer technology resulting from demands of space systems; advances in
understanding and use of exotic new materials and devices with broad applicability; re-
finement of systems engineering and management techniques for extremely complex de-
velopments.
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national security--directly through DOD space activities, and indirectly through en-
hancement of the national spirit and self-esteem; reinforcement of the image of the United
States as a leader in advanced technology; strengthening of our international posture
through demonstration that a free and democratic society can achieve a challenging, tech-
nologically sophisticated, long-term objective; maintenance of a broad base of highly skilled
aerospace workers applicable to defense needs; and advancement of technology, that may
have relevance to defense use.
science--directly through support for ground and space research programs, indi-
rectly through ability to open to observation new portions of the electromagnetic spec-
trum; opportunity to search for life on other planets, to make measurements in situ at the
planets or in other regions of space, and to utilize the unique environment of space (high
vacuum, zero "g") for experimental programs in the life sciences, physical sciences and
engineering.
exploration--the opening of new opportunities to investigate and acquire knowl-
edge about man's environment--which now has expanded to include not only the Earth,
but potentially the entire solar system.
social--providing educational services through enhanced communications which
improve treatment of social problems.
international relations--providing opportunities for cooperation; the identification
of foreign interests with U.S. space objectives and programs, and their results.
What is the value to be placed upon these benefits, and how should the space pro-
gram be constituted to provide the greatest return in each of these areas for a selected
level of public investment?
The answers to these questions cannot be stated in absolute terms--there is no dol-
lar value associated with national self-esteem or with many of the other benefits listed
above, and there is no fixed program of missions without which these benefits will not
accrue. As with many programs, there is, however, a lower limit of activity below which the
viability of the program is threatened and a reasonable upper limit which is imposed by
technological capability and rate of growth of the program.
These limits are a key consideration in the options discussed later in this report.
[5] National Resource
In the eleven years since its creation, NASA has provided the Nation with a broad
capability for a wide variety of space activity, and has successfully completed a series of
challenging tasks culminating in the first manned lunar landing. These accomplishments
have involved rapid increases to peak annual expenditures of almost $6 billion and a peak
civil service and contractor work force of 420,000 people. Expenditures for NASA have
subsequently dropped over the last three years from this peak to the present level of about
$4 billion and supporting manpower has dropped to about 190,000 people.
In addition to NASA space activity, the DOD has developed and operated space sys-
tems satisfying unique military requirements. Spending for military space grew rapidly in
the early sixties and has increased gradually during the past few years to approximately
$2 billion per year.
The Nation's space program has fostered the growth of a valuable reservoir of highly
trained, competent engineers, managers, skilled workmen and scientists within govern-
ment, industry and universities. The climactic achievement of Apollo 11 is tribute to their
capability.
This resource together with supporting facilities, technology and organizational en-
tities capable of complex management tasks grew and matured during the 1960's largely
in response to the stimulation of Apollo, and if it is to be maintained, needs a new focus for
its future.
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Manned Space Flight
There has been universal personal identification with the astronauts and a high de-
gree of interest in manned space activities which reached a peak both nationally and inter-
nationally with Apollo. The manned flight program permits vicarious participation by the
man-in-the-street in exciting, challenging, and dangerous activity. Sustained high in terest,
judged in the light of current experience, however, is related to availability of new tasks
and new mission activitymnew challenges for man in space. The presence of man in space,
in addition to its effect upon public interest in space activity, can also contribute to mission
success by enabling man to exercise his unique capabilities, and thereby enhance mission
reliability, flexibility, ability to react to unpredicted conditions, and potential for explora-
tion.
While accomplishments related to man in space have prompted the greatest acclaim
for our Nation's space activities, there has been increasing public reaction over the large
investments required to conduct the manned flight program. Scientists have been particu-
larly vocal about these high costs and problems encountered in performing science
experiments as part of Apollo, a highly engineering oriented program in its early phases.
Much of the negative reaction to manned space flight, therefore, will diminish if
costs for placing and maintaining man in space are reduced and opportunities for chal-
lenging new missions with greater emphasis upon science return are provided.
[6] Science andApplicafions
Although high public interest has resided with manned space flight, the Nation has
also enjoyed a successful and highly productive science and applications program.
The list of more achievements in space science is great, ranging from our first explor-
atory orbital flights resulting in discoveries about the Earth and its environment to the
most recent Mariner missions to the vicinity of Mars producing new data about our neigh-
bor planet.
Both optical and radio astronomy have been stimulated by the opening of new re-
gions of the electromagnetic spectrum and new fields of interest have been uncovered--
notably in the high energy X-ray and gamma-ray regions. Astronomy is advancing rapidly
at present, partly with the aid of observations from space, and a deeper understanding of
the nature and structure of the universe is emerging. In planetary exploration, we have a
unique opportunity to pursue a number of the major questions man has asked about his
relation to the universe. What is the history of the formation and evolution of the solar
system? Are there clues to the origin of life? Does life exist elsewhere in the solar system?
In the life sciences, questions about the effect of zero "g" upon living systems, de-
mands of long-duration space flight upon our understanding of man and his interaction
or response to his environment, both physiologically and psychologically, promise new
insights into the understanding of complex living systems.
These are only a few of the disciplines that have profited from the program of re-
search in space. Space science is not divorced from science on the ground, but is rather an
extension of science which builds and depends vitally upon a strong ground-based founda-
tion.
Building upon the basic science on the ground and in space, and upon the growing
capability in the design, construction and launch of satellites, the United States pioneered
in the development of space applications--notably communications, meteorology and navi-
gation. Operational systems have been placed into service in each of these areas, and the
potential for the future appears bright--not only in these areas but also in new fields such
as earth resource surveying and oceanography.
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International Aspects
Achievement of the Apollo goal resulted in a new feeling of "oneness" among men
everywhere. It inspired a common sense of victory that can provide the basis for new initia-
tives for international cooperation.
The U.S. and the USSR have widely been portrayed as in a "race to the Moon" or as
wing over leadership in space. In a sense, this has been on accurate reflection of one of
the several strong motivations for U.S. space program decisions over the previous decade.
[7] Now with the successes of Apollo, of the Mariner 6 and 7 Mars flybys, of commu-
nications and meteorology applications, the U.S. is at the peak of its prestige and accom-
plishments in space. For the short term, the race with the Soviets has been won. In
reaching our present position, one of the great strengths of the U.S. space program has
been its open nature, and the broad front of solid achievement in science and applications
that has accompanied the highly successful manned flight program.
The attitude of the American people has gradually been changing and public frus-
tration over Soviet accomplishments in space, an important force in support of the Nation's
acceptance of the lunar landing in 1961, is not now present. Today, new Soviet achieve-
ments are not likely to have the effect of those in the post. Nevertheless, the Soviets have
continued development of capability for future achievements and dramatic missions of
high political impact are possible. There is no sign of retrenchment or withdrawal by the
Soviets from the public arena of space activity despite launch vehicle and spacecraft fail-
ures and the preemptive effect of Apollo 11.
The landing on the Moon has captured the imagination of the world. It is now abun-
dandy clear to the man in the street, as well as to the political leaders of the world, that
mankind now has at his service a new technological capability, an important characteristic
of which is that its applicability transcends national boundaries. If we retain the identifica-
tion of the world with our space program, we have on opportunity for significant political
effects on nations and peoples and on their relationships to each other, which in the long
run may be quite profound.
[91 III. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
Goals
An important aspect in both popular acceptance of the space program and in the
spirit, dedication and performance of those who are direcdy involved in space activity is
the conviction that such activity is worthwhile and contributes to the quality of life on
Earth.
Public support for the space program can be related to understanding of the values
derived from space activity and to understanding and acceptance of long-term goals and
objectives which establish the framework for the program.
In the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, the Congress declared "...it is the
policy of the United States that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes
for the benefit of all mankind." This policy statement, which served effectively as a guide
to the first decade in space, must now be translated into clearly enunciated new long-range
goals and program objectives for the post-Apollo space program.
We view the challenge of setting new goals, of providing a focus for our future space
activities, of expanding the limits of man's reach and thereby demonstrating America's
leadership in scientific and technological undertakings while maintaining the confidence
of the people in the strength and purpose of our Nation, as the key to continued space
leadership by the United States.
Facing this challenge, some would urge that our efforts should be restricted to ex-
ploitation of existing capability, pointing out, quite correctly, that excidng and challeng-
ing missions remain to be accomplished which can utilize the existing base. But such a
530 THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. SPACE POLICYAND PLANS
course would risk loss of the foundation for future achievements--a foundation which
depends largely on providing a new capability which challenges our technology.
One of the values of the lunar landing goal was that it carried a definite time for its
accomplishment, which stressed our technology and served as basis for planning and for
budget support. It was a national commitment, a demonstration of the will and determina-
tion of the American people and of our technological competence at a time when these
attributes were being questioned by many.
The need for an expression of our strength and determination as a Nation has changed
considerably since that time. Today the need is for guidance--for direction--to set before
the people a vision of where we are going.
[ 10] Such a vision for the future should have a number of important qualities:
• it should have substantive values that are easily characterized and understood.
• it should have a long-term goal, a beacon, an aim for our activities to act as a guide
to both short-term and longer range decisions.
• it should be sufficiently long-range to ensure that adequate opportunity exists for
solid progress in a step-by-step fashion towards that long-term goal yet sufficiently within
reach that each step draws measurably closer to that goal.
• it should be challenging both for man's spirit of adventure and of exploration and
for man's technological capability.
• it should foster the simultaneous utilization of space capabilities for the welfare,
security, and enlightenment of all people.
The Space Task Group has concluded that a balanced space program that exploits
the great potential for automated and remotely-controlled spacecraft and at the same time
maintains a vigorous manned flight program, can provide such a vision.
This balanced program would be based upon a framework in which the United States
would:
• Accept, for the long term, the challenge of exploring the solar system, using both
manned and unmanned expeditions.
• Develop on integrated and efficient space capability that will make Earth-Moon
space easily and economically accessible for manned and unmanned systems.
• Maintain a steady return on space investments in applications, science, and tech-
nology.
• Use our space capability not only to extend the benefits of space to the rest of the
world, but also to increase direct participation by the world community in both manned
and unmanned exploration and use of space.
The balanced program for the future envisioned by the Task Group would possess
several important characteristics:
flexibility. The ability to see clearly the opportunities that lie ahead in this new field
is limited at best. Some opportunities will fade as we approach them while others, not even
discernible at this time, will blossom to the first magnitude. This program will permit the
course and time scale to be flexible, to adjust to variations in funding, to shifting national
and international conditions, while preserving a guidepost for the future.
challenge. The space program has flourished under a set of goals that has demanded
the highest standards of performance, and an incentive for excellence that has become
characteristic of our space efforts. A balanced program of both challenging near-term
objectives and long-range goals will enhance and preserve these attributes in the future.
[11] opportunity. The Nation has in being significant capability for space activity. Abun-
dant opportunities exist for further exploitation of this capability. A balanced program
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will permit adequate attention to applications and science while also creating new oppor-
tunities through development of new capability
In its deliberations, the Space Task Group considered a number of challenging new
mission goals which were judged both technically feasible and achievable within a reason-
able time, including establishment of a lunar orbit or surface base, a large 50-100 man
earth-orbiting space base, and manned exploration of the planets. The Space Task Group
believes that manned exploration of the planets is the most challenging and most compre-
hensive of the many long-range goals available to the Nation at this time, with manned
exploration of Mars as the next step toward this goal. Manned planetary exploration would
be a goal, not an immediate program commitment; it would constitute an understanding
that within the context of a balanced space program, we will plan and move forward as a
Nation towards the objective of a manned Mars landing before the end of this century.
Mars is chosen because it is most earth-like, is in fairly close proximity to the Earth, and has
the highest probability of supporting extraterrestrial life of all of the other planets in the
solar system.
What are the implications of accepting this long-range goal or option on the charac-
ter of the space program in the immediate future?
In a technical sense, the selection of manned exploration of the planets as a long-
term option for the United States space program would act to focus a wide range of
precursor activities and would be reflected in many decisions, large and small, where
potential future applicability to long-lived manned planetary systems design will have rel-
evance. In a broader sense such a selection would tend to reinforce and reaffirm the basic
commitment to a long-term continued leadership position by the United States in space.
The Space Task Group sees acceptance of the long-term goal of manned planetary
exploration as an important part of the future agenda for this Nation in space. The time
for decisions on the development of equipment peculiar to manned mission to Mars will
depend upon the level of support, in a budget sense, that is committed to the space pro-
gram.
NASA has oudined plans that would include a manned Mars mission in 1981 with the
development decision on a Mars Excursion Module in FY 1974, if the Nation were to ac-
cept this commitment. Such a program would result in maximum stimulation of our tech-
nology and creation of new capability. There are many precursor activities that will be
required before a manned Mars mission is attempted, such as detailed study of biomedical
aspects, both physiological and psychological, of flights lasting 500-600 days, unmanned
reconnaissance of the planets, creation of highly reliable life support systems, power sup-
plies, and propulsion capability adequate for the rigors of such a voyage and reliable enough
to support man. Decision to proceed with a 1981 mission would require early attention to
these precursor activities.
While launch of a manned Mars exploration mission appears achievable as early as
1981, it can also be accomplished at any one of the roughly biennial launch opportunities
following this date, provided essential precursor activities have been carried out.
[19] Thus, the understanding that we are ultimately going to explore the planets
with man provides a shaping function for the post-Apollo space program. However, in a
balanced program containing other goals and objectives, this focus should not assume
over-riding priority and cause sacrifice of other important activity in times of severe bud-
get constraints. Flexibility in program content and options for decision on the specific
date for a manned Mars mission are inherent in this understanding.
The Space Task Group, in response to the President's request for a "Coordinated
program and budget proposal," has therefore chosen this balanced program as that plan
best calculated to meet the Nation's needs for direction of its future space activity. In
reaching this conclusion we have considered international and domestic influences, weighed
and placed in perspective science and engineering development, exploration and applica-
tion of space, manned and unmanned approaches to space missions, and have appraised
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interagency influences. Discussion of the principal objectives which describe this balanced
program follows.
Program Objectives
Elements of the balanced program recommended by the Space Task Group can be
identified within the following set of program objectives which define major emphases for
future space activity:
• Application of space technology to the direct benefit of mankind
* Operation of military space systems to enhance national defense
. Exploration of the solar system and beyond
• Development of new capabilities for operating in space
• International participation and cooperation
1. Application of space technology to the direct benefit of mankind.
Focus: To increase utilization of space capabilities for services to man. Programs
directed toward the application of the Nation's space capabilities to a wide range of ser-
vices, such as air and ocean traffic control, world-wide navigation systems, environmental
monitoring and prediction (weather, pollution), earth resource survey (crops, water re-
sources, geological structures, oceanography) and communications have great potential
for improving the quality of life on this planet Earth. Significant direct economic and
social benefits from such applications have been forecast. Major contributions to manage-
ment of domestic problems and greater opportunities for international cooperation could
result from an expanded space applications program.
2. Operation of military space systems to enhance national defense
Focus: Enhance the defense posture of the United States and thereby support the
broader objective of peace and security for the world.
[13] The Department of Defense is presently using space capabilities in the support
of communications, weather forecasting, navigation, surveillance and mapping, and for
other functions. Such space activity has been not an end in itself, but a means for accom-
plishing functions in support of existing forces and missions. Military uses of space have
proven effective and space systems are now contenders for specific applications and mis-
sions. Each military space mission should continue to be decided on a case-by-case basis in
competition with ground, sea, and airborne systems and should reflect priority given to
national defense with consideration of arms limitation agreements, and other U.S. policy
reactions. Exploitation of the unique characteristics of space systems by the Department of
Defense can provide increased confidence in the ability of this Nation to defend itself
from any aggressor and assurance that space will be used for peaceful purposes by all
nations.
3. Exploration of the solar system and beyond.
Focus: Increase man's knowledge of the universe.
Exploration of the solar system and observations beyond the solar system should be
important continuing broad objectives of the Nation's space program. Many unanswered
scientific questions remain about the planets, the interplanetary medium, the sun--both
as a type of star and as a source of the earth's energymand about a variety of celestial
objects, such as pulsars, quasars, X-ray and gamma ray sources. Both ground-and space-based
experiments and observational programs will contribute to the quest for answers to these
questions. Space platforms provide several unique advantagesmsuch as ability to observe
across the range of wave lengths of the electromagnetic spectrum (rather than only through
specific atmospheric '_vindows," which is the case from the ground) ; freedom from local
environmental conditions; potential for continuous observations (no day-night cycle); ability
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tO approach, orbit and land on extraterrestrial bodies--and also disadvantages---high cost,
inaccessibility for easy repair and servicing, and long lead times for experiment modifica-
tion. For these reasons a careful balance between investments in space and ground experi-
ments should be maintained.
The major elements of such a program should be:
• Planetary Exploration--Unmanned planetary exploration missions continuing
throughout the decade, both for science returns and, in the case of Mars and Venus, as
precursors to later manned missions. The program should include progressively more so-
phisticated missions to the near planets as well as multiple-planet flyby missions to the
outer planets taking advantage of the favorable relative positions of the outer planets in
the late 1970's. Early missions to the asteroid belt and to the vicinity of a comet should be
planned.
* Astronomy, Physics, the Earth and Life Sciences--In each of these disciplines,
extension of existing or planned unmanned programs promises continued high science
return. There are additional significant opportunities for experiments in connection with
manned Earth orbital programs which should be exploited. Work in astronomy, physics
and the life sciences, as well as work in the earth sciences and remote sensing, will form an
essential part of the foundation for future applications benefits and will contribute to the
broadening horizons of man as he acquires knowledge not only of his own planet but also
about the rest of the universe.
[14] • Lunar Exploration--Apollo-type manned missions to continue exploration
of the Moon should proceed. The launch rate should permit maximum responsiveness to
new discoveries while maintaining mission safety and efficient utilization of support per-
sonnel. Early upgrading of lunar exploration capability beyond the basic Apollo level in-
cluding enhanced mobility capability, and lunar rovers, is important to safe and efficient
realization of significant returns over the longer term. An orbiting lunar station, followed
by a surface-base, building upon Earth orbital space station and space transportation sys-
tem developments, could be deployed as early as the latter half of the decade. Extension of
manned lunar activity beyond upgraded Apollo capability should include consideration of
these options.
4. Development of new capabilities for operating in space.
Focus: Develop new systems for space operations with emphasis upon the critical
factors of: commonality, (2) reusability, and (3) economy.
Exploration and exploitation of space is costly with our current generation of ex-
pendable launch vehicles and spacecraft systems. This is particularly true for the manned
flight program. Recovery and launch costs will become an even more significant factor
when multiple re-visit and resupply missions to an Earth orbiting space station are contem-
plated. Future developments should emphasize:
• Commonality--the use of a few major systems for a wide variety of missions.
• Reusability--the use of the same system over a long period for a number of mis-
sions.
• Economy--for example, the reduction in the number of"throw away" elements in
any mission; the reduction in the number of new developments required; the develop-
ment of new program principles that capitalize on such capabilities as man-tending of
space facilities; and the commitment to simplification of space hardware.
An integrated set of major new elements which satisfy these criteria are:
a. A space station module that would be the basic element of future manned
activities in Earth orbit, of continued manned exploration of the Moon, and of manned
expeditions to the planets. The space station will be a permanent structure, operating
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continuously to support 6-12 occupants who could be replaced at regular intervals. Ini-
tially, the space station would be in a low altitude, inclined orbit; later stations would be
established in polar and synchronous orbits. The same space station module would also
provide a permanent manned station in lunar orbit from which expeditions could be sent
to the surface.
By joining together space station modules, a space base could be created. Occupied
by 50-100 men, this base would be a laboratory in space where a broad range of physical
and biological experiments would be performed.
Finally, the space station module would be the prototype of a mission module for
manned expeditions to the planets.
[15] Such an array of space station modules would be designed to utilize the space
transportation system described below.
b. A space transportation system that will:
• Provide a major improvement over the present way of doing business in terms
of cost and operational capability.
• Carry passengers, supplies, rocket fuel, other spacecraft, equipment, or addi-
tional rocket stages to and from orbit on a routine aircraft-like basis.
• Be directed toward supporting a spectrum of both DoD and NASA missions.
Although the concept of such a space transportation capability is not new, advances
in rocket engine technology, additional experience in design for reentry conditions, and
improved guidance, navigation and automated check-out systems now permit initiation of
an experimental effort for a Space Transportation System with technical, operational, and
economic characteristics satisfying the needs of both NASA and DoD. An orderly, phased,
step-by-step development program could then be implemented including as potential com-
ponents:
• A reusable chemically fueled shuttle operating between the surface of the Earth
and low-earth orbit in an airline-type mode.
• A chemically fueled reusable space tug or vehicle for moving men and equip-
ment to different earth orbits. This same tug could also be used as a transfer vehicle be-
tween the lunar-orbit base and the lunar surface.
• A reusable nuclear stage for transporting men, spacecraft and supplies between
Earth orbit and lunar orbit and between low Earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit and for
other deep space activities. The NERVA nuclear engine development program, presendy
underway and included in all of the options discussed later, provides the basis for this
stage and represents a major advance in propulsion capability.
c. Advanced Technology Development--In addition to the major vehicle develop-
ments listed above, a con tinuing program of investigation and exploration of new tec hn ol-
ogy that can serve as the foundation for next generation systems is an essential component
of the DoD, NASA, and other agency programs. A broad and aggressive program to ad-
vance our capabilities to operate in space during the next decade and to set the stage for
the decade to follow is needed.
We foresee future requirements for larger and more efficient power supplies utiliz-
ing a range of energy sources, particularly nuclear systems, for continuing propulsion sys-
tem improvementsmboth in performance and reliability, for improved understanding of
the complex interface between man and machine, for advances in technology and systems
design that result in lower cost development of new spacecraft, and for achievement of
new levels of reliability. In the advanced technology program, we should emphasize bio-
medical research, space power and propulsion technology, both nuclear and non-nuclear,
remotely controlled teleoperators, data management, multi-spectral sensors, communica-
tion and navigation technology, and experimental evaluation and demonstration of new
concepts.
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[ 16] 5. International participation and cooperation.
Focus: To promote a sense of world community; to optimize international scientific,
technical, and economic participation; to apply space technology to mankind's needs; and
to share the benefit and cost of space research and exploration.
To these ends, our international interests will be served best by (1) projects which
afford maximum opportunities for direct foreign participation, (2) projects which yield
economic and social benefits for other countries as well as ourselves, and (3) activities in
which further international agreement and coordination might usefully be employed.
The past decade has demonstrated that programs like Project Apollo are virtually
unrivaled in their capacity to catch the world's imagination and interest, win extensive
admiration and respect for American achievements, and generate a common human ex-
perience. The decade has demonstrated also that effective ways can be found to share the
practical benefits of space with people everywhere, as in space meteorology and communi-
cations. Modest but significant levels of direct participation in space flight research and
exploration have also been successfully achieved through cooperative projects. Future pro-
gram plans must seek to continue and substantially extend this experience.
We should also devote special effort to meliorate, between the space powers and
others, the increasing gap in technological capability and the gap in awareness and under-
standing of new opportunities and responsibilities evolving in the space age.
If international participation and cooperation are to be expanded in an important
way, there will have to be (1) a substantial raising of sights, interest and investment in space
activity by the other nations able to do so in order to establish a base for major contribu-
tions by them; and (2) creation of attractive international institutional arrangements to
take full advantage of new technologies and new applications for peoples in developing as
well as advanced countries.
The most dramatic form of foreign participation in our program will be the inclu-
sion of foreign astronauts. This should be approached in the context of substantive for-
eign contributions to the programs involved.
The form of cooperation most sought after by advanced countries will be technical
assistance to enable them to develop their own capabilities. We should move toward a
liberalization of our policies affecting cooperation in space activities, should stand ready
to provide launch services and share technology wherever possible, and should make ar-
rangements to involve foreign experts in the detailed definition of future United States
space programs and in the conceptual and design studies required to achieve them. We
should consider three further steps:
* The establishment of an international arrangement through which countries may
be assured of launch services without being solely and directly dependent upon the United
States.
• A division of labor between ourselves and other advanced countries or regional
space organizations permitting assumptions of primary or joint responsibility for certain
scientific or applications tasks in space.
• Internationalsponsorship and support for planetary exploration such as tlaat which
was associated with the International Geophysical Year.
[17] The developing countries will be most attracted to (1) applications of space
technology which serve their economic and social needs, and (2) the development of
international institutional arrangements in which they can participate along with the ad-
vanced countries. Some examples are:
• Environmental studies and earth resource surveying via satellites;
* Direct broadcast via satellites of TV instructional and educational programs;
• Expanding arrangements to acquire and use meteorological data;
• Training opportunities in space applications and space-related disciplines.
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Totheextenthatfuturepracticalspaceapplicationsareachieved,thereshouldbe
nosignificanttechnicalobstaclestoensuringthesharingof benefitsonaglobalbasis.
Therewill,however,beeconomicandpoliticalissueswhichrequirerecognitionandeffec-
tiveanticipation.
In thecaseof theUSSR,experienceoverthepastenyearsmakesclearthatthe
centralproblemindevelopingspacecooperationispoliticalratherthantechnicaloreco-
nomic.NumerousspecifictechnicalopportunitiesforcooperationwiththeSovietUnion
havebeenidentifiedandareavailable.Indeed,manyofthemhavebeenputtotheSoviet
Unioninvariousformsthroughtheyearswithlittlesuccess.For example, we could formu-
late a series of graduated steps leading toward major cooperation. They would range from
full and frank exchange of detailed space project results, at the lowest level, to prearranged
complementary actvifies at the next level (e.q., mutual support of tracking requirements,
coordinated satellite missions for specific tasks in space), and ultimately to fully integrated
projects in which sub-systems could be provided by each side to carry out a total space
mission of agreed character. The following possibilities merit serious consideration:
• In space research---earth orbital investigation of atmospheric dynamics and Earth's
magnetic field; astronomical observations from earth satellites or lunar stations; satellite
observation of solar phenomena, and lunar and planetary exploration.
• In practical applications--coordination of a continuing network of satellites to
provide data for world-wide weather prediction and early warning of natural disasters; the
development of capabilities for earth resource surveying via satellites.
• In manned flight--bit-medical research, space rescue, coordination of experi-
ments and flight parameters for Earth orbiting space stations, lunar exploration, and ex-
change of astronauts.
• In trackingmto supplement each other's networks.
In view of the heavy commitment of the Soviets, planetary exploration appears to
offer unusual opportunities for complementary activities.
[19] IV. PROGRAM AND BUDGET OPTIONS
The Space Task Group was asked to provide "definitive recommendation on the
direction the U. S. space program should take in the post-Apollo period," through prepa-
ration of a "coordinated program and budget proposal." In the Section "Goals and Objec-
tives," the Space Task Group has outlined the elements of this coordinated program.
We have also pointed out that there are upper and lower bounds to the Funding
which will support a viable, productive and well disciplined program. Between these bounds
there are many options both in program content and in total funding required. In this
section we will explore the range of these options and their resource implications.
Clearly, there are a number of factors outside the space program and the intrinsic
merit of it; goals and objectives that must be considered in determining the allocation of
resources to the program. Demands of other domestic programs, international conditions,
and state of economic health of our Nation are only a few of the major influences upon
the specific budget for space in a given fiscal year.
Despite the highly variable nature of these influences, which produces a correspond-
ing increasing uncertainty in projections of resource availability, it is important for plan-
ning purposes to look into the future and forecast the general nature of funding required
to support decisions on content and pace of the program. Two basic questions arise. Is the
Nation to exploit its existing capabilities, to expand those capabilities or reduce its partici-
pation in space activity? Is funding for space generally to remain at present levels, to in-
crease dramatically or to decrease significantly below present levels?
We stand at a crossroads, with many sets of missions and new developmenL_ open to
us and with three main avenues for funding to pursue these opportunities.
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ToassistinansweringthesequestionsandtoprovideabasisforTaskGroupanalyses,
NASAandDODwereeachrequestedtoprepareasetofalternativeproposalsoroptions
thatwouldcoverarangeoffutureresourcel velsandbeconsistentwiththegoalsand
objectivesrecommendedbytheTaskGroup.
NASA Options
The range of resource levels considered by the Task Group for NASA is shown in
Figure 1.
[20] These include: (1) an upper bound, defined by a program conducted at a maxi-
mum pace--limited, not by funds, but by technology; (2) options I, II, and III which illus-
trate programs consistent with the Task Group recommendations, but conducted under
varying degrees of funding restraints; and (3) a low level program constructed with an
increased unmanned science and applications effort consistent with the Task Group
recommendations but, because of the significantly lower budget levels, without a manned
flight program after completion of Apollo and Apollo Applications.
A comparison of the timing of major mission accomplishments under the various
programs is indicated in Table 1.
Although the program represented by the upper bound appears technically achiev-
able, would provide maximum stimulation to our over-all capabilities, and is fully consis-
tent with the Task Group recommendations, it represents on initial rate of growth of
resources which cannot be realized because such budgetary requirements would substan-
tially exceed predicted funding capabilities. This has therefore been rejected by the Space
Task Group, and is presented only to demonstrate the upper bound of technological achieve-
ment.
We have therefore developed a set of options which falls within these limits to illus-
trate programs conducted at budget levels which appear possible during the next decade.
Option I is illustrative of a decision to increase funding dramatically and resuhs in
early accomplishment of the major manned and unmanned mission opportunities, in-
cluding launch of a manned mission to Mars in the mid-1980's, establishment of an orbit-
ing lunar station, a 50 man earth-orbit space base and a lunar surface base, Funding would
rise from the present $4 billion level to $8-10 billion in 1980. Decision to proceed with
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development of the space station, earth-to-orbit shuttle and the space tug would be re-
quired in FY 1971. Firm decisions [21] on other major systems or missions would not be
needed until later years; for example, a decision to develop the Mars excursion module for
an initial manned Mars expedition would not be required before FY 1974.
Options II and III illustrate a decision to maintain funding initially at recent levels
and then gradually increasing. These options are identical with the exception that Option
II includes a later decision to launch a manned planetary mission in 1986 and in Option
III this decision is deferred. Both options demonstrate the effect of simultaneous develop-
ment of the Space Transportation System and earth orbital space station module, each of
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which is expected to require peak expenditure rates of the order of $1 billion per year, and
both options include a substantial increase in unmanned science and applications from
present levels but less than that in Option I. Maintaining the unmanned program at the
Option I levels would require several hundred million dollars in additional funding. Deci-
sion to develop both space station and earth-to-orbit shuttle would be in about FY 1972,
resulting in initial availability of these systems in 1977. Similarly, other major milestones
would occur later, with decision on the Mars Excursion Module estimated for FY 1978.
Funding for both options would remain approximately level at $4 billion for the next two
fiscal years and then would rise to a peak of $5.7 billion in 1976----this increase reflecting
simultaneous peak resource requirements of space station and space shuttle developments.
If these developments were conducted in series, lower funding levels ($4-5 billion) could
be achieved. Option II would have a later peak of nearly $8 billion in the early 1980's
resulting from the manned Mars landing program.
Details of funding requirements for each of the program options are shown in Fig-
ure 2 through 4 and Table 2.
[23] The lower bound chosen by the Space Task Group illustrates a program con-
ducted at significantly reduced funding levels. It is our judgment that, in order to achieve
these significantly reduced NASA budgets, it would be necessary to reduce manned space
flight operations below a viable minimum level. Therefore, this program has been con-
structed assuming a hiatus in manned flight following completion of Apollo applications
and follow-on Apollo lunar missions. It thus sacrifices, for the period of such reduced
budgets, program objectives relating to development of new capability, and the contribu-
tion of continuing manned space flight to several of the other program objectives recom-
mended by the Task Group. It does, however, include a vigorous and expanded unmanned
program of solar system exploration, astronomy, space applications for the benefit of man
and potential for international cooperation. Funding for such a program would reduce
gradually to a sustaining level of $2-3 billion depending upon the depth of change as-
sumed for the supporting NASA facilities and manpower base.
The Space Task Group is convinced that a decision to phase out manned space flight
operations, although painful, is the only way to achieve significant reductions in NASA
budgets over the long term. At any level of mission activity, a continuing program of manned
space flight, following use of launch vehicles and spacecraft purchased as part of Apollo,
would require continued production of hardware, continued operation of extensive test,
launch support and mission control facilities, and the maintenance of highly skilled teams
of engineers, technicians, managers, and support personnel. Stretch-out of mission or
production schedules, which can initially reduce total annual costs, would result in higher
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unit costs. More importantly, very low-level operations are highly wasteful of the skilled
manpower required to carry out these operations and would risk deterioration of safety
and reliability throughout the manned program. At some low level of activity, the viability
at the program is in question. It is our belief that the interests of this Nation would not be
served by a manned space flight program conducted at such levels.
DOD Options
A similar set of DOD Options, A through C, was constructed to illustrate three basi-
cally different levels of military space activity.
Three options are presented, not only to provide funding and program options, but
also to characterize the band of choices within which a rational program of military space
activities will evolve. Options A and C are considered to be the upper and lower bound-
aries of probable military space activity, with Option B being an example of an intermedi-
ate levek
Option A presumes a future in which the threat to national security could evolve in
an increasingly hostile manner, thereby leading to increased priorities for national de-
fense and military space activities. This option also provides for contingency efforts
designed to accommodate a high degree of uncertainty in future international conditions.
Cost effectiveness, technology availability, growth rate of resource application, and na-
tional policy constraints were considered in establishing this upper option for a full mili-
tary space capability.
[24] Option B includes those efforts necessary to counter the known and generally
accepted projections of the threat. In addition, it provides limited developmental activities
toward those capabilities needed if the threat increases. Option B is a prototype program
which recognizes the need to minimize cost increases over the next few ),ears, but reflects
the expectation that military space activity will increase to provide the necessary support
to our military forces and posture. This option is consistent with national and DOD poli-
cies and with Force Structure planning.
Option C is directly responsive to current national economic constraints, and as-
sumes that a lessening of world tensions will result in reduced emphasis on national
defense. It, therefore, includes a lower level of system deployment than the other two
options. It still includes, however, the technology and support effort necessary for contin-
gency planning, together with those programs now considered to be reasonable and pre-
dictable requirements. Option C is the lower boundary of military space activity that will
meet existing national defense needs, although implied in this option is a higher degree
of risk than that inherent in Options A and B.
Annual resource requirements for the DOD options are shown in Figure 5.
Program Flexibility
In the option; submitted by NASA and DOD, resource requirements have been pro-
jected which represent a large number of decisions to be made in sequence over a number
of years. Thus, the resource projections represent the upper envelope or sum of funds
required to support these decisions. Many of these decisions are relatively independent--
that is, an earth orbit space station module can be developed independently, without com-
mitment to placing such a station in orbit around the moon, or sending such a module on
a mission to Mars. In both of these examples, however, development of the space station
module would [25] be the normal first step in achieving the lunar orbit station or Mars
mission capability. An example of the set of major program elements and hence decision
points inherent in the options described, based upon NASA Option II, is included as
Figure 6. A diversity of specific programs with varying emphasis can be constructed by
delaying or shifting initiation of funding for these major elements relative to other new
developments.
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There is, therefore, a great amount of flexibility inherent in each of these options
and adjustments to funding constraints may be made on a yearly basis as part of the
normal budget process. Of course, once initiated, a specific major system development
profits from continuity in funding--stretchout or major fluctuations in funding for a par-
ticular project generally increase the total costs associated with it.
The levels of activity for the NASA and the DOD programs are essentially indepen-
dent, that is, selection of Options I or II for NASA could be consistent with an Option A, B,
or C level of activity for DOD, since the DOD space activity will continue to be responsive
to national defense needs and will be determined on a case-by-case basis under the budget
and program established annually for the Defense Department. It is important, however,
that continued coordination of the NASA and DOD programs and the effect of each agency's
activity on a common industrial and facility base receive authoritative attention ....
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Document 111-26
Document tide: Robert P. Mayo, Director, Bureau of the Budget, Memorandum for the
President, "Space Task Group Report," September 25, 1969.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
Bureau of the Budget Director Robert Mayo had first been critical of NASA's desire
for a continued high budget when dealing with Thomas Paine's attempt to get an early
presidential commitment to a space station and an increase in the NASA budget when the
new Nixon administration had asked its agency heads to find ways of reducing their bud-
gets. Mayo had been an observer in the Space Task Group, and he had made occasional
comments about the difference between what the task group seemed to want to recom-
mend and the budget outlook in coming years. This memorandum, written ten days after
the president received the Space Task Group report, foreshadowed a bitter battle between
NASA and the White House over the fiscal year 1971 budget level. NASA in October 1969
requested a fiscal year 1971 budget of $4.497 billion; by the time the President finally
approved the budget the following January, it had been cut almost 25 percent, to
$3.33 billion. Although Mayo left his position after the fiscal year 1971 budget was submit-
ted, the newly renamed Office of Management and Budget continued to attempt to re-
duce NASA budget levels in subsequent years.
[]] Memorandum for the President
Subject: Space Task Group Report
This memorandum presents a summary of my views on the Space Task Group Report
and my recommendations as to the next steps in the decision process. I was an observer on
the Space Task Group and, as such, participated in its discussions on the future of the
space program, reserving the right to present to you my independent judgment as your
Budget Director.
The report sets forth an excellent catalog of technical possibilities for the future.
However, standing by itself, it has several shortcomings. In my view, these shortcomings
impair its completeness as a vehicle for your final decision.
1. The report does not clearly differentiate between the values of the manned space
flight program versus a much less costly unmanned program with its greater emphasis on
scientific achievement and potential economic returns.
2. The Space Task Group could not, nor did it try to, assess the relative standing of
the space program in our full range of national priorities. In order to do this, you might
wish to have the report reviewed by the Cabinet--and perhaps the Security Council as
well.
3. The Group could not address the future economic context within which the rec-
ommended space expenditure would have to be considered.
4. The report is written in such a way that your endorsement of any of the recom-
mended program options implies endorsement of major new long-term development
projects, which are included in all three of the program options. Therefore, in a practical
sense, the report gives you little flexibility except as to timing (and therefore annual costs).
The impact of this is only slightly softened by the assertion that the rate of progress toward
the goals would be subject to annual budget decision. This reservation has very practical
limits. All the defined options involve significant budget increases over current levels.
5. The Bureau of the Budget has not had the opportunity to review in detail the
estimates set forth on page 22 of the report, but they vary sufficiently from other esumates
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whichhavebeenusedrecentlysothatwebelievetheyaresignificantlyunderestimated.
Furthermore,thesefiguresarepresentedin termsof 1969dollarsandarethereforefur-
therunderestimatedbyreasonoftheinflationthathasalreadytakenplace.[2]Ofcourse,thereisnoreflectiononpriceincreasesthatareahnostcertainto
comein theyearsahead.
Theotherdecisionfactorsthatmostconcernmearerelatedspecificallytothe1971
budget,nowunderpreparation,andtothebudgetsthatyouwillbepreparingduringthe
remainderofyourfirstterm.
The1971problemisseverebecauseof:
1. Theinflationwearestilltryingtobringundercontrol.
2.TheneedtoassumecontinuationoftheVietnamconflictforbudgetpreparation
purposes.
3. Thecommitmentswehavealreadymadeinsuchareasasdomesticwelfare,man-
powertraining,socialsecurity"benefits,revenuesharing,airports/airways,masstransit,
andsupersonictransportdevelopmentamongothers.Everyoneof thesecommitments
requiresoutlayincreasesin 1971.4. Uncontrollableit msuchasinterestonthenationaldebt.
5. Revenuelossesassociatedwiththetaxbill--evenwithproposedTreasuryamend-
ments.
In lightof thesecircumstances,I gaveNASAanofficialbudgetplanningtargetof$3.5billionfor 1971($350millionbelow1970).Thistargetwasbasedontheassumption
thatafterthemannedlunarlanding,somereductionin NASA'scurrentbudgetlevels
couldbemadetoeaseouroverallbudgetproblem,withoutstoppingthemannedspace
program.Allthreeoptionsetforthin thereportrequire1971budgetsof atleast$100
millionpluspriceincreasesabovethecurrentNASAfundinglevelsandfurtherincreases
infollowingyears.Theseincreaseswillhavetocomefromprogramsofotheragencies.
BecausetheSpaceTaskGroupreporthasnowbeenpublished,yourendorsement
nowofanyspecificoptionwillcommitustoannualbudgetincreasesofatleasthemagni-
tudespecifiedin thereport.Therefore,youcouldloseeffectivefiscalcontrolofthepro-
gram.
I am convinced that a forward-looking manned space program can be developedforyou that
does not involve commitments to significant near-term budget increases.
Such a program would involve a slower rate of manned Apollo flights than NASA
now considers desirable. It would also involve consecutive rather than simultaneous devel-
opment of a space transportation system and space station, which are necessary steps to-
ward a manned Mars mission. I intend to explore such a program in some detail with Dr.
Paine during the FY 1971 budget decision process. Such a program could be accelerated
in the future if conditions permit.
[3] I believe this course would be preferable to announcing ambitious long-range
plans now and then having to cut back in the future due to economic constraints.
In this circumstance, I recommend:
1. That you withhold announcement of your space program decision until after you
have reviewed the report recommendations specifically in the context of the total 1971
budget problem.
2. That you ask the Cabinet and perhaps the NSC to consider the Space Task Group
report during October or November and advise you of their views on its recommenda-
tions, so that you will have those views in mind during your budget decisions.
3. That you consider meeting with Tom Paine and me after I have had an
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opportunity to discuss with him the lower cost program option I have described above.
Your meeting could be planned for December, and could serve as the final step in your
decision process on the NASA 1971 budget. At that time, it is essential that you specify
program content as well as budget guidance in order to help maintain effective fiscal
control of the program.
4. That your space program decisions be announced in the State of the Union ad-
dress, the budget message, or a special message to the Congress in the spring of 1970.
Robert E Mayo
Director
Document 111-27
Document fide: Peter M. Flanigan, Memorandum for the President, December 6, 1969.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
It was not only a desire to reduce the federal budget that led the White House in late
1969 to seek a lower level of spending on space. There was also a belief among many of
Richard Nixon's political and policy advisers that there was little political benefit to the
president from major post-Apollo space initiatives. This memorandum from Assistant to
the President Peter Flanigan, who had been asked by the president and his top policy
adviser John Erlichman to be the White House link to NASA, is an example of the political
input being provided to the president.
Memorandum for the President
The October 6 issue of Newsweek took a poll of 1,321 Americans with household in-
comes ranging from $5,000 to $15,000 a year. This represents 61% of the white population
of the United States and is obviously the heart of your constituency. Of this group, 56%
think the government should be spending less money on space exploration, and only 10%
think the government should be spending more money.
Peter M. Flanigan
Document 111-28
Document fide: Caspar W. Weinberger, Deputy Director, Office of Management and Bud-
get, via George P. Shultz, Memorandum for the President, "Future of NASA," August 12,
1971.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
In the summer of 1971, NASA and the White House were once again locked in a
bitter batde over the agency's future programs and budgets. At issue was whether NASA
would receive approval to continue the Apollo program through the Apollo 16 and 17
missions and to begin developing a reusable space transportation system, the space shutde.
Observing the interactions between NASA and the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) staff and other White House elements, OMB Deputy Director Caspar Weinberger
decided that budget cutting was going too far. His August 12, 1971, memorandum is the
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"smoking gun" with respect to the White House decision to approve the shuttle. President
Nixon read the memorandum, wrote "OK" next to Weinberger's proposal to find money
from elsewhere in the budget to fund NASA at a level adequate to support shuttle develop-
ment, and wrote "I agree with Cap" next to OMB Director George Shultz's name on the
first page of the memorandum. White House stafferJon Huntsman reported the president's
decision to Budget Director Schultz in a cover memorandum.
This exchange between Weinberger and the president was not reported to lower
OMB staff, who continued through the rest of 1971 to oppose the shuttle and to propose
further reductions in the NASA budget.
[1] Memorandum for the President
From: Caspar W. Weinberger
Via: George P. Shultz
Subject: Future of NASA
Present tentative plans call for major reductions or change in NASA, by eliminating
the last two Apollo flights (16 and 17), and eliminating or sharply reducing the balance of
the Manned Space Program (Skylab and Space Shuttle) and many remaining NASA pro-
grams.
I believe this would be a mistake.
1) The real reason for sharp reductions in the NASA budget is that NASA is entirely
in the 28% of the budget that is controllable. In short we cut it because it is cuttable, not
because it is doing a bad job or an unnecessary one.
2) We are being driven, by the uncontrollable items, to spend more and more on
programs that offer no real hope for the future: Model Cities, ted, Welfare, interest on
National Debt, unemployment compensation, Medicare, etc. Of course, some of these
have to be continued, in one form or another, but essentially they are program, not of our
choice, designed to repair mistakes of the past, not of our making.
3) We do need to reduce the budget, in my opinion, but we should not make all our
reduction decisions on the basis of what is reducible, rather than on the merits of indi-
vidual programs.
[2]4) There is real merit to the future of NASA, and to its proposed programs. The
Space Shuttle and NERVA particularly offer the opportunity, among other things, to se-
cure substantial scientific fall-out for the civilian economy at the same time that large
numbers of valuable (and hard-to-employ-elsewhere) scientists and technicians are kept at
work on projects that increase our knowledge of space, our ability to develop for lower cost
space exploration, travel, and to secure, through NERVA, twice the existing propulsion
efficiency of our rockets.
It is very difficult to re-assemble the NASA teams should it be decided later, after
major stoppages, to re-start some of the long-range programs.
5) Recent Apollo flights have been very successful from all points of view. Most im-
portant is the fact that they give the American people a much needed lift in spirit, (and the
people of the world an equally needed look at American superiority). Announcement
now, or very shortly, that we were cancelling Apollo 16 and 17 (an announcement we
would have to make very soon if any real savings are to be realized) would have a very bad
effect, coming so soon after Apollo 15's triumph. It would be confirming in some respects,
a belief that I fear is gaining credence at home and abroad: That our best years are behind
us, that we are turning inward, reducing our defense commitments, and voluntarily start-
ing to give up our super-power status, and our desire to maintain world superiority.
America should be able to afford something besides increased welfare, programs to
repair our cities, or Appalachian relief and the like.
6) I do not propose that we necessarily fund all NASA seeks---only that we couple any
announcement to that effect with announcements that we are going to fund space shuttles,
NERVA, or other major, future NASA activities ....
548 THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. SPACE POLICYAND PLANS
Document 111-29
Document title: J.C.F., Administrator, Memorandum to Dr. Low, "Meeting with Ed David,"
August 24, 1971.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
This memorandum catches the character of the NASA-White House interactions dur-
ing 1971 as seen from NASA's perspective. Edward David was President Nixon's Science
Adviser, and Russell Drew his top staff person on space issues. The Flax Committee, named
after its chairman Dr. Alexander Flax, was an ad hoc panel of the President's Science Advi-
sory Committee set up to advise the White House on NASA's shuttle proposal and possible
alternatives. One of the panel's members, Dr. Eugene Fubini, was particularly active in the
review. Richard McCurdy was the NASA official in charge of institutional management;
the Office of Management and Budget was suggesting that the post-Apollo NASA had too
many facilities and too many employees for the program envisaged for the 1970s.
[ 1] As we discussed, I met with Ed David, ostensibly to talk about the possibility of a
$3.2 billion constant budget throughout the 70's and to get a feeling from him as to how
much we can trust OMB and others with regard to holding the line at this figure if we came
in with a "bare bones" budget of this magnitude, which included a minimum shuttle. Ed's
feeling is that the Flax Committee (with Fubini leading the pack) is going to come in with
some interesting options which I would judge to be consistent with the $3.2 billion budget
and, perhaps, would include a shuttle of about $5 billion total investment running about
1 billion per year. I indicated that this might be in the same ball park, but we would have to
examine any such ideas in depth before we could commit ourselves to any such programs;
also, that we were thinking along similar lines but so far had not discussed them in any
detail with the Flax Committee. Surprisingly enough, he felt this was the wise thing to do
from our point of view and he would hope that we would continue to keep such studies
confined to a small group in NASA until the time came to discuss them. I received a very
definite impression that he would like to take credit for coming up with a reduced cost
shutde, and I didn't discourage him from this idea.
When it came to discussing tactics, he did agree that the two of us ought to sit down
after the Flax Committee results were in and plan out a program together. However, his
initial [2] thought was that he should propose the low-cost shuttle to OMB himself, but
that we should try to resist in order to argue from a better bargaining position. I am not
sure that this is a good way to proceed but his suggestion was based on the fact that we
already recognize that OMB can't entirely be trusted to commit to any kind of program
and that if we agreed too easily to the low-cost shuttle, they might try to work us down to a
smaller budget yet. Basically, the strategy and tactics remain unresolved, except Ed did
agree to chat further with us on the subject when the Flax Committee results were avail-
able.
I was personally a litde discouraged by the conversation in the sense that he didn't
feel there was anyone in OMB who could be completely trusted--not that they were dis-
honest, but that their sole function was to put a ratchet on the budget and couldn't make
a commitment to hold the line on anything.
I tried out your ideas regarding the Space Council and, at first, he was quite defen-
sive, indicating that OST perhaps served the function that we had in mind for the Space
Council, particularly when the business of earth resources policy came up. However, after
some discussion we agreed that the idea was worth considering, but he wanted to mull it
over first. I think his thought was that perhaps he could chair the Space Council in the
absence of the Vice President instead of "yours truly." I am afraid we are going to have
some difficulty on this one, but I am willing to pursue it further if we still think it is a good
idea.
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Incidentally, I brought up another subject and that is his own views and those of
OMB's toward our "operating base." He feels that OMB is unconvinced that there isn't
considerable fat in the program because of the large operating base and although he
knows Dick McCurdy's position on it, he is not himself convinced and is sure that OMB is
not convinced. I indicated that we had just started our program with OMB [3] and, hope-
fully, Dick would be successful in a period of weeks to expose enough of OMB to the report
that, at least, they would understand the problem better. Ed didn't volunteer to listen to
Dick's analysis, but I think we ought to try to set up with both Ed Da_4d and Russ Drew at
an appropriate time, even though they are lukewarm to the idea.
J.C.F
Document 111-30
Document tide: Klaus P. Heiss and Oskar Morgenstern, Memorandum for Dr. James C.
Fletcher, Administrator, NASA, "Factors for a Decision on a New Reusable Space Trans-
portation System," October 28, 1971.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
In 1970, the Office of Management and Budget had forced NASA to hire an external
contractor to analyze the economic rationale for replacing existing or new expendable
launch vehicles with a reusable space transportation system. The contractor chosen was
Mathematica, Inc., a Princeton, New Jersey, firm headed by the distinguished economist
Oskar Morgenstern. At Mathematica, the individual with primary responsibility for the
study was a brash young Austrian-born economist, Klaus Heiss.
Mathematica submitted its analysis of the economic worth of a fully reusable space
transportation system in May 1971 ,just as NASA was deciding that budget constrain ts would
only allow the development of a partially reusable system. NASA asked Mathematica to
examine the economics of a variety of possible designs for such a system.
Working closely with several aerospace contractors, Heiss came to the conclusion
that a particular design, which he called a Thrust Assisted Orbiter Shuttle (TAOS), was the
preferred alternative. Recognizing that the total study would not be completed in time to
influence decisions on the shuttle program (the study was submitted in May 1972), Heiss
and Morgenstern prepared this memorandum and circulated it among those involved in
the space shuttle decision process.
[1]
(1) REUSABLE SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM IS ECONOMICALLY FEA-
SIBLE, ASSUMING THAT THE LEVEL OF UNMANNED U.S. SPACE ACTIVITY WILL
NOT BE LESS THAN IT HAS BEEN ON THE AVERAGE OVER THE LAST EIGHT YEARS.
(2) AMONG THE MANYSPACE SHUTTLE CONFIGURATIONS SO FAR INVESTI-
GATED, AND WHICH ARE DEEMED TO BE TECHNOLOGICALLY FEASIBLE, A
THRUST ASSISTED ORBITER SHUTTLE (TA OS) WITH EXTERNAL HYDROGEN/OXY-
GEN TANKS EMERGES AT PRESENT AS THE ECONOMICALLY PREFERRED CHOICE.
EXAMPLES OF SUCH CONCEPTS ARE RATO OF MCDONNELL DOUGLAS AND TAHO
OF GRUMMAN-BOEING.
(3) THE DEMAND FOR SPACE TRANSPORTATIONIN THE 1980's AND BEYOND BY
THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE, BUT PARTICULARLY BY COMMERCIAL AND OTHER USERS IS THE
BASIS FOR THE ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION FOR THE TAOS PROGRAM. SUBSTAN-
TIAL FURTHER EFFORT IN THIS AREA IS NEEDED TO DETERMINE THESE EX-
PECTED NEEDS.
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The following sets forth briefly, in a summary manner, the principal considerations
which lead to conclusions (1) and (2). The following arguments, which in their entirety
support the recommendation (2), contribute significantly to alleviating the doubts voiced
by the Congress, the public and several branches of the Executive concerning the need for
a new Space Transportation System. Such doubts have been raised because of the magni-
tude of the investment involved and the comparative technological difficulty of the pro-
posed undertaking. [2]
I. Major Conclusions
1. In the May 31, 1971 report by MATHEMATICA, Economic Analysis of New Space
Transportation Systems, the overall economic worth of a reusable space transportation sys-
tem was examined. The study was based on the two-stage fully reusable concept then un-
der investigation by Phase B contractors and NASA. That report has demonstrated how an
economic justification of a space shuttle system, including a space tug, with an IOC date of
1978 has to be made. The report was not concerned with identifying the most economic
choice among alternative space shuttle configurations to be considered.
2. The Baseline, fully reusable, space transportation system had attached to it a
non-recurring cost of between $10 and $14 billion when the costs of all systems were in-
cluded. This large investment outlay would be largely independent of the time span within
which these funds are expended. These high non-recurring costs coupled with a relatively
high risk led to the study of many alternate configurations. Among the many other ap-
proaches studied by NASA and industry, our calculations show the emergence of an
economical and acceptable solution to the question of the best strategy for NASA to achieve a reusable
space transportation system for the 1980's at acceptable costs.
3. Over 200 space programs were analyzed by MATHEMATICA, comparing (a) the
Baseline two-stage fully reusable system, (b) the Baseline, external hydrogen tank system,
(c) the Mark I-Mark II (reusable S1C) system, (d) the RATO system of McDonnell Dou-
glas, (e) the TAHO system of Grumman-Boeing, (f) the Stage and One-Half of Lockheed
Corporation, and (g) the Identical Vehicle Concept of McDonnell Douglas. The Thrust
Assisted Orbiter Shuttle concepts (TA OS) which include concepts like [3] RATO and TAHO, emerge
as the most preferred systems within the space programs so far analyzed, using the economic meth-
odology as exemplified in the May 31, 1971 report. The common feature of TAOS con-
cepts is a single orbiter with external hydrogen/oxygen tanks and rocket assists in the
form of solid rocket motors or high pressure fed unmanned boosters. This eliminates the
need to develop a large manned, reusable booster.
[4] 1I. Objectives of a Reusable Space Transportation System
The principalobjecdves of a space shuttle system are considered to be:
1. A new capability of meeting all foreseeable space missions in NASA, DoD and
elsewhere, including manned space flight capabilities.
2. Reduction of space program costs (manned, unmanned, NASA, DoD, commercial
users) over the present expendable space transportation costs through reuse, refurbish-
ment, maintenance, and updating of payloads.
3. Reduction of space transportation costs for all missions (low energy, high energy,
manned).
4. Option of later transition to a fully reusable system.
Additional objectives supporting the major objectives are:
5. A low non-recurring cost to meet funding constraints.
6. Assurance of a low cost per launch of below $10 million--and if possible $5 million
--justifiable when payload costs and effects are considered.
The work assigned to us and reported in the May 11 report showed clearly the eco-
nomic justification of a fully reusable space transportation system and outlined some key
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questionsthatremaintobeansweredinordertoassureanoverallpurposetothespace
shuttledecision.Notyetanalyzedin thatreportwasthequestionofthe most economic shuttle
configuration, to meet the major objectives of NASA_ Any decision on an economic new
Space Transportation System will have to reconcile major constraints with those objec-
tives.
[5] IH. Constraints of Decision on Configuration
The key constraints that any decision on a particular configuration is confronted
with are:
1. Technological: The technical feasibilitv of the alternative configurations studied
by NASA and industry is assumed. However, for each alternative configuration the time-and-
cost uncertainties were analyzed as far as presently possible. This still assumes that the
concepts studied are indeed technically viable.
2. Economic:
(a) Total cost and components. Different configurations have very different costs
associated with them as outlined, for example, by the Baseline, Two Stage Fully Reusable
system, the Baseline Two Stage External Hydrogen Tank system, the Mark I-Mark II (reus-
able SIC) system, the Stage and One-Half system and the various Thrust Assisted Orbiter
Shuttles (TATS). In addition to total costs in research and development, investment, and
operations (including the cost per launch), elements of uncertainty of various degrees are
associated with individual subsystems of these configurations. NASA, industry contractors,
and others are trying to analyze in part the cost component as well as the risk component
in these different configurations. All possible different configurations, but certainly TATS,
have to be analyzed as to the advantages and disadvantages in cost, risk, and uncertainty
that these configurations promise when compared to the two stage fully reusable original
Baseline system of NASA.
[6] (b) Timing of the space shuttle development and its systems. In part the choice
of the current Mark I-Mark II approach was forced by a peak funding requirement for
space shuttle development of, say, $1 billion per year. In this approach, however, several
important parts of the system would be postponed in some configurations while other con-
figurations with the same total funding requirement assure an early IOC date not only of the
space shuttle alone, but also of the space tug. The meeting of the funding requirements, the
mission capabilities of the new system and the IOC dates of interim as well as final configu-
rations have to be further studied in detail.
(c) Timing of the Space Tug should be such that its IOC date comes closely after
the IOC date of the Space Shuttle. If European countries undertake the tug development
--after assurance that NASA will have a Space Shuttle System!--then tug funding becomes
a problem outside the NASA budget and these expenditures should not affect the shuttle
decision itself. They were, however, fully allowed for in our analysis.
Within the above constraints, the trade offs of alternative configurations have to be
studied with a number of alternative mission models. In particular, very close attention has
to be paid to the very different capabilities that are given in terms of the overall system. In
connection with the TAtS concept, tank costs are yet a major uncertainty that are in-
cluded in our present studies and which may come down substantially with further techni-
cal change. Such a development would further favor the TAtS concept.
The key question raised in the May 31, 1971 report is: Does there exist a precise and
detailed NASA and national space program for the 1980's? [7] We did receive detailed mission
models of OSSA, OMSE the DoD, non-NASA applications and others. Yet these continue
to change substantially. A space program consists of individual missions which must be
specified and integrated into an overall plan of not negligible firmness, though some flex-
ibility must also be allowed for.
To allow the space shuttle decision on the basis of the Two Stage Shuttle funding
requirements, many of the important missions were postponed recently by NASA to fit the
shuttle development into the expected funding limitation. A far more sophisticated analy-
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sis needs to be done that allows the scheduling of types of payloads. The importance of pay-
loads, the interdependence among payloads within missions and between missions, as well as
an analysis of resupply, updating, maintenance, and reliability. Utilizing programming tools
that are available today in operations research, substantial work can be performed, some
of which is incorporated in the present ongoing work by our group.
Thus, within these constraints an acceptable Space Shutde development program is
indeed difficult: budget limitation by year, total program costs, the timing of different
components of the system, the need for a Space Tug and an early full operational capabil-
ity, and comprehensive and justified national space program alternatives for the 1980's.
[8] IV. Conclusions
Among the 200 and more space programs analyzed, and comparing (a) the two stage,
fully reusable system, (b) the Baseline, external hydrogen tank system, (c) the Mark l-Mark
II (reusable SIC) system, (d) the RATO system of McDonnell Douglas, (e) the TAHO sys-
tem of Grumman-Boeing, (f) the Stage and One-Half of Lockheed Corporation, and (g)
the Identical Vehicle Concepts of McDonnell Douglas, the Thrust Assisted Orbiter (TAOS)
concepts emerge as the most economic systems within the space programs analyzed. TAOS with exter-
nal hydrogen and oxygen tanks, a 60 x 15 payload bay, and a 40,000 pound polar orbit
capability, if possible by 1979, clearly dominates any other configuration.
The TAOS concept foregoes the development of a Two Stage Shuttle System. With
the use of thrust assists of either solid rocket motors or high pressure fed systems--which
can be made in part reusable for low staging velocities--the TAOS concepts promise a
reduction of the non-recurring costs (RDT&E and initial fleet investment) from about $9
billion or more (two stage systems, including reusable SIC) to about $6 billion or less, with
a minimal operating cost increase, if any, in the operating phase of the TAOS system.
The detailed economic justifications of the TAOS concept--when compared to any
two stage reusable system are:
1. The non-recurring costs of TAOS are estimated by industry to be $6 billion or less
over the period to 1979 or to 1984-85, depending on the objectives and choices of NASA.
2. The risks in the TAOS development are in balance lower but still substantial.
Intact abort with external hydrogen and oxygen tanks is feasible; lagging performance in
the engine area can be made up by added [9] external tank capability. A large reusable
manned booster is not needed.
3. The TAOS's that were analyzed promise the same capabilities as the original two
stage shuttle, including a 40,000 pound lift capability into polar orbit and a 60 x 15 feet
payload bay.
4. The TAOS can carry the Space Tugand capture high energy missions from 1979
on.
5. The most economic TAOS would use the advanced orbiter engines immediately.
Our calculations indicate that among the alternative TAOS configurations an early full
operational capability (i. e., high performance engines on the orbiter) is economically
most advantageous, and feasible, within budget constraints of $1 billion peak funding.
6. The TAOS can useJ2S engines on the orbiter for an interim period.
7. The TAOS abolishes completely the immediate need to decide on a reusable booster
and allows postponement of that decision without blocking later transition to that system
if still desired. Thereby, TAOS eliminates or lowers the risk and potential cost overruns in
booster development.
8. The TAOS can use "parallel burn" concepts, which, if feasible, may change the
reusable booster decision.
9. Technological progress may make tank costs, and thrust assisted rocket costs less
expensive, thus further aiding TAOS concepts when compared to two stage concepts.
10. TAOS assures NASA an early program definition, and a purpose to the agency. An
agreement on TAOS will allow NASA Headquarters a quick and clear reorganization of
major NASA centers to meet the TAOS development requirements economically.
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11.TheTAOSfundingschedulemakesanearlySpaceTug[10]developmentpos-
sible.TheSpaceTugisanimportantpartoftheSpaceShuttleSystem.A 1979SpaceTug
shouldrecoveritscompletedevelopmentcostsbefore1985evenwiththestretchedbuild
upofSpaceShuttlemissionsfrom1979to1985.
12.AclearpolicyonTAOSdevelopmentwillgiveanincentivetoEuropeancoun-
triestoundertakeandfundtheSpaceTugdevelopment--therebypossiblyeveneliminat-
ingSpaceTugfundingfromNASAbudgetconsiderations.
13.ThecostperlaunchofTAOScanbeaslowas$6millionoraevenlessonan
incremental cost basis, with reuse of parts of the thrust assist rockets (either SRM or
pressure-fed). With Point 9 realized, the costs of TAOS would practically match the costsper
launch of two stage fuUy reusable systems.
14. TAOS practically assures NASA of a reusable space transportation system with
major objectives achieved. [ 11 ]
V. The Principal Open Problem: The Demand for Space Transportation
Within the analysis of payloads and their effects on a space shuttle system. The most
important problem remains of what will the demandforspace transportation be in the 1980's
(1) with a space shuttle, (2) withouta space shuttle. The demand for space transportation is
an important function of the costs of doing space applications, the reliability of the space
transportation system and the assured functioning of payloads as well as the frequen O' of
launches over time. The present space programs analyzed by our group mainly concen-
trate on NASA and DoD applications. However, it is our strong belief that the major portion of
space transportation demand in the 1980's will come from economic applications of space technolo_
to meet the growing needs of the U.S. and other developed and developing countries.
The potential in this area is of major significance and will lead to completely new
ways of looking at space and of evaluating expenditures of space programs like the space
shuttle system. This needs to be further documented in detailed work. A major portion of
the demand for space transportation will still come, of course, from NASA and DoD as
exemplified by the mission models given to us. On commercial applications. However, an
inter-agency, inter-industry, and international effort should be organized to study in detail
the economic problems that can be alleviated or solved by using space technology. Com-
munication and navigation systems are but one important component in this area. Earth
resources applications, early warning systems, management information systems, televi-
sion systems, along with completely new applications must he studied. The number of
satellites and the different needs of many countries are likely to be of such a scale that they
will contribute substantially to the demand for space shuttle flights once this system is
available. The effort that should be put [12] forth in this area is such that it be best under-
taken by a group like the Space Task Group effort of 1969. However it should now be
oriented towards the demand for space transportation, and within this, particularly to the
economic applications area of space. It is also true that with regard to space shuttle mis-
sions further work needs to be done, particularly in the area of DoD missions in support of
a decision like the space shuttle. The military implications of the additional capabilities
offered by the Space Shutde System beyond those of expendable space transportation
systems have to be analyzed fully. If this were done, further strong support for the space
shuttle decision should become available.
The point is sometimes made by NASA that the technological possibility of a space
shutde program suffices by itself to justify its construction, independent of the economic
analysis. The economic analysis is not a challenge against the importance of technical
efforts of a program like the space shuttle, but rather assures that a decision for the space
shuttle is not based solely on technology. It is difficult to see how a program like the Space
Shuttle can be undertaken, without a complete economic justification.
Last but not least, it seems to us, with all the potential promised by space and space
applications, that NASA has been very limited in the past in fulfilling its potential role and in
realizingfinaUy the importance of its function within the nation. In this NASA is severely limited
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by its charter. In the present mood and the present state of the economy a program like
the shuttle and its decision has to be user oriented, not in terms of who will build the
shuttle and benefit by these expenditures, but rather in terms of who is going to use the
space shutde system and why the different agencies, corporations, and foreign countries
will do so. NASA ought to adjust to such a reorientat.ion of emphasis. [ 13]
Within the user area, there appear to be the following major needs:
1. Military. The military uses of space are in the present DoD mission model. These
uses will presumably continue at this level into the 1980's. However, the missions analyzed
so far in the context of the space shutde system have to be supplemented by a comprehen-
sive analysis of the military significance of the added capabilities that the Space Shuttle
System offers in the 1980's. NASA will need the support of DoD and in getting this sup-
port, will have to initiate a complete re-evaluation of the additional capabilities that the
space shutde will give to DoD in addition to the "expendable mode" applications now
provided for in the DoD mission model.
2. Scientific. The mission models of OSSA activities in the 1980's seem to cover the
expected activity levels in the 1980's for scientific applications in the U.S. As scientific
developments occur over the next decade, demands for new and additional missions may
arise. At present NASA has fully worked out plans, schedules, and priorities. What remains
is to explain further to the public and the Congress the great scientific value and ulti-
mately practical importance of these activities. In doing so, however, this expenditure will
have to be seen in the context of other national scientific and R&D efforts.
3. Communications, Applications are now fully developing and the encouragement
of other countries becomes increasingly important. A new idea in this area would be to
begin with a program by NASA to help developing nations in setting up communication
systems within the fore/gn aid program of the U.S., through the United Nations and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This could ultimately lead to a
foreign aid program of _Zer0 Dollar Outflow" since the U.S. [14] contribution, as well as
launch and maintenance services, of the space based systems would occur completely within
the U.S.
4. Earth Observations. The need to assess the resources of the earth worldwide as
well as for the U.S. is apparent. NASA is undertaking major demonstration programs in
ERTS A and ERTS B. Yet when looking ahead to the 1980's it becomes apparent that given
the many different uses of earth observation satellites, the different regions to be covered,
as well as the programs of different nations, the demand for space based earth resource
satellites will be much larger and specific to each field than is now contemplated. The
function of a space shuttle system within such an application program would be tremen-
dous and has not been analyzed. In this area alone one can foresee enough traffic to justify
support for the development of a new space transportation system.
5. Navigation. Different navigation satellite systems are being used at present but
mainly in DoD. A demand for a reliable system at low cost is apparent in the aviation and
shipping industries, as well as in defense. A world wide system, again covering all industrial
users and different regional applications will lead to a substantial increase in the number
of satellites. New demands will be made concerning reliability and main tainability of these
systems.
6. Other Applications. Several other possible world wide applications of space can be
foreseen to which the space shuttle system would contribute significantly. Among these
are the use of space based production processes which for safety considerations, gravity, envi-
ronment or other technical reasons are either too expensive or not possible when earth
based. Other areas concern the generation and transmission of energy [15] using poten-
tially completely new sources (for example solar energy, fusion energy) for either large
scale space based users, or in the more distant future, for use on earth.
We conclude this memorandum with the observation--though by now trivial and
obvious, but nevertheless fundamental--that any expenditure of public funds must be
justified, precisely as expenditure of private and business funds, by the aims and purposes of
the expenditure. Technological possibilities alone carry no conviction, though they often
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bring new possible aims into sight and reach. Whatever their nature and origin, the differ-
ent aims must be hierarchically ordered and must find their place in the system of national
priorities.
Document 111-31
Document tide: James C. Fletcher, "The Space Shuttle," November 22, 1971.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, DC.
The economic benefits of the shuttle were only one, and to the NASA leadership not
the most important, reason for going ahead with the program. As the NASA-White House
discussions about shuttle approval reached their climax, NASA prepared a "best case" pa-
per reflecting its arguments for approving shuttle development.
[1] The Space Shuttle
Summary
This paper outlines NASA's case for proceedingwith the space shuttle. The principal
points are as follows:
1. The U.S. cannot forego manned space flight.
2. The space shuttle is the only meaningful new manned space program that can be
accomplished on a modest budget.
3. The space shuttle is a necessary next step for the practical use of space. It will help
-- space science,
-- civilian space applications,
military space applications, and
-- the U.S. position in international competition and cooperation in space.
4. The cost and complexity of today's shuttle is one-half of what itwas six months ago.
5. Starting the shuttle now will have significant positive effect on aerospace employ-
ment. Not starting would be a serious blow to both the morale and health of the Aerospace
Industry.
[2] The U.S. Cannot Forego Manned Space Flight
Man has worked hard to achieve--and has indeed achieved--the freedom of mobil-
ity on land, the freedom of sailing on his oceans, and the freedom of flying in the atmo-
sphere.
And now, within the last dozen years, man has discovered that he can also have the
freedom of space. Russians and Americans, at almost the same time, first took tentative
small steps beyond the earth's atmosphere, and soon learned to operate, to maneuver, and
to rendezvous and dock in near-earth space. Americans went on to set foot on the moon,
556 THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. SPACE POLICYAND PLANS
while the Russians have continued to expand their capabilities in near-earth space.
Man has learned to fly in space, and man will continue to fly in space. This is fact.
And, given this fact, the United States cannot forego its responsibility--to itself and to the
free world--to have a part in manned space flight. Space is not all remote. Men in near-
earth orbit can be less than 100 miles from any point on earth--no farther from the U.S.
than Cuba. For the U.S. not to be in space, while others do have men in space, is unthink-
able, and a position which America cannot accept.
Why the Space Shuttle?
There are three reasons why the space shuttle is the right next step in manned space
flight and the U.S. space program:
First, the shuttle is the only meaningful new manned space program which can be accomplished
on a modest budget. Somewhat less expensive "space acrobatics" programs can be imagined
but would accomplish little and be dead-ended. Additional Apollo or Skylab flights would
be very costly, especially as left-over Apollo components run out, and would give diminish-
ing returns. Meaningful alternatives, such as a space laboratory or a revisit to the moon to
establish semi-permanent bases are much more expensive, and a visit to Mars, although
exciting and interesting, is completely beyond our means at the present time.
Second, the space shuttle is needed to make space operations less complex and less costly. Today
we have to mount an enormous effort every time we launch a manned vehicle, or even a
large unmanned mission. The reusable space shuttle gives us a way to avoid this. This
airplane-like spacecraft will make a launch into orbit an almost routine event--at a cost
_/,0 th of today's cost of space operations. How is this possible? Simply by not [4] throwing
everything away after we have used it just once--just as we don't throw away an airplane
after its first trip from Washington to Los Angeles.
The shuttle even looks like an airplane, but it has rocket engines instead of jet en-
gines. It is launched vertically, flies into orbit under its own power, stays there as long as it
is needed, then glides back into the atmosphere and lands on a runway, ready for its next
use. And it will do this so economically that, if necessary, it can provide transportation to
and from space each week, at an annual operating cost that is equivalent to only 15 per-
cent of today's total NASA budget, or about the total cost of a single Apollo flight. Space
operations would indeed become routine.
Third, the space shuttle is needed to do useful things. The long term need is clear. In the
1980's and beyond, the low cost to orbit the shuttle gives is essential for all the dramatic
and practical future programs we can conceive. One example is a space station. Such a
system would allow many men to spend long periods engaged in scientific, military, or
even commercial activities in a more or less permanent station which could be visited
cheaply and frequently and refurbished, [5] by means of a shuttle. Another interesting
example is revisits to the moon to establish bases there; the shuttle would take the systems
needed to earth orbit for assembly.
But what will the shuttle do before then? Why are routine operations so important?
There is no single answer to these questions as there are many areas--in science, in civilian
applications, and in military applications---where we can see now that the shuttle is needed;
and there will be many more by the time routine shuttle services are actually available.
Take, for example, space science. Today it takes two to five years to get a new experi-
ment ready for space flight, simply because operations in space are so costly that extreme
care is taken to make everything just right. And because it takes so long, many investiga-
tions that should be carried out--to get fundamental knowledge about the sun, the stars,
the universe, and, therefore, about ourselves on earth--are just not undertaken. At the
same time, we have already demonstrated, by taking scientists and their instruments up in
a Convair 990 airplane, that space science can be done in a much more straight-forward
way with a much smaller investment in time and money, and with an ability to react quickly
to new discoveries, because airplane operations are routine. This is what the shuttle will do
for space science.
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[6] Or take civilian space applicatzons. Today new experiments in space communica-
tions, or in earth resources, are difficult and expensive for the same reasons as discussed
under science. But with routine space operations instruments could quickly be adjusted
until the optimum combination is found for any given application--a process that today
involves several satellites, several years of time, and great expense.
One can also imagine new applications that would only be feasible with the routine
operation of the space shuttle. For example, it may prove possible (with an economical
space transportation system, such as the shuttle) to place into orbit huge fields of solar
batteries--and then beam the collected energy down to earth. This would be a truly pollu-
tion-free power source that does not require the earth's latent energy sources. Or perhaps
one could develop a global environmental monitoring system, international in scope, that
could help control the mess man has made of our environment. These are just two ex-
amples of what might be done with routine space shuttle operations.
What about military space applications? It is true that our military planning has not yet
defined a specific need for man in space for military purposes. But will this always be [7]
the case? Have the Russians made the same decision? If not, the shuttle will be there to
provide, quickly and routinely, for military operations in space, whatever they may be. It
will give us a quick reaction time and the ability to fly ad hoc military missions whenever
they are necessary. In any event, even without new military needs, the shuttle will provade
the transportation for today's rocket-launched military spacecraft at substantially reduced
COSt.
Finally, the shuttle helps our internationalposition--both our competitive position with
the Soviets and our prospects of cooperation with them and with other nations.
Without the shuttle, when our present manned space program ends in 1973 we will
surrender center stage in space to the only other nation that has the determination and
capability to occupy it. The United States and the whole free world would then face a
decade or more in which Soviet supremacy in space would be unchallenged. With the
shuttle, the United States will have a clear space superiority over the rest of the world
because of the low cost to orbit and the inherent flexibility and quick reaction capability of
a reusable system. The rest of the world--the free world at least--would depend on the
United States for launch of most of their payloads.
[8] On the side of cooperation, the shuttle would encourage far greater interna-
tional participation in space flight. Scientists--as well as astronauts---of many nations could
be taken along, with their own experiments, because shuttle operations will be routine. We
are already discussing compatible docking systems with the Soviets, so that their spacecraft
and ours can join in space. Perhaps ultimately men of all nations will work together in
space--in joint environmental monitoring, international disarmament inspections, or
perhaps even in joint commercial enterprises--and through these activities help human-
ity work together better on its planet earth. Is there a more hopeful way?
The Cost of the Shuttle Has Been Cut in Half
Six months ago NASA's plan for the shuttle was one involving heavy investment--S10
billion before the first manned orbital flight--in order to achieve a very low subsequent
cost per flight--less than $5 million. But since then the design has been refined, and a
trade-off has been made between investment cost and operational cost per flight. The
result: a shuttle that can be developed for an investment of $4.5-$5 billion over a period of
six years that will still only cost [9] around $10 million or less per flight. (This means
30 flights per year at an annual cost for space transportation of 10 percent of today's NASA
total budget, or one flight per week for 15 percent.)
This reduction in investment cost was partly the result of a trade-off just mentioned,
and partly due to a series of technical changes. The orbiter has been drastically reduced in
size--from a length of 206 feet down to 110 feet. But the payload carrying capability has
not been reduced: it is still 40,000 lbs. in polar orbit, or 65,000 lbs. in an easterly orbit, in
a payload compartment that measures 15x60 feet.
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The reduction in investment cost is highly significant. It means that the peak fund-
ing requirements, in any one year, can be kept down to a level that, even in a highly con-
strained NASA budget, will still allow for major advances in space science and applications,
as well as in aeronautics.
The Shuttle and the Aerospace Industry
The shuttle is a technological challenge requiring the kind of capability that exists
today in the aerospace industry. An accelerated start on the shuttle would lead to a direct
employment of 8,800 by the end of 1972, and 24,000 by the end of 1973. This cannot
compensate for the 270,000 laid off by NASA cutbacks since the peak of the Apollo pro-
gram but would take [ 10] up the slack of further layoffs from Skylab and the remainder of
the Apollo programs.
Conclusions
Given the fact that manned space flight is part of our lives, and that the U.S. must
take part in it, it is essential to reduce drastically the complexity and cost of manned space
operations. Only the space shutde will do this. It will provide both routine and quick reaction
space operations for space science and for civilian and military applications. The shutde
will do this at an investment cost that fits well within a highly constrained NASA budget. It
will have low operating costs, and allow 30 to 50 space flights per year at a transportation
cost equivalent to 10-15 percent of today's total NASA budget.
Document 111-32
Document title: George M. Low, Deputy Administrator, NASA, Memorandum for the
Record, "Meeting with the President on January 5, 1972," January 12, 1972.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
NASA leaders James Fletcher and George Low were told in a January 3, 1975,
meeting in the office of OMB Director George Shultz that the White House had made a
decision to approve the development of a partially reusable shuttle with a 15-foot by 60-
foot payload bay. The question of whether solid-fueled or liquid-fueled strap-on boosters
would be used was left open for additional study. The next day, Low and Fletcher flew to
California to meet on January 5 with President Richard Nixon, who was at the Western
White House in San Clemente, for a discussion of the shuttle project. This memorandum
records George Low's version of the meeting. After that meeting with the president, the
White House announced approval of the shuttle to the press, and Fletcher and Low an-
swered questions about the project.
[1] Jim Fletcher and I met with the President and John Ehrlichman for approxi-
mately 40 minutes to discuss the space shuttle. During the course of the discussion, the
President either made or agreed with the following points:
1. The Space Shuttle. The President stated that we should stress civilian applications
but not to the exclusion of military applications. We should not hesitate to mention the
military applications as well. He was interested in the possibility of routine operations and
quick reaction times, particularly as these would apply to problems of natural disasters,
such as earthquakes or floods. When Dr. Fletcher mentioned a future possibility of collect-
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ingsolarpowerin orbit and beaming it down to earth, the President indicated that these
kinds of things tend to happen much more quickly than we now expect and that we should
not hesitate to talk about them now. He was also interested in the nuclear waste disposal
possibilities. The President liked the fact that ordinary people would be able to fly in the
shuttle, and that the only requirement for a flight would be that there is a mission to be
performed. He also reiterated his concern for preserving the skills of the people in the
aerospace industry.
In summary, the President said that even though we now know of many things that
the shuttle will be able to do, we should realize that it will open up entirely new fields when
we actually have the capability that the shuttle will provide. The President wanted to know
if we [2] thought the shutde was a good investment and, upon receiving our affirmative
reply, requested that we stress the fact that the shutde is not a "$7 billion toy," that it is
indeed useful, and that it is a good investment in that it will cut operations costs by a factor
of 10. But he indicated that even if it were not a good investment, we would have to do it
anyway, because space flight is here to stay. Men are flying in space now and will continue
to fly in space, and we'd best be part ofic
2. International Cooperation. The President said that he is most interested in mak-
ing the space program a truly international program and that he had previously expressed
that interest. He wanted us to stress international cooperation and participation for all
nations. He said that he was disappointed that we had been unable to fly foreign astro-
nauts on Apollo, but understood the reasons for our inability to do so. He understood that
foreign astronauts of all nations could fly in the shutde and appeared to be particularly
interested in Eastern European participation in the flight program. However, in connec-
tion with international cooperation, he is not only interested in flying foreign astronauts,
but also in other types of meaningful participation, both in experiments and even in space
hardware development.
3. USSR Cooperation. The president was interested in our joint activities with the
USSR in connection with the probes now in orbit around Mars. We also described to him
the real possibility of conducting a joint docking experiment in the 1975 time period. The
prospect of having Americans and Russians meet in space in this time period appeared to
have great appeal to the President. He indicated that this should be considered as a pos-
sible item for early policy level discussions with the USSR.
The president asked John Ehrlichman to mention both the international aspects of
the shutde and the USSR docking possibilities to Henry Kissinger.
George H. Low
cc: A/Dr. Fletcher
Document 111-33
Document fl0e: Nick MacNeil, Carter-Mondale Transition Planning Group, to Smart
Eizenstat, AI Stern, David Rubenstein, Barry Blechman, and Dick Steadman, "NASA Rec-
ommendations," January 31, 1977.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
Unlike Presidents-elect Kennedy and Nixon, Jimmy Carter did not appoint a blue
ribbon group on space during his post-election transition. Instead, the NASA transition
paper was prepared by one individual who took a generally skeptical view of NASA and
most of its programs. Unlike earlier space transition reports, this document was completed
after President Carter entered the White House.
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[no pagination] Summary
1. NASA's priorities are on the development end of R & D, not the basic research
end. NASA directs our R & D resources toward centralized big technology, maintaining
the defense R & D orientation of the aerospace industry.
2. The Shutde has become the end, rather than the means, because NASA space
policy has been shaped by the Office of (Manned) Space Flight. The Offices of Space
Science, Applications, and Aeronautics Technology get the funds that are left over.
3. Alternative directions for space technology may be neglected because
(a) the Administrator's power to hire and fire top management inhibits effective
dissent
(b) important NASA managers are from Defense and the aerospace industry
(c) NASA's budget is supported and approved by a space constituency..,.
1. Budget History
Perhaps the agency's growth, retraction, and resiliency can best be seen in its level of
employment since 1962.
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3. Funding Justifications Unconvincing
a. NASA Mission Unclear
Much apprehension and uneasiness about the NASA budget would disappear if the
civilian apace program, like its military counterpart, had clear objectives related to na-
tional goals.
DOD, with 38% of the space budget, would deny that its space efforts constitute a
program; Defense programs are not ends but rather the means of accomplishing certain
military missions, the purpose of which is to defend the nation and its allies from attack.
Space programs have to compete with other means of accomplishing the same mission.
The entire NASA budget, on the other hand, is considered R & D According to the
National Science Foundation, "R & D is not an end in itself but is a means whereby na-
tional goals can be achieved more effectively and efficiently .... "
What are these goals? NASA has more difficulty than most agencies in describing
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NASA Appropriations
In Year-by-Year Dollars
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Total
FY1977--R&D
minus T&DA
m
.15
(6%) -- Expendable launch vehicles
1.49 _ Shuttle(5_'/.)
i
i
i
Flight Science Applics eAST
m
.81
FY 1977--"Overhead"
R&D program proportions:
59% of 1.19=.70
15% of 1.19 =.18
R&PM T&DA Const of
Facilities
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Construction of Facilities
and Research and Program Management
FY 77 Estimate
(Millions of Dollars)
CofF R&PM Funcuon R&PM
Space Flight 39.8
Science 8.7
Applications
Space Research .7
Aero Research 28.9
Support 45.8 43.1
348.1 Personnel 612.4
114.2 Travel & Transp. 19.7
87.1 Rent 61.7
75.3 Supplies 13.9
146.2 Equipment 2.5
Other 103.9
124.0 814.0 814.0
national goals in such a way that its programs relate to them. The law establishing NASA is
no help in this regard. The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 declares that the
general welfare and security of the United States require "adequate provision" for aero-
nautical and space activities. But then it states that NASA must contribute to one or more
of eight objectives, several of which go far beyond the usual understanding ofweffare and
security. Are we called as a nation to something greater than our welfare and security?
There is no guide in law as to what provision is "adequate" for NASA's programs.
b. The Budgeting Process
Budgeting decisions are made in a framework provided by space scientists and engi-
neers. This term is short-hand for those employed by NASA, by the aerospace industry,
and by the universities. They decide what NASA's mission in space is .... they tell us the
value of space activities, and they largely determine the share of available funds each pro-
gram receives...
The club seems to achieve a Consensus in-house, by rallying around those programs
with enough political appeal to have a spill-over or logjam-breaking effect for the most
members. Thus seldom will scientists or engineers openly criticize programs that they
consider ill-advised. Budget requests are made to OMB and the public with as little open
dissent and as much gravity and consensus as possible. This behavior is the result of a
shared outlook. It is aggravated by the ease with which most professional groups accept
the "responsible" consensus.
It is true that independent budget evaluations are attempted by OMB, the Appro-
priations and Budget Committees, and the GAO. But as long as there is a general consen-
sus within the club, and as long as evaluations are based on NASA-commissioned studies,
these economy-oriented critiques will not be effectual. Indeed, not all these authorities
are economy-oriented. As staffers become familiar with space activities they become inter-
ested in them. If pressures build to stimulate the economy, what better place than in one's
favorite R & D program?
c. Unconvincing Arguments
Most agencies have a wide range of arguments to back up budget requests but they
usually use these arguments informally. At budget hearings an agency will try to keep it
simple. Informal arguments might lose some of their appeal to individual interests if they
were listed together, and exposed to criticism.
Critics of a particular program would do a service if they took issue not only with the
program's formal justification but with all the other claims that are made in support of it.
However, the critic runs the risk of strengthening his case logically and weakening it here
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration
FY 1978 Budget Estimates
($Millions)
Budget Authori_
FY 1978 Program Runout
_1976 _ FY1977 _1978 r'Y1979 FYI980 FY19Sl FYt982
Research & Development
Space Shuttle
Space Flight Operations
Expendable Launch Vehicles
1,206.0 321.0 1,288.1 1,302.7 1,115.4 680.8 343.9 135.9
188.7 48.4 202.2 297.6 360.4 508.7 594.0 592.1
165.9 37.1 151.4 138,5 95.4 _ _ 2O.8
Suborbital Flight 1,560.6 406.5 1,641.7 1,738.8 1,571.2 1,234.7 963.5 748.8
Physics and Astronomy
Lunar & Planetary Expl
Life Sciences
159.3 43.5 166.3 234.1 270.2 266.9 264.0 235.7
254.2 67.5 191.9 170.3 216.2 225.9 152.1 84.4
2O.6 5.4 _ _ 51.1 58.5 _ 67.9
Subtotal Science 434.1 116.4 380.3 440.8 537.5 551.3 479.9 388.0
Space Applications
Multi-Mission Modular S/C
Space Research & Tech.
Aeronautical Res. & Tech.
178.2 47.7 198.2 224.8 242.8 266.4 163.0 135.5
-0- -0- -0- 25.0 40.0 21.0 2.5 -0-
74.9 19.3 82.0 115.0 114.7 112.9 ~110.4 110.2
_ 190.1 245.6 302.1 _ 264.4
Subtotal OAST 250.3 63.1 272.1 360.6 416.8 424.5 374.8 308.7
Tracking & Data Acquisition 240.8 63.4 255.0 284.3 312.8 384.7 376.0 374.8
Technology Utilization 7.5 2.0 8.1 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Energy Technology Applic. 5.9 1.5 6.0 8.5 10.5 5.0 5.0 5.0
Subtotal R&D 2,677.4 700.6 2,761.4 3,092.8 3,141.6 2,857.6 2,374.7 1,970.8
Construction of Facilities 82.1 10.7 118.1 19 5,6 200.0 161.0 125.O 110.0
Research & Program Management 792.3 220.8 815.0 818.5 818.5 818.5 818.5 818.5
Total NASA 3551.8 932.1 3,692.5 4,106.9 4,160.1 3,837.1 3,318.2 2,899.3
Additional Requirement
Procurement of Fourth and Fifth Shuttle Orbiter
Grand Total 3,551.8 932.1 3,692.5 4,153.4 4301.5 4,050.4 3,596.6 3,190.5
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NationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration
New S_arts in FY 1978 Budget
($Millions)
Research and Development FY 1978 FY 1979 E2.kg._ EY_I_9__ FY1982 Balance Total
Space Flight Operations 15.0 15.0
Space Industrialization 15.0 15.0
Physics and Astronomy 36.0 _ 92.0 95.7 66.8
Space Telescope 36.0 79.4 92.0 95.7 66.8 65,1 435.0
Lunar and Planetary Exp. 47.8 122,6 139.4 75.3 _
Jupiter Orbiter Probe 20.7 78.7 102.0 61.4 18.9 281.7
Lunar Polar Orbiter 7.1 43.9 37.4 13.9 2.7 105.0
Mars Follow-on 20.0 20.0
Applications 14.0 600 72.0 34.0 15.0 18.0 213.0
Landsat D 14.0 60,0 72.0 34.0 15.0 18,0 213.0
Multi-Mission Modular Spacecraft 25.0 400 21.0 2.5 88.5
Aeronautics 4.2 10.5 19.6 17.2 5.5 57.0
Lift Cruise Fan Research Aircraft 4.2 10.5 19.6 17.2 5.5 57.0
Expendable Launch Vehicles ,4 17.3 6.5
Landsat D 11.0 4.9
Lunar Polar Orbiter .4 6.3 1.6
Tracking & Data AcquisitionSupport 2.6 4.9 9.9 7.1 10.2
Total New Starts 145.0 _ 360.4 231.8 119.1
1977
1975 Budget
Actual Esumate
($Thou_nds) (_'rhousands)
Space Shuttle ................................................................................. 797,500 1,288,1 O0
Space Flight Operations ............................................................... 298,800 205,200
Expendable Launch Vehicles ....................................................... 139.500 151.400
Total ........................................................................................... 1,235,800 1,644,700
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Fiscal Year
and there politically. Inaccurate claims can usually be asserted more quickly than they can
be refuted.
Unconvincing arguments tend to weaken the aura of scientific invincibility and sug-
gest a bureaucratic tendency to keep trying a multitude of arguments to weaken people's
resistance, or to provide that particular argument which one group can accept, This list is
by no means complete.
(1) The "Critical Threshold" Argument
NASA will maintain that funding must be kept at a certain level to preserve the
necessary scientific and engineering base in people and facilities.
There is no one threshold, but a series of thresholds depending on the level and the
purpose ofR & D. The concept itself is suspect: ifa base could be created when needed, it
can be recreated. The costs of starting it up must be balanced against the costs of an en-
trenchment process that diverts the government's attention and funds from new prob-
lems, or new approaches to old problems.
(2) NASA's Stimulative Effect on the Economy
It is claimed that NASA expenditures are highly labor intensive, have a high multi-
plier effect, are not inflationary, and return the investment many times over due to the
advanced technology involved.
Aside from the fact that these are the findings of studies commissioned by NASA (see
following section on vested experts), the point is not how stimulative NASA spending is in
absolute terms, but how stimulative it is compared to equivalent spending by some other
agency in some other sector, or by different fiscal and monetary policies.
(3) The Level Budget "Commitment" of January 1979
NASA often refers to OMB assurances that it would have a funding floor in constant
dollars to build the shutde. Actually the "commitment" was made by NASA, not by OMB.
The political process does not permit long-term commitments to controversial programs,
yet claims of a "commitment" are still heard.
(4) The "Cutting Edge" of Technology
In simplest form this argument holds that what makes America preeminent is ad-
vanced technology, and that we depend on it for our defense and foreign exchange earn-
ings. The "cutting edge" is never far from nuclear energy and the aerospace industry, and
in these areas the high quality of research brings the highest return on our R & D dollars.
This argument confuses the value ofR & D with subjective judgments on the value of
different types ofR & D, The issue should not be whether aircraft sales are a major earner
of foreign exchange, but whether some other industry would have produced greater social
and economic benefits if an equivalent amount had been invested in it. As to quality of
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research,talentfollowsmoney.
Ourmilitaryandspaceffortsmightwellbenefitfromcheaper,morenumerousand
moreexpendableunits.SeeAnnexD,(5)IndividualScienceProgramsVital
Thistacticistoevaluateindividualscienceprogramsin isolationfrombasicresearch
policy.Thestressi ontheworthyobjectiveandnotonwhethertheprogramiscost effec-
five, or whether data are related to results from recent or concurrent programs, or whether
technology offers the possibility of leap-frogging to a more advanced stage.
The Space Telescope is a case in point. If observations are vastly improved outside
the earth's atmosphere, why have observatories been built or upgraded recently in Chile,
Mexico, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Arizona? Is there duplication from military space pro-
grams?
(6) National Security, or A Race with the Russians
The space club is not averse to taking a page out of DOD's book. When pressed,
NASA will disclaim competition, but say the Russians are ahead.
DR. FLETCJffER. We don't regard ourselves as being in a race with the Soviet Union. We
do feel that we cannot fall too far behind in technology.
Some proponents will say that NASA programs have profound security implications.
These claims suggest that DOD does not recognize certain defense needs, or that NASA
should pay for a certain part of national defense.
(7) International Prestige
Akin to national defense is the notion that to keep our political and cultural values in
high esteem, here and abroad, we must periodically give a display of technological virtuos-
ity. Perhaps a winning team in sports or technology helps Americans feel less threatened
by foreign developments beyond our control. We transfer vigor and Number 1 status in a
particular field, to the nation as a whole. Selling international prestige on this basis pan-
ders to people's insecurities.
(8) The Call of Adventure
Adventure covers a variety of appeals to our emotions and imaginations.
-Vicarious space travel: e.g. the Shuttle will have hygienic facilities for both men and
women and that "average" people--non-astronauts---will be placed in orbit, to obtain the
"liberating perspectives" of space
- Creativity: e.g. the space program fills the same human need as cathedral-building
in the Middle Ages.
- An Alternative to War: e.g. World War I might have been avoided if European
nations could have vented their aggressiveness on space operations rather than armaments.
- A New Start for Mankind: e.g. artists' conceptions of space colonies, space facto-
ries.
- America's Destiny: e.g. the United States is the only country on this planet that can
answer the riddle of man.
- Spectator Sport: e.g. Astronauts--technological sports figuresmmay do more to
heighten this sense of adventure than to justify the added expense of manned over
un-manned space missions. Perhaps they can be likened to a strong football team, that
provides the gate receipts to support other athletic programs.
As with the international prestige appeal, there is a touch of "Madison Avenue" to
this--space is more than R & D--it is patriotism, "gee-whiz" technology, entertainment,
creativity, our national destiny. But the very success of these appeals to our emotions and
imaginations shows that welfare and security are not the total of human aspiration. We
enter a decision-making area full of risk for public policy which imposes certain responsi-
bilities on government officials. Programs funded emotionally often lead to waste, empty
psychological gratifications, and inflation. Ancient and recent history offer examples of
peoples who have asserted their values and spirit in unprecedented, uneconomic pro-
grams that drained them, sometimes fatally, of their vitality and resources. The display of
power was as important as the end it was put to. See Annex, Shuttle Justifications, 2g.
But non-economic or "irrational" motivations do exist, and they carry the potential
for great creativity as well as great waste. Adventurous social programs and R & D programs
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have given us new knowledge, new powers and perhaps a new identity. Thus it is essential
to argue over what kind of adventure we are getting into, and the costs. This is almost
impossible when budget requests are made endrely on economic grounds, and the appeal
to non-economic motivations is under the table. (See Recommendations.)
(9) Fait Accompli Statement
'q'he debate over manned vs. unmanned space flight was setded by the decision to
build the Shutde." This ploy can be used for most programs. It was a favorite for continu-
ing the Vietnam war.
d. Expert vs. Popular Opinion
Related to the consensus of scientists and engineers with regard to budget requests is
the absence of an outside vantage point that the layman could turn to for a professional
but fresh perspective. The problem goes beyond the natural similarity of viewpoint of
persons in the same field. As then Senator Mondale asked on May 9, 1972:
How can Congress and the public approve massive spending on new technology pro-
grams without the benefit of independent evaluations of such programs?
NASA's contractors are not likely to offer opinions which have not been checked
with NASA. At times estimates suggest a form of blackmail:
NASA said that if the expendable alternate were selected, a further analysis might
increase the development cost of the new expendable (launch vehicles) by about l billion
dollars)
On the one hand there must be a taxpayer counterweight to vested expert opinion.
On the other hand there must be disinterested expert opinion to dampen public enthusi-
asm for space programs based on psychic gratficadons rather than economic or scientific
returns. Those who find entertainment or the solution to war in space may ultimately push
space expenditures higher than space scientists and engineers. The object of both coun-
terweights is to use national resources wisely.
4. Recommendations
a. Outline National Goals---for example-
(l) The President's Economic Goals:
- 4 1/2% unemployment by 1981
- inflation under x%
- a balanced budget, amounting to 21% of GNP
- a relatively favorable balance of trade
(2) Defense Against Military Threat
(3) Pollution at Acceptable Levels
(4) International Collaboration, Project Humanitarian Values
(5) Scientific Discovery
(6) A program to Express National Values and Energy (?)
b. Outline Corresponding Space Programs---for example---
(1) Defense Satellites
(2) Scientific Probes, Experiments
(3) Economic Application Satellites (crop and weather forecasting, resource
management)
(4) PoUudon Detection Devices
(5) Public Service Satellites (education, search and rescue)
(6) Solar Energy Platform
(7) Reimbursable Projects (communications satellites, space manufacturing)
(8) International Cooperative Ventures (To train foreign scientists, share
information, share the expense, use and seek superior talent.) To make
these ventures effective the U.S. should avoid paternalism, or the notion
that our resources give us a Manifest Destiny in space.
J Note that there is no comparison of total development costs of expendable and reusable launch sys-
tems,
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(9) Experimental Civilian R & D Develop technology that applies to the way people
live now, in this country and abroad.
See Annex D, NASA's R & D Direction.
c. Accurate Labelling
Avoid the scientific mystique. Justify programs in terms of all other activity being
carried out to achieve the same broad objective. Set forth all the arguments used to sup-
port the program, strong or weak, point by point, if the program is based partly on
non-economic considerations, such as curiosity or adventure, make that part of the appeal
explicit, so that the rest of us can recognize the trade-offs and judge for ourselves whether
the adventure will strengthen or weaken us in the long run.
d. Downgrade Economic Objectives
Economic stimulation should take a back seat when R & D programs are funded,
because these programs invest in personnel and facilities that are far more specialized and
influential, and multiply more rapidly, than the constituencies of non-R & D programs.
Multiplying the supply of program administrators multiplies the demand for more of the
same. This skews the economy more than it stimulates it, See Annex D, NASA's R & D
Direction, Constituencies.
e. Curb Budget Expansion
Through Executive Order establish an obstacle course of hearings, studies and
consultations for budget increases over, say, 5%. Once a benchmark budget has been set,
vary the size of the slices, not the pie .... When priorities change, resources must be shifted,
not added on. Scientists and engineers should be encouraged to blunt their spears on
each other rather than the Administration.
f. Use a Science/R&D Jury to Recommend R & D Priorities to the President
Appoint a Science/g&D Council, headed by the Vice President, made up of dis-
tinguished laymen, to recommend allocation of R & D funding as to function and agency ....
This Council would not resemble the President's new Committee on Science and
Technology. It would present the president with a proposed R & D budget. Its members
would represent labor, business, education, consumers, the press and other sectors with-
out being weighted 2 to 1 in favor of engineers, scientists and bureaucrats. The members
would serve full-time, for a year, without staff.
The Council would hear expert testimony from scientists, engineers, and those most
knowledgeable about R & D. Its recommended budget would include military as well as
civilian R & D in the space field, for example, the members would have security clearances
adequate to allow them to try to fund military and space programs from the same "pie,"
minimizing duplication and maximizing multiple missions.
Discussion:
In seeking impartiality for decision-makers it would seem logical to assign laymen to
determine the over-all size of the Science/R&D budget, and scientists and engineers to de-
cide how the R & D pie will be divided. But more impartiality can be achieved by reversing the
roles.
At the level of deciding between the nation's R & D and other non-defense goods
and services (assuming this model is accepted, laymen are not disinterested, and may be
too shortsighted to see the value of R & D, whereas the parochialism of scientific and
engineering opinion would be less at the overall R & D level than at the level of funding
individual R & D programs. At the program level, experts seek national commitments to
their own programs, thus tending to jack up overall R & D on political considerations.
Expert opinion at the overall R & D level, however, might dampen this effect. A compro-
mise would be to set R & D within a narrow percentage range of general spending (not
GNP).
R & D priorities are as political as they are scientific. A full debate is necessary. With-
out it we will be less likely to achieve mid-range budgetary stability and more importantly
the lead-time necessary for contractors and scientists to prepare themselves for new prob-
lems and priorities.
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g. Enforce ONE Circular A-I09; Decentralize
Depending on how one defines a need, circular A-109 could have prevented the
Shuttle controversy. The circular states:
"When analysis of an agency's mission shows that a need for a new major system
exists, such a need should not be defined in equipment terms, but should be defined in
terms of the mission, purpose, capability, agency components involved, schedule and cost
objectives, and operating constraints."
The present arrangement allows Space Flight to turn to Space Science and Space
Applications and say "Here is your equipment, the Shuttle. Make use of it." Manned Space
Flight will then find a new project. When it can no longer carry the expense of the Spacelab,
or Space Industrialization, it will turn these half-started programs over to Science or Appli-
cations, the offices which should have controlled R & D from the beginning.
To take mission-orientation further, overhead could be funded out of the end-result
offices (Science, Applications, and OAST). The NASA Comptroller would be split in three,
and those three offices would draw up budget requests for C of F and R & PM. Facilities
would bill those 3 offices for services rendered. (OMB and the GAO would have to ensure
that billings represent the full cost of government facilities and personnel.) In effect all
work would be contracted out, to either private or government contractors, whichever
program management preferred.
Some of the advantages of decentralized budgeting are the following:
- it would weaken the agency's hierarchy, its institutional values, its growth as a bu-
reaucracy.
- it would force economies on laboratories and facilities of marginal usefulness.
- it would increase the practical applications of independent (unstructured) R & D.
- it would make programs available to facilities, and facilities available to programs,
across the board. Facilities and laboratories affected would be subject to a wider range of
ideas and work opportunities.
- it would require ways of making the Civil Service more responsive to public needs.
h. Reorient NASA Leadership
Section 203 (b) (2) of the 1958 Aeronautics and Space Act allows the ASH Adminis-
trator to hire up to 425 executives, and set their salaries to the top Civil Service grades.
This high number of excepted positions tends to unify top management. Unity is more
beneficial to the implementation of policy than to the formation of it.
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This system naturally lends itself to the notion of a network, and a perception that
when RIFs come the Civil Service takes a disproportionate share. The system may also be
related to NASA's poor Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) record, discussed in An-
nex E.
Disturbing also is the number of former military personnel and former NASA con-
tractors within the excepted positions. They cannot help but affect relations between
NASA, Defense, and industry, and the kinds of work that NASA undertakes. Likewise a
survey should be made of where NASA scientists have done their work. There may be a
certain parochialism among the prestige institutions. This too may affect the kinds of work
NASA does, who does it, and where.
If the thrust of this memorandum is followed, a new Administrator will have to come
from outside the space club. He or she will have to be willing and able to use his authority
to remove NASA veterans from excepted positions, and replace them with younger profes-
sionals. The purpose of these changes would be:
- to make NASA's personnel system more responsive to need, not less.
- implement the spirit of EEO.
- offset the steady increase in the average age of NASA employees.
- encourage disciplined dissent.
i. Postpone the Appointment of a Science Adviser (OSTP) and a NASA Administra-
tor Until These Issues Nave Been Discussed
Do not approve new starts at NASA until the budget decision-making has been stud-
ied. Do not be rushed. If an attempt is made to challenge the experts who choose our
options, appoint science and R & D officials who will support the new approach and make
it work.
5. Options
The three options listed probably bear litde relation to OMB options, which reflect
expert opinion. My options suggest that we explore new directions for R & D, that we not
commit ourselves to Shuttle operations, regardless of "cost-effectiveness," and that we give
laymen a share in setting R & D priorities. To sum up, the options are based on keeping
control of the agency. 2
The options also reflect a bias toward Space Applications. Admittedly there are no
options as to how Applications could use additional resources, but current NASA empha-
sis suggests that money (and talent) thrown at this area could bring significant results.
Option 1 - Appoint 'Jury" to recommend all R & D program priorities.
Budget effect - Unlikely to change level of space funding, but might favor Applica-
tions over Flight and Science.
Discussion
OMB states that R & D funding "is not a separately program[m]ed or budgeted activ-
ity of the Federal Government. Its funding must therefore be considered primarily in light
of the potential contributions of science and technology to meeting agency or national
goals and not as an end in itself."
Realizing that "therefore" belongs to the first sentence, not the second, the crucial
point is that agency or national goals are slurred together. There is often a time-lag be-
tween agency goals and new perceptions of how national goals can be achieved. Since R & D
needs more lead-time it is important that agency R & D decisions be subject to modifica-
tion by a group with a totally national perspective.
' OMB may not see this as a problem. In discussing NASA's FY 1979 budget request, an OMB report
states: "Substantial flexibility exists for reducing future year funding based on long-range policy and budget
decisions in future budgets"--as if a program's constituency did not grow and gain a wider hearing, as if our
investment does not bind us tighter to a program, watheach passing year
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Advantages
1. Less overlap between
military and civilian
space programs.
2. Build broader consensus
for longer-range planning,
more lead-time for
contractors.
3. A form of Executive
oversight over Defense
R&D.
4. More attention to national
goals than agency goals.
Disadvantages
1. '_ury" unqualified to
grasp issues involved.
2. '_Jury" will become the
captive of a particular
R & D faction.
Option 2 - Build only three Shuttles. Use Shuttle for R & D and as required by indi-
vidual missions.
Budget effect - Gradual reduction instead of sharp increase in Shuttle expenditure.
FY 1978 is build-up year.
Discussion
Using the Shuttle as an R & D program for launch and payload reusability, while
improving expendable systems, will provide greater flexibility. Some resources can be shifted
to Space Applications. Publicize DOD distrust, and Mondale, Proxmire and GAO objec-
tions. OMB notes 'Xvidely divergent views."
Advantages
1. Change the big-program
legacy of NASA; re-
direct R & D from
"producers" to "consumers."
2. Take advantage of new
broom; use press and public
concern over inflation and
bureaucracy.
3. Decision to put "Carter
imprint" on Applications,
give shutde contractors
an advantage in seeking
Applications contracts.
4. Catch up in expendable
vehicle technology,
building Fords instead
of Cadillacs.
5. More Science and
Applications value per
dollar spent, less drama.
Disadvantages
1. Political repercussions
from areas surrounding
affected facilities.
2. Wide currency of
"cost-effectiveness"
argument.
Option 3 - Expand the NASA charter to provide limited funding for specified tech-
nological breakthroughs.
Budget Effect- None.
Discussion
NASA coordinates with other agencies, industry and academia. It has capabilities in
energy research, materials development, and across the spectrum of advanced technology.
It put a man on the moon. It thinks more about the future than other agencies.
Why not challenge NASA to find technological breakthroughs to problems here on
earth? NASA would serve as a gadfly, to weaken monopolization of R & D fields by other
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agencies. Congress and NASA would draw up a list of problems most susceptible to new
technology, and NASA would in effect bid for a contract. New automobiles, insulation, and
housing modules come to mind. See Annex U, NASA's R & D Direction, section 3.
Advantages
1. Encourage new
interdisciplinary
approaches to old
problems ....
Disadvantages
1. Maintain unneeded
personnel and facilities
on harebrained schemes.
Document 111-34
Document title: Presidential Directive/NSC-37, "National Space Policy," May 11, 1978.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
This directive resulted from a comprehensive review of U.S. space policy and pro-
grams undertaken during the early months of the Garter administration. It dealt primarily
with the relationships among the civilian and national security portions of the national
space program; its policy guidance with respect to the national security aspects of the
effort was highly classified. The review was carried out under the auspices of the National
Security Council, and it established a National Security Council Policy Review Committee
chaired by the Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, Frank
Press, as the mechanism for space policy formulation.
[1] Presidential Directive/NSC-37
May 11, 1978
This directive establishes national policies which shall guide the conduct of United
States activities in and related to the space programs and activities discussed below. The
objectives of these policies are (1) to advance the interests of the United States through
the exploration and use of space and (2) to cooperate with other nations in maintaining
the freedom of space for all activities which enhance the security and welfare of mankind.
1. The United States space program shall be conducted in accordance with the fol-
lowing basic principles.
[2] a. [paragraph deleted during declassification review]
b. The exploration and use of outer space in support of the national well-being and
policies of the United States.
c. Rejection of any claims to sovereignty over outer space or over celestial bodies, or
any portion thereof, and rejection of any limitations on the fundamental right to acquire
data from space.
d. The space systems of any nation are nadonal property and have the right of pas-
sage through and operations in space without interference. Purposeful interference with
operational space systems shall be viewed as an infringement upon sovereign rights.
e. The United States will pursue Activities in space in support of its right of self-defense.
f. [paragraph deleted during declassification review]
g. The United States will pursue space activities to increase scientific knowledge,
develop useful civil applications of space technology, and maintain United States leader-
ship in space.
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h. The United States will conduct international cooperative space-related activities
that are beneficial to the United States scientifically, politically, economically, and/or mili-
tarily.
i. [paragraph deleted during declassification review]
j. [paragraph deleted during declassification review]
[3] k. Close coordination, cooperation, and information exchange will be maintained
among the space sectors to avoid unnecessary duplication and to allow maximum
cross-utilization, in compliance with security and policy guidance, of all capabilities.
2. [remainder of page deleted during declassification review]
[4] 3. [paragraph deleted during declassification review]
4. The United States shall conduct civil space programs to increase the body of scien-
tific knowledge about the earth and the universe; to develop and operate civil applications
of space technology; to maintain United States leadership in space science, applications,
and technology; and to further United States domestic and foreign policy objectives. The
following policies shall govern the conduct of the civil space program.
a. The United States shall encourage domestic commercial exploitation of space ca-
pabilities and systems for economic benefit and to promote the technological position of
the United States, except that all United States earth-oriented remote sensing satellites
will require United States Government authorization and supervision of regulation.
b. [paragraph deleted during declassification review]
c. Data and results from the civil space programs will be provided the widest practical
dissemination, except where specific exceptions defined by legislation, Executive Order,
or directive apply.
d. [paragraph deleted during declassification review]
[5] e. [paragraph deleted during declassification review]
f. [paragraph deleted during declassification review]
5. The NSC Policy Review Committee shall meet when appropriate to provide a fo-
rum to all federal agencies for their policy views; to review and advise on proposed changes
to national space policy; to resolve issues referred to the Committee; and to provide for
orderly and rapid referral of open issues to the President for decision as necessary. The
PRC will meet at the call of the Chairman for these purposes, and when so convened, will
be chaired by the Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy.
Jimmy Carter
Document 111-35
Document title: Zbigniew Brzezinski, Presidential Direcrive/NSC-42, "Civil and Further
National Space Policy," October 10, 1978.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
An initial assignment of the Policy Review Committee (Space) established by Presi-
dential Directive/NSC-37 was to carry out a detailed review of civilian space policy and
several other outstanding issues. NASA and its allies, recognizing that shuttle development
was only a few years from completion, were beginning to lobby the White House for a new
large-scale space initiative, and the president in this directive took a position on such a
possibility. Other portions of the directive dealt with shuttle utilization for both civilian
and national security missions.
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[1] Presidential Directive/NSC-42
October 10, 1978
This directive establishes national policies based on Presidential review of space policy
issues submitted by the Policy Review Committee (Space). The President has approved
civil and further national space policies which shall guide the conduct of United States
space programs and activities discussed below. These policies are consistent with and; aug-
ment decisions reached in PD/NSC-37-National Space Policy.
ADMINISTRATION CIVIL SPACE POLICY. The United States' overarching civil
space policy will be composed of three basic components.
First: Space activities will be pursued because they can be uniquely or more effi-
ciently accomplished in space. Our space policy will become more evolutionary rather
than centering around a single, massive engineering feat. Pluralistic objectives and needs
of our society will set the course for future space efforts.
[9] Second: Our space policy will reflect a balanced strategy of applications, science,
and technology development containing essential key elements that will:
- Emphasize applications that will bring important benefits to our understanding of
earth resources, climate, weather, pollution, and agriculture.
- Emphasize space science and exploration in a manner that permits the nation to
retain the vitality of its space technology base, yet provides short-term flexibility to impose
fiscal constraints when conditions warrant.
- Take advantage of the flexibility of the Space Shuttle to reduce operating costs over
the next two decades.
- Increase benefits by increasing efficiency through better integration and technol-
ogy transfer among the national programs and through more joint projects.
- Assure US scientific and technological leadership for the security and welfare of
the nation and to continue R&D necessary to provide the basis for later programmatic
decisions.
- Provide for the private sector to take an increasing responsibility in remote sensing
and other applications.
- Demonstrate advanced technological capabilities in open and imaginative ways
having benefit for developing as well as developed countries.
- Foster space cooperation with nations by conducting joint programs.
- Confirm our support for the continued development of a legal regime for space
that will assure its safe and peaceful use for the benefit of all mankind.
Third: It is neither feasible nor necessary at this time to commit the US to a
high-challenge, highly-visible space engineering initiative comparable to Apollo. As the
resources and manpower requirements for Shuttle development phase down, we will have
the flexibility to give greater attention to new space applications and exploration, con-
tinue programs at present levels, or contract them. An adequate Federal budget commit-
ment will be made to meet the objectives outlined above.
[3] SPACE APPLICATIONS. The President has approved the following:
Government Role in Remote Sensing
1. Land Programs. Experimentation and demonstrations will continue with LANDSAT
as a developmental program. Operational uses of data from the experimental system will
continue to be made by public and private users prepared to do so. Strategies for the
future of our civil remote sensing efforts are to be addressed in the FY 1980 budget-review.
This review should examine approaches to permit flexibility to best meet the appropriate
technology mix, organizational arrangements, and potential to involve the private sector.
2. Integrated Remote Sensing System. NASA will chair an interagency task force to
examine options for integrating current and future potential systems into an integrated
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nationalsystem.Thisreviewillcovertechnical,programmatic,privatesector,andinstitu-
tionalarrangements.Emphasiswillbeplacedonuserrequirements;assuch,agency
participationwillincludeCommerce,Agriculture,Interior,Energy,State,appropriateEx-
ecutiveOfficeparticipation,aswellasDefense,theDCI,andothersasappropriate.This
taskforcewillsubmitrecommendationstothePolicyReviewCommittee(Space)byAu-
gust1,1979,forforwardingtothePresidentpriortotheFY1981budgetreview.
3.Weather Programs. In the FY 1980 budget review, OMB-in cooperation with
Defense, the DCI, NASA, and NOAA-will conduct a cross-cut review of meteorological
satellite programs to determine the potential for future budgetary savings and program
efficiency. Based on this cross-cut, the Policy Review Committee (Space) will assess the
feasibility and policy implications of program consolidation by April 1, 1979.
4. Ocean Programs. Any proposed FY 1980 new start for initial development of a
National Oceanic Satellite System (NOSS) will be reviewed based on a ZBB priority rank-
ing. The Policy Review Committee (Space) will assess the policy implications of combining
civil and military programs as part of this process.
[4] 5. Private Sector Involvement. Under the joint chairmanship of Commerce and
NASA, along with other appropriate agencies, a plan of action will be prepared by Feb_ u-
ary I, 1979, on how to encourage private investment and direct participation in the estab-
lishment and operations of civil remote sensing systems. NASA and Commerce jointly will
be the contacts for the private sector on this matter and will analyze proposals received
before submitting to the Policy Review Committee (Space) for consideration and action.
Communications Satellite R&D. NASAwill undertake carefully selected communica-
tions technology R&D. The emphasis will be to provide better frequency and orbit utiliza-
tion approaches. Specific projects selected will compete with other activities in the budget
process.
Communications Satellite Services. Commerce's National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) will formulate policy to assist in market aggregation,
technology transfer, and possible development of domestic and international public satel-
lite services. This policy direction is intended to stimulate the aggregation of the public
service market and for advanced research and development of technology for low-cost
services. Under NTIA this effort will include: (a) an identified 4-year core budget ior
Commerce to establish a management structure-competitive against other budgetary pri-
orities in Commerce-to purchase bulk services for domestic and international use; (b)
support for advanced R&D on technologies to serve users with low-volume traffic require-
ments subject to its competitiveness against other applications expenditures; and (c) AID
and Interior coordination with NTIA in translating domestic experience in emerging
public service programs into potential programs for lesser-developed countries and re-
mote territories. (U)
Long-term Economic Activity. It is too early to make a commitment to the develop-
ment of a satellite solar power station or space manufacturing facility. There are very
useful intermediate steps that would allow the development and testing of [5] key tech-
nologies and experience in space industrial operations without committing to full-scale
projects. We will pursue an evolutionary program to stress science and basic
technology-integrated with a complementary ground program-and will continue to evalu-
ate the relative costs and benefits of proposed space activities compared to earth-based
activities.
SPACE SCIENCE AND EXPLORATION GOALS
Priorities at any given time will depend upon the promise of the science, the avail-
ability of particular technology, and the budget situation in support of the following Presi-
dentially approved goals:
- We will maintain US leadership in space science and planetary exploration and
progress.
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- The US will continue a vigorous program of planetary exploration to understand
the origin and evolution of the solar system. Our goal is to continue the reconnaissance of
the outer planets and to conduct more detailed exploration of Saturn, its moons, and its
rings; to continue comparative studies of the neighboring planets, Venus and Mars; and to
conduct reconnaissance of comets and asteroids.
- To utilize the space-telescope and free-flying satellites to usher in a new era of
astronomy, as we explore interstellar molecules, quasars, pulsars, and black holes to ex-
pand our understanding of the universe and to complete the first all sky survey across the
electromagnetic spectrum.
- To develop a better understanding of the sun and its interaction with the terrestrial
environment. Space probes will journey towards the sun. Earth orbiting satellites will mea-
sure the variation in solar output and determine the resultant response of the earth's
atmosphere.
- To use the Space Shutde and Spacelab, in cooperation with the Western Europe-
ans, to conduct basic research that complements earth-based life science investigations
and human physiology research.
- Our policy in international space cooperation should include three primary ele-
ments: (1) support the best science available regardless of national origin, but expand our
international planning and coordinating effort; (2) seek [6] supplemental foreign sup-
port only for selected experiments on spacecraft which have been chosen on the basis of
sound scientific criteria; and (3) avoid lowering cooperative activities below the threshold
where our science and international cooperative efforts would suffer.
STEPS TO INCREASE BENEFITS FOR RESOURCES EXPENDED. The President
has approved the following:
Strategy to Utilize the Shuttle
1. [Paragraph deleted during declassification review]
2. [Paragraph deleted during declassification review]
3. Incremental improvements in the Shuttle transportation system will be made as
they become necessary and will be examined in the context of emerging space policy
goals. An interagency task force will make recommendations on what future capabilities
are needed. Representation will include NASA, Defense, the DCI, Commerce, Interior,
Agriculture, OMB, NSC, OSTP, State, and others as appropriate. This task force will sub-
mit the findings to the Policy Review Committee (Space) for transmittal to the President
by August 1, 1979.
4. [Paragraph deleted during declassification review]
[7] Technology Sharing. The existing Program Review Board (PBS) will take steps to
enhance technology transfer between the sectors. The objective will be, as directed in PD/
NSC-_7, to maximize efficient utilization of the sectors while maintaining necessary secu-
rity and current management relationships among the sectors. The PBS will submit an
implementation plan to the Policy Review Committee (Space) by May 15, 1979. In addi-
tion, the PBS will submit subsequent annual progress reports.
Zbigniew Brzezinski
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Document 111-36
Document fl0e: George M. Low, Team Leader, NASA Transition Team, to Mr. Richard
Fairbanks, Director, Transition Resources and Development Group, December 19, 1980,
with attached: "Report of the Transition Team, National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration."
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
The transition team assembled to advise President-elect Ronald Reagan on space
issues consisted of individuals with long experience in the field, both within and outside of
NASA. It was chaired by George Low, who had left NASA in 1976 after a long career to
become president of the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. The team's report provided a
detailed set of recommendations and actions for the incoming administration.
December 19, 1980
Mr. Richard Fairbanks, Director
Transition Resources and Development Group
1726 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20270
Dear Mr. Fairbanks:
I am pleased to submit the report of the transition team for the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA). We hope you will find that it presents a balanced view
of the status of the agency, its problems, strengths, and potentials. Team members re-
ceived full cooperation from NASA officials. Our group worked together well, with fre-
quent unanimity on identification and resolution of issues.
Recognizing that many members have been involved in the past with space programs,
the team was particularly sensitive to its appearance of a pro-space bias. Members worked
hard to prepare an objective report, with minimal personal advocacy. Team members have
asked, however, that in this letter I emphasize our view that NASA and its civil space
program represent an opportunity for positive accomplishment by the Reagan administra-
tion. In contrast with many government agencies that are mired in seemingly insoluble
controversy, NASA can be many things in the future--the best in American accomplish-
ment and inspiration for citizens.
We are pleased to have had the opportunity to aid the new administration and trust
that our report will serve you and the next NASA Administrator well. The members of the
team and I will be happy to provide additional consultation should it be needed.
Sincerely,
George M. Low
Team Leader
NASA Transition Team...
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[ 1] I. INTRODUCTION
A. Overview
In 1958 the people of the United States set out to lead the world in space. By 1970
they had achieved their goal. Men walked on the moon, scientific satellites opened new
windows to the universe, and communications satellites and new technologies brought
economic return. With these came new knowledge and ideas, a sense of pride, and na-
tional prestige.
In 1980, by contrast, United States leadership and preeminence are seriously threat-
ened and measurably eroded. The Soviet Union has established an essentially permanent
manned presence in space, and is using this presence to meet economic, military, and
foreign policy goals. Japan is broadcasting directly from space to individual homes and
business, and France is moving ahead of the United States in preparing to reap the eco-
nomic benefits of satellite resource observation. Ironically, U.S. commercial enterprises
are turning to France to launch their satellites. In space science, the United States has
decided to forego the rare opportunity to visit Halley's comet in 1986, yet the Soviet Union,
the European Space Agency, and Japan are all planning such a venture.
Technically, it is within our means to reestablish U.S. preeminence in space. The civil
space program and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration offer a number of
options to carry out the purpose and direction of U.S. aeronautics and space activities
These options are examined in this report in full recognition of the need for fiscal re-
straint in the immediate future.
B. The U.S. Aeronautics and Space Program in 1980
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was created in 1958 by
the National Aeronautics and Space Act (PL 85-568), largely as a response to the launch of
Spumik by the Soviet Union.
The Act declared that it is the policy of the United States that activities in space be
developed to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind, and that these activities
(except those primarily associated with the defense of the United States) should be the
responsibility of a civilian agency. [2] This agency--NASA--was chartered to carry out
significant programs in aeronautics, space science, space technology and applications, and
manned space flight.
In 1961, the President challenged the nation to land men on the Moon by the end of
that decade. The Apollo project not only made the United States preeminent in space
technology, but also instilled a sense of pride in the American people. Apollo's success was
due to a long term commitment; adequate and stable financial support; a technological
partnership among government, industry and universities; and disciplined managers drawn
from within and outside the government.
Also in the past two decades, automated spacecraft explored Mercury, Venus, Mars,
Jupiter and Saturn, while telescopes above the earth's atmosphere gave us new eyes to
learn about our universe--the strange world of pulsars, quasars and black holes. The re-
sult was a new understanding of the past, present, and future of our total environment.
In the meantime, communications satellites have spawned an entire new industry,
weather satellites can warn us of storms, and remote sensing satellites offer tremendous
economic potential from assessing and managing the earth's resources.
At the end of 1980 we are on the eve of the launch of Columbia, the first Space Shuttle,
and its promise to provide a multiplicity of benefits--in science, in exploration, in terres-
trial applications, and in the security of our nationpfrom easy access to this new ocean of
space.
C. Aeronautics
Since 1915 NASA (and its predecessor, the National Advisory Committee for Aero-
nautics) has been the world leader in aeronautical research. At NASA's laboratories are
many of the national facilities and technical experts necessary to continue progress in the
rapidly advancing field of aviation. NASA is also at the focal point of a unique partnership
among industry, universities, the Department of Defense, and NASA itself that has been
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responsible for U.S. preeminence in aeronautics.
Built on the foundation of this research and technology base, the U.S. aviation indus-
try employs about 1,000,000 Americans, ranks second largest among U.S. manufacturing
employers, contributes more than any other manufacturing industry to the U.S. balance
of trade, and has replaced agriculture as first in net trade contribution.
Continued advancements in research and technology are essential if the U.S. avia-
tion industry is to remain a viable competitor in the world market.
D. The Space Program and U.S. Policy
In recent years the United States has lost its competitive edge in the world, militarily,,
commercially, and economically, [3] and our competition with the Soviet Union has taken
on a new dimension.
The Soviet Union recognizes that science and technology are major factors in that
competition. The nation that is strong in science and technology has the foundation to be
strong in all other areas and will be perceived as a world leader.
Aeronautics and space can be major factors in our technological strength. They de-
mand the very best in engineering, because the consequences of mistakes are great: the
crash of an aircraft, or the complete failure of a spaceship.
A viable aviation industry and a strong space program are important visible elements
in our international competition. Beyond these fundamental points, the United States
civil space program, unlike many other government programs and agencies, has signifi-
cant actual and potential impact on U.S. policy. Although some elements of the program
have been so utilized, their potential in U.S. policy remains largely unrecognized and un-
realized. The major factors are as follows:
1. National Pride and Prestige
National pride is how we view ourselves. Without a national sense of purpose and
identity, national pride ebbs and flows in accordance with short-term events. The Iranian
hostage situation and the abortive rescue mission have done harm to our national pride
quite out of proportion to our true abilities as a nation. On the other hand, the recent
Voyager visit to Saturn, reported by an enthusiastic press, made a significant contribution
to our sense of self-worth. The space program has characteristics of American historic
self-image: a sense of purpose; a pioneering spirit of exploration, discovery, and adven-
ture; a challenge of frontiers and goals; a recognition of individual contributions and team
efforts; and a firm sense of innovation and leadership.
National prestige is how others view us, the global perception of this country's intel-
lectual, scientific, technological, and organizational capabilities. In recent history, the space
program has been the unique positive factor in this regard. The Apollo exploration of the
Moon restored our image in the post-Sputnik years, and the Voyager exploration of Saturn
was a bright spot in an otherwise gloomy period of dwindling world recognition. With
space programs we are a nation of the present and the future, while in the eyes of the
world we become outward and forward looking.
2. Economics and Space Technology
A vigorous space program has provided many technological challenges to our na-
tion. Efforts such as Apollo, Voyager, and the Space Shuttle have involved challenges and
risks far more significant than those of short-term technological needs.
Meeting these challenges has resulted in a "technological push" to American indus-
try, fostering significant innovation in [4] a wide range of high technology fields such as
electronics, computers, science, aviation, communications and biomedicine. The return
on the space investment is higher productivity, and greater competitiveness in the world
market.
The space program also returns direct dividends, as in the field of satellite communi-
cations. The potential economic returns from satellite exploration for earth's resources
are great.
3. Scientific Knowledge and Inspiration for the Nation's Youth
U.S. leadership in the scientific exploration of space has provided new knowledge
about the earth and the universe, thus forming the basis for applied research and
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development-a significant factor in our society and economy.
The exploration of space has provided an inspirational focus for large numbers of
young people who have become students of engineering and science. At a time when
there is a shortage of technically trained people, when the U.S. productive vitality depends
on the application of science, the space program could help attract young people into
these fields.
4. Relation to U.S. Foreign Policy
Aspects of the civil space program can serve as instruments to develop and further
U.S. foreign poficy objectives. Not only can the space program contribute to how this country
is viewed in the eyes of the world, but cooperative space activities, such as the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Apollo-Soyuz mission and European Space Agency payloads on the Space Shuttle, are im-
portant to other countries. Technology associated with the space program has resulted in
strong economic and technological interaction with developed countries, as well as in
important aid to underdeveloped countries, particularly in the areas of communications
and resource exploration.
E. Observations
At the end of 1980 the U.S. civil space program stands at a crossroads. The United
States has invested in a great capability for space exploration and applications, a capability
that provides benefits in national pride and prestige, in science and technology, in the
inspiration of young people, in foreign policy, and in economic gain.
Now this capability is waning. NASA and the space program are without clear pur-
pose or direction ....
[39] VI. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIOMS
NASA represents an important investment by the United States in aeronautics and
space. The agency's programs have provided, and continue to offer, benefits in science
and technology, in national pride and prestige, in foreign policy, and in economic gain
However, in recent years the agency has been underfunded, without purpose or direction.
The new administration finds NASA at a crossroads, with possible moves toward either
retrenchment or growth. The transition team has examined ten major areas and various
options for dealing with them. For each issue, the team has made recommendations as
follows:
A. Presidential statement of purpose of the U.S. civil space program (pages 5-7)
It is recommended:
1. That the President recognize the importance of the U.S. space program at an
early date (e.g., the inaugural address) without yet making a commitment.
2. That the purpose and direction of the U.S. space effort be defined, and that a
commitment to a viable space program be articulated by the President at a timely opportu-
nity, such as the first flight of the Shuttle in the spring of 1981.
(N.B. A viable space program could be smaller than, equal to,
or larger than the present one, but it must have purpose and
direction.)
B. NASA as an organization (pages 8-11)
1. The NASA Administrator
It is recommended that the President select a politically experienced and strong
manager as NASA Administrator, that he reestablish the Administrator's role as that of
principal advisor on civil space matters, and that he be accessible to the Administrator as
necessary.
2. Management capability
It is recommended that the Administrator, working either within the agency or with
an outside group, assess NASA's vitality and discipline in management of complex projects,
and make changes necessary to effect improvements.
3. Staffing
It is recommended that the dual problem of bringing experienced people from in-
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dustry into governnent, and of [40] attracting bright young engineers and scientists into
government service be addressed immediately, for the government as a whole and for
NASA in particular.
4. The size of NASA
It is recommended that the question of whether or not NASA needs all its field cen-
ters be addressed as soon as the purpose of the aeronautics and space program is defined.
C. Space policy and conflict resolution (pages 12-16)
It is recommended that space policy development and conflict resolution be assigned
to the NASA Administrator or special ad hoc groups as the need arises; and that consider-
ation be given to a permanent space policy board for this purpose.
D. The civil space program and national policy (pages 14-15)
It is recommended that the administration develop an unequivocal statement of na-
tional space policy and an organizational framework that promotes economic exploitauon
of our capabilities and uses space to further our international goals.
In the area of remote sensing, the administration should undertake the develop-
ment of an integrated civil program.
In foreign policy, the administration should develop procedures for the Department
of State and other government agencies, together with industry, to employ space technol-
ogy to further foreign policy objectives.
E. Space Shuttle flight readiness (pages 16-17)
It is recommended that
1. The NASA Administrator schedule immediate briefings and reviews, with NASA
and contractor personnel, to become familiar with the Shuttle and its problems.
2. The Administrator obtain a formal assessment of Shuttle readiness from the Aero-
space Safety Advisory Panel.
3. The Administrator seek the advice (outside the regular review process), of the
knowledgeable outside experts.
4. The Administrator and/or Deputy participate in scheduled reviews and make speci-
fied Flight Readiness Firing and Launch decisions.
[41] F. U.S. space launch capability (pages 18-19)
It is recommended:
1. That existing plans for initial Shuttle operations, retention of expendable launch
vehicles for the time being, and transfer of payloads to the Shuttle, be allowed to stand.
2. That at an appropriate time after the first flight (or flights) of the Shuttle, the
President direct the Administrator of NASA to address the issues of Shuttle enhancement,
continued Shuttle production, and expendable launch vehicle production; and to resolve
them in the best interest of the United States, taking into account all users-commercial,
civilian, government, DOD, and foreign.
G. The transfer from research and development to operations (pages 20-22)
It is recommended:
1. That the question of operational management of remote sensing satellite systems
be addressed on an urgent basis (see section on "The Civil Space Program and National
Policy").
2. That consideration be given to turning the operation of expendable launch ve-
hicl,-s ove t to a government agency other than NASA or to a private commercial organiza-
tion in the next year.
3. That long term Space Shuttle operations be addressed only after some flight expe-
rience with the Shuttle is in hand,
H. Aeronautics (pages 23-24)
It is recommended that NASA's traditional role of research and technology support
to civil and military aviation be reaffirmed, and perhaps even strengthened, to help stem
the loss of U.S. leadership in aviation.
I. NASA's role in areas other than aeronautics and space (pages 25-26)
It is recommended that NASA's future role in non-aeronautics and non-space activi-
ties be confined to assistance to other agencies as requested for limited periods of time
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only, using cost reimbursements as possible, and that current long term commitments in
other areas be eventually moved from NASA,
[42] J. Personnel (pages 27-30)
It is recommended that the new NASA Administrator review the situation of reem-
ployed annuitants at an early date with the view of terminating the employment of many of
them ....
Requested New Starts
($MUlions)
FYI981
Solar Electric Propulsion
Power Extension Package
Gamma Ray Observatory
Venus Orbiting Imaging Radar
National Oceanic Satellite System
Upper Atmospheric Research Satellite
Numerical Aerospace Simulator
FY81 Total
FY1982
Venus Orbiting Imaging Radar
Halley Flyby
Halley Watch
Upper Atmospheric Research Sat.
(Instrument only)
Geological Application
Numerical Aerodynamic Simulator
Large Composite Primary Structures
Energy Efficient Transport
Technology Development
General Aviation Propulsion Technology
High Temperature Engine Core
Advanced Rotorcraft Technology
Cooperative Auto Research Program
Solar Power Systems
Research & Technology Base Augmentation
Solar Electric Propulsion
Shuttle Performance Augmentation
Shuttle Performance Augmentation (Study)
Power Extension Package
Advanced Space Transportation
System Capability
FY 82 Total
Fu nd:ng Funding
Requested Obtained
20 7.5
17
19.1 19,1
30
15 5.8
10
3
114.1 32.4
40 40
4
1 I
20 20
21.3
16 16
8 4
7
5.5
6
5
6.5
5
25 9
28 18
28
5 5
27
4.5
262.8 113
Grand Total 376.9 137,9
17
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NASA Program History
FY 1981 Dollars
585
15
13
9
7
Manned Space Flight
59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
Impact of Inflation on NASA Outlays
\\
-- \\\\_ Actual Dollars
_\ Effect of <,
\\ \ Inflation _]
Constant Dollars ",.._.._. .,,.,s _ -- -
I I I I I 1 1 I I l I L I L I
66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
Fiscal Years
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Manpower
500,000
Total Employment on NASA Programs
400,000 !_oyment
300,000
200,000
100,000
I_I I_ I_ 1964 1965 I_7 Im 1970 1971 19_ Ig_ 1974 1975 1976 1977 t_| tgR _gl) 1111
To_d 467_ 74+577"/137._ 246,304379.0_4 _.900 _._ J06._ _b7.871 !18.345 I_.80_ 149.600144._ 134.(_6 125._ 127.7_ I_I_ I_._ I_,._I_ 131._I 142.313 13U13Ern_oyma_'
Employment _ 57.._0 115._0 21_ 347.100 _78,700_0,00( _'3_0( _,40C _,_(_ 136.580 I_,130 117._0 108.100 I00,_( I0_,40( 10_.00CI01.50_ 101.400 t0_._ 11_.700115,100
cNA_._,_. ]10_ 17,077 22._ 27,904 31,9_4 33,_00 33524 33,?96 32,471 31,745 31,223 29,4?9 27,428 25,t1_ 24,a54 24,3._ 24,&1 23,4_ 23,111e22,533 22,ii3 22.713[
Budget History
(Millions of Dollars)
12/11/80
Subfunction Annual Authorization Ap..m-opriarion
Code FY'77 EKLT._ EZL_ FY'80 FY'81 FY'81**
Research and Development 2856.4 3041.5 3522.6 4123.5 4436,8 4396,2
253 Space Shuttle 1383.1 1354.2 1628.3 1871.0 1873.0 1873.0
253 Space Flight Operations 202.7 267.8 315.9 463.3 779.5 769.5
253 Expendable Launch Vehicles 151.4 134.5 74.0 70.7 55.7 55.7
254 Physics & Astronomy 166.3 228.2 285.5 337.5 352.7 352.7
254 Planetary Exploration 192.1 153,2 187.1 220.2 179.6 179.6
254 Life Sciences 22.1 33.3 42.6 43,9 45.2 43.2
254 Space Applications 198.2 239.8 280.3 338.3 37&7 361.5
254 Technology Utilization 8.1 9,1 12.1 12.1 12.6 12.1
402 Aeronautical Research & Technology 191.1 234.0 275.1 309.3 289,8 282,55
254 Space Research & Technology 82.8 99.7 11 L3 119.4 115.2 113.2
254 Energy Technology 3.5 7.5 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0
255 Tracking & Data Acquisition 255.0 280.0 305.4 332,8 349.7 349.0
Construction of Facilities 120.3 160.9 150.0 157.6 118.0 115.0
Research & Program Management 845.1 892.8 940.4 1001.2 1033.2 1030.0
Total 3821.8 4095.2 4612.6 5282.3 5587.9 5541.2
Appropriation 3819.1 4063.7 4558.8 5243.4 5541.2
**Doe_ not include proposed 2% cut
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Document 111-37
Document title: Hans Mark and Milton Silveira, "Notes on Long Range Planning," August
1981.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
Soon after taking office as NASA's Deputy Administrator in July 1981, Hans Mark
and his assistant Milton Silveira prepared this document in response to a call from new
Administrator James Beggs for ideas on the future of the space agency. The document was
widely circulated within NASA, and soon adopted by Beggs and Mark as the basis for their
initial actions as they assumed control.
[1] Notes on Long Range Planning
The development of long range planning for NASA should be based on Section 5 in
the 1958 Space Act requiring "the preservation of the role of the United States as a leader
in aeronautical and space science and technology...." This may be a difficult thing to do
in view of limited funds that will be available to NASA in the coming years but the intent of
the statement in the law is crystal clear and NASA must act accordingly.
1 ) FACILITIES
Fundamental to all that NASA does are the facilities that exist at NASA's research
and development centers. It is not always recognized but the NASA aeronautical facilities
are vital, not only to aircraft design, but also to the development of our space technology.
For example, the 40' x 80' wind tunnel at the Ames Research Center which is justified
solely as an aeronautical facility was used for testing the flying qualities of the Space Shuttle
during the critical approach and landing phase. A one-third scale model was tested many
hundreds of hours in the wind tunnel to insure performance, stability, and control charac-
teristics. There are many other examples where wind tunnel and high temperature facili-
ties are used to insure safe flight of a spacecraft as it passes through the atmospheric
portion of its flight.
Broadly speaking, NASA's facilities fall into five separate categories:
1. Wind Tunnels
2. Flight and Operations Simulators
3. Propulsion Test Facilities
4. Experimental Airplanes
5. Computational Facilities
[2] Recently, heavy investments have been made in required wind tunnel facilities.
Approximately $2BOM have been spent, improving the Ames 40' x 80' wind tunnel and
building at Langley the High Reynolds Number Cryogenic Tunnel. Large investments
have also been made in flight simulators, although more needs to be done in developing
and building simulators to overcome current deficiencies. There is a need to develop more
facilities for the simulation of operations and construction in space with a zero "g" envi-
ronment and under demanding thermal conditions. The major aeronautical propulsion
facility in the country is being developed by the United States Air Force at the Arnold
Engineering Development Center. NASA must take advantage of this facility as best it can.
NASA must also develop a policy toward the development of propulsion facilities at the
Lewis Research Center. Particularly, NASA must also see to it that the rocket propulsion
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test stands are adequate for programs in launch vehicles that may be initiated following
the completion of the Space Shuttle program. Experimental aircraft tend to be more spe-
cialized toward specific flight configurations. However, there are some programs such as
the F-8 fly-by-wire aircraft and the Boeing 737 control configured vehicle in which the
aircraft are used more-or-less as general purpose simulation facilities. Computers are not
usually regarded as facilities but they should be viewed as such. The Numerical Aerody-
namic Simulator now being proposed is particularly important in this regard since it may
overcome certain limitations in the simulations of the other facilities now operated by
NASA (wind tunnels, propulsion facilities and flight simulators) if the promise of compu-
tational methods in aerodynamics, chemically reacting flows, and dynamic structures can
be realized. The maintenance and development of the necessary facilities to accomplish
the mission stated in the law must, therefore, have the highest institutional priority in
NASA.
[3] 2) AERONAUTICS
Work in aeronautics by NASA, and the NACA prior to 1958, has traditionally been
oriented toward the support of military and civil aviation. Future interest in the military is
likely to be centered on the development of a new long range combat aircraft (LRCA) by
the United States Air Force having low radar, infrared, and visible observables (i.e., stealth
technology), the creation of a new family of V/STOL aircraft for the Naw, and the con-
tinuing enhancement of the performance of rotor craft for tile Army. To maintain a lead
in civil aircraft sales, continual improvements must be made for greater economy. The
technology suitable for third level carriers (i.e. commuter airlines) is likely to be the major
civil requirement. The latter is especially important in view of the inroads being made bv
foreign competition in that field. Right now the Dehavilland Twin Otter, the DHC-7, and
the Shorts Skyvan dominate that field in the United States. In addition to all of these
things, a strong basic research program in fluid mechanics, materials and other topics
related to aeronautics and space vehicles must be maintained.
3) THE SPACE SH_
The major technological development carried out by NASA in the last decade is the
Space Shuttle vehicle. That basic development is now nearly complete and the next step is
to turn it into an operational system. This effort must have the highest programmatic
priority in NASA for the coming years to realize a return for this large investment. It should
take about three years to make the space Shuttle an operational transportation system. It is
necessary to arrive at an agreed-upon definition of what is meant by "operational" and to
determine whether NASA should be the agency that operates the Shuttle or whether some
other institutional mechanism needs to be provided for that purpose. The organizational
structure needs to be developed for [4] Shuttle Operations. No matter how the matter of
Shuttle Operations is finally decided, the Johnson Space Center should phase out of the
operational mission during the next three years. It is very unlikely that it will be possible to
control costs of operation if the developmental attitudes that prevail at the Johnson Space
Center dominate after the Space Shuttle becomes operational. The operations of the
Space Shuttle, both launch as well as mission control, should be handled by the Kennedy
Space Center and by Vandenberg Air Force Base once the West Coast launch facility is
complete.
4) THE SPACE STATION
While the Space Shutde becomes operational, a project to establish a permanent
presence in space (i.e., a Space Station) should be initiated. This should become the ma-
jor new goal of NASA and, some time during the next two years, the President should be
persuaded to issue a statement proclaiming a national commitment to that effect. The
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necessary arguments that justify this step must be carefully developed now, and these argu-
ments range from national security (i.e., arms control verification, military surveillance)
to the improvement of space operations (i.e., satellite maintenance on orbit and other
things of this kind). The necessary committees of the National Academy of Engineering,
the National Academy of Sciences, and other bodies of this kind should be established to
set up now the technical baselines for this new enterprise.
5) UNMANNED LAUNCH VEHICLES
The Shuttle program has led to the creation of a new propulsion technology which
should be further exploited. It is now generally agreed that unmanned launch vehicles
will not be phased out completely once the Shuttle is operational. They will always he
necessary to supplement the Shuttle launch capability. The current launch vehicles, (At-
las, Titan, Delta) are based on technology that is now thirty [5] years old and should be
replaced by more efficient and economical vehicles. New unmanned launch vehicles based
on the Shuttle technology using solid rocket boosters and the Shuttle's main engine sys-
tem should be developed. The solid rocket booster itself is an excellent rocket with a sea
level thrust of the order of 2.5M lbs. Several solid rocket boosters strapped together could
provide a formidable launch vehicle in terms of payload capacities. Such a vehicle with
three solid rocket boosters could put into low earth orbit a payload weighing something
like 100,000 lbs. and perhaps up to 20,000 lbs. into geosynchronous orbit with an appro-
priate upper stage. An important feature of the solid rocket booster is that they are recov-
erable which means that the cost advantages inherent in that property could be important
This new generation of launch vehicles would not be "expendable" although it would be
unmanned.
6) SCIENTIFIC EXPLORATION
NASA has a fundamental responsibility to continue with the scientific exploration of
objects in space and conditions in space. In the coming decade, scientific investigations
conducted in earth orbit will be the most important because these take the best advantage
of the unique properties of the Shuttle. Specifically, this means that astronomy, experi-
ments involving certain cosmological things such as general relativity and experiments in
zero gravity using Spacelab will be the dominant trend in scientific space research, An
extremely important aspect of this are the medical and biological experiments to be done
using the Shuttle to establish what must be done to permit people, animals, and plants to
live in zero gravity conditions for lengthy periods. It is probable that exploration will be
deemphasized somewhat until we have a Space Station that can serve as a base for the
launching of a new generation of planetary exploration spacecraft, h is apparent that the
return of samples from various bodies in the solar system will be given highest priority
once that time arrives.
[6] 7) SPACE APPLICATIONS
The applications program should emphasize the scientific part of earth observations,
specifically oceanography, geodesy, and things of this kind. In view of the Administration's
policies with respect to technical demonstration programs, NASA should de-emphasize
efforts to commercialize various applications projects. The applications program should
also emphasize technology development and should cooperate closely with the national
security community in these efforts. It is likely that the nation's surveillance satellites will
move to geosynchronous orbit in the next two decades. This means that large space struc-
tures will be required, mirrors, antennas, and other systems of this type. NASA should be
extremely active in the development of this technology and should establish the closest
possible support of the national security community in achieving these objectives.
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A few thoughts regarding future directions for NASA have been outlined in this pa-
per. Obviously, much more detail needs to be done to develop some of these ideas. It is
very important to begin now by setting up the proper procedural methods within NASA as
well as the NASA advisory structure to make certain that these ideas are properly consid-
ered and developed into a coherent long range plan for the nation's aeronautical and
space programs.
Hans Mark
Milton Silveira
August 1981
Document111-38
Document title: National Security Decision Directive Number 42, "National Space Policy,"
July 4, 1982.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
hag'ton, D.C.
In 1981, its first year in office, the Reagan administration issued a National Security
Decision Directive (NSDD-8, November 13, 1981) that reiterated the central role of the
Space Transportation System in U.S. space activities. The White House then initiated a
comprehensive space policy review under the direction of new Science Adviser George
Keyworth II. The results of that review were contained in NSDD-42, issued on July 4, 1982.
This directive replaced NSDD-8 and the three Carter administration space policy state-
ments, NSDD-37, 42, and 54. It also established as the primary forum for space policy
formulation the National Security Council Senior Interagency Group (Space)--SIG
(Space)---chaired by the assistant to the president for national security affairs. SIG (Space)
was the locus of policymaking throughout the two terms that Ronald Reagan was presi-
dent.
National Security Decision
Directive Number 42
National Space Policy
I. INTRODUCTION AND PRINCIPLES
[1] July 4, 1982
This directive establishes national policy to guide the conduct of United States space
program and related activities; it supersedes Presidential Directives 37, 42, and 54, as well
as National Security Decision Directive 8. This directive is consistent with and augments
the guidance contained in existing directives, executive orders, and law. The decisions
outlined in this directive provide the broad framework and the basis for the commitments
necessary for the conduct of United States space programs.
The Space Shuttle is to be a major factor in the future evolution of United States
space programs. It will continue to foster cooperation between the national security and
civil efforts to ensure efficient and effective use of national resources. Specifically, routine
use of the manned Space Shuttle will provide the opportunity to understand better and
evaluate the role of man in space, to increase the utility of space programs, and to expand
knowledge of the space environment.
The basic goals of United States space policy are to: (a) strengthen the security of the
United States; (b) maintain United States space leadership; (c) obtain economic and sci-
entific benefits through the exploitation of space; (d) expand United States private-sector
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investment and involvement in civil space and space-related activities; (e) promote inter-
national cooperative activities that are in the national interest; and (f) cooperate with
other nations in maintaining the freedom of space for all activities that enhance the secu-
rity and welfare of mankind.
[2] The United States space program shall be conducted in accordance with the
following basic principles:
A. The United States is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all
nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all mankind. [sentence deleted dur-
ing declassification review]
B. The United States rejects any claims to sovereignty by any nation over outer space
or celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and rejects any limitations on the fundamental
right to acquire data from space.
C. The United States considers the space systems of any nation to be national prop-
erty with the right of passage through and operations in space without interference. Pur-
poseful interference with space systems shall be viewed as infringement upon sovereign
rights.
D. The United States encourages domestic commercial exploration of space capa-
bilities, technology, and systems for national economic benefit. These activities must be
consistent with national security concerns, treaties, and international agreements.
E. The United States will conduct international cooperative space-related activities
that achieve sufficient scientific, political, economic, or national security benefits for the
nation.
E [paragraph deleted during declassification review]
G. The United States Space Transportation System (STS) is the primary space launch
system for both national security and civil government missions. STS capabilities and ca-
pacities shall be developed to meet appropriate national needs and shall be available to
authorized users--domestic and foreign, commercial, and governmental.
[3] H. The United States will pursue activities in space in support of its right of
self-defense.
I. The United States will continue to study space arms control options. The United
States will consider verifiable and equitable arms control measures that would ban or oth-
erwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapons systems should those measures be
compatible with United States national security. The United States will oppose arms con-
trol concepts or legal regimes that seek general prohibitions on the military or intelli-
gence use of space. [declassified]
II. SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
The Space Transportation System (STS) is composed of the Space Shuttle, associ-
ated upper stages, and related facilities. The following policies shall govern the develop-
ment and operation of the STS:
A. The STS is a vital element of the United States space program and is the primary
space launch system for both United States national security and civil government mis-
sions. The STS will be afforded the degree of survivability and security protection required
for a critical national space resource.
B. The first priority of the STS program is to make the system fully operational and
cost-effective in providing routine access to space.
C. The United States is fully committed to maintaining world leadership in space
transportation with an STS capacity sufficient to meet appropriate national needs. The
STS program requires sustained commitments by all affected departments and agencies.
The United States will continue to develop the STS through the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) in cooperation with the Department of Defense (DoD).
Enhancements of STS operational capability, upper stages, and efficient methods of de-
pitying and retrieving payloads should be pursued as national requirements are defined.
D. United States Government spacecraft should be designed to take advantage of the
unique capabilities of the STS. The completion of transition to the Shuttle should occur as
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expeditiously as practical.
[4] E. [paragraph deleted during declassification review]
E Expandable launch vehicle operations shall be continued by the United States
Government until the capabilities of the STS are sufficient to meet its needs and obliga-
tions. Unique national security considerations may dictate developing special-purpose
launch capabilities.
G. For the near-term, the STS will continue to be managed and operated in an
institutional arrangement consistent with the current NASA/DoD Memoranda of Under-
standing. Responsibility will remain in NASA for operational control of the STS for civil
missions and in the DoD for operational control of the STS for national security missions.
Mission management is the responsibility of the mission agency. As the STS operations
mature, options will be considered for possible transition to a different institutional struc-
ture.
H. Major changes to STS program capabilities will require Presidential approval.
HI. CIVIL SPACE PROGRAM (U)
The United States shall conduct civil space programs to expand knowledge of the
Earth, its environment, the solar system, and the universe; to develop and promote se-
lected civil applications of space technology; to preserve the United States leadership in
critical aspects of space science, applications, and technology; and to further United States
domestic and foreign policy objectives. Consistent with the National Aeronautics and Space
Act, the following policies shall govern the conduct of the civil space program.
A. Science, Applications, and Technology: United States Government civil programs
shall continue a balanced strategy of research, development, operations, and exploration
for science, applications, and technology. The key objectives of these programs are to:
(1) Preserve the United States preeminence in critical major space activities to en-
able continued exploitation and exploration of space.
[5] (2) Conduct research and experimentation to expand understanding of: (a) as-
trophysical phenomena and the origin and evolution of the universe, through long-term
astrophysical observation; (b) the Earth, its environment, and its dynamic relation with
the Sun; (c) the origin and evolution of the solar system, through solar, planetary, and
lunar sciences and exploration; and (d) the space environment and technology required
to advance knowledge in the biological sciences.
(3) Continue to explore the requirements, operational concepts, and technology
associated with permanent space facilities.
(4) Conduct appropriate research and experimentation in advanced technology and
systems to provide a basis for future civil space applications.
B. Private Sector Participation: The United States Government will provide a
climate conducive to expanded private sector investment and involvement in civil space
activities, with due regard to public safety and national security. Private sector space activi-
ties will be authorized and supervised or regulated by the government to the extent
required by treaty and national security.
C. International Cooperation: United States cooperation in international civil activi-
ties will:
(1) Support the public, nondiscriminatory direct readout of data from Federal civil
systems to foreign ground stations and provision of data to foreign users under specified
conditions.
(2) Continue cooperation with other nations by conducting joint scientific and
research programs that yield sufficient benefits to the United States in areas such as access
to foreign scientific and technological expertise, and access to foreign research and devel-
opment facilities, and that serve other national goals. All international space ventures
must be consistent with United States technology-transfer policy. [declassified]
D. Civil Operational Remote Sensing: Management of Federal civil operational re-
mote sensing is the responsibility of the Department of Commerce. The Department of
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Commerce will: (a) aggregate Federal needs for civil operational remote sensing to be met
by either the private sector or the Federal government; (b) identify needed civil opera-
tional system research and development objectives; and (c) in coordination with other
departments or agencies, prmide for regulation of private-sector operational remote sens-
ing systems.
[6] [page deleted during declassification review]
[7] [page deleted during declassification review]
[8] [paragraph deleted during declassification review]
(1) The fact that tile United States conducts satellite photo-reconnaissance for peaceful
purposes, including intelligence collection and the monitoring of arms control agreements,
is unclassified. The fact that such photo-reconnaissance includes a near-real-time capabil-
ity and is used to provide defense related information for indications and warning is also
unclassified. All other details, facts and products concerning the national foreign intelli-
gence space program are subject to appropriate classification and security controls.
(2) [paragraph deleted in declassification review]
VI. INTER-SECTOR RESPONSIBILITIES
[paragraphs A-F deleted during declassification review]
[9] G. The United States Government will maintain and coordinate separate
national security and cMl operational space systems when differing needs of the sectors
dictate.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION
Normal interagency coordinating mechanisms will be employed to the maximum
extent possible to implement the policies enunciated in this directive. To provide a forum
to all Federal agencies for their policy views, to review and advise on proposed changes to
national space policy, and to provide for orderly and rapid referral of space policy issues to
the President for decisions as necessary, a Senior Interagency Group (SIG) on Space shall
be established. The SIG (Space) will be chaired by the Assistant to the President for Na-
tional Security Affairs and will include the Deputy or Under Secretary of State, Deputy or
Under Secretary of Defense, Deputy or Under Secretary of Commerce, Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, and the [10] Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration. Representatives of the Office of Management and Budget and the Office
of Science and Technology Policy will be include as observers. Other agencies or depart-
ments will participate based on the subjects to be addressed.
Document Ul-39
Document Title: National Security Decision Directive 5-83, "Space Station," April 11, 1983.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
During 1982, NASA decided to push for presidential approval of a space station
during 1983. To establish the basis for such a decision, SIG (Space) requested a study of
NASA's station proposal and alternatives to it. President Reagan was briefed on the con-
cept of a space station on April 7, 1983, and a few days later signed this directive establish-
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ing the terms of reference for the needed study. Ordinarily, Assistant to the President for
National SecurityAffairs William Clark would have signed the directive as chairman of SIG
(Space); the White House decided to have the president himself sign the document as an
indication of the study's significance. Because the various agencies participating in the
study mandated by the directive could not reach a consensus on a recommendation to the
president, that study was never completed, and other paths were followed as the basis tot
President Reagan's decision to approve the station program.
Space Station
OBJ CTIVZ
[1] April 11, 1983
A study will be conducted to establish the basis for an Administration decision on
whether or not to proceed with the NASA development of a permanently based, manned
Space Station. This NSSD establishes the Terms of Reference for this study.
GUIDELINES
The specific policy issues to be addressed are the following (responsible agencies are
indicated in parenthesis):
- How will a manned Space Station contribute to the maintenance of U.S. space
leadership and to the other goals contained in our National Space Policy? (NASA)
- How will a manned Space Station best fulfill national and international require-
ments versus other means of satisfying them? (NASA/State for national and international
civil space requirements; DOD/DCI for national security needs.)
- What are the national security implications of a manned Space Station? (DOD/
DCI)
- What are the foreign policy implications, including arms control implications, of a
manned Space Station? (State/NASA/ACDA)
-What is the overall economic and social impact of a manned Space Station? (NASA/
Commerce/State)
These five policy issues will be addressed for each of the four scenarios outlined
below.
In order to assess the policy issues in a balanced fashion, NASA will provide a back-
ground paper outlining four example scenarios that represent possible approaches for the
continuation of this nation's manned space program. These example scenarios are:
[2] - Space Shuttle and Unmanned Satellites
- Space Shutde and Unmanned Platforms
- Space Shuttle and an Evolutionary/Incrementally Developed Space Station
- Space Shutde and a Fully Functional Space Station
A separate, unrelated, generic space requirements paper will be produced for use in
addressing the national policy issues. The representative set of requirements for each space
sector will be provided by DOD/DCI for national security and NASA/DOC for civil pro-
grams. A drafting group consisting of representatives of the DCI, DOD, DOC and NASA
will coalesce the requirements into a single document. It will represent currently identifi-
able official agency statements of requirements for a Space Station. Long-term agency
requirements and objectives should also be included.
EXPLORINGTHEUNKNO'_,,'N 595
IMPLEMENTATION
A Working Group under the Senior Interagency Group for Space has been estab-
lished to conduct this study. The Working Group is chaired by NASA and includes repre-
sentatives from DOD, DOC, DCI, DOS, and ACDA. The Working Group will produce a
summary paper that assesses the issues and identifies policy options. Results of the study
will be presented to the SIG (Space) not later than September 1983 prior to presentation
to the President. Papers produced by the Working Group will not be distributed outside
the Executive Branch without the approval of the SIG (Space). The SIG (Space) may issue
more detailed Terms of Reference to implement this study.
Document 111-40
Document title: "Revised Talking Points for the Space Station Presentation to the Presi-
dent and the Cabinet Council," November 30, 1983, with attached: "Presentation on Space
Station," December 1, 1983, no pagination.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
After having failed to get the support of a majority of the members of SIG (Space) for
a recommendation to the president that he approve a space station program, NASA and its
allies in the White House sought another path to get the issue before the president. NASA
Administrator James Beggs was confident that the president would approve the program if
only it was presented to him for decision. Cabinet Secretary Craig Fuller arranged for the
station to be discussed at a meeting of the Cabinet Council for Commerce and Trade, a
group not dominated by those opposed to the station. NASA Administrator Beggs made
his presentation to the council, speaking from a set of staff-prepared "talking points" re-
produced here.
FIRST VIEWGRAPH (IKE'S QUOTE ETC,)
• President Kennedy's decision to go to the moon chartered a course that resulted
in leadership in space for the United States
• Incidentally, the Kennedy quotation is from a press conference in which the Presi-
dent is asked why he doesn't stop the Apollo program in light of budget concerns and
other pressing needs
• President Nixon, against the wishes of many, continued America's commitment to
leadership in space by approving the Space Shuttle
Link to next viewgraph
• This focus on leadership in space was reaffirmed in your Space Policy announced
a year ago last July
NATIONAL SPACE POLICY VIEWGRAPH
• This policy sets forth goals and objectives that will keep America preeminent in
space
Link to next viewgraph
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• Today, the Space Shuttle makes us the leading Nation in space
• Tomorrow, America's preeminence in space can be achieved through a space sta-
tion, manned and in permanent orbit around the earth
SHUTTLE VIEWGRAPH
• The Space Shuttle flies beautifully, and is something every American can see and
be proud of
• Shuttle is operational, a ten year development program is over. By 1991, the earli-
est a space station could be in orbit, Shuttle will have been flying a full decade
• We brought the Shuttle in within 30% of the original budget projection:
declining NASA budget (24% in constant $, 1972-1981
difficult technical hurdles
declining civil service work force
20% between 1972 and 1981
28,382 to 22,736
Might be appropriate to mention here that a space stauon would cost $8 billion
describe what the $20 billion station is
launch by 1991
The Shuttle has captured worldwide attention:
reassures our Allies of America's technological strength
concerns our enemies
impresses the fencesitters
• At a time when many in Europe and elsewhere focus on what divides us, the Shuttle
has focused attention on what unites us (refer to Spacelab flight)
• Shuttle's impact is extraordinary. It exerts an influence over ordinary people and
heads of government:
millions of Europeans turned out to see Enterprise
West German leadership
Mitterand
Link to next viewgraph
• Shutde is routine transportation to Earth orbit. What's needed now, what was origi-
nally envisioned, is a place to Shutde to...
THE WHAT IS A SPACE STATION VIEWGRAPH
• It's the logical extension of our past activities in space
• A United States Space Station would:
dominate the space environment for twenty years
stimulate commercial endeavors in space (recall the President's meeting with aero-
space executives who emphasized commercial potential of space)
place in orbit an American outpost in space. With a space station, there would
always be Americans working in space
- be a national technology laboratory in space
- check out and launch rockets to higher orbit
- open up, for the first time, the possibility of assembling large satellites in space
stake out some options for the future, enabling a President in the years to come,
to embark the United States upon missions that transcend the boundaries of earth:
back to a moon
EXPLORINGTHEUNKNOWN 597
space
toanasteroid
tothesurfaceofMars
implementtheoverridingthemeofyourspacepolicy:UnitedStatesleadershipin
Linktonextviewgraph
• In the1990's,leadershipinspacewillhavea new dimension, something perhaps
that Presidents Nixon and Kennedy could not foresee when they committed America to
leadership in space...
A SPACE STATION WOULD STIMULATE VIEWGRAPH
The new dimension will be the presence of the private sector in space
The space program is going to change over the next 20 years
no longer the monopoly of government
no longer driven solely by motives of exploration and prestige
* Space is going to become a place of business:
new products
new services
new benefits
let me give you just one concrete example:
McDonnell Douglas electrophoresis
• The government has a role to play in the commercialization of space
sponsor K & D
encourage entrepreneurs
provide some essential support services
• This is where space station comes in:
the station is a laboratory where pre-production research will need to be carried
out
the station is a servicing base where repairs to commercial equipment can be car-
ried out. Modifications to equipment can be made, and spares can be stored for dmely
deployment
• In the future, there will be commercial enterprises making products in space, and
a space station is going to make that possible
• Note importance of space program to scientific and technical education in the
U.S, and to development of new technologies, both strong thrusts of this Administration
Link to next viewgraph
• These new commercial enterprises will involve the presence of man. Just as facto-
ries on the ground that have robots require men and women working in the plant to fix
the robots and do things that machines can't, so will the space-based factories
MAN IN SPACE VIEWGRAPH
• Some people say you can do it all in space with robots. In fact, you must have man
He-and she-are the essential ingredient
• The presence of man is the key to leadership in space, And there are technical
reasons for having man as well
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• A principal reason for the excitement and attention the current Shuttle mission is
having in Europe is the simple fact that there is a European scientist onboard the Colum-
bia
• Compare Apollo 16 and Luna 16:
both were missions to the moon
both took place early in the 1970s
both brought lunar samples back to the Earth
- but one, Apollo, was manned and captured thg worla'5 attention
- while the other, an unmanned Russian rover, made no impression other than on
the surface of the moon
• Man can repair and maintain spacecraft, and there are a number of satellites that
have broken down where the capability to repair and maintain would be enormously ben-
eficial:
Seasat
Solar Max
Landsat 4
IRAS
Link to next viewgraph
• The Soviets understand the importance of man in space
THE SOVIET VIEWGRAPHS
• The Soviets have an active, expanding space program in which cosmonauts play a
central role
• The Soviet program:
is technically proficient: at present, two sophisticated So,Set scientific spacecraft
are orbiting Venus. The Soviets were the first to take pictures from the surface of the moon
and the first to transmit data from the surface of Venus
is an instrument of Soviet propaganda, particularly the cosmonauts ( 10 foreigners
have flown with the Soviets)
• The centerpiece of the Soviet program is the Salyut Space Station:
about 49 feet long, and 42,000 lbs
usually a crew of two, sometimes four (five with Chratien)
automatic refueling capability
civil and military missions
overflies the U.S. 5-6 times a day
• What worries me is what the Soviets are up to. What are they planning to fly in the
late 1980s and the 1990s? Will they be successful in their plans to dominate space?
CIA says they are expanding their level of activity and the CIA analysts expect
qualitative improvements
the National Intelligence estimate indicates they are building:
heavy lift launch vehicle
a reusable Space Shuttle to Sly in '86 or '87
and they repeatedly have said and we have some evidence to support it that they
intend to fly a large and permanent space station with up to 20 cosmonauts on board. I
have no doubt that they can and will
• The Soviets are clearly taking their space program very seriously; they appear com-
mitted to a large space station-and I'm very concerned about it
Link to next viewgraph
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• What are our alternatives?
SIG OPTIONS V1EWGRAPH
The SIG study group outlined several options:
commit to a space station
build an Extended Duration Orbiter and unmanned space platforms, or
simply defer a decision on space station
• An Extended Duration Orbiter is an upgraded Shuttle that could stay up beyond
the current limit of about nine days
• An unmanned platform is a satellite that would provide basic services such as power
and data management to a bunch of scientific instruments on board the platform
• We have studied both of these for some time and have a good understanding of
their capabilities
The platform would let you do some good science, but:
it's not a staging base for transportation to higher orbit
it's not going to lead to the commercialization of space
it's not going to let you assembly large space systems
it's not going to impress many people, except for some scientists
The Extended Duration Orbiter is something we have been looking at:
it would be nice to extend the orbiter's stay time
and we could devise some useful things to do
but the cost would be high for marginal improvements
$1.5 billion for orbiter roods
$1.6 billion for dedicated orbiter
plus $1.5 for a platform
and you still would not have continuous operations
just 40 days
• These may indeed be worthwhile projects, but they are hardly America's next step
in space, and no one seems to be pushing them very hard
SIG OPTIONS VIEWGRAPH (CONTINUED)
• A decision to defer
details new commercial endeavors in space
simply means developing a station later, for a station is crucial to future opera-
tions in space
sends a signal to the American people that their space program is going to rest on
its laurels, for the Shuttle will have flown for 10 years by the earliest time we could have a
station ready to go
sends a signal to the Soviets that we are going to stand still in space
Link to next viewgraph
• A decision to defer or to build an extended duration orbiter in lieu of a space
station really means that, in the years ahead, that we are going to forfeit our hard won
leadership in space
LAST VIEWGRAPH
• First 25 years in space have been years of accomplishment for the United States.
We have shown the world-and ourselves-what a Free People can do
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• In1958theUnitedStatesacceptedthechallengeofSputnikandchartered a course
from which I believe we can not now retreat
President Kennedy sent men to the moon, and in doing so sent a message to the
world about America
we landed a scientific laboratory on the surface of Mars, in one of the most im-
pressive scientific expeditions of all time
we began the exploration of the solar system and got a close-up look at the outer
planets including Saturn with her intriguing rings
and we developed the most sophisticated flying machine the world has ever seen,
one that routinely takes us into orbit around the Earth
• In doing all this, we developed new technologies and expanded the world of knowl-
edge. And life here in the United States is better because of it. Our leadership in space
these past 25 years told the world that America was strong and that America accepted the
challenge of space, and that she was equal to the responsibilities of leadership.
• Now, today, here in this room, we must look forward to the next twenty-five years.
The time to start a space station is now:
Shuttle development is over
technology is at hand
requirements have been analyzed
industry is ready
lead times are long
the stakes are enormous: leadership in space for the next 25 years
Document 111-41
Document tide: Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, to James M. Beggs, Administra-
tor, NASA, January 16, 1984.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash°
ington, D.C.
Throughout 1982 and much of 1983, NASA attempted to gain Department of De-
fense support for the space station program. That attempt was not successful, and in the
fall of 1983, NASA decided to seek approval of the station program as solely a civilian
program. In this letter, written after the decision to proceed with the station was made,
Secretary of Defense Caspar "Cap" Weinberger spells out for the record his reservations
about going ahead with the station.
[1] Dear Jim:
In your discussions and your correspondence after the 10 August Senior Interagency
Group (Space) meeting and before the 1 December Cabinet Council for Commerce and
Trade meeting you solicited my support for a space station commitment. Since this De-
partment has been unable to identify any national security requirements that can be
uniquely satisfied or capabilities that could be significantly enhanced by a manned space
station, you have proposed that it proceed as a civil program.
My reservations about your proposal relate to cost and impact on the Space Trans-
portation System.
The $8 billion estimate represents only a fraction of the actual costs required to
achieve the initial capabilities you desire from a space station. Modules to make it opera-
tionally useful, and an extensive complement of instruments to support scientific
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missions,wouldinevitablymultiplythetotalcostseveraltimes.Intoday'sconstrainedfiscal
environment,unprogrammedcostgrowthscanonlybefundedattheexpenseof other
programs.I havecontinuingconcernsaboutheabilityof thenationtosupportandsus-
tainmajorcommitmentstodefenseprograms,aswellasnewproposalslikethePresident's
StrategicDefense.Youwouldnotwishtocancelanyofyourapprovedcivilprogramsto
meetincreasedfundingrequirementsforspacestationan),morethanweinDefensewould
liketoseeournationalsecuritybudgetjeopardized.
Weremainfirmly committedto theSpaceTransportationSystem.Wehave
reconfiguredallourpayloadstobeShuttlecompatibleandhaveinvestedaconsiderable
portionofourspacerelatedfundinginShuttlerelatedprojects.Ourdevelopmentofthe
westcoastShuttlelaunchfacilitiesi aprimeexampleofourcommitmenttotheSpace
TransportationSystem.Ibelievethatamajornewstartofthismagnitudewouldinevitably
divertNASAmanagerialt lentandresourcesfromtheprioritytaskofmakingtheSpace
TransportationSystemfullyoperationalndcosteffective.Withallournationalsecurity
spaceprogramscommittedto theShuttleanddependentonit for theirsoleaccessto
space,I amsurethatyoucanappreciatemyconcernin thisarea.[2] I regretnotbeingableto endorsethemodifiedthrustof theproposedspace
station,butthenationalsecurityimplicationsaretooextensiveandarenotmitigatedby
callingit acivilprogram.
I willbepleasedtodiscusstheseissueswithyoufurtheratyourconvenience.
Sincerel>
Cap
Documen1111-42
Document title: Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet: Presidential Directive on Na-
tional Space Policy," February 11, 1988.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Wash-
ington, D.C.
Between the issuance of the first Reagan administration space policy statement in
July 1982 and 1987, there were a number of significant changes, including the Challenger
accident, increased emphasis on the commercial uses of space, and the report of the blue
ribbon National Commission on Space, A five-month SIG (Space) review during the sec-
ond half of 1987 resulted in a new statement of national space policy reflecting these and
other changes. President Reagan approved the new policy statement on January 5, but he
withheld its release until a parallel review of commercial space policy initiatives being con-
ducted by the Economic Policy Council was completed. The policy statement itself was
classified; this unclassified summary was all that was publicly released.
[1] Fact Sheet
Presidential Directive on National Space Policy
The President approved on January 5, 1988, a revised national space policy that will
set the direction of U.S. efforts in space for the future. The policy is the result of a five-month
interagency review which included a thorough analysis of previous Presidential decisions,
the National Commission on Space report, and the implications of the Space Shuttle and
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expendable launch vehicle accidents. The primary objective of this review was to consoli-
date and update Presidential guidance on U.S. space activities well into the future.
The resulting Presidential Directive reaffirms the national commitment to the explo-
ration and use of space in support of our national well being. It acknowledges that United
States space activities are conducted by three separate and distinct sectors: two strongly
interacting governmental sectors (Civil, and National Security) and a separate,
nongovernmental Commercial Sector. Close coordination, cooperation, and technology
and information exchange will be maintained among sectors to avoid unnecessary dupli-
cation and promote attainment of United States space goals.
GOALS AND PRINCIPLES
The directive states that a fundamental objective guiding United States space activi-
ties has been, and continues to be, space leadership. Leadership in an increasingly
competitive international environment does not require United States preeminence in all
areas and disciplines of space enterprise. It does require United States preeminence in key
areas of space activity critical to achieving our national security, scientific, technical, eco-
nomic, and foreign policy goals.
The overall goals of United States space activities are: (1) to strengthen the secu-
rity of the United States; (2) to obtain scientific, technological, and economic benefits for
the general population and to improve the quality of life on Earth through space-related
activities; (3) to encourage continuing United States private-sector investment in space
and related activities; (4) to promote international cooperative activities taking into ac-
count United States nadonal security, foreign policy, scientific, and economic interests;
(5) to cooperate with other nations in maintaining the freedom of space for all activities
that enhance the security and welfare of mankind; and, as a long-range goal, (6) to expand
human presence and activity beyond Earth orbit into the solar system.
The directive states that United States space activities shall be conducted in accor-
dance with the following principles:
- The United States is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all
nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all mankind. "Peaceful purposes"
allow for activities in pursuit of national security goals.
[2] - The United States will pursue activities in space in support of its inherent right
of self-defense and its defense commitments to its allies.
- The Unites States rejects any claims to sovereignty by any nation over outer space
or celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and rejects any limitations on the fundamental
right of sovereign nations to acquire data from space.
- The United States considers the space systems of any nation to be national prop-
erty with the right of passage through and operations in space without interference. Pur-
poseful interference with space systems shall be viewed as an infringement on sovereign
rights.
- The United States shall encourage and not preclude the commercial use and ex-
ploitation of space technologies and systems for national economic benefit without direct
Federal subsidy. These commercial activities must be consistent with national security in-
terests, and international and domestic legal obligations.
- The United States shall encourage other countries to engage in free and fair trade
in commercial space goods and services.
- The United States will conduct international cooperative space-related activities
that are expected to achieve sufficient scientific, political, economic, or national security
benefits for the nation. The United States will seek mutually beneficial international par-
ticipation in its space and space-related programs.
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CIVIL SPACE POLICY
The directive states that:
The United States civil space sector activities shall contribute significantly to en-
hancing the Nation's science, technology, economy, pride, sense of well-being and direc-
tion, as well as United States world prestige and leadership. Civil sector activities shall
comprise a balanced strategy of research, development, operations, and technology for
science, exploration, and appropriate applications.
The objectives of the United States civil space activities shall be (1) to expand
knowledge of the Earth, its environment, the solar system, and the universe; (2) to create
new opportunities for use of the space environment through the conduct of appropriate
research and experimentation in advanced technology and systems (3) to develop space
technology for civil applications and, wherever appropriate, make such technology, avail-
able to the commercial sector; (4) to preserve the United States preeminence in critical
aspects of space science, applications, technology, and manned space flight; (5) to estab-
lish a permanently manned presence in space; and (6) to engage in international coop-
erative efforts that further United States space goals.
COMMERCIAL SPACE POLICY
The directive states that the United States government shall not preclude or deter
the continuing development of a separate, non-governmental Commercial Space Sector.
Expanding private sector investment in space by the market-driven Commercial Sector
generates economic benefits for the Nation and supports governmental Space Sectors
with an increasing range of space goods and services. Governmental Space Sectors shall
purchase commercially available space goods and services to the fullest extent feasible and
shall not conduct [3] activities with potential commercial applications that preclude or
deter Commercial Sector space activities except for national security or public safety rea-
sons. Commercial Sector space activities shall be supervised or regulated only to the ex-
tent required by law, national security, international obligations, and public safety.
NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE POLICY
The directive further states that the United States will conduct those activities in
space that are necessary to national defense. Space activities will contribute to national
security objectives by 1) deterring, or if necessary defending against enemy attack; 2) as-
suring that forces of hostile nations cannot prevent our own use of space; 3) negating, if
necessary, hostile space systems; and 4) enhancing operations of United States and Allied
forces. Consistent with treaty obligations, the national security space program shall
support such functions as command and control, communications, navigation, environ-
mental monitoring, warning, and surveillance (including research and development pro-
grams which support these functions).
INTER-SECTOR POLICIES
This section contains policies applicable to, and binding on, the national security
and civil space sectors:
The United States Government will maintain and coordinate separate national
security and civil operational space systems where differing needs of the sectors dictate.
Survivability and endurance of national security space systems, including all nec-
essary system elements, will be pursued commensurate with their planned use in crisis and
conflict, with the threat, and with the availability of other assets to perform the mission.
Government sectors shall encourage, to the maximum extent feasible, the
604 THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. SPACE POLICYAND PLANS
development and use of United States private sector space capabilities without direct Fed-
eral subsidy.
The directive states that the United States Government will: (1) encourage the
development of commercial systems which image the Earth from space competitive with
or superior to foreign-operated civil or commercial systems; (2) discuss remote sensing
issues and acdvites with foreign governments operating or regulating the private opera-
tion of remote sensing systems; and (3) condnue a research and development effort for
future advanced, remote sensing technologies. Commercial applications of such technolo-
gies will not involve direct Federal subsidy.
The directive further states that assured access to space, sufficient to achieve all
United States space goals, is a key element of national space policy. United States space
transportations systems, must provide a balanced, robust, and flexible capability with suffi-
cient resiliency to allow continued operations despite failures in any single system. The
goals of United States space transportation policy are: (1) to achieve and maintain safe
and reliable access to transportation in, and return from, space; (2) to exploit the unique
attributes of manned and unmanned launch and recovery systems; (3) to encourage to
the maximum extent feasible, the development and use of United States private sector
space transportation capabilities without direct Federal subsidy; and (4) to reduce the
costs of space transportation and related services.
- The directive also states that communications advancements are critical to all
United States space sectors. To ensure necessary capabilities exist, the directive states [4]
that the United States Government will continue research and development efforts for
future advanced space communications technologies. These technologies, when utilized
for commercial purposes, will be without direct Federal subsidy.
The directive states that it is the policy of the United States to control or prohibit,
as appropriate, exports of equipment and/or technology that would make an significant
contribution to a foreign country's strategic military missile programs. Certain United
States friends and allies will be exempted from this policy, subject to appropriate non-transfer
and end-use assurances.
- The directive also states that the United States will consider and, as appropriate,
formulate policy positions on arms control measures governing activities in space, and will
conduct negotiations on such measures only if they are equitable, effectively verifiable,
and enhance the security of the United States and its allies.
The directive further states that all space sectors will seek to minimize the creation
of space debris. Design and operations of space tests, experiments and systems will strive to
minimize or reduce accumulation of space debris consistent with mission requirements
and cost effectiveness.
IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES
The directive states that normal interagency procedures will be employed wherever
possible to coordinate the policies enunciated in this directive. To provide a forum to all
Federal agencies for their policy views, to review and advise on proposed changes to na-
tional space policy issues to the President for decisions as necessary, a Senior lnteragency
Group (SIG) on Space shall continue to meet. The SIG (Space) will be chaired by a mem-
ber of the National Security Council staff and will include appropriate representatives of
the Department of State, Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Commerce
(DOC), Department of Transportations (DOT), Director of Central Intelligence (DCI),
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy. Other Executive agen-
cies or departments will participate as the agenda of meeting shall dictate.
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POLICY GUIDELINES AND IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS
The directive also enumerates Policy Guidelines and hnplementing Actions to pro-
vide a framework through which the policies in the directive shall he carried out. Agencies
are directed to use this section as guidance on priorities, including preparation,
review, and execution of budgets for space activities, within the overall resource and policy
guidance provided by the President. Within 120 days of the date of this directive, affected
Government agencies are directed to re_-iew their current policies for consistency with the
directive and, where necessary, establish policies to implement the practices contained
therein.
CML SPACE SECTOR GUIDELINES
The directive specifies that in conjunction with other agencies: NASA will
continue the lead role within the Federal Government for advancing space science, explo-
ration, and appropriate applications through the conduct of activities for research, tech-
nology, development and related operations; the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration will gather data, conduct research, and make predictions about the [5]
Earth's environment; DOT will license and promote commercial launch operations which
support civil sector operations.
Space Science. NASA, with the collaboration of other appropriate agencies, will
conduct a balanced program to support scientific research, exploration, and experimen-
tation to expand understanding of: (1) astrophysical phenomena and the origin and evo-
lution of the universe; (2) the Earth, its environment and its dynamic relationship with the
Sun; (3) the origin and evolution of the solar system; (4) fundamental physical, chemical,
and biological processes; (5) the effects of the space environment on human beings; and
(6) the factors governing the origin and spread of life in the universe.
Space Exploration. In order to investigate phenomena and objects both within
and beyond the solar system, the directive states that NASA will conduct a balanced pro-
gram of manned and unmanned exploration.
Human Exploration. To implement the long-range goal of expanding human pres-
ence and activity beyond Earth orbit into the solar system the policy directs NASA to begin
the systematic development of technologies necessary to enable and support a range of
future manned missions. This technology program (Pathfinder) will be oriented toward a
Presidential decision on a focused program of manned exploration of the solar system.
Unmanned Exploration. The policy further directs NASA to continue to pursue a
program of unmanned exploration where such exploration can most efficiently and effec-
tively satisfy national space objectives by among other things: achieving scientific objec-
fives where human presence is undesirable or unnecessary; exploring realms where the
risk or costs of life support are unacceptable; and providing data vital to support future
manned missions.
Permanent Manned Presence. The directive states that NASA will develop the Space
Station to achieve permanendy manned operational capability by the mid-1990s. The di-
rective further states that the Space Station will: (1) Contribute to United States preemi-
nence in critical aspects of manned spaceflight; (2) provide support and stability to scien-
tific and technological investigations; (:3) provide early benefits, particularly in the materi-
als of life sciences; (4) promote private sector experimentation preparatory to indepen-
dent commercial activity; (5) allow evolution in keeping with the needs of Station users
and the long-term goals of the United States; (6) provide opportuniues for commercial
sector participation; and (7) contribute to the longer term goal of expanding human pres-
ence and activity beyond Earth orbit into the solar system.
Manned Spaceflight Preeminence. The directive specifies that approved programs
such as efforts to improve the Space Transportation System (STS) and return it to safe
flight and to develop, deploy and use the Space Station, are intended to ensure United
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States preeminence in critical aspects of manned spaceflight.
Space Applications. The policy directs NASA and other agencies to pursue the
identification and development of appropriate applications flowing from their activities.
Agencies will seek to promote private sector development and implementation of applica-
tions. The policy also states that:
- Such applications will create new capabilities, or improve the quality' or efficiency
of continuing activities, including long-term scientific observations.
- NASA will seek to ensure its capability to conduct selected critical missions through
an appropriate mix of assured access to space, on-orbit sparing, advanced [6] automation
techniques, redundancy, and other suitable measures.
- Agencies may enter cooperative research and development agreements on space
applications with firms seeking to advance the relevant state-of-the-art consistent with United
States Government space objectives.
- Management of Federal civil operational remote sensing is the responsibility of
the Department of Commerce. The Department of Commerce will: (1) consolidate Fed-
eral needs for civil operational remote sensing products to be met either by the private
sector or the Federal government; (2) identify needed civil operational system research
and development objectives; and (3) in coordination with other departments or agencies,
provide for the regulation of private sector operational remote sensing systems.
Civil Government Space Transportation. The policy states the unique Space Trans-
portation System (STS) capability to provide manned access to space will be exploited in
those areas that offer the greatest national return, including contributing to United States
preeminence in critical aspects of manned spaceflight. The STS fleet will maintain the
Nation's capability and will be used to support critical programs requiring manned pres-
ence and other unique STS capabilities. In support of national space transportation goals,
NASA will establish sustainable STS flight rates to provide for planning and budgeting of
Government space programs. NASA will pursue appropriate enhancements to STS opera-
tional capabilities, upper stages, and systems for deploying, servicing, and retrieving space-
craft as national and user requirements are defined.
International Cooperation. The policy guidelines state that the United States will
foster increased international cooperation in civil space activities by seeking mutually ben-
eficial international participation in its civil space and space-related programs. The SIG
(Space) Working Group on Space Science Cooperation with the U.S.S.R. shall be respon-
sible for oversight of civil space cooperation with the Soviet Union. No such cooperative
activity shall be initiated until an interagency review has been completed. The directive
provides that United States cooperation in international civil space activities will:
- Be consistent with United States technology transfer laws, regulations, Executive
Orders and presidential directives.
- Support the public, nondiscriminatory direct readout of data from Federal civil
systems to foreign ground stations and the provision of data to foreign users under speci-
fied conditions.
- Be conducted in such a way as to protect the commercial value of intellectual
property developed with Federal support. Such cooperation will not preclude or deter
commercial space activities by the United States private sector, except as required by na-
tional security or public safety.
COMMERCIAL SPACE SECTOR GUIDELINES
The directive states that NASA, and the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and
Transportation will work cooperatively to develop and implement specific measures to
foster the growth of private sector commercial use of space. A high-level focus for commer-
cial space issues has been created through establishment of a Commercial Space Working
Group of the Economic Policy Council. SIG (Space) will continue to coordinate the devel-
opment and implementation of national space policy.
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[7]- Tostimulateprivatesectorinvestment,ownership,andoperationofspaceas-
sets,thedirectiveprovidesthattheUnitedStatesGovernmentwillfacilitateprivatesector
accesstoappropriateU.S.space-relatedhardwareandfacilities,andencouragetheprivate
sectortoundertakecommercialspaceventures.ThedirectivestatesthatGovernmental
SpaceSectorsshall,withoutprovidingdirectFederalsubsidies:
- Utilizecommerciallyavailablegoodsandservicestothefullestextentfeasible,
andavoidactionsthatmayprecludeordetercommercialspacesectoractivitiesexceptas
requiredbynationalsecurityorpublicsafety.A spacegoodor serviceis"commercially
available"if it iscurrentlyofferedcommercially,orif it couldbesuppliedcommerciallyin
responsetoagovernmentserviceprocurementrequest."Feasible"meansthatsuchgoods
orservicesmeetmissionrequirementsinacost-effectivemanner.
- Enterintoappropriatecooperativeagreementstoencourageandadvanceprivate
sectorbasicresearch,development,andoperationswhileprotectingthecommercialvalue
oftheintellectualpropertydeveloped;
- ProvidefortheuseofappropriateGovernmentfacilitiesonareimbursablebasis;
- Identify,andeliminateorproposeforelimination,applicableportionsofUnited
Stateslawsandregulationsthatunnecessarilyimpedecommercialspacesectoractivities;
- Encouragefr etradeincommercialspaceactivities.TheUnitedStatesTradeRep-
resentativewillconsult,or,asappropriate,negotiatewithothercountriestoencourage
freetradeincommercialspaceactivities.Inenteringintospace-relatedchnolo_,devel-
opmentandtransferagreementswithothercountries,ExecutiveDepartmentsandagen-
cieswilltakeintoconsiderationwhethersuchcountriespracticeandencouragefreeand
fairtradeincommercialspaceactivities.
ProvideforthetimelytransferofGovernment-developeds acetechnolo_'tothe
privatesectorinsuchamannerastoprotecti scommercialvalue,consistentwithnational
security.
- PriceGovernment-providedgoo sandservicesconsistentwithOMBCircular A-25.
- The directive also states that the Department of Commerce (DOC) will commis-
sion a study to provide information for future policy and program decisions on options for
a commercial advanced earth remote sensing system. This study, to be conducted in the
private sector under DOC direction with input from Federal Agencies, will consist of as-
sessments of the following elements: (1) domestic and international markets for remote
sensing data; (2) financing options, such as cooperative opportunities between govern-
ment and industry in which the private sector contributes substantial financing to the
venture, participation by other government agencies, and international cooperative part-
nerships; (3) sensor and data processing technology and; (4) spacecraft technology and
launch options. The results of this study will include an action plan on the best alternatives
identified during the study.
NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE SECTOR GUIDELINES
General. The directive states that:
- The Department of Defense (DOD) will develop, operate, and maintain an as-
sured mission capability through an appropriate mix of robust satellite control, assured
access to [8] space, on-orbit sparing, proliferation, reconstitution or other means.
- The national security space program, including dissemination of data, shall be
conducted in accordance with Executive Orders and applicable directives for the protec-
tion of national security information and commensurate with both the missions performed
and the security measures necessary to protect related space activities.
- DOD will ensure that the military space program incorporates the support re-
quirements of the Strategic Defense Initiative.
Space Support. The directive states that:
- The national security space sector may use both manned and unmanned launch
systems as determined by specific mission requirements. Payloads will be distributed among
launch systems and launch sites to minimize the impact of loss of any single launch system
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or launch site on mission performance. The DOD will procure unmanned launch vehicles
or services and maintain launch capability on both the East and West coasts. DOD will also
continue to enhance the robustness of its satellite control capability through an appropri-
ate mix of satellite autonomy and survivable command and control, processing, and data
dissemination systems.
- DOD will study concepts and technologies which would support future contin-
gency launch capabilities.
Force Enhancement. The directive states that the national security space sector
will develop, operate, and maintain space systems and develop plans and architectures to
meet the requirements of operational land, sea, and air forces through all levels of conflict
commensurate with their intended use.
Space Control. The directive also states that:
- The DOD will develop, operate, and maintain enduring space systems to ensure
its freedom of action in space. This requires an integrated combination of antisatellite,
survivability, and surveillance capabilities.
- Antisatellite (ASAT) Capability. DOD will develop and deploy a robust and com-
prehensive ASAT capability with programs as required and with initial operational capabil-
ity at the earliest possible date.
- DOD space programs will pursue a survivability enhancement program with
long-term planning for future requirements. The DOD must provide for the survivability
of selected, critical national security space assets (including associated terrestrial compo-
nents) to a degree commensurate with the value and utility of the support they provide to
national-level decision functions, and military operational forces across the spectrum of
conflict,
- The United States will develop and maintain an integrated attack warning, notifi-
cation, verification, and contingency reaction capability which can effectively detect and
react to threats to United States space systems.
Force Application, The directive states that the DOD will, consistent with treaty
obligations, conduct research, development, and planning to be prepared to acquire and
deploy space weapons systems for strategic defense should national security conditions
dictate
INTER-SECTOR GUIDELINES
The directive states that the following paragraphs identify selected, high priority
cross-sector efforts and [9] responsibilities to implement plans supporting major United
States space policy objectives:
Space Transportation Guidelines.
- The United States national space transportation capability will be based on a mix
of vehicles, consisting of the Space Transportation System (STS), unmanned launch ve-
hicles (ULVs), and in-space transportation systems. The elements of this mix will be de-
fined to support the mission needs of national security and civil government sectors of
United States space activities in the most cost effective manner.
- As determined by specific mission requirements, the national security space sec-
tor will use the STS and ULVs. In coordination with NASA, the DOD will assure the Shuttle's
utility to national defense and will integrate missions into the Shuttle system. Launch pri-
ority will be provided for national security missions as implemented by NASA-DOD agree-
ments. Launches necessary to preserve and protect human life in space shall have the
highest priority except in times of national security emergency.
- The STS will continue to be managed and operated in an institutional arrange-
ment consistent with the current NASA/DOD Memorandum of Understanding. Responsi-
bility will remain in NASA for operational control of the STS for civil missions, and in the
DOD for operational control of the STS for national security missions. Mission manage-
ment is the responsibility of the mission agency.
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- UnitedStatescommerciall unchoperationsareanintegralelementofarobust
nationalspacelaunchcapability.NASAwillnotmaintainanexpendablelaunchvehicle(ELV)adjuncttotheSTS.NASAwillprovidelaunchservicesforcommercialndforeign
payloadsonlywherethosepayloadsmustbeman-tended,requiretheuniquecapabilities
oftheSTS,or it isdeterminedthatlaunchingthepayloadsontheSTSisimportantfor
nationalsecurityorforeignpolicypurposes.Commercialandforeignpayloadswillnotbe
launchedongovernmentownedoroperatedELVsystemsexceptfornationalsecurityor
foreignpolicyreasons.
- CivilGovernmentagencieswillencourage,tothemaximumextentfeasible,ado-
mesticommerciall unchindustrybycontractingfor necessaryELVlaunchser_4cesdi-
reedyfromtheprivatesectororwithDOD.
- NASAandtheDODwillcontinuetocooperatein thedevelopmentanduseof
militaryandcivilspacetransportationsystemsandavoidunnecessaryduplicauonofactix4-
ties.Theywill pursuenewlaunchandlaunchsupportconceptsaimedatimproving
cost-effectiveness,responsiveness,capability, reliability, avaliability, maintainability and
flexibility. Such cooperation between the national security and civil sectors will ensure
efficient and effective use of national resources.
The directive lists guidelines for the federal encouragement of commercial un-
manned launch vehicles (ULVs):
- The United States Government fully endorses and will facilitate the commercial-
ization of United States unmanned launch vehicles (ULVs).
- The Department of Transportation (DOT) is the lead agency within the Federal
Government for developing, coordinating, and articulating Federal policy and regulatory
guidance pertaining to United States commercial launch activities in consultation w_th
DOD, State, NASA, and other concerned agencies. All Executive departments and agen-
cies shall assist the DOT in carrying out its responsibilities as [ 10] set forth in the Commer-
cial Space Launch Act and Executive Order 12465.
- The United States Government encourages the use of its launch and launch-related
facilities for United States commercial latmch operations.
- The United States Government will have priority use of Government facilities and
support services to meet national security and critical mission requirements. The United
States Government will make all reasonable efforts to minimize impacts on commercial
operations.
- The United States Government will not subsidize the commercialization of ULVs,
but will price the use of its facilities, equipment, and services with the goal of encouraging
viable commercial ULV activities in accordance with the Commercial Space Launch Act.
- The United States Government will encore'age fi-ee market competition within
the United States private sector. The United States Government will provide equitable
treatment for all commercial launch operators for the sale or lease of Government equip-
ment and facilities consistent with its economic, foreign policy, and national security inter-
ests.
- NASA and DOD, for those unclassified and releasable capabilities for which they
have responsibility shall, to the maximum extent feasible:
-- Use best efforts to provide commercial launch firms with access, on a reimburs-
able basis, to national launch and launch-related facilities, equipment, tooling, and ser-
vices to support commercial launch operations;
-- Develop, in consultation with the DOT, contractual arrangements covering access
by commercial launch firms to national launch and launch-related property and serx4ces
they request in support of their operations;
-- Provide technical advice and assistance to commercial launch firms on a reim-
bursable basis, consistent with the pricing guidelines herein; and
-- Conduct, in coordination with DOT appropriate em4ronmental analyses neces-
sary to ensure that commercial launch operations conducted at Federai launcb facilities
are in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act.
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The directive lists government ULV Pricing Guidelines. The price charged for the
use of United States Government facilities, equipment, and service, will be based on the
following principles:
- Price all services (including those associated with production and launch of com-
mercial ULVs) based on the direct costs incurred by the United States Government. Reim-
bursement shall be credited to the appropriation from which the cost of providing such
property or service was paid.
- The United States Government will not seek to recover ULV design and develop-
ment costs or investments associated with any existing facilities or new facilities required
to meet United States Government needs to which the U.S. Government retains title;
- Tooling, equipment, and residual ULV hardware on hand at the completion of
the United States Government's program will be priced on a basis that is in the best overall
interest of the United States Government, taking into consideration that these sales will
not constitute a subsidy to the private sector operator.
[ 11 ] -The directive also states that commercial launch firms shall:
- Maintain all facilities and equipment leased from the United States Government
to a level of readiness and repair specified by the United States Government;
- Comply with all requirements of the Commercial Space Launch Act, all regulations
issued under the Act, and all terms, conditions or restrictions of any license issued or
transferred by the Secretary of Transportation under the Act.
The directive establishes the following technology transfer guidelines:
- The United States will work to stem the flow of advanced western space technol-
ogy to unauthorized destinations. Executive departments and agencies will be fully
responsible for protecting against adverse technology transfer in the conduct of their pro-
_l?alns.
- Sales of United States space hardware, software, and related technologies for use
in foreign space projects will be consistent with relevant international and bilateral agree-
ments and arrangements.
The directive states that all Sectors shall recognize the importance of appropriate
investments in the facilities and human resources necessary to support United States space
objectives and maintain investments that are consistent with such objectives. A task force
of the Commercial Space Working Group, in cooperation with OSTP, will conduct a feasi-
bility study of alternate methods for encouraging, without direct Federal subsidy, private
sector capital funding of United States space infrastructure such as ground facilities,
launcher developments, and orbital assembly and test facilities. Coordinated terms of ref-
erence for this study shall be presented to the EPC and SIG (Space).
The directive notes that the primary forum for negotiations on nuclear and space
arms is the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) with the Soviet Union in Geneva. The instruc-
tions to the United States Delegation will be consistent with this National Space Policy
directive, established legal obligations, and additional guidance by the President. The
United States will continue to consult with its Allies on these negotiations and ensure that
any resulting agreements enhance the security of the United States and its Allies. Any
discussions on arms control relating to activities in space in fora other than NST must be
consistent with, and subordinate to, the foregoing activities and objectives.
Finally the directive states that using NSC staff approved terms of reference, an IG
(Space) working group will provide recommendations on the implementation of the Space
Debris Policy contained in the Policy section of this directive.
Chapter Four
Organizing for Exploration
by Sylvia K. Kraemer
The Eisenhower administration's calculated policy of"open skies" and "peaceful uses
of space" to enable satellite overflights of other nations virtually assured that the U.S. non-
defense space program would be lodged in a civilian agency/ Eisenhower's uneasiness
over an emerging military-industrial complex, expressed in his Farewell Address, _ no doubt
also contributed to his view that all non-defense-related space activities should be assigned
to a new civilian organization. Scientists--who recognized that scientific exploration of
space would fare better intertwined with a "peaceful," or nonmilitary, space program--
agreed with Eisenhower. The president's own Science Advisory Committee, chaired by
James R. Killian,Jr., of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, favored creating a civil-
ian national space agency out of the nucleus of the National Advisory Committee tor Aero-
nautics (NACA)._ In a March 1958 memorandum to President Eisenhower, Killian joined
forces with Bureau of the Budget Director Percival Brundage and Nelson A. Rockefeller,
chairman of the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization, to make a
lucid case for choosing NACA over the proposed alternatives, the most prominent of which
were the Department of Defense (DOD), the Atomic Energy Commission, a private con-
tractor, or a new Department of Science and Technology, to lead "the civil space effort."
[IV-l, IV-2, IV-3, IV-4, IV-5]
A New Organization
Created by the National Aeronautics and Space Act (PL 85-568) [II-17], the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) opened for business on October 1, 1958,
with a complement of nearly 8,000 employees transferred from the old NACA research
laboratories: Langley Aeronautical Laboratory at Hampton, Virginia (est. 1917); Ames
Aeronautical Laboratory at Moffett Field, California (est. 1939); the Flight Research Cen-
ter at nearby Muroc Dry Lake (est. 1946), now known as the Dryden Flight Research Cen-
ter; and the Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory in Cleveland, Ohio (est. 1940). By the end
of 1960, NASA personnel rolls had nearly doubled to over 16,000. The principal increases
were a result of the tripling of NASA Headquarters personnel and the addition of portions
of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA), renamed the George C. Marshall Space
Flight Center, and the new Goddard Space Flight Center in Beltsville, Maryland. Most of
Goddard's personnel had been transferred from the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL)
and the Naval Ordnance Laboratory (NOL). The Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the Califor-
nia Institute of Technology, a contractor-owned and -operated facility involved in rocket
1, See R. Cargill Hall, "Origins of U.S. Space Policy: Eisenhower, Open Skies, and Freedom of Space,"
Chapter Two of this volume.
2. "Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People,'January 17, 1961, Public Papers _![the
Presidents t!f the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1962), pp. 1035-40. Quote from pp. 1038-39; "military-industrial complex" phrase on p. 1038.
3. The political and legislative origins of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration are de-
scribed in Walter A. McDougall, .,. The Heavens and The Earth: A Political Histor'_ of the ,Space Age (New York: Basic
Books, 1985). Chapter 7, "The Birth of NASA," and Enid Curtis Bok Schoettle, "The Establishment of NASA," in
Sanford A. Lakoff, ed., Knowledge and Power: Egsay,_ on Sczence and Government (New York: Free Press, 1966),
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research since 1936, was also transferred from the U.S. Army to NASA. Tile Manned Space-
craft (;enter in Houston and the Kennedy Space Center at Cape Canaveral were added
within the next three years2
Because of the way NASA was initially assembled, a little over 80 percent of NASA's
technical core during the 1960s and 1970s--its engineers and scientists--held within its
corporate memory the experience of working with NACA, ABMA, and the Na W organiza-
tions from which the Goddard Space Flight Center had drawn much of its personnel. Each
group would bring its own institutional cuhure. Predominating among NASA's initial cadre,
the scientists and research engineers of NACA (est. 1915) had based their careers in an
institution that had conducted research in aerodynamics and aircraft structures and pro-
pulsion systems for both industrial and military clients. Informally structured, NACA had
been overseen by its Main Committee and various technical subcommittees, and its work
in aeronautical engineering was done largely by civil servants. Aside from its work in aero-
nautics, what distinguished NACA as an institution was the ethos that permeated its labo-
ratories. With its emphasis on technical competence, evaluation of one's work by technical
peers, and a collegial in-house research environment conducive to engineering innova-
tion, the NACA centers were not well equipped for the sweeping institutional growth and
change that would complicate their life after 19587
To the technical core of NACA were added, during NASA's first two years, the comple-
mentary Naval Research Laboratory habits of in-house engineering research and science
and, by the ABMA group, the emphasis on in-house technical development characteristic
of the Army's arsenal system. The presence at ABMA of a contingent of German rocket
engineers reinforced its emphasis on in-house technical mastery and control. What these
various components shared was a common cuhure that placed technical judgment above
political competence. They undoubtedly also shared the conviction that they were em-
barked upon an exploratory venture unrivaled in the annals of mankind."
The new agency's charter, the "Space Act of 1958," had given it broad latitude to
contribute "to the general welfare and security of the United States" by expanding
"human knowledge of phenomena in the atmosphere and space" and preserving "the role
of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and space science and technology and in
the application thereof to the conduct of peaceful activities within and outside the atmo-
sphere." Within three years--not much time given the pace of policy evolution in most
popularly elected governments--John E Kennedy provided NASA a specific mission so
compelling that debate over just how NASA's broad charter was to be carried out was
effectively quieted.
The Cold War, most notably in the "Sputnik Crisis," and then the flight ofYuri Gagarin
in 1961 stimulated not only the creation of NASA in 1958 but its tremendous expansion in
the early 1960s to carry out the Apollo program7 After President John F. Kennedy issued
4. By the end of 1960, the old NACA laboratories and Marshall Space Flight Center accounted for 49
percent and 33 percent, respectively, of NASA's employees. (The Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, Texas,
was added in 1961. The U.S. Army's Missile Firing Laboratory at Cape Canaveral, Florida, was added to Marshall
Space Flight Center's organization in 1960 and was lenamed the John F. Kennedy Space Center in 1963.) The
157 personnel who had been working on the Naw's Project Vanguard, which became the nucleus of the Goddard
Space Flight Center (est. 1959), were transferred to NASA in 1958 from one of the Navy's own in-house research
laboratories, the Naval Research Laboratory. They were soon joined by 63 more who had been working for the
Naval Research Laboratory's Space Sciences and Theoretical Divisions. The next large group to transfer to
NASA was the 5,367 civil servants from the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) at Redstone Arsenal, in
Huntsville. Alabama. ABMA had been essentially an in-house operation. The youngest NASA installations, the
Manned Spacecraft Center (renamed Johnson Space Center in 1973) and the Kennedy Space Center, were
initially staffed by personnel from Langley Research Center and the ABMA.
5. Alex Roland, Model Re._earch: The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1915-1958 (Washington,
DC: NASA SP-4103, 1985); Nancy.Jane Petrovic, "Design for Decline: Executive Management and the Eclipse of
NASA." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maryland, 1982 (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International,
1982).
6. On NASA's culture, see Howard E. McCurdy, Inside NASA: High 7"echnolzJg_yand Organizational Culture in
the US. Space Program (Baltimore, MD:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
7. Thanks to the GI Bill and its Korean War counterpart, the military services' reserve officers' training
programs, cooperative work-education programs, and draft exemptions for those in engineering school or
working tor the governmen! in engineering fields, NASA and its contractors were able to mobilize unprec-
edented numbers of engineers and scientists.
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hischallengetothenationinMay1961tosendamantotheMoonandreturntrimsafely
withinthedecade--achallengeframedwithintheColdWarcontestbetweentheCommu-
nistBlocnationsandthe"freeworld"---NASAundertookamobilizationcomparable,in
relativescale,tothatundertakenbytheUnitedStatestofightWorldWarII.Tileagency's
civil service personnel rolls increased by a factor of three, while the men and women em-
ployed on NASA contracts increased by a factor of tell. Likewise, NASA's annual budget
increased an order of magnitude between 1960 and 1965, from roughly $500 million to
$5.2 billion.
Table 1: Dimensions of the Apollo Mobilization*
Overall Budget (billions)
Amount Percentage
Increase
FY 61 $0.964
FY 62 $1.825 89%
FY 63 $3.674 101%
FY 64 $5.100 38%
FY 65 $5.250 2%
Construction of Facilities Budget (millions)
FY 61 $98.2
FY 62 $217.1 121%
FY 63 $569.8 162%
FY 64 $546.6 -4%
FY 65 $522.2 -4%
Personnel
In-House Contractor Ratio
NASA
1958 (9/30) 8,040
1960 10,200 36,500 1:3.5
1961 17,500 57,000 1:3.3
1962 23,700 115,500 1:4.9
1963 29,900 218,400 1:7.3
1964 32,500 347,100 1:10.7
1965 34,300 376,700 1:11
Contracting Out
The private sector provided even more scientists, engineers, technicians, and sup-
porting personnel tot Apollo than did NASA. Throughout its history, between roughly
80 percent and 90 percent of NASA's budget has gone into goods, services, and develop-
ment procured from the private sector through contracts. The notion of relying on private
industry and universities did not originate with NASA's Apollo-era Administrator
James E. Webh ( 1961-1968)--though both necessity and good politics made him a natural
8..lane \ran Nimmen and l.eomud C. Bt uno with Robert l_ Roshoh, _,_4.h_ Hi._torical l)ata Book, Vol. 1,
NASA Re_m+rce._,195£ / 96& (Washi ngton, DC: NASA SPA012, 1988), pp. 137-141, 134, 63-119.
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champion of contracting out as the best way of getting the agency's work done. NACA had
supplemented its in-house research with contracts to Stanford, the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, and other universities. To NASA's first administrator, T. Keith Glennan,
and his ideologically sympathetic boss, President Eisenhower, reliance on the pri_te sec-
tor came naturally2 [IV-7] Indeed, the practice had its roots deep in U.S. history. [IV-8]
Since the beginning of the republic, U.S. citizens have shared a widespread mistrust
of large government establishments. Coupled with this mistrust has been a public faith in
private enterprise that, through the mechanism of a free market, was thought the best
guarantor of economic growth and a free society. On this usually hi-partisan ideological
foundation, and partly in reaction to the alleged excesses of the New Deal, federal policy
encouraged government agencies to acquire their goods and services from the private
sector.
The military services had been acquiring equipment and logistics support from the
private sector since the early nineteenth century; they were well schooled in government
procurement. More recently, it was the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, created out of the
U.S. Army Air Forces under the Defense Reorganization Act of 1947 that established the
Department of Defense, that had the most experience with contracting to the private sec-
tor. As a result of the Army's Manhattan Project and the ballistic missile programs man-
aged by the Air Force's Research and Development Command, both services came to rely
on private contractors for advanced engineering and development work and, in some cases,
to assist in the technical direction of other development contractors--the Air Force going
so far as to create the Rand and Aerospace Corporations.
Contracting out by NASA also had great practical merit. Because most of the experi-
ence in the country to date in related missile and high-performance aircraft development
centered in industry, which had worked as contractors to the military, the resources of
industry could be marshalled more effectively by the government than reproduced within
the government. NASA would be able to harness talent and institutional resources already
in existence in the emerging aerospace industry and the country's leading research uni-
versities. _°In 1959 the General Services Administration authorized NASA's use of the Armed
Service Procurement Regulations of 1947, which contained important exemptions, suited
to research and development work, from the principle of making awards to the "lowest
responsible bidder." Contracting out promised the additional political advantage of dis-
persing Federal funds around the country and, as a consequence, creating within Con-
gress a political constituency with a material interest in the health--and management--of
the space program. The attempt to meld different institutional cultures into a single orga-
nization was not without its problems. For example, when the California Institute of
Technology's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) became affiliated with NASA on Janu-
ary 1, 1959, its managers believed the lab would be called upon to play the dominant role
in determining America's space exploration agenda. NASA had a much more limited role
in mind forJPL, however, and the resulting conflict between these divergent expectations
laid a foundation for lingering animosity between the two institutions. N [IV-6]
By 1961 the federal government had been contracting to the private sector for much
of its research and development work for two decades, since World War 1I. Enough ques-
tions had been raised about the wisdom of that policy to prompt President John F. Kennedy
to ask the director of the Bureau of the Budget to review it. Budget Director David E. Bell
was joined in this task by the secretary of defense (Robert S. McNamara), the administra-
tor of NASA (James E. Webb), the chairman of the Civil Service Commission (John W. Macy,
Jr.), the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Glenn T. Seaborg), tile director of
9. On Glennan, see J.D. Hunley, ed., The Birth of NASA: 771e Diary of 7_ Keith (;lennan (Washington, DC:
NASA SP-4105, 1993).
10, One NASA installation, the,let Propulsion Laboratory of the California Institute of Technology in
Pasadena, California, would remain wholly a contractor operation, For an excellent and brief discussion of the
NASA acquisition process, see Arnold S. Levine, Managing NASA in the Apollo Era (Washington, DC: NASA SP-
4102, 1982), Chapter 4.
| 1. Clayton L. Koppes,]Pl, and the American ,'_mce Pr_Jffram (New ttaven: Yale University Press, 1982.)
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the National Science Foundation (Alan T. Waterman), and the special assistant to the presi-
dent for science and technology (Jerome B. Wiesner). The report--which came to be known
as the "Bell Report"Iconstituted a detailed and comprehensive review of federal con-
tracting for research and development. [IV-9]
The Bell Report affirmed the federal government's policy of relying "heavily on con-
tracts with non-federal institutions to accomplish scientific and technical work needed for
public purposes." At the same time, it cautioned that "the management and control of
such programs must be firmly in the hands of full-time Government officials clearly re-
sponsible to the President and the Congress. With programs of the size and complexity
now common," it continued,
. . . the Government [must] have on its staffexceptionally strong and able executives, scientists, and
engineers, fully qualified to weigh the views and advice of technical specialists, to make policy deci-
sions concerning the types of work to be undertaken, when, by whom, and at what cost, to supervise the
execution of work undertaken, and to evaluate the results.
This requirement, according to the Bell group, was not being met: "In recent years
there has been a serious trend toward eroding the competence of the Government's re-
search and development establishments--in part owing to the keen competition for scarce
talent which has come from Government contractors." The solution, advised the budget
director and heads of federal research and development agencies, was not "setting artifi-
cial or arbitrary limits on Government contractors" hut creating a working environment
and offering salaries that would better enable the government to compete with the private
sector for top scientific and engineering talent. However wise and well-intentioned the
Bell Report's recommendations may have been, they do not seem to have had great effect.
"Contracting out" continues to this day to be a primary issue among NASA managers,
scientists, and engineer,_.
Program Management
Not only were NASA's procurement procedures based on those of the military estab-
lishment, but NASA made extensive use of the military's experience in program manage-
ment as well. The ratio of military detailees to civilians working in NASA increased steadily
between 1960 and 1968. '_ Many of the detailees were Air Force or Navy career officers
assigned to program or operations management positions. For example, 103 of the roughly
180 military detailees in NASA at the beginning of 1963 were career Navy or Air Force
officers. 's [IV-10] Though fewer in number, program managers who had honed their skills
in private industry also helped to manage the NASA enterprise. For example, NASA's Of-
rice of Manned Space Flight was led during much of the 1960s and 1970s by men who had
come from industry, such as George E. Mueller (Space Technology Laboratories),
Dale D. Myers (North American Rockwell), and John E Yardley (McDonnell Douglas As-
tronautics).
The epitome of the proven military program manager at NASA was U.S. Air Force
Major General Samuel C. Phillips. Schooled in Air Force research and development
12. Nirnmen and Bruno with Rosholt, NASA HistoncalData Book, Vol. I, pp. 80-81,98-99.
13. Albert F. Siepert, Memorandum to James E. Webb, February 8, 1963, NASA Historical Reference
Collection, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC. A list of positions "requiring USAF officers" forwarded by
NASA to the Department of the Air Force in 1964 included: director, program control, Apollo; director, pro-
gram control, Saturn V; deputy director for program management, Apollo spacecraft; assistant to director for
program management, Saturn V; chief, configuration management, Apollo spacecraft; configuration manage-
ment officer, Saturn V; chief, configuration management, Saturn I-IB; configuration management officer, Gemini;
configuration management officer, Apollo launch site; assistant depu_' director for program management, Apollo
program office; configuration management officer; and chief, mission requirements, Apollo. Attachment to
Eugene M. Zuckert, Secretary of the Air Force, Memorandum to Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator of
NASA, May 27, 1964, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
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program management at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Phillips was assigned in
1959 to manage the development of the "Minuteman" intercontinental ballistic missile.
Phillips was convinced that the development of a new technology system required that the
program head have centralized authority over engineering, configuration management,
procurement, testing, construction, manufacturing, logistics, and training. Phillips' suc-
cess with the Minuteman program won the admiration of NASA's Associate Administrator
for Manned Flight George Mueller, who brought Phillips to NASA where he served as
deputy director and then program director for the Apollo program. '4
What this conglomeration of assorted talents drawn from NASA and the military
wrought was not simply the historic feat of placing Americans on the Moon and bringing
them back safely. Less visible but no less important was their catalytic role in the emerging
ability of U.S. industry to develop, manufacture, and operate large, complex, and sophisti-
cated technical systems. In 1968, Science magazine, the publication of the American Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Science, observed:
In terms of numbers of dollars or of men, NASA has not been our largest national undertaking, but in
terms of complexity, rate of growth, and technological sophistication it has been unique .... It may
turn out that [the space program 's] most valuable spin-off of aU will be human rather than technologi-
cal: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate, and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities
of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings?
NASA and military managers responsible for developing new aerospace technologies stimu-
lated the government's contractors in U.S. industry to adopt program management and
systems engineering strategies that would promote their sur_fval in a market dominated by
a few large federal customers.
The forces that have influenced the management strategies characteristic of U.S.
industries at any given time have varied both with the nature of contemporary economic
trends and with the nature of the goods being produced. For example, in the United
States during the 1880s and 1890s, in an era before the triumph of mass media consumer
advertising, companies sought to control markets by controlling production and/or prices.
Firms producing relatively undifferentiated commodities (e.g., whiske); salt, coal, tobacco,
sugar, and kerosene) attempted to combine financial as well as management structures to
achieve more effective market control within an industry. Toward the end of the century,
such combinations were increasingly subject to state and federal anti-trust legislation.
Successful prosecutions under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 brought about the
dissolution of such "horizontally integrated" firms as the Standard Oil Company of New
Jersey and the American Tobacco Company.
Meanwhile, U.S. firms that began to produce increasingly complex manufactured
items sought to achieve economies of scale in an expanding market through mass produc-
tion and volume retailing (e.g., sewing machines, automobiles, and typewriters). By inte-
grating vertically--controlling as many steps in the production of an item as possible, from
raw material through manufacture and even marketing--firms (e.g., Carnegie Steel) com-
bined to create even larger companies better able to withstand the economic oscillations
of the period between the end of the Civil War and 1896.
The new large enterprises could no longer be administered informally, with control
of markets the principal preoccupation of management. Creative managers of some of
these enterprises (in, for example, the tobacco, meat-packing, and agricultural power ma-
chinery industries) developed the centralized, functionally departmentalized organiza-
tional structure. After 1900, a new wave of expansion occurred in industries exploiting
new technologies such as electrification and the gasoline engine. Product diversification
became a common strategy for expansion in firms that could exploit systematic research
14. That Phillips enjoyed continuing esteem long after Apollo was reflected in NASA's request that he
head a comprehensive post-Chalbenger accident study of NASA's management practices.
15. Dale Wolfe. Executive Officer, American Association for the Advancemenl of Science, editorial for
Science, November 15, 1968.
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anddevelopment--firmsin thechemical,rubber,automobile,andelectricalindustries.
Productdiversification,i turn,requiredadifferentorganizationalapproachtomanage-
ment.Thestrategyofdiversificationwasfollowedbydecentralizationnthesefirms'orga-
nizationalstructures.
Decentralization,however,poseditsownadministrativeproblemstorthesefirms.
Howwasauthoritytobedistributedamongheadquartersandfieldactivities?Themost
common solution was that developed by managers of the railroads nearly a half-century
before: the multi-divisional line-and-staff organization, by which authority was delegated
from headquarters to plant managers in the field (who could not otherwise be held ac-
countable for the performance of their units), while managers of centrally located auxil-
iary or service functions set standards and procedures. ''_
In post-World War 1I America, several new forces began to make themselves felt on
U.S. industry and, as a consequence, gave rise to new management strategies. Among these
was the entrance of the public sector--primarily the federal government--into the mar-
ketplace as a significant buyer. Another was the emergence of a substantial market, and a
responding productive capacity, for goods and services having highly sophisticated tech-
nological ("hardware," "software," and "services") components.
The importance of technological sophistication as a driving force in this new market
cannot be overestimated. The largest public sector buyer, the military establishment, seek-
ing out eve>improved weapons systems, funded industrial research and development both
indirectly as a buyer of newer and more advanced systems and directly as the largest single
investor in research and development) 7 How much the U.S. economy has been affected by
these two factors--the federal government as buyer and that buyer's interest in new tech-
nologies-is reflected in the top five industries (measured by sales) in the United States in
1988. Heading the list are two U.S. industries well-established before World War II: petro-
leum refining ($284.3 billion) and motor vehicles and parts ($273.1 billion). Third, fourth,
and fifth are industries that were initially stimulated by the federal government's post-
World War II appetite for technologically sophisticated systems and its ability to find ways
to pay for them: electronics ($1 15.3 billion), aerospace ($112.8 billion), and computers
and office equipment ($112.6 billion).'" The sales and capital represented by these figures
grew on a foundation built of successfully managed government research and develop-
ment programs.
To appreciate the complexity of the technical management and quality controls, not
to mention coordination and accounting, that government and industrial managers faced
in assuring the success of one major NASA program, consider the prime contracts awarded
to industry to design, build, test, and certify the principal components of the Saturn V
alone: Boeing Co., S-IC, first stage (powered by five F-1 engines); North American Avia-
tion, S-II, second stage (powered by five J-2 engines) ; Douglas Aircraft Company, S-IVB,
third stage (powered by a single J-2 engine); Rocketdyne Div. of North American Aviation,
J-2 and F-1 engines; and International Business Machines (IBM), Saturn instrument unit. '_
Were this the extent of industrial contractor involvement in the program, that would
have been management challenge enough. In addition, a partial listing of the subcontracts
these contractors awarded to other firms that "played a major role in the development and
16. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of American Industrial Enterprise
(Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1962), Chaplers 1, 2, pa._sim.
17. Ross M. Robertson, Hist_rryo]'theA merican Economy, 2nd ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace &World, inc.,
1964), p. 555. In 1946-47 the Federal government paid 24 percent, and industry paid 72 percent, of the dollars
(est. $2.1 billion) spent on industrial research and development during that period. By 1969 the federal
government's share of the total (est. $28 billion) had increased to 40 percent and industry's share declined to
58 percent. Which sector (private or public) actually spent the rapidly increasing number of dollars devoted to
research and development during 1946-1969 undm went a comparable change: industry spent 62 percent of the
nation's research and development dollars in 1946-47 and 76 percent in 1969
18. The,_,'vbrldAlmanac and Book o]Fact.s(New _tbrk, 1990), p. 86. Data from Fortune magazine.
19. North American Aviation was bought by Rockwell and was known as North American Rockwell Corp.
after September 1967. In 1967 Douglas Aircraft Co. and the McDonnell Corp. merged, becoming the McDonnell
Douglas Corporation. The former Douglas division in California became the McDonnell Douglas Astronautics
Co. (MDAC).
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productionoftheSaturnVlaunchvehicle"wouldhaveto include the 50 subcontractors to
Boeing, 91 subcontractors to Douglas Aircraft, 54 subcontractors to IBM, 28 subcontrac-
tors to North American Space Division, and 51 subcontractors to North American
Rocketdyne? ° These well over 250 firms provided innumerable parts and components,
ranging from hydraulic hoses to analog computers, all of which had to meet exacting
specifications for integrated fit and performance• "I wish to emphasize," remarked a
Marshall Space Flight Center procurement officer during the bidding for the S-II stage
contract, "that the important product that NASA will buy in this procurement is the effi-
cient management of a stage system. ''''
So impressive was the management undertaking involved in developing and fabricat-
ing the Apollo/Saturn systems that even before the historic Apollo 11 mission left the
launch pad on the morning of July 16, 1969, the Committee on Science and Astronautics
of the U.S. House of Representatives asked key industry Apollo/Saturn contractors and
NASA program managers to review their program management practices• [IV-11 ] Their
published responses make tedious reading, littered as they are with charts and acronyms
and general ineloquence, but they have an important story to tell. Unlike the industrial
firms of earlier periods of U.S. history, the firms that supplied the aerospace programs of
NASA and the military were engaged in the low-volume production of items that were
complex, novel, and relatively unique; thousands of "end items" produced by dozens of
different suppliers and manufacturers had to fit and function together, and be produced
on schedule and at the levels of reliability called for by manned missions. Thus the effi-
ciency-seeking attributes of the traditional "American system of manufacture" (use of stan-
dardized interchangeable parts and continuous process manufacture) no longer applied.
The "efficiency"-inspired organizational structure of functionally distinguished units
(e.g., finance, accounting, marketing, research, facilities, engineering, testing, manufac-
ture, logistics, etc.), adequate for the production of essentially undifferentiated products,
would not suffice. "Early in the development phase of the Apollo/Saturn effort," recalled
Rocketdyne's vice president of management planning and controls, "Rocketdyne manage-
ment recognized that the traditional functional organizational alignment was not adequate
to direct the effort of the various engine programs effectively. To ensure the necessary
concentration of effort, it was decided to establish separate product organizations with
responsibility for the development of specific types of engines. "_ Not all companies had
been organized like Rocketdyne; Boeing's management was "basically decentralized and
organized around product line responsibilities," one in which "the functional executive
provides a unifying force which crosses the boundaries of the various line organizations .... "
Nonetheless, at Boeing the "line organization managers" had the "ultimate authority and
responsibility for carrying out The Boeing Co.'s contractual and related commitments to
its customers."_'
The novelty and relative uniqueness of the aerospace industry's products necessarily
meant that little would be "standard"; the ability to respond intelligently and quickly to
failures would become a critical management responsibility. That responsibility was felt
especially acutely among government (NASA) managers responsible for the Saturn
program's success:
• • . such [Apollo/Saturn program management]features as actions for early problem detection, ac-
tions and process for problem solving, and action and processes for recovery from anomalies and
failures are basic features.. /4 . . . the system must provide visibility and jT.exibility. You need the
visibility to identify nonproductive tasks and you need the flexitn'lity to redirect the effort.Otherwise,
20. Roger E. Bilstein, Stages to Saturn: A TechnologicalHistory of the Apollo Saturn Launch Vehicle._(Washing-
ton, DC: NASA SP-4206, 1980), passim, and Appendix E.
21. Manned Space Flight Center, "Minutes of the Phase II Pre-Proposal Conference for Stage S-II Pro-
curement on June 21, 1961,"JSC files. Quoted in Bilstein, Stages to Saturn, p. 211.
22. "Apollo Program Management: StaffStudy for the Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, U.S. House of
Representatives, Committee on Science and Astronautics, 91st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office. 1969), p. 122.
23. H.H. Gunning (Boeing Co.), ibid., pp. 15-16.
24. Eberhard EM. Rees (NASA Marshall Space Flight Center), ibid., p. 9.
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you would be using up limited resources on tasks that were no good. Visibility and flexibility imply a
knowledgeable decision point close to the work. _
The project manager, the program manager, and their staff became the "knowledge-
able decision" points "close to the work" that government and industry created to manage
the development and production of specialized technological systems. "The heart of the
Program Management System," explained one NASA program manager,
is the Project Manager who is responsible for the design, fabrication, test, delivery, and successful
performance of a major piece of hardware, a product best exemplified by a stage of the launch vehicle.
To achieve his goal, the Project Manager has clear lines of authority and responsibility as well as clear
channels of coordination with supporting entities. These have been committed to clear, concise docu-
mented agreements .... In addition to management by product, such as the S-H Stage, the Program
and Project managers also manage, to an extent, by function. These functional management
elements...permeate the entire program .... These elements insure, within their disciplines, a con-
tinuous coordination between the functional elements [among other NASA organizations]...enabling
many things to be handled at the working level .... "'_
Critical communication and coordination between government "customers" and indus-
trial contractor organizations required of the latter that they develop management
systems that paralleled, or mirrored, those NASA established. One Rocketdyne manager
described NASA's (and DOD's) impact on the aerospace industry this way:
During the past seven years NASA has had a significant and favorable influence in the development
of advanced management systems within Rocketdyne. Program planning and control requirements
specified by both DoD and NASA have stimulated such management systems activity as development
and implementation of the Rocketdyne Cost Management System, the Mechanized Production Control
System, the Mechanized Inventory Control System coupled with the Required Inventor), Control Sys-
tem, the Mechanized Quality Performance System, and the Mechanized Time-keeping ,_'stem, to name
a few. New concepts such as the weU-definedprogram organization operating in a program/functional
matrix relationship, the assignment of specific individuals to manage all activit_ on product-oriented
elements of program work breakdown structures, and the application of the multiple accountability
technique also saw their genesis during this periodF
Similar managerial adaptations occurred throughout the aerospace industry.
The government's and the aerospace industry's strategy for managing the design
and development of large, complex, and relatively unique technical systems---or program
management--had an important political dimension as well. The project (the develop-
ment of a single entity or system) and the program (a cluster of interrelated projects) soon
became, in effect, products and product lines marketed by the military and NASA to Con-
gress and the White House. NASA learned, as the military had learned, that Congress,
relatively stingy with funds for abstract and indefinite activities such as fundamental
research, could be persuaded to open the public purse for clearly defined packages of
concrete "end items" with specific missions. Concrete end items meant actual hardware
contracts that might benefit particular congressional constituencies. The Apollo program,
like the Manhattan Project before it, was just such a package. A program thus became a
bureaucratic and budgetary device for framing and executing projects to explore space
and advance aeronautical technology. '_"The design and execution of a successful project
became the measure of success, as many of NASA's people got caught up in the annual
25. R.L. Brown (NASA Marshall Space Flight Center), ibid., p. 13.
26. Edmund F. O'Connor, "General Program Management," ibid., p. 247-48.
27. Ibid., p. 126.
28. NACA's more modest aeronautical research role--the "service" it provided the military and aviation
industry--was rapidly replaced by NASA's need to direct its research and development know-how to specific
programs, in particular, the manned spaceflight sequence known as Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo. Conceptu-
ally and administratively, the NASA program became the umbrella under which projects were justified and
planned, congressional authorization and appropriations obtained, private sector sources solicited and evalu-
ated, contract awards made, and those contracts administered.
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needto marketthe agency'sprojectsandprogramsto Congressto obtainthe
appropriationsecessarytosustaintheirwork.
Inanearly(1961)reorganization,NASAsoughttodiscourageinternecinecompeti-
tionforresourcesthatdevelopedwhenanagencyorganizeditselfaroundhardwarepro-
gramsbyidentifyingitsownprogramswithbroadlyframedgoalsinstead.TheApollopro-gramrepresentedonesuchgoal._Theultimate ffectivenessofthisapproach,owever,
dependedsomewhatonthenatureofthegoalused--onthevarietyofrealistichardware
approachesthatcouldbeusedtoachieveit.Forexample,thegoalof"SpaceSciences"was
fairlydiffuse;manyhardwareprojectscouldbeembracedbyit.Thiswaslesstrueforcostly
projects.AfterApollo,onlytheshuttleandthehoped-forspacestation--eachaveryspe-
cifichardwareprogramthatwouldrequirerelativelyargeportionsoftheagency'stotal
budget--emergedtosatisfythegoalofmannedspacexploration.Toappreciatetheemer-
genceandeffectovertimeofthe"program"bothasamanagerialandasapoliticaldevice,
noteitsabsenceinHughL.Dryden'speechonthefledglingspaceprogram,givenwhen
NASAwasonlyafewmonthsold.
A Culture at Risk
It would be difficult to exaggerate the significance of the policy of "contracting out"
in terms of the way NASA went about its daily work. Virtually every aspect of the agency's
business was ensnared in the dense forest of regulations and procedures of federal acqui-
sitions policy. The number of procurement actions processed by NASA quadrupled from
roughly 44,000 in 1960 to almost 190,000 in 1963; by 1965, NASA was processing almost
300,000 actions, or almost seven times the actions the agency was managing only five years
before. The dollar value of the average NASA contract more than doubled as well. How-
ever, during the same period (1960-1965), NASA's personnel increased by only a factor of
three, and only a fraction of them was qualified to manage or monitor contractors. Thus,
the burden of implementing the government's "contract out" policy was borne increas-
ingly by NASA's technical people. Engineers who had come to NASA (or earlier to NACA)
to do engineering found themselves increasingly cast in the role of overburdened contract
monitors, ever more remote from the "hands-on" work that had attracted them in the first
place. [IV-] 9]
Originally an aggregate of essentially independent, in-house research organizations,
NASA also struggled with the centralized controls inherent in large-scale program man-
agement. As NASA faced, after 1966, tighter budgets, competition among the former NACA
laboratories, new NASA centers, and Headquarters intensified. Because the centers man-
aged the contractors, and because the centers housed NASA's technical expertise, they
acquired the power of fiefdoms--and were often so called. Nonetheless, NASA sought to
retain the discipline orientation of NACA's decentralized laboratories--further accen tuat-
ing a tension between aspirations of various research disciplines and program organiza-
tion that would persist through much of NASA's institutional life in the next thirty years.
The agency's inherited culture struggled against centralization at the government-
wide level as well. When NACA was transformed into NASA in 1958, the committee struc-
ture by which it had been administered was abandoned for a hierarchical and centralized
management structure. Centralized federal administrative controls that evolved during
the 1940s and 1950s--controls such as standardized personnel management, budgeting,
procurement, and operating procedures--were imposed on NASA by the Bureau of the
Budget (after 1970 the Office of Management and Budget, OMB), the Civil Service Com-
mission (after 1979 the Office of Personnel Management, OI'M), and ultimately, of course,
the U.S. Congress.
The proportion of NASA's total in-house permanent workforce consisting of scien-
tists and engineers gradually increased from one-third in 1958 to slightly less than one-half
29, Levine, Manag'ing NASA in the Apollo Era, p. 5.
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in 1970.At thesametime,theratioofNASA'scontractoremployeestoci_filservicem-
ployeesincreasedfromroughly3to 1in 1960to11to1in 1965(seeTable1).Afterthe
post-fiscalyear1966downwardslideinNASA'sfunding,thatratiodeclined.Assumingan
increaseinexternallyimposed,andthusdifficultochange,administrativeburdenson
NASAfrom1960forward,thoseburdenshadtobecarriedincreasinglyb theagency's
civilservicescientistsandengineers._''
Amongexternallyimposedmanagementcontrols,thefederalpersonnelsystemhas
provenascriticaltoNASAasfederalacquisitionspolicy.NASA'spredecessor,NACA,had
struggledagainstcivilservicepayscalesandhiring/promotionproceduresandceilings,
which,NACAinsisted,madeit difficultorecruitandretaingoodengineers.NASAwas
abletoobtain525"excepted"positions_tohirethetalentit neededtocarryouttheApollo
program.Howeverthesewereindeedexceptions--exceptionst a long-term,systemic
disregardbythefederalpersonnelsystemofitsimpactontheagency'scultureoftechnical
competence.Thatsystemwasandremainstronglybiasedtowardseniorityandgeneric
functions;itassumesthatincreasesin rankandsalaryshouldbedirectlyrelatedtoincreas-
ingsupervisoryormanagerialresponsibilities.
Compoundingthissystemicbarrierto"advancement"forengineershasbeenacul-
turalprejudicethatgoesbacktoGreekandRomanantiquity,thenotionthatthosewho
workwithideashavegreatersocialvaluethanthosewhoworkwiththeirhands---or"things."
Fortypical managers, the hierarchical and centralized structure of power in most organi-
zations (not excepting NASA) reinforces their increasing remoteness, as they moved "up
the ladder," from practical, day-to-day concerns and "hands-on" work. More than four-
fifths of the NASA engineers recruited during NASA's first decade "advanced" into man-
agement positions, and among the older engineers who were employed with NASA o1
NACA before 1960, over 90 percent ended their careers in management positions. Occa-
sionally, a NASA engineer has risen to the level of GS-16 without moving into manage-
ment, but the widespread perception within the agency has been that the dual-career lad-
der works only for the very exceptional few. Thus many NASA engineers' occupations
diverged increasingly fiom their vocations as they began to spend more of their days doing
work for which they had not been trained and may have had little natural inclination. On
the other hand, some NASA engineers, fearing obsolescence in engineering careers, con-
sidered management a legitimate and productive alternative for individuals with some
understanding of how technical programs work) _ Engineers turned managers could then
leverage their knowledge and experience through the projects for which they were re-
sponsible.
Looking for a Mission
The Apollo program was unargnably an enormous achievement. Nevertheless, the
transient motives behind the program, and the rapid mobilization of funds and personnel
that made success possible, impeded the gradual evolution of a stable and broad public
consensus about the nation's purpose in space. As more than 13,000 NASA engineers worked
at their daily routines during the mid-1960s, pursuing the adventure to which President
Kennedy had summoned them, the solid ground of common national purpose had al-
ready begun to shift ominously under their feet. By 1965,John F. Kennedy lay buried, and
three years later he would be joined by Robert Kennedy, who, along with Martin Luther
King, would be victims of violence. Violence in the United States, as race-related riots
spread from urban ghetto to urban ghetto, was matched by U.S. violence abroad.
3(1. Sylvia 1)mighty Fries, "Apollo: A Pioneering Generation," International Astronautical Federation,
371h Congress (Octoher 9. 1986), Ref. No. Ie%,\-86-495.
31. Appointments are exempt from standard federal civil service classifications and salary ranges.
32. The infi)t marion in this section is drawn from Sylvia Doughty Fries. NASA l"n_neers and the Age o/
Apolb_ (Washington. DC: NASA SP-410,1, 1992).
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Television, which had been acquired by 94 percent of all U.S. households by the mid°
1960s, rendered these scenes of violence commonplace and provided a world stage for an
outpouring of public protest against U.S. military involvement in Viemam? _ In March
1968, that champion of space exploration, President Lyndon B.Johnson--so tough in the
battle against the North Vietnamese, so tough in the battle against poverty and race dis-
crimination--formally abandoned any hope of reelection. Raising the specter of runaway
inflation as costs for the war in Vietnam and the social programs of the "Great Society"
mounted,Johnson's economic advisers had persuaded the president in 1965 that the bud-
get for the space program would have to be contained. There was diminishing enthusiasm
outside NASA for an ambitious space program to follow the Apollo adventure. In fiscal
year 1966, NASA's budget began its downward slide (though actual outlays for 1966 were
the highest of the decade).S' [III-20]
The political consensus that had produced the visionary National Aeronautics and
Space Act of 1958 began to dissipate before the first few Apollo missions were flown? _
NASA's fiscal year 1971 budget took a battering from the Bureau of the Budget in 1969,
forcing the cancellation of Apollo missions 18 through 20 and leading Webb's successor
Thomas O. Paine to complain that the Bureau of the Budget had ignored the ambitious
recommendations of the White House's own Space Task Group, chaired by Vice President
Spirt T. Agnew. [III-25] A staunch supporter of a vigorous manned space program (and
hence further Apollo manned expeditions to the Moon), Paine was willing to cease the
continued production of the Saturn launch vehicle and to defer the Viking project to
launch an unmanned spacecraft to land on the planet Mars to pay for further manned
lunar missions. Viking survived, as did a proto-space station (Skylab) fashioned from Apollo-
Saturn hardware and flown during 1973; but the mighty Saturn did not. NASA was able to
persuade the Nixon administration that a new Space Transportation System (STS) featur-
ing a reusable orbiter spacecraft and solid propellant rocket boosters, flying thirty or more
times a year, would be an economical alternative to the use of large "throw away" launchers
such as the Saturn.
The fortunes of NASA's authorizing legislation, the "Space Act," reflects a similar
diminished priority for a great national adventure in space as successive amendments
stripped the statute of its originally well-focused declaration of purpose. In 1964 NASA's
ten top executives lost their special pay status. In 1973 the National Aeronautics and Space
Council, which could have served as a vehicle by which the executive branch crafted an
interagency consensus around a well-defined program, was abolished. From 1974 onward,
NASA's authorizing statute became burdened with numerous charges to the agency, occa-
sionally having only the most tangential relation to NASA's original purpose. At the same
time, the addition of these new statutory directives reflected admiration for the agency's
technical and managerial know-how. After all, "if NASA could send men to the Moon, why
couldn't they also... ?" NASAwas directed to develop and demonstrate "solar heating and
cooling technologies" in 1974, to monitor and investigate the "chemical and physical in-
tegrity of the Earth's upper atmosphere" in 1975, to develop "more energy efficient and
petroleum conserving and environment preserving ground propulsion systems" in 1976,
to develop and demonstrate "electric and hybrid [ground] vehicle" technologies in 1976,
and to develop advanced automobile propulsion systems and to assist "in bioengineering
research, development, and demonstration programs designed to alleviate and minimize
the effects of disability" in 1978. In the early 1980s NASA lost its privileged position as the
U.S. arbiter of non-military space activity, as the agency was denied authority to
33. For one view of the decade, see AUenJ. Matusow, The Unraveling ofA merica: A History o[Liberalism in the
1960's (New York: Harper & Row, 1984).
34. Robert A. Divine, "Lyndon B.Johnson and the Politics of Space," in Robert A. Divine, ed.. TheJohnson
_ars: Vietnam, the Environment, and Science,Vol. II (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987). pp. 217-53.
35. The last Apollo mission was the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project jointly conducted with the Soviet Union.
An Apollo command and service module, equipped with a specially adapted docking module, joined with a
Soyuz spacecraft in July 1975. The spacecraft spent two days docked together in orbit while American astronauts
and Soviet cosmonauts ate and visited together and performed joint scientific investigations.
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promulgater gulationsforthegrantingoflicensesforNASApatentsand,in 1984,asthe
agencyacquiredstatutorydirectionto "seekandencouragetothemaximumextentpos-
siblethefullestcommercialuseofspace."By1988NASAfounditselfrequiredtocontract
withindustryforExpendableLaunchVehicle(ELV)services,s'_
Aspublicsupportforthecivilianspaceprogramremainedsoft,_7thenumberofgov-
ernmentemployeesNASAwasabletosupportdeclinedtoaboutwo-thirds(in1988)of
thealmost36,000peopleontheNASApayrollin19667"Facedwithdeterioratingsupport,
NASAexecutiveshadalegitimatedesiretoprotecthefieldcenters,whosemostskilled
technicalemployeesweressentialtotheagency'sabilitytogoaboutitswork.Bydesignat-
ing"rolesandmissions"foreachofthecenters,NASAattemptedtoavoid uplicationand
assureachinstallationessentialfunctionsrelatedtotheparticularprojectworkassigned
toit.s_'[IV-14]TheelaborateinstitutionalmachinerydevelopedtocarryoutApollocould
notbesoeasilydisassembled,however,giventheinterlockinginterestsit hadcreatedamong
NASA'sinstallations,contractors,andgeographicregionsandtheirrepresentativesin
Washington.
AndsotheorganizationthatbuiltAmerica'scivilspaceprogramin thehigh-noonof
theColdWargropedaboutforamarketablemission.In1971DeputyAdministratorGeorge
M.LowevencontemplatedrecastingNASAasanationaltechnologyagency,responsible
notonlyforaeronauticsandspaceresearchanddevelopment,butalsoforawiderangeof
"technologicalsolutions"for nationalproblemsuchasalternativepowerandenergy
sources,environmentalpollution,improvedtransportationsystems,healthcaresystems,
productivityof services,education,andhousing.4°[IV-12]Thatotherswerethinkingin
thisveinaswellisapparentfromthenon-aerospaceresponsibilitiesaddedtoNASA'satt-
thorizinglegislationduringthe1970s.
NASA'scivilservantsandvariousadvisorygroupscarriedoutperiodicstudiesduring
subsequentyearstodefineNASA'sgoals,or toarticulateavision,forthecivilspacepro-
gram.[IV-15,IV-16]Therewere,of course,thosevisionarieswithintheagencywhohad
workedwithNASAfordecadesandbelievedthatif theytriedharderthepubliccouldbe
persuadednotonlytorecognizethepromiseofanambitiousspaceprogram,buttopay
for it.Suchvisionariescombinedwithbureaucraticentrepreneursadecadelatertoper-
snadePresidentRonaldReagani 1984topronouncehisblessingonaprogramtodesign,
build,andoperateatruespacestation--anorbitingU.S.outpostinspacethathadbeena
NASAdreamsincetheagencywasfirstestablished.4'
36.National Aeronautics and ,SpaceAct of 1958, asAmended. Printed for the use of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (`lanuary 1990).
37. As measured by NASA appropriations, which have not recovered their 1965 level in constant dollars.
See also "Towards a New Era in Space: Realigning Policies to New Realities," Committee on Space Policy, Na-
tional Academy of Sciences and National Academy of Engineering (Washington, DC: National Academy Press,
1988).
38. NASA contractor employees outnumbered civil servants 3 to 1 in the early 1960s, ballooned to 10 to
1 in 1966, and subsided to about 2 to 1 in the 1980s. Nimmen and Bruno with Rosholt, NASA Historical Data
lJook,VoL/, p. 118; NASA Pocket Statistics (Washington, DC: NASA, 1986), p. C-27. Numbers of current contractor
ernployees can only be estimated.
39. Associate Director ['or Center Operations, on "Catalog of NASA Center Roles," April 16, 1976. Part of
the intent of the "roles and missions" concept may have been to reduce inter-center rivalry, but institutional
specialization has apparently done little to relieve institutional particularism.
40. George M. Low, Deputy Administrator, NASA, Memorandum for the Administrator, "NASA as a Tech-
nology Agency." May 25, 1971.
41. Sylvia Doughty Fries, "2001 to 1994: Political Environment and the Design of NASA's Space Station
System," Technolol..Tyand Culture 29 (.July 1988): 568-93.
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A Space Transportation System
Meanwhile, during the 1970s the more pragmatically minded bowed to the budget-
ary pressures that had come to dominate Washington's political climate. In 1971 NASA
persuaded the Nixon White House that the proposed shuttle program 42 would "take the
astronomical costs out of astronautics. '_ The agency had contracted with an economic
research firm to investigate the economics of the proposed shuttle system. The economists
reported in 1971--on the basis of figures and formulas that had to have been somewhat
speculative--that such a system would be economical assuming a flight rate of "between
300 and 360 shuttle flights in the 1979-1990 period, or about 25 to 30 space shuttle flights
per year. '_4 [III-30] Even more portentous was what such a flight rate, in turn, assumed
that NASA--its organizational strength rooted in its history as an advanced technology
research and development organization--would be just as successful as the operator of a
routine transportation system.
NASA Deputy Administrator George M. Low acknowledged that the agency would
have to change to operate a cost-effective space transportation system, though whether he
grasped just how fundamental a change was involved is not clear. [IV-13] The cost of "do-
ing business in space, coupled with limited and essentially fixed resources available for
space exploration," observed Low to his senior management team, "places severe limita-
tions on the amount of productive work that NASA can do, unless we can develop means
to lower the unit cost of space operations." Low correctly attributed that "high cost" to the
"great sophistication" with which most space systems are designed in order to "operate
acceptably with low allowable weight" and to the fact that "most systems are individually
tailored for their mission, used once or twice, and then never used again. Thus the econo-
mies of producing a number of like systems are never attained." NASA would now, asserted
Low, have to abandon the strategy of developing "individually tailored technologies" and,
instead, "focus on multiple-use, standardized systems" (emphasis added). 4_In 1983, with the
shuttle's series of flight tests completed, Congress added to the statutory activities in which
NASA was authorized to engage "the operation of a space transportation system..." (emphasis
added).
Although Low may not have thought of it in these terms, he was, in effect, asking the
NASA organization to turn back the clock to a time when U.S. manufacturers evolved
management strategies to achieve the efficiencies of standardized, volume production to
exploit an expanding market. It was a bold risk that he was taking. To the extent that the
nation's civil space program hinged on the success of the shuttle program, NASA would
have to undertake the most profound reversal in its organizational culture that any organi-
zation could be asked to make. Would it succeed? Could the agency and its industrial
partners unlearn the management strategies and habits they had had to learn in order to
design and produce the complex and reliable aerospace systems that carried men to the
Moon? Would NASA's inherited research culture be able to respond to the administrative
and logistical demands of routine operational efficiency? And would an expanding mar-
ket for space transportation support the need to divert scarce resources into the routine
operation of "multiple-use, standardized systems"?
A partial answer came in the form of the report issued by the Presidential Commis-
sion on the space shuttle Challenger accident that had occurred January 28, 1986, [IV-17]
Chaired by former Secretary of State William P. Rogers, the commission concluded that
the fiery end of the STS-51L mission was caused by "the failure of the pressure seal in the
aft field joint of the right Solid Rocket Motor. The failure was due to a faulty design unac-
ceptably sensitive to a number of factors. These factors were the effects of temperature,
42. Properly referred to as the "Space Transportation System" (i.e., the Shuttle Orbiter, External Tank
(non-recoverable), and twin Solid Rocket Boosters).
43. Statement by the President, the White House,January 5, 1972.
44. Mathematica, Inc., "Economic Analysis of the Space Shuttle System," National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Contract NASW-2081 (January 1972).
45. George M. Low, Deputy Administrator, NASA, Memorandum to Addressees, "Space Vehicle Cost
Improvement," May 16, t972.
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physicaldimensions,thecharacterofmaterials,theeffectsofreusability,processing,and
thereactionofthejointtodynamicloading.'"'_Thatwasthetechnical cause. The commis-
sion was also impressed by other proximate causes of the accident to which it ultimately
gave great weight: a top-level decision to launch that had been inadequately informed
about the sensitivity of the O-rings on the Solid Rocket Boosters' aft field joints to the
inordinately cold temperatures prevailing at the time of the launch, a "silent" safety, reli-
ability, and quality' assurance program, and an organizational failure to adapt to the re-
quirements of a trnly operational transportation system. These included lack of schedule
discipline and inadequate logistics to support the flight rate that would enable the agency
to deliver the economies promised when President Ronald Reagan announced in 1982
that "the first priority of the STS program is to make the system fully operational and cost-
effective in providing routine access to space. ''_7 [III-38]
For the next two and a half years NASA redesigned known weaknesses in tile shuttle's
systems, elevated the status of the safety, reliability, and quality assurance organization,
and tightened decision-making channels between its centers and headquarters. Tile result
was a successful "return to flight" in September 1988. Wags remarked that the flight of
STS-26 was probably the safest shuttle mission imaginable. Underlying management is-
sues--especially whether NASA could, or even should, attempt to transform itself into an
operations organization--proved more stubborn. When the agency undertook an assess-
ment of its "management practices and...the effectiveness of the NASA organization," it
turned fi_r help to one of its most respected program managers, General Phillips.
Not surprisingly, the Phillips group, which reported back to NASA in December 1986
[IV-18], recommended (among other things) stronger program management, to be
achieved through "strong headquarters program direction for each major NASA program,
with clear assignment of responsibilities to the NASA centers involved," and improved
"discipline and responsiveness to problems of the program management system." At the
same time, the group insisted that "NASA must accept that it will be responsible for space-
flight operations for the foreseeable future." That NASA had not, to that point, fully
accepted its operational responsibility was suggested by the fact that the agency's "present
structure of organization and management does not assure adequate attention to opera-
tions requirements in system design or in the planning and conduct of operations and
logistic sttpport in the era of frequent shuttle flights and long-term operation of the space
station."
To buttress the agency's ability to meet the operational needs of the shuttle program,
the Phillips group called for the creation of a new associate administrator for operations,
whose organization would include space tracking network and data systems and--eventu-
ally-the Kennedy Space Center. Two years later NASA did create an associate administra-
tor-level Office of Space Operations, but it was not clear whether the new organization was
merely old wine (the former Office of Space Tracking and Data Systems) in a new bottle.
The competing demands of operations and research and development continued to trouble
the agency whenever (as in 1990 and early 1991) its heightened safety procedures de-
tected problems with shuttle hardware, requiring protracted "stand downs" of one or more
shuttle spacecraft.
Compromise
Underscoring the uncertainty of NASA's mission and its standing within the constel-
lation of Federal programs, President George H. Bush reestablished in April 1989 an inter-
agency policy council for the nation's space activities when he created the National Space
46. I¢.eport(?[the Presidential Commi._gionan the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, !._l.1 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office,June 6. 1986), p. 72.
,t7. Quoted in Report of the l're_idential ('ommi._ion on the Spa_e Shuttb' Challenger AccideT_t,p. 164.
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Council, chaired by the vice president. Through the Advisory Committee on the Future of
the U.S. Space Program, established in 1990 under the auspices of NASA and the National
Space Council, a consensus emerged that NASA's primary business should continue to be
what it had been in the 1960s--the scientific exploration of space and aerospace research
and development. [IV-20] Asserting that "perfection" should be the single most important
aim for NASA's organizational culture, the "Augustine Committee," informally named for
its chairman, Norman R. Augustine, chairman and CEO of the Martin Marietta Corpora-
tion, explained:
• . . perfection can most closely be approached in an organization whose ethos is one of excellence and
where this ethos permeates everything it does .... It must be clear to all that, in this culture, excellence
is more important than schedule and more important than cost--even though these too are impor-
tant--and that management at all levels can be reliably counted upon to act with this as its set of
values (emphasis author's).4,
At the same time, the committee recognized that, so long as NASA was responsible
for the shuttle, the agency would have to adapt to the demands of a successful operating
organization. The comments of many who spoke with the committee "frequently referred
to the consuming effect this [flight operations] responsibility can have on NASA's senior
management, limiting the time available for the planning and direction of leading-edge
technological developments." Committee witnesses also expressed the belief that "the
merging of operations into a largely developmental organization does not foster the build-
ing of a professional operations cadre which can best manage this vital responsibility.'_"
The committee added a refinement to the issue that had been provided by a 1988
National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) study, also led by Phillips, of NASA
Headquarters management. The NAPA study did not fault NASA for its weaknesses in
operations management. Rather, it argued,
the term "operational" as applied to commercial aircraft, to ships, or to mass-produced articles of
defense will most likely never apply to space systems in that same context. What we do see, howev_ are
large, complex space systems such as the Shuttle and the Space Station that are or will be largely driven
by operational issues--turnaround time between flights, man_esting, retrofitting of design changes
for safety, cost or payload capability purposes, logistics, training of basic and science crew members,
and so on. These are not the basic work of research and development leading to new concepts and ideas
for future space systems, nor for expanding knowledge of the universe and discerning the implications
of that knowledge for life on this planet or elsewhere. 5°
The NAPA report supported the earlier Phillips report recommendations and what
the Augustine committee would recommend: "an organizational separation, from the top
of the agency down, on the two matters of space flight operations and space system devel-
opment." A new associate administrator position for space flight operations should be
established, whose responsibilities should include space shuttle operations, ELV (expend-
able launch vehicle) operations, and the tracking and data systems organization. This indi-
vidual should then be given the formidable task of "injecting operational requirements
into new programs to assure that they can be effectively operated over their lifetimes at
reasonable cost."_ Just what leverage this individual would have at budget time over the
prevailing research and development culture of the agency, the committee did not say.
Shuttle operations themselves, however, might be less likely to receive short shrift, added
the committee, if responsibility for the space shuttle was "eventually moved from a devel-
opment oriented center [viz.,Johnson Space Center] to the operationally oriented Kennedy
48. Report o['the Advisory Committee on the Future _?[the U.S. Space Program (Washington. DC: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, December 1990), p. 16.
49. Ibid., p. 38.
50. National Academy of Public Administration, Samuel C. Phillips, Chairman. EJfectivenessof NASA Head-
quarters: A Rep_rrtfirr the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, February 1988. Quoted in ibid., p. 38.
5 I. Ibid., p. 38.
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SpaceCenter."WhatNASAshouldstrivefor,urgedthecommittee,is"safeoperation[of
theShuttle],performedasefficientlyandroutinelyasitscomplexitypermits,andnot
burdenedbyexcessivelayersofmanagementthatarethelegacyofthedevelopmentera
andrecoveryfromtheChallengeraccident."_
Andso,acompromisewas truck.NASAshouldretainitsidentityandroleasare-
searchanddevelopmentorganization,theidentitywithwhichmostof itspeoplewere
comfortableanduponwhichitsself-esteemdepended,andit wouldnothavetoloseits
mostvisibleachievement--theshuttlewtodoso.Suggestionsthatspaceshuttleopera-
tionsbetransferredtosomeother,andperhapsespeciallycreated,governmententity,or
totheprivatesector,hadbeenrejected.Butsomesignificantportionoftheorganization
wouldhavetolearnhowtooperateatransportationsystem.WhetherCongress,orNASA's
internalbudgetarypolitics,wouldyieldthewherewithaltodosoremainedtobeseen.
Howeffectivelyanorganizationimbuedwiththevaluesandhabitsofaresearchand
developmentmissioncouldadaptotherequirementsoftheefficientandcost-effective
operationofaspacetransportationsystemwas(settingasideperennialfundingissues)
oneofthetwoprincipalissuesfacingtheNASAorganizationatthebeginningofthe1990s.
Theotherwasanoldissue,onethatcouldbetracedbacktothe1950s:thewisdomand
consequencesofthefederalgovernment'spolicyof "contractingout"forthebulkofits
researchanddevelopmentworkaswellasforsuppliesandservices.
In thespringof1990,NASA'sadministratoraskedtheNationalAcademyofPublic
AdministrationtorevisithatquestionforNASA.TheNAPAstudy,completedinJanuary
1991,foundstillvalidthe1962BellReport'sguidelineforwhat,andwhatshouldnot,be
contractedout.Thegovernmentshouldnot contract out...
decisions on what work is to be done, what objectives are to be set for the work, what time period and
what costs are to be associated with the work, what the results are expected to be, and the evaluation,
and the responsibilities for knowing whether the work has gone as it was supposed to go, and if it has
not, what went wrong, and why, and how can it be corrected .... _
Having surveyed, with interviews and questionnaires, over 2,000 NASA scientists and
engineers, the NAPA study team concluded that contracting out had indeed led to an
erosion of strength among NASA's civil service scientists and engineers. Critics argued
that that was a predictable conclusion, given the persons surveyed. It then proceeded to
develop recommendations, most of which called on NASA's top management to provide
better scrutiny of, and clearer guidelines for, the kinds of activities being contracted to the
private sector. The context for these recommendations was the NAPA group's finding that
"hands-on science and engineering work experience is essential to developing scientists
and engineers with a level of knowledge that provides a sixth sense for spotting problems
early, for being a smart buyer of technical products and services, and for being astute
overseers of the work of technical contractors" and that NASA was not providing enough
opportunities for this kind of work: '4
The Augustine Commission, for its part, agreed that "an appropriate balance be-
tween in-house and external activity also should be developed." But this group saw the
balance differently. In the more than three decades that had passed since NASA was cre-
ated, there had developed a solid basis of space technology skills in both industry and
academia; it was no longer necessary for NASA to match every development being con-
tracted with comparable in-house laboratory skills. Citing the recent experience of na-
tional security aerospace research and development procurement, the committee argued
that NASA could "buy smart" with fewer civil service project and program personnel. "NASA
should concentrate its 'hands-on' expertise," the committee recommended, "in those
areas unique to its mission, and avoid the excessive diversion of technical or mission
52. Ibid., p. 40.
53. Quoted in National Academy of Public Administration, Maintaining the Pmh,'ramBalance: The Di.stribu-
tion _[ NASA Science and Engineering Wark Between NASA and Contractors and the l!ffect on NASA _ ln-Ht_use Technical
(2apahility, 2 vols. (Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,January 1991 ). Vol. I, p. 6.
54. Ibid., Vol. I, p. x.
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specialists to functions which could be performed elsewhere. Contract monitoring is best
accomplished by a cadre of professional systems managers with appropriate experience.
Increased use of performance requirements, rather than design specifications, will fur-
ther increase the effectiveness of this approach."_s
The Augustine Commission also called for more competitive government salaries for
scientists and engineers, "pay for performance," and full use of existing flexibility within
the government's personnel system. NASA should be a "pathfinding" agency for the devel-
opment of an "advanced" federal personnel system that would reward excellence and spe-
cial skills over seniority and generic tasks. Should NASA fail to persuade the Office of
Personnel Management to allow the agency to revamp its personnel system, NASA might
convert additional centers to federally funded research and development centers affili-
ated with major universities? _ Whether NASA would succeed remains to be seen. Even if
NASA were able to increase the number of high-caliber scientists and engineers within its
ranks, would the practice of contracting out most of the agency's research and develop-
merit work--leaving its own people to function as contract monitors--undermine its gains?
Conclusion
NASA's ongoing struggle to maintain its organizational momentum in the face of
seemingly insuperable obstacles--public uncertainty, as well as its own, as to its overarching
purpose; the constraining tendencies of federal regulations designed to keep political,
bureaucratic, and technical power in check; and the need, time after time, to plead for
funds and justify itself--is worth understanding not only because of what the agency does,
but for what it represents. One obstacle NASA could not escape was the need to develop a
large organization to carry out its work. That organization would perforce become a
federal bureaucracy.
A creative bureaucracy seems to most a contradiction in terms. We rightly under-
stand that the essence of a bureaucracy is depersonalized routine. Indeed, bureaucracies
came into being so that the execution of laws and regulations in emerging nation-states
might become less arbitrary, less capricious, and more accountable than it had been un-
der personalized monarchical rule. No modern society with any aspiration to democracy
would countenance surrendering its resources and destiny to a handful of solitary dream-
ers, however enticing the dream. Thus "organizing for exploration" was and remains the
challenge facing the United States if it would venture across the frontier of outer space.
The fact that managing the organization created to conduct that journey has proven diffi-
cult is less a sign of the failings of the travelers--though being human they have had
failings enough--than a sign of the enormity of their task.
Document IV-1
Document title: J.R. Killian, Jr., "Memorandum on Organizational Alternatives for Space
Research and Development," December 30, 1957.
Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
In the wake of Sputnik I and II, there was a wholesale reexamination of the U.S.
organization for space-related activities. In 1955, when a scientific satellite program was
initiated, it was given a low priority in comparison to other military efforts. At the time
there was concern that even a small civilian space program, if given too many resources,
could adversely affect critical ballistic missile programs. The issue was not so much one of
cost, but the scarcity of human resources and development and test facilities. However, the
political firestorm set off by the Soviet satellite brought into question the relatively low
priority given the scientific space program. From the time the first Sputnik was launched
55. Report r?[the Advi._ory Committee. pp. 40-41.
56. Ibid., pp. 40-42.
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untilNASAwasestablished,almostallelementsofthegovernmentwereengagedin the
debateonhowbestoredressthesituationandreestablisht eprestigeof theUnited
States.ThefailureofthefirstVanguardlaunchonDecember6,1957,onlyintensifiedthe
callsforchange.Sputnikalsocreatedthenecessaryimpetusin theWhiteHouseforthe
creationofthepositionofpresidentialscienceadvisor.OnNovember7,JamesR.Killian,
presidentofMIT,wasappointedtothisposition.OneofKillian'sfirstdutieswastoaddress
theissueofalternativesforspaceresearchorganization.Someofhisthoughtsin thisearl),
memorandum eventually formed the basis of the administration's future policy toward the
creation of a space agency.
[1] December 30, 1957
Memorandum on Organizational Alternatives for
Space Research and Development
This memorandum is based upon the following assumptions:
A. That the Department of Defense proceeds with its announced plan for a Special
Projects Division, reporting directly to the Secretary and including, as one of its major
responsibilities, space research and development for the DOD.
B. That there is a broad area of non-military basic research relating to space which
will command the interest and participation of scientists and engineers in a variety of non-
government and government institutions.
With these assumptions in mind, we can proceed to a discussion of how the
Government's sponsorship of space research and development can be handled and how
the military and non-military programs can be related.
There have been proposals for a new Government agency analogous to either NACA
or the AEC to handle all space research and development. In appraising this approach,
the following considerations are of importance:
A. The DOD is committed to a space program and is in process of setting one up,
although the nature of the program has not been clearly defined.
[2] B. Those aspects of space research and development which relate to the use of
missile engines, and the testing and launching of vehicles must be closely associated with
DOD missile programs. The necessity of such close association may dictate the placing of
responsibility in the DOD for the development, testing, and use of rocketry for putting up
space vehicles. It would seem unwise for a new agency, independent of the DOD, to have
to create and use test facilities other than those built by DOD.
It seems of greatest importance that the DOD's own space program be very closely
related to its missile program or for the two programs at some time to be merged.
These considerations seem to indicate clearly that the DOD must play a major role in
space research and development if we are to use the nation's manpower and facilities in
this area to the greatest advantage.
The DOD will, of course, be primarily concerned with those aspects of space re-
search and development which will have military value. It is hard at this stage, however, to
separate out of space R&D those elements, however basic and purely scientific, which would
not contribute to military objectives. It seems entirely feasible for DOD to be the major
sponsor and entrepreneur of space research and development, both military and "non-
military."
There are many scientists and others, however, who are opposed to the centraliza-
tion of all space R&D under the DOD. There are deeply felt convictions that the more
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purely scientific and non-military aspects of space research should not be under the con-
trol of the military. In the first place, [3] such an arrangement might improperly limit the
program to narrowly concerned military objectives. In the second place, it would tag our
basic space research as military and place the United States in the unfortunate position
before the world of apparently tailoring all space research to military ends.
The problem of planning our non-military basic space research, then, becomes one
of devising the means for non-military basic space research while at the same time taking
advantage of the immense resources of the military missile and recon satellite programs,
there are several possible ways of doing this:
A. The D.O.D. as a part of its program would establish a central space laboratory with
a very broad charter which would permit the conduct of the most basic sort of research as
well as R and D, having obvious military objectives. We see the pattern for this is such a
Laboratory as the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory of the A.E.C. Such a laboratory might
also have the authority to sponsor research in civilian institutions.
B. The Department of Defense might confine itself to its military mission and some
other agency or agencies external to the D.O.D. might engage in basic research. One
obvious way of doing this would be to encourage N.A.C.A. to extend its space research and
to provide it with the necessary funds to do so. A second [4] method (and this one might
be handled along with an N.A.C.A. program) would be to provide funds either through
the Department of Defense or otherwise to the National Research Counsel, the Council in
turn sponsoring a series of projects in universities and in dustrial laboratories. The N.A.C.A.
itself might do sub-contracting as indeed it does now to a limited extent. The problem
here would be not to burden the N.A.C.A. with so large a program that the nature of
N.A.C.A. would be changed. In its present form, it has been very successful but an undue
enlargement of its program might reduce its effectiveness.
If either the N.A.C.A. or N.R.C. methods or both were followed, it would be neces-
sary to carefullywork out a cooperative arrangement with the D.O.D., for the D.O.D. would
have to be an active partner with these agencies.
Such combination of sponsorship and programs would probably be the most advan-
tageous way of carrying on space research for meeting both military and non-military
objectives.
In considering these various alternatives and means, it is important to keep in mind
existing resources available in the D.O.D., the Army's ABMA has a highly competent group
for space research. The Air Force's BMC has important resources, including a going pro-
gram for the development of a recon satellite. Cal Tech'sJet Propulsion Laboratory has
advantages and resources for space research--a laboratory which has been closely associ-
ated with the Army. In the interest of conserving [5] man power and utilizing skill and
experience already in being, these agencies must be considered in planning a new pro-
gram. Some one or combination of these might well be made the nucleus of an extended
program.
There should be some mechanism, however, which gives coherence to the broad
program and which avoids a program encouraging inter service rivalries.
The overall plan must permit and provide for bold, imaginative research and plan-
ning. It must recognize the importance of providing the means and incentives for pure
scientists to move effectively into space research without regard to practical applications.
We must realize that in addition to such obvious objectives as space travel and reconnais-
sance, there are extraordinary opportunities to extend our knowledge of the earth and its
environment and enormously to extend astronomical observations. It may well be that
these kinds of pure, non-practical research objectives may prove to be the most important
and in the end the most practical.
The overall plan, then, must keep steadily in view the need for those means and
programs which will command the interest and participation of our best scientists. We
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musthavefarmorethanaprogramwhichappealstothe"spacecadets."Itmustinvoke,in
thedeepestense,theattentionofourbestscientificmindsifweasanationaretobecome
aleaderinthisfield.If wedonotachievethis,thenothernationswillcontinuetoholdthe
leadership.
December29,1957 J.R.Killian,Jr.
Document IV-2
Document title: L.A. Minnich, Jr., "Legislative Leadership Meeting, SupplementaryNotes,"
February 4, 1958.
Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
The Soviets had orbited Sputnik I four months prior to the meeting recorded by
Minnich. By this time, it was all but certain that a new space agency would be created;
however, its responsibilities, form, and location were still undecided. The question of the
military or civilian character of a new agency was discussed in a regularly scheduled meet-
ing among the president, vice president, other White House officials, and Republican
leaders in Congress. The issue was raised in response to the impending reorganization of
the Department of Defense, which was necessitated in part by the increasing sophistica-
tion and cost of weapons systems. Missiles and other space-related hardware were respon-
sible for a significant portion of the technological revolution sweeping the military
services at the time. At this time (February 1958), President Eisenhower had apparently
not yet decided that most of the U.S. space program should be carried out under civilian
auspices.
[ 1] ...Outer Space Program- A question was raised as to whether a new Space Agency
should be set up within Department of Defense (as provided in the pending Defense ap-
propriation bill), or be set up as an independent agency. The President's feeling was essen-
tially a desire to avoid duplication, and priority for the present would seem to rest with
Defense because of paramountcy of defense aspects. However, the President thought that
in regard to non-military aspects, Defense could be the operational agent, taking orders
from some non-military scientific group. The National Science Foundation, for instance,
should not be restricted in any way in its peaceful research.
Dr. Killian had some reservations as to the relative interest and activity of military vs.
peaceful aspects, as did the Vice President who thought our posture before the world
would be better if non-military research in outer space were carried forward by an agency
entirely separate from the military.
There was some discussion of the prospect of a lunar probe. Dr. Killian thought this
might be next on the list of Russian efforts. He had some doubt as to whether the United
States should at this late date attempt to press a lunar probe, but the question would be
fully canvassed by the Science Advisory Committee in the broad survey it had under way.
[2] Dr. Killian thought the United States might do a lunar probe in 1960, or perhaps get to
it on a crash program by 1959. Sen. Sahonstall had heard, however, that it might even be
accomplished in 1958, if pressed hard enough.
[2] Dr. Killian outlined for the Leadership the various phases of future developmel, t
(along the lines of the subsequent press release listing projects in the "soon," "later," and
"much later" categories).
Sen. Knowland complained about having to get his information about Space research
from the Democratic Senator from Washington (Jackson)--which was just as bad as
ha_4ng to learn from Mr. Syrnington anything there was to know about the Air Force.
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ThePresidentwasfirmlyoftheopinionthataruleofreasonhad to be applied to
these Space projects--that we couldn't pour unlimited funds into these costly projects
where there was nothing of early value to the Nation's security. He recalled the great effort
he had made for the Atomic Peace Ship but Congress would not authorize it, even though
in his opinion it would have been a very worthwhile project.
And in the present situation, the President mused, he would rather have a good
Redstone than be able to hit the moon, for we didn't have any enemies on the moon.
Sen. Knowland pressed the question of hurrying along with a lunar probe, because
of the psychological factor. He recalled the great impact of Sputnik, which seemed to
negate the impact of our large mutual security program. If we are close enough to doing a
probe, he said, we should press it. The President thought it might be OK to go ahead with
it if it could be accomplished with some missile already developed or nearly ready, but he
didn't want to just rush into an all-out effort on each one of these possible glamor perfor-
mances without a full appreciation of their great cost. Also, there would have to be a clear
determination of what agency would have the responsibility.
The Vice President reverted to the idea of setting up a separate agency for "peaceful"
research projects, for the military would be deterred from things that had no military
value in sight. The President thought Defense would inevitably be involved since it pres-
ently had all the hardware, and he did not want further duplication. He did not preclude
ha_ing eventually a great Department of Space ....
Document IV-3
Document title: S. Paul Johnston, Memorandum for Dr.J.R. Killian, Jr., "Activities," Feb-
ruary 21, 1958, with attached: Memorandum for Dr. J. R. KiUian, Jr., "Preliminary Obser-
vations on the Organization for the Exploitation of Outer Space," February 21, 1958.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA Headquar-
ters, Washington, D.C.
On February 4, 1958, President Eisenhower announced that science advisor James
R. Killian had appointed a panel to recommend the outlines of a space program and the
organization to manage it. The so-called "Purcell Panel" (General James H. Doolittle, Chair-
man, NACA; Edwin Land, President, Polaroid Corporation; Herbert York, Director,
Livermore Laboratory; and Edward Purcell, Professor of Physics, Harvard University), aug-
mented by William Finan of the Bureau of the Budget and the staff support of S. Paul
Johnston, Director of the Institute for Aeronautical Sciences, assessed organizational alter-
natives for the proposed agency. The task of inventing an organization to manage a space
program was a difficult one. The number and strength of the claimants for the right to
direct the space program had peaked in the wake of Sputnik. Several bills were already
pending before Congress, which gave responsibility for space programs to the Depart-
ment of Defense or to the Atomic Energy Commission.Johnston's thoughts on the subject
eventually found their way into the March 5, 1958, memorandum [IV-4] to the president
containing the formal proposal that NACA be reconstituted and given the responsibility
for managing the nation's space program.
Memorandum for Dr. J. R. Killian, Jr.
FROM: S. Paul JOHNSTON
SUBJECT: Activities
1. During the past week, in accordance with your suggestion, I have conferred on the
problem of organization and its legal implications with the following:
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JamesA.Perkins,VicePresident,CarnegieCorporation;JohnCobbCooper,Legal
Consultant,Professor,InternationalAirLaw,McGillUniversity;Dr.JamesFisk,VicePresi-
dent,BellTelephoneLaboratories;JohnJ.Corson,McKinsey&Company;DonK.Price,
VicePresident,FordFoundation;Dr.EdwardMason,HarvardUniversity;DeanDavidCavers,HarvardLawSchool
Theabovearein additionto thepeoplewehavetalkedto in theBureauof the
BudgetatthemeetingwhichyouattendedonMonday.
2.AsaresultoftheaboveconferencesI havepreparedtheattachedmemorandum
whichsummarizesthevariousviewswhichhavebeenexpressedon theorganizational
problemandwhichmakesarecommendationwhichismyownbywhichappearstobe
consistentwiththediscussionsofthepastweek.Todatethishasbeendiscussedonlywith
Dr.JamesFisk.
S.P.Johnston
Attachment
{11THEWHITEHOUSE
WASHINGTON
February21,1958
MEMORANDUMFORDR.J.R.KILLIAN,JR.
Preliminary Observations on the Organization for the
Exploitation of Outer Space
The exploitation of any unknown areas involves two distinct objectives, - one, explora-
tion and two, control. The first is largely a scientific operation and the second largely mili-
tary.
At the present time plans for the exploitation of outer space fall more nearly into
civilian-scientific areas rather than into military areas. The "take" from the probing of
outer space by rockets, satellites and interplanetary vehicles will be of more direct interest
to the scientist than to the strategist. We can discount at this point most of the "Buck
Rogers" type of thinking which anticipates hordes of little men in space helmets firing
disintegrators into each other from flying saucers. Certainly, ICBM's will transit portions
of outer space in performing their missions, but for the moment the chief military interest
lies in better methods of surveillance, communications and long-range weather forecast-
ing.
The potential space explorations in the immediate future are well outlined in a pa-
per dated 14 February 1957 titled "Basic Objectives of a Continuing Program of Scientific
Research in Outer Space" by Hugh Odishaw, Executive Director of the U.S. National Com-
mittee for the IGY of the National Academy of Sciences. A good layman's summary of the
same subject appeared in a recent issue of LIFE magazine by Dr. Van Allen.
The control of outer space, basically a military matter, involves many troublesome
questions of international law. The problem of the vertical extent of national sovereignty
has yet to be determined. It appears to depend on the capability of any nation to deny
access to space above its territory by physical means. No body of international law yet exists
covering [2] the use of outer space. As a matter of fact, no acceptable definition has yet
been evolved as to where "air-space" and "outer-space" begin and end. Maritime law has no
such problem because, under most conditions, one is either afloat or ashore. The limits of
the "high seas" have been determined by international agreement on the basis of very
easily made physical measurements. With respect to outer space, however, such questions
are wide open (a discussion of these problems is to be found in our files in papers on the
subject by Professor John Cobb Cooper and others).
The control of radio-communications in our upper atmosphere and in space is an-
other problem which must be settled by international agreement if a completely chaotic
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condition is to be avoided. Within the next ten years the probabilities are that dozens, if
not hundreds, of objects will be in orbit around the earth. Apart from the question of
sorting scientific intelligence from this "celestialjunkyard" it will be highly important from
a military point of view to be able to distinguish an incoming ICBM from other less lethal
objects.
By any standards of comparison, the problems involved are tremendous and the pro-
grams which must be undertaken in their solution will be lengthy and costly. The technical
feasibility studies and the forecasts that have been made by Doctors Purcell, York and
others, anticipate the development of such items as booster rockets of one million to five
million pounds of thrust in a period of 15 to 25 years. It is estimated that such develop-
ment programs, quite apart from the missile requirement of the military, may cost any-
where from 500 million to a billion a year. We are, therefore, considering something of the
general order of magnitude of the AEC. Obviously the Bureau of the Budget will exert an
important influence in deciding whether the national economy can stand such a drain for
such purposes.
General Organizational Requirements
In considering the proper organization to handle a project of such magnitude two
factors must be taken into consideration--first, how to get the program off the ground
immediately, i.e., how to get something started now with the facilities that are presently
available and, second, how to gear-up for a long-range program to take care of the 5-10-25
year development. This leads to the thought that some sort of Ad Hoc organization could
be set up in a very short time, possibly by Executive Order of the President, to take care of
the immediate requirements. Such a group would [3] not only act as a temporary operat-
ing organization but would also initiate studies that would lead toward a more permanent
organization on some basis that could be agreed upon by all departments of government
and for which the necessary enabling legislature could be obtained.
Whatever plan is adopted, either for the short or for the long-range period, it would
appear that certain basic characteristics should be incorporated. First of all, for reasons
stated above, it should be a civilian managed organization both at the policy and at the
operating levels. It must have wide contractual powers, and it must be free from the limita-
tions of the Civil Service in hiring personnel. It must have access to, and be able to draw
upon, all existing scientific talent in the country, both within government, and without,
and it must be able to utilize the physical facilities that already exist in industry, universi-
ties, government laboratories and military installations. It must be able to purchase what-
ever hardware, systems or components it needs from all available sources. It must have its
own physical facilities for testing completed vehicles and it must also be empowered to
operate airborne and space vehicles.
Possible Organizational Patterns
To date four specific proposals have been made as to possible organizations to ac-
complish these ends. These include:
1. the formation of an entirely new agency of government;
2. assignment of the project to the AEC;
3. establishment of the NACA as the controlling agency, with assistance from
National Science Foundation, National Academy of Sciences, the military
services, etc.;
4. assignment of the project to the Advanced Research Project Agency of the Depart-
ment of Defense (ARPA).
In the following paragraphs some of the advantages and disadvantages of the above
suggestions will be briefly noted.
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1. New Agency
The establishment of a wholly new agency may prove to be the eventual solution to
the problem. Such an agency should report directly to the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent. It should be empowered by law to perform all the functions stated above and be
given the necessary funds to accomplish them.
[4] The major difficulty would be in the time required to establish such an agency.
New legislation would be required which might invoh,e a very long time to debate and to
formulate. It would need a new staff both on the management and on the scientific sides.
This would take a long time to recruit, and in view of the overall shortage of scientific
personnel in the country, would draw off key people from other necessary jobs. This pro-
cedure would also take a long time.
It would also need new facilities, with the inevitable delays in reaching decisions as to
what was needed and where new laboratories should be located, before the planning and
construction phases could begin.
In summary, the establishment of a new agency would require a very great legislative
effort and a very long time to get into operation.
2. Atomic Energy Commission
Strong Congressional support is in exfidence for assigning the mission to the AEC.
There is no question but that the AEC is organizationally sound and is a going con-
cern. It already has the necessary authorization to contract for anything it needs and also
is free from civil service restraint in hiring people. Its scope could very easily be expanded
so that it could legally perform an), additional assignment.
On the other hand, the technology of flight both in and out of the atmosphere is not
a part of the normal AEC area of competence. Although it is true that nuclear propulsion
for aerial and space vehicles comes within its field, consensus seems to be that practical
utilization of such propulsion is 5 to 10 years away. AEC, therefore, has an interest in a very
small part of the space exploitation picture but it has had little experience in such matters
as high-speed aerodynamics, control, guidance, structures, telecommunications, etc.
Furthermore, the AEC is already engaged in a huge operation of great national im-
portance. If it were asked to undertake an additional program of the magnitude contem-
plated for space exploration, its efforts [5] in each one might be so diluted that long
delays in the production of end items would be inevitable and its overall effectiveness
seriously impaired.
Although the AEC has unquestionably adequate management and all the authority it
would need, it would be required to expand both its facilities and its staff into wholly new
technical areas if it were given the space exploitation job.
3. National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
Persuasive arguments can be made for assigning the responsibility for space explora-
tion to the NACA. The Committee itself has suggested that with the support of the Na-
tional Science Foundation and the National Academy of Sciences it could undertake the
job by expanding its facilities.
The NACA is basically a civilian-operated, independent government agency. It has a
long history of accomplishment. Its relations with the Congress and with the Executive
Departments are good and it has an international standing for competence in scientific
fields.
The NACA has been in the space exploitation field for a long time. Most of the work
that has been done in extremely high altitude and high-speed aerodynamics on which the
design of missiles and rockets has been based has been clone in its laboratories. It has
already made great progress in research in some of the very sophisticated propulsion sys-
tems required for space flight. It has recently established a special subcommittee in space
flight technology made up of outstanding scientists in the field. Extending its interests
into space technology would appear to be a logical evolutionary step from its research
activities of the past 40-odd years.
636 ORGANIZING FOR EXPLORATION
The NACA budget for the coming year is of the order of 80 million and it has been
authorized to expand its present personnel of 8,000 to 9,000. Its three laboratories (Lan-
gley, Ames and Lewis) and its missile firing range at Wallop's Island represent an aggre-
gate investment of about 350 million dollars.
It has been argued that the difference between the size of current NACA operation
and the proposed operation is so great that the result [6] would be, in effect, the establish-
ment of a wholly new agency to which the NACA would be attached. There is no reason to
believe, however, given proper authority and adequate funds, that the NACA could not
expand its management functions to handle the larger assignment effectively as it did in
1942 to meet the comparably tremendous demands of World War II.
A moderate amount of legislation would be needed to assign the job to NACA. Its
contractual authorization would have to be expanded, and the present civil service limita-
tions on personnel would have to be relieved.
4. ARPA - Department of Defense
A strong case can be made for integration of the space program into the Department
of Defense under ARPA on the grounds of immediate action. A great deal of hardware is
already available, essential tacilities (e.g.,JPL, ABMA) exist. The facilities are well staffed
and the experience level is high.
It has been suggested that whatever form of organization is agreed upon to initiate
the space exploration program it should be attached temporarily to ARPA. If this were
done it would appear to be important that some provision be made so that the entire outfit
could be detached and assigned to some other agency in the future if it subsequently
appeared desirable. It might happen that military interests might outweigh the purely
scientific and civil aspects to the detriment of the latter. It would be difficult to avoid
security restrictions, and participation in international programs of a purely scientific na-
ture might thereby be hampered.
Under its present directive it seems that ARPA could take on the job with a minimum
of additional legislation.
Suggested Compromise Program
Of the four proposals discussed above, No. 2, - i.e., assigning the project to the AEC,
seems the least practical. As an example of appropriate organization and good manage-
ment, it deserves careful study, but the problems under discussion here seem somewhat
outside its main fields of interest.
None of the other proposals would satisfy all the requirements in themselves. A pos-
sible compromise suggests itself which might satisfy the requirement for immediate action
and also lay the groundwork both as the organization and legislation for future action.
[7] This consists, in effect, of the immediate establishment of a provisional Space
Exploration Control Group headed by a special assistant to the President and composed
of the operating heads of the several government agencies who are already involved in
research, development or operation of space vehicles. Several outstanding individuals from
non-government organizations might also be included, but the total group should not be
large. Their main function would be the implementation of national space policy as deter-
mined by the President and Congress, utilizing all assets and facilities which already exist
in established government agencies and in industry. Their secondary function should be
the determination of the kind of agency which should be established to put space exploi-
tation on a permanent basis to handle the requests of the foreseeable future.
The suggested procedure might be outlined as follows:
[8] A. Short Range - By Executive Order for Immediate Action
1.Appoint a Special Assistant to the President for Space Exploration (This should be the
Chairman of the NACA - See Footnote)
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2.AppointaProvisional Board of Regents for Space Exploration consisting of:
a. Special Asst. to President for S.E. (Chairman)
b. Scientific Advisor to President
c. Director, AEC
d. Director, NACA
e. President, NSF
f. Director, NAS
g. Director, ARPA
h. Two civilians, possibly fiom industry or science
3.Empower above to
a. Establish immediate space objectives
b. Establish program priorities
c. Coordinate programs of associated agencies toward meeting established objec-
tives
d. Utilize fimds already appropriated to the associated agencies to implement im-
mediate objectives.
4.1nstruct Special Assistant for Space Exploration to make immediate plans for the
establishment of a Permanent Space Exploration Agency and to prepare the necessary
legislation.
[9] B. LonL_ Range- By Legislation for Continuing Action
1.Organize a permanent Space Exploitation Agency
2.Authorize the Agency to:
a. establish, maintain and operate its own testing and operational facilities
b. enter into whatever contractual arrangements may be necessary with
government and civilian agencies
c. hire personnel without regard to Civil Service restrictions
d. operate air/space Vehicles
Document IV-4
Document title: James R. Killian,Jr., Special Assistant for Science and Technology; Percival
Brundage, Director, Bureau of the Budget; Nelson A. Rockefeller, Chairman, President's
Advisory Committee on Government Organization, Memorandum for the President,
"Organization for Civil Space Programs," March 5, 1958, with attached: "Summary of
Advantages and Disadvantages of Alternative Organizational Arrangements."
Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Eisenhower Library, AbUene, Kansas.
As the preceding documents have shown [IV-l, 1V-2, IV-3], there was substantial at-
tention given within the Executive Office of the President during the December 1957-
March 1958 period to how best to organize the nation's space effort. This memorandum
was the cnhnination of that attention and laid the basis for President Eisenhower's deci-
sion to create a new civilian space agency.
Memorandum for the President
SUBJECT: Organization for Civil Space Programs
The Problem
As you know, there will soon be presented for your consideration civil space pro-
grams tor the United States which will entail increased expenditures and the employment
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of important numbers of scientists, engineers and technicians?
This Committee, in conjunction with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and
your Special Assistant for Science and Technology, have given consideration to the man-
ner in which the executive branch should be organized to conduct the new program. This
memorandum contains our joint findings and recommendations. The memorandum
(1) discusses some of the factors which should be taken into account in establishing the
government's organization for these civil space programs, (2) recommends a pattern of
organization, and (3) indicates certain interim actions which will be necessary. Also
attached is a summary of the advantages and disadvantages of certain alternative organiza-
tional arrangements.
[2] Discussions to date suggest that an aggressive space program will produce impor-
tant civilian gains in the form of advances in general scientific knowledge and protection
of the international prestige of the United States. These benefits will be in addition to
such military uses of outer space as may prove feasible.
Establishing a Long Term Organization
Because of the importance of the civil interest in space exploration, the long term
organization for Federal programs in this area should be under civilian control. Such civil-
ian domination is also suggested by public and foreign relations considerations. However,
civilian control does not envisage taking out from military control projects relating to
missiles, anti-missile defense, reconnaissance satellites, military communications, and other
space technology relating to weapons systems or direct military requirements.
[3] We have considered a number of different approaches to civil space organiza-
tion. It is our conclusion that one of these alternatives provides a workable solution to the
problem. The other principal alternatives have serious shortcomings which argue against
their selection as a basis for space organization.
Recommendation No. 1. We recommend that leadership of the civil space effort be lodged
in a strengthened and redesignated National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.
The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), in a resolution adopted
on January 16, 1958, has proposed that the national space program be implemented by
the cooperative effort of the Department of Defense, the NACA, the National Academy of
Sciences and the National Science Foundation, together with the universities, research
institutions, and industrial companies of the nation. NACA further recommended that
the development of space vehicles and the operations required for scientific research in
space phenomena and space technology be conducted by the NACA when within its capa-
bilities. NACA is now formulating a program which is expected to propose expansion of
existing programs and the addition of supplementary research facilities.
[4] Factors Favoring NACA as the Principal Civil Space Agency
1. NACA is a going Federal research agency with a large scientific and engineering
staff (approximately 2,000 of its 7,500 employees are in these categories) and a large plant
($300,000,000 in laboratories and test facilities). It can expand its research program and
increase its emphasis on space matters with a minimum of delay and can provide a func-
tioning institutional setting for this activity.
2. NACA's aeronautical research has been progressively involving it in technical prob-
lems associated with space flight and its current facilities construction program is designed
to be useful in space research. It has done research in rocket engines (including advanced
1. These programs do not include those projects relating to space vehicles and exploration which will
be carried out in the Department of Defense under the direction of the Advanced Research Projects Agency
(ARPA).
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chemical propellants), it has developed materials and designs to withstand the thermal
effects of high speeds in or on entering the earth's atmosphere, it conducts multi-stage
rocket launchings, and in the X-15 project it has taken the leadership (in cooperation with
the Navy and Mr Force) in developing a manned vehicle capable of flights beyond the
earth's atmosphere.
[5] 3. If NACA is not given the leading responsibility for the civil space program, its
future research role will be limited to aircraft and missiles. Some of its present activities
would have to be curtailed, and the logical paths of progress in much of its current work
would he closed. It would, under such circumstances, be difficult for NACA to attract and
retain the most imaginative and competent scientific and engineering personnel, and all
aspects of its mission could suffer. Moreover, it is questionable whether it would be pos-
sible to define practicable boundaries between the missile and high performance aircraft
research now performed by NACA and the space vehicle projects.
4. NACA has a long history of close and cordial cooperation with the military depart-
ments. This cooperation has taken place under a variety of arrangements, usually with
little in the way of formalized agreements. Mthough new relationship problems are bound
to arise from an augmented NACA role in space programs, the tradition of comity and
civil-military accommodation which has been built up over the years will be a great asset in
minimizing friction between the civil space agency and the Department of Defense.
[6] 5. Mthough much of its work has been done for the military departments, NACA
is a civilian agency and widely recognized as such. A civilian setting for space programs is
desirable and NACA satisfies this requirement.
6. Some of the principal problems in using NACA, as listed below, can be overcome
by relatively limited accommodations to existing law and by appropriate administrative
action. These measures are described in later paragraphs.
Problems in Using NACA as the Agency with Primary Responsibility
for Civil Space Programs
1. NACA has in the past been concerned chiefly with research involving air breathing
aircraft and missiles. NACA's competence in certain fields related to space flight (such as
electronics and space medicine) will need to be augmented. NACA has also had little
experience in the direct administration of large scale developmental contracts.
9 Many of the scientists who have done the most work on rocket engines and space
vehicles are now employed by Defense Department agencies and by private contractors of
the military ser_4ces. Some means of utilizing such experienced personnel will have to be
found which does not unduly impair the capacity of the Department of Defense to con-
tinue defense related aspects of missile and space activity.
[7] 3. The NACA is not in a position to push ahead with the immediate demonstra-
tion projects which may be necessary to protect the nation's world prestige. Therefore the
military services may have to be relied on for such demonstrations while NACA is equip-
ping itself for the full performance of the space job.
4. NACA suffers from some of the limitations imposed on civil service agencies, and
some scientists are known to favor reliance on private research organizations operating
under government contracts. Ceilings and numerical restrictions on the salaries of top
scientific staff and the general lag in Classification Act salaries are among the obstacles to
administration through government laboratories which pose problems in utilizing NACA.
5. NACA now spends around $100,000,000 per year. A civil space program may even-
tually entail additional annual expenditures substantially in excess of this amount. It is
obvious that important changes in NACA will be required by such an expansion, and the
agency may have some difficuhy in assimilating the additional staff and functions.
[8] Recommendation No. 2. We recommend that NACA's basic law be amended to give
NACA the authority and flexibility to overcome or mitigate the problems noted above so
that NACA can carry out its total program effectively.
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Specifically the amendments should:
a. Rename the NACA the National Aeronautical and Space Agency to get away from
the limited connotations of the term "aeronautics" when used alone and to recognize that
NACA has long since ceased to be an "advisory committee" as the term is customarily used.
b. Retain a board for top policy direction. Some changes in the composition of the
present NACA board may be appropriate.
c. Provide for the appointment of a Director by the President by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate.
d. Provide a system for the fixing of compensation of employees which, under appro-
priate Presidential controls, will permit the agency to pay rates which are reasonably
competitive with the rates paid by non-Federal employers for comparable work. (This
amendment will ease the salary limitations under the Classification Act of 1949 which have
caused so much concern in and out of NACA.)
[9] Certain additional miscellaneous powers may also have to be given NACA if fur-
ther investigation reveals that they are not already available and confirms that they will be
of material assistance to the agency.
The above powers would give NACA as much flexibility as can reasonably be achieved
by contract laboratories and would at the same time permit retention of the traditional
NACA practice of conducting such research and testing through its own government em-
ployee staffed facilities as it determines to be desirable in carrying out a space program.
There will remain the need to refine relationships with the Department of Defense
in space matters and to draw upon and utilize staff and experience now lodged in the
laboratories of the military services and their contractors, but the reorganized NACA would
be equipped to work out these problems in a flexible manner. Some Presidential interven-
tion may prove necessary to bring about or implement agreements between the space
agency and Defense, and it may also be desirable for the President to be given the specific
authority to transfer to NACA space activities directly related to the civil program which
_re now being performed by other agencies.
[10] Overlapping between NACA's civil space program and the work of Defense on
military projects should be kept to a minimum. This can be done if Defense, in a manner
analogous to the practice followed on developing aircraft and missiles, makes appropriate
use of NACA for supporting research and development on military space vehicles. An
arrangement of this kind could reduce duplication without undermining the basic De-
fense Department responsibility, for developing weapons systems and other military equip-
ment.
Interim Measures
Recommendation No. 3. If you approve our recommended approach to space organiza-
tion, we further recommend that a number of interim and short-term measures be given
immediate attention.
Specifically, we propose:
a. An all-out attempt should be made to draft needed legislation within the next few
weeks so that there will be some chance of final action during the current session of the
Congress. At the same time decisions should be made with respect to the supplemental
appropriations which will be required for NACA to get its part of the space program under
way. If congressional [ ! 1 ] action can be secured on both matters before adjournment, the
full civil space program under arrangements designed to serve long term needs can be
launched this year.
If it proves impossible to obtain the enactment of the comprehensive legislation
strengthening NACA during the current session, the passage of the general Classification
Act revisions now pending, the authorization of addition super-grade and Public Law 313
positions, and the securing of supplemental appropriations would still enable NACA to
get under way with a space program.
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b.WhileawaitingcongressionalactionwesuggestthatthePresidentadvisetheNACA's
top committee that it is being charged with the responsibility for developing and arrang-
ing for the execution of the civil space program. NACA will at first have to rely heavily
upon the Department of Defense and its instrumentalities for interim development and
demonstration projects. However, the problems created by such arrangements will be mini-
mized once the President gives NACA the clear-cut authority required for it to select and
monitor the advanced space projects entrusted to the Department of Defense during the
transitional period.
[12] c. None of the immediate measures is more essential and fundamental than
defining as clearly as possible just what the nation plans to do in the space field. At the
same time an effort must be made to estimate _dth reasonable exactness the annnal addi-
tional costs of the civil space program.
Immediate Action
If you concur in the recommendations set forth above, the director of the Bureau of
Budget will proceed, in cooperation with this Committee, your Special Assistant for Sci-
ence and Technology and other departments and agencies concerned, to develop for your
consideration specific proposals for legislative and executive action.
James B. Killian,Jr.,
Special Assistant for
Science and Technology
Percival Brundage,
Director, Bureau
of the Budget
Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Chairman
[ 1]Attachment
Summary of Advantages and Disadvantages
of Alternative Organizational Arrangements
1. Use of a private contractor to carry out the civil space program under supervision
of NACA.
A variation of our recommended organizational approach is to select NACA as the
civilian agency to supervise contracts with a private laboratory charged with developing
and testing space vehicles. This is the pattern followed by the Atomic Energy Commission
in much of its research. This approach has also been used to some extent by the military
services in developing missiles.
Advantages
Contract operation is preferred by some scientific personnel as a means of circum-
venting government salary and administrative controls, it would retain NACA in a supervi-
sory capacity while making use of selected private research organizations.
Disadvantages
This approach is in conflict with the traditional NACA practice of carrying out
research largely through its own government-employee staffed laboratories: there is no
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assurance that a private research laboratory can be found to do the work on a sufficiently
urgent schedule; and such greater flexibility as private laboratories may enjoy can also be
provided NACA through the changes in law previously described.
[2] Conclusion
No real gains would flow from this alternative which could not be achieved under the
preferred organization. It would be better to permit NACA to make its own decisions as to
the extent to which it would use contracting authority in executing the space research
program. It is assmned, of course, that NACA will, in fact, make fairly extensive use of
research contracts, but on a selective basis.
2. Utilization of the Department of Defense
The recent Supplemental Military Construction Authorization Act authorizes the
Secretary of Defense, for a period of one year, to carry on such space projects as may be
designated by the President. It confers permanent authority for the Secretary or his desig-
nee to proceed with Missile and other space projects directly related to weapons systems
and military requirements.
Advantages
The Department of Defense is now doing most of the current missile and satellite
work: it has the bulk of the scientists and engineers active in these fields in its employ or on
the rolls of its contractors; it will have to continue work on space vehicles on an interim
basis for demonstration purposes; it is experienced in working with and utilizing the facili-
ties of NACA; and it may be possible for a civilian agency of the Department to carry out
the program.
[3] Disadvantages
The Department of Defense is a military agency in law and in the eyes of the world
and placing the space program under it would be interpreted as emphasizing military
goals: the space program is expected to produce benefits largely unrelated to the central
mission of the Department of Defense; there is some danger that the non-military phases
of space activity would be neglected; the Department is already so overloaded with its
central military responsibilities that care should be taken to avoid charging it with addi-
tional civil functions; cooperation with other nations in international civil space matters
could be made more difficult; and adequate civil-military cooperation can be achieved
under the recommended organization without assigning inappropriate functions to De-
fense.
Conclusion
Since the space program has a relatively limited military significance, at least for the fore-
seeable future, and since the general scientific objectives should not be subordinated to
military priorities, it is essential that the arrangements for space organization provide for
leadership by a civilian agency.
[4] 3. Utilization of the Atomic Energy Commission
There are now pending before the Congress bills which would authorize the Atomic
Energy Commission to proceed with the development of vehicles for the exploration of
outer space. Among these bills are S. 3117 (introduced by Senator Anderson) and S. 3000
(introduced by Senator Gore). The justification for these proposals is the role already
being played by the Atomic Energy Commission in developing nuclear propelled jet and
rocket engines.
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Advantages
The Atomic Energy, Commission is a civilian agency with competence in directing
scientific research and development projects: it has had experience in managing research
contracts and in working with the military agencies; and it is now charged with developing
a nuclear rocket engine which may eventually be used to propel space vehicles.
Disadvantages
The Atomic Energy Commission is concerned chiefly with the use of a single form of
energy and it is expected that chemical propellants, not atomic energy, will be the chief
power source for space vehicles for years to come. Moreover, the Commission has _4rtually
no experience or competence in most aspects of the design, construction and testing of
space vehicles.
[51 Conclusion
The Atomic Energy Commission has a contribution to make in the space field. How-
ever, it should limit its work to the aspects of the space problem in which nuclear energy
may have practical applications. An administration position along these lines has already
been conveyed to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.
4. Creation of a Department of Science and Technology
Senators Humphrey, McClellan and Yarborough recently introduced S. 3126, a bill
to create a Department of Science and Technology. The bill calls for the establishment of
a new executive department which at the outset would contain or be given the functions of
the National Science Foundation, the Patent Office, the Office of Technical Services of
the Department of Commerce, the National Bureau of Standards, the Atomic Energy Com-
mission and certain divisions of the Smithsonian Institution. The Secretary would also be
authorized to establish institutes for basic research.
Advantages
The proposed department would provide a civilian setting for the administration of
space programs, and it would give this and other scientific activities the prestige and acces-
sibility to the President associated with departmental status.
[6] Disadvantages
The proposed department will be highly controversial, and there is no assurance
that it can be established in time to assume the responsibility for civil space programs. It is
also unlikely that science, of itself, will provide a sound basis for organizing an executive
department.
Conclusion
There would be little prospect of getting such a reorganization approved and func-
tioning in the near future. Even if the department could be created, it might not provide
as good a setting for a high priority space program as that proposed under the preferred
organization.
Document IV-5
Document title: Maurice H. Stans, Director, Bureau of the Budget, Memorandum for the
President, "Responsibility for 'space' programs," May 13, 1958.
Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
Prior to the creation of NASA in 1958, the nation's space efforts were housed in
various branches of the military services. The Naval Research Laboratory managed the
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VANGUARD project; the Army was responsible for Explorer I, which led to the discovery
of the Van Allen radiation belts; and the Army, Air Force, and Navy were responsible for a
variety of booster programs. In addition, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)
had been created in early 1958 to house military space activities not closely linked to spe-
cific service missions. Although program content was generally dominated by military
requirements, substantial portions of the military space program had no immediate
relationship to established defense needs. However, many of these projects eventually proved
essential to the human and scientific exploration of space. By March 1958, it had already
been decided that a new civilian agency would best serve the scientific and prestige needs
of the nation. What was absent was a plan for allocating responsibility for the various facets
of the nation's space program. Even so, the desire to avoid duplication of effort and estab-
lish a new space agency in the shortest possible time necessitated the transfer of whole
programs and in some cases military facilities to NASA. At the time no other alternative
was tenable to those making the decisions. But, as the memorandum suggests, elements of
the Department of Defense attempted to resist the transfer of their programs to the new
civilian agency.
[1] Memorandum for the President
Subject: Responsibility for "space" programs
In your letters of April 2, 1958, you directed the Secretary of Defense and the Chair-
man of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics to review and report to you
which of the "space" programs currently underway or planned by Defense should be placed
under the direction of the new civilian space agency proposed in },our message to Congress.
These instructions specifically stated that "the new Agency will be given responsibility for
all programs except those peculiar to or primarily associated with military weapons sys-
tems or military operations."
It now appears that the two agencies have reached an agreement contemplating that
certain space programs having no clear or immediate military applications would remain
the responsibility of the Department of Defense. This agreement would be directly con-
trary to your instructions and to the concept underlying the legislation the administration
has submitted to Congress.
The agreement is primarily the result of the determination of the Defense represen-
tatives not to relinquish control of programs in areas which they feel might some day have
military significance. The NACA representatives apparently have felt obliged to accept an
agreement on the best terms acceptable to Defense.
Specifically, Defense does not wish to turn over to tile new agency all projects related
to placing "man in space" and certain major component projects such as the proposed
million pound thrust engine development. The review by your Scientific Advisory Com-
mittee did not see any immediate military applications of these projects.
The effect of the proposed agreement would be to divide responsibility for programs
primarily of scientific interest between the two agencies. This would be an undesirable and
unnecessary division of responsibility and would be highly impractical. There would not
be any clear dividing line, and unnecessary overlap and duplication would be likely. The
Bureau of the Budget wonld have an almost hopeless task in trying to keep the two parts of
the program in balance, and problems on specific projects would constantly have to come
to you for resolution. The net result of the proposed arrangement would be a less effective
program at higher total cost.
[2] On the other hand, it will be relatively simple to work out practical working ar-
rangements under which responsibility and control of the programs in question would
clearly be assigned to the new agency as contemplated in your instructions, and the mili-
tary interest would be recognized by the participation of the Department of Defense in the
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planningand,whereappropriate,theconductoftheprograms.
In the circumstances, it is recommended that you direct that the two agencies con-
stilt with the Bureau of the Budget and Dr. Killian's office to be sure that any agreement
reached is in accordance with the intent of your previous instructions. It is especially im-
portant that announcement of the agreement now being proposed be avoided at this stage
of the consideration by the Congress of legislation to establish the new space agency.
If you approve this recommendation, there are attached memoranda to return it) tile
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronau-
tics for your signature.
(Handled orally per President's
instructions. AJG) 5/13/58
Signed by Maurice H. Stans
Director
5/13/58
5/14/58
I notified the Secretary of Defense (General Randall)
and Dr. Dryden.
AIG
Document IV-6
Document tide: W.H. Pickering, Director, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, to Dr. T. Keith
Glennan, NASA, March 24, 1959.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA Headquar-
ters, Washington, D.C.
NASA was not created fiom whole cloth; rather, it was an amalgamation of a number
of pre-existing programs and facilities. However, the attempt to meld different institu-
tional cultures into a single organization was not without its problems. Management meth-
ods as well as institutional expectations often differed. The lingering animosity that was to
plague the relationship between NASA Headquarters and the.Jet lhopulsion Laboratory
(.]PL) was present fiom the start of the relationship, as this letter demonstrates.
The Vega prc_ject mentioned in Pickering's letter was aJPL-favored three-stage booster
for launching hmar missions, h was based on a modified Atlas ICBM, developed by Convair
as Ihe first stage, and aJPL-developed third stage. The project was canceled in December
1959 in favor of the Air Force Centaur. The Centaur was similar to the Vega, but its second
stage used liquid hydrogen as a filel. This stage was eventually developed, but not under
.]I'L management, and used with the Atlas and Titan missiles to launch a variety of space-
( rafl.
[1] March 24, 1959
l)r. T Keith Glennan
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
1520 H Sn-eet, N.W.
Washington 25, I).C.
Dear Keith:
I was very glad to have had the opportunily to discuss some of our problems with you
on Saturday, but I feel that I would like to enlarge on some of these topics with you. In so
doing, I hope that you will regard this as a priwtle communication between ourselves. My
646 ORGANIZINGFOREXPLORATION
motivesareessentiallyanattempttoclarifymypositiononsomeofthesematters.
I. TheImportanceoftheVegaProjecttotheU.S.andtoNASA.
I believethattheVegaprojectisoneofthemostimportantactionswhichNASAmust
takethisyear.VegaisthefirstvehiclewhichNASAwillbuildunderitsowndirectionfor
scientificandcivilianpurposes.IfVegaisnotstartedalmostimmediatelythen;
A.TheMars1960datewillnotbeobtainedwithconsequentlossofprestigetoboththeU.S.andNASA.
B.Vegawillbescheduledonlyafewmonthsaheadof Centaurand,therefore,a
powerfulargumentwillbepresentedthatVegaisunnecessary.If thisprevails,thenthe
NASAspaceprogramwillbesubordinatetotheAirForcemilitaryrequirementsforCen-taur.
II. WhyhasnottheVegaProjectbeenStartedAlready?
Asthisletterisbeingwrittenit appearsthatthereiseveryhopethattheprojectwill,
in fact,befinalizedwithinthenextweek,butI thinkit isdesirabletoreviewsomeof the
causesforthedelayingettingit underway.I believethesehavebeen,first,thereluctance
ofHeadquarterstoinitiateauthorizationa dfundsforVegactivitiestoJPL,or toinitiate
aletterorderwithConvair.Second,thereluctanceofHeadquarterstodelegatenegotiat-
ingresponsibilitytoJPLtoworkwithConvairtodevelopthebestpossibleprogramwithin
the[2]JPL-Headquartersagreeduponobjectivesandmoney.
III.ProblemAreasWhichExistBetweenHeadquartersandJPL.
I amlistinganumberofbaldstatementswithoutamplificationorjustification,butI
thinkthesearesignificant.
A.HeadquartersisnotyetwillingtotreatJPLlikeoneofitsownLaboratories,orat
leastinthemannerinwhichJPLbelievesHeadquarterstreatsitsownLaboratories.
B.Headquartersappearstobetooconcernedwithtechnicaldetailsofprojects.
C.JPLdoesnotseemtounderstandHeadquarter'soperatingprinciples.JPLtriesto
cooperatewhenaskedtodosomethingbyHeadquarters,butisall toofrequentlyfrus-
tratedwhentheexpectedresultsarenotforthcoming.
D.JPLisconcernedthatHeadquartershasnotapparentlyestablishedaVegapro-
gramofficewhichwill,in fact,beafocalpointforallVegaprogramactivities.
E.JPLwouldliketofeelthatHeadquarterstrustsusenoughtoaskforhelporadvice
whenneeded,andalsotoinviteustopertinentmeetingsinwhichweareconcerned.
EJPLispronetocomparetheHeadquartersnegotiationsontheVegaprogramwith
thesimilartypeofnegotiationsecessarywhentheSergeantprogramwasetupwiththe
Army.TheresultisnotflatteringtoHeadquarters.
IV.WhataretheProblemAreaswhichJPLBelievesFaceNASA?
A.Theflightprogramistoodiversifiedandcontainstoomanyshots.Eventhere-
ducedscheduleofapproximatelyoneshotpermonthisaveryheavyprogram.
B.I believethatNASAfacesomedifficultproblemswiththeAirForce,particularly
inVegandCentaur.
C.NASAshouldactivelyworktoobtainitsownlaunchandhangerfacilities,bothat
AMRandPMR.[3]D.NASAmustclarifytherelationshipbetweenVegandCentaurwhenbothare
underNASAsponsorship.I believethatinspiteoftheobviousproblems,thebestansweris
forJPLtobetechnicallyresponsibleforboth.But,if thisisplanned,thenJPLneedstobe
madecognizantofthepresentCentaurcontractualndtechnicalprogress.E.I thinkit isessentialforNASAtomoveintotheGoldstoneareawithatleasta
tokenpropulsionactivity.NASAneedstodemonstrateanimaginativeprogramtothepub-
lic.Astartonanadvancedpropulsionfacilityshouldbeanexcellentexample.
V.WhatNeedstobeDone?
It appearstomethatthemosturgenthingin theJPL-NASApictureistogetthe
Vegaprogramgoing.It shouldbeestablishedasaprogramevenif theobjectivesarenotall
asdesired.Thepresentcontractisadownpaymentonacontinuingprogram,notafinal
contract.It shouldbewrittenasflexiblyaspossible.Forexample,aninitialbuyof six
EXPLORINGTHEUNKNOWN 647
roundsisprobablyadequatefornow.Afiringrateofperhapssixperyearcouldwellbe
requiredsothatit willbeacontinuingpurchaseofVegavehicles.
Inwritingthesecommentstoyou,I hopeyouwillnotregardthemasjustpettycriti-
cisms.I havetriedtoputdownsomeofthethingswhicharebotheringmypeople,andI
believeit isfair tosaythatweattheLaboratoryaretryingtotakeaNASAviewof the
problemratherthanaLaboratoryview.I thinkthatweallexpectedthatwewouldencoun-
terproblemswithourNASAoperations,andI donotknowthattheseproblemshavebeen
anymoreseriousthanwehadexpected.However,I dofeeltheimportanceoftryingto
establisht ebestpossibler lationshipbetweentheLaboratoryandHeadquarterssothat
theSpaceProgramwillprogressaseffectivelyaspossible.
Sincerely,
W.H.PickeringDirector
Document IV-7
Document title: T. Keith Glennan, The Birth of NASA: The Diary ofT. Keith Glennan (Wash-
ington, DC: NASA Special Publication-4105, 1993), pp. 1-6.
The Eisenhower administration chose as first NASA Administrator T. Keith Glennan,
who had been president of Case Institute of Technology in Cleveland, Ohio, since 1947.
Up until almost the time that Glennan was asked to take the job, the leading candidate
had been NACA Director Hugh Dryden. But Dryden was a career civil servant, a Demo-
crat, and thought by some, particularly in Congress, to be insufficiently bold in his ap-
proach to the emerging space program. Glennan was an engineer who prior to World War
II had worked primarily in the motion picture industry. He had one previous tour of duty
in Washington, as a member of the Atomic Energy Commission from 1950 to 1952. In this
excerpt from his diary, Glennan discusses how he came to NASA and the philosophy he
brought to the position.
[ 1] In spite of my membership on the Board of the National Science Foundation, the
agency providing the funding for the Vanguard Project, I had taken no more than casual
interest in the efforts of this nation to develop a space program following the successful
orbiting of Sputnik I by the Russians on 4 October 1957. The aftermath was marked by a
continuous chorus of lament over the fact that the Soviet Union had stolen a march on the
United States in fields that had seemed to be the special province of our own country. In
reaction, President Eisenhower appointed Jim Killian of MIT as his Science Advisor. I
thought this a most excellent appointment and sent a telegram to Jim congratulating him
and stating that I would be happy to assist in any possible way.
In April 1958, the president sent to the Congress a bill calling for the establishment
of an agency to develop and manage a national space program. Quite naturally, there was
much debate about the actual management of this program--should it be handled by the
military departments or by a civilian agency? The proponents of the civilian management
won out, and the bill was passed and signed into law on 29July by President Eisenhower. It
called for the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration using the
then existing National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics as its foundation. That distin-
guished 43-year-old agency employed some 8,000 people, with major laboratories in Cleve-
land; Langley, Virginia; and Moffett Field, California. There were smaller field stations at
Edwards Air [2] Force Base in California and at Wallops Island, Virginia. Its budget for the
1959 fiscal year had been set at $101 million as I recall.
The policy statement in the preface of the Act called for the establishment and pros-
ecution of a program aimed at the development of useful knowledge of the space
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environment and the exploration and exploitation of that environment for peaceful pur-
poses and for the benefit of all mankind. In recognition that space might well be used for
military purposes, the law provided that any activities concerned principally with the de-
fense of the nation were the responsibility of the Department of Defense.
As already stated, I paid about as much attention to all of these events as the ordinary
citizen--not much more. Imagine my surprise when on 7 August 1958 I received a call
from Jim Killian asking me to come immediately to Washington. I flew down on that same
day and met with him at his apartment that evening. He said his purpose was to ask me, on
behalf of President Eisenhower, to consider becoming administrator of the new agency,
which of course was the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). He handed
me a copy of the bill, which I had not previously seen. I read it through rather hurriedly
and pointed out immediately the built-in conflict that seemed to me to be present whereby
the Defense Department most certainly would dispute the claim of the civilian agency to
important elements of any program that might be initiated. After some considerable dis-
cussion, I agreed to meet with the president the next morning.
The meeting with President Eisenhower was brief and very much to the point. He
said he wanted to develop a program that would be sensibly paced and vigorously pros-
ecuted. He made no mention of concern over accomplishments of the Soviet Union
although it was clear he was concerned about the nature and quality of scientific and
technological progress in this country. He seemed to rely on the advice of Jim Killian. I
agreed that I would give the matter consideration and would give him a reply within a few
days.
Discussions with Killian were followed by a visit to Don Quarles, Deputy Secretary of
Defense. I had known Quarles for years, since my stay in New London during World War
II. It was apparent that few people had been asked to recommend a candidate for the
NASA job, and I gained the impression that Quarles had only heard about the proposal
that I be offered the post. He urged me to take it but expressed some unhappiness over
the fact that he had not acted more promptly on a matter troubling him--head of the
research and development activity in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He stated that
he had intended to offer that job to me. Although flattered, I assured him that I would not
have been able to accept because of my conviction that only a scientist should handle that
job.
[3] Returning to Cleveland, I discussed these matters with my wife Ruth, several of
my associates on the campus, and members of the board of trustees. Frederick C. Crawford
[chairman of the board of trustees at Case Institute of Technology] urged me to take the
post, and after two or three days of soul searching I called Killian to say I would accept--
but only if Hugh Dryden, the director of the NACA, would endorse the appointment and
would agree to serve as my deputy. Events began to move rapidly. Fred and I agreed that it
would be desirable to ask Kent Smith to serve as acting president during my absence since
John Hrones [Case's vice president for academic affairs] had been with us only a year and
was not acquainted with all facets of the campus. Fred and I talked with Kent and Thelma
and, in spite of the fact that they had planned a year abroad, Kent agreed to take on the
job.
The swearing-in was set for 19 August in Washington. Ruth, Polly, and Sally drove
down with me and Ruthie and Jack Packard attended the ceremony in the executive of-
rices of the White House. A crowd of friends attended the brief ceremony, and the family
had a chance to speak with President Eisenhower who [4] presided and handed us our
Commissions, Hugh Dryden having been sworn in at the same time. Together with the
Packards, we had lunch at LaSalle du Bois with everyone a bit punch drunk over events of
the day. Ruth Packard and my Ruth immediately started a search for an apartment, and I
returned to the NACA offices to become acquainted with members of the staff of that
organization, soon to be absorbed by NASA.
Although my visit had been billed as casual, I found myself thrust into the problems
of the new agency. Dryden called in Abe Silverstein and some of the top operating people
who wanted to discuss budget. I will not try to describe the budget cycle in Washington
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agencies;sufficeit to saythatwewereattemptingtoputtogetherabudgetthatshould
havebeeninitiatedmonthsbefore.Staffmemberswereseekingmyapprovalofafigure
towardwhichtheymightworkonthebudget,whichhadtobesubmittedwithinweeks.
Imaginemyconsternationwhentheyproposedthatweseek$615million.TileCasebud-
getatthattimewasin theneighborhoodf$6or$7millionandIdoubthatI hadmuch
feelfor$615million.Membersof thestaffmadethepointthatwhenNASAwastobe
declared"readyforoperations"wewouldbetakingoverfromtheDefenseDepartment
projects,togetherwithmanpowerandfundsalreadyappropriated.It appearedthatwe
wouldhaveabout$300millionforFY1959(July1958-June1959).Theirargumentsmust
havebeenconvincing,forI approvedabudgetforFY1960usingtheguidelinefigureof$615million.This,then,wasmyintroductiontowhatwastobecomeoneof themajor
activitiesofthefederalgovernment.
In acceptingtheappointmentl hadstipulatedthatI wouldtakeavacationbefore
reportingfordutyandhadsetthereportingdateat9September.In additiontotakinga
vacation,I hadtocompletemyannualreportforCase.Wewereabletofindacottageon
Martha'sVineyardandafterdepositingthechildreninClevelandwedroveimmediatelyto
Wood'sHoleandtooktheferrytotheVineyard.Thiswasadelightfnlspot,andIwasable
tocompletemyreporteventhoughI spenttimeonthetelephonecounselingwithDryden
andothersaboutadditionaltoppersonnel.
Iwantorecordmyfirstbrushwithtileinflexibilityofbureaucraticprocedure.The
Casetrusteeshadvotedtocontinuemysalarythroughoutthebalanceof1958,pa,_4ngme
inalumpsumdeterminedtobealegalprocedure.I didnotwantoacceptacheckflom
thefederalgovernmentuntilIwasonthejob,soI askedourfinancialofficeratNASAto
determinehowthis could be managed since my salary was supposed to begin when I was
sworn in. He shook his head but agreed to make the attempt. When I returned to Wash-
ington on 9 September, I called him in. He stated that the only possible way to manage this
affair was for me to accept the payment and to return it to the federal government as a gift.
I would have to pay income tax. Since there seemed no way of circumventing these regula-
tions, I decided to keep the salary although I suppose I could have paid the tax and re-
turned the balance of the salary less the tax. The whole procedure seemed so unbusinesslike
that I guess I acted as much in pique as from any sense of conviction.
Now my work began in earnest. Ruth was engaged, with the help of Mr. Bacome, a
Cleveland decorator, in making the apartment livable. [5] We bought drapes, a bookcase
and a room divider, a daybed, and a rug and shipped furniture from Cleveland. As I look
back over my appointment schedules for those days, I wonder how I kept anything straight.
I was concerned with acquiring a number of good men to fill top positions in the agency
and I seem to have spent a good bit of my time on this task. Hardly a day passed without a
visit from the representatives of some industrial concern--usually the president--and
meetings with top people in the Department of Defense and some of the other agencies
with which we would be dealing.
Although NACA contained many fine technical people, it had been an agency pro-
tected from the usual in-fighting found on the Washington scene. Its staff, composed of
able people, had little depth and little experience in the management of large projects.
Considerable thought had been given by the staff to the organization that might develop,
and these plans served to get us underway. It became apparent ahnost immediately that
further studies would be needed and that some good people would have to be hired.
Let me discuss the philosophy with which I approached thisjob--a philosophy about
which I had thought while vacationing at Martha's Vineyard. First, having the conviction
that our government operations were growing too large, I determined to avoid excessive
additions to the federal payroll. Since our organizational structure was to be erected on
the NACA staff, and their operation had been conducted ahnost wholly "in-house," I knew
I would face demands on the part of our technical staff to add to in-house capacity. In-
deed, approval had been given in the budget to initiate consn'uction of a so-called "space
control center" laboratory at Belts_flle, Maryland, an action I approved. But I was con-
vinced that the major portion of our funds must be spent with industry, education, and
other institutions.
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Second, it seemed to me that we were starting virtually from scratch and with little in
the way of rocket-propelled launching systems. Thus it seemed to me that we should mount
an aggressive program that would build on the advancing state of the art as we came to
understand more about technologies with which we were dealing. Third, it seemed clear
that we should not lose sight of the propaganda values residing in successful launches--yet
we had to be aware of the limitations imposed upon us by the lack of availability of proven
launch vehicle systems. This was because the military missile program was just reaching
the testing stage and these same rocket-propelled units were going to have to serve as
"booster systems" or, as we came to call them, launch vehicle systems for our space shots.
Fourth, in the nature of things it seemed necessary that we structure our program in
accord with our own ideas of fields to be explored and the pace at which progress could
and should be made. This meant we must avoid the undertaking of particular shots, the
purpose of which would be propagandistic rather than directed toward solid accomplish-
ment. Fifth, we faced the prospect of carrying to completion the projects [6] started by the
Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Defense Department, called into being by Sec-
retary Neil H. McElroy during the period between 4 October 1957 and the operational
beginnings of NASA. At the same time we must be planning our own broadly-based pro-
gram of science and technology and organizing to accomplish all these tasks.
Document IV-8
Document title: Anonymous, "Ballad of Charlie McCoffus," n.d.
Source: Johnson Space Center, Historical Documents Collection, Houston, Texas.
The doggerel that collects in people's desk drawers or on hallway bulletin boards
sometimes tells more about an organization's culture than the dry, cautious language of
bureaucratic prose. The "field centers" of the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion shared little besides NASA's budget and a suspicious contempt for "headquarters"
efforts to impose some coherent administrative order on the lot of them. Resentment of
"headquarters" was strongest among former NACA aeronautical research laboratories. The
oldest was Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory, dedicated in 1920 and named for
Smithsonian Institution Secretary Samuel E Langley.
Ballad of Charlie McCoffus*
A young tield engineer named Charlie McCoffus
Worked all day in the field and at night in the office,
Preparing reports and estimates too
To be picked all to bits by the Washington crew.
For the boys in D. C. and their double lensed specs,
Their sallow complexions and fried collar necks,
Care not for the time or trouble they make
If a comma is missing, or a carbon misplaced.
The}, fire it back with ill conceived jeers
To harass the poor hardworking field engineers.
* A ballad used by Langley in the early days!
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TogetbacktoCharliehestruggledalong
Till anacheinhisheadtoldhimsomethingwaswrong.
Hewentothedoctorand"Doctor"sayshe,
"There'sabuzzinmybrain.What'sthematterwithme?"
Wellthemedicothumpedasthemedicosdo
andtestedhispulseandhisreflexestoo,
Andhisheadandhisheartandhiseyesandeachlung
AndCharliesaid"Ah"andstuckouthistongue.
Thenthedoctorsaid"Wellwhatanarrowescape!
Butabriefoperationwillputyouinshape.
I mustakeoutyourbrainforacompleteoverhauling,
Intheinterimtakearespitefromyourcalling."
TheweekspassedbyandCharlieMcCoffusNevercalledforhisbrainatthemedico'soffice.
ThedoctorgotworriedandgaveCharliearing,
'_You'dbettercomeoverandgetthedamnthing."
"ThanksDoc,I don'tneedit"saidCharlieMcCoffus.
"IhavebeentransferredtotheWashingtonOffice."
SoCharlienowwearsafliedcollartowork,
Andhidesin thelairswheretheauditorslurk,
Andhislettersbringtremorsofangerandfear
Totheheartofeachhardworkingfieldengineer.
AndtheprideandthejoyoftheWashingtonOffice
IsthebrainlesspredaciousyoungCharlieMcCoffus.
Document IV-9
Document title: Report to the iYesident on Government Contracting for Research and Develop-
ment, Bureau of the Budge.t, U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, 87th
Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, _,_: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. vii-xiii,
1-24.
Public debates over the proper spheres of government and private enterprise, which
became more intense with the _rowth of the federal establishment during and after World
War If, drew a distinction between the "public sector" and "private sector" that was often
more fiction than fact. By the end of the 1950s, there were entire industries that depended
hea_41y on federal contracts, and there were federal agencies, such as the Atomic Energy
Commission, whose facilities were operated almost entirely by private contractors. Was the
government improperly transferring its authority and responsibilities to private industry?
As early as 1961, the White House created a task force to examine this question. The group's
report, issued in April 1962, became informally known as the "Bell Report," after its chair-
man, David Bell, Director of the Bureau of the Budget. This excerpt contains the body of
the report's analysis and conclusions.
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Report to the President on Government Contracting
for Research and Development
[vii] Executive Office of the President,
Bureau of the Budget,
Washington, D.C., April 30, 1962
Dear Mr. President: As requested by your letter of July 31, 1961,_ we have reviewed
the experience of the Government in using contracts with private institutions and enter-
prises to obtain research and development work needed for public purposes.
The attached report presents our findings and conclusions. Without attempting to
summarize the complete report, we include in this letter a few of our most significant
conclusions, as follows:
1. Federally financed research and development work has been increasing at a phe-
nomenal rate--from $100 million per year in the late 1930's to over $10 billion per year at
present, with the bulk of the increase coming since 1950. Over 80 percent of such work is
conducted today through non-Federal institutions rather than through direct Federal
operations. The growth and size of this work, and the heavy reliance on non-Federal orga-
nizations to carry it out, have had a striking impact on the Nation's universities and its
industries, and have given rise to the establishment of new kinds of professional and tech-
nical organizations. At present, the system for conducting Federal research and develop-
ment work can best be described as a highly complex partnership among various kinds of
public and private agencies, related in large part by contractual arrangements.
While many improvements are needed in the conduct of research and development
work, and in the contracting systems used, it is our fundamental conclusion that it is in the
national interest for the Government to continue to rely heavily on contracts with non-
Federal institutions to accomplish scientific and technical work needed for public pur-
poses. A partnership among public and private agencies is the best way in our society to
enlist the Nation's resources and achieve the most rapid progress.
2. The basic purposes to be served by Federal research and development programs
are public purposes, considered by the President and the Congress to be of sufficient
national importance to warrant the expenditure of public funds. The management and
control of such programs must be firmly in the hands of full-time Government officials
clearly responsible to the President and the Congress. With programs of the size and com-
plexity now common, this requires that the Government have on its staff exceptionally
strong and able executives, scientists, and engineers, fully qualified to weigh the views and
advice of technical specialists, to make policy decisions concerning tile types of work to be
undertaken, when, by whom, and at what cost, to superxfse the execution of work under-
taken, and to evaluate the results.
[viii] At the present time we consider that one of the most serious obstacles to the
recruitment and retention of first-class scientists, administrators, and engineers in the
Government service is the serious disparity between governmental and private compensa-
tion for comparable work. We cannot stress too strongly the importance of rectifying this
situation, through congressional enactment of civilian pay reform legislation as you have
recommended.
3. Given proper arrangements to maintain management control in the hands of
Government officials, federally financed research and development work can be accom-
plished through several different means: Direct governmental operations of laboratories
and other installations; operation of Government-owned facilities by contractors; grants
and contracts with universities; contracts with not-for-profit corporations or with profit
corporations. Choices among these means should be made on the basis of relative effi-
ciency and effectiveness in accomplishing the desired work, with due regard to the need to
1. Ed. note:see Annex 1, p. 25, for complete text of letter.
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maintainandenlargethelong-termstrengthof theNation'scientificresources,both
publicandprivate.
Inaddition,therapidexpansionoftheuseofGovernmentcontracts,inafieldwhere
25),earsagotheywererelativelyrare,hasbroughttotheforeanumberofdifferenttypes
ofpossibleconflictsofinterests,andtheseshouldbeavoidedinassigningresearchand
developmentwork.Clear-cuts andardsexistwithrespecttosomeofthesepotentialcon-
flict-of-interestsi uations--asis thecasewithrespectto personsin privatelifeactingas
advisersandconsultantstoGovernment,whichwascoveredinyourmemorandumofFeb-
ruary9, 1962.Someotherstandardsarenowwidelyaccepted--forexample,the
undesirabilityofpermittingafirmwhich oldsacontractfortechnicaldvisoryservicesto
seekacontracttodevelopor tosupplyanymajoritemwithrespecttowhichthefirmhas
advisedtheGovernment.Stillotherstandardsareneeded,andwerecommendthatyou
requesttheheadof eachdepartmentandagencywhichdoesa significantamountof
contractingforresearchanddevelopmenttodevelop,in consultationwiththeAttorney
General,clear-cutcodesofconduct,oprovidestandardsandcriteriatoguidethepublic
officialsandprivatepersonsandorganizationsengagedin researchanddevelopment
activities.
4.Wehaveidentifiedanumberofwaysinwhichthecontractingsystemcanandshould
beimproved,including:
Providingmoreincentivesforreducingcostsandimprovingperformance;
Improvingourabilitytoevaluatehequalityofresearchanddevelopmentwork;
Givingmoreattentiontofeasibilitystudiesandthedevelopmentof specifications
prior to invitingprivateproposalsfor majorsystemsdevelopment,thusreducing
"brochuremanship"withitsheavywasteofscarcetalent.
Wehavecarefullyconsideredthequestionwhetherstandardsshouldbeappliedto
salariesandrelatedbenefitspaidbyresearchanddevelopmentcontractorsdoingworkfor
theGovernment.Webelieveit isdesirabletodosoin thosecasesinwhichthesystemof
lettingcontractsdoesnotresultincostcontrol through competition. We believe the basic
standard to be applied should be essentially the same as the standard you recently recom-
mended to the Congress with [ix] respect to Federal employees--namely, comparability,
with salaries and related benefits paid to persons doing similar work in the private economy.
Insofar as a comparability standard cannot be applied--as would be the case with respect
to the very top jobs in an organization, for example--we would make it the personal re-
sponsibility of the head of the contracting agency to make sure that reasonable limits are
applied.
5.Finally, we considered that in recent years there has been a serious trend toward
eroding the competence of the Government's research and development establishments--
in part owing to the keen competition for scarce talent which has come from Government
contractors. We believe it to be highly important to improve this situation--not by setting
artificial or arbitrary limits on Government contractors but by sharply improving the work-
ing environment within the Government, in order to attract and hold first-class scientists
and technicians. In our judgment, the most important improvements that are needed
within Government are:
To ensure that governmental research and development establishments are assigned
significant and challenging work;
To simplify management controls, eliminate unnecessary echelons of review and su-
pervision, and give to laboratory directors more authority to command resources and make
administrative decisions; and
To raise salaries, particularly in higher grades, in order to provide greater compara-
bility with salaries available in private activities.
Action is under way along the first two lines--some of it begun as the result of our
review. Only the Congress can act on the third aspect of the problem, and we strongly
hope it will do so promptly.
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In preparing this report, we have benefited from comments and suggestions by the
Attorney General, the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare, and the Administrator, Federal Aviation Agency, and they concur in
general with our findings and conclusions.
Robert S. McNamara,
Secretary of Defense.
James E. Webb,
Administrator, National
Aeronautics and
Space Administration.
John W. Macy, Jr.,
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.
Dr. Alan T. Waterman,
Director, National Science Foundation.
Jerome B. Wiesner,
Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology.
David E. Bell,
Director, Bureau of the Budget ....
[xi] FOREWORD
This report has been prepared in response to the President's letter of July 31, 1961,
to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, asking for a review of the use of Government
contracts with private institutions and enterprises to obtain scientific and technical work
needed for public purposes.
Such contracts have been used extensively since the end of World War II to provide
for the operation and management of research and development facilities and programs,
for analytical studies and advisory services, and for technical supervision of complex sys-
tems, as well as for the conduct of research and development projects.
As the President noted in his letter, there is a consensus that the use of contracts is
appropriate in many cases. At the same time, a number of important issues have been
raised, including the appropriate extent of reliance on contractors, the comparative sala-
ries paid by contractors and the Government, the effect of extensive contracting on the
Government's own research and development capabilities, and the extent to which con-
tracts may have been used to avoid limitations which exist on direct Federal operations.
Accordingly, the President asked that the review focus on-
Criteria that should be used in determining whether to perform a function through
a contractor or through direct Federal operations;
Actions needed to increase the Government's ability to review contractor operations
and to perform scientific and technical work; and
Policies which should be followed by the Government in obtaining maximum effi-
ciency from contractor operations and in reviewing contractor performance and costs
(including standards for salaries, fees, and other items).
The President requested the following officials to participate in the study: The Secre-
tary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.
The Director of the National Science Foundation was also invited to participate.
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Inmakingthereviewrequested by the President, a great deal of material was avail-
able from hearings and reports of the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations,
Armed Services, Judiciary, and Government Operations, the House Committees on Post
Office and Civil Service and on Science and Astronautics, the second Hoover Commis-
sion, and various governmental and private studies. In addition, information was obtained:
By questionnaires to which 10 Federal agencies and 71 Government field installa-
tions, universities, and contract establishments respond; and
[xii] By interviews conducted at 28 Government field installations and non-Federal
establishments, and with a number of agency headquarters officials.
These data were obtained and analyzed with respect to major policy implications by
an interdepartmental staff group, which included representatives of each of the officials
whom the President asked to participate in the review.
This report presents a summary analysis and recommendations growing out of this
review ....
[1] PART 1
STATEMENT OF MAJOR ISSUES
Policy questions relating to Government contracting for research and development'-'
must be considered in the perspective of the phenomenal growth, diversity, and change in
Federal activities in this field.
FEDERAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTMTIES AND THEIR IMPACT
Prior to World War II, the total Federal research and development program is
estimated to have cost annually about $100 million. In the fiscal year 1950, total Federal
research and development expenditures were about $1.1 billion. In the fiscal year 1963,
the total is expected to reach $12.4 billion.
The fundamental reason for this growth in expenditures has been the importance of
scientific and technical work to the achievement of major public purpose. Since World
War II the national defense effort has rested more and more on the search for new tech-
nology. Our military posture has come to depend less on production capacity in being and
more on the race for shorter lead times in the development and deployment of new weap-
ons systems and of countermeasures against similar systems in the hands of potential en-
emies. The Defense Department alone is expected to spend $7.1 billion on research and
development in fiscal 1963, and the Atomic Energy Commission another $1.4 billion.
Aside fi-om the national defense, science and technology are of increasing signifi-
cance to many other Federal programs. The Nation's effort in nonmilitary space explora-
tion-which is virtually entirely a research and development effort--is growing extremely
rapidly; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration is expected to spend $2.4
billion in fiscal 1963, and additional sums related to the national space program will be
spent by the Department of Commerce and other agencies. Moreover, scientific and tech-
nological efforts are of major significance in agriculture, health, natural resources, and
many other federal programs.
The end of this period of rapid growth is not in sight. Public purposes will continue
to require larger and larger scientific and technological efforts for as far ahead as we can
see.
The increase in Federal expenditures for research and development has had an enor-
mous impact on the Nation's scientific and technical resources. It is not too much to say
2. Note on terminology: The term "research and development" is used in this report in the sense in
which it is used in the Federal budget--that is, it means the conduct of activities intended to obtain new knowl-
edge or to apply existing knowledge to new uses. The Department of Defense uses the term "research, develop-
ment, test, and evaluation," which is a somewhat fuller but more cumbersome term for the same concept. In
this report the shorter term is used for convenience. For a summary of all Federal activities of this type, see
Annex 3. "Federal Research and Development Programs," reprinted from "The Budget of the U.S. Government
for fiscal year 1963."
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that the major initiative and responsibility for promoting and financing research and de-
velopment have in many important areas been shifted from private enterprise (including
academic as well as business institutions) to the Federal [2] Government. Prior to World
War II, the great bulk of the Nation's research achievements occurred with little support
from Federal funds, although there were notable exceptions, such as in the field of agri-
culture. Today it is estimated by the National Science Foundation that the Federal budget
finances about 65 percent of the total national expenditure for research and develop-
ment. Moreover, the Federal share is rising.
Federal financing, however, does not necessarily imply Federal operation. As the
Federal research and development effort has risen, there has been a steady reduction in
the proportion conducted through direct Federal operations. Today about 80 percent of
Federal expenditures for research and development are made through non-Federal
institutions. Furthermore, while a major finding of this report is that the Government's
capabilities for direct operations in research and development need to be substantially
strengthened, there is no doubt that the Government must continue to rely on the private
sector for the major share of the scientific and technical work which it requires?
The effects of the extraordinary increase in Federal expenditures for research and
development, and the increasing reliance on the private sector to perform such work,
have been very far reaching.
The impact on private industry has been striking. In the past, the Government uti-
lized profitmaking industry mainly for production engineering and the manufacture of
final products--not for research and development. Industries with which it dealt in secur-
ing the bulk of its equipment were primarily the traditional large manufacturers for the
civilian economy--such as the automotive, machinery, shipbuilding, steel, and oil indus-
tries, which relied on the Government for only a portion, usually a minority, of their sales
and revenues. In the current scientific age, the older industries have declined in promi-
nence in the advanced equipment area and newer research and development-oriented
industries have come to the fore--such as those dealing in aircraft, rockets, electronics,
and atomic energy.
There are significant differences among these newer industries and others. While
the older industries were organized along mass-production principles, and used large num-
bers of production workers, the newer ones show roughly a 1-to-1 ratio between produc-
tion workers and scientist-engineers. Moreover, the proportion of production workers is
steadily declining. Between 1954 and 1959, production workers in the aircraft industry
declined 17 percent while engineers and scientists increased 96 percent. Also, while the
average ratio of research and development expenditures to sales in all industry is about
3 percent, the advanced weapons industry averages about 20 percent and the aerospace
industry averages about 31 percent.
But the most striking difference is the reliance of the newer industries almost en-
tirely on Government sales for their business. In 1958, a reasonably representative year, in
an older industry, the automotive industry, military sales ranged from 5 percent for Gen-
eral Motors to 15 percent for Chrysler. In the same year in the aircraft industry, military
sales ranged from a low of 67 percent for Beech Aircraft to a high of 99.2 percent for the
Martin Co.
[3] The present situation, therefore, is one in which a large group of economically
significant and technologically advanced industries depend for their existence and growth
not on the open competitive market of traditional economic theory, but on the sales only
to the U.S. Government. And, moreover, companies in these industries have the strongest
incentives to seek contracts for research and development work, which will give them both
the know-how and the preferred position to seek later follow-on production contracts.
The rapid increase in Federal research and development expenditures has had
3. Annex 4 provides data. supplied by the National Science Foundation, on the sources of funds for the
national research and development effort and on the distribution of work between the various types of perform-
ing installations-direct Federal operations, industry, universities, and not-for-profit establishments.
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strikingeffectsonotherinstitutionsinoursocietyapartfromprivateindustry.
Therehasbeenamajorimpactontheuniversities.TheNationhasalwaysdepended
largelyon theuniversitiesfor carryingoutfundamentalresearch.Assuchworkhas
becomemoreimportanto Governmentandmoreexpensive,anincreasingshare--
particularlyinthephysicalndlifesciencesandengineering--hasbeensupportedbyFed-
eralfunds.Thetotalimpactonauniversitycanbesizable.Welloverhalfof theresearch
budgetsofsuchuniversitiesa Harvard,Brown,Columbia,MassachusettsInstituteofTech-
nology,Stanford,CaliforniaInstituteof Technology,Universityof Illinois,NewYork
University,andPrinceton,forillustration,issupportedbyFederalfunds.
Newinstitutionalrrangementshavebeenestablishedinmanycases,relatedtobut
organizedseparatelyfromtheuniversities,inordertorespondtotheneedsoftheFederal
Government.Thus,theLincolnLaboratoryoftheMassachusettsInstituteofTectmology
wasestablishedbycontractwiththeAirForcetosupplyresearchanddevelopmentservices
andto establishsystemsconceptsfor thecontinentalirdefense,andsimilarlytheJet
PropulsionLaboratorywasestablishedattheCaliforniaInstituteofTechnologytocon-
ductresearchonrocketpropulsionfortheDepartmentoftheArmyandlatertosupply
spacecraftdesignandsystemsengineeringservicestotheNationalAeronauticsandSpace
Administration.I addition,otherresearchinstitutions--suchastheStanfordResearch
Institute--whichwereestablishedtoconductresearchoncontractforprivateor public
customers,nowdoamajorshareoftheirbusinesswiththeFederalGovernment.
In additionto alteringthetraditionalpatternsof organizationofprivateindustry
andtheuniversities,theriseinFederalresearchanddevelopmentexpenditureshasre-
suitedin thecreationofentirelynewkindsoforganizations.
OnekindoforganizationistypifiedbytheRandCorp.,establishedimmediatelyaf-
terWorldWarII, toprovideoperationsresearchandotheranalyticalservicesbycontract
totheAirForce.Anumberofsimilarorganizationshavebeenestablishedsince,moreor
lessmodeledonRand,toprovidesimilarservicestoothergovernmentalagencies.
Asecondnewkindoforganizationistileprivatecorporation,generallynot-for-profit
butsometimesprofit,createdtofurnishtheGovernmentwith"systemsengineeringand
technicaldirection"andotherprofessionalservices.TheAerospaceCorp.,theMITRE
Corp.,theSystemsDevelopmentCorp.,andthePlanningResearchCorporationareillus-trations.
[4]A thirdneworganizationalarrangementwaspioneeredbytheOfficeofScien-
tificResearchandDevelopmentduringWorldWarIIandusedbytheAtomicEnergyCom-
mission,whichtookoverthewartimeatomicenergylaboratoriesandaddedothers--all
consistingoffacilitiesandequipmentownedbytheGovernmentbutoperatedundercon-
tractbyprivateorganizations,eitherindustrialcompaniesoruniversities.
Apartfromtheirimpactontheinstitutionsofoursociety,Federalneedsin research
anddevelopmentareplacingcriticaldemandsonthenationalpoolofscientificandengi-
neeringtalent.TheNationalScienceFoundationpointsoutthatthecountry'supplyof
scientistsandengineersi increasingatthefairlystablerateof6percentannually,while
thenumberengagedin researchanddevelopmentactivitiesi growingatabout10per-
centeachyear.Accordingly,thetaskofdevelopingourmanpowerresourcesinsufficient
qualityandquantitytokeeppacewiththeexpandingresearchanddevelopmenteffortis
amatterofgreaturgency.Thecompetitionforscientistsandengineersisbecomingkeener
allthetimeandrequiresurgentattentiontotheexpansionfeducationandtraining,and
totheefficientuseofthescientificandtechnicalpersonnelwehavenow.
QUESTION AND ISSUES CONSIDERED IN THIS REPORT
The dynamic character of the Nation's research and development efforts, as summa-
rized in the preceding paragraphs, has given rise to a number of criticisms and points of
concern. For example, concern has been expressed that the Government's ability, to per-
form essential management functions has diminished because of an increasing depen-
dence on contractors to determine policies of a technical nature and to exercise the type
658 ORGANIZINGFOREXPLORATION
ofmanagementfunctionswhichGovernmentitselfshouldperform.Somehavecriticized
thenewnot-for-profitcontractors,performingsystemsengineeringandtechnicaldirec-
tionworkfor theGovernment,on thegroundsthattheyareintrudingon traditional
functionsperformedbycompetitiveindustry.Someconcernhasbeenexpressedthat
universitiesareundertakingresearchanddevelopmentprogramsof anatureandsize
whichmayinterferewiththeirtraditionaleducationalfunctions.Thecost-reimbursement
typeofcontractsheGovernmentuses,particularlywithrespecttoresearchanddevelop-
mentworkonweaponsandspacesystems,havebeencriticizedasprovidinginsufficient
incentivestokeepcostsdownandensureffectiveperformance.Criticism has been lev-
eled against relying so heavily on contractors to perform research and development work
as simply a device for circumventing civil service rules and regulations.
Finally, the developments of recent years have inevitably blurred the traditional di-
viding lines between the public and private sectors of our Nation. A number of profound
questions affecting the structure of our society are raised by our inability to apply the
classical distinctions between what is public and what is private. For example, should a
corporation created to provide services to Government and receiving 100 percent of its
financial support from Government be considered a "public" or a "private" agency? In
what sense is a business corporation doing nearly 100 percent of its business with the Gov-
ernment engaged in "free enterprise"?
[5] In light of these criticisms and concerns, an appraisal of the experience in using
contracts to accomplish the Government's research and development purposes is evidently
timely. We have not, however, in the course of the present review attempted to treat the
fundamental philosophical issues indicated in the preceding paragraph. We accept as de-
sirable the present high degree of interdependence and collaboration between Govern-
ment and private institutions. We believe the present intermingling of the public and
private sectors is in the national interest because it affords the largest opportunity for
initiative and the competition of ideas from all elements of the technical community. Con-
sequently, it is our judgment that the present complex partnership between Government
and private institutions should continue.
On these assumptions, the present report is intended to deal with the practical ques-
tion: What should the Government do to make the partnership work better in the public
interest and with maximum effectiveness and economy?
We deal principally with three aspects of this main question.
There is first the question, What aspects of the research and development effort
should be contracted out? This question falls into two parts. One part relates to those
crucial powers to manage and control governmental activities which must be retained in
the hands of public officials directly answerable to the President and Congress. Are we in
danger of contracting out such powers to private organizations? If so, what should be done
about it?
The other part of this question relates to activities which do not have to be carried
out by Government officials, but on which there is an option: they may be accomplished
either by direct Government operations or by contract with non-Federal institutions. What
are the criteria that should guide this choice? And if a private institution is chosen, what
are the criteria for choice as among universities, not-for-profit corporations, profit corpo-
rations, or other possible contractors?
The second question we deal with is what standards and criteria should govern con-
tract terms in cases where research and development is contracted out. For example, to
what extent is competition effective in ensuring efficient performance at low cost, and
when--if at all--must special rules be established to control fees, salaries paid, and other
elements of contractor cost?
The third question we deal with is how we can maintain strong research and develop-
ment institutions as direct Governments operations. How can we prevent the best of the
Government's research scientists, engineering, and administrators from being drained off
to private institutions as a result of higher private salaries and superior private working
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environments,andhowcanweattractanadequatenumberofthemostalentednewcol-
legegraduatestoacareerinGovernmentservice?
Thesequestionsaretreatedin thesectionswhichfollow.[Blankpage]
[71 PART 2
CONSIDERATIONS IN DECIDING WHETHER TO CONTRACT
OUT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORK
Generalizations about criteria for contracting out research and development work
must be reached with caution, in view of the wide variety of different circumstances which
must be covered.
A great many Governmm:t agencies are involved. The Department of Defense, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Atomic Energy Commission pro-
vide the bulk of Federal financing, but a dozen or more agencies also play significant roles.
Most Federal research and development work is closely related to the specific pur-
pose of the agency concerned--to the creation of new weapons systems for the Depart-
ment of Defense, for example, or the exploration of new types of atomic power reactors
for the Atomic Energy Commission. But a significant portion of the research financed by
the Federal Government is aimed at more general targets: to enlarge the national supply
of highly trained scientists, for example, as is the case with some programs of the National
Science Foundation. And even the most "mission oriented" agencies have often found it
desirable to make funds available for basic research to advance the fundamental state of
knowledge in fields that are relevant to their missions. Both the Department of Defense
and the AEC, for example, make substantial funds available for fundamental research, not
related to any specific item of equipment or other end product.
A great many different kinds of activity are involved, which have been classified by
some under five headings:
(1) Fundamental research.
(2) Supporting research or exploratory development.
(3) Feasibility studies, operations analysis, and technical advice.
(4) Development and engineering of products, processes, or systems.
(5) Test and evaluation activities.
The lines between many of the activities listed are necessarily uncertain. Neverthe-
less, it is clear that "research and development" is a phrase that covers a considerable
number of different kinds of activity.
Finally, there have been distinct historical developments affecting the different Gov-
ernment agencies. Some agencies, for example, have a tradition of relying primarily on
direct Government operations of laboratories--others have precisely the opposite tradi-
tion of relying primarily on contracting for the operation of such installations.
Against this background of diversity in several dimensions, we have asked, what crite-
ria should be used in deciding whether or not to contract out any given research and
development task? In outline, our judgment on this question runs as follows:
[8] There are certain functions which should under no circumstances be contracted
out. The management and control of the Federal research and development effort must
be firmly in the hands of full-time Government officials clearly responsible to the Presi-
dent and the Congress.
Subject to this principle, many kinds of arrangements--including both direct Fed-
eral operations and the various patterns of contracting now in use--can and should be
used to mobilize the talent and facilities needed to carry out the Federal research and
development effort. Not all arrangements, however, are equally suitable for all purposes
and under all circumstances, and discriminating choices must be made among them by
the Government agencies havir_g research and development responsibilities. These choices
should be based primarily on two considerations:
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(1) Getting the job done effectively and efficiently, with due regard to the long-term
strength of the Nation's scientific and technical resources; and
(2) Avoiding assignments of work which would create inherent conflicts of interest.
Each of these judgments is elaborated below:
STRENGTHENING THE ABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO MANAGE AND
CONTROL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
We regard it as axiomatic that policy decisions respecting the Government's research
and development programs---decisions concerning the types of work to be undertaken
when, by whom, and what cost--must be made by full-time Government officials clearly
responsible to the President and to the Congress. Furthermore, such officials must be in a
position to supervise the execution of work undertaken, and to evaluate the results. These
are basic functions of management which cannot be transferred to any contractor if we are
to have proper accountability for the performance of public functions and for the use of
public funds.
To say this does not imply that detailed administration of each research and develop-
ment task must be kept in the hands of top public officials. Indeed, quite the contrary is
true, and an appropriate delegation of responsibility--either to subordinate public offi-
cials or by contract to private persons or organizations--for the detailed administration of
research and development work is essential to its efficient execution.
It is not always easy to draw the line distinguishing essential management and con-
trol responsibilities which should not be delegated to private contractors (or, indeed, to
governmental research organizations such as laboratories) from those which can and should
be so assigned. Recognizing this difficulty, it nevertheless seems to be the case that in
recent years there have been instances---particularly in the Department of Defense--where
we have come dangerously close to permitting contract employees to exercise functions
which belong with top Government management officials. Insofar as this has been true,
we believe it is being rectified. Government agencies are now keenly aware of this problem
and have taken steps to retain functions essential to the performance of their responsibil-
ity under the law.
[9] It is not enough, of course, to recognize that governmental managers must retain
top management functions and not contract them out. In order to perform those func-
tions effectively, they must be themselves competent to make the required management
decisions and, in addition, have access to all necessary technical advice. Three conclusions
follow:
First, where management decisions are based substantially on technical judgments,
qualified executives, who can properly utilize the advice of technical consultants, from
both inside and outside the Government, are needed to perform them. There must be
sufficient technical competence within the Government so that outside technical advice
does not become de facto technical decisionmaking. In many instances the executives
making the decisions can and should have strong scientific backgrounds. In others, it is
possible to have nonscientists so long as they are capable of understanding the technical
issues involved and have otherwise appropriate administrative experience.
By and large, we believe it is necessary for the agencies concerned to give increased
stress to the need to bring into governmental service as administrators men with scientific
or engineering understanding, and during the development of Government career execu-
tives, to give many of them the opportunity, through appropriate training and experience,
to strengthen their appreciation and understanding of scientific and technical matters.
Correspondingly, scientists and engineers should be encouraged and guided to obtain,
through appropriate training and experience, a broader understanding of management
and public policy matters. The average governmental administrator in the years to come
will be dealing with issues having larger and larger scientific and technical content, and his
training and experience, both before he enters Government service and after he has joined,
should reflect this fact.
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Atthepresenttime,wearestronglypersuadedthatoneofthemostseriousobstacles
toacquiringandmaintainingthemanagerialcompetencewhichtheGovernmenteeds
foritsresearchanddevelopmentprogramsi thediscrepancybetweengovernmentaland
privatecompensationforcomparablework.Thisobstaclehasbeengrowingincreasingly
seriousinrecent),earsasincreasesinFederalpayhavebeenconcentratedprimarilyatthe
lowerendofthepayscale--resultingin theanomaloussituationthatmanyofficialsof
GovernmentresponsibleforadministeringmajorelementsofFederalresearchanddevel-
opmentprogramsarepaidsubstantiallysmallersalariesthanpersonnelofuniversities,or
businesscorporations,orofnot-for-profitorganizationswhocarryoutsubordinateaspects
ofthoseresearchanddevelopmentprograms?Wecannotstresstoostronglytheimpor-
tanceofrectifyingthissituation,andhopetheCongresswilltakeatthissessiontheaction
whichthePresidenthasrecommendedtoreformFederalcivilianpayscales.
Second,it isnecessaryforeventhebestqualifiedgovernmentalmanagerstoobtain
technicaldvicefromspecialists.Suchtechnicaldvicecanbeobtainedfrommenwithin
theGovernmentor thoseoutside.Whenit isobtainedfrompersonsoutsideofGovern-
ment,specialproblemsofpotentialconflictofinterestareraisedwhichwere[10]dealt
within thePresident'srecentmemorandumentitled"PreventingConflictsofInterestonthePartofAdvisersandConsultantstotheGovernment."
Webelieveit highlyimportantfortheGovernmenttobeabletoturnto technical
advicefromitsownestablishmentaswellasfromoutsidesources.Onemajorsourceofthis
technicalknowledgeistheGovernment-operatedl boratoryorresearchinstallationand,
asismadeclearlaterin thisreport,webelievemajorimprovementsareneededatthe
presenttimeinthemanagementa dstaffingoftheseinstallations.Astrongbaseoftech-
nicalknowledgeshouldbecontinuallymaintainedwithintheGovernmentserviceand
availableforadvicetotopmanagement.
Third,weneedto beparticularlysensitivetothecumulativeeffectsof contracting
outGovernmentwork.Aseriesofactionstocontractoutimportantactivities,eachwhollyjustifiedwhenconsideredonitsownmerits,maywhentakentogetherbegintoerodethe
Government's ability to manage its research and development programs. There must be a
high degree of awareness of this danger on the part of all governmental officials con-
cerned. Particular attention must be given to strengthening the Government's ability to
provide effective technical supervision in the letting and carrying out of contracts, and to
developing more adequate measures for performance evaluation.
DETERMINING THE ASSIGNMENT OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORK
As indicated above, we considered it necessary and desirable to use a variety of ar-
rangements to obtain the scientific and technical services needed to accomplish public
purposes. Such arrangements include: direct governmental operations through laborato-
ries or other installations; operation of Government-owned facilities by contractors; grants
and contracts with universities and entities associated with universities; contracts with not-
for profit corporations wholly or largely devoted to performing work for Government; and
contracts with private business corporations. We also feel that innovation is still needed in
these matters, and each agency should be encourage to seek new and better arrangements
to accomplish its purposes. Choices among available arrangements should be based pri-
marily on two factors:
Relative effectiveness and efficiency, and
Avoidance of conflicts of interest.
Relative effectiveness and efficiency
In selecting recipients, whether public or private, for research and development as-
signments, the basic rule (apart from the conflict-of-interest problem) should be to assign
the job where it can be done most effectively and efficiently, with due regard to the strength-
ening of institutional resources as well as to the immediate execution of projects. This
4.Annex 5 summarizes information obtained during the present re_iew regarding salaries and related benefits.
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criterion does not, in our judgment lead to a conclusion that certain kinds of work should
be assigned only to certain kinds of institutions. Too much depends on individual compe-
tence, historical evolution, and other special circumstances to permit any such simple rule
to hold. However, it seems clear that some types of facilities have natural advantages which
should be made use of.
Thus:
[11] Direct Federal operations, such as the governmental laboratory, enjoy a close
and continuing relationship to the agency they serve, which permits maximum respon-
siveness to the needs of that agency and a maximum sense of sharing the mission of the
agency. Such operations accordingly have a natural advantage in conducting research,
feasibility studies, developmental and analytical work, user tests, and evaluations which
directly support the management functions of the agency. Furthermore, an agency-oper-
ated research and development installation may provide a useful source of technical man-
agement personnel for its sponsor.
At the present time, we consider that the laboratories and other facilities available to
Government are operating under certain important handicaps which should be removed
if these facilities are to support properly the Federal research and development effort.
These matters are discussed at some length in part 4 of this report.
Colleges and universities have a long tradition in basic research. The processes of
graduate education and basic research have long been closely associated, and reinforce
each other in many ways. This unique intellectual environment has proven to be highly
conducive to successful undirected and creative research by highly skilled specialists. Such
research is not amenable to management control by adherence to firm schedules, well-
defined objectives, or predetermined methods of work. In the colleges and universities,
graduate education and basic research constitute an effective means of introducing future
research workers to their fields in direct association with experienced people in those
fields, and in an atmosphere of active research work. Applied research appropriate to the
universities is that which broadly advances the state of the art.
University-associated research centers are well suited to basic or applied research for
which the facilities are so large and expensive that the research acquires the character of a
major program best carried out in an entity apart from the regular academic organization.
Research in such centers often benefits from the active participation of university scien-
tists, At the same time, the sponsoring university (and sometimes other, cooperating uni-
versities) benefits from increased opportunities for research by its faculties and graduate
students.
Not-for-profit organizations (other than universities and contractor-operated Gov-
ernment facilities), if strongly led, can provide a degree of independence, both from Gov-
ernment and from the commercial market, which may make them particularly useful as a
source of objective analytical advice and technical services. These organizations have on
occasion provided an important means for establishing a competent research organiza-
tion for a particular task more rapidly than could have been possible within the less flex-
ible administrative requirements of the Government.
Contractor-operated Government facilities appear to be effective, in some instances,
in securing competent scientific and technical personnel to perform research and devel-
opment work where very complex and cosily facilities are required and the Government
desires to maintain control of these facilities. Under such arrangements, it has been pos-
sible for the Government to retain most of the controls inherent in direct Federal opera-
tions, while at the same time gaining many of the advantages of flexibility with respect to
staffing, organization, and management, which are inherent in university and industrial
operations.
[12] Operations in the profit sector of the economy have special advantages when
large and complex arrays of resources needed for advanced development and preproduction
work must be marshaled quickly. If the contracting system is such as to provide appropri-
ate incentives, operations for profit can have advantages in spurring efficiency, reducing
costs, and speeding accomplishments. (It is plain that not all operations in this sector have
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resultedin lowcostsorrapidandefficientperformance;weregardthisasamajorprob-
lemforthecontractingsystemanddiscussitfurtherinpt.3ofthisreport.)Contractorsin
theprofitsectormayhavetheadvantageofdrawingonresourcesdevelopedto satisfy
commercialswellasgovernmentalcustomers,whichaddsto theflexibilityof procure-
ment,andmaypermitresourcestobephasedinandoutofGovernmentworkondemand.
Theprecedingparagraphsavestressedtheadvantagesofthesedifferentypesof
organization.Therearedisadvantagesrelatingtoeachtype,whichmustalsobetakeninto
account.Universities,forexample,arenotordinarilyqualified--norwouldtheywishwto
undertakemajorsystemsengineeringcontracts.
Werepeatthattheadvantages--anddisadvantages---notedabovedonotmeanthat
thesedifferentypesof arrangementsshouldbegivenareasof monopolyondifferent
kindsofwork.Thereare,bycommonagreement,considerableadvantagesderivedfrom
thepresentdiversityofoperations.It permitsgreatflexibilityinestablishinganddirecting
differentkindsoffacilitiesandunits,andin meetingtheneedfor managingdifferent
kindsofjobs.Comparisonfoperationsamongthesevarioustypesoforganizationshelps
provideyardsticksforevaluatingperformance.
Moreover,thisdiversityhelpsprovidemanysourcesofideasandofthecriticalanaly-
sisofideas,onwhichscientificandtechnicalprogressdepends.Indeed,webelievethat
someresearch(incontrasttodevelopment)shouldbeundertakenbymostypesoforga-
nizations.Basicandappliedresearchactivitiesrelatedtothemissionof theorganization
helptoprovideabetterintellectualenvironmenti whichtocarryoutdevelopmentwork.
Theyalsoassistgreatlyin recruitinghigh-qualityresearchstaff.
Inadditiontothedesirabilityofmakinguseofthenaturalareasofadvantagewithin
thisdiversityof arrangements,thereisoneadditionalpointwewouldstress.Activities
closelyrelatedtogovernmentalmanagerialdecisions( uchasthoseinsupportofcontrac-
torselection),or toactivitiesinherentlygovernmental(suchasregulatoryfunctions,or
technicalctivitiesdirectlyboundupwithmilitaryoperations),arelikelytocallforadi-
rectFederalcapabilityandtobelessuccessfullyhandledbycontract.
Conflicts of interest
There are at least three aspects of the conflict-of-interest problem which arise in
connection with governmental research and development work.
First, there are problems relating to private individuals who serve simultaneously as
governmental consultants and as officers, directors, or employees of private organizations
with which the Government has a contractual relationship. Many of these individuals are
among the Nation's most capable people in the research and development field and can
be of very great assistance to Government agencies.
[ 13] The problems arising in their case with respect to potential conflicts of interest
have been dealt with in the President's memorandum of February 9, referred to earlier in
this report. The essential standard set out in that memorandum was that no individual
serving as an adviser or consultant should render advice on an issue whose outcome would
have a direct and predictable effect on the interests of the private organization which he
serves. To this end, the President asked that arrangements he made whereby each adviser
and consultant would disclose the full extent of his private interests, and the responsible
Government officials would undertake to make sure that conflict-of-interest situations are
avoided.
Second, there is a significant tendency to have on the boards of trustees and direc-
tors of the major universities, not-for-profit and profit establishments engaged in Federal
research and development work, representatives of other institutions involved in such work.
Such interlocking directorships may serve to reinforce and strengthen the overall man-
agement of private organizations which are heavily financed by the Government. Certainly
it is in the public interest that organizations on whom so much reliance is placed for ac-
complishing public purposes, should be controlled by the most responsible, mature, and
knowledgeable men available in the Nation. However, we see the clear possibility of con-
flict-of-interest situations developing through such common directorships that might be
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harmfulto thepublicinterest.Membersofgoverningboardsofprivatebusinessenter-
prises,universities,orotherorganizationswhichadvisetheGovernmentwithrespectto
researchanddevelopmentactivitiesareoftensimultaneouslymembersofgoverningboards
ororganizationswhichreceiveormayreceivecontractsorgrantsfromtheGovernment
forresearch,development,orproductionwork.Unlesstheseboardmembersalsoserveas
consultantstotheGovernment,presentconflict-of-interestlawsdonotapply.Thespirit,if
not theletter,of thestandardsof conductfor Governmentadviserssetforthin the
President'smemorandum,inourjudgment,canandshouldprovideguidancetoboards
andtheirmemberswithrespecttotheinterrelationshipsamonguniversities,not-for-profit
organizations,andbusinesscorporationswhereGovernmentbusinessi involved.Some
boardsoftrusteesanddirectorshavealreadytakenactionalongtheselines.
Beyondthis,however,thereisathirdtypeofproblemwhichrequiresconsideration:
Thismightbedescribedaspotentialconflictsofinterestrelatingtoorganizationsrather
thantoindividuals.It arisesinseveralformsJnotallofwhichbyanymeansareyetfully
understood.Indeed,in thisareaofpotentialconflictsofinterestrelatingtoindividuals
andorganizationsi theresearchanddevelopmentfield,weareinanearlystageofdevel-
opingacceptedstandardsforconduct--unlikeotherfields,suchasthelawormedicine,
wheretherearelong-establishedstandardsofconduct.
Oneformoforganizationalconflictof interestrelatesto thedistinctionbetween
organizationsprovidingprofessionalservices(e.g.,technicaldvice)andthoseproviding
manufacturedproducts.A conflictofinterestcouldarise,forexample,if aprivatecorpo-
rationreceivedacontractto providetechnicaladviceandguidancewithrespectto a
weaponssystemforwhichthatsameprivatecorporationlatersoughtadevelopmentor
productioncontract,orforwhichit soughttodeveloporsupplyakeysub-systemorcom-
ponent.It is [14]clearthatsuchconflict-of-interestsituationscanarisewhetherornotthe
profitmotiveispresent.Themanagersofthenot-for-profitinstitutionshavenecessarilya
stronginterestin thecontinuationandsuccessofsuchinstitutions,andit ispartgood
managementof Federalresearchanddevelopmentprogramsto avoidplacingany
contractor--whetherprofitornonprofit--inapositionwhereaconflictofinterestcould
clearlyexist.
Anotherkindof issueisraisedbythequestionwhetheranorganizationwhichhas
beenestablishedtoprovideservicestoaGovernmentagencyshouldbepermittedtoseek
contractswithotherGovernment agencies----or with non-Government customers. The
question has arisen particularly with respect to not-for-profit organizations established to
provide professional services.
There is not a clear consensus on this question among Government officials and
officers of the organizations in question. We have considered the question far enough to
have the following tentative views:
In the case of organizations in the area of operations and policy research (such, for
example, as the Rand Corp.), the principal advantages they have to offer are the detached
quality and objectivity of their work. Here, too close control by any Government agency
may tend to limit objectivity. Organizations of this kind should not be discouraged from
dealing with a variety of clients, both in and out of Government.
On the other hand, a number of the organizations which have been established to
provide systems engineering and technical direction (such, for example, as Aerospace
Corp.) are at least for the time being of value principally as they act as agents of a single
client. In time, as programs change and new requirements arise, it may be possible and
desirable for such organizations also to achieve a fully independent financial basis, resting
on multiple clients, but this would seem more likely to be a later rather than an earlier
development.
Enough has been said to indicate that this general area of conflict of interest with
respect to research and development work is turning up new kinds of questions and all the
answers have not yet been found. We believe it important to continue to work toward
setting forth standards of conduct, as was done by the President in his February memoran-
dum. We recommend that the President instruct each department and agency head, in
consultation with the Attorney General, to proceed to develop as much of a code of con-
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duct for individuals and organizations in the research and development field as circum-
stances now permit.
Finally, we would note that beyond any formal standards, we cannot escape the ne-
cessity of reb4ng on the sensitive conscience of officials in the Government and in private
organizations to make sure that appropriate standards are continually maintained.
[15] PART 3
PROPOSAL FOR IMPROVING POLICIES AND PRACTICES
APPLYING TO RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CONTRACTING
l)uring the course of this review, a number of suggestions arose which we believe to
indicate desirable improvements in the Government's policies and practices applying to
research and development contracting.
IMPROVING THE GOVERNMENT'S COMPETENCE AS A "SOPHISTICATED BUYER"
In order for the contracting system to work effectively, the first requirement is for the
Government to be a sophisticated buyer--that is, to know what it wants and how to get it.
Mention has already been made of the requirements this placed on governmental man-
agement officials. At this point four additional suggestions are made.
1. In the case of many large systems development projects, it has been the practice to
invite private corporations to submit proposals to undertake research and development
work--relating to a new missile system, for example, or a new aircraft system. Such propos-
als are often invited before usable and realistic specifications of the system have been
worked out in sufficient detail. As a consequence, highly elaborate, independent, and
expensive studies are often undertaken by the would-be contractors in the course of sub-
mitting their proposals. This is a very costly method of obtaining competitive proposals,
and it unnecessarily consumes large amounts of the best creative talent this country
possesses, both on the preparation of the proposals and their evaluation. Delivery time
pressures may necessitate inviting proposals before specifications are completed, but we
believe that practice can and should be substantially curtailed.
This would mean, in many instances, improving the Government's ability to accom-
plish feasibility studies, or letting special contracts for that purpose, before im_iting
proposals. In either event, it would require the acceptance of a greater degree of responsi-
bility by Government managers for making preliminary decisions prior to inviting private
proposals. We believe the gains from such a change would be substantial in the avoidance
of unnecessary and wasteful use of scarce scientific and technical personnel as well as
heavy costs to the private contractors concerned--costs which in most cases are passed on
to the Government.
2. We believe there is a great deal of work to be done to improve the Government's
ability to supervise and to evaluate the conduct of research and development efforts--
whether undertaken through public or private facilities. We do not have nearly enough
understanding as yet of how to know whether we are getting a good product for our money,
whether research and development work is being [16] competently managed, or how to
select the more competent from the less competent as between research and development
establishments.
When inadequate technical criteria exist, there is a tendency to substitute confor-
mity with administrative and fiscal procedures for evaluation of substantive performance.
What is required is more exchange of information between agencies on their practices in
contractor evaluation and on their experience with these practices. A continuing forum
should be provided for such exchange. It is possible also that some central and fairly for-
mal means of reporting methods and experience and recording them permanently should
be established. We recommend that the Director of the new Office of Science and Tech-
nology, when established, be asked to study the possibility of establishing such a forum and
the best means for providing information regarding evaluation practices.
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3. With the tremendous proliferation of research and development operations and
associated facilities in recent years, it has become difficult for the Government officials
who arrange for such work to be done to be aware of all the facilities and manpower that
are available. To maintain a complete and continuous roster of manpower, equipment,
and organizations, sensitive to month-by-month changes, would undoubtedly be too costly
in terms of its value.
Nevertheless, we believe that an organized attempt should be made to improve the
current inventory of information on the scientific and technical resources of the country.
We recommend that the National Science Foundation consider ways and means of im-
proving the availability of such information for use by all concerned in public and private
activities.
4. In addition, the expansion of the Nations's research and development effort has
multiplied the difficulties of communication among researchers engaged on related projects
at separate facilities, both public and private. It is clear that additional steps should be
taken to further efforts to improve the system for the exchange of information in the field
of science and technology.
At present, a panel on scientific information of the President's Science Advisory
Committee is at work on this subject. We expect that its report will be followed by full-scale
planning for the establishment of a more effective technical information exchange sys-
tem, to support the needs of the operating scientist and the engineer.
IMPROVING ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR TYPES
OF CONTRACTS
The principal type of contract for research and development work which is made
with private industry is the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract. Such contracts have been used in
this area because of the inherent difficulty of establishing precise objectives for the work
to be done and of making costs estimates ahead of time.
At the same time, this type of contract has well-known disadvantages. It provides little
or no incentive for private managers to reduce costs or otherwise increase efficiency.
Indeed, the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, in combination with strong pressures from gov-
ernmental managers to accomplish work on a rapid time schedule, probably provides in-
centives for raising rather than for reducing costs. If a corporation is judged in terms of
whether it accomplishes a result by [ 17] a given deadline rather than by whether it accom-
plishes that result at minimum cost, it will naturally pay less attention to costs and more
attention to speed of accomplishment. On the other hand, where there is no given dead-
line, the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract may serve to prolong the research and development
work and induce the contractor to delay completion.
Consequently, we believe it to be desirable to replace cost-plus-fixed-fee contracting
with fixed-price contracting wherever that is feasible--as it should be in the procurement
of some late-stage development, test work, and services. Where it is judged that cost reim-
bursement must be retained as the contracting principle, it should be possible in many
instances to include an incentive arrangement under which the fee would not be fixed,
but would vary according to a pre-determined standard which would relate larger fees to
lower costs, superior performance, and shorter delivery times. There is ample evidence to
prove that if adequate incentives are given by rewards for outstanding performance, both
time and money can be saved. Where the nature of the task permits, it may be desirable to
include in the contract penalty provisions for inadequate performance.
Finally, if neither fixed-price nor incentive-type contracts are possible, it is still neces-
sary for Government managers to insist on consideration being given to lower cost, as well
as better products and shorter delivery times---and to include previous performance as
one element in evaluating different contractors and the desirability of awarding them sub-
sequent contracts.
Contract administration
The written contract itself, however well done, is only one aspect of the situation.
The administration of a contract requires as much care and effort as the preparation of
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the contract itself. This is particularly important with respect to changes in system charac-
teristics, for these changes often become the mechanism for justifying cost overruns. Other
factors of importance in contract administration are fixing authority and responsibility in
both Government and industry, excessive reporting requirements, and all-too-frequent
lack of prearranged milestones for auditing purposes.
Reimbursable costs
Concern has been expressed because of significant differences among the various
agencies in policies regarding which costs are eligible for reimbursement--notably with
respect to some of the indirect costs. These differences are now being reviewed by the
Bureau of the Budget with the cooperation of the Department of Defense, the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the General
Services Administration.
Arrangements with universities
With respect to universities, Government agencies share responsibility for seeing that
research and development financed at universities does not weaken these institutions or
distort their functions which are so vital to the national interest.
Government agencies use both grants and contracts in financing research at univer-
sities, but in our judgment the grant has proved to be a simpler and more desirable device
for Federal financing of fundamental research, where it is in the interest of the Govern-
ment [18] not to exercise close control over the objectives and direction of research. Since
all relevant Government agencies are now empowered to use grants instead of contracts in
supporting basic research, the wider use of this authority should be encouraged.
Apart from this matter, three others seem worthy of comment. One arises from the
extensive use of contracts (or grants) for specific and precisely identified projects. Often
there is a tendency to believe that in providing support for a single specific project the
chance of finding a solution to a problem is being maximized. In reality, however, less
specific support often would permit more effective research in broad areas of science, or
in interdisciplinary fields, and provide greater freedom in drawing in more scientists to
participate in the work that is undertaken. Universities, too, often find project support
cumbersome and awkward. A particular professor may be working on several projects fi-
nanced by several Government agencies and must make arbitrary decisions in allocating
expenses to a particular project. It thus appears both possible and desirable to move in the
direction of using grants to support broader programs, or to support the more general
activities of an institution, rather than to tie each allocation of funds to a specific project.
A number of Government agencies have been moving in this direction and it would be
desirable to expand the use of such forms of support as experience warrants.
At the same time, it would not, in our judgment, be appropriate to place major reli-
ance on the institutional grant, since the major purpose of making grants in most cases is
to assure that the university personnel and facilities concerned will be devoted to pursuing
specific courses of inquiry.
A second problem associated with the support of research at universities is whether
the Government should pay all costs, including indirect expenses or "overhead," associ-
ated with work financed by the Government. We believe this matter involves two related
but distinct questions, which should be separated in considering the appropriate policy to
be followed.
1. We believe there is no question that, in those cases in which it is desirable for the
Government to pay the entire cost of work done at a university, the Government should
pay for allowable indirect as well as direct costs. To do otherwise would be discriminatory
against universities in comparison with other kinds of institutions. For purposes of finan-
cial and accounting simplicity, in those cases where grants are used, and it is desirable for
the Government to pay all allowable costs, it may be possible to work out a uniform or
average percentage figure which could be regarded as covering indirect costs.
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2. We believe there are many cases in which it is neither necessary nor desirable for
the Government to pay all the costs of the work to be done. In many fields of research, a
university may gain a great deal from having the research in question done on its campus,
with the participation of its faculty and students, and may be able and willing to share in
the costs, either through its regular funds or through raising additional funds from foun-
dations, alumni, or by other means. The extent and degree of cost-sharing can and should
vary among different agencies and programs, and we are not prepared at this time to
suggest any uniform standards---except the negative one that it would be plainly illogical
to require that the university uniformly provide its share through the payment of all or a
part of the indirect [19] costs. Only in the exceptional case would this turn out to be the
best basis for determining the appropriate sharing of costs.
A third problem relates to the means for furnishing major capital assets for research
at universities (such as a major building or a major piece of equipment such as a linear
accelerator, synchrotron, or large computer. In most cases, it will be preferable to finance
such facilities by a separate grant (or contract), which will ensure that careful attention is
given to the long-term value of the asset and to the establishment of appropriate arrange-
ments for managing and maintaining it.
Arrangements with respect to not-for-profit organizations other than universities
It has been the practice in contracting for research and development work with such
organizations to cover all allowable costs and, in addition, to provide what is commonly
called a "fee." The reason for paying a "fee" to not-for-profit organizations is quite differ-
ent from the reason for paying a fee to profit-making contractors and therefore the term
"fee" is misleading. The profitmaldng contractor is engaged in business for profit. His
profit and the return to his shareholders or investors can only come from the fee. In the
case of the not-for-profit organizations, there are no shareholders, but there are two sound
reasons to justify payment of a "development" or "general support" allowance to such or-
ganizations.
One is that such allowances provide some degree of operational stability and flexibil-
it,/to organizations which otherwise would be very tightly bound to the precise limitations
of cost financing of specific tasks; the allowances can be used to even out variations in the
income of the organization resulting from variations in the level of contract work. A sec-
ond justification is that most not-for-profit organizations must conduct some independent,
self-initiated research if they are to obtain and hold highly competent scientists and engi-
neers. Such staff members, it is argued, will only be attracted if they can share, to some
extent, in independently directed research efforts.
We considered that both of these arguments have merit and, in consequence, sup-
port the continuation of these payments. Both arguments represent incentives to main-
tain the cohesiveness and the quality of the organization, which is in the interest of the
Government. They should underlie the thinking of the Government representatives who
negotiate contracts with not-for-profit organizations. But the amount of the "fee" or allow-
ance in each instance must still be determined by bargaining between Government and
contractor, in accordance with the independent relationship that is essential to successful
con tracting.
An important question relating to not-for-profit organizations, other than universi-
ties, concerns facilities and equipment. In our judgment, the normal rule should be that
where facilities and equipment are required to perform research and development work
desired by the Government, the Government should either provide the facilities and equip-
ment, or cover their cost as part of the contract. This is the rule relating to profit organiza-
tions and would hold in general for not-for-profit organizations--but there are two special
problems with respect to the latter.
[20] First, we believe it is generally not desirable to furnish funds through "fees" for
the purpose of enabling a contractor to acquire major capital assets. On the other hand,
the Government should not attempt to dictate what a contractor does with his "fee," pro-
vided it has been established on a sound and equitable basis, and ifa contractor chooses to
use part of his "fee" to acquire facilities for use in his self-initiated research we would see
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noobjection.
Second,wewouldthinkit equitable,wheretheGovernmenthasprovidedfacilities,
fundstoobtainfacilities,substantialworkingcapital,orotherresourcestoacontractor,it
should,upondissolutionof theorganization,beentitledtoafirstclaimuponsuchre-
sources.Thiswouldseemtobeamatterwhichshouldbegoverned,insofaraspossible,by
thetermofthecontract--or,in thecaseofanynewlyestablishedorganizations,shouldbe
providedin theprovisionsofitscharter.
Salariesandrelatedbenefits
In additiontothequestionoffeesandallowances,therehasbeenagreatdealof
concernoverthesalariesandrelatedbenefitsreceivedbypersonsemployedonfederally
financedresearchanddevelopmentworkinprivateinstitutions,particularlypersonsem-
ployedinnot-for-profitestablishmentsdoingworkexclusivelyfortheGovernment.Con-
trolshavebeensuggestedorurgedbycongressionalcommitteesandotherstomakesure
thatthereisnoexcessiveexpenditureofpublicfundsandtominimizetheundesirable
competitiveeffectontheFederalcareerservice.
Weagreethatwherethecontractingsystemdoesnotprovidebuilt-incontrols(for
example,throughcompetitivebidding),attentionshouldbepaidtothereasonablenessof
contractors'alariesandrelatedbenefits,andcontractorsshouldbereimbursedonlyfor
reasonablecompensationcosts.
Thekeyquestionishowtodecidewhatisreasonableandappropriatecompensation.Webelievethebasicstandardforreimbursementofsalariesandrelatedbenefitsshouldbe
oneofcomparabilitytocompensationofpersonsdoingsimilarworkintheprivateconomy.
ThePresidentrecentlyproposedtotheCongressthatthepayforFederalcivilianemploy-
eesshouldbebasedon theconceptof reasonablecomparabilitywithemployeesdoing
similarworkintheprivateconomy.Webelievethistobeasoundprinciplewhichcanbe
appliedin thepresentcircumstancesaswell.
Applicationofthiscomparabilityprinciplemayrequiresomespecialcompensation
surveys(perhapsmadebytheBureauof LaborStatistics),whichcanandshouldbear-
rangedforasnecessary.Furthermore,therewillundoubtedlybecases in which compa-
rable data are difficult to obtain--as, for example, with respect to top management jobs.
In such cases the specific approval of the head of the Government contracting agency or
his designee should be required.
In view of the inherent complexity and sensitivity of this subject, we st, ggest that
special administrative arrangements should be established in each agency. Contract poli-
cies respecting salaries and related benefits in each contracting agency should be con-
trolled by an official reporting directly to the head of the agency (in the Department of
Defense, to assure uniformity, of treatment, by an official reporting directly to the Secre-
tary of Defense), and salaries above a certain level--say $25,000--should require the per-
sonal approval of that official.
[21] PART 4
PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO CARRY OUT
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES DIRECTLY
Based on the evidence acquired in the course of this review, we believe there is no
doubt that the effects of the substantial increase in contracting out Federal research and
development work on the Government's own ability to execute research and development
work have been deleterious.
The effects of the sharp rise in contracting out have included the following. First,
contractors have often been able to provide a superior working environment for their
scientists and engineers--better salaries, better facilities, better administrative support--
making contracting operations attractive alternatives to Federal work. Second, it has often
seemed that contractors have been given the more significant and more interesting work
assignments, leaving Govermnent research and development establishments with routine
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missions and static programs which do not attract the best talent. Third, additional bur-
dens have often been placed on Government research establishments to assist in evaluat-
ing the work of increasing numbers of contractors and to train and educate less skilled
contractor personnel--without adding to the total staff and thus detracting from the di-
rect research work which appeals to the most competent personnel. Fourth, scientists in
con tracting institutions have often had freedom to move "outside of channels" in the Gov-
ernment hierarchy and to participate in program determination and technical advice at
the highest levels--freedom frequently not available to the Government's own scientists.
Finally, one of the most serious aspects of the contracting out process has been that it has
provided an alternative to correcting the deficiencies in the Government's own opera-
tions.
In consequence, for some time there has been a serious trend toward the reduction
of the competence of Government research and development establishments. Recently a
number of significant actions have been started which are intended to reverse this trend.
We point particularly to the strong leadership being given within the Defense Department
by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, in striving to raise the capabilities
of the Department's laboratories and other research and development facilities.
Nevertheless, we believe the situation is still serious and that major efforts are re-
quired.
We consider it a most important objective for the Government to maintain first-class
facilities and equipment of its own to carry out research and development work. This
observation applies not only to the newer research and development agencies but equally
to the older agencies such as Commerce, Interior, and Agriculture.
No matter how heavily the Government relies on private contracting, it should never
lose a strong internal competence in research and development. By maintaining such
competence it can be sure of [22] being able to make the difficult but extraordinarily
important program decisions which rest on scientific and technical judgments. Moreover,
the Government's research facilities are a significant source of management personnel.
Major steps seem to us to be necessary in the following matters:
1. It is generally recognized that having significant and challenging work to do is the
most important element in establishing a successful research and development organiza-
tion. It is suggested that responsibility should be assigned in each department and agency
to the Assistant Secretary for Research and Development or his equivalent to make sure
that assignments to governmental research facilities are such as to attract and hold first-
class men. Furthermore, arrangements should be made to call on Government laboratory
and development center personnel to a larger extent for technical advice and participa-
tion in broad program and management decisions--in contrast to the predominant use of
outside advisers.
2. The evidence is compelling that managerial arrangements for many Government-
operated research and development facilities are cumbersome and awkward. Several im-
provements are needed in many instances, including--
Delegating to research laboratory directors more authority to make program and
personnel decisions, to control funds, and otherwise to command the resources which are
necessary to carry out the mission of the installation;
Providing the research laboratory director a discretionary allotment of funds, to be
available for projects of his choosing, and for the results of which he is to be responsible;
Eliminating where possible excess layers of echelons of supervisory management
and ensuring that technical, administrative, and fiscal reviews be conducted concurrently
and in coordinated fashion; and
Making laboratory research assignments in the form of a few major items with a
reasonable degree of continuity rather than a multiplicity of small narrowly specific tasks;
this will put responsibility for detailed definition of the work to be done at the laboratory
level where it belongs.
To carry out these improvements will require careful and detailed analysis of the
different situations in different agencies. Above all, it will require the energetic direction
of top officials in each agency.
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Plans have already been developed for joint teams of Civil Service Commission and
Department of Defense research and manpower personnel to visit nine defense laborato-
ries during April and May 1962, in order to analyze precisely what administrative restric-
tions exist that hamper research effectiveness. In this fashion, those unwarranted
limitations that can be eliminated by executive action can be identified as distinguished
from those that may require legislative change.
3. Salary limitations, as already mentioned, in our opinion play a major role in pre-
venting the Government from obtaining or retaining highly competent men and women.
Largely because of the lack of comparable salaries, the Government is not now and has not
for at least the past 10 years been able to attract or retain its share of such critically neces-
sary people as: recently graduated, highly recommended Ph.D.'s in mathematics and physics,
recent B.S.-M.S. scientific and [23] engineering graduates in the upper 25 percent of their
classes at top-ranked universities; good, experienced weapons system engineers and mis-
sile, space, and electronic specialists at intermediate and senior levels; and senior-level
laboratory directors, scientific managers, and administrators. This obstacle will be sub-
stantially overcome if the Congress approves the President's recommendation to establish
a standard of comparability with private pay levels for higher professional and technical
jobs in the Federal service.
4. A special problem in the Defense Department is the relationship between uni-
formed and civilian personnel. This is a difficult and sensitive problem of which the De-
partment of Defense is well aware. We do not attempt in this report to propose detailed
solutions, but we do suggest that certain principles are becoming evident as a result of the
experience of recent years.
It seems clear, for example, that the military services will have increasing need for
substantial numbers of officers who have extensive scientific and technical training and
experience. Such officers bring firsthand knowledge of operational conditions and re-
quirements to research and development installations and, in turn, learn about the state
of the art and the feasible applications of technology to military operations. The military
officer is needed to communicate the needs of the user, to prepare the operational forces
for new equipment, to plan for the use of developing equipment, and later to install it and
supervise its use.
All of the above roles suggest that when military personnel are used in research and
development activities, they should perform as "technical men" rather than "military men"
except when there is a need for their military skills. Military command and direction be-
come important only as one moves from the research end of the spectrum into the area
where operational considerations predominate. Both at middle management and policy
levels, a well-balanced mixture of military and civilian personnel may be most advanta-
geous in programs designed to meet military needs.
In research, there are many instances in which the existence of military supervision,
and the decreased opportunities for advancement because of military occupancy of top
jobs, are among the principal reasons why the Defense Department has had difficulty in
attracting outstanding civilian scientists and engineers. On the other hand, there are ex-
amples within the Department of cause in which enlightened policies of civil-military rela-
tionships have drawn on the strengths of each and produced excellent results. In such
instances, the military head of the laboratory has usually concentrated on administrative
problems and the civilian technical director has had complete control of technical pro-
grams.
Military officers should not be substituted for civilians in the direction and manage-
ment of research and development unless they are technically qualified and their military
background is directly needed and applicable.
In the course of the next year, the Department of Defense intends to give consider-
ation to the delineation of those research and development installations in which
operational considerations are predominant and those installations in which scientific and
technical considerations are predominant. Having done so, the assignment of military
officers [24] to head the former type of installation, and civilians (or equally qualified
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militaryofficers)tohead the latter will be encouraged. Furthermore, when military per-
sonnel are assigned to work in civilian-directed installations on the basis of their technical
abilities, it is intended that they should be free of the usual rotation-of-duty requirements
and not have separate lines of reporting.
5. In addition to the recommendations above, we have given consideration to the
possible establishment, which might be called a Government institute. Such an institute
would provide a means for reproducing within the Government structure some of the
more positive attributes of the nonprofit corporation. Each institute would be created
pursuant to authority granted by the Congress and be subject to the supervision of a Cabi-
net officer or agency head. It would, however, as a separate corporate entity directly man-
aged by its own board of regents, enjoy a considerable degree of independence in the
conduct of its internal affairs. An institute would have authority to operate its own career
merit system, as the Tennessee Valley Authority does, would be able to establish a compen-
sation system based on the comparability principle, and would have broad authority to use
funds and to acquire and dispose of property.
The objective of establishing such an instrumentality would be to achieve in the ad-
ministration of certain research and development programs the kind of flexibility which
has been obtained by Government corporations while retaining, as was done with the Gov-
ernment corporation, effective public accountability and control.
We regard this idea as promising and recommend that the Bureau of the Budget
study it further, in cooperation with some of the agencies having major research and devel-
opment programs. It may well prove to be a useful additional means for carrying out gov-
ernmental research and development efforts.
6. It would seem, based on the results of this review, that it would be possible and
desirable to make more use of existing governmental facilities and avoid the creation of
duplicate facilities. This is not as easy a problem as it might seem. It is ordinarily necessary
for a laboratory, if it is to provide strong and competent facilities, to have a major mission
and a major source of funding. This will limit the extent to which it is possible to make
such facilities available for the work of other agencies. Nevertheless, in some cases and to
some extent it is clearly possible to do this, and a continuing scrutiny is necessary in order
to make sure that the facilities which the Government has are used to their fullest extent.
7. Finally, together with the better use of existing facilities, the Government must
also make better use of its existing scientific and engineering personnel. This implies not
only a careful watch over work assignments, but also a continual upgrading of the capabili-
ties of Federal personnel through education and training. At the present time, technology
is changing so rapidly that on-the-job scientists and engineers find themselves out of date
after a decade or so out of the university. To remedy this, the Government must strengthen
its educational program for its own personnel, to the extent of sending them back to the
university for about an academic year every decade. This program, necessary as it is, will
only become attractive if the employee is ensured of job security on his return from school
and if his parent organization is allowed to carry him on its personnel roster....
Document IV-IO
Document rifle: Albert F. Siepert to James E. Webb, Administrator, "Length of Tours of
Certain Military Detailees," February 8, 1963.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA Headquar-
ters, Washington, D.C.
From its inception NASA administrators made a practice of accomplishing goals by
marshalling outside resources rather than reproducing them within the agency. Although
NASA was a civilian agency, in its early days it made extensive use of military expertise. In
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fact,thenumberofmilitarypersonnelworkingforNASAincreasedsteadilybetween1960
and1968,andmilitaryofficersplayedkeyrolesin theApolloprogram.This1963memo-
randumemphasizedtheneedforNASAtoobtaintheser_4cesofmilitarydetaileesforthe
extendedtimeneededforthemtocarryouttheresponsibilitiesas ignedtothembyNASA.
[1] Length of Tours of Certain Military Detailees
On April 13, 1959, the President approved an agreement between the Departments
of Defense, Army, Naw, Air Force, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion which provides for the detailing of military personnel for serx4ce with NASA. This
agreement has made it possible for NASA to obtain from the military the services of many
fine officers with skills and experience not obtainable from other sources. This coopera-
tion on the part of the Department of Defense has contributed materially to the success of
NASA's efforts.
Tile agreement provides that the normal tour of duty with NASA for military person-
nel on active duty will be three years. It also provides that NASA "... send a timely request
to the military department concerned for any desired extension." Normally, the three-
year tour is satisfactory. There are exceptions, however, and problems occasionally arise in
obtaining extensions of more than onefear when NASA management happens to place a
career officer with rather unique skills in a key program or management position. Even
with the most careful planning, NASA's rapid growth has thus far made it impossible to
plan ahead for an adequate understudy to take over these unusual assignments at the
expiration of an atttomatic three- or four-year period. Jobs to which career officers have
been assigned have in many instances grown considerably in terms of scope, responsibility,
and urgency. Of greater significance, the ability of the officer himself to assume greater
and greater responsibility and thereby become more critical to our needs makes it even
more important for us to seek a more liberal interpretation of the provision in the basic
agreement on extending tours of duty of career officers detailed to NASA when they oc-
cupy positions critical to our operations.
In two instances, by dealing with the military service concerned, we have been able
to secure extensions greater than one year. The astronauts were granted a three-year ex-
tension because it was determined that such an extension was mutually beneficial to the
officers, the military services, and NASA. Cdr. AlbertJ. Kelly was granted a three-year ex-
tension by the Na W because of his assignment as Director, Electronics and Control, Office
of Advanced Research and Technology,, a key executive position which was of considerable
benefit to his career development. A onefear extension would not have provided suffi-
cient time for NASA to secure and indoctrinate an acceptable replacement. Major Victor
Hammond, Chief, National Range Support, Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition, is
presently serving on a one year extension and no action has been taken to replace or to
[2] obtain another extension. On the other hand, NASA has not attempted to obtain
extended tours of duty of career officers when such an extension might stand in the way of
the long-term career objectives of the officer. General Ostrander, General Roadman (re-
turning to military assignment soon), Col. Heaton, and Col. Seaberg are good examples.
The Launch Operations Center at Cape Canaveral, more than any other NASA in-
stallation, has relied upon career officers of the military to staff key positions. Col. Asa
Gibbs has occupied the position of liaison with the Atlantic Missile Range, thereby provid-
ing a focal point for all NASA range requirements. A request to extend his tour of duty of
denied. Lt. Col. Ray Clark, presently serving as Special Assistant to Kurt Debus, has se-
cured orders returning him to duty in a military assignment. A request for an extended
tour of duty was disapproved. Major Rocco Penone, presently serving as, Chief Heavy
Space Vehicle Systems Office, is nearing the end of his three-year detail, and a request for
extension of his tour of duty has been filed with the Department of the Army.
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The loss of Lt. Col. Clark, and very possibly Major Petrone, will be a severe blow to
the LOC organization. While the military objective of fulfilling the requirements of career
development are recognized and understood, we feel we must do everything we can to
obtain extended tours of duty for both Lt. Col. Clark and Major Petrone.
As background, the following table provides information on military details and ex-
tended tours of duty under terms of the agreement:
Career Military Officers Assigned to NASA
Army Navy Air Force Total
Presently Assigned 12 30 52 94
Previously Assigned 3 5 16 24
Assigned 118
Requests
Approved
Disapproved
Pending 1
* 1 Navy+ 2 AirForceextendedfor2 years
** 4 Navy+ 3 AirForceextendedfor 3 years
Requests for Extended Tours of Duty
3 7 8
1 7* 6**
1 1 1
1
18
14
[3] The few times we have sought extensions of tours of duty clearly indicates that we
have been most considerate of military objectives in furthering the career development of
its officer personnel. Also, it is clearly evident that there is better cooperation on the part
of the Navy and Air Force than there is by the Army.
Lt. Col. Clark and Major Petrone are key figures in the LOC organization which is
now at the very beginning of a tremendous expansion. It is my opinion that every effort
should be made to obtain two-year extensions of their tours of duty with NASA.
Document IV-11
Document tide: U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcom-
mittee on NASA Oversight, Staff Study, "Apollo Program Management," 91st Cong., 1st
sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1969), pp. 59-74.
Olin ("Tiger") E. Teague (D-Texas), one of the space program's staunchest support-
ers in the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Subcommittee on NASA
Oversight of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, struggled to protect NASA's
budgets from cuts that began to occur after the agency's peak of $5.2 billion for FY 1965.
In 1968 Teague wrote the presidents and chief executive officers of the Boeing Company,
the McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, North American Rockwell Corporation,
Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation, and the Space Division of the Chrysler Cor-
poration, seeking their cooperation in a committee study of "those key management sys-
tems which have been adapted and developed in the Apollo program and which may have
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the potential for making a contribution to other large and complex technological
programs." McDonnell Douglas, whose submission is reprinted here, designed and devel-
oped under contract to NASA the upper stage (S-IV) of the Saturn ! launch vehicle and
the third stage (S-IVB) of the Saturn IB and the Saturn V.
[59] Apollo Program Management
PRESENTATION TO THE STAFF OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON NASA OVERSIGHT...
[61 ] INTRODUCTION
In May 1960 the McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co.-Western Division (MDAC,-WD)
then known as the Douglas Aircraft Co., was awarded a NASA contract to design and
develop the Saturn S-IV, the upper stage of the Saturn I launch vehicle, and the first of a
family of three giant launch vehicles whose ultimate mission is manned exploration of the
moon. In April 1962, this organization was also awarded a second NASA contract, to
design and develop the Saturn S-IVB, the uppermost stage of the two other members of
the launch vehicle family, the Saturn IB and Saturn V.
At the time of the first award, the organizational structure of that entity of the Com-
pany responsible for discharge of the newly contracted obligations was one which had
been formed for the efficient and simultaneous development of various guided missile
weapon systems for military forces. The advent of the Saturn/Apollo system, the greatest
engineering task in history, required a much more intimate integration of Government
and industry resources than had previously been the case. The necessity of this close inte-
gration of resources and effort was not immediately visible to either industry or Govern-
ment, at least to the degree eventually required. Accordingly, over a period of time, the
MDAC-WD found it necessary to realign its organizational structure and adjust its manage-
ment techniques to accommodate the unique requirements of this great, joint,
government-industry venture.
The report discusses how and why the MDAC-WD Saturn organization and manage-
ment methods evolved to meet this challenge. It presents in chronological order how the
organization configuration changed from an integrated functional form to a project form,
to a divisional status, and then to a matrix form. It reviews the creation of new manage-
ment tools to efficiently handle the requirements of precise configuration control, exact-
ing quality standards, extensive contract change traffic, and even fundamental revision in
the type of contract. The effectiveness of these management systems is then finally demon-
strated by presenting the performances on cost control, schedule compliance, and flight
program success.
SECTION 1
MANAGEMENT
1,1 Concepts
To manage the Saturn program, the Company devised a logical, systematic frame-
work for the task with the ingredient of flexibility to accommodate program growth and
change. Management concepts were influenced by the nature of the Company, Customer,
work to be performed, and legal and regulatory requirements.
[62] 1.1.1 Company
The chain of events involving organization and reorganization of the Company's
missile and space systems efforts, covered elsewhere in this report, has influenced the
Saturn/Apollo program. Two management principles were used: (1) provide autonomy
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andfreedomtoCompanypersonneltointerfacedirectlywiththeCustomer'smanagers,
and(2)providetopmanagementwi hthemeanstoevaluateprogramstatusandsupport
theprogrammanager'sneedsforresources.(Thiswasmadepossiblebytheprojectized
programorganizationplacedinamatrixedivisionframework.)
1.1.2Customer
InterfacingeffectivelyandexpeditiouslywithCustomerp ogram anagersatalllev-
elsbecameanoverridingnecessity.Toachievethis,appropriateparallelswerestablished
betweenkeyorganizationssuchasinthestructuringoftheNASApolloProgramOffice
and(thentitled)DouglasSaturn/ApolloProgramOffice.
1.1.3Workto be Performed
Large scientific and technical staffs were established during the design and develop-
ment phases, and the results of their eftorts implemented by manufacturing and test groups.
Physical requirements imposed by geography and logistics had to be met. The stage was to
be manufactured in Southern California, tested in Northern California (NASA test facili-
ties are in Alabama), with checkout and launch taking place in Florida. Stages were to be
transported between these areas and facilities managed at each.
1.1.4 Legal and Regulatory Requirements
Finally, NASA requirements had to be expressed in contractual terms. MDAC,-WD
had to conform to NASA's procurement regulations and other federal regulations.
Increasingly precise requirements were embodied in tile contract, and they ex-
erted powerful influences on the management philosophies.
1.2 Organization
For best control, MDAC-WD consists of organizations structured vertically according
to function and horizontally by product line. Saturn/Apollo, one of the 13 subdivisions in
this matrix framework, is projectized for single-point management control. Thus, the vital
functions of Development Engineering, Financial Management, Reliability and Launch
Operations (R. & L.O.), and Operations are made directly available to Saturn by organiza-
tional structure ....
Support given by these subdivisions to Saturn is (1) Huntington Beach Development
Engineering-Engineering design and test, material research and production methods,
standardization, etc., (2) Financial Management-Controller, contracts (including Work
Order Authorizations), Operations Control (costs, pricing, budgets, schedules, program
tracking, etc.), and financial forecasts and analysis, (3), R. & L.O.--Launch support ser-
vices for Saturn/Apollo launches at KSC, including mission variation modifications, pre-
launch preparations and stage testing, operating launch consoles, and participating in
[63] countdown, and (4) Operations--Manufacturing Operations, Manufacturing
Engineering, Reliability Assurance, Procurement, and Facilities.
1.3 Saturn/Apollo Program Subdivision
This subdivision manages the Company's Saturn/Apollo programs and coordinates
support from other subdivisions. In certain areas cutting across the functional activities of
several subdivisions, the Director, Assistant General Manager, MDAC--WD for the Sat-
urn/Apollo program has established his own directorates, i.e., Director of Saturn Pro-
gram Product Assurance, Director of Saturn Program Production, and others.
1.3.1 Director/Assistant General Manager
Mr. H. E. Bauer, Director/Assistant General Manager, has complete authority to plan,
direct, and control the MDAG---_rD resources applied to Saturn work. Mr. Bauer repre-
sents and acts for the Vice- President-General Manager of MDAC-WD in all matters con-
cerning Saturn at all Division locations.
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1.3.2DirectorsandStaff
The directorates and staffelements.., comprise the essential links of a project orga-
nization, autonomous but supportable throngh a matrix structure by other Subdivisions.
No attempt is made to describe functions and responsibilities in this report ....
[64] In addition, support is given Saturn by the following subdivisions:
1.3.2.1 Information Systems
Developing and implementing integrated, management information system; the data
from checkout, static firing, and flight operations for engineering analysis and evaluation,
etc.
1.3.2.2 Advance Systems and Technology
Analysis of new product areas; conducting CRAD and 1RAD programs, including the
Saturn/Apollo.
1.4 Program Management Objectives
From its inception, the Saturn/Apollo effort was managed in a manner little recog-
nized in textual theory on aerospace program management and management informa-
tion control systems. Successes to date are attributable to the unique direct management
techniques which were and are being used to meet program objectives.
1.4.1 Zero Flight Failures
The overriding objective was to avoid flight failures. MDAC-WD devised techniques
and methods to produce articles of such quality and reliability that there would be no
failures in flight. Administrative controls and requirements which had no direct bearing
on flight success were subordinated to a secondary role, for later development in satisfying
auditing agencies, internal and external.
1.4.2 Maximum Direct Communications
MDAC-_rD and Customer personnel at middle management levels and higher were
given freedom of direct communication for the sake of expediency and to avoid undue
paperwork channels which might hinder progress on the day-by-day management of the
program.
[65] 1.4.3 Flexibility With Short Reaction Time
Built into the management systems was the flexibility to respond to Customer direc-
tion, redirection, and changes in the program. These techniques are covered in subse-
quent sections of this report.
1.4.4 Change Management, Not Change Inhibition
This objective was achieved.
1.4.5 Schedule Compliance Ahead of Schedule Capability
Early in the program, management struggled to move on time from engineering
release, through first hardware test, and first article acceptance firing and delivery to the
Cape. They resolved to first meet, then get ahead of the schedule.
1.4.6 Outstanding Technical Capability
The record of achievements attests to the success of this objective. The S-IV program
established an outstanding technical capability, which bore fruits in the S-IVB and related
efforts.
1.4.7 Avoid Cost Overruns
This very important objective and the techniques used to overcome an actual over-
run will be explained later in the report. It is noteworthy that, in so doing, management
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implemented numerous cost reduction activities that resulted in an on-target or underrun
condition.
SECTION 2
KEY MANAGEMENT EVENTS AND ACTIONS
2.1 Reorganization
In 1966, the program organization underwent several significant changes. The
projectized Program Control was abandoned in favor of the Division concept. The Sacra-
mento Test Center now reported to the program director, instead of Saturn Engineering.
Also, an effective Configuration Change Control Board had been created. The success of
being able to communicate the role and relationship of program managers to the remain-
der of the Division's organizations, and the providing of sound management systems with
which he can carry out his responsibilities, has reduced the need for projectized organiza-
tions. The reduction in projectized organizations in favor of recentralization of functional
resources contributes to flexibility in the shifting of resources between programs, with the
inherent benefits of better utilization of manpower, improved performance, and lower
costs.
2.2 All-Up Test Concept
The Marshall Space Flight Center set the tone for the space program. Their philoso-
phy was to drive the first stage with dummy upper stages and fly the needed number of
development rounds with two-stage vehicles. MDAC-WD history through such programs as
Nike/Ajax Nike/Hercules, Nike/Zeus, also led to the concept of progressive developments.
Since they were unmanned vehicles, the company employed an incremental development
methodology. Upon entering the S-IV and S-IVB programs, we were ready to accept the all-
up test concept.
[66] Flights occurred with near-to-operational configurations on the very first launch,
as opposed to flying with partially complete or alternative configurations, such as pro-
grammers instead of full guidance. This meant a most comprehensive ground test pro-
gram, which prevented the revelation of hardware weaknesses in flight.
This brought the S-IVB into the flight stage far ahead of schedule. Originally, several
decisions were made to fly men on the Saturn I with the S-IV. Economics dictated against
a decision to have a Saturn I, an IB, and a V all going at once. In 1962, the decision was
made to cancel. The S-IV was actually canceled before it ever flew.
The obvious consequence of the all-up test concept was the imposition of configura-
tion control disciplines on the program, on the technical staff, on suppliers, and on the
entire community. Rigorous management of configuration changes avoided a near cha-
otic condition which would have resulted from the inclusion of results from various test
analyses in the hardware. This would have caused much difficulty in establishing the proper
configuration for each acceptance firing or launch.
Ground rules were laid down that connected the all-up philosophy with configura-
tion control. It was considered a law that anything that flew on 205 had to be flown on 204,
and anything on 503 had to be on 502. That the rules were well conceived is attested to by
the program's degree of success.
2.3 Saturn I Performance and the LOR Decision
Performance of the Saturn I program and the Saturn S-IV stage was technically out-
standing. All six vehicles were launched with complete success, providing MDAC-WD with
the technical capability and the baseline necessary to proceed into the S-IVB. The lunar
orbital rendezvous decision was then made, which led to the requirement of the S-IVB
stage and the S-II Stage using the J-2 liquid-oxygen/liquid/hydrogen engine. With that
decision the Company entered into the contract definition phase for the S-IVB. Successful
development of hydrogen technology had a tremendous effect on Apollo. In 1961, Pratt &
Whitney experienced several accidents with their RL-10 engine, and there followed a wave
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ofadversesentimentagainsthydrogen.Ifworkhadnotprogressedtoshowthathydrogen
wasaneasymaterialtoworkwith,andthatmultienginedcapabilitywasnotimpossibleto
achieve,theentireSaturn/Apolloprogram ighthavebeenshapedquitedifferently.
2.4 Controls
Management awareness and control of Saturn required a continuous monitoring
analysis, and evaluation of all program aspects in terms of cost, schedule, and technical
performance. This in-depth surveillance of the program was made feasible through the
operation of four high-level action boards chartered to review program progress. These
boards were not only to review, but also carry out a wide range of overall management
functions. Their authority cut across all program activities, and they were the principal
apparatus by which management formulated policy and provided program direction. By
name they are: the Configuration Change Control Board, Change Analysis Board, Senior
Management Action Board, and the Senior Financial Management Review Board. They
are real-time, decisionmaking [67] boards with the capability to record and establish their
findings and convert them to firm contract language in the form of change orders and
program adjustments.
2.4.1 Configuration Change Control Board (CCCB)
In one sense, the management process often begins with this board, which was
established to coordinate the activities of the Saturn program. It is here that proposed
contractual changes in the program are formally brought to the attention of Saturn top
management and the initial decisions made for putting them into effect. The board is
chaired by the Program Director.
The Configuration Change Control Board meets three times a week. It examines all
contract change orders, supplemental agreements, proposed ECP's that adjust the con-
tract, and all work effort that requires responsiveness across the Division. A NASA repre-
sentative also attends, and the products of the staff work are brought before all of the
directors. This community of directorates, located at Huntington Beach, sits in that meet-
ing as formal members of the team. The community expands, depending on the particu-
lars of the agenda. Members acquire a thorough understanding of what is contemplated,
and may object, agree, or propose a change. It is not, however, a voting board.
Saturn management is, perhaps, unique in the depth of detail into which it goes--
the turning on of any change order or supplemental agreement, of board items down to
very small items. The program director has all of his decisionmakers immediately avail-
able--often in one room--and they have an opportunity to look at every important piece
of work to be authorized, including details that many would consider completely unneces-
sary when related to the stature of the board.
2.4.2 Change Analysis Board (CAB)
All Company-initialed requests for changes are first presented to this board before
being sent to the CCCB. Those changes deemed advisable that do not require a formal
change in the contract can be approved or rejected on the spot by this board. For those
changes requiring formal contractual change, an Engineering Change Proposal is pre-
pared and submitted to the CCCB. Authority for the operation of this board rests with its
chairman, who reports directly to the program director.
2.4.3 Senior Management Action Board
This biweekly board is one of the principal tools by which Saturn management con-
trols the progress of the program. The meeting, chaired by the program director, is zt-
tended by senior management and key supervisory personnel. Characterized by incisive
question-and-answer sessions, the meetings have come to be known as the "Black Tuesday"
reviews.
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2.4.4 Senior Financial Management Review
This review is presented each month by the Financial Management Subdivision to
the program director and his staff. Target costs and expenditures of each of the operating
departments are examined in detail, with particular emphasis given to estimates for the
future. Budget adjustments to correct deviations and resolve potential problems are made
on the basis of much of the information coming from this financial review process.
[68] 2.4.5 Other Reviews
Still other techniques used on the program embody the concept of review and
re-review. The various levels of management or disciplines review the program progress.
Communities are established to simply review the program on a short-term basis. In progress
reviews with MSFC, however, the 30-45 review (meet for 30 minutes every 45 days) is pre-
sented only to division management.
In the launch mission reviews, any major tests may be reviewed, not only by the pro-
gram but by an independent agency such as the Reliability and Launch Operations organi-
zation (R. & L.O.). These reviews are conducted by the Vehicle Flight Readiness Review
Committee, which addresses itself to a specific test, such as an acceptance firing or a launch
operation. They draw, from the division, appropriately skilled people to be the auditors.
The program presents the status of the hardware, the configurations, significant failure
and rejection reports, and open supplementary failure analysis documentation.
Another side benefit is the record of all of the examinations, findings, and actions
taken to respond to those findings. These findings are presented to the director of the
program. He must respond to all of those action items, in writing and to the satisfaction of
the Reliability and Launch Operations organization--which is empowered to stop the test.
It is then placed in the record for reference, should it become necessary.
The concept of review and re-review by different communities has been an impor-
tant ingredient to ensure technical success.
2.5 Configuration Management Disciplines
Also in development during reorganization of the Saturn Program were the initial
NASA/Contractor agreements involving application of the configuration management
disciplines on program changes. These agreements were made contractual in early 1966
and represent a milestone in the achievement of program change control. Worthy of note
is the fact that the agreement exceeded systems for control of the hardware only and pro-
vided methods by which all changes to the contract are defined and documented. Imple-
menting these agreements significantly improved the control of the program.
2.6 Implementing Decisions
Given an organizational structure and an effective decisionmaking process, manage-
ment decisions, once reached, still have to be put into effect. There are three such princi-
pal tools which have been adapted for use on the Saturn Program: a set of "management
manuals" for issuing general operating directives; a work-management system for autho-
rizing and implementing decisions; and a contract management procedure for identifying
NASA requirements, negotiating contract provisions, and authorizing the work necessary
to meet requirements.
2.7 Informal Communications
Superimposed upon the formal systems are the informal systems of communication
through face-to-face contact. These are judged to be equally key to the success of the pro-
gram. The management of the Saturn Program at MDAC-WD has not attempted to sit in
an office examining status reports to reach significant management decisions. To the con-
trary, the program management's visibility is substantially [69] improved by daily personal
contacts between Company and Customer personnel, and decisions are guided by infor-
mation and facts which thus come to light.
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2.8 Incentive Fees
NASA took positive steps to assure Apollo mission success by emphatically expressing
to contractors the things most important to the Apollo Program. They did this in the way
most meaningful to contractors: by increasing their profits for superlative performance
and reducing profits for poor performance. The factors thus emphasized by NASA were:
cost, schedule, and operational success.
At the time--in 1965 and early 1966--when the contract was converted from
cost-plus-fixed-fee to cost-plus-incentive-fee, target costs and the cost-sharing incentive fees
were agreed upon for the work then under contract. Provisional payment of incentive fees
was to be made thereafter upon demonstration of specific evidences of superior perfor-
mance.
The features have become a very important tool in controlling the technical perfor-
mance, the schedules and the cost. It had been difficult to determine what would be paid
for and what would not be paid for. Also, the many facets of the customer organization and
MDAC-WD complicated contractual negotiations. Communications between MDAC-WD
and the customer crystallized about these incentive features. The tradeoffs became crystal
clear. Within 9 months to a year after signing, the confusion and difficulties in the pro-
gram vanished because objectives were clearly defined. It now appears that the optimum
time to incentivize is after the definition is well along.
Taken alone, a cost incentive could work to the detriment of other valuable consider-
ations, but, combined with schedule and technical performance incentives, meaningful
tradeoffs can be made to the benefit of the program. The greatest effect of these tradeoff
considerations is to create in the whole organization--from top management right down
to the man on the bench--an awareness of the importance for each of them to evaluate
the effectiveness of every action that affects performance, cost, and schedule.
Meeting technical performance goals is the real make-or-break factor for an incen-
tive contractor. Without this operational success, meeting cost and schedule goals is mean-
ingless. So specific measures of technical excellence have been identified for comparing
success, and fees are adjusted upward or downward in accordance with the results.
Performance is evaluated in terms of how flight missions are accomplished, the pay-
load capability demonstrated, and telemetry responses shown. The performance require-
ments are based on technical requirements contained in CEI specifications. Flight-test
plans are prepared for each flight by the Company and are followed afterward by final
flight reports that set forth performance achievements. Certificates of performance achieve-
ment are submitted to NASA, and NASA's position is stated in return.
Schedule incentives are based on meeting three important milestones leading to
delivery of completed S-IVB stages. The milestones here selected to provide NASA with
the opportunity to review the effectiveness of the Company's work at regular, preplanned
intervals. This is accomplished by the administrative technique of requiring from the [70]
Company certificates stating the degree of completion of specific schedule-oriented ac-
tions and requiring from NASA prompt response--concurring or differing--so that pro-
gram status is continually known by both parties.
In this way, the effect of all actions on delivery of contract end items becomes a part
of total Saturn program activity, but is the special concern of the "Black Tuesday" reviews
held biweekly and the primary concern of the Director for Saturn Program Production.
As a result of the incentive feature, MDAC-WD developed an improved reporting
system in schedules and cost performance.
SECTION 3
ADDITIONAL MANAGEMENT ACTIONS
3.1 Introduction
The Saturn program introduced a new range of challenges for MDAC-WD. Manage-
ment techniques geared to the production of aircraft in volume had to be slanted toward
the complexity and state-of-the-art nature of the Saturn program. MDAC-WD relied heavily
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upon the quality and effectiveness of management practices that had been evolving steadily
on prior programs but made them sufficiendy flexible to be responsive to Saturn require-
ments. To do this, they established clear, detailed requirements, and provided for precise
command and control through total program visibility. The success of this approach lies in
the management record of the Saturn program.
3.2 Administrative
3.2.1 Interface
The number of agencies involved with Saturn, both within the Company and exter-
nally (Customer, associates, subcontractors, vendors and suppliers), is enormous. Com-
municating effectively with each, therefore, was a significant challenge. Both formal and
informal lines of communication were established as were the means of transmitting infor-
mation and documents to conduct daily business with NASA.
3.2.2 Evolution of the Role of the Program Manager
The role of the program manager in the newly formalized program office was not
clearly understood by all levels of management. Further, a proper set of tools with which to
carry out his responsibility was not available to the program manager. His capability to
control his program depended somewhat upon his personal forcefulness and his success
at inserting himself or members of his staff into the then existing Division's work authori-
zation systems.
Customer organizations with responsibility to oversee the program were sympathetic
to the frustrations of the program manager and began to express concern that their pro-
grams would not receive sufficient management attention.
To alleviate this situation, Division management responded with two courses of ac-
tion: (1) Large programs were permitted significant projectization, especially in financial
management and engineering; (2) A substantial effort was mounted to better define and
publicize the responsibility and authority of the program manager. Position guides were
carefully rewritten to assure that they carried a strong message [71] on that role. Division
management directives were revised to define in operating directives the contribution and
participation of the program manager. Probably the most significant change in the Division's
management systems was the establishment of a Task Authorization Notice (TAN), the
program manager's tool to authorize the release or cancellation of program plans and
requirements to the Division's functional departments.
3.2.3 Company Standard Practice Bulletins
MDAC-WD sought to meet specific requirements of the Saturn program by expressly
tailoring its Standard Practice Bulletins to the program and furnishing these documents
to the Customer. This highly unusual amount of Customer orientation is somewhat re-
flected in that during 1964, over 507 SPB's were revised to improve MDAC-WD manage-
ment systems. The Division sustains a concerted effort to continually revise, refine, and
upgrade these management directives.
3.2.4 VIP Program
In 1964, a Value in Performance program (VIP) was implemented to produce supe-
rior product quality and personal excellence in work performance. The program empha-
sizes the importance of people, and enhances the feeling of each that he is a very impor-
tant part of the Company. The program (1) motivates each person to take an increased
interest in his job, (2) improves the quality of products and services, and (3) reduces costs
and improves schedules.
The backbone of VIP accomplishment has been the establishment of meaningful
measurable goals, and the subsequent attainment and improvement of these goals. Over
200 specific performance goals were established in 1967 of which 91 percent were achieved.
This year Saturn/Apollo's VIP program has adopted the theme, "Management by Objec-
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tives." The objectives are goals which have become more specific and demand a high or-
der of performance attainment. For MDAC-WD, the VIP program has been a factor in the
dramatic increase in validated cost reductions, increasing from $16 million in 1964 to over
$93 million in 1967.
In 1966 the Company received the U.S. Air Force's coveted Zero Defects honor, The
Craftmanship Award. Of 3,500 competing companies, Douglas was one of the two to win
this award. In October 1968, McDonnell Douglas was notified that they had achieved the
Second or Sustained Craftsmanship Award for accomplishments in the field of motivation
for the preceding year.
3.2.5 Supplier Motivation Program
NASA and MDAC-WD initiated a Supplier Motivation Program in early 1967. The
intent was to advise MDAC-WD suppliers management of specific applications for the items
they were manufacturing and thus motivate them to produce more reliable hardware.
The Company brought all suppliers of critical components to Huntington Beach to
make them aware of the consequences of a failure in the critical component they were
providing to the program. They were briefed thoroughly on failure-mode specification
analysis of their individual piece of hardware, and the president of each Company com-
pletely understood what would happen should his component fail. They were shown their
hardware on the stage, how it was handled, and [72] then asked to go back and examine
the method by which they were providing this hardware. They were to determine whether
they could detect anything that should be brought to MDAC-WD's attention, or anything
they felt they should do internally in the preparation of their hardware. Sixty suppliers
participated in 4 half-day sessions. A number of suppliers conducted awareness programs
for employees and for their own suppliers. Their recommendations included design
changes, and reverification of conformance to design requirements. The program ben-
efited from these meetings before AS-501 was committed to launch at the Cape.
SECTION 4
SELECTED KEY PROBLEMS
4.1 Introduction
Managing Saturn has been almost as complicated and demanding a task as overcom-
ing attendant technical difficulties, While geared to take on the management of this im-
mense and complex program by valuable experience gained with Thor, Nike, and other
families of missiles and space systems, no previous program compared with Saturn for
scope, size and complexity. In retrospect, it can be seen that significant strides were made
in learning how to control a major program of the size and magnitude of the Saturn project.
This section highlights some of the key management problems encountered by MDAC-
WD with Saturn and how they were solved.
4.2 Effective Communication
On a program the size of Saturn/Apollo, the problem of communicating effectively
impinges on all transactions, from the simplest, vis-a-vis, contact to major program nego-
tiations. Throughout the program, at all levels, heavy emphasis was laid on the personal
encounter. This basic philosophy was strengthened by firm and precisely defined require-
ments to document and record decisions made on the spot and under the duress of pro-
gram schedules and requirements. The net effect of the decision to run the program on
this basis, although intrinsically not measurable, was to expedite management and pro-
duction decisions and raise morale.
A corollary of this decision lay in the necessity to so aline counterparts within the
Company (as well as between those people and all external organizations) that each indi-
vidual would be talking to others at precisely the right levels and in equally correct areas.
The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) provided both in-depth technical and
nontechnical control. Communications with the Industrial Operations Office, the Stage
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Manager at MSFC, the laboratories at MSFC, and the technical communities within our
Development Engineering organization, and supporting in-house technical activities had
to be face to face. To realign the Saturn organization so that technical counterparts could
be identified on a one-to-one basis, a technically oriented directorate was established, which
could communicate to the Industrial Operations office, the Stage Manager at MSFC, and
his corollary--the contracting officer. Saturn System Development supported that
combination, so that the products that came out of technical interchanges and program
requirements were crystallized into specific documents and became the contract end-item
specifications.
[73] This was the beginning of effective control over the products of the technical
working groups and the face-to-face interchange between technical counterparts. Real-
time decisionmaking was implemented and authorized both by MSFC and Division man-
agement. The S-IVB, Stage Manager and the S-IVB Program Director made the principal
program decisions, and all members of the program community accepted them.
Another area of communication, now formal, was the generation Change Orders
that ultimately developed into contract requirements. To facilitate Change Order process-
ing, the program director strengthened Saturn Systems Development and the manager of
Saturn contracts. The Director of Development Engineering developed a supporting
capability within his organization to assist in preparation of a formal response to Change
Order direction. In concert, these organizations could quickly translate Change Order
direction into work authorization.
4.3 Avoiding Cost Overruns
The number one priority was to achieve technical performance of the highest cali-
ber. The second was to get the program on and ahead of schedule. The lowest priority was
to avoid cost overruns (which should have been achieved had the program schedule re-
mained intact). At present, the program is in an on-target position and in the process of
realignment as a consequence of the schedule stretchout from the launch activity.
4.4 Program Schedule
The program is on schedule. Upon emerging from engineering release, and at the
beginning of ground research programs, all contractors involved found themselves quite
nervous about meeting schedule obligations. Several years ago, the goal was established of
getting ahead and staying ahead of contract schedule. A vigorous program was initiated to
obtain a complete set of hardware ahead of the contract schedule. This was probably the
fundamental decision which permitted a get-ahead and stay-ahead-of-schedule capability.
The procedure involved substantial risk, but resulted in avoidance of actual cost vulner-
abilities inherent in major overtime panic situations generated in trying to meet contract
schedules. Premium prices were sometimes paid to get these supplies into the system, but
use of overtime and premium time was weighed very carefully by Saturn management and
the NASA Resident Manager.
4.5 Information Retrieval
Saturn management does not maintain a program control room, with charts, graphs
and schedule status on the walls. By themselves, such charts are considered out of date by
anywhere from an hour to a month, depending on how responsive the system is. Instead,
management developed a recording technique which retained the real-time decisions of
those responsible and converted them properly to contract language. That was the es-
sence of the unique feature of the Saturn/Apollo program management.
4.6 Capability Retention
A key consideration in the retention of a high-level of technical competence is that,
for all practical purposes, Saturn has a fleet of S-IB, S-IVB's and Saturn V, S-IVB's. Five
were launched on the IB program and two on the Saturn V Program, which means that
[74] some 20-odd stages in inventory have yet to be flown. A technical and supporting staff
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mustbemaintained,capableof handlinganyproblemswhichcouldcomeoutrelativeto
newmissionassignmentsoranomalies.
4.7Mission Failure Avoidance
To avoid mission failures, management went into a very comprehensive, in-depth,
system, subsystem, and component development. The object was early exposure of weak-
nesses through repetitive forced exposures. The underlying and most fundamental
activities are the ground test program, development tests, qualification tests, formal quali-
fication tests, repeat qualification tests, and reliability verification tests, which are essen-
tially component and subsystem oriented. In the system area are the factor)' checkout at
Huntington Beach, the preacceptance firing checkout at Sacramento, the acceptance
firings at Sacramento, and the postacceptance firing checkout at Sacramento. At KSC,
prior to launch, there are a very elaborate set of validation, subsystem, and systems tests.
Major opportunities for reducing costs on a program such as this (in area of debate) are to
reduce or delete acceptance firings or repetitive subsystem and system tests at KSC.
The basic formal qualification activity on this program will soon diminish. A group of
reliability verification tests will be eliminated entirely. Qualification tests on selective items
will be repeated for some time to provide an opportunity for forced exposure to weak-
nesses inherent either in the design, in the manufacturing technique, or the production
acceptance testing technique. Each one of these areas, although it is an opportunity to
reduce costs on the program, also must be weighed as another opportunity of forcing an
exposure of something that has escaped through the reliability assurance and quality pro-
grams. Large cost returns may be realized by deleting some of these activities. They may or
may not be cost effective. The major tradeoff becomes nontechnical and political in na-
ture, very rapidly.
SECTION 5
CONCLUSIONS
However economical their cost performance, however timely their schedule perfor-
mance, the management systems described herein cannot be said to have justified the
customer's investment unless the technical performance of the products assures him that
his overall program objective can be achieved. In recognition of this, each management
system element has actively participated in technical operations to assure success in tech-
nical performance. Unquestionably, the most significant technical operation assuring the
customer of the effectiveness of these management systems is the performance of the
product in acceptance testing and in-flight operations. Recapitulating, 23 flight vehicles
have experienced successful acceptance testing. Thirteen flight vehicles have been suc-
cessfully launched in either developmental or operational flight test configurations. While
these acceptance and flight test programs have not been flawless (almost by definition
developmental programs cannot be) the high incidence of success, MDAC-WD believes,
bespeaks the effectiveness of the management systems it has devised and operated to con-
trol the S-IV and S-IVB programs. Its measure lies in the fact that current planning for the
next flight is directed toward manned circumnavigation of the moon.
Document IV-12
Document title: George M. Low, Deputy Administrator, NASA, Memorandum for the
Administrator, "NASA as a Technology Agency," May 25, 1971.
Source: James C. Fletcher Papers, Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of Utah,
Salt Lake City.
The political consensus on the importance of space that produced the National Aero-
nautics and Space Act of 1958 and the Apollo program began to dissipate even before the
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first few Apollo missions were completed. As public support deteriorated, NASA execu-
tives found it more difficult to protect not just their programs, but their mission and insti-
tution as well. Maintaining NASA's infrastructure depended in part on the identification
of marketable missions that the agency could pursue. A 1971 White House review of how
government-funded technology could be applied to the nation's problems stimulated
NASA's deputy administrator to reassess the agency's future role. His May 25, 1971, memo-
randum to the administrator printed here describes his position on the subject.
[1] SUBJECT: NASA as a Technology Agency
These are some thoughts as to why it might make sense to assign to NASA the govern-
men t-wide responsibility for the application of technology to national needs.
There are many national problems that require, at least in part, technology solutions
and often, at the same time, require a systems management approach. These problems
can be found, for example, in the areas of power and energy, pollution, transportation
system, health care systems, productivity of services, education, and housing.
NASA has demonstrated a capability to solve difficult technological problems and to
apply systems management and know-how in the solution of these problems. In these
efforts, NASA has established a working relationship with the aerospace industry that would
be difficult for other agencies to duplicate. At the same time, the aerospace community
has a surplus of talent that could be applied to these problems, if properly controlled and
managed. It, therefore, appears to be logical that NASA should be the agency to under-
take the newly needed technological tasks.
There are two alternative ways in which this could be done. First, NASA could pro-
vide its services to other agencies; second, NASA could do these things in its own right as
part of an expanded NASA mission.
If the first alternative were to be followed, NASA could apply some of its inhouse
personnel resources (say, up to ten percent or 3,000) for any direct inhouse efforts and get
[2] funding for out-of-house efforts by transfers of funds from other agencies. These other
agencies would provide for the funds in their own budgets. This alternative could be done
today without any change in existing laws.
Were we to take the second alternative (to do these tasks as part of an expanded
NASA mission), then the job would be assigned direcdy to NASA and budgeted for by
NASA. This, however, would require a change in the Space Act. The major disadvantage of
the second alternative would be that other agencies would be reluctant to let go of jobs
that they now consider to be their own. However, the second alternative, I believe, would
be much more likely to succeed.
A word about the kinds of jobs that NASA could undertake. First, I believe that they
should be in the general area of applied technology. It is in this area that NASA has the
talent and the demonstrated capability. Also, the jobs must be doable, and they must be
adequately supported. Finally, they should be tasks that are not now clearly assigned and
capably carried out by other agencies,
If it were desired to change NASA's name, I would vote for something like "Aeronau-
tics, Space and Applied Technology Administration."
Should we be asked to undertake a job like this, the first step would be to form a task
team, reporting to NASA, to define the charter for the new agency, and to formulate the
required government reorganization legislation.
George M. Low
Deputy Administrator
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Document IV-13
Document title: George M. Low, Deputy Administrator, NASA, Memorandum to Address-
ees, "Space Vehicle Cost Improvement," May 16, 1972.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA Headuqarters,
Washington, D.C.
NASA's dwindling budgets and its aspirations for an aggressive space program in
early 1970s were incompatible. However, the NASA leadership did not perceive themselves
as wholly at the mercy of the political environment in which the agency existed. Although
politicians established spending levels, NASA's top administrators, as engineers and scien-
tists, believed it was within the organization's ability to reduce the cost of doing business in
space. Doing so would not only allow them to live within externally imposed budgets, but
also to pursue aggressive institutional and programmatic goals as well. This memorandum
of May 16, 1972, from George M. Low, the NASA Deputy Administrator, to several senior
NASA officials emphasizes the importance of reducing costs and creating greater efficien-
cies inside the agency.
[ 1] SUBJECT: Space Vehicle Cost Improvement
The high cost of doing business in space, coupled with limited and essentially fixed
resources available for space exploration, places severe limitations on the amount of pro-
ductive work that NASA can do, unless we can develop means to lower the unit cost of
space operations. It therefore becomes an item of first-order business for each of us to find
ways to drastically reduce the costs of all elements of space missions.
A fundamental reason for high costs has been the fact that most space systems are
designed with great sophistication so as to operate acceptably with low allowable weight.
However, as the cost of space transportation is decreased (especially with the shuttle, but
even with some existing launch vehicles) a great many designs should be optimized for
high reliability and low cost--in general with weight being a secondary consideration.
Another reason for high cost has been that most systems are individually tailored for
their mission, used once or twice, and then never used again. Thus the economies of pro-
ducing a number of like systems are never attained. Now that we have acquired a consider-
able background of experience as to the kinds and needs of space missions, we can better
plan for multiple-use types of equipment.
I am convinced that major cost improvements can be realized, and that this matter
should become a first order item of business for all of us. A basic approach to lowering the
costs of space systems should include the following:
[2] 1. A detailed understanding of exactly where we spend our money. We need to
identify those areas where a substantial cost improvement would be worthwhile in that it
would have a major impact on the cost of the end product. In other words, we need to
define the things with the greatest potential pay-off for cost improvement.
2. The determination of range of requirements (for the systems or subsystems with
the highest potential payoff) for our spacecraft of the future. (So that we can develop a few
"standard" systems, instead of individually tailored systems for each requirement.)
3. The development of "standard" systems or subsystems, designed for low cost and
high reliability. (We need a catalog, ultimately, of available preferred parts.)
4. A method for assuring that as a rule only the "standard" systems are used.
I consider this effort of such high importance and priority that I am prepared to
devote whatever resources are required, both in-house and on contract, to achieve signifi-
cant results.
688 ORGANIZINGFOREXPLORATION
To begin with, I am hereby establishing a task force, chaired by Del Tischler, to carry
out steps 1and 2, above, and to develop a plan, goals and objectives for steps 3 and 4. I want
each of the addressees to provide the necessary support to the task force, especially in
terms of experienced people.
My plan is to have task force members named within one week, and to be in business
in two weeks. Thereafter I intend to meet with the task force on a biweekly basis, and to
have its final report in six months.
The task force is authorized to place requirements on the various line organizations
to accomplish its objectives.
George M. Low
Document IV-14
Document title: E.S. Groo, Associate Administrator for Center Operations, NASA, to Cen-
ter Directors, "Catalog of NASA Center Roles," April 16, 1976.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA Headuqarters,
Washington, D.C.
The elaborate institutional machinery inherited by NASA from the National Advi-
sory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), supplemented by that developed to carry out
Apollo, could not be easily disassembled, nor demobilized after the completion of the
Apollo program, given the interlocking interests it had created among NASA's installa-
tions, contractors, and geographic regions and their representatives in Washington. By
designating "roles and missions" for each of its field centers, NASA Headquarters attempted
to avoid duplication, reduce intercenter rivalry, and assure each installation adequate work
to utilize its special capabilities and facilities.
[ 1 ] SUBJECT: Catalog of NASA Center Roles
Enclosed is a copy of the catalog of NASA Center Roles, dated April 1976, developed
on the basis of decisions reached during the Institutional Assessment conducted earlier
this year. The primary purposes of the catalog are to describe in a consistent way the pro-
grammatic responsibilities of the Centers and to serve as a guide in the assignment of work
to the Centers.
The catalog has been reviewed by the Program Associate Administrators and reflects
the changes they have proposed. As we discussed at the last Center Directors' meeting, the
document is now forwarded to you for your comments. Dr. Naugle and I will entertain
specific proposals which would further clarify the document within the context of the
Institutional Assessment decisions.
While it is possible that refinements to the catalog should be made based upon your
suggestions, we should, in the meantime, assume this document to be the definitive state-
ment of the roles and missions of the Centers on which new program assignments will be
based. There will, or course, be changes from time to time in the catalog as roles and
missions evolve and all changes will be issued in writing and signed jointly by Dr. Naugle
and me and, where appropriate, by Mr. Yardley.
We are now developing a procedure for the review and approval of major work as-
signments to the Centers. This [2] procedure, which we expect to issue in about one month,
will recognize the catalog as the baseline document in the assignment of work.
E. S. Groo
Enclosure...
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[ 1 of Enclosure]
CENTER ROLES
Introduction and Rationale
Assignment of specific responsibilities to NASA Field Centers is one of the keystones
in the process by which the Nation's goals in Aeronautics and Space are met. Field Center
responsibilities relate, in their broadest context, to these major goals. These goals are:
• gaining new fundamental knowledge about the earth, solar system and universe
through maintaining a strong program in space science and exploration;
• bringing the benefits of space and space technology to bear for the direct and
immediate benefit of man on earth through cooperation in applications oriented activities
with a wide range of users and non-space mission oriented agencies;
• facilitating improvements in aircraft design and operations through the provision
of an on-going aeronautics research and technolog 3 base;
• maintaining a strong base of space research and technolog)' as a national resource which
can serve to evolve and/or support new initiatives in space exploration or applications;
and
• making space more accessible to both domestic and foreign users through devel-
opment and operation of economical space transportation and the operation of efficient
tracking and data acquisition systems.
These goals translate into a set of broad program areas to which the roles in this
document are related.
Within these broad program areas, a Center is assigned and carries out both pTqncipal
roles and supportingroles.
Principal: Roles of fundamental importance in supporting the Agency's overall goals.
They serve as a basis for deploying resources to Centers over the longer term. They also
represent areas of Center excellence and expertise that [2] is clearly discernible within
NASA and recognized as a national capability.
Supporting: Roles of more limited scope or tentative nature supporting the Agency's
overall goals. Such roles can also support principal roles for which other Centers or gov-
ernment agencies generally have the lead. They may also support a Center's own principal
role or roles, or are discrete roles assigned to a Center because of a specific expertise a
Center can provide in a particular discipline."
Each NASA Field Center represents particular areas of special capability whic h, when
considered on an Agency-wide basis, form the core of our national capability in aeronau-
tics and space. The special capabilities highlighted herein consist of areas of technical
excellence and facilities of superior merit - technical facilities which may be of unique or
almost unique character and constitute, in themselves, a national resource. Consideration
of such special capabilities is integral to the process of assigning Field Center responsibili-
ties within the Agency's overall program.
Summarized on the following pages are highlights of Center capabilities and state-
ments of role responsibilities current as of April 1976. Roles are grouped according to
overall emergency goals by broad program areas - so that "Applications," for instance, has
a broader context than just Office of Applications programs and includes Technology
Utilization and Energy programs as well. The same can be said of "Space Research and
Technology" vs. the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology programs.
For supporting roles, any other Centers having related responsibilities - either prin-
cipal or supporting- are noted in parentheses following each supporting role description.
There are a few cases where a Center shares principal responsibility with another Center
* Many of these roles were previously identified in the institutional assessment as "limited roles." Others
may have been identified as "broad roles" but are now judged to be supportive to principal roles assigned to the
Center.
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or acts as an alternate to another Center in the development of space hardware. Such roles
are so identified where appropriate.
[3] AMES RESEARCH CENTER
Special Capabilities
Areas of Technical Excellence
• Biology
• Human factors and man-machine interactions
• Fluid dynamics and heat transfer
• Aerodynamics and flight dynamics
• Flight stability and control
• Technical project management
Facilities of Superior Merit
• 40 X 80 ft. Wind Tunnel
• Flight Simulator for Advanced Aircraft
• Illiac IV
• C-141 Airborne Infrared Observatory
• High-Enthalpy Arc Jets
• Unitary Wind Tunnel Complex
• 3.5 ft. Hypersonic Wind Tunnel
• Biological Containment Facility
• Vertical Gun
[4] AMES RESEARCH CENTER
PROGRAM AREAS:
Aeronautics
Space Science and Exploration
Space Research and Technology
Applications
Space Transportation
Principal and Supporting Roles
• Aeronautics
- Principal
• Short-haul aircraft technology - developing a technology base for facilitating in-
corporation of short-haul aircraft into overall air transportation systems.
• Helicopter technology' - developing a technology base for improving efficiency
and flexibility for both civil and military use.
• Computational fluid mechanics - furthering the state-of-the-art through the defi-
nition of new systems, both hardware and software, for application to aeronautical and
other related areas such as weather and climate, etc.
• Fluid simulation - improving the state-of-the-art to permit more effective use of
simulators in aircraft design and validation of flight simulation.
• Human-vehicle interactions - furthering the state-off-the-art through the study of
man-machine and other human factor interactions and considerations involved in aircraft
operations.
* Under study
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• Fundamental aerodynamics - advancing the general state-of-the-art, both theo-
retical and experimental. (Shared principal responsibility with LaRC; supporting respon-
sibilities: DFRC, JPL)
• Fire resistant materials - developing a technology base for internal application in
aircraft. (Supporting responsibilities: JPL, JSC)
[5] - Supporting
• Aviation system studies - conducted to help define technical and system require-
ments. (Shared supporting responsibility with LaRC)
• Aircraft structures - improving predictive capability for structural lifetimes in
degrading chemical environments, unsteady aerodynamic loads and aeroelasticity, and
high temperature fuel tank sealants. (Principal responsibility: LaRC; supporting responsi-
bility: DFRC)
• Acoustics noise reduction - using ARC unique fullscale low speed wind tunnel to
study airframe noise and forward velocity effects. (Principal responsibility: LaRC; support-
ing responsibilities: DFRC, LeRC)
• Aviation safety- contributing to advances through joint efforts with the FAA and
other appropriate agencies. Advanced tire materials, and wake vortex studies. (Support-
ing responsibilities: DFRC, JPL, LaRC, LeRC, MSFC, WFC)
• Wind tunnel support - provision of facility support to industry and other govern-
ment agencies. (Other Centers having unique or outstanding facilities may provide similar
support.)
• Military support- provision of military aviation systems technology support. (Other
Centers providing military aeronautics support: DFRC, LaRC, LeRC)
• General aviation aircraft technology- developing a technology base for improv-
ing agricultural aircraft. (Principal responsibility: LaRC)
• Space Science and Exploration
Principal
• Extraterrestrial life detection - developing and applying the analytical basis for
life detection in space, including experiment design and management.
[6] • Biological experiments - developing and implementing experiments for de-
termining effects of space flight environment on (non-human) living organisms.
• Level IV life sciences integration - developing, integrating and operating space
flight hardware to conduct in-flight biomedical experiments and experiments on
non-human living organisms.
• Airborne research operations - operating instrumented jet aircraft for the pur-
pose of conducting airborne science experiments.
• Planetary probes - developing thermoprotection systems required for planetary
atmosphere entry probes and managing probe development.
• Pioneer - completing the currently approved series, including associated flight
operations. Phase out to be concluded after Pioneer Venus."
-Supporting
• Planetary science analysis techniques - developing and applying techniques for
analysis of planetary atmosphere and mass. To be completed in early 1980. (Principal
responsibility: JPL; supporting responsibility: GSFC)
* Future pioneer spacecraft will be managed byJPL
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• Astronomical observation techniques - focus on airborne science and the devel-
opment of IR techniques and supporting systems for use in Spacelab payloads. (Principal
responsibility: GSFC; alternate responsibility: JPL)
• Upper atmospheric research - providing aircraft based sampling and contribut-
ing to model development. (Principal responsibilities:JPL, GSFC; supporting responsibili-
ties: LaRC, LeRC)
• Spacelab bioresearch - supporting development of Spacelab life science research
capability through common operating research equipment development. (Principal re-
sponsibility: JSC)
• Space Research and Technology
- Principal
[7] * Planetary entry technology'- advancing thermal heat protection technology for
planetary entry. (Supporting responsibility: LaRC)
• Biomedical support systems - developing advanced technology for development
of long duration life support systems.
- Supporting
• Fundamental research - focus on quantum and surface states in solids. (Support-
ing responsibilities: JPL, LaRC, LeRC)
• Space vehicle structures and materials technology - focus on prediction of dy-
namic loading parameters related to space vehicles. (Principal responsibilities: MSFC, LaRC;
supporting responsibilities: GSFC, JPL)
• Space energy processes and systems technology -furthering state-of-the-art in key
areas such as heat pipes for thermal control and high power gas dynamic laser technology.
(Principal responsibility: LeRC; supporting responsibilities: GSFC,JPL)
• Technology experiments in space - definition and development of experiments
in areas consistent with ARC's other Space Research and Technology roles. (Principal re-
sponsibilities:JSC, LaRC; supporting responsibilities: DFRC, GSFC,JPL, LeRC, MSFC)
• Shuttle technology- Shuttle vehicle technology development and ground facility
testing in the areas of thermal protection systems, dynamics and aeroelasticity. (Shared
supporting activity with LaRC)
• Space technology studies - conducted to help define technology and systems re-
quirements. (Supporting responsibilities: GSFC,JPL)
• Medical research - utilizing non-human specimens to derive information and
develop countermeasures needed to solve space medicine problems. (Principai responsi-
bility: JSC)
[8] • Applications
- Principal
• Airborne instrumentation research - providing aircraft platform support for ap-
plications oriented sensor research and development.
• Technology transfer
- Technology utilization - conducting projects to establish applicability of NASA
technology in health care, participate in technology transfer to industry, identify and re-
port new technology, and document results of secondary applications of NASA technol-
ogy.
- Specialized applications tasks - draw upon unique Center capabilities included
under other Center roles to advance the application of space related techniques. Current
emphasis is on space processing and video compression techniques.
* Under study
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- Regional applications transfer - current effort is a joint demonstration activity
with USGS/EROS, the Pacific Northwest Regional Commission, and State agencies with
Idaho, Washington and Oregon.
- Supporting
• Energy technology - conducting energy related materials investigations. (Princi-
pal responsibility: LeRC; supporting responsibilities: JPL, JSC, MSFC)
• Space Transportation
- Supporting
• Passenger selection criteria - establishment of medical criteria for non-crew pas-
senger selection.
[9] DRYDEN FLIGHT RESEARCH CENTER
Special Capabilities
Areas of Technical Excellence
• Flight research instrumentation
• Flight dynamics and controls
• Flight research operations
Facilities of Superior Merit
• High Temperature Loads Facility
• 600-Mile Instrumented Range
• Remote Piloted Research Facility
• Airborne Launch Aircraft
• General Purpose Airborne Simulator
[10] DRYDEN FLIGHT RESEARCH CENTER
PROGRAM AREAS:
Aeronautics
Space Transportation
Applications
Space Research and Technology
Tracking and Data Acquisition"
Principal and Supporting Roles
• Aeronautics
- Principal
• Aeronautical flight research - providing a broad-based flight research and test
capability including tracking and data acquisition for the Agency in support of aeronautics
and other programs as required. (This principal role represents the composite of the sup-
porting roles given below.)
• Remotely piloted vehicle research - development of research aircraft, and man-
agement/operation of flight experiments.
* Included within other program areas as indicated
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- Supporting
• Fundamental aerodynamics - contributing to state- of-the-art advancement through
flight testing of aerodynamics concepts. (Principal responsibilities: ARC, LaRC; support-
ing responsibility: JPL)
• Aircraft structures - contributing to technology base with focus on flight loads
measurements. (Principal responsibility: LaRC; supporting responsibility: ARC)
• Acoustics and aircraft noise reduction - focus on flight measurements of airframe
noise. (Principal responsibility: LaRC; supporting responsibilities: ARC, LeRC)
• Short-haul aircraft technology- support of ARC role through participation in
flight testing of short-haul aircraft and systems.
• Long-haul aircraft systems- support of LaRCrole through flight testing of long-haul
aircraft and [11] systems, with focus on digital fly-by-wire experiments and active controls
aircraft flight experiments.
• Aviation safety - contributing to advances through flight testing of devices/sys-
tems for wake vortex marking and minimization; definition of atmospheric conditions for
supersonic acceleration and cruise. (Supporting responsibilities: ARC,JPL, LaRC, LeRC,
MSFC, WFC)
• Military support - provide flight research support to the DOD. (Other Centers
providing military aeronautics support: ARC, LaRC, LeRC)
• Space Transportation
- Supporting
• Shuttle orbiter development - conducting approach and landing tests in support
of JSC. Provide landing and recovery capability during OFT and contingency recovery
capability after OFT. (Principal responsibility: JSC)
• Applications
- Supporting
• Technology transfer
- Technology transfer - identify and report new technology, participate in technol-
ogy transfer to public service and private organizations, and document results of second-
ary applications of NASA technology.
• Space Research and Technology
- Supporting
• Space vehicle configurations technology - analysis and study of the effect of op-
erational considerations on the design and test program of manned research vehicles.
(Principal responsibility: LaRC; supporting responsibility: MSFC)
• Technology experiments in space - definition and development of experiments
consistent with DFRC's [12] other Space Research and Technology roles. (Principal re-
sponsibilities:JSC, LaRC; supporting responsibilities: ARC, GSFC,JPL, LeRC, MSFC)
[13] GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
Special Capabilities
• Areas of Technical Excellence
• Space and earth sciences
• Data systems and analysis
• Sensors and instrument systems
• Flight systems - automated
• Tracking and data acquisition and communications
• Technical project management
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• Space flight operations
• Mission operations control and information processing
• Facilities of Superior Merit
• Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network
• Spacecraft Magnetic Test Facility
• Optical Systems Laboratories
• Optical Tracking and Communications Facility
• Thermal-Vacuum Simulation and Test Facilities
• Dynamic Test Chamber
• Remote Sensing Information Processing Facilities
• Operations Communications Network
• Mission Operations Control Centers
[14] GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
PROGRAM AREAS:
Space Science and Exploration
Space Research and Technology
Applications
Tracking and Data Acquisition
Space Transportation
Principal and Supporting Roles
• Space Science and Exploration
- Principal
• Earth orbit spacecraft development- for science, including spacecraft propulsion
systems. Emphasis on automated, standard spacecraft system and free flyers, including
experiment integration.
• Earth orbit flight operations - planning and conducting flight operations for earth
orbit science spacecraft.
• Physics and astronomy- developing the technical discipline base, developing and
implementing flight experiments. (Includes planetary astronomy and the transfer of AMPS.)
• Upper atmospheric research - developing the technical discipline base, develop-
ing and implementing flight experiments.
• Sounding rocket development, procurement and operations - developing and
procuring sounding rockets, and carrying out all phases of operations from mission/flight
planning to landing and recovery. Payload carrier development, development and man-
agement of experiments, experiment management support to other institutions, launch
operations and tracking and data acquisition are included. (Most GSFC sounding rocket
activities involve the higher performance, more complex vehicle support systems. Most
activities involving lower performance vehicle systems are assigned to WFC.)
[15] • Spacelab payloads - development, integration, and data processing for
Spacelab payloads in astrophysics, solar terrestrial physics, and astronomy.
Supporting
• Planetary science - developing and applying techniques for the analysis of plan-
etary atmospheres. (Principal responsibility:JPL; supporting responsibility: ARC)
• Lunar science - phase out by FY 79. Continuation of unique computer programs
for processing lunar and planetary remote sensing data currently being used for lunar and
Venera data. Those unique computer programs that cannot be economically transferred
will continue.
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• Space Research and Technology
- Principal
• Information systems technology- developing and maintaining technical disci-
pline base. (Supporting responsibilities:JPL,JSC, LaRC)
- Supporting
• Space vehicle structures and materials technology- contributing to technology
base with focus on reducing cost of structural evaluation and reliability demonstration for
space flight hardware. (Principal responsibilities: LaRC, MSFC; supporting responsibili-
ties: ARC, JPL)
• Guidance and control technology - contributing to technology base with focus on
magnetic suspension systems. (Principal responsibility: JPL; supporting responsibilities:
LaRC, MSFC)
• Space energy processes and systems technology -contributing to space technol-
ogy base - space power system component test and evaluation. (Principal responsibility:
LeRC; supporting responsibilities: ARC, JPL)
• Sensor and data acquisition technology - focus on CCD astronomical sensor work
for application in [16] space astronomy. (Principal responsibility: LaRC; supporting re-
sponsibilities: JPL, MSFC)
• Space technology studies - focus on earth applications spacecraft technology re-
quirements. (Supporting responsibilities: ARC, JPL)
• Technology experiments in space - definition and development of experiments
in areas consistent with GSFC's other Space Research and Technology roles. (Principal
responsibilities:JSC, LaRC; supporting responsibilities: ARC, DFRC,JPL, LeRC, MSFC)
• Applications
- Principal
• Earth orbital spacecraft development - for applications, including spacecraft pro-
pulsion systems. Emphasis on automated, standard spacecraft system and free flyers, in-
cluding experiment integration.
• Earth orbit flight operations - planning and conducting flight operations for earth
orbit applications spacecraft.
• Technology transfer
- Applications system verifications test- acquire, process, and disseminate LANDSAT
coverage toJSC.
- Technology utilization - conducting projects to establish applicability of NASA
technology in public service activities, participate in technology transfer to industry, iden-
tify and report new technology, and document results of secondary applications of NASA
technology.
• Applications R&D- developing the technical discipline base, developing and imple-
menting experiments in the following Applications disciplines:
- weather and climate
- earth and ocean dynamics (JPL shares principal responsibility)
[17] - communications
-Supporting
• Contributing to the discipline base, developing and implementing experiments in:
- environmental monitoring (Principal responsibility: LaRC; supporting responsi-
bility: JPL)
- earth resources (Principal responsibility:JSC)
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• Tracking and Data Acquisition
- Principal
• Tracking and data acquisition support operations -planning and conducting sup-
port for earth orbit spacecraft. Includes flight control, tracking, data acquisition, commu-
nications, and information processing. (Tracking and data acquisition responsibilities
include orbital phase of all mission types, such as manned, deep space, etc.)
• Tracking and data acquisition systems - planning, development, and implementa-
tion of network, data processing, communications, and mission control systems and facili-
ties for earth orbit spacecraft.
• Space Transportation
- Principal
• Launch vehicle procurement - for science/applications oriented missions.
Current focus on sounding rockets and Delta (includes procurement for Delta).
- Supporting
• Hight operations - network planning and implementation support for Shuttle
including ALT and OFT.
[18] JET PROPULSION LABORATORY
Special Capabilities
• Areas of Technical Excellence
• Space sciences
• Space flight mechanics and flight systems
• Space guidance and control
• Tracking and data acquisition
• Sensors and instrument systems
• Technical project management
• Deep space flight operations
• Facilities of Superior Merit
• Space Flight Operations Facility
• Deep Space Network
• Rocket Propulsion Test Facilities
• Solid Propellant Processing Laboratory
• Table Mountain Solar Test Facilities
• Electric Propulsion Laboratories
• Radio Telescope Facility
[ 19] JET PROPULSION LABORATORY
PROGRAM AREAS:
Space Science and Exploration Applications
Space Research and Technology Aeronautics
Tracking and Data Acquisition
Principal and Supporting Roles
• Space Science and Exploration
- Principal
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• Planetary spacecraft development - development of automated spacecraft for
deep space exploration. Includes experiment integration and all aspects of spacecraft sys-
tems technology, with special emphasis on guidance and control, space power systems and
the procurement of spacecraft propulsion systems.
• Space flight operations - conduct of flight operations for de_ space missions in-
volving automated spacecraft. Includes mission/flight planning, and flight command and
control. (ARC retains flight control of current Pioneer series.)
• Lunar/planetary science - development of discipline base in lunar and planetary
sciences, including developing and applying techniques for analysis of planetary charac-
teristics (except geosdences for which JSC has principal responsibility, along with returned
sample handling and analysis).
• Upper atmospheric research - developing and testing advanced instrumentation
for atmospheric constituent analysis; conducting diffusion studies and contributing to model
development. (Principal responsibility: GSFC; supporting responsibilities: ARC, LaRC,
LeRC)
• Science/Applications spacecraft development- serves as alternate center to GSFC
for earth orbital spacecraft development. Current focus is SEASAT. (Principal responsibil-
ity: GSFC)
[20] - Supporting
• Space physics - contributing to discipline base with focus on particles and fields;
development of space physics experiments for planetary missions. Cometary physics work
will continue under "planetary science" designation. (Principal responsibility: GSFC)
• Space astronomy- contributing to discipline base with focus on ground based
radio astronomy, relatively and celestial mechanics, IR astronomy, laboratory and high-
energy astrophysics. (Principal responsibility: GSFC; supporting responsibility: ARC)
• Lunar/planetary geoscience - conducting earth based observations, theoretical
studies, analog studies, and developing science experiment concepts. (Principal responsi-
bility: JSC)
° Applications
- Principal
• Technology transfer
- Specialized applications tasks - utilizing the unique capability associated with
other roles to meet discrete needs. Current emphasis is on communications and space
processing.
- Technology utilization - conducting projects to establish applicability of NASA
technology in biomedicine and other fields, participate in technology transfer to industry,
identify and report new technology, and document results of secondary applications of
NASA technology.
• Science/Applications spacecraft development- serves as alternate center to GSFC
for earth orbital spacecraft development. Current focus is SEASAT. (Principal responsibil-
ity: GSFC)
• Earth and ocean dynamics - focus on contributing to discipline base, data analy-
sis and investigation management, and spacecraft payload/experiment development. Cur-
rent emphasis on ocean sensor experiments related to SEASAT.
[21] - Supporting
• Weather and climate - focus on sensor development for solar radiation measure-
ment, definition of weather and climate-related experiments. (Principal responsibility: GSFC;
supporting responsibility: LaRC)
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• Environmental monitoring - focus on development of advanced instrumentation.
(Principal responsibility: LaRC; supporting responsibility: GSFC)
• Energy technology - conducting energy R&D, primarily on a reimbursable basis,
with principal focus on photovoltaics and advanced coal energy extraction technology.
(Principal responsibility: LeRC; supporting responsibilities: ARC, JSC, MSFC)
• Space Research and Technology
- Principal
* Teleoperator technology - focus on teleoperator/robot technology and commu-
nication delayed control techniques for exploration.
* Guidance and control technology- developing and maintaining a broad technol-
ogy base in guidance and control systems. (Supporting responsibilities: GSFC, LaRC, MSPC)
- Supporting
• Sensor and data acquisition technology- focus on planetary imaging, failure mod-
eling and prediction. (Principal responsibility: LaRC; supporting responsibilities: MSFC,
GSFC)
• Information systems technology- focus on planetary data processing and transfer
systems. (Principal responsibility: GSFC; supporting responsibilities: JSC, LaRC)
* Space vehicle structures and materials technology - focus on planetary expand-
able structures and dynamic response. (Principal responsibilities: LaRC, MSFC; support-
ing responsibilities: ARC, GSFC)
[22] • Space propulsion systems technology- focus on planetary spacecraft propul-
sion and low-cost solids. (Principal responsibility: LeRC; supporting responsibility: MSFC)
• Energy processes and systems technology- focus on long life, high energy density
power systems for planetary spacecraft. (Principal responsibility: LeRC; supporting respon-
sibilities: ARC, GSFC)
• Space technology studies- focus on planetary spacecraft technology requirements.
(Supporting responsibilities: ARC, GSFC)
• Fundamental research - focus on photon-matter interactions and energy transfor-
mation research. (Supporting responsibilities: ARC, LaRC, LeRC)
• Technology experiments in space - definition and development of experiments
in areas consistent with JPL's other Space Research and Technology roles. (Principal re-
sponsibilities:JSC, LaRC; supporting responsibilities: ARC, DFRC, GSFC, LeRC, MSFC)
• Aeronautics
- Supporting
• Fire resistant materials - focus on fire resistant polymers and anti-misting fuels,
(Principal responsibility: ARC; supporting responsibility:JSC)
• Propulsion systems - focus on hydrogen enrichment of piston engine fuels and
reducing oxides of nitrogen via unconventional combustor design. (Principal responsibil-
ity: LeRC; supporting responsibilities: DFRC, LaRC)
• Fundamental aerodynamics - focus on fundamental fluid mechanics, non-linear
wave interactions. (Principal responsibilities: ARC, LaRO, supporting responsibility: DFRC)
• Aviation safety- focus on wake vortex marking techniques. (Supporting responsi-
bilities: ARC, DFRC, LaRC, LeRC, MSFC, WFC)
[93] • Tracking and Data Acquisition
- Principal
• Tracking and data acquisition support operations- planning and conducting track-
ing, command, and data acquisition support for planetary spacecraft and radio science.
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• Tracking and data acquisition systems -planning, development, and implementa-
tion of network systems and facilities for planetary spacecraft and radio science.
[24] JOHNSON SPACE CENTER
Special Capabilities
• Areas of Technical Excellence
• Biotechnology and space medicine
• Extraterrestrial materials analysis
• Space flight mechanics - manned vehicles
• Data systems and analysis
• Sensors and instrument systems
• Space flight systems - manned vehicles
• Flight crew training and mission simulation
• Mission operations - manned vehicles
• Technical project management
• Facilities of Superior Merit
• Space Environment Simulation Laboratories
• Docking Test Facility
• Simulation and Training Facility
• Mockup and Integration Laboratory
• Mapping Sciences Laboratory
• Geology and Geochemistry Laboratory
• Test and Evaluation Laboratories for All Major Spacecraft Systems and Subsystems
• Earth Resources Laboratory (Slidell, LA)
• Mission Control Center
• Lunar Curatorial Facility
[25] JOHNSON SPACE CENTER
PROGRAM AREAS:
Space Transportation
Space Science and Exploration Applications
Aeronautics
Space Research and Technology
Principal and Supporting Roles
• Space Transportation
- Principal
• Manned vehicles - development of manned space vehicles and
- Shuttle - development of the orbiter and lead Center for management of the
Shuttle system.
- Advanced missions - focus is on space station, advanced transportation systems
and construction of a satellite space power station-definition activities (MSFC and JSC
have co-equal roles through definition, development responsibilities are notyet assigned).
- Environmental and crew support systems -develop and demonstrate EC/LSS and
EVA systems suitable for the space transportation systems and other advanced needs.
-Advanced developments - development of prototypes, long lead time systems, and
new procedures and software for advanced systems.
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• Operations - operational planning, crew selection and training, space transporta-
tion system flight control, experiment/payload flight control for Spacelab and STS utiliza-
tion planning/payload accommodation studies.
• STS sustaining engineering- providing sustaining engineering and logistical sup-
port for STS hardware. Includes Shuttle configuration management, Shuttle sustaining
engineering and orbiter operational procurement. (To be phased over to KSC at a future
point, yet to be identified.)
[26] • Space Science and Exploration
- Principal
• Lunar and planetary geosciences - developing and maintaining the technical dis-
cipline base for lunar/planetary geosciences and extraterrestrial sample handling tech-
niques.
• Space medicine - defining and developing in-flight biomedical experiments to
assess human physiological response to space flight environments. (Supporting responsi-
bility': ARC)
• Spacelab bioresearch - development of Spacelab life science research capability
through Common Operating Research Equipment development. (Supporting responsi-
bility: ARC)
- Supporting
• Physics and astronomy - phase out by FY 79 of all science activity including pay-
load definition activity.
• Upper atmospheric research- phase out by FY 79 of modeling and measurement
activities.
• Applications
- Principal
• Earth resources - provide a discipline base for earth resources applications in-
cluding airborne instrumentation research, data interpretative techniques, and space-based
flight sensors.
• Technology transfer
-Application systems verification tests -conducting interagency operational tests to
demonstrate atttomated natural resources inventory systems. Current emphasis includes
tile l,arge Area Crop Inventory Experiment and the Louisiana Environmental Informa-
tion System.
- Specialized applications tasks - drawing on unique capabilities associated with
other roles to meet discrete needs. Current emphasis involves life sciences space process-
ing.
[27] - Technology utilization - conducting projects to establish applicability of NASA
technology in health care, participate in technology transfer to industry, identify and re-
port new technology, and document results of secondary applications of NASA technol-
ogy.
- Supporting
• Energy technology- complete assigned energy efficient utility systems program.
(Principal responsibility: LeRC; supporting responsibilities: ARC, JPL, MSFC)
• Aeronautics
- Supporting
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• Fire resistant materials- performing evaluation tests of fire resistant materials for
use in aircraft. (Principal responsibility: ARC; supporting responsibility: JPL)
• Space Research and Technology
- Principal
• Technology experiments in space - management of Orbiter Experiments pro-
gram. Definition and development of experiments in areas consistent with JSC's other
Space Research and Technology roles. (Principal responsibilities: JSC, LaRC; supporting
responsibilities: ARC, DFRC, GSFC,JPL, LeRC, MSFC)
• Medical reJearch - establishing human baseline data and developing counter-
measures to solve space medicine problems.
• Food systems technology - developing nutritional requirements and food pro-
cessing systems in support of human space flight.
[28] - Supporting
• Information _tems technology - contributing to technical discipline base, with
focus on advanced software for manned spacecraft data systems. (Principal responsibility:
GSFC; supporting responsibilities: JPL, LaRC)
[29] KENNEDY SPACE CENTER
Special Capabilities
Areas of Technical Excellence
• Flight systems testing
• Facility and equipment operations
• Launch operations
• Technical management
Facilities of Superior Merit
• Launch Complexes
• Operations and Checkout Facilities
• Central Instrumentation Facility
• Fluid Test Area
• Landing Strip for Shuttle
[30] KENNEDY SPACE CENTER
PROGRAM AREAS:
Space Transportation
Applications
Principal and Supporting Roles
• Space Transportation
- Principal
• Launch systems development - provide launch systems support for all Agency
flight programs.
• Unnumned launch operations - includes launch preparations and checkout for
current inventory of launch vehicles.
• STS ground operations - includes launch operations, STS turnaround, Levels I
and II integration, Spacelab Level III integration, integrated logistics and transportation
and post-landing operations, and flight line medical and biomedical support.
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* STS sustaining engineering - includes configuration management, operational
hardware accommodations and mods. (This responsibility will be phased over fromJSC at
a future point, yet to be identified.)
• Applications
- Principal
• Technology transfer
- Regional applications transfer - remote sensing applications involving studies of
thermal pollution and methods of sensing crop freeze exposure over large areas.
- Specialized applications tasks - support to NSTL and studies of changes in re-
quirements, procedures and techniques for processing space applications type payloads
for Spacelab.
- Technology utilization - conducting projects to establish applicability of NASA
technology in public safety and other fields, participate [31] in technology transfer to
industry, identify and report new technology, and document results of secondary applica-
tions of NASA technology.
- Supporting
• Bicentennial exhibition - support major science and technology exhibition of
national scope in conjunction with Bicentennial celebration.
[32] LANGLEY RESEARCH CENTER
Special Capabilities
• Areas of Technical Excellence
• Structures and aerostructural dynamics
• Flight mechanics and configurations
• Flight stability, control, and performance
• Sensors and instrument systems
• Avionics
• Flight acoustics
• Aerothermodynamics
• Technical project management
• Facilities of Superior Merit
• 8 ft. Transonic Pressure Tunnel
• Transonic Dynamics Tunnel
• 16 ft. Transonic Tunnel
• V/STOL Tunnel
• Unitary Wind Tunnel
• 8 ft. High Temperatures Structures Tunnel
• Fatigue Laboratory
• Aircraft Noise Reduction Facility
• Scramjet Test Facility
• Real Gas/Viscous Effects Entry Simulation Facilities
• Differential Maneuvering Simulator
[33] LANGLEY RESEARCH CENTER
PROGRAM AREAS:
Aeronautics
Space Research and Technology
Applications
Space Transportation
Space Science and Exploration
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Principal and Supporting Roles
• Aeronautics
Principal
* Long-haul aircraft technology - developing a technology base for improving
long-haul aircraft as cost effective, safe and environmentally compatible transportation
modalities.
• General aviation aircraft technology- developing and maintaining an engineer-
ing technology base related to improving general aviation aircraft.
• Acoustics and noise reduction - conducting research and development of tech-
nology related to reducing aircraft noise.
• Aircraft structures - development of technology base for facilitating structural
advances.
• Helicopter technology'- developing a technology base for improving efficiency
and flexibility for both civil and military use.
• Fundamental aerodynamics - advancing the general state-of-the-art, both theo-
retical and experimental.
- Supporting
• Avionics technology- developing a technology base related to improving avionics.
• Computational fluid mechanics - contributing to technology base, with emphasis
on the prediction of aerodynamic characteristics of 3-D aerodynamic configurations. (Prin-
cipal responsibility: ARC)
[34] * Propulsion systems - contributing to technology base of air breathing pro-
pulsion systems by advancing the state-of-the-art hypersonic propulsion. (Principal respon-
sibility: LeRC; supporting responsibilities: DFRC,JPL)
• Remotely piloted vehicle research - contributing to the technology base of highly
maneuvering aircraft through analytical studies, experimental studies in wind tunnels and
test evaluations on the differential maneuvering simulator. (Principal responsibility: DFRC)
• Aviation safety- contributing to safety advances with focus on wake vortex mini-
mization. (Supporting responsibilities: ARC, DFRC, JPL, LeRC, MSFC, WFC)
• Aviation systems studies - with focus on foreign technology assessment. (Shared
support responsibility with ARC)
• Military support - supporting military aviation advances through work for DOD.
(ARC, DFRC and LeRC also provide military aeronautics support.)
• Wind tunnel support - provision of wind tunnel support to industry and other
government agencies. (Other Centers having unique or outstanding facilities may provide
similar support.)
• Space Research and Technology
- Principal
• Space vehicle structures and materials - developing technology base to facilitate
advances.
• Space vehicle configurations technology- developing technology base related to
advanced configuration including advanced space transportation concepts.
• Technology experiments in space - development and management of the Long
Duration Exposure Facility and Advanced Technology Laboratory. Definition and devel-
opment of experiments in areas consistent with LaRC's other Space Research and Tech-
nology roles.
* Under study
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[35] • Sensor and data acquisition technology - contributing to the technology
base of sensors and devices. (Supporting responsibilities: GSFC,JPL, MSFC)
- Supporting
• Guidance and control technology- contributing to technology base, with focus on
multi-purpose stabilization systems. (Principal responsibility:JPL; supporting responsibili-
ties: GSFC, MSFC)
• Information systems technology - contributing to technology base, with focus on
solid state data storage. (Principal responsibility: GSFC; supporting responsibilities: JPL,
JSC)
• Fundamental research - focus on high density plasma phenomena. (Supporting
responsibilities: ARC, JPL, LeRC)
• Planetary entry technology" - provide planetary and earth entry aerothermody-
namics experimental and analytical data. (Principal responsibility: ARC)
• Shuttle technology - Shuttle vehicle technolo D, development and ground facility
testing in the areas of thermal protection systems, dynamics and aeroelasticity. (Shared
supporting role with ARC)
• Applications
- Principal
• Environmental quality monitoring technology - developing improved techniques
for environmental monitoring. Includes maintenance of discipline base, experiment de-
velopment/management, data analysis and investigator management and specialized
ground/aircraft investigations. Also includes development of Shuttle payloads related to
environmental monitoring.
• Technology transfer
- Specialized applications tasks - drawing on unique competence related to other
roles to perform discrete tasks. Current emphasis [36] involves earth resources and space
processing studies.
- Technology utilization - conducting projects to establish applicability of NASA
technology in environmental fields, participate in technology transfer to industry, identify
and report new technology, and document results of secondary applications of NASA tech-
nology.
Supporting
• Weather and climate - contributing to discipline base. Emphasis on earth radia-
tion budget. (Principal responsibility: GSFC; supporting responsibility: JPL)
• Earth and ocean dynamics - contributing to discipline base. Emphasis on wave
modeling and ocean sensor experiments. (Principal responsibilities: GSFC, JPL)
• Space Transportation
- Supporting
• Launch vehicle development - development and procurement for science/appli-
cations missions, includes scout and meteorological sounding rockets. (Principal respon-
sibilities: GSFC, LeRC)
• Space Science and Exploration
- Principal
* Under study
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• Viking - completion of the Viking project including extended Viking mission
management.
- Supporting
• Physics and astronomy- phase out of all physics and astronomy science and space-
craft development management.
• Upper atmospheric research - conduct stratospheric emissions research relative
to Shuttle operations.
* Planetary/lunar science - phase out of all activities.
[37] LEWIS RESEARCH CENTER
Areas of Technical Excellence
• Acoustics
• Materials
• Space propulsion systems
• Energy processes and systems
• Internal flow dynamics
• Heat transfer
• Instrument and control systems
• Technical project management
Facilities of Superior Merit
• Engine Research Building
• Turbine Combustor Facility
• Engine Fan and Jet Noise Facility
• Zero Gravity Facility
• Icing Research Tunnel
d 8 x 6 and 10 x 10 ft. Wind Tunnels
[38] LEWIS RESEARCH CENTER
PROGRAM AREAS:
Aeronautics
Space Transportation
Space Research and Technology
Applications
Space Science and Exploration
Principal and Supporting Roles
• Aeronautics
- Principal
* Propulsion systems - development of advanced aeronautical propulsion systems
(except hypersonic). Focus on efficiency and environmental compatibility.
- Suppordng
• Wind tunnel support - testing and facility operations support to DOD, other gov-
ernment agencies and industry. (Other Centers having unique or outstanding facilities
may provide similar support.)
• Aviation safety- contributing to advances, with focus on lighming hazards, rotor
burst protection and high-energy brakes. (Supporting responsibilities: ARC, DFRC, JPL,
LaRC, MSFC, WFC)
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• Acoustics and noise reduction- focus on internal engine noise reduction. (Princi-
pal responsibility: LaRC; supporting responsibilities: ARC, DFRC)
• Military support - provision of propulsion systems technology support to DOD.
(ARC, DFRC and LaRC also provide military aeronautics support.)
• Space Transportation
- Principal
• Centaur - development and procurement of Centaur launch vehicle system.
[39] • Space Research and Technology
- Principal
• Space propulsion systems technology - development and maintenance of space
propulsion systems technology base.
• Space energy processes and systems technology - development and maintenance
of technology base.
- Supporting
• Fundamental research - contributing to basic knowledge of metals and ceramics
at atomic/molecular level. (Supporting responsibilities: ARC,JPL, LaRC)
• Technology experiments in space - definition and development of experiments
in areas consistent with LeRC's other Space Research and Technology roles. (Principal
responsibilities: JSC, LaRC; supporting responsibilities: ARC, DFRC, GSFC, JPL, MSFC)
• Applications
- Principal
• Energy technology- conducting energy related R&D, primarily on a reimbursable
basis, with broad emphasis on solar, gas turbine, ground propulsion and other appropriate
terrestrial energy systems.
• Technology transfer
- Application systems verification tests - demonstrate through exploratory tests the
use of remote sensing techniques to improve current operational techniques. Current
emphasis is on the use of satellite data to enhance ocean navigation, particularly shipping
operations in Arctic areas.
[40] - Regional applications transfer - utilizing remote sensing techniques to moni-
tor pollution, water quality, and land reclamation potential in cooperation with various
neighboring governments.
- Technology utilization - conducting projects to establish applicability of NASA
technology in public service activities, participate in technology transfer to industry, iden-
tify and report new technology, and document results of secondary applications of NASA
technology.
- Supporting
• Communications - development of high-power communications technology ori-
ented toward satellite-based applications. Includes experiment development and manage-
ment. (Principal responsibility: GSFC)
• Space Science and Exploration
- Supporting
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• Upper atmospheric research - contributing to discipline base, with emphasis on
support of Global Atmospheric Sampling Program. (Principal responsibilities: GSFC, JPL;
supporting responsibilities: ARC, LaRC)
[41 ] MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
Special Capabilities
• Areas of Technical Excellence
• Launch vehicle flight mechanics and control
• Structures and aerostructural dynamics
• Materials
• Propulsion systems
• Space vehicle flight systems
• Data systems and analysis
• Technical project management
• Facilities of Superior Merit
• Neutral Buoyancy Facility
• X-Ray Telescope Facility
• Acoustic Model Engineering Test Facility
• External Tank Structural Test Facility
• Dynamics Test Facility
• Solid Rocket Booster Structural Test Facility
• Structures and Materials Laboratory
[42] MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
PROGRAM AREAS:
Space Transportation
Space Science and Exploration
Applications
Space Research and Technology
Aeronautics
Principal and Supporting Roles
• Space Transportation
- Principal
• Propulsion systems - design, development and procurement of major propul-
sion-oriented systems and subsystems. Current focus on Shuttle-related systems, including
Shuttle main engine, solid rocket booster, external tanks and interim upper stage in coop-
eration with the Air Force. Advanced development effort includes TUG and solar electric
propulsion systems.
• Manned vehicle - design, development and procurement of manned vehicle sys-
tems on "as assigned" basis.
- Spacelab - focus on systems engineering management, development interface with
European Space Agency and procurement.
- Advanced missions - focus is on space station, advanced transportation systems
and construction of a satellite space power station -definition activities (MSFC and JSC
have co-equal roles through definition; development responsibilities are notyet assigned).
- Advanced development - technology advances focused on advanced missions iden-
tified above within those disciplines assigned. Termination and transfer of all biotechnol-
ogy efforts.
• STS sustaining engineering- providing sustaining engineering for assigned STS
hardware.
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[43] • Space Science and Exploration
- Principal
• Spacelab mission management- management of Spacelab I and II missions.
• Specialized automated spacecraft - design and development of large, complex
and/or specialized automated spacecraft as assigned. Current focus on spacecraft and
systems/experiment integration for STS, HEAO, and Gravity Probe B spacecraft develop-
ment. (Principal responsibility: GSFC; alternate responsibility: JPL)
Supporting
* Physics and astronomy science - phase out by FY79 of science discipline base with
retention of a minimal science capability to fulfill such scientific interfaces as are required
to support space science mission and spacecraft management roles.
• Applications
- Principal
• Space processing - developing space processing discipline base, developing and
managing space processing experiments for Spacelab.
• Data management - development of applications oriented data management dis-
cipline base. Contributing overall data management systems expertise in support of ad-
vanced high data rate systems development.
• Technology transfer
- Regional applications transfer - transfer of aerospace technology to State and
local agencies in the Southeastern United States with particular emphasis on applications
of earth resources data from satellites.
- Specialized applications tasks - drawing on capability related to other roles pro-
vides [44] discrete support in such as is related to laser applications in earth and ocean
dynamics.
- Technology utilization - conducting projects to establish applicability of NASA
technology in transportation, manufacturing, and other fields; participate in technology
transfer to industry; identify and report new technology; and document results of second-
ary applications of NASA technology.
- Supporting
• Spacelab payload definition - definition of requirements for an Atmospheric Cloud
Physics Laboratory for flight as a partial payload of the Spacelab. (Principal responsibility:
GSFC; supporting responsibilities: JPL, LeRC)
• Energy technology - conducting energy related systems studies for reimbursable
activity with primary focus on solar heating and cooling and advanced coal extraction
technology. (Principal responsibility: LeRC; supporting responsibilities: ARC, JPL, JSC)
• Space Research and Technology
- Principal
• Space vehicle structures and materials - contributing to large complex space ve-
hicle structures and materials technology base. (Shared responsibility with LaRC)
- Supporting
• Space propulsion systems technology- contributing to space propulsion systems
technology base, with focus on launch vehicle propulsion, solar electric propulsion, sys-
tem performance and technology assessment, and contamination control. (Principal re-
sponsibility: LeRC; supporting responsibility: JPL)
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• Space vehicle configuration technology- contributing to technology base for ad-
vanced space vehicle configuration. (Principal responsibility: LaRC; supporting responsi-
bility: DFRC)
[45] * Guidance and control technology- contributing to guidance and control
technology base. Focus on inertial components. (Principal responsibility: fPL; supporting
responsibilities: GSFC, LaRC)
• Sensor and data acquisition technology- contributing to fundamental electronics
technology base, with focus on long-life reliable circuits. (Principal responsibility: LaRC;
supporting responsibilities: GSFC, JPL)
• Information systems technology- contributing to technology base, with focus on
high capacity data systems for applications use. (Principal responsibility: GSF_ supporting
responsibilities: JPL, JSC, LaRC)
• Technology experiments in space - definition and development of experiments
in areas consistent with MSFC's other Space Research and Technology roles. (Principal
responsibilities: JSC, LaRC; supporting responsibilities: ARC, DFRC, GSFC, JPL, LeRC)
• Aeronautics
- Supporting
• Aviation safety - contributing to advances in aviation safety through improved
understanding of turbulence phenomena. (Supporting responsibilities: ARC, DFRC, JPL,
LaRC, LeRC, WFC)
[46] WALLOPS FLIGHT CENTER
Special Capabilities
* Areas of Technical Excellence
• Operations support
• Tracking and data acquisition
• Small project management
• Facilities of Superior Merit
• Sounding Rocket Range
• World-Wide Mobile Launch Tracking and Telemetry Capability
• Research Airport
[47] WALLOPS FLIGHT CENTER
PROGRAM AREAS:
Space Science and Exploration
Applications
Aeronautics
Tracking and Data Acquisition'
Principal and Supporting Roles
• Space Science and Exploration
Principal
• Sounding rocket development, procurement, and operations - developing and
procuring sounding rockets and carrying out all phases of operations, from mission/flight
planning to landing and recovery. Payload carrier development, development and man-
agement of experiments, experiment management support to other institutions, launch
operations and tracking and data acquisition are included. (Most WFC sounding rocket
* Included within other program areas
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activitiesinvolvelowerperformancev hiclesupportsystems.MostactivitiesinvoMnghigher
performancesystemsareassignedtoGSFC.)
• Balloonprogram- Managing,Monitoring,scheduling,andtechnicalnalysisof
OSSfundedballoonactivitiesconductedbyotheragencies(NRLandNSFatthepresent
time).
• Applications
- Principal
• Technology transfer
- Regional applications transfer - identify, demonstrate and evaluate specific practi-
cal applications of remote sensing technology with emphasis on those of particular con-
cern to the Chesapeake Bay regional resource managers.
[48] - Specialized applications tasks - undertaking desirable tasks in areas related
to other roles. Current emphasis includes pollution monitoring and atmospheric mea-
surement techniques.
- Technology utilization - identify and report new technology, participate in
technology transfer to public service and private organizations, and docmnent results of
secondary' applications of NASA technology.
- Supporting
• Sounding rocket payload carrier development and experiment management sup-
port- provided in the following applications disciplines:
-Weather and climate - (Principal responsibility: GSFC; supporting responsibilities:
JPL, LaRC)
- Space processing - (Principal responsibility,: MSFC)
- Earth and ocean dynamics - (Principal responsibilities: GSFC, JPL; supporting re-
sponsibility: LaRC)
• Aeronautics
- Supporting
• Aviation safety- contributing to advances in aviation operations through improved
instrumentation and procedures in critical phases such as approach and landing. (Sup-
porting responsibilities: ARC, DFRC, LaRC, LeRC, MSFC, JPL)
Document IV-15
Document title: James C. Fletcher, Administrator, NASA, Memorandum to Bob Frosch,
"Problems and Opportunities at NASA," May 9, 1977.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA Headquar-
ters, Washington, D.C.
In the aftermath of the completion of the lunar landing phase of the Apollo pro-
gram in December 1972, NASA as a post-Apollo, transitional institution was very much in
an uncertain and potentially unstable situation. In this memorandum,James Fletcher, who
headed NASA from May 1971 to March 1977, reflects for his successor Robert Frosch on
the major institutional and programmatic issues facing the agency. Of particular interest
are Fletcher's observations on keeping the NASA institutional base intact or at least ensur-
ing a flow of new people into the agency. The "Al" referred to by Dr. Fletcher is Alan
Lovelace, NASA Deputy Administrator under Frosch. The project called LACIE (Large
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Area Crop Inventory Experiment) was an Earth observation project using Landsat satel-
lites. The Jupiter Orbiter Project (JOP) was later renamed Galileo.
[1] May 9, 1977
(Dictated May 6)
SUBJECT: Problems and Opportunities at NASA
Continuing our discussion in writing on some of the things that are less sensitive, let
me raise some issues not in any particular order but simply for the record. Please feel free
to share these with AI if you feel you would like to do so. He is already aware of most of
them.
1. Applications Program. In my view, the Applications Program is the "wave of the
future" as far as NASA's public image is concerned. It is the most popular program (other
than aeronautics) in the Congress and as you begin to visit with community leaders, you
will understand it is clearly the most popular program with them as well. The Application
Program consists mainly of communications satellites, weather satellites, LACIE, and earth-
quake research. There are problems in each of these areas:
a. Communication Satellites. We temporarily phased out of this program in 1973 due
to a severe budget cut. At the time, it seemed like industry was picking it up most rapidly
and was something they could do without much help from NASA. I had serious misgivings
when this decision was made since I realized that it was the part of the Applications Pro-
gram which had the greatest public visibility and was the most obvious example of transfer
to industry. We were able to keep a skeleton group aboard to support OTP and FCC and,
to a limited extent, the existing ATS/CTS satellites. However, at this point in time, I be-
lieve we need to get back into the business one way or another. The search and rescue
satellite was a small attempt in this direction. Also, the work we are doing with NOAA and
the Coast Guard to monitor fishing vessels within the 200-mile limit (they install the tran-
sponders) is also a small step in that direction. The National Academy study prepared
under the chairmanship of [2] Bill Davenport was a good one, and I think it is time we
started following along the tracks that they recommended. I'm a/raid, however, that OMB
is going to give us problems.
b. Weather Satellites. To many, weather satellites are mostly talk and not much show.
I had been at NASA four years before I realized that NOAA was not using weather satellites
at all in their weather forecasting but rather used them as backup for their forecasters and
occasionally for monitoring severe storms such as tornadoes and hurricanes. Weather sat-
ellites, however, have been used extensively by the Navy and by the Air Force for overseas
forecasting, I think very effectively, and just recently NOAA's Numerical Weather Service
in Suitland has begun making global weather forecasts for overseas construction and a
variety of military uses.
The real potential, however, of weather satellites lies in the possibility of 5-day (possi-
bly up to 2-week) forecasts and it has only been clear in the last year or two what the
technical problems really are in making such forecasts. Bob Cooper is very much aware of
the problem, as is BobJastrow of GISS, so I won't try to elaborate further on it except to say
that what is really needed is some broad-gauge scientific talent to be involved rather than
the specialized, narrow scope meteorologists who have been working the problem at NOAA
(and for that matter at NASA also).
c. LACIE. The LACIE program is not going well and OMB is very much aware of this.
If this program fails, it is going to reflect on NASA's credibility in the Applications area.
What is needed here also is a new approach to the problem either organizationally or by
using people of different technical background. The people now involved in the program
at Houston are not the most talented, and they have been doing the same thing for too
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manyears.It hasnothadhigh-levelattentionatHoustonbecause,ofcourse,theShuttle
istheirmainfuture.It maybethattheprogramcanbehandledbetterbysimplyshifting
thefocusfromHoustontoGoddard.(I recommendedthistwo),earsagobutgotlessthan
anenthusiasticreceptionfromtheOfficeofApplications.)[3] d.EarthquakeResearch.I'mafraidwehavenoprograminearthquaker search,
butwewereabletogetfundsfromtheCongressandOMBbylabelingsomeofour"tec-
tonicplatemotion"investigationsimproperly.AsnearasI cantell,whatwearedoingis
scientificresearchonlyandthisdoesnotrelatedirectlytopredictingearthquakes,although
admittedlyit mightaddtothescientificbaseonwhichfutureearthquakepredictiontech-
niquesmightbepredicated.
TherearealotofopportunitiesinApplicationsthatwemaybemissingwhichmayor
maynotberelatedirectlytotheprogramsinwhichwearenowengaged.Electronicmail,
wiredsuburbs,theCooper/AugensteinGlobalInformationSystemand,ofcourse,alead-
ershipresponsibilityfoxanationalclimateprogramareallthingsthatAIisawarewecould
moveinto;however,it doestakeaggressiveleadershiptopursuetheseopportunities.We
don'thavethatin theApplications Office itself. In fact, to ptusue these new programs, it
might be wisest to set up a separate office outside of Applications and leave the marketing
of current programs (a, b, c, and d above) to the Applications Office.
In addition to opportunities and problems, we have personnel problems in the Of-
fice of Applications, which I'd be glad to discuss with you sometime.
2. The MSFC Institutional Problem. As I indicated to you in our discussion, NASA
has an overall institutional problem which arises from the fact that we had to trim out civil
service staff by almost a factor of two since its peak during the Apollo days. This has caused
a number of problems that go with aging institutions generally, but our problems were
accelerated because of the rapid RIFing that went on in the late 60's and early 70's. We still
have a large number of competent people at NASA, but we are not bringing in new blood
either at the younger age group or at the middle age level. There are three principal
reasons for this. One is that some of the glamour has worn off from the Apollo days;
second, there are other interesting fields in which scientists and engineers can become
involved (in my judgment none of them compete with [4] what goes on at NASA but, of
course, I'm prejudiced); and, third, new employees feel insecure knowing that the last
ones hired are usually the first to leave in case of a RIE This would be a dilemma for any
agency in such a situation and even though we try diligently to protect our best people, we
are still in danger of approaching mediocrity.
This is especially severe at Marshall where some of the largest cuts were made. Some
time in the 1980-81 period, we face severe manpower cuts at this Center. An obvious solu-
tion would be to close the Center unless some new program came along that would keep
the staff fully occupied. Because of the urgent need for the talent that Marshall has for the
Space Shuttle development, we have tried to put new programs there (such as space tele-
scope, HEAO, etc.) and have allowed them to do a considerable amount of in-house work
on the Shuttle to make good use of their personnel. Closing Marshall has been on OMB's
agenda ever since I came to NASA, ahhough fi'om time+to-time they have also suggested
JPL, :Mnes, and Lewis. We have always resisted this very strongly on the basis that (a) the
initial cost of replacing the facility would be very high, and (b) we couldn't afford to risk
the Space Shuttle program. The real reason, however, is that there is no guarantee that by
closing a Center we would be allowed to build back to the institutional base we had before
the closing, and we might find ourselves in the same RIF situation but be one Center
smaller. The only possible solution that I can see is to get a commitment from the Presi-
dent himself (the OMB Director's commitment can always be overturned) that if we do
close the Center we will be allowed to huild back substantially in order to bring in new
personnel. Most people in Headquarters would laugh at this suggestion but I think that it
is one that ought to be considered early on in your tenure. My own bias, of course, would
be to try to find work to put into MSFC and use the Center as a national resource, which it
indeed is, but so far efforts along these lines have not been successful.
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3. Space Science Program. As you have already undoubtedly picked up, we are in a
dilemma on space science at NASA because it seems to be strongly supported by the White
House (President, Science Adviser, OMB, etc.) but poorly supported by the Congress.
Congress seems to go for the Applications [5] Program, the Aeronautics Program, and the
so-called "space spectaculars" such as Apollo, Skylab, ASTP, Viking, etc. Space solar power
is an excellent example of such a spectacular and is a case in point. Apparently the reason
for this dilemma is that OMB feels the Applications Program should more properly be left
to the user agencies or to industry, which are always slow to support new satellite pro-
grams, whereas, Congress, especially the Space Committees, doesn't care about the user
agencies because that's not their responsibility. In science, however, we have a clear man-
date since we are our own user but somehow Congress recognizes that science of any kind
is not popular among the general public (ask Herb Rowe for polls on that subject) and
although low-profile science can get through Congress fairly easily, large bites such as the
space telescope, JOP and Viking Follow-on (perhaps) seem to have difficult times. I have
no pat solution for this dilemma except to continue to work the problem as we have been
doing.
4. Senate Power Base. I used to raise my eyebrows when Jim Webb talked about a
"power base" in Congress. Having just come from academia, this seemed a crude way of
operating; however, after being here six years, I'm beginning to see what he meant. In the
Senate especially, but to some degree also in the House, there are individuals who seem to
sway the rest of the body. In the House this is less clear but certainly Tip O'Neill, George
Mahon and to a lesser extent, Jim Wright, could be put into this category. In past years,
Wilbur Mills and Eddie Hebert served that function, but I'm not sure their successors have
quite moved into such strong positions.
Incidentally, Tiger Teague has a great deal of respect in the House, and when he is
willing and able to acknowledge this respect, he can be very helpful; however, in recent
years his health has been a definite handicap and this is one of our problems at the mo-
ment in the House Appropriations Subcommittee. Tiger says he is not going to run again,
but when he gets his lightweight leg and his spirits improve, I wouldn't bet against his
running.
In the Senate, however, the situation has changed drastically. When I first heard that
Senator Proxmire was going to be [6] Chairman of our Appropriations Subcommittee, it
looked like "the end of the world" until we began to work the problem. It began to be clear
that the ex officio votes on the Proxmire Subcommittee by the Senate Space Committee
Chairman and Majority Leader were enough to swing the rest with no problem at all. The
votes typically were 8 or 9 to 1, with Senator Proxmire's being the only negative vote. The
loss of Senator Moss was considerable even though he did not have the leverage that some
of the other Senators had. He was the Chairman of the Democratic Caucus and the #3
democrat in the Senate and on occasion could swing a fair number of votes. Senator
Goldwater, of course, was the undisputed conservative leader in the Senate and conse-
quently both sides of the house could be swayed by him. So it was not only the loss of
Senator Moss but the loss of those ex officio votes that caused us to lose leverage in the
Senate. Senator Stevenson is just learning the business but I think in time he, along with
his strong staff members, should be great support especially if they are able to involve
Senator Magnuson in helping him to influence some of their colleagues. Meanwhile, I'm
afraid we are forced into falling back on the Proxmire Subcommittee itself.
Although we have strong support in Senator Stennis and, I believe, Senator Sasser on
the Democratic side and I think all four on the Republican side, this is not enough to be
considered strong support in the sense of adding in programs that the House may have
taken out. This latter situation occurred many times in the past through the help of Sena-
tors Moss and Goldwater, but this year we simply can't count on it. On the other hand, I
think the support is strong enough so that they are not likely to make further cuts.
The one redeeming feature in the Senate reorganization is the position of Senator
Cranston as Majority Whip. He is a strong space supporter in his own right but, being a
California Senator, has vested interests as well. Senator McClellan also has a great deal of
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influence as does Senator Stennis but those are primarily on the conservative side of the
House and the number of conservative democrats is becoming fewer each year. Senator
Jackson, of course, [7] is powerful as in earlier years but so far has not had any impact on
NASA's programs. Senator Cannon has moved up in stature since his recent reelection,
ha_ing been one of the few western democratic Senators to be returned to the Senate. I
had hoped that he would end up in one way or another as Chairman of one of our commit-
tees but that was not to be. I think becoming better acquainted with Senator Cannon can
be a great help both by influencing votes in the Appropriations Committee and, of course,
in the Commerce Committee itself.
These are all things that must be tracked very carethlly, and l'm aftaid roles are
changing so rapidly that I can only alert you to the problems. Pete Crow and.Joe Allen, I
think, understand the situation pretty well and should be able to help make the appropri-
ate contacts. Judy Cole, if she stays, is excellent on the G-2 and has a very good working
relationship with the staff of the Senate Budget Committee. Although run by Senator
Muskie, it is not yet clear how much impact it will have.
5. Aeronautics. I won't dwell on this subject since AI Lovelace is very familiar with the
problem, but simply mention that we need to revive the fundamental work tbat the old
NACA used to do. (The Aeronautical Centers should be at least as good as NRL is to the
Na_3,, but so far not a single member of the NASA organization has been elected to the
National Academy of Science as has Herb Friedman of NRL.) It is not clear how to do this
but, of course, it is related to the institutional problem of bringing in stronger scientific
and creative new talent.
6. The Shuttle Launch Phase. Undoubtedly A1 must have mentioned to you that nay
biggest concern on the Shuttle at the moment (aside from operational costs) is the techni-
cal difficulties involved in the launch phase. As you know, Houston is the lead Center for
Shuttle development and performed very well on the Apollo spacecraft and the LM, and
also carrying out operations in space. They had very little to do with the development of
the Saturn launch vehicle, which was done out of Huntsville. Wernher yon Braun and the
people [8] he brought with him both from Germany and from within the United States
had an in-house capability second to none in the world." As a result, if you look back in the
records, you will find very few difficulties with the Saturn itself and, in fact, the extra
weight-carrying margin of the Saturn saved the Apollo program more than once. Inciden-
tally, neither George Low nor John Yardley has had this launch vehicle background, and so
with the loss of Rocco Petrone, we have never really had anybody in Headquarters who had
much experience in this area.
I guess the question is, why do I consider this different from space problems gener-
ally? It comes down to something like the following: With the spacecraft itself during its
flight in space and its landing and its attitude control system and its life support systems,
etc., we had the capability to build highly redundant systems. So if we ran into a problem,
there was usually time to find a '_orkaround" and, in fact, in every case except the fire on
the ground, we managed a workaround good enough to bring the astronauts back. On the
other hand, look at all of the things that went wrong during the Apollo/Skylab series. If we
hadn't had this redundancy, we would have lost essentially every mission. In the case of the
booster, however, there was no time for any significant workarounds on the ground. There
is some redundancy built in but not an excessive amount. Therefore, testing analyses and
engineering intuition have been the backbone of the launch vehicle business from the
days of the V-2. Clearly the combined vehicle consisting of the two solid rockets, the exter-
nal tank, and the Shuttle is the most complicated launch vehicle ever built. My big con-
cern is whether or not analysis and testing on the ground are sufficient to ensure the
reliability of this phase of the flight profile or whether engineering judgment and experi-
ence which were the hallmark of the yon Braun group aren't still necessary for a guaran-
teed success. So far I have discussed this with AI Lovelace and Walt Williams only. Walt, of
'[handwritten note] Korolov played the same role in the U.S.S.R. When he died, the Soviets were not
able to make a single new launch vehicle work.
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course, has had extensive experience with Air Force launch vehicles but again nothing like
the experience of the Huntsville group. [9] Perhaps I'm overly concerned about this prob-
lem, but when you consider the value of the payload even on the first flight and the conse-
quences of a failure, I'd have to put it as one of my high-priority items for the near term.
7. Pet Projects. There are a number of things which I have tried to keep going be-
cause I believed in them, but most had a low level, which you may want to discontinue:
a. Hypersonic Transport. I have always felt, aside from environmental problems, that
it would be a rather straightforward development to build a commercial vehicle for long-
distance travel (say from New York to Delhi or from New York to Bahrein), hut I'm not
sure that the airplane is the best way to do it. I have the uncomfortable feeling that it might
be simpler to remove the energy from a returning space vehicle by means of high-drag
devices such as parachutes, blunt bodies, retrorockets, etc., rather than with wings. This is
heresy at NASA but you must understand that I came up through the rocket route, not the
airplane route. I did, however, go to the trouble of bringing in the parachute people to see
whether indeed parachutes could be built that would allow large transports to be dropped
through the atmosphere in much the same way as the Apollo capsule, and it always seems
to be technically feasible but on the surface more optimal than the Shuttle itself. Needless
to say, I didn't want to emphasize this in the middle of the Shuttle program.
b. Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle. For putting large quantities of payloads in space, it
seems there are better ways of doing this than the Shuttle itself since the missions are all
one way and all you need to recover are pieces of the launch vehicle itself. This can be
done easily with parachutes. We might easily gain a factor of 10 to 1 over the cost per
pound now required by the Shuttle.
e. Solar Sailing. I am sure you remember with some ambivalence Dick Garwin partly
for his abrasive tone but also for his tremendous creativity. In 1972, he strongly urged me
to look into the possibility of using lightweight [ 10] materials to "sail" around the solar
system, It took four years for the NASA "system" to respond. Bruce Murray picked it up
and is now running with it. In my opinion this will be the way we will move out to Mars and
other planets in the future even when we decide to go there with manned missions.
d. Personal Communication Systems. I really do believe that some day we will want to
have person-to-person communications systems, not necessarily for the wristwatch variety
but at least of the pocket calculator variety in which any person can dial any other person
long distance from his car, from the golf course or wherever. This, I think, is a straightfor-
ward use of a high-powered, highly directional stationary satellite, I don't believe cost
tradeoffs of this system have been made, and I'm not sure how much a person would pay
for such a convenience.
e. Technology Transfer. The early studies made on the relationship between high
technology and national productivity were very exciting indeed. The whole problem is not
very well understood by economists and, I do not believe, other people in government.
People seem to equate high technology with new inventions or new products instead of
with productivity, and the picture gets all out of proportion. Paul Kochanowski, a former
Brookings Fellow at NASA, understood the problem very well and I learned what little I
know from him. It does seem to me that the impact on our economy of the technology
such as NASA develops and as portions of DoD develop is absolutely enormous. I there-
fore have encouraged fllrther economic studies of this process but you may wish to discon-
tinue it.
f. Broadening NASA's Responsibility. As AI has probably indicated to you, I've always
felt that NASA's managerial talents as well as some of its technical talents have been under-
utilized, and we ought to move into areas that are now the responsibilities of other agen-
cies. This is a severe bureaucratic problem, and I'm not sure you'll want to get into that but
if you do, the best time to do it [ 11 ] is during a change of Administration, as you well know,
before the bureaucracy becomes firmly entrenched.
8. Public Affairs. During the Apollo days and before, NASA provided an excellent
public information service to the media and, generally speaking, the public was well in-
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formed about the so-called "space spectaculars." At this point in time though we need to
move to a public relations program; that is, an aggressive program to inform the public as
to how their money is being spent and what they get for it. This is a much different prob-
lem and I have asked Bob Newman and Herb Rowe to put together a program plan which
presumably has been done by now but is awaiting guidance. The last session we had brought
out the fact that the focus on this aggressive program ought to be on applications and
spinoffs, but we really hadn't come down to the heart of the matter and that is how to have
one or two simple themes which describe NASA's contributions to the nation. My own
feeling is that we need outside expertise on this one and although we brought in Burson-
Marsteller, a first-rate Chicago outfit, I value the advice of Jim Mortensen of Yonng and
Rubicam much more highly. Jim is a broad, thoughtful person interested in the space
program and is willing to contribute his service freely when he has the time available.
Todd Groo's experience in this area is also helpful. All of these latter are more creative
than Herb and I have indicated to him that I wanted all of these other men to be heavily
involved in any program plans for the future. You may wish to change that.
There are other items that I could mention here and still more that I will think of
before I leave, but I expect I have covered 90 percent of the biggest issues.
James c. Fletcher
Document IV-16
Document title: Task Force for the Study of the Mission of NASA, NASA Advisory Coun-
cil, "Study of the Mission of NASA," October 12, 1983, pp. 1-9.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA Headquar-
ters, Washington, D.C.
Tile NASA Advisory Council and its standing committees are descendants of the
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), which, through its technical com-
mittees, oversaw the research conducted by NACA's Langley, Lewis, and Ames research
laboratories. Lacking the statutory authority of its predecessor, the NASA Advisory Coun-
cil acts as an informal "board of directors" to the NASA administrator. The council's 1983
"Study of the Mission of NASA," chaired by DanielJ. Fink, was a detailed and comprehen-
sive effort to chart a course for the U.S. civil space agency in a changed political and
technical environment. It reviewed in a comprehensive manner the overall mission of the
agency and recommended alterations for its activities for the next 20 to 40 years in both
aeronautics and space. While the task force members said they unanimously agreed with
the elements of the mission statement that emerged, they admitted some disagreement as
to whether the mission area of "Exploration of the Solar System" should be viewed as an
overarching theme to guide the forward technological thrusts of the agency. While some
strongly endorsed this as a central focus for NASA's future space activity, the majority were
concerned that such a specific identification would result in the diminution of the other
important missions. A special area of concern was the space shuttle, and the report recom-
mended that a new NASA organization, with resources "fenced" from those of the rest of
the agency, be established to manage the shuttle program.
t la Study of the Mission of NASA
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A task force of the NASA Advisory Council was authorized by the NASA Administra-
tor in July 1982 to study the long-range missions of NASA and present recommendations
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for the future course and direction of the Agency over a period of the next 20 to 40 years.
The Task Force membership consisted of selected members of the NASA Advisory Coun-
cil, augmented by additional participants representing the requisite areas of expertise.
1. The Mission of NASA
The Task Force recommends this "Mission of NASA" that rests on current statute and
policy and provides a framework for NASA's activities for the next 20 to 40 years.
Mankind has acquired the ability to move within and beyond the confines of the
surface and the atmosphere of Earth, creating apparently limitless opportunities for ben-
eficial human activity. In this regard, NASA has a dual mission--in space and the atmo-
sphere-portions of which are overlapping.
NASA's space mission is to conduct activities on behalf of the people of the United
States in collaboration with other nations, to:
• explore the solar system and study its planetary processes, including, as appropri-
ate, those governing the Earth, for the benefit of humankind,
• pursue a program of fundamental scientific research in space to expand human
knowledge,
• plan and implement space technology programs and research into the use of the
environment of space in order to provide for the continued advance of the national space
capability and its exploitation for public and commercial purposes,
• and, to achieve these ends, create the capability for an expanded human presence
in space and develop and assure the operation of launch and space vehicles.
NASA's mission in aeronautics is to maintain, and augment as appropriate, an aero-
nautics research and technology program which contributes materially to the U.S. leader-
ship in civil and military aviation.
[2] The Task Force believes that it is inevitable that human habitation will eventually
extend beyond the confines of the Earth in many ways and on a scale far larger than is
currently envisioned. Although it may not now be productive to debate the specific nature
or the timing of this most dramatic of all human ventures, it is appropriate to use such a
venture as a distant goal to guide our search for an understanding of the solar system and
to stimulate the further advance of humankind.
2. Key Missions Considered
In arriving at this broad statement of the Mission of NASA, the Task Force consid-
ered a wide range of specific mission areas:
• Exploration of the Solar System, Including the Planet E_rth, for Human Benefit
• Fundamental Space Science
• Space Technology
• Space Applications
• STS Operations
• Aeronautics
• Human Spaceflight Research
• International Relationships.
a. Exploration of the Solar System, Including Planet Earth, for Human Benefit
NASA's mission in space science can be considered in two distinct parts: one is space
science conducted to contribute direcdy to human welfare and national need, and the
other is fundamental space science conducted to expand human knowledge. The first is
currently focused on solar system exploration, including the planet Earth, while the sec-
ond covers the full range of space science fields, from astronomy to space physics.
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NASA'smissioni theexplorationofthesolarsystemitselfcontainstworelatedparts,
whichtogetherprovideamajorobjectiveforthenexthalfcentury.Thefirstinvolvesex-
plorationof thesolarsystemwiththeeventualgoalofutilizingtheresourcesandknowl-
edgeofspaceforhumanbenefit.Thesecondbringsaplanetaryperspectivetoourown
planetandleadstothegoalofunderstandingthoseprocessesinvolvedinglobalsurface
andatmospherechangespeciallyimportanttolivingsystems.
Toaccomplisht islong-rangemission,theTaskForcerecommendsthat:
• TheUnitedStates,incollaborationwithotherinterestednations,vigorouslypur-
sueaprogramofexplorationandunderstandingofthesolarsystemforultimatehuman
benefit.[3] • A moreaggressivepursuitofthetechnologiesofrobotics,teleoperafion,and
machineintelligencebeundertakentomaintainaproperleadandbalancein thedesign
ofNASAprograms.
• NASAacceptaleadershiproleinmajoraspectsofthestudyoftheplanetEarth,in
particularin thoseareaswhichconcernglobalchangesof importancetothesupportof
humanlife.
• Adequate funding be provided for ground-based, laboratory, and theoretical work
as well as for space systems.
• NASA seek a lasting national commitment in order to achieve these goals, which
will require new approaches to project procedures and budgetary policies including steady
funding levels and program continuity.
b. Fundamental Space Science
In fimdamental science, NASA shares a responsibility with the National Science Foun-
dation, with the break in responsibility occurring at the construction of spacecraft and
space instruments. Working relations are generally satisfactory, but policy interactions have
been limited. This division of responsibility has left a gray area of ground-based observa-
tions and theoretical and laboratory work, all essential for realizing the full advantages of
space missions. Problems also exist in the provision of adequate funding to maintain effec-
tiveness in research capabilities built laboriously over decades. The Task Force sees no
simple solutions to these problems, but is convinced that the effort to find solutions must
continne.
The Task Force recommends that:
• Space science must remain a principal part of NASA's mission because research in
space science has become a central element of scientific research in the United States and
the prospects for future maior advances in this field remain bright.
• Adequate and stable levels of funding for ground-based, laboratory, and theoreti-
cal research, a key part of NASA's scientific program, be provided independently of the
fluctuating needs for spacecraft and instrument construction.
• NASA take a lead role in assuring that the activities sponsored by NASA and NSF
are properly coordinated.
[4] c. Space Technology
The Task Force considered whether NASA should support the space technology needs
of other government agencies, both military and civil, and the private sector. A recent
study by the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board of the National Research Council
recommended that NASA's program be redirected to the needs of the broad national
space constituency, and endorsed the concept of a role in space technolo_" analogous to
NASA's traditional role in aeronautics.
720 ORGANIZINGFOREXPLORATION
Thedevelopingcapabilityoconductspacexperimentationorwiththesupport
oftheShuttleprovidesNASAwithauniqueresourceforspaceR&Tandonethatiscritical
tothetechnologyneedsofmanyspaceusers.Aspacestationcouldprovideanevengreater
laboratoryinspace--a"fieldcenter"--thatwouldbetrulyuniquein thisregard.TheTask
ForceconcurswiththeASEBinitsrecommendationthatNASA'smissioni spaceR&Tbe
supportiveoftotalnationalspacerequirements.
TheTaskForcerecommendsthat:
• NASA'smissioninspaceresearchandtechnologybesupportiveof totalnational
requirements,consideringfutureneedsof thecivil,military,andcommercialsectors.In
termscomparabletothoseforNASA'smissioni aeronautics,NASAshouldhavethemis-
sioninspaceR&Tto:
- Fund,direct,andimplementspaceresearch,technology,anddemonstrationpro-
gramsinsupportofitsownandothercivilspaceactivities;andsupportDODtechnology
needswheretheresultshavebroadapplicationandarenotduplicativeof other
government-fundedeffort.
- Encourageandfacilitate,togetherwithotherappropriateagencies,thetransferof
spaceR&TresultstoandwithinU.S.industry.
- Manage,maintain,andoperatespaceresearch,development,test,andevaluation
facilities.UseoftheSpaceShuttleandeventuallyaspacestationasalaboratoryfacilityin
spaceshouldbeexploitedfordevelopmentofnewspacetechnologies.
• Fundingfor NASAspaceR&Tbeincreasedselectivelyto permitimplementing
theserecommendations.Thefollowingcriteriaaresuggestedfor identificationoftech-
nologiestobeaccordedhighpriority:[5] -Thetechnologyisin thenationalinterestandwillfill areasonablyestablished
futurerequirement.
- Thetechnologyofferspayoffsignificantlygreaterthanthatpresentlyavailableata
reasonablecostandisatleastcomparableinpayoffandcostoalternativeapproachestothesamend.
- Thetechnologyprogramisnotlikelytobeundertaken,onatimelybasis,byoth-
ers,eitherpublicorprivate.
- ThetechnologyisinanareainwhichNASAalreadyhasademonstratedcapability,
or if inanewarea,isoneinwhichNASAcanreadilybuildthecapabilityandexpertise
withoutduplicatinganequivalentcapabilityoutside.
• Fundingaugmentationsi high-priorityechnologiesbeprovidedonlyafterrea-
sonableassurancethatongoingtechnologydevelopmentsoflittlepotentialvaluearebe-
ingphasedownandthatabaselevelofmorebasicresearchisbeingmaintainedacross
thefullspectrumofdisciplinestoassurethatnewtechnologyopportunitiesapplicabletofuturemissionsarenotmissed.
d. Space Applications
There appears to be little question that NASA should perform research and technol-
ogy development in major space applications areas such as telecommunications, meteo-
rology, Earth resources, and materials processing in space. However, there is much
concern about how far NASA should go to provide utility demonstration and early
operation of space applications systems.
NASA's role in space applications should be compatible with the overall mission of
NASA. The present assumption is that NASA's primary focus should be on space R&D with
involvement in operations only if necessary. The other working assumption is that NASA's
primary emphasis should be on the civil side, although support of military and other de-
fense interests is not excluded.
The Task Force recommends that the NASA mission include the study of space and
space technology for civil applications, by:
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• Continuing the identification of possible civil applications of potential value and
by conducting preliminary studies of potential benefits, users, and markets. This includes
taking the leadership in systematic reviews of existing and possible civil applications of
space
[6] • Conducting or supporting research and technology development on essential
components and subsystems of space and ground systems for civil space applications.
• Conducting, with suitable cooperative arrangements with the private or public agen-
cies, tests, demonstrations, and experimental user operations of new types of spacecraft,
spaceborne systems, and ground systems for civil space applications in cases where:
- Potential advantages, uses, and users have been identified.
- The private sector or other agencies cannot reasonably be expected to pay the full
cost.
Administration recognition of this mission of NASA should be sought.
• Arranging for the transfer to private or public agencies, as appropriate, of useful
applications systems employing space technologies, unless it is in the national interest for
NASA to become the operating agency.
e. STS Operations
Realization of the maximum operational efficiency for Shuttle operations is an int-
mediate task which requires a major amount of attention from senior NASA management.
A continuation of the current STS management approach might create a serious diversion
of NASA resources and attention from its more uaditional roles of aeronautics and space
R&D and space exploration and experimentation. The view also has been expressed that
NASA is not the proper organization to achieve the operating efficiencies, levels of cus-
tomer satisfaction, or degree of market development desired. Therefore, resolution of the
technical and management issues involved in Shuttle operations can have a major impact
on future NASA missions.
Various options for the management of STS operations were examined by the Task
Force, including commercial management by an industrial organization, full operation by
DOD, creation of a new Federal agency for Shuttle operations management, establish-
ment of a quasi-government corporation, creation of a new organization within NASA,
and continuation of the present management arrangements in NASA.
The study group concluded that the present small size of the Shattle fleet, its lack of
maturity and high costs of operation, and the lack of DOD interest in assuming full oper-
ating responsibility, all militate against shifting Shuttle operations outside [7] of NASA in
the near future. The potential for future diversion of management attention and resources
from the STS to other NASA programs suggests the advisability of further segregating the
Shuttle operating management organization from the rest of the NASA organization, at
least as an evolutionary, timely step.
The Task Force recommends that:
• A new NASA organization be created at the appropriate time within NASA to focus
on Shuttle operations and utilization, including marketing activities and sustaining engi-
neering support. This organization, which should be headed by a Deputy Administrator,
should have fenced manpower, finances, and facilities
• The Shuttle Operations organization continue to enhance customer services and
market development activities through the application of resources both internal and ex-
ternal to NASA as appropriate. Consideration should be given to contracting out the mar-
ket development activities
• The Deputy Administrator for Shuttle Operations be charged with proposing the
evolutionary steps for future management of Shuttle operations
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• The Shuttle operations organization not undertake future STS development activi-
ties, such as a follow-on Shuttle or new launch capability. It should, however, help define
future requirements for such major improvements
• The value of the STS as a national resource due to its unique capabilities to provide
for manned spaceflight, defense missions, space science support, and research and tech-
nology development in the space environment, as well as its special capabilities for satellite
retrieval and spacecraft servicing, be recognized. The total costs associated with this na-
tional resource value should not be charged to the Shuttle's launch service users.
• As markets for the STS develop, NASA consider shifting pricing of Shuttle services
towards an incremental (i.e., Institutional) cost basis. This is the usual practice in NASA
research facilities and, given the national resource character of the Shuttle for civil and
military Government programs, is more appropriate than pricing on the basis of total
recovery of recurring costs (industrial funding).
[8] f. Aeronautics
When the Task Force was established, the issue of NASA's mission in aeronautics was
thought to be one that would require a great deal of attention as a result of questions
raised in recent years regarding the role of the Federal government vis-a-vis that of the
private sector. However, a broad policy statement on the Federal mission in aeronautical
R&T has been issued by the Office of Science and Technology Policy, which resolved most
of the issues. The Task Force addressed two derivative issues: demonstration of technology
for civil aviation, and effective relations with the DOD.
The Task Force recommends that:
[9] • NASA's mission in aeronautics, subject to specific approval, include support to
the industry in civil aviation technology demonstration programs provided that they are in
the national interest, the industry cannot effectively conduct the programs without that
support, and the support fits naturally within NASA's capabilities.
• NASA continue to assist, communicate with, and cooperate with all branches of the
DOD in all matters relating to aeronautics. The first priority should be in basic aeronautics
research and technologies, and should include providing access to and utilization of both
human resources and laboratories and other physical test facilities as appropriate. The
second priority should be in mission-oriented systems work, as requested or when special
expertise or facilities are available.
g. Human Spaceflight Research
While the effects of spaceflight have proved to be manageable in flights of the dura-
tions experienced up to now, there are additional concerns when prolonged duration
spaceflight, as in permanent space stations or eventually in interplanetary flight, is consid-
ered. Five areas which require intensive research include: prolonged exposure to zero
gravity; provision of oxygen, food, and water; provision of an adequate social and organiza-
tional environment; exposure to ionizing radiation; and extra-vehicular activities.
The Task Force believes that it is inevitable that people will seek to explore the solar
system, not only by remote sensing or even by automated acquisition of samples, but by
being there, and thus ultimately extend the domain of human l',fe beyond the confines of
the Earth. The requirement for mission durations ranging from months to years is im-
plicit. Given the significance of the issues and the lengthy interactive R&D process re-
quired, the Task Force recommends that:
[9] NASA give high priority to the continuing program needed for the development
of the capability to keep people healthy, effective, and well motivated over the long peri-
ods required for manned exploration of the solar system. The development of effective
countermeasures for the disturbances associated with zero gravity requires research ex-
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tending over many years, and must be addressed now to avoid later constraints on manned
exploration missions.
h. International Relationships
Bearing in mind that one of the basic goals of the National Space Policy, is to pro-
mote international cooperative activities in the national interest, the Task Force examined
the international aspects of NASA's roles and missions. NASA's international role is very
important to the maintenance of the image of the United States as the technological leader
of the free world. There is need for more binding commitments in our cooperative activi-
ties in space ventures with other nations. Further, the U.S. policy on technology transfer
was observed to be counter-productive because it limits other nations in their ability to
procure U.S. space products rather than develop such products domestically.
The Task Force recommends that:
• NASA take the steps necessary to ensure greater awareness within the U.S. govern-
ment of its value and that of its aerospace programs as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy.
• Cooperative agreements between NASA and foreign or international agencies be
developed and maintained consistent with long-term foreign policy objectives as well as
with scientific and technological objectives to achieve a greater degree of constancy and
stability.
Document IV-17
Document tide: Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident,
Vol. I (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 6, 1986), pp. 164-77.
The January 28, 1986, explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger and the ensuing
in_,estigation invited comparison with the events that followed the launch-pad fire of the
Apollo 204 spacecraft almost 19 years before that resulted in the deaths of three astro-
nauts. During the earlier accident a politically strong administrator was at the hehn of
NASA; James E. Webb persuaded the White House to allow NASA to take the lead in the
accident investigation. That investigation was largely technical, and it was sufficiently rig-
orous and critical to be seen as credible. It resulted primarily in engineering changes; what
ma:_agerial changes Webb made as a result were surgical in nature, lest the agency's entire
management corps be cast into confusion. In contrast, after the Challengeraccident NASA's
internal investigation took a back seat to the work of a White House-appointed commis-
sion, chaired by former Secretary of State William P. Rogers. NASA was unable to seize the
initiative because, among other factors, its own top management was in disarray. The agency
had been without a permanent administrator for two months, and Acting Administrator
William Graham was an "outsider" not widely trusted within the agency. The report of the
"Rogers Commission" was deliberate and thorough and, as this excerpt suggests, gave as
much emphasis to the accident's managerial as to its technical origins.
[ 164] Pressures on the System
With the 1982 completion of the orbital flight test series, NASA began a planned
acceleration of the Space Shuttle launch schedule. One early plan contemplated an even-
tual rate of a mission a week, but realism forced several downward revisions. In 1985, NASA
published a projection-calling for an annual rate of 24 flights by 1990. Long before the
Challenger accident, however, it was becoming obvious that even the modified goal of two
flights a month was overambitious.
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In establishing the schedule, NASA had not provided adequate resources for its at-
tainment. As a result, the capabilities of the system were strained by the modest nine-
mission rate of 1985, and the evidence suggests that NASA would not have been able to
accomplish the 15 flights scheduled for 1986. These are the major conclusions of a Com-
mission examination of the pressures and problems attendant upon the accelerated launch
schedule.
On the same day that the initial orbital tests concluded--July 4, 1982wPresident
Reagan announced a national policy to set the direction of the U.S. space program during
the following decade. As part of that policy, the President stated that:
'¢Fhe United States Space Transportation System (STS) is the primary space launch
systems fbr both national security and civil government missions."
Additionally, he said:
"The first priority of the STS program is to make the system fully operational and
cost-effective in providing routine access to space."
From the inception of the Shuttle, NASA had been advertising a vehicle that would
make space operations '.'routine and economical." The greater the annum number of flights,
the greater the degree of routinization and economy, so heavy emphasis was placed on the
schedule. However, the attempt to build up to 24 missions a year brought a number of
difficulties, among them the compression of training schedules, the lack of spare parts,
and the focusing of resources on near-term problems.
One effect of NASA's accelerated flight rate and the agency's determination to meet
it was the dilution of human and material resources that could be applied to any particular
flight.
The part of the system responsible for turning the mission requirements and objec-
tives into flight software, flight trajectory information and crew training materials was strug-
gling to keep up with the flight rate in late 1985, and forecasts showed it would be unable
to meet its milestones for 1986. Itwas falling behind because its resources were strained to
the limit, strained by the flight rate itself and by the constant changes it was forced to
respond to within that accelerating schedule. Compounding the problem was the fact that
NASA had difficulty evolving from its single-flight focus to a system that could efficiently
support the projected flight rate. It was slow in developing a hardware maintenance plan
for its reusable fleet and slow in developing the capabilities that would allow it to handle
the higher volume of work and training associated with increased flight frequency.
[165] Pressures developed because of the need to meet customer commitments, which
translated into a requirement to launch a certain number of flights per year and to launch
them on time. Such considerations may occasionally have obscured engineering concerns.
Managers may have forgotten--partly because of past success, partly because of their own
well-nurtured image of the program--that the Shuttle was still in a research and develop-
ment phase. In his testimony before a U.S. Senate Appropriations subcommittee on May
5, 1982, following the third flight of the Space Shuttle, James Beggs, then the NASA Ad-
ministrator, expressed NASA's commitment
"rhe highest priority we have set for NASA is to complete development of the Shuttle
and turn it into an operational system. Safety and reliability of flight and the control of
operational costs are primary objectives as we move forward with the Shuttle program."
Sixteen months later, arguing in support of the Space Station, Mr. Beggs said, 'qAre
can start anytime .... There's no compelling reason [why] it has to be 1985 rather than '86
or '87. The point that we have made is that the Shuttle is now operational." The prevalent
attitude in the program appeared to be that the Shuttle should be ready to emerge from
the developmental stage, and managers we determined to prove it "operational."
Various aspects of the mission design and development process were directly affected
by that determination. The sections that follow will discuss the pressures exerted on the
system by the flight rate, the reluctance to relax the optimistic schedule, and the attempt
to assume an operational status.
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Planning of a Mission
The planning and preparation for a Space Shuttle flight require close coordination
among those making the flight manifest, those designing the flight and the customers
contracting NASA's services. The goals are to establish the manifest; define the objectives,
constraints and capabilities of the mission; and translate those into hardware, software and
flight procedures.
There are major program decision points in the development of every Shuttle flight.
At each of these points, sometimes called freeze points, decisions are made that form the
basis for further engineering and product development. The disciplines affected by these
freeze points include integration hardware, engineering, crew timeline, flight design and
crew training.
The first major freeze point is at launch minus 15 months. At that time the flight is
officially defined: the launch date, Orbiter and major payloads are all specified, and initial
design and engineering are begun based on this information.
The second major freeze point is at launch minus 7.7 months, the cargo integration
hardware design. Orbiter vehicle configuration, flight design and software requirements
are agreed to and specified. Further design and engineering can then proceed.
Another major freeze point is the flight planning and stowage review at launch mi-
nus five months. At that time, the crew activity timeline and the crew compartment con-
figuration, which includes middeck payloads and payload specialist assignments, are
established. Final design, engineering and training are based on these products.
Development of Flight Products
The "production process" begins by collecting all mission objectives, requirements
and constraints specified by the payload and Space Shuttle communities at the milestones
described above. That intormation is interpreted and assimilated as various groups gener-
ate products required for a Space Shuttle flight: trajectory data, consumables require-
ments, Orbiter flight software, Mission Control Center software and the crew activity plan,
to name just a few.
Some of these activities can be done in parallel, but many are serial. Once a particu-
lar process has started, if a substantial change is made to the flight, not only does that
process have to be started again, but the process that preceded it and supplied its date may
also need to be repeated. If one group fails to meet its due date, the group that is next in
the chain will start late. The delay then cascades through the system.
Were the elements of the system meeting their schedules? Although each group be-
lieved it had an adequate amount of time allotted to perform its function, the system as a
whole was falling [ 166] behind. An assessment of the system's overall performance is best
made by studying the process at the end of the production chain: crew training. Analysis of
training schedules for previous flights and projected training schedules for flights in the
spring and summer of 1986 reveals a clear trend: less and less time was going to be avail-
able for crew members to accomplish their required training ....
The production system was disrupted by several factors including increased flight
rate, lack of efficient production processing and manifest changes.
Changes in the Manifest
Each process in the production cycle is based on information agreed upon at one of
the freeze points. If that information is later changed, the process may have to be re-
peated. The change could be a change in manifest or a change to the Orbiter hardware or
software. The hardware and software changes in 1985 usually were mandatory changes;
perhaps some of the manifest changes were not.
The changes in the manifest were caused by factors that fall into four general catego-
ries: hardware problems, customer requests, operational [167] constraints and external
factors. The significant changes made in 1985 are shown in the accompanying table. The
following examples illustrate that a single proposed change can have extensive impact, not
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because the change itself is particularly difficult to accommodate (though it may be), but
because each change necessitates four or five other changes. The cumulative effect can be
substantial ....
When a change occurs, the program must choose a response and accept the conse-
quences of that response. The options are usually either to maximize the benefit to the
customer or to minimize the adverse impact on Space Shuttle operations. If the first op-
tion is selected, the consequences will include short-term and/or long-term effects ....
1985 Changes in the Manifest
Hardware Problems
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (canceled 51-E, added 61-M).
Synchronous Communication Satellite (added to 61-C).
Synchronous Communication Satellite (removed from 61-C),
OV-102 late delivery from Palmdale (changed to 51-G, 51-I, and 61-A).
Customer Requests
HS-376 (removed from 51-I).
G-Star (removed from 61-C).
Satellite Television Corporation-Direct Broadcast Satellite (removed from 61-E).
Westar (removed from 61-C).
Satellite Television Corporation-Direct Broadcast Satellite (removed from 61-H).
Electrophoresis Operations in Space (removed from 61-B).
Electrophoresis Operations in Space (removed from 61-H).
Hubble Space Telescope (swap with Earth Observation Mission).
Operational Constraints
No launch window for Skynet/Indian Satellite Combination (61-H).
Unacceptable structural loads for Tracking and Data Relay Satellite/Indian
Satellite (61-H).
Landing weight above allowable limits for each of the following missions: 61-A,
61-E, 71-A, 61-K.
External Factors
Late addition of SenatorJake Garn (R-Utah) (51-D).
Late addition of Representative Bill Nelson (D-Florida) (61-C).
Late addition of Physical Vapor Transport Organic Solid experiment (51-I).
[168] Operational constraints (for example, a constraint on the total cargo weight)
are imposed to ensure that the combination of payloads does not exceed the Orbiter's
capabilities. An example involving the Earth Observation Mission Spacelab flight is pre-
sented in the NASA Mission Planning and Operations Team Report in AppendixJ. That
case illustrates that changes resulting from a single instance of a weight constraint viola-
tion can cascade through the entire schedule.
External factors have been the cause of a number of changes in the manifest as well.
The changes discussed above involve major payloads, but changes to other payloads or to
payload specialists can create problems as well. One small change does not come alone; it
generates several others. A payload specialist was added to mission 61-C only two months
before its scheduled lift off. Because there were already seven crew members assigned to
the flight, one had to be removed. The Hughes payload specialist was moved from 61-C to
51-L just three months before 51-L was scheduled to launch. His experiments were also
added to 51-L. Two middeck experiments were deleted from 51-L as a result, and the
deleted experiments would have reappeared on later flights. [169] Again, a "single" late
change affected at least two flights very late in the planning and preparation cycles.
The effects of such changes in terms of budget, cost and manpower can be signifi-
cant. In some cases, the allocation of additional resources allows the change to be accom-
modated with little or no impact to the overall schedule. In those cases, steps that need to
be re-done can still be accomplished before their deadlines. The amount of additional
resources required depends, of course, on the magnitude of the change and when the
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changeoccurs:earlychanges,thosebeforethecargointegrationreview,haveonlyamini-
realimpact;changesatlaunchminusfivemonths(twomonthsafterthecargointegration
review)cancarryamajorimpact,increasingtherequiredresourcesbyapproximately30
percent.Inthemissionsfrom41-Cto51-L,only60percentofthemajorchangesoccurred
beforethecargointegrationreview.Morethan20percentoccurredafterlaunchminus
fivemonthsandcausedisruptivebudgetandmanpowerimpacts.
Engineeringflightproductsaregeneratedunderacontractthatallowsforincreased
expenditurestomeetoccasionalhighworkloads.[170]Evenwiththisbuilt-inflexibility,
however,therequestedchangesoccasionallysaturatefacilitiesandpersonnelcapabilities.
Thestrainonresourcescan be tremendous. For short periods of two to three months in
mid-1985 and early 1986, facilities and personnel were being required to perform at roughly
twice the budgeted flight rate.
If a change occurs late enough, it will have an impact on the serial processes. In these
cases, additional resources will not alleviate the problem, and the effect of the change is
absorbed by all downstream processes, and ultimately by the last element in the chain. In
the case of the flight design and software reconfiguration process, that last element is crew
training. In January, 1986, the forecasts indicated that crews on flights after 51-L would
have significantly less time than desired to train for their flights ....
"Operational" Capabilities
For a long time during Shuttle development, the program focused on a single flight,
the first Space Shuttle mission. When the program became "operational," flights came
more frequently, and the same resources that had been applied to one flight had to be
applied to several flights concurrently. Accomplishing the more pressing immediate re-
quirements diverted attention from what was happening to the system as a whole. That
appears to be one of the many telling differences between a "research and development"
program and an "operational program." Some of the differences are philosophical, some
are attitudinal and some are practical.
Elements within the Shuttle program tried to adapt their philosophy, their attitude
and their requirements to the "operational era." But that era came suddenly, and in some
cases, there had not been enough preparation for what "operational" might entail. For
example, routine and regular post-flight maintenance and inspections are critical in an
operational program; spare parts are critical to flight readiness in an operational fleet; and
the software tools and training facilities developed during a test program may not be suit-
able for the high volume of work required in an operational environment. In many re-
spects, the system was not prepared to meet an "operational" schedule.
As the Space Shuttle system matured, with numerous changes and compromises, a
comprehensive set of requirements was developed to ensure the success of a mission. What
evolved was a system in which the preflight processing, flight planning, flight control and
flight training were accomplished with extreme care applied to every detail. This process
checked and rechecked everything, and though it was both labor- and time-intensive, it
was appropriate and necessary for a system still in the developmental phase. This process,
however, was not capable of meeting the flight rate goals.
After the first series of flights, the system developed plans to accomplish what was
required to support the fight rate. The challenge was to streamline the processes through
automation, standardization, and centralized management, and to convert from the de-
velopmental phase to the mature system without a compromise in quality. It required that
experts carefully analyze their areas to determine what could be standardized and auto-
mated, then take the time to do it.
But the increasing flight rate had priority--quality products had to be ready on time.
Further, schedules and budgets for developing the needed facility improvements were not
adequate. Only the time and resources left after supporting the flight schedule could be
directed toward efforts to streamline and standardize. In 1985, NASA was attempting to
develop the capabilities of a production system. But it was forced to do that while respond-
ing--with the same personnel--to a higher flight rate.
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Atthesametimetheflightratewasincreasing,avarietyoffactorsreducedthenum-
berofskilledpersonnelavailabletodealwithit.Thesesincludedretirements,hiringfreezes,
transferstootherprogramsliketheSpaceStationandtransitioningtoasinglecontractor
foroperationssupport.[171] Theflightratedidnotappeartobebasedonassessmentofavailabler sources
andcapabilitiesandwasnotreducedtoaccommodateth capacityoftheworkforce.For
example,onJanuary1,1986,anewcontracttookeffectatJohnsonthatconsolidatedthe
entirecontractorworkforceunderasinglecompany.Thistransitionwasanotherdistur-
banceatatimewhentheworkforceneededtobeperformingatfullcapacityomeethe
1986flightrate.In someimportantareas,asignificantfractionofworkerselectednotto
changecontractors.Thisreducedtheworkforceanditscapabilities,andnecessitatedin-
tensivetrainingprogramstoqualifythenewpersonnel.Accordingtoprojections,thework
forcewouldnothavebeenbacktofullcapacityuntilthesummerof1986.Thisdrainona
criticalpartofthesystemcamejustasNASAwasbeginningthemostchallengingphaseof
itsflightschedule.
Similarly,atKennedythecapabilitiesoftheShuttleprocessingandfacilitiesupport
workforcebecameincreasinglystrainedastheOrbiterturnaroundtimedecreasedtoac-
commodateheacceleratedlaunchschedule.Thisfactorhasresultedin overtimeper-
centagesofalmost28percentinsomedirectorates.Numerouscontractemployeeshave
worked72hoursperweekorlongerandfrequent12-hoursshifts.Thepotentialimplica-
tionsof suchovertimefor safetyweremadeapparentduringtheattemptedlaunchof
mission61-ConJanuary6,1986,whenfatigueandshiftworkwerecitedasmajorcontribut-
ingfactorsto aseriousincidentinvolvingaliquidoxygendepletionthatoccurredlessthanfiveminutesbeforescheduledliftoff....
Responding to Challenges and Changes
Another obstacle in the path toward accommodation of a higher flight rate is NASA's
legendary "can-do" attitude. The attitude that enabled the agency to put men on the moon
and to build the Space Shuttle will not allow it to pass up an exciting challenge--even
though accepting the challenge may drain resources from the more mundane (but neces-
sary) aspects of the program.
A recent example is NASA's decision to perform a spectacular retrieval of two com-
munications satellites whose upper-stage motors had failed to raise them to the proper
geosynchronous orbit. NASA itself then proposed to the insurance companies who owned
the failed satellites that the agency design a mission to rendezvous with them in turn and
that an astronaut in a jet backpack fly over to escort the satellites into the Shuttle's payload
bay for a return to Earth.
The mission generated considerable excitement within NASA and required a sub-
stantial effort to develop the necessary techniques, hardware and procedures. The mis-
sion was conceived, created, designed and accomplished within 10 months. The result,
mission 51-A (November, 1984), was a resounding success, as both failed satellites were
successfully returned to Earth. The retrieval mission vividly demonstrated the service that
astronauts and the Space Shuttle can perform.
Ten months after the first retrieval mission, NASA launched a mission to repair an-
other communications satellite that had failed in low-Earth orbit. Again, the mission was
developed and executed on relatively short notice and was resoundingly successful for
both NASA and the satellite insurance industry.
The satellite retrieval missions were not isolated occurrences. Extraordinary efforts
on NASA's part in developing and accomplishing missions will, and should, continue, but
such efforts will be a substantial additional drain on resources. NASA cannot both accept
the relatively spur-of-[172] the-moment missions that its "can-do" attitude tends to gener-
ate and also maintain the planning and scheduling discipline required to operate as a
"space truck" on a routine and cost-effective basis. As the flight rate increases, the cost in
resources and the accompanying impact on future operations must be considered when
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infrequentbutextraordinaryeffortsareundertaken.Thesystemisstillnotsufficiently
developedasa"productionline"processintermsofplanningorimplementationproce-
dures.It cannotroutinelyorevenperiodicallyacceptmajordisruptionswithoutconsider-
ablecost.NASA'sattitudehistoricallyhasreflectedthepositionthat"Wecandoanything,"
andwhilethatmayessentiallybetrue,NASA'soptimism ustbetemperedbytherealiza-
tionthatit cannotdoeverything.
NASAhasalwaystakenapositiveapproachtoproblemsolvingandhasnotevolvedto
thepointwhereitsofficialsarewillingtosaytheynolongerhavetheresourcestorespond
toproposedchanges....[173]It is importanttodeterminehowmanyflightscanbeaccommodated,and
accommodatedsafely.NASAmustestablisharealisticlevelofexpectation,thenapproach
it carefully.MissionschedulesshouldbebasedonarealisticassessmentofwhatNASAcan
dosafelyandwell,notonwhatispossiblewithmaximumeffort.Thegroundrulesmustbe
establishedfirmly,andthenenforced.
Theattitudeisimportant,andthewordoperationalcanmislead."Operational"should
notimplyanylesscommitmenttoqualityorsafety,noradilutionofresources.Theatti-
tudeshouldbe,"Wearegoingtoflyhighriskflightsthisyear;everyoneisgoingtobea
challenge,andeveryoneisgoingtoinvolvesomerisk,sowehadbetterbecarefulinour
approachtoeach."...
[176]Findings
1.Thecapabilitiesofthesystemwerestretchedtothelimittosupporttheflightrate
inwinter1985/1986.Projectionsintothespringandsummerof1986showedacleartrend;
thesystem,asit existed,wouldhavebeenunableto delivercrewtrainingsoftwarefor
scheduledflightsbythedesignateddates.Theresultwouldhavebeenanunacceptable
compressionfthetimeavailableforthecrewstoaccomplisht eirrequiredtraining.
2.Sparepartsareincriticallyshortsupply.TheShuttleprogram adeaconscious
decisiontopostponesparepartsprocurementsinfavorofbudgeti emsofperceivedhigher
priority.Lackofsparepartswouldlikelyhavelimitedflightoperationsin 1986.
3.Statedmanifestingpoliciesarenotenforced.Numerouslatemanifestchanges(afterthecargointegrationreview)havebeenmadetobothmajorpayloadsandminor
payloadsthroughouttheShuttleprogram.
• Latechangestomajorpayloadsorprogramrequicementscanrequireextensive
resources(money,manpower,facilities)toimplement.
• If manylatechangesto"minor"payloadsoccur,resourcesarequicklyabsorbed.
• Payloadspecialistsfrequentlywereaddedtoaflightwellafterannounceddead-
lines.
• Latechangestoamissionadverselyaffecthetraininganddevelopmentofproce-
duresforsubsequentmissions.[177]4.Thescheduledflightratedidnotaccuratelyreflecthecapabilitiesand
resources.
• Theflightratewasnotreducedtoaccommodateperiodsofadjustmentin theca-
pacityoftheworkforce.Therewasnomarginin thesystemtoaccommodateunforeseen
hardwareproblems.
• Resourceswereprimarilydirectedtowardsupportingtheflightsandthusnotenough
wereavailabletoimproveandexpandfacilitiesneededtosupportahigherflightrate.
5.Trainingsimulatorsmaybethelimitingfactorontheflightrate:thetwocurrent
simulatorscannottraincrewsformorethan12-15flightsperyear.
6.Whenflightscomeinrapidsuccession,currentrequirementsdonotensurethat
criticalanomaliesoccurringduringoneflightareidentifiedandaddressedappropriately
beforethenextflight.
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Document IV-18
Document tide: Samuel C. Phillips, NASA Management Study Group, "Recommendations
to the Administrator," December 30, 1986.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA Headquar-
ters, Washington, D.C.
In the wake of the Challengeraccident, former NASA Administrator James c. Fletcher
was asked by President Reagan to return to the agency. One of Fletcher's early actions was
to seek the advice of the National Academy of Public Administration on the management
issues facing him. The academy's response was to organize a NASA Management Study
Group, headed by retired General Samuel C. Phillips, who bad been program manager for
Apollo. The group's final report provided an overview of NASA's management problems
in the post-Challenger, Space Station era.
[1] Summary Report of the NASA Management
Study Group Recommendations
I. INTRODUCTION
The NASA Management Study Group (NMSG) was established under the auspices of
the National Academy of Public Administration at the request of the Administrator of
NASA to assess NASA's Management practices and to evaluate the effectiveness of the
NASA organization. The NMSG addresses first the organization and management of the
space station program, then the restructuring of the space shutde program, and finally
NASA's overall organization and management.
Recommendations of the NMSG on the space station program were made in the
form of oral briefings to the Administrator and other officials of NASA on June 26, 1986,
and have subsequently been largely implemented. With respect to the space shuttle pro-
gram the NMSG contributed to and reviewed the study led by Astronaut Robert Crippen
and participated in the discussions that led to the Administrator's decisions announced
on November 5, 1986, with which the NMSG has concurred.
This report summarizes the conclusions and recommendations of the NMSG on the
overall management and organization of NASA. Detailed findings and draft recommenda-
tions were presented and discussed on several occasions during the course of the study in
oral briefings to the Administrator and to the Advisory Panel of the National Academy of
Public Administration. A presentation was made to the entire team of NASA top headquar-
ters officials and center directors at an all day meeting on November 25, 1986. A final
report, in the form of a revised oral briefing taking account of the comments of the Advi-
sory Panel and the NASA officials after the November 25 meeting, was presented to Ad-
ministrator and Deputy Administrator on December 16, 1986.
[2] II. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
The NMSG study has concentrated on identifying issues in need of special attention
by NASA management at this time. As a result, our recommendations focus on areas where
changes or improvement may be required.
We must emphasize, at the outset, therefore, that a principal finding of our study is
that NASA is fundamentally a sound institution, with many outstanding people with strong
dedication to the success of NASA and its programs. We also recognize that many positive
steps have been taken in recent months to strengthen the organization, management, and
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practices of NASA, and that some NMSG recommendations were adopted during the course
of our study. The conclusions and recommendations set forth below should be viewed in
this context.
The NMSG recognizes that NASA management is conditioned to a significant de-
gree by factors in the external environment over which NASA has only limited control.
NASA must conform to Administration policies, budgetary restrictions, Congressional
guidance, and the increasingly complex web of legal and regulatory constraints affecting
procurement, personnel, and other areas. As a result of the Challenger accident, NASA
faces increased critical scrutiny by Congress and the media, a long hiatus in space flights,
and some unrealistic public expectations of risk-free space flight. On the other hand, NASA
and its program have the President's personal interest and support, and there is, we be-
lieve, strong public and Congressional support as well.
In this situation, NASA has the challenge of coping with its external environment
and managing its affairs in a way that earns the respect and continued support of the
Administration, Congress, and the public. To reestablish NASA's leadership [3] position
in space and aeronautics, management excellence is as essential as technical excellence.
Our recommendations are intended as suggestions to help NASA achieve the level of ex-
cellence it must have.
III. PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS
The principal recommendations of the NMSG can be summarized as follow:
1. Establish strong headquarters program direction for each major NASA program,
with clear assignment of responsibilities to the NASA centers involved.
2. Improve the discipline and responsiveness to problems of the program manage-
ment system.
3. Place shuttle and space station programs under a single Associate Administrator
when the Administrator is satisfied that recovery of the shuttle will not thereby be compro-
mised.
4. Increase management emphasis on space flight operations.
5. Place special management emphasis on establishing NASA world-class leadership
in advanced technology in selected areas of both space and aeronautical technology.
6. Establish a formal planning process within NASA to enunciate long-range goals
and lay out program, institutional, and financial plans for meeting them.
7. Strengthen agency-wide leadership in developing and managing people, facilities,
equipment, and other institutional resources.
[4] 8. Improve management of NASA's external relations.
9. Strengthen the Office of the Administrator and ease the workload of the Adminis-
trator and Deputy Administrator.
These and other NMSG recommendations are discussed briefly in the following sec-
tions for each of the areas covered by the NMSG study.
IV. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
Effective management of its technical program is NASA's central task. Five of the
principal NMSG recommendations and many subsidiary recommendations are in this area.
1. Establish strong headquarters program direction for each major NASA program,
with clear assignment of responsibilities to the NASA center involved.
a. Large mvlti-center spaceflight programs should be managed by a strong
program director at headquarters supported by a competent program office in the Wash-
ington area. The functions of the headquarters program office should include systems
engineering (a support contractor may be needed); program planning and control; man-
agement of operations and interfaces with users; safety, reliability, and quality assurance;
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and other functions as appropriate. Program managers at each center should have clearly
defined responsibilities and accountability to the headquarters program director. The
NMSG has concurred in the actions now being taken to structure the shuttle and space
station programs in this way. The NMSG also believes that the Technical Management
Information System (TMIS) proposed for the space station program should be initiated
but should be subject to periodic [5] review by non-advocates and outside experts to en-
sure that the expected utility is being achieved.
b. Single center spaceflight programs or projects should also have a program di-
rector at headquarters with the overall program control functions of establishing require-
ments, reviewing progress, and approving changes as necessary. A central program control
staff at the Program AA level could support the directors of several smaller programs. The
program or project manager at the center should be responsible for planning and imple-
menting the program (including systems engineering), for keeping the program director
regularly informed of status and problems, and for requesting his approval of major changes
that may be necessary.
c. NASA should avoid organizing major programs so that large tasks are assigned
to more than one center unless technical demands or the scale of the program clearly
require substantial contribution from more than one center.
d. A highly qualified independent office of safety, reliability, and quality assurance
is an essential requirement for assuring safety and success in NASA programs. The NMSG
has reviewed the goals, organization, priorities, and general plans of the new office re-
cently established in NASA and agrees with the actions already taken and now planned.
e. NASA Headquarters and each center should assess their procurement practices
to seek to minimize the long lead times in placing contracts and to assure that proper
emphasis is placed on contract structure, contractor selection, and contract administra-
tion.
[6] 2. Improving the discipline and responsiveness of the program management
system.
a. Reinstitute the former system of Program Approval Documents (PAD's) as the
basic agreement between the Administrator and the Program Associate Administrator re-
sponsible for the program. The PAD should contain the official statement of the pro-
gram objectives and scope, how the program is to be performed, the responsibilities of the
participating organizations, the total resources required (dollars, people, facilities and
support from other organizations), and cost and schedule baselines against which progress
can be measured. Program control documents at successive lower levels of management
should be integrated into a system consistent with and supporting the PADS.
b. Revitalize regular status reviews at each successive level of management at which
progress is measured against the approved baselines, current and potential problems are
fully discussed and actions assigned. The Administrator or Deputy Administrator should
conduct periodic reviews of all major NASA programs.
c. Strengthen the agency's independent cost estimating and program assessment
capabilities at headquarters and at the centers.
3. Place shuttle and space station programs under a single Associate Administrator
when the Administrator is satisfied that recovery of the shuttle will not thereby be compro-
mised. Although now in very different stages of development, the shuttle and space
station programs should be unified to ensure proper attention to compatibility of space
station design and operational planning with the shuttle and its capabilities, [7] opera-
tional availability, and requirements for logistic support. Nevertheless, the programs should
not be combined until it is clear that the NASA's top priority task of returning the shuttle
to flight status will not thereby be adversely affected. Until the programs are combined
under one AA, the offices of Space Station and Space Flight should jointly prepare plans
for the Administrator's approval which clearly define their responsibilities and relation-
ships.
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4. Increase management emphasis on spaceflight operations. NASA must accept that
it will be responsible for spaceflight operations for the toreseeable fl, ture- shuttle, space
station, man-tended and fiee-flying spacecraft, deep space probes, etc. The present struc-
ture of organization and management does not assure adequate attention to operations
requirements in system design or in the planning and conduct of operations and logistic
support in the era of frequent shuttle flights and long-term operations of the space
stauon. A better delineation between development and operations activities is needed even
before the shuttle or space station become operational. It is also important that steps be
taken to accommodate users more efficiently without compromising safety. At the same
time, the shuttle recovery program must not be placed at risk. Therefore, NASA should:
a. Strengthen management of operations in the space shuttle program at head-
quarters and the NASA centers. Steps to do this are now under way.
b. Ensure responsiveness to operational and user requirements in the design and
development of the space station. The Offices of Space Station (OSS), Space Science and
Applications, and Aeronautics and Space Technology should jointly prepare plans for the
Administrator's approval which clearly define their responsibilities and relationships. OSS
should ensure [8] that its organization and procedures provide adequate linkages with all
major user constituencies.
c. Establish a new Associate Administrator for Operations to develop a compre-
hensive plan for managing NASA spaceflight operations, to be implemented when shuttle
recovery is complete. Initial priority should be given to planning for the future manage-
ment of manned, mantended, and related operations. The present Offices of Space
Tracking and Data Systems should become a division in the new Office of Spaceflight
Operations. The NMSG anticipates that at some point in the future, the Kennedy Space
Center would also be placed under the Office of Spaceflight Operations.
5. Place special management emphasis on establishing NASA world-class leadership
in advanced technology in selected areas of both space and aeronautical technology. The
NMSG believes that NASA's efforts to develop advanced technologies beyond the require-
ments of current spaceflight programs, on which the U.S. future in space and aeronautics
will depend, need more emphasis and a clearer sense of direction. Specifically, NASA should:
a. Strengthen capabilities for advanced research and technology development at
all NASA centers.
b. Limit spaceflight program management activities at NASA OAST research cen-
ters. This should permit a stronger focus on advanced research and technology.
c. Seek to establish stronger linkages between the NASA research centers and
industry in space technology, comparable to those that now exist in aeronautics.
[9] V. PLANNING
6. Establish a formal planning process within NASA to enunciate long-range goals
and lay out program, institutional, and financial plans for meeting them. NMSG believes
that a formal iterative planning process that involves direct participation of the entire
NASA line organization at headquarters and the center would materially assist NASA by
giving a clearer sense of direction and better focus to its programs.
a. A biennial planning process should be instituted to develop detailed program,
institutional, and financial plans for the next five years and skeletal plans for the ten years
beyond.
b. The plans should be developed by the line organization, based on goals and
guidelines enunciated by the Administrator after taking account of the views and recom-
mendations of the NASA program offices, congressional reports, scientific and other
advisory groups, and other constituencies.
c. The present Strategic Planning Council should be retained and its role broad-
ened to include an annual evaluation of progress against plans.
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d. A small planning support staff should be established in a new Policy and Plan-
ning Support Office reporting to the Administrator, to analyze and integrate planning
within the agency and to publish and update agency plans. (See also VII-9-c.)
[10] VI. INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT
7. Strengthen agency-wide leadership in developing and managing people, facilities,
equipment, and other institutional resources. The NMSG believes that more attention needs
to be given at headquarters and the centers to improving the management of NASA as an
institution, both to make current agency operations more efficient and to assure the fu-
ture strength of NASA capabilities. The NMSG recommends that NASA:
a. Appoint an Associate Deputy Administrator-Institution to provide a focus on
institutional management in the Office of the Administrator. This official would assist, and
when appropriate act for the Administrator and Deputy Administrator on institutional
matters generally, including determination of requirements and distribution of resources
for manpower, facilities, and institutional funding.
b. Strengthen the institutional management capabilities of the Program Associate
Administrators, who should continue to be responsible for supervising NASA field centers
as at present. Each Program Associate Administrator having supervision of a field center
must assure the center's responsiveness to the requirements of programs assigned by other
Associate Administrators.
c. Establish institutional planning as an integral part of the NASA planning pro-
cess, to include planning for personnel, facilities, major equipment and support service
contractor requirements and for the evolution of the assigned roles and missions of NASA
Centers. A small staff focused on institutional planning should be included in the new
Policy and Planning Support office recommended below (VII-9-c).
[11] d. Place a new special management emphasis on human resources in NASA
to enhance efforts to acquire, retain, and make full utilization of the best possible people
to conduct and manage NASA's work. Where necessary to meet its special needs, NASA
should seek administrative or legislative relief from general government requirements that
impede effective human resources management.
_I. EXECUTIVEMANAGEMENT
8. Improve management of NASA's external relations.
a. Give special management attention to ensuring that NASA:
( 1) Keeps Congress informed on a timely basis of matters of importance or special
interest.
(2) Is effectively represented in dealings with other agencies, other governments,
and industry.
(3) Maintains the NASA tradition of openness in its relations with the media and
the public.
b. Consolidate under the Associate Administrator for External Relations the func-
tions of public, international, and industry affairs, with either de facto or actual responsi-
bility for legislative affairs.
c. Reaffirm to all headquarters offices and field centers the requirement for con-
sistent agency policies and actions in external affairs under the functional management
leadership of the headquarters staff offices.
[12] 9. Strengthen the Office of the Administrator and ease the workload of the
Administrator and DeputyAdministrator. The NMSG believes that these needs can best be
addressed by appointing two new senior officials within the Office of the Administrator
and the establishment of a small policy and planning support staffunit. Specifically, NASA
should:
a. Appoint an Associate Deputy Administrator-Policy to assist, and where appro-
priate act for the Administrator, on policy, external affairs, and related matters. The Ad-
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ministrator continually faces problems in the policy and external affairs areas that are
growing in number and complexity. Coping with these problems now requires major per-
sonal involvements of the Administrator, creating the risks of insufficient attention to policy
matters, missed opportunities for leadership, and diversion from other important respon-
sibilities. The Associate Deputy Administrator-Policy would share the Administrator's and
Deputy Administrator's workload and help ensure effective use and participation of NASA
staff and program offices in policy matters and external affairs.
b. Appoint an Associate Deputy Administrator-Institution to assist, and where ap-
propriate act for the Administrator or Deputy Administrator in the management of NASA
as an institution (IV-7-a).
c. Establish a small Policy and Planning Support Staff for policy analysis and to
support the program and institutional planning processes. This staff would provide a re-
source for the Office of the Administrator to perform or coordinate selected policy studies
and analysis as assigned, and to assist in the review of studies and analysis done elsewhere
in the agency. It [13] would also provide support for the program and institutional plan-
ning processes as previously recommended.
Documenl IV-19
Document title: NASA, "The Hubble Space Telescope Optical Systems Failure Report,"
November 1990, pp. ill-v, 9-1 to 9-4, 10-1 to 10-4.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA Headquar-
ters, Washington, D.C.
The Hubble Space Telescope was launched in May 1990 with an aberration in its
primary mirror that made the telescope unable to carry out significant aspects of its planned
observations. The fault in the mirror was introduced during its manufacture in the early
1980s and not detected in the testing program that preceded assembly and launch of the
telescope. NASA in July 1990 established a Board of Investigation to identify reasons for
the fault in the Hubble mirror and for the failure to detect the fault prior to launch. The
board was chaired by Jet Propulsion Laboratory Director Lew Allen.
These excerpts from the board's report reflect the shortfalls in NASA technical man-
agement and quality assurance that contributed, along with the performance of the mir-
ror manufacturer Perkin-Elmer, to the problems with the Hubble mirror.
[iii] EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) was launched aboard the Space Shuttle Discov-
ery on April 24, 1990. During checkout on orbit, it was discovered that the telescope could
not be properly focused because of a flaw in the optics. The HST Project Manager an-
nounced this failure on June 21, 1990. Both of the high-resolution imaging cameras (the
Wide Field/Planetary Camera and the Faint Object Camera) showed the same character-
istic distortion, called spherical aberration, that must have originated in the primary mir-
ror, the secondary mirror, or both.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Associate Administra-
tor for the Office of Space Science and Applications then formed the Hubble Space Tele-
scope Optical Systems Board of Investigation on July 2, 1990, to determine the cause of the
flaw in the telescope, how it occurred, and why it was not detected before launch. The
Board conducted its investigation to include interviews with personnel involved in the
fabrication and test of the telescope, review of documentation, and analysis and test of the
equipment used in the fabrication of the telescope's mirrors. The information in this re-
port is based exclusively on the analysis and tests requested by the Board, the testimony
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giventotheBoard,andthedocumentationf undduringthisinvestigation.
Continuedanalysisofimagestransmittedfromthetelescopeindicatedthatmost,if
notall,oftheproblemliesin theprimarymirror.TheBoard'sinvestigationfthemanu-
factureof themirrorprovedthatthemirrorwasmadein thewrongshape,beingtoo
muchflattenedawayfromthemirror'scenter(a0.4-wavermswavefronterrorat632.8
nm).Theerroristentimeslargerthanthespecifictolerance.
Theprimarymirrorisadiscofglass2.4mindiameter,whosepolishedfrontsurface
iscoatedwithaverythinlayerof aluminum.Whenglassi polished,smallamountsof
materialarewornaway,sobyselectivelypolishingdifferentpartsofamirror,theshapeis
altered.Duringthemanufactureofalltelescopemirrorstherearemanyrepetitivecycles
inwhichthesurfaceis testedbyn flecfinglightfromit; thesurfaceis thenselectively
polishedtocorrectanyerrorsin itsshape.Theerrorin theHST'smirroroccurredbe-
causetheopticaltestusedin thisprocesswasnotsetupcorrectly;thusthesurfacewas
polishedintothewrongshape.
TheprimarymirrorwasmanufacturedbythePerkin-ElmerCorporation,owHughes
DanburyOpticalSystems,Inc.,whichwasthecontractorfortheOpticalTelescopeAssem-
bly.Thecriticalopticsusedasatemplateinshapingthemirror,thereflectivenullcorrec-
tor(RNC),consistedoftwosmallmirrorsandalens.The[iv]RNCwasdesignedandbuilt
bythePerkin-ElmerCorporationfortheHSTProject.Thisunithadbeenpreservedbythe
manufacturerxactlyasit wasduringthemanufactureof themirror.WhentheBoard
measuredtheRNC,thelenswasincorrectlyspacedfromthemirrors.Calculationsof the
effectof suchdisplacementontheprimarymirrorshowthatthemeasuredamount,1.3
mm,accountsindetailfortheamountandcharacteroftheobservedimageblurring.
Noverificationofthereflectivenullcorrector'sdimensionswascarriedoutbyPerkin-
Elmeraftertheoriginalassembly.Therewere,however,clearindicationsoftheproblem
fromauxiliaryopticaltestsmadeatthetime,theresultsofwhichhavebeenstudiedbythe
Board.Aspecialopticalunitcalledaninversenullcorrector,designedtomimicthereflec-
tionfromaperfectprimarymirror,wasbuiltandusedtoaligntheapparatus;whenso
used,it clearlyshowedtheerrorin thereflectivenullcorrector.Asecondnullcorrector,
madeonlywithlenses,wasusedtomeasurethevertexradiusofthefinishedprimarymir-
ror.It,too,clearlyshowedtheerrorin theprimarymirror.Bothindicatorsoferrorwere
discountedatthetimeasbeingthemselvesflawed.
ThePerkin-Elmerplanforfabricatingtheprimarymirrorplacedcompleter liance
on thereflectivenullcorrectorastheonlytesttobeusedin bothmanufacturingand
verifyingthemirror'surfacewiththerequiredprecision.NASAunderstoodandaccepted
thisplan.ThismethodologyshouldhavealertedNASAmanagementto hefragilityofthe
processandthepossibilityofgrosserror,thatis,amistakeintheprocess,andtheneedfor
continuedcareandconsiderationfindependentmeasurements.
Thedesignofthetelescopeandthemeasuring instruments was performed well by
skilled optical scientists. However, the fabrication was the responsibility of the Optical
Operations Division at the Perkin-Elmer Corporation (P-E), which was insulated from re-
view or technical supervision. The P-E design scientists, management, and Technical Advi-
sory Group, as well as NASA management and NASA review activities, all failed to follow
the fabrication process with reasonable diligence and, according to testimony, were un-
aware that discrepant data existed, although the data were of concern to some members of
P-E's Optical Operations Division. Reliance on a single test method was a process which
was clearly vulnerable to simple error. Such errors had been seen in other telescope pro-
grams, yet no independent tests were planned, although some simple tests to protect against
major error were considered and rejected. During the critical time period, there was great
concern about cost and schedule, which further inhibited consideration of independent
tests.
The most unfortunate aspect of this HST optical system failure, however, is that the
data revealing these errors were available from time to time in the fabrication [v] process,
but were not recognized and fully investigated at the time. Reviews were inadequate, both
internally and externally, and the engineers and scientists who were qualified to analyze
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the test data did not do so in sufficient detail. Competitive, organizational, cost, and schedule
pressures were all factors in limiting full exposure of all the test information to qualified
reviewers ....
[9-1 ] CHAPTER IX
WHY THE ERROR WAS NOT DETECTED PRIOR TO FLIGHT
The explanations for why the HST error was not detected before launch can be
separated into two categories: factual and judgmental. Based on the test plan that was in
place at the time of the fabrication of the HST mirrors, the factual issues presented in this
Chapter were events that should have warned the Project personnel of the existence of a
problem. The judgmental issues that follow are conclusions based on the Board's own
expertise.
A. FACTUAL STATEMENTS
1 Complete reliance was placed on the reflective null corrector (RNC) to determine
the shape of the primary mirror, It was determined that the RNC would be certified only
by accurate measurement of the elements and the spacings. Although test philosophy placed
great emphasis on "certification" of the RNC, the Board could not find documentation
that the RNC was certified. In spite of the total reliance on the RNC, no independent
measurements were made of the optical-element spacings of the RNC to veri_, the values.
Although the RNC was designed so that spacings could be rechecked without disassembly,
the actual implementation did not permit such measurements, and no remeasurement of
spacings was made after initial assembly.
2. The erroneous measurement of the spacing of the field lens of the RNC led to the
need to install spacers to increase the separation of the field lens fi-om the lower mirror.
The bolts securing the field-lens basket were not staked, suggesting a lack of quality
surveillance, since securing bolts was a common and easily observable inspection to con-
duct. These anomalies should have led to a Material Review Board (MRB) approval docu-
ment and a thorough consideration of the cause. Although the NASA representative
recalls approving such an MRB, no documentation was found.
3. After the RNC was assembled in the laboratory, an INC was set up below the RNC.
The INC was intended to simulate a perfect mirror below the RNC so that any errors in the
null corrector could be detected. The interferograms taken when using the INC to align
the RNC/CORI indicated a spherical aberration pattern (see Figure D-3). The full RNC/
CORI assembly was then moved to the top of the optical telescope assembly test chamber,
and each time the primary mirror was tested the INC was used to check the alignment of
the setup. As before, the same spherical aberration distortion was evident in the fringes.
These aberration fringes [9-2] could not be aligned out and were incorrectly attributed to
the spacing errors in the lens system of the INC. Perkin-Elmer's Optical Operation Divi-
sion believed that the INC was not reliable when, in fact, it was quite accurate enough to
detect the gross error, and indeed did so.
4. The vertex radius measurement taken by the refractive null corrector (RvNC) in-
dicated the presence of spherical aberration (see Figure D-2). This information was dis-
missed, as it was in the case for the INC, because the RvNC was believed to be less precise
than the RaNC and therefore not reliable. It has been determined that the RvNC was easily
accurate enough to detect the spherical aberration the existed, and its reliability should
not have been discounted.
5.There were two other occasions when a careful analysis of the data might have
revealed the problem:
a. The primary mirror was ground and polished to an approximate shape, about
1 wavelength rms, using the RNC for the test. This took place at Perkin-Elmer's facility in
Wilton, Connecticut. The mirror was then transferred to P-E's Danbury facility, where the
RNC was the test instrument for final polishing. At the time of transfer, the interferograms
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obtained with the RvNC were compared with those obtained from the RNC, and the dis-
crepancy could have been noted. However, the data and the circumstances of transfer are
unclear, and the requirements for transfer appeared to be adequately met; therefore no
concern was noted.
b. After the assembly of the OTA, tests were performed to assure proper focus
position. Those tests were made with a 0.36-mn telescope (subaperture test), and careful
analysis of the data might have revealed the problem. However, the data were complicated
by gravity sag because the OTA was mounted horizontally, and only the focus position was
verified.
6. A range of feasible tests to verify the shape of the primary mirror were considered,
but not carried out. Finally, no end-to-end tests were planned or implemented to verify the
performance of the OTA.
B. JUDGMENTAL STATEMENTS
The following judgements are offered with the recognition that there were many
distraction and crises during this period-cost, schedule, threat of cancellation, mirror con-
tamination, possibility of mirror distortion caused by [9-3] mount, etc. Nevertheless, the
flaw occurred and, as can now be seen, these are factors that bear on that occurrence.
1. The proposal of P-E, accepted by NASA, to rely entirely on the RNC should have
alerted knowledgeable people in P-E and NASA that special attention was required to
certify the RNC; to the need for independent validation of the RNC and/or the primary
mirror; and to the need to examine and review the test data for any indications of inconsis-
tency. A project test plan that considered the various measurements, the possibilities of
error in each, and the feasibility of independent checks should have been prepared by the
implementing organization and externally reviewed.
2. The conclusion by P-E, accepted by NASA, that the RNC was the only device that
would yield an accuracy of 0.01 wave rms at 632.8 nm led P-E to fail to consider any inde-
pendent measurement which would yield less accuracy. In fact, such independent data
were obtained incidental to other measurements and were rationalized away due to this
mindset.
3. The HST development program was complex and challenging and there were
many issues demanding management attention; the primary mirror was only one of these.
Although the telescope was recognized as a particular challenge, with a primary mirror
requiring unprecedented performance, there was a surprising lack of participation by op-
tical experts with experience in the manufacture of large telescopes during the fabrication
phase. The NASA Project management did not have the necessary expertise to critically
monitor the optical activities of the program and to probe deeply enough into the
adequacy and competence of the review process that was established to guard against
technical errors. The record of reviews reveals no sensitively to in-process data and no
questioning of the test method.
4. The NASA Scientific Advisory Group did not have the depth of experience and
skill to critically monitor the fabrication and test results of a large aspheric mirror. How-
ever, this Group should have recognized the criticality of the figure of the primary mirror
and the fragility of the metrology approach, and these concerns should have impelled
them to penetrate the process and ask for validation.
5. A highly competitive environment existed between Perkin-Elmer and the Eastman
Kodak subcontractor. Although the manufacturing process and the method of measure-
ment for the backup primary mirror were reviewed and approved by P-E, there was limited
additional technical exchange of experience. NASA did not utilize the opportunity
offered by this directed subcontract to validate, and gain confidence in, the P-E approach
to the primary mirror manufacture.
[9-4] 6. Perkin-Elmer line management did not review or supervise their Optical
Operations Division adequately. In fact, the management structure provided a strong block
against communication between the people actually doing the job and higher level ex-
perts both within and outside of P-E.
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7.TheP-ETechnicalAdvisoryGroupdidnotprobeatalldeeplyintotheoptical
manufacturing processes and, although they recognized the fragility of the measuring
approach, they did not adequately assert their concerns or follow up with data reviews.
This is particularly surprising since the members were aware of the history of manufacture
of other Ritchey-Chretien telescopes, where spherical aberration was known to be a com-
mon problem.
8. The most capable optical scientists at P-E were involved closely with the produc-
tion of the 1.5-m demonstration mirror and the design of the HST mirror and the test
apparatus. However, fabrication of the HST mirror was the responsibility of the Optical
Operations Division of P-E, which did not include optical design scientists and which did
not use the skills external to the Division which were available at Perkin-Elmer.
9. The Optical Operations Division at P-E operated in a "closed-door" environment
which permitted discrepant data to be discounted without review. During the testimony, it
was indicated that some technical personnel in the Optical Operations Division were deeply
concerned at the time that the discrepant optical data might indicate a flaw. There are no
indications that these concerns were formally expressed outside this Division.
10. The quality assurance people at P-E, NASA, and DCAS (Defense Contract Admin-
istration Services, now Defense Contract Management Command) were not optical ex-
perts and, therefore, were not able to distinguish the presence of inconsistent data resuhs
from the optical tests. The DCAS people concentrated mainly on safety issues.
1 1. The basic product assurance requirements and formal review processes were
procedurally adequate to raise critical issues in most safety, material, and handling mat-
ters, but not in optical matters.
12. The inability of P-E to provide the Board with vital archival data on the design
and manufacture of the primary mirror is an indication of inadequate documentation
practices, which hampered the Board in determining the source of the primary mirror
error.
[ 10-1 ] CHAPTER X
LESSONS _LEARNED
A. IDENTIFY AND MITIGATE RISK
The Project Manager must make a deliberate effort to identify those aspects of the
project where there is a risk of error with serious consequences for the mission. Upon
recognizing the risks the manager must consider those actions which mitigate that risk.
[ 10-2] In this case, the primary mirror fabrication task was identified as particularly
challenging due to the stringent performance requirements. The contractor clearly speci-
fied in the proposal that total reliance would be placed on a single test instrument and
that no optical performance tests would be made at higher levels of assembly. Therefore,
OTA performance would be determined by component tests and great care in precision
assembly. Although NASA accepted this proposal, the methodology should have alerted
NASA management to the fragility of the process, the possibility of gross error (that is,
mistake in the process), and the need for continued care and consideration of indepen-
dent tests.
The history of spherical aberration in the primary mirrors of Ritchey-Chretien tele-
scopes was known to some of the optical scientists involved, but did not lead to specific
recommendations early in the Project. Late in the Project an advisory group did call out
the risk of gross error and suggested simple tests to check for such errors. This recommen-
dation was not seriously considered, primarily due to total lack of concern that such a risk
was reasonable, but also in view of cost and schedule problems.
Several methods of detecting the flaw were inherent in the testing, but Project man-
agement did not recognize the value of or need for independent tests. Project manage-
ment was concerned about the performance specifications and directed a subcontract to
Eastman Kodak Company for an alternate primary mirror. The Eastman Kodak mirror was
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fabricatedandtestedusingquitedifferenttechniques.Themirroror theinstrumentation
couldalsohaveservedascross-checksforgrosserror.Sucherrorcheckswerenotmade,
againduetototallackofconcernaboutthepossibilityofgrosserror.Projectmanagement
failedto identifyasignificantriskandthereforefailedtoconsidermitigatingactions.A
formaldisciplinesuchasfault-treeanalysismighthaveassistedthemanagerindirecting
hisattentiontothisrisk.
[10-3]B. MAINTAIN GOOD COMMUNICATION WITHIN THE PROJECT
While proper delegation of responsibility and authority is important, this delegation
must not restrict communication such that problems are not subject to review. In this case,
the Optical Operations Division of P-E was allowed to operated in an artisan, closed-door
mode. The impermeability of this Division seems astounding. The optical designers at P-E
did not learn how their designs were being implemented; e.g., if the designer of the null
correctors had been following their use, the data from the INC and the RNC likely would
not have been discounted. The data indicating the flaw was of great concern to some
members of the division. Testimony indicates that their concerns were addressed at the
level of the head of metrology and the division manager, but were not satisfied by the
decision to rely only on the RNC data and remained deeply concerned. Their concerns
and the data which caused them did not seem to come to the attention of anyone external
to the division. P-E management should have been sensitive and open to these concerns.
The P-E Technical Advisory Group should have found out what was going on in the Divi-
sion and insisted on reviewing in-process data. NASA Project management should have
been aware that communications were failing with the Optical Operations Division.
Contributing to poor communications was an apparent philosophy at MSFC at tile
time to resolve issues at the lowest possible level and to consider problems that surfaced at
reviews to be indications of bad management.
A culture must be developed in any project which encourages concerns to be ex-
pressed and which ensures that those concerns which deal with a potential risk to the
mission cannot be disposed without appropriate review, a review which includes NASA
project management.
C. UNDERSTAND ACCURACY OF CRITICAL MEASUREMENTS
The project manager must understand the accuracy of critical measurements. P-E
concluded, based on design considerations, that the RNC was the only test device which
could achieve the required precision. They stated that its performance could not be deter-
mined by optical test but would be determined by component and assembly measure-
ments which could be made in situ. P-E engineers regarded the RNC as "certified" and the
INC and RvNC as "uncertified." The terms were not defined, and "certifit.ation" was not
documented. P-E discounted evidence of spherical aberration from INC and RNC mea-
surements on the basis of "uncertified" status. In fact, the Board reviewed a recent as-built
error analysis of both devices. The review showed the RNC to be [10-3] accurate to
0.02 wave rms and the INC to 0.14 wave rms. This indicates that the INC is a factor of three
more accurate than the error observed in the INC/RNC interferograms. While in-process
data were not subject to external review, which is another lesson, the methodology of test
instrument use was reviewed by P-E and NASA management. This review could and should
have questioned the judgment not to use the INC or the RNC as independent checks of
the accuracy of the RvNC even though the precision was not to specification. Project man-
agement must understand critical tests and measurement.
In addition, the project management must seriously consider the classification of test
equipment that directly impacts the fight hardware. The RNC was classified as standard
test equipment, which means that the RNC was not subject to the rigorous documentation
and review requirements demanded of items classified as flight hardware equipment. Un-
der the contract, there were no Government regulations requiring that records for the
RNC be maintained. Considering the importance placed on the RNC in the test program,
management should have upgraded the level of classification of this equipment.
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Keydecisions,testresults,andchangesinplansandproceduresmustbeadequately
documented.Inpreparingsuchdocumentation,i dividualsareforcedtoreviewandex-
plaininconsistenciesin thetestdata.Thisalsoprovidesacommunicationli ktothose
individualswhoareresponsibleforoverseeingtheproject.
D.ENSURE CLEAR ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY
Project managers must ensure clear assignment of responsibility to QA and Engi-
neering. NASA QA personnel were not optical system experts, The Project relied upon
P-E Engineering to establish test and fabrication procedures, and P-E or NASA QA gener-
ally verified that Engineering approved and certified accomplishment of procedures,
However, at times, NASA management seemed to rely on QA to verify the adequacy of
procedures and the fact that they were satisfactorily accomplished. This lack of clarity
apparently led to incomplete documentation and may have contributed to faulty proce-
dures. The project manager must know what QA can and cannot do, and when it is
necessary to rely on engineering for verit;fing its own procedures, management should be
alert to the need for independent checks.
Quality assurance, to be truly effective, must have an independent reporting path to
top management.
[ 10-4] E. REMEMBER THE MISSION DURING CRISIS
There will be a period of crisis in cost or schedule during most challenging projects.
The project manager must be especially careful during such periods that the project does
not become distracted and fail to give proper consideration to prudent action. At one
point in the fabrication cycle of the primary mirror, an urgent recommendation for inde-
pendent tests to check for gross error entered the system, but was apparently not acted
upon. Again, at the completion of mirror polishing, the final review of data for a final
report was abandoned and the team reassigned as a cost-cutting measure.
E MAINTAIN RIGOROUS DOCUMENTATION
The project manager should ensure that documentation covering design, develop-
ment, fabrication, and testing is rigorously prepared, indexed, and maintained. Because
quality, at a minimum, consists in meeting requirements, it is not possible to determine
whether the necessary quality is being achieved if the requirements are not set forth in
sufficient detail and maintained in retrievable archival form. Adequate documentation
also helps maintain a disciplined approach to fabrication and testing processes, especially
with so complicated a project as the HST.
Document IV-20
Document title: Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.& Space Program,
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1990), pp. 47-48.
On July 25, 1990, the White House announced the creation of a blue-ribbon panel to
make a comprehensive assessment of the status of the U.S. civilian space program. This
announcement was the result of increasing dissatisfaction on the part of the National Space
Council with both NASA's response to President Bush's 1989 call for what came to be
known as the "Space Exploration Initiative" and NASA's technical and mangerial perfor-
mance as evidenced by the grounding of the space shuttle in June 1990 because of prob-
lems in its tirol lines and the discovery that the Hubble Space Telescope had been launched
with an improperly shaped primary mirror. The original intent was to have the panel
report only to the vice president in his role as the chairman of the National Space Council,
but NASA Administrator Richard Truly successfully argued that it should also report to
him. The panel was chaired by Martin Marietta Corporation Chief Executive Officer
Norman R. Augustine, and it was composed of a cross-section of individuals knowledge-
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ableaboutallaspectsof U.S.spacefforts.Thepanelheldaseriesofhearingsandcon-
ductedfact-findingvisitsaroundthecountrybetweenSeptemberandNovember1990.It
issueditsreportonDecember17,1990.Publishedherearetheprincipalrecommenda-tionsofthecommission.
[47] Principal Recommendations
This report offers specific recommendations pertaining to civil space goals and pro-
gram content as well as suggestions relating to internal NASA management. These are
summarized below in four primary groupings. In order to implement fully these recom-
mendations and suggestions, the support of both the Executive Branch and Legislative
Branch will be needed, and of NASA itself.
Principal Recommendations Concerning Space Goals
It is recommended that the United States' future civil space program consist of a
balanced set of five principal elements:
a science program, which enjoys highest priority within the civil space program,
and is maintained at or above the current fraction of the NASA budget (Recommenda-
tions 1 and 2);
- a Mission to Planet Earth (MTPE) focusing on environmental measurements
(Recommendation 3) ;
a Mission from Planet Earth (MFPE), with the long-term goal of human explora-
tion of Mars, preceded by a modified Space Station which emphasizes life-sciences, an
exploration base on the moon, and robotic precursors to Mars (Recommendations 4, 5, 6,
and 7);
- a significantly expanded technology development activity, closely coupled to space
mission objectives, with particular attention devoted to engines + a robust space transpor-
tation system (Recommendation 9).
Principal Recommendations Concerning Programs
With regard to program content, it is recommended that:
the strategic plan for science currently under consideration be implemented (Rec-
ommendation 2);
- a revitalized technology plan be prepared with strong input from the mission
offices, and that it be funded (Recommendation 8) ;
Space Shuttle missions be phased over to a new unmanned (heavy-lift) launch
vehicle except for mission where human involvement is essential or other critical national
needs dictate (Recommendation 9);
- Space Station Freedom be revamped to emphasize life-sciences and human space
operations, and include microgravity research as appropriate. It should be reconfigured
to reduce cost and complexity; and the current 90-day time limit on redesign should be
extended if a thorough reassessment is not possible in that period (Recommendation 6);
- a personnel module be provided, as planned, for emergency return from Space
Station Freedom, and that initial provisions be made for two-way missions in the event of
unavailability of the Space Shuttle (Recommendation 11).
Principal Recommendations Concerning Affordability
It is recommended that the NASA program be structured in scope so as not to
exceed a funding profile containing approximately 10 percent real growth per year through-
out the remainder of the decade and then remaining at that level, including but not
limited to the following actions:
- redesign and reschedule the Space Station Freedom to reduce cost and complexity
(Recommendation 6) ;
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- defer oi eliminate the planned purchase of another orbiter (Recommendation
10);
- place the Mission from Planet Earth on a "go-as-you-pay" basis, i.e., tailoring the
schedule to match the availability of fimds (Recommendation 5).
Principal Recommendations Concerning Management
With regard to management of the civil space program, it is recommended that:
- an Executive Committee of the Space Council be established which includes tile
Administrator of NASA (Recommendation 12) ;
- major reforms be made in the cMl service regulations as they apply to specialty
skills; or, if that is not possible, exemptions be granted to NASA for at least 10 percent of its
employees to operate under a tailored personnel system; or, as a final [48] alternative, that
NASA begin selectively converting at least some of its centers into university-affiliated Fed-
erally Funded Research and Development Centers (Recommendations 14 and 15);
- NASA management review the mission of each center to consolidate and refocus
centers of excellence in currently relevant fields with minimum overlap among centers
(Recommendation 13).
It is considered by the Committee that the internal organization of any institution
should be the province of, and at the discretion of, those bearing ultimate responsibility
for the performance of that institution ....
- That the current headquarters structure be revamped, disestablishing the positions
of certain existing Associate Administrators...
- an exceptionally well-qualified independent cost analysis group be attached to head-
quarters with ultimate responsibilily for all top-level cost estimating including cost esti-
mates provided outside of NASA;
- a systems concept and analysis group reporting to the Administrator of NASA be
established as a Federally Funded Research and Development Center;
- muhi-center projects be avoided wherever possible, but when this is not practical, a
strong and independent project office reporting to headquarters be established near the
center having the principle share of the work for that project; and that this project office
have a systems engineering staffand full budget authority (ideally industrial funding--i.e.,
trading allocations related specifically to end-goals).
In summary, we recommend:
1 ) Establishing the science program as tile highest priority dement of the civil space
program, to be maintained at or above the current fraction of the budget.
2) Obtaining exclusions for a portion of NASA's employees from existing civil ser-
',,ice rules or, failing that, beginning a gradual conversion of selected centers to Federally
Funded Research and Development Centers affiliated with universities, using as a model
theJet Propulsion Laboratory.
3) Redesigning the Space Station Freedom to lessen complexity and reduce cost,
taking whatever time may be required to do this thoroughly and innovatively.
4) Pursuing a Mission flom Planet Earth as a complement to the Mission to Planet
Earth, with the former having Mars as its very long-term goal--but relieved of schedule
pressures and progressing according to the availability of funding.
5) Reducing our dependence on the Space Shuttle by phasing over to a new un-
manned hea W lift launch vehicle for all but missions requiring human presence.
Tile Committee would be pleased to meet again in perhaps six months should the
NASA Administrator so desire, in order to assist on the implementation process. In the
meantime, NASA may wish to seek the assistance of its regular outside ad_q.sory group, the
NASA Advisory Council, to provide independent and ongoing advice for implementing
these findings.
Each of the recommendations herein is supported unanimously by the members of
tile Advisory Committee on tile Future of tile U.S. Space Program.
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1953, and Rockefeller University, 1953-1968.
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Percival Brundage (1892-1981) was the first deputy director and then director of the Bureau of the Budget, 1954-
1958. Thereafter, he went on to a series of business and financial positions.
Nikolai A. Bulganin _*"aschairman of the So_4et Council of Ministers, and he was heas41y involved in the negotia-
tions over the freedom of space issue in terms of flying over territories.
George H.W. Bush (1924- ) served as president of the United States between 1989 and 1993. Before that, he had
been a diplomat, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Cbk), and _ice president under Ronald Reagan
(1981-1989).
Va_evar Bush (1890-1974) was one of the most powerful members of the scientific and technological elite to
emerge during World War II. An aeronautical engineer on the faculty at the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy; Bush lobbied to create and then headed the National Defense Research Committee in 1940 to oversee science
and technolo_: in the federal government. Later, its name w_aschanged to the Office of Science Research and
Development, and Bush used it as a means to build a powerful infrastructure for scientific research in support of
the federal government. Although he went to the Carnegie Institution after the war, Bush remained a powerful
force in shaping post-war science and technology by serving on numerous federal ads4sory committees and pre-
paring several influential reports. See David Petechuk, Wannevar Bush," in EmilyJ. McMurray, et al., eds., Notable
7_,entiett_-Cemury Sctenti_ts (New _brk: Gale Research Inc., 1995), pp. 285-88.
Howard W. Cannon (1912- ) (D-NV) was first elected to the Senate in 1958 and served until 1983.
Jimmy Carter (192,t- ) was president of the United States between 1977 and !981. Previously, he had been a naval
officer and businessman before entering politics. He entered politics in the Georgia State Legislature (1962-1966)
and later served as the governor of Georgia (1971-1975).
Benjamin Chidlaw ( 1900- ) was a career U.S. Mr Force officer. He entered the U.S. Army Air Corps in 1924 as a
pilot and progressed through a series of ranks until he became chief of the Materiel Division at General Headquar-
ters, Ai'my Air Forces, in 1942. He was deputy commander of the Army Air Forces for _e Mediterranean Theater,
19,t4-1945, and deputy at the Air Material Command, 1945-1949. He served as commander of several research and
development organizaticms for the .Mr Force and retired as a four-star general in 1955.
William Clark was Ronald Reagan's assistant for National Security Affairs and chair of the Senior Interagency
Group (Space) that worked on the decision to develop the Space Station.
Arthur C. Clarke (1917- ), one of the most well-known science fiction authors, has also been an eloquent writer
on behalf of the exploration of space. In 1945, before the invention of the transistor, Clarke wrote an article in
Extraterrestrial Relays describing the possibility of geosynchronous orbit and the development of communication
relays by satellite. He also wrote several novels, and the most well-known was 2001: A Space Odyssey, based on a
screenplay of the same name that he prepared for Stanley Kubrick. The movie is still one of the most realistic
depictions of tiae rigors of spaceflight ever to be filmed.
Francis H. Clauser (1913- ) was a leading research aerodynamicist in academia and the aerospace industry until
the 1970s. He worked _ith the Douglas Aircraft Co., 193%1946, and served as chair of aerospace studies at The
Johns Hopkins University, 1946-1960. He then served in a variety of acadenfic appointments; from 1969 until
ietirement in 1980, he was the Clark B. Millikin Professor of Aerospace Engineering at the California Institute of
Technology.
AnsleyJohnson Coale ( 1917- ) received a Ph.D. from Princeton University in 1947 and worked in several capaci-
ties _ith the federal govermnent in social science and population statistics. He became a professor of economics at
Prin(et_n in 1947 and also directed the Office of Population Research between 1959 and 1973. He was especially
involved in research associated v_4Thpopulation loss from a nuclear holocaust.
William Congreve (1772-1828) of Great Britain was an artillery officer and inventor, who was best known for his
work on blac k powder rockets that could be used for bombardment of enemy fortifications. He based his rocketry
on the pioneering work of Indian prince Hyder All, who had successfully used them against the British in 1792 and
1799 at Seringapatam. Congreve's rockets were used in the Napoleonic Wars and in the War of 1812 (Frank H.
Winter, The Fim C_lden Age of Rocketry: Congreve and Hale Rocket._of the Nineteenth Century [Washington, DC: Smithsonian
Institution Press, 1990]).
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Donald Clarence Cook (1909-1981) was a government official, lawyer, and businessman who held numerous posts
from 1935 to 1945 in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as well as staff positions in other agencies
and in Congress before being appointed SEC member in 1949. In 1952 he became chair of the SEC. He joined the
American Electric Power Company in 1953, and he served as its president between 1962 and 1972 and as its chair
from 1971 to 1976 ("Cook, Donald C[larence] ," Current Biography 1982, p. 462).
Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) of Poland symbolized the spirit of scientific inquiry that came to dominate the
Renaissance. The son of a prosperous merchant, when his father died Copernicus was raised by his uncle, Lucas
Watzelrode, the Bishop of Ermland. He was educated at the University of Cracow, where he excelled at mathemat-
ics, and at the University of Bologna in Italy, where he began to study astronomy. Copernicus developed complex
models of movement for the Earth and other planets around the Sun. His _Heliocentric Solar System" concept
gained acceptance slowly, but a century after his death was accepted as the norm for the scientific community
(Edward Rosen, "Nicolaus Copernicus," Dictionary of Scient_c Biography [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971 ],
3: 401-402).
JohnJ. Corson (1905-1990) was a management consultant with McKinsey & Co. since 1951, remaining there until
1966. "12Keith Glennan contracted with McKinsey & Co. for a series of studies. These included: "Organizing
Headquarters Functions," two volumes, December 1958; "Financial Management--NASA-JPL Relationships," Feb-
ruary 1959; "Security and Safety--NASA-JPL Relationships," February 1959; "Facilities Construction--NASA-JPL
Relationships," February 1959; "Procurement and Subcontracting--NASA-JPL Relationships," February 1959;
"NASA-JPL Relationships and the Role of the Western Coordination Office," March 1959; "Providing Supporting
Services for the Development Operations Division," January 1960, on the transfer of the Army Ballistic Missile
Agency to NASA; "Report of the Advisory Committee on Organization," October 1960; and "An Evaluation of
NASA's Contracting Politics, Organization, and Performance," October 1960. All are in "T. Keith Glennan," corre-
spondence files, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Alan Cranston (1914- ) (D-CA) served in the U.S. Senate from 1969 to 1991.
Robert Cutler (1895-1974) was a lawyer and banking executive. He practiced law in Boston from 1922 to 1942 and
then became president and director of the Old Colony Trust Co., 1946-1953, and its chairman for the next several
years. He served as special assistant for security affairs for President Eisenhower, 1953-1960. From 1960 to 1962 he
served as executive director of the Inter-American Development Bank.
Cyrano de Rergerac, Savinien (1619-1655) was a French writer whose works combined political satire and fantasy.
As a young man, he joined the company of guards, but he was wounded at the siege of Arras in 1640 and retired
from military life. He then studied under philosopher and mathematician Pierre Gassendi, whose influence was
sigaaificant. His two best known written works were his two novels of spaceflight to the Moon. He has become
famous in the twentieth century largely through the 1897 novel by Edmond Rostand, who described him as a
gallant and brilliant, but ugly man with the large nose ("Cyrano de Bergerac, Savinien," The New Encyclopedia
Britannica [Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1987 ed.], 3: 829).
Edward E. David, Jr. (1925- ), served as science advisor to President Richard M. Nixon in 1970 and then as
director of the Office of Science and Technology. Previously, he had served as executive director of research of
Bell Telephone Laboratories, 1950-1970. For a discussion of the President's Science Advisory Committee, see
Gregg Herken, Cardinal Choices: Science Advice to the President from Hiroshima to SD1 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1992).
Merton E. Davies (191% ) was educated at Stanford University and worked at the Douglas Aircraft Co., 1940-
1948, and at the Rand Corporation since 1948. He served as a member of the U.S. delegation to the Surprise
Attack Conference in Geneva in 1958 and on the imaging teams of Mariner 6and 7in 1969, Mariner 9in 1971, and
Voyagerin 1977.
Kurt H. Debus (1908-1983) earned a B.S. in mechanical engineering (1933) and an M.S. (1935) and Ph.D. (1939)
in electrical engineering, all from the Technical University of Darmstadt in Germany. He became an assistant
professor at the university after receiving his degree. During the course of World War II, he became an experimen-
tal engineer at the A-4 (V-2) test stand at Peenemt'mde (see entry for Wernher yon Braun), rising to become
superintendent of the test stand and test firing stand for the rocket. In 1945, he came to the United States with a
group of engineers and scientists headed by yon Braun. From 1945 to 1950 the group worked at Fort Bliss, Texas,
and then moved to the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama. From 1952 to 1960 Debus was chief of the missile
firing laboratory of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency. In this position, he was located at Cape Canaveral, Florida,
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where he supervised the launching of the first ballistic missile fired from there, an Army Redstone. When the
Army Ballistic Missile Agency became part of NASA, Debus continued to supervise missile and space vehicle
launchings, first as director of the Launch Operations Center and then of the Kennedy Space Center (as it was
renamed in December 1963). He retired from that position in 1974 ("Kurt H. Debus," biographical file, NASA
Historical Reference Collection).
Thomas Digges was an astronomer and mathematician who modified Dante's medieval conceptions of the uni-
verse in his Description of the Caelestiall Orbes (1576), adopting a Copernican view that placed the Sun in the center
of the universe.
Everett Dirksen (1896-1969) (R-IL) served in the U.S, Senate from 1951 to 1969 and in the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives from 1933 to 1949. He served as the Republican leader in the Senate from 1959 until 1969 (Current
Biography 1969, p. 465).
Walt Disney (1901-1966) was the creator of Mickey Mouse and several other animated characters. In 1955 his
weekly television series aired the first of three programs related to spaceflight. The first of these, "Man in Space,"
premiered on March 9, 1955, with an estimated audience of 42 million. The second show, "Man and the Moon,"
also aired in 1955 and sported the powerful image of a wheel-like space station as a launching point for a mission
to the Moon. The final show, "Mars and Beyond," premiered on December 4, 1957, after the launching of Spumik
I (obituary in New York Times, December 16, 1966, p. 1).
Allen Frances Donovan ( 1914- ) was an accomplished aeronautical engineer who worked for several aeronautical
firms between 1936 and 1946. He then headed the aeronautical mechanics department at Cornell University from
1946 to 1955. He later became a corporate executive with the Aerospace Corporation, serving as senior vice
president, technical, 1960-1978. He also served on several government advisory boards, including the President's
Science Advisory Committee, 1959-1968.
James H. Doolittle (1896-1993) was a longtime aviation promoter, air racer, Air Force officer, and aerospace re-
search and development advocate. He had served with the U.S. Army Air Corps between 1917 and 1930, and then
he was manager of the aviation section for Shell Oil Co. between 1930 and 1940. In World War II Doolitde won
early fame for leading the April 1942 bombing of Tokyo, and then he was commander of a succession of air units
in Africa, the Pacific, and Europe. He was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general in 1944. After the war he was
a member of the Air Force's Scientific Advisory Board and the President's Scientific Advisory Committee. At the
time of Sputnik, he was chair of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and the Air Force Scientific
Ad'Asory Board. In 1985, the Senate approved his promotion in retirement to four-star general (General James H.
(Jimmy) Doolittle with Carroll V. Glines, I Could Never Be So Lucky Again: An Autobiography [New York: Bantam
Books, 1991] ; Carroll V. Glines, Jimmy Doolittle: Daredevil Aviator and Scientist [New York: Macmillan, 1972] ; _James
H. DoolitOe," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection).
Walter Dornberger (1895-1980) was Wernher yon Braun's military superior during the German rocket develop
ment program of World War II. He oversaw the effort at Peenemfinde to build the V-2, fostering internal commu-
nication and successfully advocating the program to officials in the German army. He also assembled the team of
highly talented engineers under yon Braun's direction and provided the funding and staff organization necessary
to complete the technology" project. After World War II Dornberger came to the United States and assisted the
Department of Defense with the development of ballistic missiles. He also worked for the Bell Aircraft Co. for
several years, helping to develop hardware for Project BOMI, a rocket-powered spaceplane. See Waiter R.
Dornberger, V-2, trans, by James Cleugh and Geoffrey Halliday (New York: Viking, 1958) ; Gerald L. Borrowman,
"Walter R. Dornberger," Spaceflight 23 (April 1981) : 118-19.
Russell C. Drew (1931- ) has been an influential physicist who served in the U.S. Navy from 1953 through 1973,
and he spent much of his career working on nuclear submarine ballistic missile programs. He also served as
assistant to the President's Science Advisor, 1966-1972, and director of the staff of the President's Space Task
Group. His last assignment, as a naval captain, was as the head of the Office of Naval Research (London). There-
after, he served as the director of the Science and Technology Policy Office of the National Science Foundation,
1973-1976, and in several capacities in the aerospace industry since 1976.
Hugh L. Dryden (1898-1965) was a career civil servant and an aerodynamicist by discipline who had also begun life
as something of a child prodigy. He graduated at age 14 from high school and went on to earn an A.B. in three
years from The Johns Hopkins (1916). Three years later (1919) he earned his Ph.D. in physics and mathematics
from the same institution, even though he had been a full-time employee of the National Bureau of Standards
since.June 1918. His career at the Bureau of Standards, which lasted until 1947, was devoted to stud?Ang airflow,
turbulence, and particularly the problems of the boundary layer--the thin layer of air next to an airfoil that causes
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drag.In1920hebecamechiefoftheaerodynamicssectioninthebureau. His work in the 1920s on measuring
turbulence in wind tunnels facilitated research in NACA that produced the laminar flow wings used in the P-51
Mustang and other World War II aircraft. From the mid-1920s to 1947, his publications became essential reading
for aerodynamicists around the world. During World War II his work on a glide bomb named the Bat won him a
Presidential Certificate of Merit. He capped his career at the Bureau of Standards by becoming its assistant direc-
tor and then associate director during his final two years there. He then served as director of NACA from 1947-
1958, after which he became deputy administrator of NASA under T. Keith Glennan and James E. Webb (Richard
IL Smith, The Hugh L Dryden Papers, 1898-1965 [Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Library, 1974] ).
Lee A. DuBrldge (1901- ), a physicist with a Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin (1926), became director of
the radiation laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology after an academic career capped to that
point by a deanship at the University of Rochester, 1938-1941. He was president of the California Institute of
Technology between 1946 and 1969, when he resigned to serve as science advisor to President Richard M. Nixon.
He had been involved in several governmental science advisory organizations before taking up his formal White
House duties in 1969 and serving in that capacity until 1970 ("Lee A. DuBridge," biographical file, NASA Histori-
cal Reference Collection).
Allen W. DuUes (1893-1969), younger brother of President Eisenhower's more famous secretary of state, served as
director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1953 to 1961.
John Foster Dulles (1888-1959) served as secretary of state under President Eisenhower, 1953-1959.
John S. Dunning (1892-1975) was a physicist who conducted the early experiments in nuclear fission that helped
lay the groundwork for developing the atomic bomb. He later became the dean of the School of Engineering at
Columbia University (obituary in New York Times, August 28, 1975, p. 36).
Frederick C. Durant 11I (1916- ) was heavily involved in rocketry in the United States between the end of World
War II and the mid-1960s. He worked for several different aerospace organizations, including Bell Aircraft Corp.,
Everett Research Laboratory, the Naval Air Rocket Test Station, and the Maynard Ordnance Test Station. He later
became the director of astronautics for the National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution. In addition,
he was an officer in several spaceflight organizations, such as president of the American Rocket Society (I 953),
president of the International Astronautical Federation (1953-1956), and governor of the National Space Club
(1961).
Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890-1969) was president of the United States between 1953 and 1961. Previously, he had
been a career U.S. Army officer and was Supreme Allied Commander in Europe during World War II. As presi-
dent, he was deeply interested in the use of space technology for national security purposes and directed that
ballistic missiles and reconnaissance satellites be developed on a crash basis. On Eisenhower's space efforts, see
Rip Bulkeley, The Sputniks Crisis and Early United States Space Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991);
R. Cargill Hall, "The Eisenhower Administration and the Cold War: Framing American Astronautics to Serve
National Security," Prologue: Quarterly of the National Archives 27 (Spring 1995): 59-72; Robert A. Divine, The .Sputnik
Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
John D. Erliehman was a senior assistant to the president during the Nixon administration. See John Erlichman,
Witness to Power: 1"he Nixon Years (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).
PhilipJ. Farley (1916- ) earr_ed a Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1941 and v,as on the faculty
at Corpus Christi Junior College from 1941 to 1942 before entering government work--for the Atomic Energy
Commission, 1947-1954, and for the State Department, 1954-1969. From 1957 to 1961 he was a special assistant to
the secretary of state for disarmament and atomic energy, and from 1961 to 1962 his responsibilities shifted to
atomic energy and outer space. After several years of assignment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
he returned to Washington and became deputy secretary of state for political-military affairs, 1967-1969. Then
from 1969 to 1973 he became deputy director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
William Finan was a staff member with the Bureau of the Budget during the Eisenhower administration. He was a
member of the Purcell Panel that assessed spaceflight capabilities for the U.S. government in 1957 and 1958.
Daniel J. Fink was chair of the NASA Advisory Council's Task Force that produced the 1983 "Study of the Mission
of NASA."
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James Brown Fisk (1910-1981) received his Ph.D. in physical science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy in 1935 and served in a variety of education al and industry positions. Most importandy, he was heavily involved
in work at Bell Telephone Labs, serving as president from 1959 (obituary in New York Times, August 13, 1981,
p. D21).
Peter M. Flanigan ( 1923- ) was an assistant to the president on the White House staff, 1969-1974. Previously, he
had been involved in investment banking with Dillon, Read, and Co. lie returned to business when he left govern-
ment service. His position in the White House from 1969 to 1972 involved him in efforts to gain approval to build
the Space Shuttle.
Alexander H. Flax (1921- ) was art aeronautical engineer, with a Ph.D, in physics, who worked in several impor-
tant positions in universities and industry. He worked for Curtiss-Wright, 1940-1944; the Piasecki Helicopter Cor-
poration, 1944-1946; and Cornell University, 1946-55. He served in scientific positions with the U.S. Air Force,
1955-1969, and as assistant secretary of the Air Force for research and development, 1963-1969. Thereafter, he
became _ice president for research for the Institute for Defense Analysis.
James C. Fletcher (1919-1991) was born on June 5, 1919, in Millburn, New Jersey. He received an undergraduate
degree in physics from Columbia University and a doctorate in physics from the California Institute of Technol-
o_'. After holding research and teaching positions at Harvard and Princeton Universities, he joined Hughes
Aircraft in 1948 and later worked for the Guided Missile Division of the Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation. In 1958
Fletcher co-founded the Space Electronics Corporation in Glendale, California, which after a merger became the
Space General Corporation. He was later named systems vice president of the Aerojet General Corporation in
Sacramento, California. In 1964 he became president of the University of Utah, a position he held until he gas
named NASA administrator in 1971. He served until 1977. He served as NASA administrator a second time, for
nearly three years following the loss of the Space Shutde Challengerin 1986 until 1989. During his first administra-
tion at NASA, Dr. Fletcher was responsible for beginning the Shuttle effort. During his second tenure he presided
over the effort to recover from the Challenger accident. See "Fletcher, James C., Administrator's Files," NASA
Historical Reference Collection.
Gerald R. Ford (1913- ) (R-MI) was elected to the House of Representatives in 1948 and served there until he
became vice president in 1973 following the resignation of Spirt T. Agnew. He then served as president, 1974-
1977, following Richard M. Nixon's resignation in the wake of the Watergate break-in.
William C. Foster, later the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, yeas President Eisenhower's
representative to the U.S./U.S.S.R. summit at Geneva, Switzerland, in 1955. One of his responsibilities _as to
obtain fi'eedom of space for overflight by spacecraft.
Robert A. Frosch (1928- ) was NASA administrator throughout the adminisuation of President Jimmy carter,
1977-1981. He earned undergraduate and graduate degrees in theoretical physics at Columbia University, and
between September 1951 and August 1963 he worked as a research scientist and director of research programs for
Hudson Laboratories of Columbia University. Until 1953 he worked on problems in underwater sound,
sonar, oceanography, marine geolog% and marine geophysics. Thereafter, Frosch was first associate and then di-
rector of the laboratories. In September 1963 Dr. Froscb came to Washington to work with the Advanced Research
Projects Agency (,Mq.PA), Department of Defense, serving as director for nuclear test detection (Project VELA)
and then as deput)' director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency. In July 1966 he became assistant secretary
for research and development for the Navy, responsible for all Navy programs of
research, development, engineering, test, and evaluation. From January 1973 to July 1975 he served as assistant
executive director of the United Nations Environmental Program. While at NASA Frosch was responsible for
overseeing the continuation of the development effort on the Space Shutde. During his tenure, the project under-
went testing of the first orbiter, EnterprL_e. at NASA's Dryden Flight Research Facility in southern California. The
orbiter made its first free flight in the atmosphere on August 12, 1977. He left NASA with the change of adminis-
trations in January 1981 to become vice president for research at the General Motors Research Laboratories. See
"Frosch, Robert A., Administrator's Files," NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Eugene G. Fubini (1913- ) _-as a noted physicist. A native of haly, he came to the United States in 1938 towork for
CBS and was responsible for microwave and international broadcasting. He worked for the U.S. military in $_,brld
War II and then in a succession of technical and scientific positions with the Department of Defense in the post-
war era, Since 1969 he has served as a consultant with Texas Instruments and IBM.
Craig Fuller was President Ronald Reagan's Cabinet secretary in the early 1980s and arranged for NASA's space
station proposal to be discussed at a meeting of the Cabinet Council for Commerce and Trade.
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YuriG_,m-ln(1934-1968)wastheSovietcosmonautwhobecameth first human in space with a one-orbit mission
aboard the spacecraft Vostok 1 on April 12, 1961. The great success of that feat made the gregarious Gagarin a
global hero, and he was an effective spokesman for the Soviet Union until his death in an unfortunate aircraft
accident.
Galileo Gnlilei (1564-1642) used the newly invented telescope to view the bodies of the universe and to develop to
its most advanced state in the pre-nineteenth century the "Heliocentric System" of the Solar System. Galileo made
four important observations that convinced him that Copernican cosmology was correct, as described by writers
Lloyd Motz and Jefferson Hane Weaver: "(1) the moon's surface is cratered and highly irregular, thus negating the
theory that celestial bodies are 'perfect'; (2) the phases of Venus and those of the moon are similar, proving that
Venus revolves around the sun and not around the earth; (3) four moons (satellites) revolve around Jupiter,
illustrating in miniature the Copernican model of the solar system; and (4) the Milky Way consists of numerous
points of light, which Galileo correctly interpreted as very distant stars" (p. 42). Galileo ran afoul of ecclesiastical
authorities because of his observations, but they quickly became the standard explanation for understanding the
workings of the universe (Lloyd Motz and Jefferson Hane Weaver, The Story of Physics [New York: Avon Books,
1992]).
Dave Garroway (1913-1982) was a television and radio personality who hosted the "Today Show" for NBC between
1952 and 1961 (obituary in New York Times, July 22, 1982, p. D22).
S. Everett Gleason (1905- ) was a longtime government official in the Department of State and for a time its
official historian.
1". Keith Glennma (1905-1995) was the first NASA administrator. Born in 1905 in Enderlin, North Dakota, Glennan
was educated at Yale University, and he then worked in the sound motion picture industry with the Electrical
Research Products Company. He was also studio manager of Paramount Pictures, Inc., and Samuel Goldwyn Stu-
dios in the 1930s. Glennan joined Columbia University's Division of War Research in 1942, serving through the
war, first as administrator and then as director of the U.S. Navy's Underwater Sound Laboratories at New London,
Connecticut. In 1947 he became president of the Case Institute of Technology. During his administration, Case
rose from a primarily local institution to rank with the top engineering schools in the nation. From October 1950
to November 1952 he served as a member of the Atomic Energy Commission. He also served as administrator of
N._SA while on leave from Case, between August 7, 1958, and January 20, 1961. Upon leaving NASA Glennan
returned to the Case Institute of Technology, where he continued to serve as president until 1966. SeeJ.D. Hunley,
ed., The Birth of NASA: The Diary of Z Keith Glennan (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4105, 1993).
Robert H. Goddard (1882-1945) was one of the three most prominent pioneers of roc kerry and spaceflight theory.
He earned his Ph.D. in physics at Clark University in 1911 and went on to become head of the Clark physics
department and director of its physical laboratories. He began to work seriously on rocket development in 1909
and is credited with launching the world's first liquid-propellant rocket in 1926. He continued his rocket develop-
ment work with the assistance of a few technical assistants throughout the remainder of his life. Although he
developed and patented many of the technologies later used on large rockets and missiles---including film cool-
ing, gyroscopically controlled vanes, and a variable-thrust rocket motor---only the last of these contributed directly
to the furtherance of rocketry in the United States. Goddard kept most of the technical details of his inventions a
secret and thus missed the chance to have the kind of influence his real abilities promised. At the same time, he
was not good at integrating his inventions into a workable system, so his own rockets failed to reach the high
altitudes he sought. See Milton Lehman, Robert H. Goddard: A Pioneer of Space Research (New York: Da Capo, 1988);
J.D. Hunley, "The Enigma of Robert H. Goddard," Technology and Culture 36 (April 1995--forthcoming).
HarryJ. Goett (1910- ) earned a degree in physics from Holy Cross College in 1931 and one in aeronautical
engineering from New York University in 1933. After holding a number of engineering posts with private firms, he
became a project engineer at Langley Aeronautical Laboratory in 1936. He later moved to Ames Aeronautical
Laboratory, where he was chief of the full-scale and flight research division, 1948-1959. During the the last year at
Ames he became director of the Goddard Space Flight Center, a post he held until July 1965, when he became a
special assistant to NASA AdminisrratorJames E. Webb. Later that year he became director for plans and programs
at Philco's Western Development laboratories in California and ultimately retired from a position with Ford
Aerospace and Communications ('HarryJ. Goett," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection).
Barry M. Goldwater (1909- ) (R-AZ) was a U.S. senator from 1953 to 1965. In 1964 he ran unsuccessfully for
president of the United States against LyndonJohnson. He was an outspoken conservative and became the leader
and later elder statesman for the right wing of the Republican party.
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AndrewJacksonGoodpaster(1915-) was a career Army officer who served as defense liaison officer and secre-
tary of the White House staff from 1954 to 1961, being promoted to brigadier general during that period. He later
was deputy commander, U.S. forces in Vietnam, 1968-1969, and commander-in-chief, U.S. Forces in Europe, 1969-
1974. He retired in 1974 as a four-star general but returned to active duty in 1977 and served as superintendent of
the U.S. Military Acadeiny, a post he held until his second retirement in 1981.
William R. Graham ( 1937- ), with a Ph.D. in physics from the California Institute of Technology and a Ph.D. in
electrical engineering from Stanford University, was a founder and executive of R&D Associates, Marina Del Rey,
California, and became deputy administrator of NASA on November 25, 1985. In 1980 Graham served as an
advisor to candidate Ronald Reagan and was a member of the president-elect's transition team. Graham had also
served for three years prior to coming to NASA as chair of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and
Disarmament. Graham left NASA in October 1986 to become director of the White House Office of S_:ience and
Technology Policy, a position he held until June 1989 when he left government service to join Jaycor, a high-
technology company headquartered in San Diego, California. See "Graham, William R., Deputy
Administrator Folders," NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Virgil I. "Gus" Grissom (1927-1967) was chosen ,_ith the first group of astronauts in 1959. He was the pilot for the
1961 Mercury-Redstone 4 (Liberty Bell 7) mission (a suborbital flight), command pilot for Gemini lIl, and backup
command pilot for Gemini VI. He had been selected as commander of the first Apollo flight at the time of his death
in the Apollo fire in January 1967. See Betty Grissom and Henry Still, Staff all (New York: Thomas Y Crowell,
1974); The Astronauts Themselves, B_ Seven (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962).
Aristid V. Grosse ( 1905- ) was born in Riga, Russia, and trained in engineering at the Technische Hochschule in
Berlin. He came to the United States in 1930 and was on the chemistry faculty at the University of Chicago, 1931-
1940. He then went to Columbia University briefly before working on the Manhattan Project during the war years.
In 1948 he became a facuhy member at Temple University, presiding over the Research Institute (now Franklin
Institute) through 1969.
Fritz Haber (1868-1934) was a German research chemist who received the Nobel Prize for developing nitrates
from ammonia, which were put to numerous agricultural and industrial uses.
John P. Hagen (1908-1990) was director of the Vanguard program during the 1950s. He had been an astronomer
at Wesleyan University, 1931-1935, before working for the Naval Research Laboratory, 1935-1958. With the cre-
ation of NASA, he became the assistant director of spaceflight development, 1958-1960, and in 1962 he returned
to higher education, becoming a professor of astronomy at Pennsylvania State University (obituary in New York
Times, September 1, 1990, p. 25).
James c. Hagerty (190%1981) had been on the staff of the New York Times from 1934 to 1942, the last four years as
legislative correspondent in the paper's Albany bureau. He served as executive assistant to New York Governor
Thomas Dewey from 1943 to 1950 and then as Dewey's secretary for the next two years, before becoming press
secretary for President Eisenhower from 1953 to 1961.
Edward Everett Hale (1822-1909) was a writer in the United States during the middle part of the nineteenth
century. He was best known for his short story "The Man Without a Country," about a conspirator in the 1803
attempt of Aaron Burr to create a separate nation in the ,Mnerican West. He was widely regarded as one of the
foremost literary figures of his time and was the primary speaker at the dedication of the Civil War cemetery in
Gettysburg in 1863, at which Abraham Lincoln gave his famous address (Jean Holloway, Edward Everett Hale: A
Biography [Austin: University of Texas Press, 1956]).
Donald H. Heaton was an Air Force officer who from 1951 to 1957 as a lieutenant colonel and colonel had served
on various subcommittees of the NACA committee on power plants for aircraft as well as on the committee itself.
Available information does not indicate just when he joined NASA headquarters, but the August 1959 telephone
directory shows him working in the office of the assistant director of propulsion within the Office of Space Flight
Development. He served in a variety of positions connected with launch vehicles, and in June 1961 Associate
Administrator Robert Seamans appointed him chairman of an ad hoc task group to formulate plans and deter-
mine the resources necessary to carry out a manned lunar landing. His group submitted its summary report in
August 1961. He appears to have left NASA headquarters sometime between June and October 1963. See "Donald
H. Heaton," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection and headquarters telephone directories for
the period; on his committee's report, see especially Cour tney G. Brooks,James M. Grimwood, and Loyd S. Swenson,
Jr., Chariots for Apollo: A History of Manned Lunar Spacecraft (Washington, DC: NASA SP_,205, 1979), pp. 45, 70-72.
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E F_Award Hebert (1901-1979) (D-LA) was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1932 and came to
Washington as part of the Democratic sweep that led to the "New Deal" legislation of 1933-1935. He retired from
office in 1976 after being stripped of his chairmanship of the House Armed Services Committee (obituary in New
York Times, December 31, 1979, p. A13).
Robert A. Heinlein (1907-1988) was a well-known science fiction author who began publishing stories before
World War II and continued a celebrated career until his death. He published more than sixty books; among the
best known were Starship Troopers (1952), Stranger in a Strange Land ( 1961), and The Moon is a Harsh Mistress (1966)
(obituary in New York Times, May 10, 1988, p. D2).
Klaus 13.Heiss ( 1942- ) is an Austrian-born economist who prepared a major economic feasibility study for the
Space Shuttle program in 1971. He later worked with Econ, Inc., and founded and headed Space Transportation
Corp., in Princeton, New Jersey. See "Heiss, Klaus P.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection,
Christian A. Herter (1895-1966) was under secretary of state, 1957-1959, and then succeeded John Foster Dulles as
secretary of state from 1959-1961. He never achieved the level of mutual understanding with President Eisenhower
that Dulles had enjoyed, however, and thus failed to have the sort of influence in developing the administration's
foreign policy th at his predecessor had achieved (Chester A. Pach and Elmo Richardson, The Presidency ofDwight D.
Eisenhower [Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1987], p. 204).
Harry H. Hess (1906-1969) was one of the senior scientists involved in analyzing the lunar samples returned to
Earth by Project Apollo. Blair Professor of Geology at Princeton University, he was chair of the Space Science
Board of the National Academy of Sciences during the Apollo era.
William M. Holnday ( 1901- ) was special assistant to the secretary of defense for guided missiles between 1957
and 1958. He was then Department of Defense director of guided missiles in 1958 and chairman of the civilian-
military liaison committee, 1958-1960. Previously, Holaday had been associated with a variety of research and
development activities, notably as director of research for the Socony-Mobit Oil Co., 1937-1944 ('William M.
Holaday," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection).
D. Brainard Holmes ( 1921- ) was involved in the management of high-technology efforts in private industry and
the federal government. He was on the staff of Bell Telephone Laboratories, 1945-1953, and at RCA, 1953-1961.
He then became deputy associate administrator for manned spaceflight at NASA, 1961-1963. Thereafter, he as-
sumed a series of increasingly senior positions with Raytheon Corp., and he served as chairman of Beech Aircraft
since 1982. See "D. Brainard Holmes," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection; "Holmes, D(yer)
Brainard," Current Biography 1963, pp. 191-92.
Donald E Hornig (1920- ), a chemist, was a research associate at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Laboratory,
1943-1944, and a scientist and group leader at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 1944-1946. He taught chem-
istry at Brown University starting in 1946, rising to the directorship of Metcalf Research Laboratory, 1949-1957,
and also serving as associate dean and acting dean of the graduate school from 1952 to 1954. He was Donner
Professor of Science at Princeton from 1957 to 1964, as well as chairman of the chemistry department from 1958
to 1964. He was a special assistant to the U.S. president on science and technology from 1964 to 1969 and presi-
dent of Brown University from 1970 to 1976. See Gregg Herken, Cardinal Choices: Science Advice to the President frora
Hiroshima to SDI (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
Norman H. Horowitz (1915- ) was a biologist educated at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech),
receiving a Ph.D. in 1939. He made a career as a scientist at both Cahech and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in
Pasadena, California. At the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, he worked as a scientist on the Viking Mars lander
program.
Hubert H. Humphrey (1911-1978) (D-MN) served in the U.S. Senate, 1949-1964 and 1971-1978. As a senator, he
pressed for the creation of a Cabinet-level Department of Science and Technology in early 1958, which was de-
feated by the president's proposal to establish NASA. He was vice president of the United States between 1965 and
1968 under LyndonJohnson (obituary in New York Times, January 14, 1978, p. 1).
Jerome C. Htmsaker (1886-1984) was a senior aeronautical engineer at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
He was heavily involved in the development of the science of flight in America for the first three-quarters of the
twentieth century. See Roger D. Launius, "Jerome C. Hunsaker," in EmilyJ. McMurray, et al., eds., Not_,blr Twentieth-
Century Scientists (New York: Gale Research Inc., 1995), pp. 980-81.
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HenryM. ("Scoop') Jackson (1912-1983) (D-WA) was first elected to the House of Representatives in 1940 and to
each succeeding Congress until 1952, when he was elected to the Senate, where he served until the mid-1980s.
During the Eisenhower administration he was a leading advocate of greater attention to the development of the
U.S. missile program.
RobertJastrow ( 1925- ) earned a Ph.D. in theoretical physics from Columbia in 1948 and pursued post-doctoral
studies at Leiden, Princeton (Institute for Advanced Studies), and the University of California at Berkeley before
becoming an assistant professor at Yale, 1953-1954. He then served on the staff at the Naval Research Laboratory
from 1954 to 1958. In the last year he was appointed chief of the theoretical division of the Goddard Space Flight
Center. He became director of the Goddard Institute of Space Studies in 1961 and stayed at its helm for twenty'
years before becoming professor of earth sciences at Dartmouth. He specialized in nuclear physics, plasma phys-
ics, geophysics, and the physics of the Moon and terrestrial planets ("Robert Jastrow," biographical file, NASA
Historical Reference Collection).
Clarence L (Kelly) Johnson (1910-1990) was one of the foremost aircraft designers in the United States. As the
head of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation's famous "Skunk Works" design center, he headed the effort to build
the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft in the 1950s. He also worked on the F-80 "Shooting Star," which was the first U.S.
jet aircraft, and the SR-71 "Blackbird" reconnaissance plane that still holds speed records. During World War II he
was also responsible for the design of the P-38 twin-tailed fighter, "Lightning." He worked for Lockheed from 1933
until his retirement as senior vice president in 1975. See Clarence L. "Kelly"Johnson with Maggie Smith, Kelly:
More Than My Share of it All (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1985).
Louis A. Johnson (1891-1966) was the assistant Secretary of the U.S. Department of War (1937-1940) and then
secretary of defense, 1949-1950. See obituary in New York Times, April 25, 1966, p. 31.
Lyndon B. Johnson (1908-1973) (D-TX) was elected to the House of Representatives in 1937 and served until
1949. He was a senator from 1949 to 1961, vice president of the United States under President Kennedy from 1960
to 1963, and president from then until 1969. Best known for the social legislation he passed during his presidency
and for his escalation of the war in Vietnam, he was also highly instrumental in revising and passing the legislation
that created NASA and in supporting the U.S. space program as chairman of the Committee on Aeronautical and
Space Sciences and of the preparedness subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. He was later
effective as chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council when he was vice president (On his role in
support of the space program, Robert A. Divine, "Lyndon B.Johnson and the Politics of Space," in Robert A.
Divine, ed., The Johnson Years: Vzetnara, the Environment, and Science [Lawrence: University, of Kansas Press, 1987], pp.
217-53; Robert Dallek, ':Johnson, Project Apollo, and the Politics of Space Program Planning," unpublished paper
delivered at a symposium on "Presidential Leadership, Congress, and the U.S. Space Program," sponsored by
NASA and American University, March 25, 1993.)
U. Alexis Johnson (1908- ) was a longtime member of the U.S. Foreign Service and served in a numbe: of
embassies around the world. A specialist in Asian affairs, he was attached to the embassy in Tokyo, 1935-1938;
consul general to Japan, 1947-1949; and ambassador to Japan, 1966-1969. He served on several international
commissions and in numerous senior positions with the Department of State in Washington, D.C., most signifi-
cantly as under secretary of state for political affairs beginning in 1969 until his retirement.
S. Paul Johnston was director of the Institute for Aeronautical Sciences. He was also a member of the 1957-1958
Purcell Panel that assessed spaceflight capabilities for the U.S. government.
Joseph Kaplan (1902-1991) was born in Tapolcza, Hungary, and came to the United States in 1910. He trained as
a physicist at The Johns Hopkins University and worked on the faculty of the University of California at Berkeley
from 1928 until his retirement in 1970. He directed the university's Institute of Geophysics, later the Institute of
Geophysics and Planetary Physics, from the time of its creation in 1944. Kaplan was heavily involved in efforts in
the 1950s to launch the first artificial Earth satellite, serving as the chair of the U.S. National Committee for the
International Geophysical Year, 1953-1963. See "Kaplan, Joseph," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference
Collection;Joseph Kaplan, "The Aeronomy Story: A Memoir," in R. Cargill Hall, ed., Essays on the History of Rockary
and Astronautic.s: Proceedings of the Third Through the Sixth History Symposia of the International Academy of Astronautics
(Washington, DC: NASA Conference Publication 2014, 1977), 2: 423.27; Joseph Kaplan, "I'he ICY Program,"
Proceedings of the IRE,:june 1956, pp. 741-43.
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Theodore you lgdu'mfm (1881-1963) was a Hungarian aerodynamicist who founded the Aeronautical Institute at
Aachen before World War I and achieved a world<lass reputation in aeronautics through the 1920s. In 1930
Robert A. Millikan and his associates at the California Institute of Technology lured yon l_arm_n from Aachen to
become the director of the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory at Caltech (GALCIT). There, he trained a
generation of engineers in theoretical aerodynamics and fluid dynamics. With its eminence in physics, physical
chemistry, and astrophysics as well as aeronautics, it proved to be an almost ideal site for the early development of
U.S. ballistic rocketry. See Judith R. Goodstein, Millikan's School: A History of California Institute of Technology (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1991); Clayton R. Koppes, JPL and the American Space Program: A History of theJet Prc?ulsion
Laboratory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Michael H. Gorn, The UniversalMan: Theodore yon KairmAn's
Life in Aeronautics (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992).
Amron Harry Katz (1915- ) was a physicist who worked with the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, California,
between 1954 and 1969. He was a specialist in aerospace reconnaissance.
Willlam W. Kellogg ( 1917- ) was a meteorologist with the RarM Corporation between 1947 and 1959. Thereafter,
he held a senior position with the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Boulder, Colorado.
John E Kennedy (1916-1963) was president of the United States, 1961-1963. In 1960 Kennedy, a senator from
Massachusetts between 1953 and 1960, ran for president as the Democratic candidate, with party "wheelhorse"
Lyndon B.Johnson as his running mate. Using the slogan, "Let's get this country moving again," Kennedy charged
the Republican Eisenhower administration with doing nothing about the myriad social, economic, and interna-
tional problems that festered in the 1950s. He was especially hard on Eisenhower's record in international rela-
tions, taking a "cold warrior" position on a supposed "missile gap" (which turned out not to be the case) wherein
the United States lagged far behind the Soviet Union in ICBM technology. On May 25, 1961, President Kennedy
announced to the nation a goal of sending an American to the Moon before the end of the decade. The human
spaceflight imperative was a direct outgrowth of it; Projects Mercury (at least in its latter stages), Gemini, and
Apollo were each designed to execute it. On this subject, see Walter A. McDougall .... The Heavens and theEarth:
A Political History of the Space Age (New York: Basic Books, 1985);John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon:
Project Apollo and the National Interest (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970).
Robert F. Kennedy (1925-1968) was attorney general during the administration of his brother, John E Kennedy,
and a candidate for the Democratic nomination for the presidency in 1968 at the time of his assassination. He was
involved in the 1961 decision to go to the Moon as a senior advisor (as well as attorney general) in the Kennedy
administration, On his career, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1978).
Johann Kepler (1571-1630), a young German astronomer, began work with Tycho Brahe in Prague, Czechoslova-
kia, in 1599. When Brahe died in 1601, Kepler inherited his position and continued his observations for a method
of mathematically solidifying the Copernican view of the universe. He developed his three laws of planetary mo-
tion, and he was interested in cosmology and dabbled in astrology. His last book, Somnium, was completed shortly
before his death and related a fantastic story of space travel that was memorable for its exposition of the Coperni-
can model to explain planetary motion (Owen Gingerich, ']ohnnes Kepler, _ Dictionary of Scientific Biography [New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970], 7: 289-90).
Robert S. Kerr (1896-1963) (D-OK) had been governor of Oklahoma from 1943-1947 and was elected to the
Senate the following year. From 1961 until 1963 he chaired the Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee. See
Anne Hodges Morgan, Robert S. Kerr: The Senate Years (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1977).
George A. Keyworth II (1939- ) was director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy and science advisor
to President Ronald Reagan between 1981 and 1986. Formerly the head of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory,
Keyworth was a Ph.D. in nuclear physics from Duke University in 1968. He began work at Los Alamos after gradu-
ation and remained there until 1981. See "Keyworth, George A(lbert), 2d," Current Biography Yearbook 1986,
pp. 265-68.
Nikita S. IQua_hchev (1894-1971) was premier of the Soviet Union from 1958 to 1964 and first secretary of the
Communist Party from 1953 to 1964. He was noted for an astonishing speech in 1956 denouncing the crimes and
blunders of Joseph Stalin and for gestures of reconciliation with the West in 1959-1960, ending with the break-
down of a Paris summit with President Eisenhower and the leaders of France and Great Britain in the wake of
Khrushchev's announcement that the Soviets had shot down an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over the
Urals on 1 May 1960. Then in 1962 Khrushchev attempted to place So_fiet medium-range missiles in Cuba. This led
to an intense crisis in October, after which Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles if the United States promised
to make no more attempts to overthrow Cuba's Communist government. Although he could be charming at
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times, Khrushchev was also given to bluster (extending even to shoe-pounding at the U.N.) and was a tough
negotiator, although he believed, unlike his predecessors, in the possibility of Communist victory over the West
without war. For further information about him, see his Khrushch_ Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1974); Edward Crankshaw, lO_rushchev: A Career (New York: Viking, 1966); Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday:
Eisenhoweg, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (New York: Harper and Row, 1986); Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the
Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).
James R. Kilfian, Jr. (1904-1988), was president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technolog 3, (MIT) between 1949
and 1959. He w_ason leave between November 1957 and July 1959 when he served as the first presidential science
advisor. President Dwight D. Eisenhower established the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), which
Killian chaired, following the Sputnik crisis. After leaving the White House staff in 1959, Killian continued his
work at MIT, but in 1965 he began working with the Corporation for Public Broadcasting to develop public televi-
sion. Killian described his experiences as a presidential advisor in Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A t_.'lemoir of the
First SpecialAssistant to the President for Science and Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977). For a discussion of
the PSAC, see Gregg Herken, Cardinal Choices: Science Advice to the President from Hiroshima to SDI (New Sbrk: Oxford
University Press, 1992).
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick (1926- ) was U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
Henry Kissinger (192% ) was assistant to the president for national security affairs, 1969-1973, under President
Richard Nixon and secretary of state thereafter until 1977 under Nixon and President Gerald Ford. In these
positions he was especially involved in international aspects of spaceflight, particularly the joint Soviet/American
flight, the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, in 1975.
George B. Kisfiakowsky (1900-1982) was a pioneering chemist at Harvard University, associated with the develop-
ment of the atomic bomb, and later an advocate of banning nuclear weapons. He served as science advisor to
President Eisenhower from.July 1959 to the end of the administration. He later served on the ads_isory board to
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1962 to 1969 (New York Times, December 9, 1982, p. B21; "George
B. Kistiakowsky," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection).
William E Knowland (1908-1974) (R-CA) served in the Senate between 1945 and 1959 ( Washington Post, October
5, 1959, p. C3; Guide to Research Collections of Former United States Senators, 1789-1982 [Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1983], p. 291).
Joseph J. Knopow was a young Lockheed engineer who helped develop an infrared radiometer and telescope to
detect the hot exhaust gases emitted by long-range jet bombers and, more important, large rockets in the mid-
1950s. This aircraft-tracker and missile-detection system became a standard method of targeting enemy air- and
spacecraft.
Melvin laird (1922- ) was secretary of defense during the Nixon administration.
Edwin Land w-as president of the Polaroid Corporation, as weU as a member of the 1957-1958 Purcell Panel that
assessed spaceflight capabilities for the U.S. government.
Harold Lasswell (1902-1978) was a political scientist at Yale University. He was especially interested in pubic opin-
ion polling, the uses of propaganda, and the democratic political process.
James S. Lay, Jr. (1911-1987), was a senior official in the Nadonal Security Council, first as assistant executive
secretary, 1947-1950, and then as executive secretary, 1950-1961. He then served as deputy assistant to the director
of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 1961-1964, and the executive secretary of the Intelligence Board through
1971.
Tom Lehrer (1928- ) w"as a satirist who wrote and recorded several folk songs in the 1960s that made light of
current events. His last album, That IVa._ the Year That 1Va.g(1965), contained the satirical song "Wernher yon
Braun," dealing with the relationship of science to ethics. See "Lehrer, Tom," Current Biography 1982, pp. 227-30.
Curtis E. LeMay (1906-1990) was a career Air Force officer who entered the Army Air Corps in the 1920s and rose
through a series of increasingly responsible Army Air Forces commands in World War II. After the war, LeMay
built the Strategic Air Command into the premier nuclear deterrent force in the early 1950s. He also served as
deputy chief of staff, 1957-1961, and chief of staff, 1961-1965, of the U.S. Air Force. He retired as a four-star
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generalin1965,andheranfor vice president with independent candidate George C. Wallace in 1968. See
Thomas M. Coffey, Iron Eagle: The Turbulent Life of General Curtis LeMay (New York: Crowaa Pub., 1986).
Samuel Lenher (1905- ) was a chemical manufacturing executive with the Dupont Corporation in Wilmington,
Delaware, from 1929 until his retirement.
Willy Ley (1906-1969) was an extremely effective popularizer of spaceflight, first in Germany and then after 1935
in the United States, to which he emigrated after Hitler's ascension to power. He helped found the large and
significant German "Verein fur Raumschiffahrt" (Society for Spaceship Travel, or VfR) in 1927. He also wrote
several books that dealt with the dream of spaceflight. One of the most important was Rockets: The Future of Travel
Beyond the Stratosphere, first published in 1944. In it Ley labored to convince interested readers that rockets would
soon be able to carry humans offthe surface of the Earth. One of the earliest books on rocketry for the general
public, this work became a reference source for future science fiction and reality writing. A revised edition ap-
pearefl in 1947, rifled Rockets and Space Travel, and another in 1952, Rockets, Missiles, and Space Travel. An obituary
can be found in the New York Times, June 25, 1969, p. 47.
Charles A. Lindbergh (1902-1974) was an early aviator who gained fame as the first pilot to fly solo across the
Atlantic in 1927. His public stature following this flight was such that he became an important voice on behalf of
aerospace activities until his death. He served on a variety of national and international boards and committees,
including the central committee of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics in the United States. He
became an expatriate living in Europe, following the kidnapping and murder of his two-year-old son in 1932. In
Europe during the rise of fascism, Lindbergh assisted American aviation authorities by providing them with infor-
marion about European technological developments. After 1936 be was especially important in warning the United
States of the rise of Nazi air power. He assisted with the war effort in the 1940s by serving as a consultant to aviation
companies and the government, and after the war he lived quietly in Connecticut and then in Hawaii. See Walter
S. Ross, The Last Hero: Charles A. Lindbergh (New York: Harper and Row, 1967). .
James E. Lipp (1910- ) earned a Ph.D. in aeronautical engineering from the California Institute of Technology
in 1935, and he then worked for the Douglas Aircraft Co., 1935-1948. Thereafter, he went to work for the Rand
Corporation and eventually headed its aerospace division.
Man M. Lovelace (1929- ) was bern in St. Petersburg, Florida, and wa.s educated at the University of Florida,
Gainesville, receiving a B.S. in chemistry in 1951, an M.S. in organic chemistry in 1952, and a Ph.D. in organic
chemistry in 1954. Shortly after the end of the Korean conflict, he served in the U.S. Air Force from 1954 to 1956.
Thereafter, Dr. Lovelace began work as a government scientist at the Air Force Materials Laboratory at Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. In January 1964 he was appointed chief scientist of the Air Force
Materials Laboratory. In 1967 he was named director of the Air Force Materials Laboratory, and in October 1972
he was named director of science and technology for the Air Force Systems Command at headquarters, Andrews
Air Force Base, Maryland. In September 1973 he became the principal deputy to the assistant secretary of the Air
Force for research and development. In September 1974 Dr. Lovelace left the Department of Defense to become
the associate administrator of the NASA Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology. With the departure of
George Low as NASA deputy administrator in June 1976, Dr. Lovelace became deputy administrator, serving until
July 1981. He retired from NASA to accept a position as corporate vice president--science and engineering with
the General Dynamics Corporation in St. Louis, Missouri. See "Lovelace, Alan M.," Deputy Adm_.nistrator files,
NASA Historical Reference Collection.
George M. Low (1926-1984), a native of Vienna, Austria, came to the United States in 1940 and received an
aeronautical engineering degree from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) in 1948 and an M.S. in the same
field from that school in 1950. He joined NACA in 1949, and at the Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory, he special-
ized in experimental and theoretical research in several fields. He became chief of manned spaceflight at NASA
headquarters in 1958. In 1960 he chaired a special committee that formulated the original plans for the Apollo
lunar landings. In 1964 he became deputy director of the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, the forerunner
of the Johnson Space Center. He became deputy administrator of NASA in 1969 and served as acting administra-
tor from 1970 to 1971. He retired from NASA in 1976 to become president of RPI, a position he still held at his
death. In 1990 NASA renamed its quality and excellence award after him ("Low, George M.," Deputy Administra-
tor files, NASA Historical Reference Collection).
Percival Lowell (1855-1916) was the U.S. astronomer who predicted the existence of the planet Pluto. A Boston
Brahmin, Lowell was a gendeman scholar who was involved in literature, writing several books on his la'avels
around the globe. He also served as counselor and foreign secretary to the Korean Special Mission to the United
States. Lowell developed an interest in astronomy in middle age, and he founded an observatory in Flagstaff,
Arizona, to study the Solar System, especially Mars. He was enamored with the prospect of life on the red planet
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andtheorizedthati s"canals"werett-,eproductofintelligentlife(WilliamGravesHoyt,l_weU and Mar_ [Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 1976] ).
M
Richard C. McCurdy (1909- ), an engineer specializing in petroleum, was associate administrator for orgamza-
tion and management at NASA headquarters, Washington, D.C., 1970-1973, and a consultant to the agency fiom
1973 to 1982.
Nell H. McElroy (1904-1972) became secretary of defense in 1957 and served through 1959. He had previously
been president of Procter & Gamble and returned there in December 1959 to become chairman of the board, tle
served in that position until October 1972, a month before his death.
Walter A. MacNair ( 1901- ) was an electrical engineer who worked with the Bell Telephone Laboratories, 1929-
1952, and the Consolidated Electrodynamics Corporation thereafter.
Robert S. McNamara (1916- ) was secletary ofdetense during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, 1961-
1968. Thereafter, he served as president of the World Bank, where he remained until retirement in 1981..-ks
secretary of defense in 1961 McNamara was intimately involved in the process of approving Project Apollo by the
Kennedy administration. See "McNamara, Robert S(trange)," Current Biography Yearbook 1987, pp. 408-13;John M.
kogsdon, The Dectsion to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo rout the National h_terest (Cambridge, NL_.: MIT Press, 1970).
John W. Mac),, Jr., was chair of the Civil Service Commission during the Kennedy administration. He served as a
member of a study committee in 1961 to ascertain the viability of "contracting out" considerable functions in
aerospace research and development. The 1961 study was kno_a as the _Bell Report" because the chair of the
committee was David E. Bell, director of the Bureau of the Budget.
Frank J. Malina (1912-1981) was a young Ph.D. student at the California Institute of Technology in the mid-1930s,
when he began an aggressive rocket research program to design a high-altitude sounding rocket. Beginning in late
1936 Malina and his colleagues started the static testing of rocket engines in the canyons above the Rose Bowl, with
mixed results, but a series of tests ever_tually led to the development of the WAC Corporal rocket during World
War II. After the war Malina worked with the United Nations and eventually retired to Paris to pursue a career as
an artist. See "Malina, Frank J,," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Gordon Manning was a journalist for several periodicals. He was a staft'_,_ iter for Collier% 1948-1949, and worked
in a series of increasingly responsible positions for Newsweek, 1949-1964. Between 1961 and 1964 he was executive
editor. Thereafter, he worked with television, first as vice president and director of news for CBS, 1964-1972, and
then as executive producer of NBC News, 1975-1978.
Hans Mark (1929- ) became NASA deputy administrator in July 1981. He had previously served as secretary of
the Air Force from July 1979 until February 1981 and as under secretary of the Air Force since 1977. In February
1969 Mark became director of NASA's Ames Research Center in Mountain View, California, where he managed
the center's research and applications efforts in aeronautics, space science, life science, and space technology.
Born in Mannheim, Germany, he came to the United States in 1940, and he became a citizen in 1945. He received
a Ph.D. in physics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1954. Upon leaving NASA he became Chan-
cellor of the University of Texas at Austin. See _Mark, Hans," Deputy Administrator files, NASA Historical Refer-
ence Collection.
Robert P. Mayo (1916- ) was an economist and President Richard Nixon's first director of the Bureau of the
Budget. On July 1, 1970, when the Bureau of the Budget was replaced with the Office of Management and Budget,
Mayo was shifted to the White House as a presidential assistant. In July 1970 he left Washington to assume the
presidency of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago ("Mayo, Robert P(orter)," Current Biography 1970,
pp. 282-84).
John B. Medaris (1902-1990) was a major general commanding the Army Ballistic Missile Agency when T. Keith
Glennan tried to incorporate it into NASA in the late 1950s. He attempted to retain the organization as part of the
Army, but with a series of Department of Defense agreements, the Air Force obtained primacy in space activities,
and Medaris could not succeed in his effort. Medaris also worked with Wernher yon Braun to launch Explorer/in
early 1958. He retired from the Army in 1969 and became an Episcopal priest, later joining an even more conser-
vative Anglican-Catholic church ("Medaris,John Bruce," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection;
John B. Medaris with Arthur Gordon, Countdown for Decision [New York: Pumam, 1960]).
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Ruben F. Mettler (1924- ) was an electronics and engineering company executive who worked for the Hughes
Aircraft Co., 1949-1954; Ramo-Wooldridge Corp., 1955-1958; TRW Space Technology Laboratories, 1958-1965;
and TRW Systems Group, 1965-1968. He became president and chief operating officer of TRW Inc., 1969-1977,
and then TRW chairman of the board and CEO, 1977-1988.
Smart Miller (1927- ) was a research engineer in industry, working with the Chrysler Corporation, 1952-1953,
and the General Electric Co., 1953-1977.
Robert A. Millikan (1868-1953) was a Nobel Prize-winning physicist at the California Institute of Technology
(Caltech). Best known for his research on cosmic rays, he also built Caltech into a world-class educational and
scientific institution, over which he presided until his retirement in 1946. For more information on Millikan, see
Robert H. Kargon, The Rise of Robert Millikan: Portrait of a Life in American Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornetl University
Press, 1982) ; The Autobiography of Robert A. Millikan (New York: Pre ntice-Hall, 1950).
Wilbur D, Mills (1909-1992) (D-AR) was a member of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1939 to 1977. He
served as chair of the powerful House Ways and Means Committee, 1957-1975 (obituary in New York Times, May 3,
1992, p. 153).
L. Arthur Minnieh, Jr. (1918- ), was assistant staff secretary in the White House, 1953-1960. A historian by
training, he also served on the faculty of Lafayette College before 1953. After leaving the White House, he served
as the executive secretary of UNESCO.
Oskar Morgemtern (1902- ) was a German-born and -trained economist. He came to the United States in 1925
and worked at Princeton University after 1938. He founded and headed Mathematica, Inc., which provided eco-
nomic analyses to government and industry.
Frank E. "Ted" Moss (1906-) (D-UT) was first elected to the Senate in 1958 and served until 1977. Between 1972
and 1977 he served as chair of the Senate Space Committee.
George E. Mueller (1918-) was associate administrator for the Office of Manned Space Flight at NASA headquar-
ters, 1963-1969, where he responsible for overseeing the completion of Project Apollo and for beginning the
development of the Space Shuttle. He moved to the General Dynamics Corporation, as senior vice president in
1969, and remained until 1971. He then became president of the Systems Development Corporation, 1971-1980,
and then its chairman and chief executive officer, 1981-1983. See "Mueller, George E.," biographical file, NASA
Historical Reference Collection.
Edmund Muskie (1914- ) (D-ME) served in the U.S. Senate, 1959-1981.
Dale D. Myers (1922- ) served as NASA deputy administrator from October 1986 until 1989. He had previously
been under secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy from 1977 to 1979. From 1974 to 1977 he was vice presi-
dent at Rockwell International and president of the North American Aircraft Group in El Segundo, California. He
was also the associate administrator for the Office of Manned Space Flight at NASA from 1970 to 1974. From 1969
to 1970 Myers served as vice president/program manager of the Space Shuttle Program at Rockwell International.
He was also vice president and program manager of the Apollo Command/Service Module Program at North
American-Rockwell from 1964 to 1969. After leaving NASA in 1989 Myers returned to private industry. See "Myers,
Dale D.," Deputy Administrator files, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
John E. Naugle (1923- ) was trained as a physicist at the University of Minnesota and began his career studying
cosmic rays by launching balloons to high altitudes. In 1959 be joined NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center in
Greenbelt, Maryland, where he developed projects to study the magnetosphere. In 1960 he took charge of NASA's
fields and particles research program. He also served as NASA's associate administrator for the Office of Space
Science and as the agency's chief scientist before his retirement in 1981. See John E. Naugle, First AmongEqt;als:
The Selection of NASA Space Science Experiments (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4215, 1991).
Richard G. Neustadt (1919- ) was a Harvard University-trained political scientist who made a career in public
policy analysis. He served for a time (1946-1953) with the federal government in Washington and thereafter in
academia at Columbia University (1954-1964) and Harvard University (since 1964). He was all informal advisor to
presidents and their associates between the 1940s and the 1980s. See Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May,
Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York: Free Press, 1986).
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Isaac Newton (1642-1727) created a scientific explanation of the workings of the universe that held sway until the
twentieth century. Based on the concept of gravity and three laws of motion that related to it, the Newtonian
construct placed astronomy and physics on a firm mathematical foundation. Born in England, Newton was edu-
cated at Trinity College in Cambridge. As a relatively young man, by 1667 he had developed his ideas on universal
gravitation and its consequences, the nature of white light, and the calculus, In the same year, he was elected a
fellow of Trinity College and two years later succeeded to the chair of his mentor Isaac Barrow. In 1696 Newton was
named warden of the mint and became its master in 1699. While still officially associated with Cambridge, his work
at the mint effectively ended Newton's academic career (James R. Ne_anan, ed., The World of Mathematic._ [New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1956], pp. 256-78; Lloyd Motz and Jefferson Hane Weaver, The Story of Physic.s [New
York: Avon Books, 1992]).
Kenneth D. Nichols ( 1907- ) worked on the Manhattan Project in World War II and served in a variety of special
weapons activities with the Department of Defense. In the early 1950s he was involved in directing the guided
missile research and development effort for the secretary of defense. He also held posts with the Atomic Ener_,
Commission and with industry.
Richard M. Nixon (1913-1994) was president of the United States between January 1969 and August 1974. Early in
his presidency Nixon appointed a Space Task Group under the direction of Vice President Spiro T. Agnew to
assess the future of spaceflight for the nadon. Its report recommended a vigorous post-Apollo exploration prO-
gram culminating in a human expedition to Mars. Nixon did not approve this plan, but he did decide in favor of
building one element of it, the Space Shuttle, which was approved on January 5, 1972. See Roger D. Launius,
"NASA and the Decision to Build the Space Shuttle, 1969-72," The Hist_man 57 (Autumn 1994): 17-34.
HermannJ. Oberth (1894-1989) is one of the three recognized fathers of spaceflight. A Transylvanian by birth but
a German in his family heritage, he was educated at the Universities of Klausenburg, Munich, Gottingen, and
Heidelberg. His doctoral dissertation being rejected because it did not fit into any established scientific discipline,
he published it privately as Die Rakete zu den Planetenrdumen ( The Rocket into Interplanetary Space) in 1923. It and its
expanded version, titled Ways to ,Spaceflight (1929), set forth the basic principles of spaceflight and direc dy inspired
many subsequent spaceflight pioneers, including Wernher von Braun. See his "Hermann Oberth: From My Life,"
Astronautic._,June 1959, pp. 38-39, 100-106; Frank Winter, Rockets into Space (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1990), pp. 17-25; Helen B. Waiters, Hermann Oberth: Father of Space Travel (New _brk: Macnfillan, 1962).
Charles R. O'Dell ( 1937- ) was trained as an astronomer at the University of Wisconsin and was project scientist
for the Hubble Space Telescope project, 1972-1983, at the Marshall Space Flight Center. He has been on the
astronomy faculty" at several universities, including the University, of Houston where he is Buchanan Professor of
Astrophysics.
Hugh Odishaw (1916-1984) became assistant to the director of the National Bureau of Standards from 1946 to
1954, served as executive director of the U.S. National Committee for the International Geophysical Year from
1954 to 1965, and then became the executive secretary of the Division of Physical Sciences in the National Acad-
emy of Sciences from 1966 to 1972.
Thomas E (Tip) O'Neill (1912-1994) (D-M_A) served in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1953 until 1987.
For much of his later service in the House, he was speaker.
Don Richard Ostrander (1914-1972) was a career Air Force officer who became a major general in 1958. He was
deputy commander of the Advanced Research Projects Agency in 1959 and became director of NASA's launch
vehicle programs in late 1959 as NASA began taking over responsibility for the Saturn program. He left NASA in
1961 and retired from the Air Force in 1965 as vice commander of the Ballistic Systems Division, Air Force Systems
Command, to become vice president for planning of the Bell Aero Systems Corporation ("Don Ricl-,ard Ostrander,"
biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection).
Carl EJ. Overhage (1910- ) earned his Ph.D. in physics at the California Institute of Technology in 1937 and
served as acting director of research for Technicolor Motion Picture Corp. until 1941, when he joined the staffof
the radiation laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) from 1942 to 1945. After a stint with
Eastman Kodak from 1946 to 1954, he joined the Lincoln Laboratories of MIT, becoming its director from 1957 to
196,t, after which he served as a professor of engineering.
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Thomas O. Paine (1921-1992) was appointed deputy administrator of NASA on January 31, 1968. Upon the retire-
ment of James E. Webb on October 8, 1968, he was named acting administrator of NASA. He was nominated as
NASA's third administrator March 5, 1969, which was confirmed by the Senate on March 20, 1969. During his
leadership the first seven Apollo manned missions were flown, in which twenty astronauts orbited the earth, four-
teen traveled to the Moon, and four walked on its surface. Paine resigned from NASA on September 15, 1970, and
he returned to the General Electric Co. in New York City as vice president and executive of the Power Generation
Group, where he remained until 1976. In 1985 the White House chose Paine as chair of a National Commission on
Space to prepare a report on the future of space exploration. Since leasing NASA Fifteen years earlier Paine had
been a tireless spokesperson for an expansive view of what should be done in space. The Paine Commission took
most of a year to prepare its report, largely because it solicited public input in hearings throughout the United
States. The commission's report, P/0neer/ng the SpaceFrontieg, was published in a lavishly illustrated, glossy format in
May 1986. It espoused a "pioneering mission for 21st-century America"--"to lead the exploration and develop-
ment of the space frontier, advancing science, technology, and enterprise, and building institutions and systems
that make accessible vast new resources and support human settlements beyond Earth orbit, from the highlands of
the Moon to the plains of Mars." The report also contained a "Declaration for Space," which included a rationale
for exploring and settling the Solar System and outlined a long-range space program for the United States.
Richard S. Perkin (1906- ) was co-founder and president of Perkin-Elmer Corp., 1937-1960, and thel_ chairman
of the board.
James A. Perkins (1911- ) was vice president of the Carnegie Corporation from 1951 to 1963 and president of
Cornell University from 1963 to 1969. He served on the Kimpton Committee of 1959 to assess the space effort.
Rocco Petrone (1926- ) was heavily involved at NASA with the development of the Saturn V booster used to
launch Apollo spacecraft to the Moon in the 1960s and early 1970s. He worked at the Marshall Space Flight Center
and became its director in 1973. He left Marshall in 1974 for a position at NASA headquarters in Washington,
D.C., in 1974, and he retired from the agency in 1975. He then became president and chief executive officer of the
National Center for Resource Recovery.
Samuel C. Phillips (1921-1990) was trained as an electrical engineer at the University of Wyoming, but he also
participated in the Civilian Pilot Training Program during World War II. Upon his graduation in 1942 Phillips
entered the Army infantry but soon transferred to the air component. As a young pilot, he served with distinction
in the Eighth Air Force in England----earning two distinguished flying crosses, eight air medals, and the French
croix de guerre--but he quickly became interested in aeronautical research and development. He became in-
volved in the development of the incredibly successful B-52 bomber in the early 1950s and headed the Minuteman
intercontinental ballistic missile program in the latter part of the decade. In t964, by this time an Air Force
general, Phillips was lent to NASA to head the Apollo moon landing program, which, of course, was unique in its
technological accomplishment. He went back to the Air Force in the 1970s and commanded the Air Force Systems
Command prior to his retirement in 1975. See _Gen. Samuel C. Phillips of Wyoming," C_mgressionalRe_ord, August
3, 1973, S-15689; Rep.John Wold, "Sam Phillips: One Who Led Us to the Moon," NASA Activities, May/June 1990,
pp. 18-19; obituary in New York Times, February 1, 1990, p. D1.
William H. Picketing (1910- ) obtained his bachelor's and master's degrees in electrical engineering and then a
Ph.D. in physics from the California Institute of Technology before becoming a professor of electrical engineering
there in 1946. In i944 he organized the electronics efforts at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) to support
guided missile research and development, becoming project manager for Corporal, the first operational missile
thatJPL developed. From 1954 to 1976 he was director of JPL, which developed the first U.S. satellite (Explorer I),
the first successful U.S. cislunar space probe ( Pioneer IV), the Mariner flights to Venus and Mars in the early to mid-
1960s, the Ranger photographic missions to the Moon in 1964-65, and the Surveyor lunar landings of 1966-1967
("William H. Pickering," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection).
William Proxmire (1915- ) (D-WI) served in the U.S. Senate between 1957 and 1989.
Claudius Ptolemy (ft. 127-145) of Alexandria, Egypt, was responsible for the development of the "Ptolemaic Sys-
tem" of understanding the universe. It placed the Earth at its center with the planets, Moon, Sun, and stars orbit-
ing overhead. Ptolemy based his system on observations of celestial bodies and the application of mathematical
models that adequately explained the movements he observed. He also catalogued 1,022 stars (Owen T. Gingerich,
gen. ed., The Carnbhdgt. GeneralHistory of Astronomy, Vol. 1 [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984]).
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Allen E. Puckett (1919- ) earned his Ph.D. at the California Institute of Technology in 1949 and went to work for
Hughes Aircraft Co. that year, becoming its executive vice president from 1965 to 1977 and its president thereaf-
ter. He served as a member of the Nixon transition team's Task Force on Space, which v,as led by Dr. Charles
Townes, to make recommendations on the new administration's efforts in aerospace.
Edward M. Purcell (1912- ) was a professor of physics at Harvard University and also served on the president's
Scientific Advisory Committee from 1957 to 1960 and 1962 to 1965. He had been co-winner of the Nobel Prize in
physics in 1952 (with Felix Bloch) for the discovery of nuclear magnetic resonance in solids.
Donald L. Putt (190.%1988) was a career U.S. Air Force officer who specialized in the management of aerospace
research and development activities. Trained as an engineer, he entered the Army Air Corps in 1928 and worked
in a series of increasingly responsible posts at the Air Materiel Command and general headquarters of the ,Mr
Force. From 1948 to 1952 he was director of research and development for the Air Force, and he was first _ce
commander and then commander of the Air Research and Development Command between 1952 and 1954.
Thereafter until his retirement in 1958, he served as deputy chief of the development staff at Air Force headquar-
ters.
Donald A. Quarles (1894-1959) was a depu W secretary of defense between 1957 and 1959.Just after World War II
he had been a vice president first at Western Electric Co. and later at Sandia National Laboratories, but in 1953 he
accepted the position of assistant secretary of defense (research and development). He was also secretary of the
Air Force between 1955 and 1957.
Ronald Reagan ( 1911- ) was elected president of the United States in 1980 and assumed office in January 1981;
he served until 1989. During his presidency the maiden flight of the Space Shuttle took place. In 1984 he man-
dated the construction of an orbital space station. Reagan declared that "America has always been greatest when
we dared to be great. We can reach for greatness again. We can follow our dreams to distant stars, living and
v'orking in space for peaceflll, economic, and scientific gain. Tonight I am directing NASA to develop a perma-
nently manned space station and to do it within a decade." See Syl_'ia D. Fries, "2001 to 1994: Political En_fron-
ment and the Design of NASA's Space Station System," Technology and Culture 29 (July 1988) : 568-93.
Sally K. Ride (1951- ) was the first American woman to fly in space. She was chosen as an astronaut in 1978 and
served as a mission specialist for STS-7 (1983) and for STS41G (1984). She was also a member of the Presidential
Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident in 1986, and from 1986 to 1987 she chaired a NASA task
force that prepared a report on the fltture of the civilian space program, tided Leadership and America's Future in
Space (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987). Ride resigned from NASA in 1987 to join the
Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University. She left Stanford in 1989 to assume the
directorship of the California Space Institute, part of the University of California at San Diego. See "Ride, Sally K.,"
biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
Louis N. Ridenour ( 1911- ) received his Ph.D. in physics from the California Institute of Technology in 1936, and
he began work at Princeton University. In 1938 he moved to the University of Pennsylvania, where he remained
until 1947. He then went to the University of Illinois, but he left there in 1951 to become vice president of the
International Telemeter Corp. He also served in several positions v4th scientific organizations in the federal gov-
ernment, most significandy as chief scientist with the U.S. Air Force in the early 1950s.
Walter O. Roberts ( 1915-1990) was an astronomer at the University of Colorado's High Altitude Observatory. He
was also instrumental in the creation of the National Center tot Atmospheric Research in 1960, and he directed
the program on food, climate, and the world's future for the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1974-1981.
lie was heavily involved in the debate over "nuclear winter" and the possibili_, of the "Greenhouse Effect" on the
Earth in the 1980s. See "Roberts, Walter Orr," Current Biography }_arbook 1990, p. 660.
Nelson A. Rockefeller (1909-1979) was _4ce president of the United States from 1974 to 1977. He had previously
been the Republican governor of New _brk, 1958-1973 (obituary in New York TzmeL January 26, 1979, p. 27).
William P. Rogers ( 191% ) was chair of the presidentiany mandated blue ribbon commission investigating the
Challengeraccident in January 1986. It found that the failure had resuhed from a poor engineering decision, an O-
ring used to seal joints in the solid rocket booster that v_s susceptible to failure at lov, temperatures, introduced
innocently enough years earlier. Rogers kept the commission's analysis on that technical level, and he
documented the problems in excepti_mal detail. The commission, after some prodding by Nobel Prize-winning
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scientist Richard E Feynman, did a credible job of grappling with the technologically diffilcult issues associated
with the accident. See Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Vol. I (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing office,June 6, 1986).
H.E. Ro_ was one of the leaders of the British Interplanetary Society from the time of its inception in 1933. Ross
wrote a 1939 article in the society's journal that outlined a method of accomplishing a lunar mission. The effort
leading to the article had begun in London in February 1937 when the British Interplanetary Society formed a
technical committee to conduct feasibility studies.
Herbert J. Rowe (1924- ) was NASA associate administrator for external affairs, 1975-1978. He also worked with
several high-technology industrial firms, including the Aerovax Corporation.
Richard B. Russell, Jr. (1897-1971) (D-CA), was a U.S. Senator from 1933 until his death. He was an influential
force in the Senate, and he served as chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 1951-1969.
Cornelius Ryan was an influential journalist who worked for Col//er's magazine in the 1950s and v-as in large
measure responsible for the issues of the magazine devoted to space that appeared between 1952 and 1955. He
became best known for his World War II trilogy: The LongestDay:June 6, 1944 (1959); A Bridge TooFar ( 1974); and
The Last Battle (1966).
Robert M. Salter, Jr. ( 1920- ), was a physicist who worked with North American Aviation, 1946-1948; the Rand
Corporation, 1948-1954; Lockheed Aircraft Co., 1954-1959; Quantatron, Inc., 1960-1962; and Xerad, Inc., since
1962. He was responsible for much of the early thinking at Rand on the possibility of an artificial Earth-orbiting
satellite.
Leverett Saltonstall (1892-1979) (R-MA) was governor of Massachusetts from 1939 to 1944, when he won election
to the U.S. Senate. He served in the Senate from then until 1967 and became one of its Republican leaders.
Giovanni Schiaparelli (1835-1910) was an Italian astronomer and senator of the Kingdom of Italy. He studied
astronomy in Berlin. beginning in 1854 under Johann E Encke. Two years later he was appointed assistant ob-
server at Pulkovo Observatory, Russia. In 1860 he returned to Italy as an observer at Brera Observatory in Milan.
There he made controversial observations of Martian canali, or straight lines, that set off speculation about the
possibility of intelligent life who had constructed them. He also discovered the asteroid Hesperia and correctly
calculated the Perseid meteor showers (Frederick I. Ordway III, "The Legacy of Schiaparelli and Lowell,"Journalof
the British Interplanetary Society, January 1986, pp. 18-22).
Bernard A. Schriever (1910- ) earned a B.S. in architectural engineering from Texas A&M in 1931 and was
commissioned in the Army Air Corps Reserve in 1933 after completing pilot training. Following broken service,
he received a regular commission in 1938. He earned an M.A. in aeronautical engineering from Stanford in 1942
and then flew sixty-three combat missions in B-17s with the 19th Bombardment Group in the Pacific Theater
during World War II. In 1954 he became commander of the Western Development Division (soon renamed the
Air Force Ballistic Missile Division), and from 1959 to 1966 he was commander of its parent organization, the Air
Research and Development Command, renamed the Air Force Systems Command in 1961. As such, he presided
over the development of the Atlas, Thor, and Titan missiles, which served not only as military weapon
systems but 'also as boosters for NASA's space missions. In developing these missiles, Schriever instituted a systems
approach, whereby the various components of the Atlas and succeeding missiles underwent simultaneous design
and testing as part of an overall "weapons system." Schriever also introduced the notion of concurrency, which has
been given various interpretations but essentially allowed the components of the missiles to enter production
while still in the testing phase, thereby speeding up development. He retired as a general in 1966. See Jacob
Neufeld, "Bernard A. Schriever: Challenging the Unknown," Makers of the United States AirForce (Washington, DC:
Office of Air Force History, 1986), pp. 281-306; Robert L. Perry, "Atlas, Thor .... "in Eugene M. Emme, ed., A
History of Rocket Technolog_ (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1964), pp. 144-160; Robert A. Divine, The
Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 25.
Glenn T. Seaborg (1912- ) earned a Ph.D. in physics from the University of California at Berkeley in 1937 and
worked on the Manhattan Project in Chicago during World War II. Afterward, he became associate director of
Berkeley's Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, where he and associates isolated several ta'ansuranic elements. For this
work, Seaborg received the Nobel Prize in 1951. He also served as chair of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1961-
1971, and thereafter returned to the faculty of the University of California at Berkeley. See David Petechuk, "Glenn
T. Seaborg," in EmilyJ. McMurray, et al., eds., Notable Twentieth-Century Scientists (New York: Gale Research Inc.,
1995), pp. 1803-1806.
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Robert C. Seamans,Jr. ( 1918- ), had been involved in aerospace issues since he completed his Sc.D. degree at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1951. He _,ras on the faculty at MIT's department of aeronautical
engineering between 1949 and 1955, when he joined the Radio Corporation of America as manager of the Air-
borne Systems Laboratory. In 1958 he became the chief engineer of the Missile Electronics and Control Division
and joined NASA in 1960 as associate administrator. In December 1965, he became NASA deputy administrator.
He left N?tA in 1968 and became secretary of the Air Force in 1969, serving until 1973. Seamans was president of
the National Academy of Engineering from May 1973 to December 1974, when he became the first administrator
of the new Energy Research and Development Administration. He returned to MIT in 1977, becoming dean of its
School of Engineering in 1978. In 1981 he was elected chair of the board of trustees of Aerospace Corp. ("Robert
C. Seamans,Jr.," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection; Robert C. Seamans,Jr., ,Aiming at Targets
[Beverly, NL_k: Memoirs Unlimited, 1994] ).
Alan B. Shepard, Jr. ( 1923- ), was a member of the first group of seven astronauts in 1959 chosen to participate
in Project Mercury. He was the first American in space, piloting Mercury-Redstone 3 (Freedom 7) and was backup
pilot for Mercury-Atlas 9. He was subsequendy grounded because of an inner ear ailment until May 7, 1969 (dur-
ing which time he served as chief of the Astronaut Office). Upon returning to flight status Shepard
commanded Apollo 14, and in June 1971, he resumed duties as chief of the Astronaut Office. He retired from
NASA and the U.S. Navy on August 1, 1974, to join the Marathon Construction Company of Houston, Texas, as
partner and ch airman. See Alan Shepard and Deke Slayton, Moonshot: The Inside Story _f A nwrica's Race to the Moon
(New York: Turner Publishing, Inc., 1994); The Astronauts Themselves, _¢_ S_,ea (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1962).
George P. Shultz (1920- ) served as director of the Office of Management and Budget after 1970, dunng the
Nixon administration. Before that he had been Nixon's secretary of labor. During the Reagan administration,
1981-1989, Shultz served as secretary of state ("Shultz, George P(ratt)," Current Biography Yearbook I988, pp. 525-
30).
Albert E Siepert ( 1915- ) was a longtime federal employee who entered federal service in 1937 and moved from
being executive officer for the National Institutes of Health to NASA in 1958. In 1959 he was NASA's chief nego-
tiator in the transfer of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency to the space agency from his position as director of
business administration, and in 1963 he moved to the deputy director position at the Kennedy Space Center in
Florida. In 1969 Siepert left NASA to become a program associate at the University of Michigan's Institute for
Social Research ("Albert F. Siepert," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection).
Milton A. Silvelra ( 1929- ) was a longtime NASA employee, who worked at the agency's Lewis Research Center,
1955-1963, and at the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, 1963-1967. He also served as deputy manager of the
orbiter project at theJohnson Space Center, 1967-1981; assistant to the deputy administrator at NASA, 1981-1983;
and NASA chief engineer, 1983-1986.
Abe Silverstein (1908- ), who earned a B.S. in mechanical engineering (1929) and an M.E. (1934) from Rose
Polytechnic Institute, was a longtime NACA manager. He had worked as an engineer at the Langley Aeronautical
Laboratory between 1929 and 1943 and had moved to the Lewis Laboratory (later, Research Center) in a succes-
sion of management positions, the last (1961-1970) as director of the center. Interestingly, in 1958 Case Institute of
Technology bad awarded him an honorary doctorate. When T. Keith Glennan arrived at NASA, Silverstein was on
a rotational assignment to the Washington headquarters as director of the Office of Space Flight Development
(later, Office of Space Flight Programs) from the position of associate director at Lewis, which he had held since
1952. During his first tour at Lewis he had directed investigations leading to significant improvements in recipro-
cating and early turbojet engines. At NASA headquarters he helped create and direct the efforts leading to the
spaceflights of Project Mercury and establish the technical basis for the Apollo program. As Lewis's director he
oversaw a major expansion of the center and the development of the Centaur launch vehicle. He retired from
NASA in 1970 to take a position with Republic Steel Corp. On the career of Silverstein, see Virginia P. Dawson,
Engines and Innovation: Lewis Laboratory and American lqopulsion Technology (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4306, 1991),
passim; "Abe Silverstein," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
S. Fred Singer (1924- ), a physicist at the University of Maryland, proposed a Minimum Orbital Unmanned
Satellite of the Earth (MOUSE) at the fourth Congress of the International Astronautics Federation in Zurich,
Switzerland, in the summer of 1953. It had been based on two years of previous study conducted under the aus-
pices of the British Interplanetary Society, which had built on the post-war research of the V-2 rocket. The Upper
Atmosphere Rocket Research Panel at White Sands discussed Singer's plan in April 1954. In May Singer presented
his MOUSE proposal at the Hayden Planetarium's fourth Space Travel Symposium. MOUSE was the first satellite
proposal widely discussed in nongovernmental engineering and scientific circles, although it never was adopted.
See "Singer, S. Fred," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
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Maurice H. Stans (1908- ) was a longtime Republican in Washington. He served in several positions with the
Eisenhower administration, notably as deputy director of the Bureau of the Budget between 1957 and 1958 and
then as its director from 1958 to 1961. In 1969 he was appointed secretary of commerce for the Nixon administra-
tion and served until 1972. He was finance director of the 1972 Nixon re-election campaign and pleaded guilty in
1975 to five misdemeanor charges of violating campaign laws ("Maurice H. Stans," biographical file, NASA His-
torical Reference Collection).
Frank Stanton (1908- ) earned a Ph.D. from Ohio State University in 1935 and went on to become a business
executive, serving most notably as president of CBS, Inc., from 1946 to 1971 and its vice chairman from 1971 to
1973.
Edward V. Stearns (1922- ) was trained in physics at the University of California at Berkeley and worked in several
research positions in industry and universities. He was a physicist with the Rand Corporation, 1949-1954, and
assistant chief engineer with the Lockheed Missile and Space Co. after 1954.
John C. Stennis (1901-1995) (D-MS) was elected to the Senate in 1947 and served until 1989. He was a member of
the Appropriations, Armed Services, and Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committees in the early 1960s. In 1988
NASA's National Space Technology Laboratories in Mississippi became the John C. Stennis Space Center in his
honor ("John C. Stennis," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection).
Ted Stevens (1923- ) (D-AK) was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1968 and has served to the present.
Lewis L. Strauss (1915-1974) was chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission from 1953 to 1958 and was secre-
tary of commerce from 1958 to 1959. He also held the rank of admiral in the U.S. Navy.
Stuart Symington (1901-1988) (D-MO) served in the Senate between 1953 and 1977. He entered government in
1945 when his fellow Missourian, Harry S. Truman, appointed him chair of the Surplus Property Board. He later
served Truman as secretary of the Air Force and was an outspoken advocate of building a strong aerospace pres-
ence. As such, he repeatedly charged the Eisenhower administration with balancing the budget at the expense of
national security and was one of its most vocal critics after the launch of Sputnik, predicting what proved to be a
fallacious missile gap between the United States and the Soviet Union. He left the Senate in 1977 (New York Times,
December 15, 1988, p. D26; Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge: The U.S. Response to the Soviet Satellite [New York:
Oxford University Press, 1993], pp. 20, 43, 125, 178-183).
Olin ("Tiger") E. Teague (1910-1981) (D-TX) was first elected to the House of Representatives in 1946 and served
in each succeeding Congress through the 95th (1977-1979). He was appointed to the new Science and Astronau-
tics Committee in the 86th Congress (1959-1961).
Charles H. Townes ( 1915- ) was trained in physics at Duke University and specialized in the development of laser
and maser technology. He first worked for the Bell Telephone Laboratories, and in 1948 he joined the faculty of
Columbia University, leaving there in 1961 to move to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and on to the
University of California. For his work on the maser, Townes received the Nobel Prize in 1964. See David E. Newton,
"Charles H. Townes," in EmilyJ. McMurray, et al., eds., Notable Twentieth-Century Scientists (New York: Gale Research
Inc., 1995), pp. 2042-44.
Richard H. Truly (1937- ) was a career naval aviator who split time between naval assignments and NASA in the
1960s. In 1965 he was selected to participate in the Air Force's Manned Orbiting Laboratory program and trans-
ferred to NASA as an astronaut in August 1969. He served as capsule communicator for all three Skylab missions
in 1973 and the Apollo-Soyuz mission in 1975, He was also involved in the Space Shuttle flight test program, and
he piloted Columbia (STS-2) in 1981 and Challenger (STS-8) in 1983. He became NASA's associate administrator for
the Office of Space Flight on February 20, 1986, leading the effort to return to flight following the Challenger
accident. He served as NASA administrator between 1989 and 1992, and he then became vice president and
director of the Georgia Tech Research Institute, Georgia Institute of Technology, in Atlanta ('q'ruly, Richard H.,"
NASA Administrator Folders, NASA Historical Reference Collection).
H.S. Tsien (1909- ) was a Chinese national who received a Ph.D. in aeronautics in 1939 from the California
Institute of Technology (Caltech) and worked on the development of rocket technology at his alma mater through
World War II. He was on the faculty of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1946 to 1949, when he
returned to Caltech. In the 1950s his loyalty to democratic institutions was questioned, and he was deported from
the United States to the People's Republic of China. There, he was largely responsible for the development of
ICBM rocket technology, especially the "Long March" launch vehicle.
767
Konstantin E. Tsiolkovskiy (1857-1935) is one of the three recognized pioneers of spaceflight. A schoolteacher in
Kaluga, Russia, Tsiolovskiy theorized about the flight of rockets and spacecraft, calculated many of the equations
required for the successful launch of rockets, and speculated on the development of space vehicles and perma-
nent space colonies. See Arkady Kosmodemyansky, Konstantin Tsiolkovskiy (Moscow, USSR: Nauka, 1985).
Nathan E Twining (1897-1982) was a career pilot in the Army and the Air Force, commanding the 13th Air Force
in the Pacific, the 15th Air Force in Europe, and then the 20th Air Force again in the Pacific during World War If.
He became chief of staff of the Air Force in 1953 and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1957 to 1960
(DonaldJ. Mrozek, "Nathan E Twining: New Dimensions, a New Look," in John L. Frisbee, ed., Makers of the United
States AirForce [Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1987], pp. 257-80).
Max Valier (1893-1930) was an early advocate of the use of rockets for spaceflight. A German, he had been edu-
cated in engineering in Berlin, and as a young man in the 1920s he began experimenting with rockets with the
"Verein fur Raumschiffahrt" (VfR), the Society for Spaceship Travel of which Wernher yon Braun and Hermann
Oberth were prominent members. He was also interested in using rockets for propelling ground vehicles, and he
built a rocket-powered automobile. He died in a crash of this car in 1930 (I. Essers, Max Valier: A Pioneer of Space
Travel [Washington, DC: NASA "IT F-664, 1976]).
James A. Van Allen (1914- ) was a pathbreaking astrophysicist best known for his work in magnetospheric physics.
Van Allen's January 1958 Explorer I experiment established the existence of radiation belts--later named for the
scientist--that encircled the Earth, representing the opening of a broad research field. Extending outward in the
direction of the Sun approximately 40,000 miles, as well as stretching out with a trail away from the Sun to approxi-
mately 370,000 miles, the magnetosphere is the area dominated by Earth's strong magnetic field. See James A. Van
Allen, Or/g/ns of Maguetospheric Physics (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1983); David E. Newton,
"James A. Van Allen," in EmilyJ. McMurray, et al., eds., Notable Twentieth-Century Scientists (New York: Gale Research
Inc., 1995), pp. 2070-72.
Cyrus R. Vance (1917- ) had a long career as a senior government official in various Democratic administrations.
He had been general counsel for the Department of Defense during the Kennedy administration of the early
1960s and was also secretary of the Army from 1962 to 1964. He was deputy secretary of defense from 1964 to 1967.
He served as secretary of state for President Jimmy Carter in the latter half of the 1970s ('Vance, Cyrus R[oberts] ,"
Current Biography 1977, pp. 408-11).
Jules Verne (1828-1905) was one of the leading writers of his time, as well as one of the founders of the literary
genre of science fiction. He described in his novels the possibility of spaceflight, the use of submarines for travel
beneath the ocean, and a variety of other visionary technologies that were realized in the twentieth century (I.O.
Evans, Ju/es Verne and His Work [New York: Twayne, 1966] ).
Alan T. Waterman (1892-1967) was the first director of the National Science Foundation (NSF), from its founding
in 1951 until 1963. Waterman received his Ph.D. in physics from Princeton University in 1916; he then served with
the Army's Science and Research Division in World War I, on the faculty of Yale University in the interwar years,
with the War Department's Office of Scientific Research and Development in World War II, and with the Office of
Naval Research between 1946 and 1951. He and NASA leaders contended over control of the scientific projects to
be undertaken by the space agency, with Waterman's NSF being used as an advisory body in the selection of space
experiments. See "Waterman, First NSF Head, Dies at 75," Science 158 (8 December 1967): 1293; Norriss S.
Hetherington, "Winning the Initiative: NASA and the U.S. Space Science Program," Prologue: The Journal of the
National Archives 7 (Summer 1975): 99-108; John E. Naugle, First Among Equals: The Selection of NASA Space Science
Experiments (Washington, DC: NASA SPat215, 1991).
James E. Webb (1906-1992) was NASA administrator between 1961 and 1968. Previously, he had been an aide to a
congressman in New Deal Washington, an aide to Washington lawyer Max O. Gardner, and a business executive
with the Sperry Corporation and the Kerr-McGee Oil Co. He had also been director of the Bureau of the Budget
between 1946 and 1950 and under secretary of state from 1950 to 1952 (W. Henry Lambright, Powering Apollo:
James E. Webb of NASA [Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995] ).
R.S. Wehner (1915- ) was a research scientist with the Radio Corporation of America, 1943-1945; the Airborne
Instrument Laboratory, 1945-1948; the Rand Corporation, 1948-1951; and the Hughes Aircraft Co., 1951-1959.
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Carat w. Weinberger (1917- ), a longtime Republican government official, was a senior member of the Nixon,
Ford, and Reagan administrations. For Nixon he was deputy director (1970-1972) and director (1972-1976) of the
Office of Management and Budget. In this capacity, had a leading role in shaping the direction of NASA's major
effort of the 1970s, the development of a reusable Space Shuttle. For Reagan he served as secretary of defense,
where he also oversaw the use of the Shuttle in the early 1980s for the launching of classified Department of
Defense payloads into orbit. See "Weinberger, Caspar W(illard)," Curn, ntBiogTaphy 1973, pp. 428-30.
H.G, Wells (1866-1946) was a noted futurist and one of the founders of the literary genre of science fiction. His
novels described a future idled with technology, some of it terrifying, and contact with extraterrestrial beings,
much of it disastrous (Lovat Dickson, H.G. Wells: His Turbulent Life [New York: Atheneum, 1969]).
Edward C. Welsh ( 1909- ) had a long career in various private and public enterprises. He had served as legislative
assistant to Senator Stuart Symington (D-MO), 1953-1961, and was the executive secretary of the National Aero-
nautics and Space Council through the 1960s.
Fred L. Whipple (1906- ) was a University of California at Berkeley Ph.D. in astronomy who served on the faculty
of Harvard University. He was involved in efforts in the early 1950s to expand public interest in the possibility of
spaceflight through a series of symposia at the Hayden Planetarium in New York City and articles in Col//er_ maga-
zine. He was also heavily involved in planning for the International Geophysical Year, 1957-1958. As a pathbreaking
astronomer he pioneered research on comets. See Raymond E. Bullock, "Fred Lawrence Whipple," in EmilyJ.
McMurray, et at, eds., Notable Twentieth-Century ,Scientists (New York: Gale Research Inc., 1995). pp. 2167-70.
Jerome B. Wiesner (1915-1994) was science advisor to President John E Kennedy. He had been a faculty member
of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and had served on President Eisenhower's Science Advisory Commit-
tee. During the presidential campaign of 1960 Wiesner had advised Kennedy on science and technology issues
and prepared a transition team report on the subject that questioned the value of human spaceflight. As Kennedy's
science advisor he tussled with NASA over the lunar landing commitment and the method of conducting it. See
Gregg Herken, Cardinal Choices: Science Advice to the President from Hiroshima to SDI (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1992).
Wal_r C. Williams (1919- ) earned a B.S. in aerospace engineering from Louisiana State University in 1939 and
went to work for NACA in 1940, serving as a project engineer to improve the handling, maneuverability, and flight
characteristics of World War II fighters. Following the war he went to what became Edwards Air Force Base to set
up flight tests for the X-l, including the first human supersonic flight by Capt. Charles E. Yeager in October 1947.
He became the founding director of the organization that became the Dryden Hight Research Facility. In Septem-
ber 1959 he assumed the associate directorship of the new NASA space task group at Langley that was created to
carry out Project Mercury. He later became director of operations for the project and then associate director of
NASA's Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, subsequently renamed the Johnson Space Center. In 1963 Will-
iams moved to NASA headquarters as deputy associate administrator of the Office of Manned Space Flight. From
1964 to 1975 he was a vice president for Aerospace Corporation. Then from 1975 to 1982 he served as chief
engineer of NASA, retiring in 1982 ('Walter C. Williams," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collec-
tion).
Charles E. Wilson (1886-1972) was an industrialist with General Electric who worked with the Office of Defense
Mobilization in the 1950s.
John E Yardley (1925- ) was an aerospace engineer who worked with the McDonnell Aircraft Corporation on
several NASA human spaceflight projects from the 1950s and into the 1970s. He also served as NASA associate
administrator for the Office of Space Hight between 1974 and 1981. Thereafter, he returned to McDonnell Dou-
glas as president, 1981-1988 ('Yardley, John E," biographical file, NASA Historical Reference Collection).
Chuck Yeager (1923- ) was the U.S. Air Force test pilot who piloted the X-1 research aircraft on the first super-
sonic powered flight in 1947. Thereafter, he served in several Air Force positions, retiring as a brigadier general.
See Chuck Yeager, Yeager (New York: Bantam Books, 1982).
Herbert E York (1923- ) had been associated with scientific research in support of national defense since World
War II. He was director of the Livermore Radiation Laboratory for the University of California before moving to
the Department of Defense in March 1958 as chief scientist of the Advanced Research Projects Agency. He became
the Department of Defense's director of research and engineering in December 1958 during a Department of
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Defense reorganization; this was the third-ranking civilian office after the secretary and deputy secretary of de-
fense. He served as director of defense research and engineering until 1961. He then moved to the University of
California at San Diego, where he was chancellor and a professor of physics. He also served as a member of the
President's Science Advisory Committee under both Eisenhower and Johnson and was later the chief negotiator
for the comprehensive test ban during the Carter administration ("Dr. Herbert E York," biographical file, NASA
Historical Reference Collection; Herbert E York, Making Weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist's Odyssey from Hitoshima
to Geneva [New York: Basic Books, 1987]).
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